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The 2020 Stock Market Crash Is a Global Stock Market Crash That Began on 20 February 2020

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The 2020 Stock Market Crash Is a Global Stock Market Crash That Began on 20 February 2020 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 2020 EVENTS IN THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (UP TO APRIL 1ST, 2020) The 2020 stock market crash is a global stock market crash that began on 20 February 2020. On 12 February, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 Index all finished at record highs (while the NASDAQ and S&P 500 reached subsequent record highs on 19 February). From 24 to 28 February, stock markets worldwide reported their largest one-week declines since the 2008 financial crisis, thus entering a correction. Global markets into early March became extremely volatile, with large swings occurring in global markets. On 9 March, most global markets reported severe contractions, mainly in response to the 2019–20 coronavirus pandemic and an oil price war between Russia and the OPEC countries led by Saudi Arabia. This became colloquially known as Black Monday I, and at the time was the worst drop since the Great Recession in 2008. Three days after Black Monday I there was another drop, Black Thursday, where stocks across Europe and North America fell more than 9%. Wall Street experienced its largest single-day percentage drop since Black Monday in 1987, and the FTSE MIB of the Borsa Italiana fell nearly 17%, becoming the worst-hit market during Black Thursday. Despite a temporary rally on 13 March (with markets posting their best day since 2008), all three Wall Street indexes fell more than 12% when markets re-opened on 16 March. At least one benchmark stock market index in all G7 countries and 14 of the G20 countries has been declared to be in bear markets. As of March 2020, global stocks have seen a downturn of at least 25% during the crash, and 30% in most G20 nations. On March 20, Goldman Sachs warned that the US GDP would shrink 29% by the end of the 2nd quarter of 2020, and that unemployment could skyrocket to at least 9%. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has called the looming economic crisis 'akin to the Great Depression' Contents 1- Background o 1.1Causes 2-10–14 February 3-17–21 February 4-24–28 February 5-2–6 March o 5.1Russia–Saudi Arabia oil price war 6-9–13 March o 6.1Black Monday I (9 March) . 6.1.1Crash . 6.1.2Etymology o 6.2-10–11 March . 6.2.1United States presidential address o 6.3Black Thursday (12 March) . 6.3.1Crash . 6.3.2United States o 6.4-13 March 7 - 16–20 March o 7.1Black Monday II (16 March) o 7.2 - 17–20 March 8-23–27 March 9-30 March–1 April Background Causes The 2020 stock market crash occurred during the 2019–20 coronavirus pandemic, one of the most impactful pandemics since the Spanish flu in 1918. Rising fears and global economic shutdown due to the economic impact of COVID-19 is believed to be a main cause of the stock market crash, though many experts have argued that it is an 'accelerant' rather than a sole core reason behind the crash. 10–14 February On Monday, 10 February 2020, Asia-Pacific stock markets closed up while European stock markets closed mixed, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 also closing up (and the NASDAQ Composite and S&P 500 at record highs). Oil prices rose by 1%, while the yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.54% and 2.02% (with part of the yield curve inverting as the 10-year yield fell below the 3-month yield at 1.56%). On 11 February, Asia-Pacific and European stock markets closed up, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed flat but the NASDAQ Composite and S&P 500 closed at new record highs. Oil prices rose by 2%, while yields on 10-year and 30- year U.S. Treasury securities rose to 1.59% and 2.05% respectively. On 12 February, Asia-Pacific stock markets closed down while European stock markets closed up, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 all closed at new record highs. Oil prices rose by 1%, while the yield on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities rose to 1.63% and 2.09% respectively. On 13 February, Asia- Pacific stock markets rose while European and U.S. stock markets closed down, with oil prices rising but yields on 10- year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities falling to 1.58% and 2.04% respectively. The Bank of Mexico cut its overnight rate by 25 basis points. On 14 February, Asia-Pacific stock markets closed up while European stock markets finished with mixed closings, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 closed up (and net positive on the week). Oil prices were steady (but closed up on the week), while yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.58% and 2.03% respectively. 17–21 February On Monday, 17 February 2020, Asia-Pacific stock markets closed down but European stock markets closed up, while U.S. stock markets were closed in observance of Presidents Day. Oil prices fell, while the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.59%. On 18 February, Asia-Pacific stock markets closed up, while European stock markets, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 all closed down. Oil prices rose by more than 2%,while the yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.54% and 1.99%. Singaporean Finance Minister Heng Swee Keat announced a $4.5 billion fiscal stimulus program. On 19 February, Asia-Pacific and European stock markets closed mostly up, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average finished up and the NASDAQ Composite and the S&P 500 finished at record highs. Oil prices rose by another 2%, while yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.56% and 2.00% respectively. The People's Bank of China and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey cut their repo rates by 10 and 50 basis points respectively, while the Central Bank of Argentina cut its bank rate by 400 basis points. On 20 February, stock markets worldwide closed mostly down, while oil prices fell by 1% and yields on 10-year and 30- year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.51% and 1.96% respectively. Bank Indonesia cut its overnight rate by 25 basis points, while the Central Bank of Brazil announced it would cut its reserve requirement on 16 March from 31% to 25%, which is expected to release R$135 billion (or $29 billion) into the money supply. On 21 February, stock markets worldwide closed down on the day (with the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 closing down on the week), while oil prices fell and yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.45% and 1.89% respectively (with the 30-year finish being an all-time low). 24–28 February On Monday, 24 February 2020, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and FTSE 100 dropped more than 3% as the coronavirus outbreak spread worsened substantially outside China over the weekend. This follows benchmark indices falling sharply in continental Europe after steep declines across Asia. The DAX, CAC 40 and IBEX 35 each fell by about 4% and the FTSE MIB fell over 5%. There was a large fall in the price of oil and a large increase in the price of gold, to a 7-year high. Yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.36% and 1.81% respectively. On 25 February, stock markets worldwide closed down, while oil prices fell to their lowest level in more than a year and the yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to new record lows of 1.31% and 1.80% respectively. Indonesian Finance Minister Sri Mulyani announced a $742 million fiscal stimulus program. On 26 February, stock markets worldwide finish with mixed records, while oil prices fell for the fourth session in a row while the yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell 1.30% and 1.80% respectively. The Bank of Korea declined to cut its overnight rate. On 27 February, due to mounting worries about the coronavirus outbreak, stock markets in Asia-Pacific and Europe saw 3–5% declines, with the NASDAQ-100, the S&P 500 Index, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average posting their sharpest falls since 2008 (and the Dow falling 1,191 points, its largest one-day drop since the 2008 financial crisis). Oil prices sank to their lowest level in over a year, while yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to 1.28% and 1.77% respectively. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde indicated that while the European Central Bank was monitoring the outbreak, it was not yet causing a long-term impact on inflation and thus did not yet require a monetary policy response. On 28 February, stock markets worldwide reported their largest single-week declines since the 2008 financial crisis, while oil futures saw their largest single week decline since 2009 and the yields on 10-year and 30-year U.S. Treasury securities fell to new record lows at 1.12% and 1.30% respectively.
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