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Het Schild Van Bedrog HET SCHILD VAN BEDROG Lessen van de operationele risico’s van de Britse contra-inlichtingen tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog W.J.P. van Lierop Juli 2015 Masterscriptie Geschiedenis Traject Nieuwste Geschiedenis Scriptiebegeleider: dr. B. von Benda-Beckman Tweede Lezer: dr. S. Kruizinga 1 Inhoudsopgave Inhoudsopgave ....................................................................................................................2 English abstraCt...................................................................................................................3 Inleiding.................................................................................................................................4 Huidige deFinities van het Contra-inliChtingen veld ............................................11 SNOW: het begin van het double-Cross systeem ...................................................17 TATE: de groei van het dubbelspel............................................................................27 TRICYCLE: de bedreigingen van je bondgenoten..................................................42 GARBO: de ‘oFFensieve CapaCiteiten’ van een dubbelspion................................59 ConClusie.............................................................................................................................75 Literatuurlijst ...................................................................................................................81 2 English abstract Scholars are still working on a useable theory of counterintelligence. This is because counterintelligence is made up out of several roles and practices viewed diffently by intelligence agencies. The current theory of counter-intelligence describes a couple of different aspects of the counterintelligence work: gathering information, a defensieve role and an offensive role. To add a usefull insight into the offensive aspect, by example of the running of double agents, this study focusses on running double agents on the operational level. In a history of the operational level of one of the most succesfull double agent operations, the British double-cross system in World War Two, this study analyses the risks and dilemma’s faced by the double agents’ controllers. As chairman of the double-cross comittee, J.C. Masterman wrote a report of the double-cross system in the Second World War and this report is viewed by the counterintelligence community as a handbook for the use of double agents in counterintelligence. The report reads as a straightforward development of the double-cross system, which resulted in British intelligence controlling the whole of the German spy apparatus in Great-Britain. But this straightforwardness is decieving. The history of the operational level teaches us that the development of the double-cross system was far more ad-hoc in nature. The study concludes that describing the double-cross System as a prime example of the offensive aspect of counter-intelligence is incorrect. The double-cross system was, at every point in its development, a defensive operation focussed on protecting allied military operations 3 Inleiding Elke grote gebeurtenis in de geschiedenis van de twintigste eeuw had zijn schaduwzijde. Deze schaduwzijde speelde in elk conflict in de twintigste eeuw een rol. De inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten van de grote natiestaten zorgden met behulp van infiltratie, spionage, en misleiding ervoor dat de intenties en plannen van hun eigen staten geheim blijven en die van de oppositie werden ontrafeld. In de Tweede Wereldoorlog speelden de inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten van de Britse staat een sleutelrol in het omverwerpen van Nazi-Duitsland. Een van de meest succesvolle operaties van de Britse veiligheidsdienst MI5 was het double- cross systeem. Het double-cross systeem is een tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog opgezette operatie die Duitse spionnen die naar de Britse eilanden werden gezonden, moest onderscheppen en neutraliseren. Veel van deze spionnen werden uiteindelijk ‘gekeerd’ waardoor ze voor de Britse dienst gingen werken. Onder het toeziende oog van een aantal case-officers werden deze dubbelagenten in staat gesteld om de Duitsers fictieve en foute informatie te verschaffen om zo de meeste militaire operaties van de geallieerden te laten beschermen door een “bodyguard of lies”.1 De Duitse militaire inlichtingendienst, de Abwehr, werd in 1920 opgericht als onderdeel van het Duitse ministerie van defensie. De dienst was primair gericht op contra-inlichtingen, het tegengaan van militaire spionage in Duitsland. Tot Hitler in 1935 aan de macht kwam in Duitsland was de Abwehr een relatief kleine organisatie en had, zeker op het gebied van Humint (Human intelligence; inlichtingen uit menselijke bron) nog geen voet aan de grond in Groot-Brittannië. De Britse Military Intelligence Service, MI5, en in het bijzonder de contra-inlichtingen afdeling B1, stond er aan het begin van de oorlog eveneens 1 Naar een uitspraak van Winston Churchill: “In war-time truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” 4 weinig florisant voor. De dienst was klein en bijna niet uitgerust om de inmense taak van het opsporen en neutraliseren van Duitse spionnen naar behoren uit te voeren.2 Het double-cross systeem, dat zich gedurende de oorlog ontwikkelde bleek achteraf gezien een enorm succes. Nadat een aantal spionnen succesvol waren gerekruteerd tot dubbelspion, werd een overkoepelend comité opgericht om dagelijkse bezigheden van alle dubbelagenten te monitoren en berichtenverkeer dat naar de Duitse Abwehr werd verstuurd te controleren. Dit comité werd het Twenty Comittee genoemd, naar het Romeinse cijfer voor twintig; XX, twee kruizen, double-cross. Het comité bestond uit een afgevaardigde van iedere tak van de Britse inlichtingendienst en werd voorgezeten door Sir John. C. Masterman, een historicus uit Oxford. Dit comité functioneerde als ‘clearing house’ om de informatie te controleren die via dubbelagenten aan de Duitsers werd gevoed. Masterman stelde direct na de oorlog een rapport op over de werkzaamheen van het double-cross comité en het document kan worden gezien als ‘handleiding’ voor het runnen van dubbelagenten. Masterman benoemde in zijn rapport over het double-cross systeem de sleutelvoorwaarden waar een spion aan moest voldoen om succesvol als dubbelspion gerund te kunnen worden; Dubbelagenten werden alleen gerekruteerd uit spionnen die werden gezonden vanuit Duitsland. Dit had te maken met de carrièrekansen binnen de Abwehr waar de spionnenmeesters zelf hun spionnen rekruteerden en hun eigen carrière dus afhankelijk was van het succes van hun ‘eigen’ agent. Alle dubbelagenten zouden zo goed als het kon het leven moeten leiden dat ze als spion zouden moeten leiden. Zo was het wenselijk dat ze wel de reizen door het land maakten en de vliegvelden zelf bezochten waarover ze moesten rapporteren. Dit om de betrouwbaarheid van de berichten te versterken. Al het radioverkeer stond onder toezicht van controllers en mocht alleen na schriftelijke bevestiging van het comité worden verzonden naar de Abwehr. Een case officier werd toegewezen aan elke specifieke dubbelagent. Deze moest de dubbelagent dagelijks in de gaten houden en vormde 2 Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, The Authorized History of MI5 (Londen 2010) 217- 241. 5 vaak een vertrouwenspersoon van de dubbelagent. Een grondige psychologisch analyse van elke agent was belangrijk. Dit om een vinger aan de pols te houden met betrekking tot de loyaliteit van de dubbelagent. Een snel contact moest gemaakt worden met de Duitsers zodra er zekerheid bestond over de achtergrond van de spion, mogelijke waarschuwingscodes in zijn berichten en de stijl in het zenden van de morse code. Alle zaken omtrent de dubbelagent moest worden gedocumenteerd om later te kunnen analyseren. Het was belangrijk te voorkomen dat men in een later stadium een tegenstrijdig bericht zou zenden. De agent zou zo min mogelijk contact met andere dubbelagenten moeten hebben, om hem zo onafhankelijk mogelijk te houden en het risico op lekken te verkleinen. Een financiële vergoeding voor de dubbelagent was belangrijk. Dit was vaak een percentage van de beloning die dat vanuit Duitsland naar de dubbelagent werd gestuurd om zijn taken uit te voeren. Wanneer het aantal dubbelagenten groeide was kwaliteit altijd belangrijker dan kwantiteit. De belangrijkste dubbelagenten waren vaak personen die laag op de sociale ladder stonden. Zij leverden kleine stukjes informatie welke indirect gebruikt konden worden om een groter beeld te scheppen van de situatie in Groot-Brittannië. Het was belangrijk om bij desinformatie zo dicht mogelijk bij de waarheid te blijven. De desinformatie moest zo betrouwbaar mogelijk zijn om zo het vertrouwen van de Duitsers in ‘hun’ spion geleidelijk op te bouwen en pas op het essentiële moment de grote misleiding los te laten welke de Duitsers dan voor waarheid zouden aannemen.3 In het hieronder volgende verslag zal ik aan de hand van de huidige stand van zaken met betrekking tot het theoretische gedeelte van het overkoepelende veld (de contra- inlichtingen) een kader scheppen om het double-cross systeem nader te bestuderen. Het rapport van Masterman lijkt een vooropgesteld en logisch volgende handleiding voor het controleren van dubbelagenten te suggereren. Liep de ontwikkeling van het double-cross systeem wel volgens zo’n voorbedachte lijn? In een viertal casestudies van dubbelspionnen zal de nadruk worden gelegd op het operationele niveau van het double-cross
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