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SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY, i3th MARCH, 1951 bp gutftortQ> Registered as a Newspaper

MONDAY, 19 MARCH, 1951 OPERATIONS IN BURMA AND NORTH-EAST INDIA FROM 16th NOVEMBER, 1943 TO 22nd JUNE, 1944. NOTE.—A set of maps for this Despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set of maps also covers the operations described in the other Army and Air Despatches of the Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following Despatch was submitted to the who was responsible for the conduct of opera- Secretary of State for War on the 19th June, tions in Burma and Assam. The assumption of 1945, by GENERAL SIR GEORGE J. command by the Supreme Allied Commander GIFFARD, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., entailed the formation of 11 Army Group Commander-in-Chief, 11 Army Group, Headquarters and of Fourteenth Army Head- South-East Asia Command. quarters, which then assumed command of the PART I.—INTRODUCTION. operations which had, up to then, been directed by me as G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Army. 1. This Despatch covers the operations in Burma and North-East India between the 16th I was appointed to command 11 Army November, 1943, the date on which the Group and Lieut.-General W. J. Slim,* was Supreme Allied Commander,* South-East Asia, selected for command of Fourteenth Army. assumed responsibility from the India Com- The undermentioned formations, etc., previ- mand, and the 22nd June, 1944, the date on ously under India Command, were allotted to which our lines of. communication from South-East Asia Command: — Manipur Road (Dimapur) to Imphal were re- opened, after the defeat of the Japanese forces FOURTEENTH ARMY. at Kohima. By this date, also, the .enemy had been cleared from the area north of Kamaing, 4 Corps. Mogaung and Myitkyina by the Chinese- Lieut.-General G. A. P. Scoones.f American forces under General Stilwell.f and 17 Indian Light Division. a re-adjustment of our dispositions to meet 20 Indian Division (less 32 Brigade— monsoon conditions had been made in Arakan. joined end of November). Thus a definite phase of the campaign may 23 Indian Division. be said to have ended. The Despatch also gives an account of the administrative situation 15 Indian Corps. and certain major changes in our organization during the period. Lieut.-General A. F. P. Christison.J 5 Indian Division (less 9 Brigade—joined Forces allotted and assigned to South-East in December). Asia Command (S.E.A.C.). 7 Indian Division. 2. The formation of the South-East Asia 26 Indian Division (less 4 Brigade—joined Command necessitated a reorganization of the in February, 1944). system of command of the land forces. Until then, the Eastern Army had been under the 81 (West African) Division (less 3 Brigade, command of the Commander-in-Chief, India,t allotted to Special Force). * Now Vice-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of * Now Field-Marshal Sir William J. Slim, G.B.E., Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. K.C.B., D.S.O. t The late Lieut-General Joseph W. Stilwell, United t Now General Sir Geoffry A. P. Scoones, K.C.B., States Army. K.B.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C. t General (now Field-Marshal) Sir Claude J. E. J Now General Sir A. F. Philip Christison, Bart., Auchinleck, G.C.B., G.C.I.E., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E. G.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C. 1350 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

CEYLON ARMY COMMAND. In the north of Burma (designated Northern Lieut-General H. E. de R. Wetherall.* Combat Area Command—N.C.A.C.) the 11 (East African) Division. American-trained and equipped Chinese 22 and 99 Indian Infantry Brigade. 38 Divisions under the command of General Royal Marine Group, Mobile Naval Base Stilwell were in the general area between Defence Organization (less one A.A. Ledo and Maingkwan towards which they Brigade assigned to S.E.A.C. in were advancing. They were opposed by 18 Southern India). Japanese Division, with 114 Regiment between Myitkyina and Sumprabum, 56 Regiment INDIAN OCEAN BASES. around Katha and Rail Indaw, and 55 Regi- Addu Atoll ~\ Containing ment between Wuntho and Shwebo. Diego Garcia > small In no sector was there close contact but we, Cocos Islands J garrisons. and the Japanese, were patrolling to gain con- In addition, the following troops in India tact ; and in Arakan we were preparing for were assigned to South-East Asia Command, an offensive. The Headquarters of Fourteenth being allotted later:— Army was at Barrackpore (later at Comilla) Headquarters 33 Indian Corps (Lieut.- and of 15 Japanese Army at Maymyo. General M. G. N. Stopford).f Geography and Topography. 2 British Division. 19 Indian Division (Did not arrive until 3. Before discussing the numerous plans October, 1944; in the interim 25 Indian which were made and discarded for various Division was substituted for it). reasons and describing the operations which 36 Indian Division (This consisted of two actually took place, it is essential to appreciate British brigades, and of divisional troops, the extent to which all operations for the cap- some of which were Indian ; but it was called ture of Burma are affected by peculiar topo- "Indian" for deception purposes. It was graphical and climatic conditions such as exist renamed 36 British Division in July, 1944, in few other parts of the world. and I shall refer to it as such throughout this 4. The Indo-Burmese frontier, from where Despatch). it leaves the sea in Arakan, near Maungdaw, 3 Indian Division (Cover name of Major- until it joins the. Sino-Thibetan frontier on the General Wingate'sJ "Special Force": con- Salween. River north of Myitkyina, follows1 a sisting of six Long-Range Penetration series of mountain ranges, the general axes of Brigades; 14, 16 and 23 British Infantry which run from north to south. The mam Brigades; 77 and 111 Indian Infantry features of these mountain ranges are then* Brigades and 3 (West African) Infantry precipitous sides and the fast flowing rivers in Brigade. It contained Gurkha but no Indian the deep valleys. These mountains are at their units. I shall refer to it hereafter as maximum heights at the north-east end of the "Special Force"). frontier, where they rise to heights of ten to 50 Indian Tank Brigade. twelve thousand feet and more. Their height 3 Special Service Brigade (consisting of gradually declines as the ranges run south- No. 5 Commando and No. 44 Royal Marine wards, though in the Naga and Chin Hills there Commando). are many peaks of 9,000 feet, until they reach Details showing when these " assigned" the lesser ranges in Arakan where the maxi- formations were actually transferred to my mum heights are seldom over 2,000 feet. The command, and allotted to Fourteenth Army, main spine, however, of this range continues will be given later in this Despatch. southwards, parallel to the coast, towards the In November, 1943, 15 Corps, consisting of mouth of the Irrawaddy and finally disappears 7 Indian Division and 36 Brigade of 26 Indian just north of the town of Bassein. Throughout Division and 81 (West African) Division (which these ranges the hillsides are for the most part was just moving in), was holding a line in covered with jungle so dense that it is not Arakan approximately from Teknaf to Taung possible to move without cutting paths. In Bazaar facing 55 Japanese Division. The the whole length of this mountain system there enemy Division had its Headquarters in Akyab, are only three roads, none of them of good its 143 Regiment was on a line from Maungdaw quality, over which wheels can pass. These to Buthidaung, with 112 and 213 Regiments are the Ledo—Myitkyina road, the Dimapur— disposed in depth behind this line, in reserve. Imphal—Tamu road and the Taungup—Prome road, none of which has been completed to a 4 Corps, composed of 17 Indian Light Divi- standard which will carry heavy traffic all the sion and 20 and 23 Indian Divisions, was re- year round. sponsible for the defence of the Imphal and Tiddim areas of the Central front. The Light 5. East and south of this great mountain Division (48 and 63 Indian Infantry Brigades) system lies the main river basin of the was holding the Fort White—Tiddim area Irrawaddy with its principal tributary the against 214 and 215 Regiments of 33 Japanese Chindwin to the west and almost parallel to it Division, which was disposed generally along until it joins the Irrawaddy at Myingyan. The the line of ,the Chindwin River as far north as Irrawaddy forms a delta which begins just Mawlaik. 23 Indian Division was in the north of Henzada, but the main mouth reaches Imphal Plain, and had under command 80 the sea just south of Rangoon. The Irrawaddy Indian Infantry Brigade of 20 Indian Division is navigable by various craft, according to the which was coming forward in relief of 23 time of the year, as far north as Myitkyina; Indian Division. and the Chindwin can be navigated up to Tamanthi. These two great rivers provide, * Now Lieut-General Sir H. Edward de R. therefore, first class lines of communication Wetherall, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C. throughout the year. The valley of the t Now General Sir Montagu G. N. Stopford, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C. Irrawaddy and other tributary valleys provide J The late Major-General O. C. Wingate. access for a system of railways which, starting SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1351

at Rangoon, pass through Mandalay to diseases which are products of the conditions ; Myitkyina. There are various branches such dysentry, the worst effects of which have been as that from Rangoon to Prome and from reduced by discipline .and good hygiene Sagaing to Ye-U. The road system in Burma measures, skin diseases of various types, is reasonably good, especially from Ye-U especially during the rainy season, and scrub southwards. Communications, therefore, in typhus which is endemic in various areas. Burma, may be said to be adequate for the maintenance and movement of large forces. It 10. While the South-West monsoon has a is clear, therefore, that it should always be bad effect upon the health of troops and possible for the Japanese with these communi- causes them also acute discomfort from wet, its cations to concentrate superior forces to meet really worst effect is upon the communications any advance by us over the three indifferent in the country. The heavy rain turns Arakan,. roads over the mountains. a rice growing area, into a muddy swamp quite impassable to wheeled vehicles unless the roads 6. In Arakan the " chaungs " (or waterways) have proper foundations and surfaces capable with which the coastal strip is intersected are of withstanding heavy rain. In Assam and almost as great an obstacle as the hills and the jungle. In dry weather they can be forded Burma there is very b'ttle stone, most of the by infantry at low water, but at other times hills, which are clothed in forest or bamboo, a six-foot tide makes them difficult to cross. In being composed of a soft shale quite useless the rains of the South-West monsoon they are for road making. The making of roads is, swollen by flood water which makes them therefore, very difficult as; they have to be greater obstacles. The banks are usually muddy built to a high standard in order to stand up and crumbling. Bridging presents considerable to the torrential rains which fall between May difficulties and special arrangements have to be and October. The heavy rains also make the made at each for the passage of tanks and ordinary native tracks very nearly impassable mechanical transport. as they get so slippery on the steep hillsides that neither man nor beast can stand up on 7. There are other difficulties also for our them. Finally, as can be imagined, these heavy forces operating southwards in Arakan. The rains make the rivers and streams into very two main rivers, the Mayu and the Kaladan, formidable obstacles, all of which have to be with their tributaries, converge on the main bridged to allow the passage of troops and Japanese base at Akyab. By his command of transport. the entrance to these two waterways, the Indeed, campaigning in the monsoon in enemy was able to make use of excellent water Burma may be said to be one of the most communications which were denied to us. arduous operations anywhere in the world today. Climatic Conditions. 8. The climate of Burma is affected by the The Japanese Soldier. two monsoons, the North-East in the winter and the South-West in the summer. The in- 11. The Japanese soldier is fanatically brave fluence of .the former produces fine dry weather when ordered to succeed or die, yet he is liable with little cloud and conditions are good for to panic when surprised or in doubt. His plan- operations both on land and in the air. The ning is bold yet he is at a loss if plans go South-West monsoon on 'the other hand, blow- wrong. Although most secretive and careful, ing as it does across the Bay of Bengal, is he will go into action carrying diaries and mili- heavily charged with moisture which it dis- tary papers. He takes infinite pains to conceal charges over Burma and Eastern Bengal during his positions and then nullifies the result by the months of May to October. Precipitation talking in them at night. An expert in the of rain, especially on the Arakan coast, is use of ground and in silent movement, yet extremely 'high, reaching in places as much as his patrol work is frequently bad. Although 200 inches. The climate varies too, according bold at infiltrating into, and then rushing a to -the altitude, the temperatures above 3,000 position from an unexpected direction, he be- feet being reasonably low and above 5,000 feet comes easily nonplussed by determined resist- cool and invigorating. In the lowlands along ance. He is good at laying fixed lines of fire the coast, the temperatures are high, with a and skilful in the use of snipers, yet he is a high humidity which makes campaigning in bad shot, those areas exhausting. 12. Our successes in the fighting have, in 9. Malaria is endemic throughout the no small measure, been due to the fact that we country below 3,000 feet but it is worse in some have taken full advantage of the enemy's weak areas than others; for instance, the Kabaw points. The results have been gratifying, not Valley is reputed to be one of the worst only tactically, but also psychologically: signs malarial valleys in the world. There are two are not lacking that the blind obedience, fana- seasonal increases in the rate of infection, one tical courage and determination to die rather at the beginning of the monsoon in May, and than surrender, which the Japanese soldier has the other at the end of the monsoon in October hitherto displayed, may not withstand the con- and November. Much has been done to re- tinuous reverses which he is now suffering duce the casualties from malaria during the and will suffer in the future. That this fact past two years and the ineffective rate amongst has been recognised by the Japanese High all troops has fallen very considerably. This Command, and is causing some misgiving, has is due to much improved personal discipline, been seen in captured orders. efficient draining of bad areas on the lines of This must not be taken to mean, however, communication, training and various medical that the Japanese soldier now surrenders easily. prophylactic measures which have been intro- His whole up-bringing and outlook make him duced. In such a climate there are other regard capture as the worst disgrace. Conse- A2 1352 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 quently, even when cornered, he not only sells (b) The capture of Mogaung—Myitkyina his life dearly, but will frequently commit by Chinese-American forces from Ledo with suicide rather than surrender. The mopping- possible exploitation southwards. up of captured enemy positions is, therefore, (c) An advance on Bhamo—Lashio by a slow process, as every Japanese officer and Chinese forces from Yunnan. man has usually to be ferreted out and killed. The plan which I had thought gave the best Since the crushing defeat inflicted on the chance of success was made in September 1943, enemy in the Imphal battle, and the failure when the Commander-in-Chief, India, was still of his lines of communication, there have in command of the operations and I was been a few surrenders of unwounded men, G.O.C.-in-C., Eastern Army. This plan aimed but they are still rare. at forcing a crossing of the Chindwin on the Imphal Front, and the introduction with the 13. To sum up, I would say that, although aid of airborne troops of a force of all arms, his discipline and training are good, the including tanks and medium artillery, into the Japanese soldier has shown himself lacking in Central Burma plain in the Ye-U area. A de- initiative and self-reliance when his leaders tailed examination of the many problems which have been killed and he is faced with the un- such a plan created, among them the capacity expected. The very fact that surrender has of the Assam lines of communication, and the now made its appearance, though on a very delays in the concentration programme caused small scale, in an army where such a thing was by the breaching of the main railway line to undreamt of, is not without significance. Calcutta from the west by the Damodar River, showed that the launching of such an offensive The Outlook in November, 1943. before early March was not possible. 14. Strategically, Burma is important for This plan was submitted to the British Chiefs three reasons: — of Staff, who preferred an airborne operation (a) The only way in which we can, either against Katha—Indaw 'because there would be now or in the immediate future, send help closer support and co-operation with Chinese to China is through or over Burma. forces advancing south from Ledo and across (b) Burma is the principal area in which the Salween. This plan, approved at the Cairo we can contain and destroy considerable conference in November 1943, had eventually Japanese forces. to be abandoned as the necessary transport air- (c) In our hands Burma provides a step- craft were not forthcoming. It became ping stone for operations further east or necessary, therefore, to make a less ambitious south. In Japanese hands it is a base for plan. operations against the eastern frontier of 18. It was not easy, within the means at our India. disposal, even partially to achieve the objects given by the Chiefs of Staff. After several 15. As a result of decisions reached at the alternatives had been examined and rejected, Quebec Conference, the Chiefs of Staff directed I submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, the Supreme Allied Commander to undertake in December, the following plan. operations in Burma with two objects: — (a) An advance down the Kabaw Valley (a) The security and improvement of the towards Kalewa—Kalemyo; the construc- air ferry route to China and the establish- tion of an all-weather road, via Tamu, as far ment of land communications with China. as possible towards Yuwa and Kalewa on the (b) The close and continuous engagement Chindwin. of Japanese land and air forces, so as to (ft) The use (initially) of three Long-Range cause attrition and diversion from the Pacific Penetration Brigades in the Katha—Indaw Theatre. area. To execute these orders meant, of course, The objects I had in mind were:— offensive operations whenever and wherever (i) To achieve a greater, though not com- possible; but it was obvious that the main plete measure of security for the China air operations to secure Northern Burma, without route, by forcing the enemy further south. which complete security of the China air route (ii) To obtain greater freedom of action could not be ensured, would have to be for offensive operations in 1944-45, when launched from Imphal, Yunnan and Ledo. more resources might be expected. (iii) To destroy the maximum possible 16. As our resources were limited, it was number of Japanese land and air forces. essential to decide on the southern limits of such an offensive. Examination showed that (iv) To gain some control of Upper Burma only the capture of the Shwebo—Mandalay by the employment, in conjunction with our area would fulfil the instructions of the Chiefs mam forces and those of the Chinese Army of Staff but this was beyond our resources, in India (C.A.I.), of Long-Range Penetra- either in troops or transport aircraft. Plans of tion Troops to confuse the enemy and inflict a less ambitious nature which would obey the casualties. spirit of the instructions to the Supreme Allied 19. This plan was approved by the Supreme Commander had, therefore, to be considered. Allied Commander and was referred by him to the Chiefs of Staff early in December. It 17. The plan generally approved at Quebec depended for success not only on overcoming •was:— strong enemy defences in the Tiddim area, but (a) The capture by Long-Range Penetra- also on progress in road construction. At the tion Forces of the Katha—Indaw area which end of January, the Chiefs of Staff were told would be then held by a division, flown in that we did not anticipate reaching the Kalewa or moved overland across the Chindwin with —Kalemyo area before the monsoon. Actually light equipment. the all-weather road of a two-way standard SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1353

had only reached a point ten miles south of by the Supreme Allied Commander. My Palel, though it was all-weather one-way for objects were, first, to improve our general a good many miles south of that point, when situation in Arakan, and, second, to contain the enemy launched their March offensive. and destroy Japanese forces. 20. Concurrently with planning for opera- 25. A period during which certain sub- tions on the Imphal Front, planning for opera- sidiary operations were undertaken to secure tions in Arakan was, of course, in progress. .the necessary jumping-off places for our offen- Several plans, which included amphibious sive then followed. The enemy defended these operations against Akyab in conjunction with positions stubbornly. an advance down the Mayu Peninsula, were On the 15th January, the dispositions of examined, but all were eventually abandoned the forward elements of 15 Indian Corps either for lack of resources or for other reasons, (Lieut-General A. F. P. Christison), were as and I was thrown back on a plan for an ad- follows:— vance with the limited objective of the Maung- daw—Buthidaung road, and the mouth of the 5 Indian Division: Maungdaw—Magyi Naf River. Once the latter was captured, Chaung—Rehkat Chaung—Point 1619, with supplies could be brought in by sea, not only a brigade in reserve west of the Mayu to Maungdaw but also to Teknaf. Range. 7 Indian Division: One brigade in the 21. Other plans for amphibious operations, hills north and north-east of Htindaw. One among them one for the capture of the brigade Tatmakhali to Sinohbyin, with for- Andamans, were also examined, but all were ward troops on the Letwedet Chaung. One in the end rejected as the resources for them brigade Kyaukit massif—Pyinshe—Windwin,. were needed for more important operations with a detachment on the Saingdin Chaung. in other theatres of war. 81 (West African) Division: Daletme— I was finally compelled, therefore, to limit Satpaung area, in the Kaladan Valley. the operations of the Army to a short advance in Arakan and advances down the Tiddim road Tanks: One regiment, in support of 5 and Kabaw Valley with the object of captur- Indian Division. ing the Kalewa—Kalemyo area. Medium Artillery: One battery in sup- port of each division. PART n—OPERATIONS. 26. The enemy had turned the area about Operations by 15 Indian Corps in Arakan. the Tunnels, through which the road runs in its passage through the highest portion of the 22. In November, 1943, we were in contact Mayu Range between Maungdaw and with the Japanese in Arakan, the Imphal Front Buthidaung, into a fortress with two strong and in North Burma (N.C.A.C.). buttresses—Razabil on the west and Letwedet The situation in Arakan at the end of the on the east. monsoon of 1943, was that we held positions The general plan of attack was framed to covering Cox's Bazaar with 26 Indian Division capture these two buttresses in turn and sur- on the general line Teknaf—Taung Bazaar, round the garrison of the Tunnels fortress. while the enemy held the Maungdaw— 5 Indian Division was to take Razabil and Buthidaung road. The advance to close con- 7 Indian Division Buthidaung, thus cutting in tact started in the middle of October. behind the Letwedet buttress. 81 (West African) Division was to advance down the 23. Between October and the end of Kaladan River to capture Kyauktaw, with December other changes were made in our dis- the ultimate object of cutting the Kanzauk— positions :— Htizwe road, which was the enemy's main (a) 26 Indian Division was relieved by 7 lateral line of communication between the and 5 Indian Divisions. Kaladan and Kalapanzin Valleys. (b) 7 Indian Division moved across the Mayu Range, complete with all its guns and 27. The main offensive was launched on the lorries. A fair-weather road was built over 19th January, and, despite strong opposition, the Ngakyedauk Pass, which lies north-west our preliminary operations against the enemy's of the village of that name, to provide the outposts were very successful. The original necessary communications. plan had included a sea landing by 2 British Division further south down the Mayu Penin- (c) 5 Indian Division took over the sula. As we did not wish to drive the Japanese western sector of the front. into the toe of the Peninsula until 2 British (d) Our rear areas were re-adjus'ted. Division had effected a firm lodgement, our (e) Finally we drove in the enemy's out- attack on the main enemy positions was de- post line. ferred to synchronize with the sea landing, the At the end of December, 5 Indian Division date of which could not be put forward as it held from the sea to the crest of the Mayu was governed by the state of the tide and Range, while 7 Indian Division, had moved moon. Unfortunately, the craft required for over complete into the Kalapanzin Valley. The the amphibious operation were taken away stage was set for an attack on the main enemy and, therefore, this "right hook" had to be position. cancelled. Thus our land offensive had been held up to no purpose. By the 4th February, 24. Early in January, I issued an Opera- however, the attack on Razabil had achieved tional Instruction to the Commander, a measure of success, but the main position Fourteenth Army, Lieut-General W. J. Slim, still held out. Progress elsewhere had been directing him to secure the mouth of the Naf steady, but slow. River; Maungdaw—Buthidaung; and exploit success to the maximum. These instructions 28. It was at this moment that the enemy were based on an Operational Directive issued launched his counter-attack and our offensive 1354 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 iad to be delayed until the enemy attack had at Taung Bazaar of an enemy regiment, with •been defeated. This took some four weeks, elements from two others, which had passed but when it was finished the attack on our partly round our left flank through the jungle original objectives was continued. and partly through the positions held by 114 Brigade. Almost simultaneously, strong fron- 29. This Japanese counter-attack merits tal attacks were made by two regiments in the attention, both on, account of the boldness of area north and north-west of Buthidaung. A its conception and also on account of the firm brigade of 7 Indian Division, which had been stand made by 7 Indian Division which was relieved by 5 Indian Division, but had not yet surrounded and attacked from all sides. The been committed to their new task, was sent Division was supplied by air and thus did north to check the enemy advance south- not -have to uetire when its lines of com- wards from Taung Bazaar. In this it partially munication were cut. This was the main cause succeeded, but, owing to the closeness of the of the defeat of the Japanese counter-attack. country and the enemy's numerical superiority, 30. In the last week of January, identifica- was outflanked by a party of the enemy which tion of a fresh enemy regiment was obtained. overran the Headquarters of 7 Indian Division On the 1st February, documents ordering the in the early morning. The Divisional Com- J.I.Fs. (Indians fighting for the Japanese) to mander, however, regained control of the concentrate east of the Mayu Range at once for operations that evening. Brigades and divi- an operation were captured. I was in Four- sional troops had been ordered to prepare teenth Army area at that time and discussed positions capable of all round defence as soon the position with the Army Commander. We as the enemy's presence in Taung Bazaar had concluded that these moves indicated a been discovered. 9, 33 and 114 Brigades, counter-attack by the Japanese, but were un- therefore, dug in on their positions, while able to decide upon the exact form it was another defended area which contained Divi- likely to take, though it seemed probable that sional H.Q., part of 89 Brigade and Divisional an attempt to outflank 15 Indian Corps was Troops was hastily .prepared in the area of the most probable. We agreed that if 5 and 7 Awlanbyin and Sinzweya. These areas were Indian Divisions held their positions against a called " boxes " during the battle. frontal attack, while at the same time pre- 34. The enemy cut the Ngakyedauk Pass paring an all-round defence to meet attacks and closely invested these boxes. One from the flank or rear, it would be possible to Japanese battalion also crossed by the destroy any Japanese outflanking detachment Maunghnama Pass further north and 'began with the reserves. I placed 36 British Division, to harass 15 Indian Corps Headquarters and which had arrived at Chittagong for another the rear of 5 Indian. Division from a position operation, at General Slim's disposal and he in the hills on the east of the road. But they ordered one brigade of this Division, together made no further headway, although on the 9th with 26 Indian Division, which was in Four- February the situation in 7 Indian Division's teenth Army reserve in the Comilla area, to defended area {Sinzweya) was difficult and con- move south at once. He ordered all forma- tinued so for several days. 26 Indian Division, tions in the forward areas to hold their ground. which had been moved up to Bawli Bazaar He made arrangements for the packing for air by 15 Indian Corps, now began to make its transport of three days' rations, ammunition presence felt, but it was evident that its opera- and medical stores and with the R.A.F. for tions, in conjunction with those of 5 Indian their delivery by air to 7 Indian Division, if Division from the west to clear the Ngakye- called for. These preparations had a far- dauk Pass, would take tune. reaching effect on the battle. 35. Supply dropping to the various boxes 31. When the enemy's blow actually fell on began on the 9th February, and an airstrip for the 4th February, it so happened that prepara- the evacuation of casualties was ready by the tions for transferring our offensive from the 12th at Taung Bazaar, which had by then west to the east of the Mayu Range were in been cleared of the enemy. progress. One infantry brigade of 5 Indian Division had moved over to the east of the 36. In spite of continuous attacks, supported range to free one brigade of 7 Indian Division by the fire of 150-mm guns and by fighter for this operation; thus 15 Indian Corps had bombers, the enemy were unable to reduce any available at that time a reserve infantry brigade of our strongholds. On the 12th the Com- and a tank regiment east of the range, which mander, 7 Indian Division issued orders to take was the flank menaced by the Japanese threat. the offensive to prevent any further hostile infiltration and the escape of any enemy 32. The Japanese plan, captured early in already in his rear. The enemy was now " in the battle, was to pass through and round the the bag" and it was the task of 7 Indian left flank of 7 Indian Division, take Taung Division to keep him there until destroyed. Bazaar from the east, and cut the Bawli 37. Severe fighting continued with the Bazaar—Razabil road. This move completed, Japanese trying to stem the advance of 26 and the Japanese intended to attack 7 Indian 5 Indian Divisions and overcome what their Division from the rear and drive it through the orders described as "the hysterical defence" Ngakyedauk Pass. This would isolate 5 Indian of the areas of 7 Indian Division. Hysterical Division which would in turn be mopped up or not, it may one day be called historical as and the remnants driven over the Naf River.- it was the first successful f^ply to Japanese So certain were they of success, that the Tokyo large-scale infiltration tactics in jungle country. radio announced victories at the appropriate The bitterness of the fighting is illustrated by times, according to their pre-arranged time- the remark made by a veteran of Dunkirk, table, regardless that this time-table bore no who spent two days on the beaches ; he stated relation to the facts. he would willingly have spent a fortnight at 33. The attack against 7 Indian Division began Dunkirk if he could have been let off with with the appearance in rear of its left flank two days in 7 Indian Divisional defended area. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1355

38. On the 16th February, 36 British Divi- The basic reason for our victory was, how- sion began to relieve 26 Indian Division to ever, the refusal of our troops, or any portion enable it to concentrate east of the Mayu of them, to waver, and their unflinching Range. courage in exceptionally trying circumstances. 39. By the 20th February, the shortage of 42. Mopping up in the thick mountainous food and ammunition, severe casualties and jungle was a difficult and necessarily slow lack of any tactical success began to have their operation, and it was not until the 5th March effect upon the Japanese forces, and they that we were able to resume the interrupted began to try to escape, at first in driblets course of our offensive. Razabil was captured and then in larger parties. Many of them by 5 Indian Division on the 12th March. It failed to run the gauntlet and were wiped out. was found to be a position of great strength, By the 24th February the Ngakyedauk Pass complete with underground rooms, etc. The had been re-opened and the Japanese offen- Tunnels position was surrounded by the 19th sive, heralded as the beginning of the march March, and was finally captured by 36 British on Delhi, had been defeated. Division some days later. Meanwhile, 7 40. It is convenient at this stage to examine Indian Division had taken Buthidaung and the enemy's plan and analyse the cause of its had also captured the outer ring of the Kyaukit failure. defences. These defences were evacuated by the enemy on the 23rd March and considerable The Japanese have always supported the equipment fell into our hands. On the 25th, doctrine that the best defence is the attack. about 500 enemy again infiltrated to the They proved it to their satisfaction in Ngakyedauk area, but were dealt with expedi- Arakan in the Spring of 1943 and they confi- tiously. dently expected to prove it again in 1944. Their attacks have usually taken the form of an 43. At the end of March, 25 Indian Division enveloping movement combined with infiltra- began to take over from 5 Indian Division and tion and frontal attacks. the latter was transferred 'by air to 4 Corps' These tactics achieved success in 1943, partly front. owing to the lack of training of our forces and 44. Fighting to improve our positions con- partly owing to the fact that it was not pos- tinued throughout April against strong opposi- sible, for lack of supplies, for forward troops tion. As a result of successful actions by 26 to hold out when their lines of communica- Indian Division in the Buthidaung area in the tion were cut. first week in May, we withdrew from Buthi- 41. The Japanese plan was bold, typical of daung, as planned, to positions more suitable their readiness to take risks, and its execution for the monsoon; forward brigades of 15 went smoothly for the first thirty-six hours. Indian Corps taking up positions on the It then began to fail, at first slowly but with general line Godusara—Tunnels Area—Taung increasing momentum until disaster overtook Bazaar. it. The main reasons for this failure were: — 45. 36 British Division was withdrawn to (a) The Japanese conviction that we ShUlong in Assam to rest and refit, with a view should retire if our rear was threatened, as to its being transferred to General StilwelTs we had done in 1943. His whole plan was command in North Burma at a later date. 7 based on this assumption. A captured direc- Indian Division, two brigades moving by air, tive, by the Commander of 55 Divisional also left Arakan in April for 4 Corps' front. Infantry Group, ended with this significant By the end of May, therefore, we were phrase: —" As they have previously suffered holding Arakan with 15 Indian Corps, com- defeat, should a portion of the enemy waver prising three divisions. Our monsoon disposi- the whole of them will at once get confused tions being: — and victory is thus certain ". 25 Indian Division: In the Tunnels Area, (£>) The fine fighting spirit of all ranks covering the Maungdaw—Buthidaung road, who, in this the first large encounter with the Japanese this year, showed their up to and including, the East Tunnel. superiority in jungle-fighting when well 26 Indian Division: One brigade in the trained and adequately equipped. Bawli—Goppe—Taung Bazaars area. One (c) The ability to supply forward troops brigade at Taungbro and the third at Cox's by air. Bazaar. Contributory factors to its failure were our 81 (West African) Division: Concentrating successful use of tanks over ground much of at Chiringa. which was regarded as " untankable ", the use We also had detachments on the Sangu of medium artillery, and our continual harass- River as flank protection against a small ing from the air of the enemy's water-borne Japanese force which had infiltrated into that and road communications. The Japanese area. under-estimation of their enemy and their con- viction that they would capture large quantities 46. The term " monsoon dispositions " does of supplies in the first few days, led them to not imply static defence. We occupied positions neglect their arrangements for the supply of of our own choice, selected for their strength food and ammunition and their troops carried and to preserve tEe health of our troops by only five days' food. We defeated all their avoiding the worst malarial areas. The attempts to bring food or ammunition forward. necessity, during the monsoon in Arakan, to In consequence, their troops soon began to evacuate certain flooded districts and take up suffer from hunger and starvation and short- positions which are defensively strong and age of ammunition. Their casualties amounted accessible for supplies, did not mean that every to 4,500 killed and wounded out of a total of opportunity for local offensive action was not 7,000 men. taken. 1356 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

Results of the Arakan Campaign. which the Japanese were making to in- 47. As already mentioned (paragraph 24), filtrate across the hills into the Sangu Valley. the objects of the Arakan campaign were to It was later withdrawn into this valley and, in improve our general situation and engage and June, was providing detachments along the destroy Japanese forces. Our success had led Sangu River, which were successful in driving me to hope that we could clear the whole of back, with considerable losses, small enemy the Mayu Peninsula, but the need for providing forces which had penetrated this area. reinforcements (5 and 7 Indian Divisions) for the Imphal Front frustrated this. The Chin Hills. Although this further advance was not 52. The link between Arakan and the Imphal possible, the objects of the campaign had been Front is the Chin Hills; the strategic import- generally achieved. Maungdaw had been ance of which lies in the fact that it covers firmly established as a base ; the Mayu Range, the approaches to Chittagong and Aijal, via including the important Tunnels area, together Lungleh. It also flanks the Japanese lines of with the eastern foothills, was firmly in our communication through Gangaw to Kalemyo. hands ; and the lateral road was in daily use. 53. The Chin Hills and the Lushai Hills 55 Japanese Division, despite reinforcements, lying west of them, were garrisoned by two had been outfought and was weak and tired. detachments of Levies, each with a stiffening In spite of the reduction in the strength of 15 of one regular battalion; Headquarters being Indian Corps by three divisions (the 5th, 7th at Aijal. The role of these detachments was and 36th), operations after their withdrawal to interrupt the enemy's communications and went according to plan. To sum up, the Japan- to hamper his movements in the area Aijal— ese offensive, from which they confidently ex- Champai—Falam—Haka. Early in November pected great results, had been defeated, and 1943, however, just before the assumption of we had captured our objectives. Last, but not command by Admiral The Lord Louis Mount- least, we had established a moral ascendency batten, the enemy advancing in some strength, over the enemy which promised well for the had, though they suffered severe casualties hi future. gaining these minor successes, driven our Irregulars out of Falam and Haka and caused Operations in the Kaladan Valley. our regular troops to withdraw from Fort 48. The Japanese threatened our left flank White. during the previous year's operations by ad- vancing up the Kaladan River, and I was deter- 54. Early in April, another battalion was mined that this should not happen again. 81 added to the Chin Hills detachment, which then (West African) Division was, in consequence, became the Lushai Brigade. This force has moved across into the Kaladan Valley to pro- performed its task very satisfactorily, laying tect the left flank of 15 Indian Corps. ambushes, obtaining information, and inflicting Our ability to supply troops by air made it considerable losses. It was reinforced by an possible for a division to operate down this additional battalion in June, and ordered to valley, but the physical difficulties of moving interfere with the Japanese communications into the valley were great. A jeep track 73 along the Imphal—Tiddim road. miles long had to be built from Chiringa to The Chindwin. Daletme across four mountain ranges. It was begun on the 18th November and finished on 55. 4 Corps (Lieut-General G. A. P. Scoones), the 17th January—an engineering feat which with Headquarters at Imphal, had been respon- reflected the greatest credit on all ranks. sible for the defence of the Indian frontier east and south of Manipur since 1942. The area 49. 81 (West African) Division concentrated for which the Corps was responsible extended in the Satpaung—Daletme area in January and from its boundary with Northern Combat Area started its move down the Kaladan at the end Command (N.C.A.C.) on the line Mawlu— of that month. They captured Kyauktaw by Taro—Wakening (40 miles east of Jorhat) the 3rd March and were then advancing on down to and inclusive of the Chin Hills. In Apaukwa when a strong Japanese counter- November 1943, 23 Indian Division had its attack developed from the south-east. The ad- Headquarters at Tamu, and 17 Indian Light vance had to be stopped in order to meet it. Division with its Headquarters was on the The enemy captured our position near Imphal—Tiddim road at Milestone 102. 20 Kyauktaw and the Division withdrew to Indian Division, with its Headquarters at positions south of Kaladan Village. There- Shenam, about 10 miles south-east of Palel, after, it continued its r61e of flank protection was engaged in patrolling across the Chindwin. in the Paletwa area. At the end of December the whole of this Divi- 50. In April, this Division (less one battalion sion had been concentrated in the Tamu area, left at Paletwa, where it was joined by two its Headquarters having moved forward to battalions of Indian troops, one of which was Sibong. This Division relieved 23 Indian Divi- withdrawn later) was moved westwards across sion which was withdrawn from the Imphal Ithe Arakan Yomas to the east of the Plain for rest and 'training ; having been in the Kalapanzin River, to provide closer protection forward area without relief since June 1942. to the left flank of 15 Indian Corps. Subse- quently, it was withdrawn via Buthidaung— 56. The task which I had allotted Fourteenth Taung Bazaar to the neighbourhood of Army on this sector of the front was to carry Chiringa. out offensive operations with the objects of:— 51. The battalion left in the Kaladan was (a) Clearing the Chin Hills as far as the later reinforced by Headquarters 6 (West foothills south-east of Tiddim. African) Brigade and another battalion. One (b) Dominating the area between the Yu Indian battalion also remained in the area. and Chindwin Rivers, south of the Tamu— The role of this force was to frustrate attempts Sittaung road. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1357 (c) Containing and killing Japanese in the forces, and (ii) its value to the Japanese as Kabaw Valley and Atwin Yomas. a base for attacks against the 'Surma Valley (d) Pushing forces across the Chindwin, in Eastern Bengal and our Assam lines of if the Long-Range Penetration Brigades communication. Attacks against Bengal created a favourable situation. would have an adverse and widespread moral effect; while interruption of the Assam lines 57. On the 13th January, patrols reported of communication would seriously jeopard- considerable enemy activity east of the Chind- ise both the Sino-American operations based win, between Sittaung and Paungbyin, and also on Ledo and the air ferry route to China. east of Homalin, .some forty miles further up I pointed out that the enemy's effort with- the river. This information, which supple- out control of the Imphal Plain, would prob- mented previous air reconnaissance reports, in- ably have to be confined to raids, owing dicated that the enemy might be preparing for to the indifferent communications and the an offensive. paucity of food supplies in the hill tracts. 58. On the 17th January, we attacked enemy (d) The security of the Imphal Plain was positions at Kyaukchaw, eighteeen miles south- his primary task. east of Tamu in the Atwin Yomas, and there (e) A confirmation of the authority I had were other small operations in the same area recently given General Slim verbally that during the month. he might, if necessary, give ground in the 59. Throughout January and February, 17 Chin Hills and the Kabaw Valley. In this Indian Light Division was continually engaged event, I stated he would be justified in using with the enemy in the Tiddim area; attack Long-Range Penetration forces to operate and counter-attack following each other in boldly against the enemy's flanks and com- quick succession. munications. (/) I stated that,. apart from 25 Indian The Japanese Offensive against Imphal and Division, Long-Range Penetration Brigades, Kohima. and 50 Indian Parachute Brigade, immediate reinforcements for 4 Corps must come from 60. During February, it became steadily more Fourteenth Army sources, and that, there- evident that the Japanese were preparing for fore, preparations should be made for the an offensive across the Chindwin and from the quickest possible moves of troops to rein- area about Fort White against 17 Indian Light force 4 Corps, although this might (i) limit Division. The general situation remained un- the depth of our advance in Arakan, (ii) changed until the 8th March, when the antici- cause troops to be retained in Arakan longer pated Japanese offensive was launched. This than desirable and (iii) interfere with in- began with two main advances, one up the tended reliefs. 77 and 111 Long-Range west bank of -the Manipur River, the other Penetration Brigades were already in the northwards up the Kabaw Valley, from which Fourteenth Army area; 16 Long-Range Japanese columns moved westwards to cut the Penetration Brigade was marching into North Imphal—Tiddim road. It was also apparent, Burma, 14 and 23 LongiRange Penetration^ from the enemy's dispositions, that he would Brigades, and 3 (West African) Long-Range probably launch an offensive farther north Penetration Brigade, were about to move from the Thaungdut—Homalin area against into Fourteenth Army's area from India. Tamu, Ukhrul and Kohima. I promised to investigate whether the pro- 61. Our dispositions at the beginning of jected moves of 14 and 23 Long-Range March were:— Penetration Brigades could be accelerated. 50 Indian Parachute Brigade: Kohima. 63. The relative dispositions of our own This Brigade (less one battalion) had been troops and those of the enemy and the topo- flown in from India as a reinforcement to graphy of the country all combined to facilitate 4 Corps early in March. infiltration, which is the basis of Japanese 23 Indian Division: One brigade in the tactics in fighting in close country. General Ukhrul area ; the remainder south and south- Slim, therefore, decided very rightly, that to east of Imphal. leave 17 Indian Light Division at Tiddim, and 20 Indian Division east and south of Tamu 20 Indian Division: On the Tamu road would not only give the Japanese excellent and in the Kabaw Valley. opportunities of cutting off these two Divisions, 17 Indian Light Division (two brigades but would imperil the defence of the Imphal only): Tiddim area. Plain which was his primary task. 62. On the 7th March, I had sent an instruc- He also appreciated that, if he could engage tion to the Commander, Fourteenth Army, of the Japanese forces in the neighbourhood of which the following were the main points:— the Imphal Plain, he would impose upon them (a) A warning that the impending all the difficulties and disadvantages of a long Japanese offensive against 4 Corps' area line of communication over difficult country would probably be on a considerably larger and preserve to himself the advantages of a scale than anything the enemy had yet short line of communication. attempted in Burma. 64. The G.O.C-in-C. 4 Corps gave instruc- (6) An indication of the tactical difficulties tions to Commander, 17 Indian Light Division, of the situation, due to the fundamental that he was to withdraw if his line of com- weakness of our line of communication munication was seriously threatened. The being parallel to the enemy's front along Commander, 17 Indian Light Division, not find- the Chindwin River. ing himself unduly pressed frontally, and not (c) The strategical importance of the realising the extent to which the enemy were Imphal Plain: (i) as a base for the main- infiltrating behind him, postponed his retire- tenance and operation of our air and land ment somewhat too long. 17 Indian Light 1358 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

Division, therefore, became so closely involved On the 15th March, 15 Japanese Division that the Commander, 4 Corps had to make crossed the Chindwin at Thaungdut and their use of the greater portion of 23 Indian Divi- 31 Division at Homalin and Tamanthi. 20 sion, his only reserve, to assist in extricating Indian Division was withdrawn to better posi- it. This had serious results as the forces de- tions north-west of Tamu, astride the road fending Ukhrul were so reduced that the enemy leading to Imphal. was able to capture the place. A few days later, the enemy attacked 50 Indian Parachute Brigade at Ukhrul in force 65. I had for many months been anxious and after heavy fighting it was forced to with- to increase the strength of 4 Corps by another draw fighting towards Imphal. division; but the low capacity of the line of communication had prevented its maintenance 69. Early in April, we were forced to evacu- in that area and I had to be content, therefore, ate Kanglatongbi, astride the Dimapur road, with one extra brigade, 50 Indian Parachute about 15 miles north of Imphal, and thus lost Brigade, which was brought in early in March. the use of our lines of communication between the railhead at Dimapur and Imphal. 66. With the start of the Japanese offensive, administrative risks had to be -taken and 4 Corps Operations on the Imphal Front. General Slim decided to move 5 Indian Divi- 70. The plan of the Commander, 4 Corps sion from Arakan to the Jmphal—Kohima on the 10th April was as follows:— area. Its move by train and air began on the (a) To prevent the enemy gaining access 19th March. Divisional H.Q., 9 and 123 to the Imphal Plain by either the Palel— Indian Infantry Brigades, were moved to Imphal or Tiddim—Imphal roads. Imphal and 161 Indian Infantry Brigade was (6) To re-establish a force in the Ukhrul moved to Dimapur. The move was finished on area and cut the enemy's line of communi- the 12th April. cation from the east. The Army Commander also transferred 3 (c) To use the largest possible force Commando Brigade from Arakan to Silchar offensively against either 15 or 33 Japanese early in April, with the rdle of operating Divisions in succession. along the track to Bishenpur. 71. The successful withdrawal of 17 Indian Shortly after this, General Slim moved 7 Light Division and 20 Indian Division hi the Indian Division from Arakan (two brigades by face of heavy pressure has already been men- air and one by rail): one brigade joining 4 tioned. 20 Indian Division was now holding Corps by the 18th April, whilst the Division positions in depth along the Palel—Tamu road. less this brigade was allotted to 33 Corps, The gallant delaying action of 50 Indian Para- the Headquarters of which had been flown chute Brigade near Ukhrul had proved most from India to the Dimapur area. 2 British useful, as -it held up the Japanese advance Division was moved by air and train from down the Ukhrul—Imphal road for several Bombay to Dimapur, the move being com- days and thus gave time for the recently arrived pleted between the 25th April and the 2nd 5 Indian Division to concentrate in this area. May. 33 Corps then comprised 2 British Divi- 20 Indian Division was now still further sion, 7 Indian Division (less one brigade), one withdrawn hi order to release troops for a brigade of 5 Indian Division, 23 Long-Range counter-attack against the Japanese 15 Divi- Penetration Brigade, which had been brought sion, north-east of Imphal. forward from India by that time, and the equivalent of a regiment of tanks. It was later 72. Determined enemy attempts against reinforced by a lorried infantry brigade. Imphal from the south and south-east con- tinued, but were successfully withstood by 20 67. The situation caused me some anxiety Indian Division. At the end of April, 23 Indian during this time and I was very grateful for Division on the right, 5 Indian Division fless the valuable assistance which was given me one brigade) in the centre, and a brigade of both by the Cpmmander-in-Chief, India, and 17 Indian Light Division on the left were by General Stilwell. The former, with that advancing north and north-east from Imphal, unfailing readiness to help which he has always and had moved twenty-three miles up the track displayed, had put H.Q. 33 Corps, 2 British running north-east to Ukhrul and ten miles Division, H.Q. 21 Indian Division (late H.Q. up the mam road north to Kohima. (Imphal 44 Indian Armoured Division), 268 Indian to Ukhrul is sixty-seven miles as the track Lorried Infantry Brigade, two regiment of goes and Imphal to Kohima is eighty-four tanks and other troops at my disposal. General miles.) Stilwell undertook the defence of aerodromes 73. It was apparent from the enemy's and communications in an area agreed on be- efforts that he considered the capture of tween him and General Slim, deflecting Chinese Imphal to be essential before the monsoon set troops for this purpose. in. By the first week in May, however, his advance had not only been checked, but forced 68. 17 Indian Light Division pulled out of back in all sectors, except in that of 20 Indian Tiddim on the 17th March and, after hard Division. This division had had to give fighting, in which the enemy suffered heavy ground slightly in the face of heavy attacks by losses, succeeded in cutting its way through to the Japanese Yamamoto Fof£e, composed of Imphal early in April. This Division in spite parts of 33 and 15 Japanese Divisions, up the of many difficulties had succeeded in bringing Palel road. through most of its transport and vital stores, together with its wounded during the with- 74. Heavy fighting had been hi progress in drawal up the Tiddim road. The Silchar— the area of Bishenpur, south-west of Imphal, Bishenpur track was cut by the enemy's for some time, and 33 Japanese Division had advance. been pressing strongly against 17 Indian Light SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1359

Division. It was decided that the situation Hills, whose tracks were narrow, steep and must be cleared up, as any further Japanese scarce. advance here would endanger not only Imphal On the 29th March, however, it had become itself but the neighbouring aerodromes upon evident that 31 Japanese Division was mov- which the air supply of 4 Corps entirely de- ing against the Kohima area. pended. The Commander, 17 Indian Light Division 79. Jessami and Kharasom cover the tracks decided, therefore, to engage the enemy closely leading to Kohima and Tuphema, the latter is south of Bishenpur, and simultaneously to on the main road some fifteen miles due south make a flank movement with two battalions of Kohima. The enemy attacked Kharasom west of the Imphal—Tiddim road. These batta- on the 27th March and Jessami the next day. lion's cut the road behind the enemy positions The garrisons of these two posts, found by which they then attacked from the rear. This 1 Assam Regiment, put up a most spirited attack, coming as it did simultaneously from defence for several days and then made a the north and the south, took 33 Japanese gallant fighting withdrawal, which gained Division by surprise and inflicted heavy valuable time for the preparation of the de- casualties, though the nature of the country, fences of Kohima. lack of sufficient reserves and maintenance 80. 161 Brigade of 5 Indian Divisiori~~had difficulties prevented decisive results. concentrated at Manipur Road on the 30th 75. While these actions were in progress March, and was sent to reinforce the Kohima 23 Indian Division had relieved 20 Indian garrison, but it was withdrawn to meet a re- Division on the Palel—Tamu road, south- ported enemy threat further north which east of Imphal, and had thrown back con- menaced the Dimapur base. As the enemy tinuous enemy attacks. 20 Indian Division closed in on Kohima, however, the Com- was •transferred to the area east and north- mander, 202 Line of Communication Area, east of Imphal, whence operating in two sent back the 4th Battalion, The Queen's columns it continued the advance on Ukhrul. Own Royal West Kent Regiment of that 5 Indian Division made slow progress north- brigade to assist in its defence, and it arrived wards, astride the main road, and by the first on the day on which the Japanese opened week in June, had cleared the strong enemy their attack. When it became apparent that position at Kanglatongbi, fifteen miles north the threat to Manipur Road from the east was of Imphal. During the succeeding fortnight, not serious, and that, moreover, the enemy this Division advanced slowly in the face of were making no attempt to cut the railway, strong opposition in difficult country and under although it would have been easy for them most adverse weather conditions. to do so by sending forward small demolition parties by forest tracks, the remainder of 161 Operations by 33 Corps in the Kohima Sector. Brigade less one battalion already in Kohima 76. Early in April, my main preoccupation was again ordered forward towards Kohima. had been the Japanese advance on Kohima It advanced into the hills to within four miles which, if successful, would have threatened the of Kohima on the west, but, being itself en- Assam Railway, our main line communication gaged, was unable to reach the garrison, with North-Eastern Assam, upon which although two companies actually succeeded in General StilwelTs forces operating in North fighting then- way in on the 18th and proved Burma and the air ferry route to China were a welcome reinforcement in the bitter fighting both based. which occurred on that date. 77. When the scale of the Japanese offen- 81. The Japanese launched their attack on sive was disclosed and it was apparent that Kohima itself on the night 4th-5th April, using there was a threat to Kohima and that the two regiments (the equivalent of two of our road to Imphal was likely to be cut, it was brigade groups) and pressed it incessantly for clear that 4 Corps could no longer control fourteen days. It was gallantly held by the operations in this area in addition to those to garrison consisting of the 4th Battalion, The the south and north of Imphal. As a tempor- Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment, the ary measure, therefore, Kohima was placed Assam Regiment, the Shere Regiment of the under the Commander, 202 Line of Com- Maharaja of Nepal's Troops and a number of munication Area*, and an extemporised head- administrative units and men collected from quarters was set up at Kohima under Colonel the convalescent camp. Richards f, who had formerly commanded an 82. Ammunition and food were adequate, infantry brigade in 81 (West African) Division. but the water ration had to be reduced to half- Headquarters 33 Corps was meanwhile flown a-pint a man for some days as the enemy got to Jorhat from India and moved forward from astride the water pipeline on the 5th April there to Manipur Road, where it arrived on the and it was not till the 13th that a new source 8th April. of water was fortunately discovered. The Siege of Kohima. 83. On the llth, the Air Force was asked 78. The strength of the Japanese advancing to drop water and mortar ammunition. on Kohima was originally estimated at three Boxes of three-inch mortar bombs were battalions, with possibly one more in reserve, dropped, some of which were delivered hi error and the orders given to Colonel Richards were to the enemy. When the Japanese used them to hold Kohima and to deny the area Jessami— against the garrison it was reported that they Kharasom—Kohima to the enemy. It was had started using a new and most effective type thought unlikely that the Japanese could move of bomb. a force greater than this through the Naga 84. On the 15th, and again on the 18th, the enemy made determined assaults, but were * Major-General R. P. L. Ranking, C.B., C.B.E., M.C. ejected from the footings they gained; the t Now Brigadier H. U. Richards, C.B.E., D.S.O. air support given to the defenders on these 1360 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 dates by bombing and cannon fire proving minefields covered by Japanese artillery; but, most helpful. by the 21st June, the leading elements of 2 British Division had reached Milestone 102. 85. Kohima was relieved by 6 Brigade of 2 As forward troops of 5 Indian Division from British Division on the 20th April. This 4 Corps at this time were in the vicinity of Division had hard fighting before it was able Milestone 111, the gap between the two Corps to break through the defences which the enemy had been reduced to nine miles. held astride the Dimapur—Kohima road and gain touch with the garrison which by that 93. 7 Indian Division, which had been time had been driven on to one small hill operating through very difficult country east called Summer Hill in the centre of the area. of the road, had naturally been unable to keep 86. I have dealt with this comparatively level with 2 British Division astride the road; small operation in some detail, not only in but they had contributed greatly to its advance justice to a gallant defence, but because the by capturing several enemy positions on the holding of Kohima was of great importance, Japanese lines of communication leading east and its successful defence proved to be the from the Imphal road, and had thus compelled turning point in the campaign. the enemy to retire. 23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade operat- The Relief of Imphal. ing further east, wide on the left flank of 7 87. H.Q. 33 Corps reached Dimapur on the Indian Division, caused further interference 8th April. The general outline of the Com- with the enemy's communications by cutting mander's plan was as follows:— the Kharasom—Ukhrul track and other tracks (a) Cover the Manipur Road base. to the southward. (6) Capture Kohima area as a starting 94. At about 1245 hours on the 22nd June, point for offensive operations. 2 British and 5 Indian Divisions met at Mile- (c) Operate offensively on the general axis stone 109 from Dimapur (twenty-nine miles of the Dimapur—Imphal road, as soon as the from Imphal) and the road to Imphal was concentration of his forces permitted. open. 31 Japanese Division, which had been 88. The Japanese held the Kohima area allotted the task of capturing Kohima and the in strength except for Summer Hill. Their base at Dimapur. had been severely defeated, strongpoints were nearly, although as it proved and was shortly to meet with virtual annihila- not quite, inaccessible to our tanks: but tion. Kohima was cleared of the enemy by the 2nd 95. I think the somewhat confused fighting June by 2 British and 7 Indian Divisions, after may be more easily followed if I here briefly some weeks of severe hand-to-hand fighting in summarise the phases of the battle for the which the Japanese lost heavily. Our casual- Imphal Plain. The main stages were: — ties were not light. By the 6th June, we had captured the Aradura Spur, which covered the (a) The fighting withdrawal of 17 Indian road some two miles south of Kohima. Light Division and 20 Indian Division. (b) The Japanese attack on Kohima. 89. While these operations were in progress, (c) The rearguard action by 50 Indian columns of 23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade Parachute Brigade from Ukhrul, and the of Special Force were clearing the country making of a defensive position north-east of north-east and east of Kohima, and moving Imphal by 5 Indian Division. southwards by the jungle tracks on Jessami. (d) The further withdrawal by 20 Indian 90. The capture of Kohima and the clearing Division to shortern the southern front and of the difficult and hilly country which lies thus enable troops to be released for the immediately to the east and south of it, attack on 15 Japanese Division north-east of marked the first step in our counter-offensive. Imphal. The Japanese offensive against our base at (e) The transfer of effort to the south to Manipur Road had been driven back with very deal with 33 Japanese Division, and thus to heavy losses to the enemy, and the threat to clear the threat to Imphal from that quarter our road and rail communications in North- before launching a major offensive north- East Assam had been removed. There re- wards, in co-ordination with the drive south mained the urgent task of re-opening the road by 33 Corps, to clear the Imphal—Kohima to Imphal. road. 91. Our dispositions at this time were:— (/) The operations to open the road, com- bined with the subsidiary operations to 268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade (33 capture Ukhrul, which was the vital point Corps)'. Holding Kohima. on the lines of communication of 15 and 23 Long-Range Penetration Brigade : 31 Japanese Divisions. Clearing Jessami area and moving south- wards parallel to the Kohima—Imphal 96. The elimination of the threat to our lines road. of communication in North-East Assam and 2 British Division: Advancing south down the opening of the road from Kohima to the Imphal road from Kohima in pursuit of Imphal ended a definite phase of the campaign. the retreating enemy. 31 Japanese Division had been so roughly 7 Indian Division: Less 89 Brigade (still handled that it had practically lost all fighting under 4 Corps), but with 161 Brigade (5 value. Similarly, the offensive value of the Indian Division) under command, operating enemy's 15 and 33 Divisions had been on the left flank of 2 British Division. greatly reduced by the very heavy losses they had incurred. A conservative estimate of the 92. The advance south from the Aradura enemy's casualties in killed alone amounted to Spur entailed severe fighting and our progress, 13,500, which excluded losses by our air action. especially that of our tanks, was hindered by To this, of course, must be added their wounded SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1361 and the toll taken by disease, from which, on route to China via Ledo and Myitkyina and of their own admission, they suffered severely. securing the air route from Assam to China. The total Japanese casualties on this front, This force, known originally as the Chinese after they crossed the Chindwin in March up Army in India (C.A.I.), which had been trained till the middle of June, may safely be put at with the help of American officers and not less than 30,000. Against this, our own equipped with American material, comprised losses in killed, wounded and missing, from the initially 22 and 38 Chinese Divisions, and was 4th March to the -17th June totalled 12,525, joined later by 30 Chinese Division. These of whom only 2,669 were killed. We captured three divisions were subsequently -reinforced a large amount of equipment, including nearly by 50 and 14 Chinese Divisions, which were 100 guns. flown from China in April and May respec- tively. The force was completed by the addi- 97. The results achieved had been due to the tion of U.S. 5307 Provisional Regiment, con- determination and skill shown by all Com- sisting of three battalions of Long-Range manders hi surmounting difficulties and the fine Penetration troops which had trained with fighting spirit displayed by the troops who had Major-General Wingate's Special Force in shown a marked superiority over the Japanese. India and were now being used as medium- 4 Corps was entirely dependent on supplies range penetration battalions. Known officially brought in by air and in spite of the splendid by the code name "Galahad Force", they work of Air Transport Command, which is were more usually referred to—after the name mentioned later in this Despatch, there were of their commander—as Merrill's Marauders. occasions when our stocks of ammunition ran dangerously low. Rations too had to be cut 102. General Stilwell, the Deputy Supreme although the numbers of mouths to be fed had Allied Commander, South-East Asia Com- been greatly reduced by the movement out of mand, personally assumed command of these Imphal, by road, before the Japanese cut it, troops in the Field. They never formed part and subsequently by air, of every man whose of my Army Group, but General Stilwell presence was unnecessary. In spite of these agreed, until C.A.I. forces had captured handicaps the spirit of 4 Corps remained as Kamaing, to accept instructions from General high as ever and officers and men fought Slim, who was, of course, under my command. splendidly throughout the long battle. This, 103. On the 17th May, C.A.I. had reached coupled with the determination and vigour dis- the outskirts of Myitkyina and captured the played by 33 Corps, led, in the words of the airfield, Galahad Force having contributed Supreme Allied Commander, to the Japanese much to this very notable advance. Kamaing Army suffering a defeat greater than ever was captured on the 16th June and Mogaung before in its history. invested. The situation in the Mogaung Valley on the 22nd June was that the Japanese in Fort Hertz. the Kamaing area were being forced into the 98. This isolated outpost, in the extreme southern end of the valley; while Special north of Burma, was originally occupied by a Force was attacking their supply lines in the small detachment in September 1942, in order area north of Indaw. Special Force also had to protect the landing ground and to raise and a detachment, known as " Morrisf orce", support Kachin Levies to operate towards blocking the Myitkyina—Bhamo road. Myitkyina. These Levies have carried out 104. Supply of all forces was largely by air, many very successful operations and, indeed, at as owing to the weather the construction of one time, became such a thorn in the side of the Ledo Road did not keep pace with the the enemy that the Japanese made a direct advance of the troops. threat against Fort Hertz. To counter this, the 4th Battalion, The Burma Regiment was Special Force. flown there from India at the end of November 105. I have already mentioned Special 1943. Force. This Force consisted of six Long- Range Penetration Brigades, which were 99. In November 1943, the Americans agreed specially selected, trained, organised and to maintain the Fort Hertz garrison by ah", as equipped by the late Major-General Wingate there was no road link with India. Command to give them the maximum mobility in jungle of this detachment was transferred to General fighting. The plan was to concentrate this Stilwell in February 1944. Force within a circle of forty miles radius from Indaw, with the objects of: — 100. These troops, including the Levies, after (a) Assisting the advance of the Chinese- many skirmishes, subsequently made a steady American forces on Myitkyina by drawing advance down the Mali Hka Valley (which con- off and harassing the Japanese forces op- stitutes the headwaters of the Irrawaddy), in posing them, and by preventing reinforce- conjunction with General StilwelTs forces ments reaching them. moving south from Ledo. They did most use- (b) Creating a situation which would en- ful work, inflicting many casualties on small able the Chinese forces to advance from enemy parties, and by the 19th March they had Yunnan. occupied Sumprabumv From the beginning of (c) Causing confusion, damage and loss to June they co-operated with the Chinese- the enemy forces hi North Burma. American troops in the Myitkyina area. I hoped that General Wingate's operations Northern Burma-Ledo-Myitkyina. might also interfere with the Japanese advance against Imphal. 101. The role allotted to the Chinese troops which were under -the command of General 106. The operations of both Special Force Stilwell in India, in January, was to advance and the Sino-American forces moving south on Mogaung and Myitkyina with the object from Ledo were co-ordinated by the Com- of covering the construction of an overland mander, Fourteenth Army. 1362 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 107. The operations of Special Force began was to have operated in the same way as the on the night of the 5th-6th March, and be- other brigades of the Force. But before the tween then and the night of the lOth-llth operations actually started, it was decided to March nearly six hundred Dakota and one hun- split up title brigade and attach one battalion dred glider sorties carried 77 and 111 L.R.P. to each of the 77, 111 and 14 Brigades, to act as Brigades, totalling 9,500 troops and 1,100 a garrison for the stronghold which was to animals, into the heart of Japanese-occupied form the base of each of the three above-men- Burma. The initial role of these glider-borne tioned brigades. 3 (West African) Brigade com- forces was to secure sites for and to prepare pleted its fly-in by the 12th April. These for- landing strips west of the Irrawaddy. Last mations used airstrips established near Man'hton minute air reconnaissance disclosed that one of (" Aberdeen "), twenty-seven miles north-north- the two [potential strips selected, thirty-five miles west of Indaw; Mawlu (" White City ")»twenty, north-east of Katha (called " Piccadilly ") had miles north of Katha, and in the Hopin area. been deliberately obstructed. General Sim, who During this second phase some 6,000 troops, was present at the starting point when this 850 animals and 550,000 Ibs. of stores were news was received, was faced with the difficult transported with the very slight casualties of decision whether to launch the operation, since 15 killed (all in one aircraft) and six injured. it appeared that the enemy had got wind of it, or to postpone it until fresh plans could 112. General Wingate originally estimated be made. Ke decided to let the operation go that about twelve weeks would be the maximum forward and on the first night the landings period which troops would be able to with- were confined to one strip only, called " Broad- stand the rigorous conditions under which they way ", which was some twenty-seven miles south- would be called upon to operate. His original east of Hopin on the Myitkyina—Mandalay plan, therefore, was (i) to march in 16 L.R.P. railway. Brigade from Ledo, because the route was known to be practicable and this formation 108. The landings at Broadway, and subse- would be able to co-operate more closely with quently on another strip (" Chowringhee") General Stilwell's forces advancing in the same some twenty miles south-south-east of Katha, area, and (ii) later to fly in 77 and 111 L.R.P. achieved complete surprise and until the 12th Brigades, retaining the other brigades as a March no ground opposition was met. Air " second wave " which might, or might not, attacks did not begin until the 10th and were be used to operate during the monsoon, in relief directed against the Chowringhee strip which, of the three brigades sent in initially. This by that tune, had fulfilled its purpose and had plan was later modified, however, as General been abandoned. The Broadway strip was not Slim decided to fly in 14 and 3 (West African) attacked until the 13th March, when our Brigades early in April. On the 5th February fighters were present and A.A. defences had 16 Brigade marched in from Ledo as planned, been established. The Japanese lost about via Singkaling Hkamti, after a long inarch 50 per cent, of their attacking aircraft. during which it had a few minor engagements, and began operations in the Indaw area in 109. Our losses during the initial fly-in March. 23 L.R.P. Brigade was sent into amounted to only one per cent, of the total Burma, but was subsequently employed by personnel transported. The only animal casualty the Army Commander in the Naga Hills and was one mule. The smallness of these losses is Manipur area hi co-operation with 33 Corps. remarkable in view of the fact that, at the peak period of the fly-in, double the planned 113. It is impossible, in a report of this effort was achieved, and aircraft were coming nature, to give a detailed summary of the in and taking off at the rate of one " landing " varied activities of the five brigades of Special and one " take-o^f" every three minutes. Force which operated independently in North Burma. The damage they inflicted on the 110. A special American air force, called enemy, both human and material, was con- No. 1 Air Commando, had been formed to siderable, comprising, at it did, the laying of co-operate both tactically and administratively many ambushes, the destruction or blocking of with Special Force. It was a composite force rail and road communications, and the destruc- comprising some 250 aircraft—long- and short- tion of supply dumps and other military instal- range fighters, light bombers, Dakotas and lations.. The operations carried out by these gliders. This force carried out the hazardous columns, combined with the story of how and difficult glider-borne operations, flying fully American aircraft released their gliders, filled laden gliders, some in double tow, over 9,000 with British troops and American engineers, foot mountains by night, a distance of 300 miles to make their landings hi jungle clearings in to the selected area. Equally important was pitch darkness, forms one of the outstanding the action of the fighters and bombers of this episodes of the war, but an account of the force, before, during, and after the actual operations will not be given until a subsequent landings, against targets which it was vital to Despatch. attack. No. 221 Group, R.A.F., also did splen- did work in these operations. I wish to ex- 114. I have nothing but praise for the organi- press my appreciation of the work carried out zation of the initial landings, and the gallantry by these air forces, without whose assistance and endurance displayed by all ranks in the Special Force could not have operated. operations which followed. Events have shown, however, that these operations had less effect 111. 77 and 111 L.R.P. Brigades were followed upon the enemy than I hoped for. The enemy by 14 L.R.P. Brigade, whose fly-in was com- did not divert troops from his forward areas, pleted by the 4th April. 3 (West African) nor did he alter his main strategical plan. Brigade, which formed part of Special Force, In fact, the. results achieved did not prove to SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1363 be commensurate with the expenditure in man- (d) The urgent need for plenty of infantry power and material which had been employed. in this theatre of war has again been These operations: — emphasised. All divisions, except 19 Indian (a) Did not affect the launching of the Division which was the only reserve at the Japanese offensive against Assam. disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, India, (6) Had but little effect on the enemy's were engaged in the course of the fighting lines of communication, to Assam. They and no proper relief of formations was pos- delayed for one month up to three batta- sible. The relief of tired troops is most lions of 15 Japanese Division, which might important and it was not solved satisfactorily otherwise have reached the Imphal Front owing to shortage of troops. earlier. Some of my divisions had, by last June, been (c) Although they severed the rail com- in the forward areas for twenty-eight months. munications of 18 Japanese Division for I need not stress the mental and physical strain about three months, only one battalion (from which jungle warfare, under adverse climatic the 18 Divisional Reserve) was actually conditions, imposes on the soldier. diverted from the front of General StilwelTs forces and that only for about a month. Naval Operations. (d) On the other hand, the Japanese were 117. I wish to acknowledge the assistance compelled to collect troops to meet the given by coastal forces in the Arakan opera- threat but they did not amount to more than tions, which carried out valuable raids against twelve battalions at any one time, although vulnerable points on the coast, and were pro- the number of enemy battalions which were tection against possible small sea-borne raids employed at one time or another added up by the enemy. to sixteen. The concentration of twelve In March, 3 Commando Brigade (No. 5 battalions was not complete until two months Commando and No. 44 Royal Marine Com- after the original landings. mando) carried out successfully a small am- 115. 16 L.R.P. Brigade, which had originally phibious operation in the Alethangyaw area marched in from Ledo, was evacuated by air from St. Martin's Island, with the object of early in May. On the 17th May, the three containing the enemy in that area and prevent- remaining brigades of Special Force came ing the movement north of reinforcements under the command of General Stilwell in the during our main attack on the Maungdaw— Northern Combat Area Command and subse- Buthidaung road. quently operated, in a normal infantry role, in tihe Kamaing—Mogaung—Myitkyina sector. Although there was no large-scale naval " Dahforce'", which was composed of Kachin activity^ in conjunction with land forces dur- Levies, was flown in with Special Force and ing the" period under review, it was the ever later amalgamated with three columns of 111 present threat of amphibious operations which Brigade, the whole being re-named "Morris- tied nearly two Japanese divisions to coastal force " (already briefly mentioned in paragraph areas. 103). Air Co-operation. Before leaving the subject of Special Force, I wish to pay tribute to its gallant commander, 118. Tasks. The general tasks performed by Major-General Wingate, whose death occurred Eastern Air Command during the first six in a flying accident late in March. He was that months of the year were as follows: — rare combination of the dreamer and the man (d) Strategic air offensive to destroy of action and his example and spirit will remain enemy forces, transportation, and mainten- an inspiration to the men he trained. He was ance installations. succeeded by his Second-in-Command, Major- (to) Support of Fourteenth Army opera- General W. D. A. Lentaigne, C.B., C.B.E., tions. D.S.O. (c) Air defence of Calcutta and the Lessons of the Campaign. adjacent industrial areas and, also, of the 116. The following important facts emerge airfields used by the American Air Trans- from a study of the operations undertaken port Command in North-East Assam for the during the first six months of 1944: — China ferry service. . (a) The reinforcements received were well (d) Ah- transportation for airborne and air trained, thanks to the training arrangements transit forces. made by the Commander-in-Chief, India, (e) Photographic reconnaissance. and our troops, both individually and collec- tively, were able to engage the Japanese 119. Strategic Air Force. I am, of course, with confidence. chiefly, concerned with the air transport and (6) Our ability to make full use of air tactical support given to Fourteenth Army, supply by virtue of our air superiority has but I wish to acknowledge the assistance ren- fundamentally altered the tactical picture, dered by the Strategic Air Force. Their attacks and enabled our troops not only to operate on Rangoon and Bangkok, and, also, those on in country hitherto considered impassable Saigon by 14 ILS.A.A.F. from China, have and so attack the enemy, but also to hold greatly impeded the flow of Japanese reinforce- positions when the enemy has cut their ments and material into Burma. In fact, -up till lines of communication. the time when monsoon conditions reduced air (c) The operations have shown that ordin- activity, Rangoon was practically denied to the ary formations can be transported quickly enemy as a port. Operations against enemy- •by air." They have also shown the need, for held ports have been supplemented by constant fighting under Far Eastern conditions, of a attacks against coastal shipping and, most im- " Standard Infantry Division " which can be portant from my point of view, against rail readily transported by rail, sea, M.T. or air. communications and military installations. On 1364 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 several occasions, also, elements of the Strategic (c) The maintenance of the Chinese Air Force have acted in a tactical r61e and divisions advancing south-east from Ledo, furnished most valuable close support both by which included supplies for our Fort Hertz bombing and by ferrying supplies. garrison and the Levies operating in that area. 120. Tactical Air Force. The successful pro- (d) The delivery by air of some 2,000 tons vision of ground support in this Theatre, of supplies of all kinds to 7 Indian Division although facilitated by our complete air during the fighting between the 8th February supremacy, is faced by two difficulties: — and the 6th March. (a) the problem of target recognition in (e) The fly-in of the Brigades of Special dense jungle (enhanced, as it is, by the Force to the centre of Burma. enemy's skill hi camouflaging his positions (/) The move by air of 50 Indian Para- and dumps), and chute Brigade from Northern India to the (b) the Japanese skill in building field de- Imphal area, followed by the transfer of the fences which require direct hits from heavy personnel of 5 Indian Division, two brigades Indian Army since the outbreak 134. I wish to pay a tribute to the tribes- of the Japanese war, mainly on propaganda men of the Naga, Chin and Kachin Hills, who and espionage tasks. Some have been landed have remained staunchly loyal to us, in spite in India by submarine or parachute, and con- of all the enemy's efforts to suborn them. siderable numbers have infiltrated across the 135. Casualties. The following table shows Indo-Burman border. This movement, which the 'battle casualties inflicted on the enemy be- has been in the main a matter for India Com- tween November, 1943, and June, 1944, both mand to counter, was largely defeated. Its months inclusive:— effects on the troops under my command have By Fourteenth Army By C.A.I. been negligible. Killed 26,203 13,232 Wounded 39,305 19,848 130. The I.N.A. is principally composed of Prisoners 288 57 Indian prisoners of war taken in Singapore, Total 98,933 though civilians are now also being recruited. This army, which had a rather ill-starred This proportion of killed to wounded is beginning in 1942—at the end of wihich year it calculated from captured returns and may be was disbanded by the Japanese—was re-formed assumed to be reasonably accurate. by Subhas Chandra Bose, the Bengali revolu- This estimate does not include the losses tionary, soon after his arrival in the East from the enemy has suffered from our sustained air Germany in 1943. It is now organised in three attacks or from disease, the incidence of divisions, of which two are afieged to be fit which captured documents have shown to be to take the field. Its headquarters was at high. There is of course, always a tendency Maymyo, with a rear headquarters at Singa- to over-estimate enemy casualties but I think pore. A strength of 13,000, including No. 1 it would be no exaggeration to assume that Division, has been moved up into Burma since the total Japanese losses, on all counts, during last November, while No. 2 Division (approxi- the eight months under review amounted to mately 7,000) is prepared to follow. at least one hundred thousand. B 1366 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

PART in—ORGANIZATION. Standard Organizations for:— 136. I have already given a summary of the A Corps Headquarters. land forces transferred to me from India Com- An Infantry Division. mand with effect from midnight on the 15th- Armoured Formations (re-organization of 16th November 1943 when the Supreme Allied Tank Brigades). Commander assumed command. In addition, Organization for the movement and main- the following formations passed to my com- tenance of Air Transported Formations. mand between November 1943 and June Assumption of full contol by 11 Army 1944: — Group of Fourteenth Army and Land Forces, 9 Indian Infantry Brigade (5 Indian Ceylon. Division). (December.) The principal changes involved, together with 32 Indian Infantry Brigade (20 Indian my reasons for effecting them, are summarized Division). (Late November.) in the succeeding paragraphs:— 254 Indian Tank Brigade Qess 45th Cavalry, but plus 3 Dragoon Guards). 139. 11 (East African) Division. At a con- (December.) ference held in Ceylon in January, at which 25 Indian Division. (February and the G.O.C.-in-iC, East African Command was March.) present, I decided to increase the artillery of 14 and 16 L.R.P. Brigades. (In March this formation up to the scale of that in an and January respectively.) Animal and Motor Transport (A. and M.T.) 77 and 111 L.R.P. Brigades. (January.) Division on the Indian Establishment. 36 British Division. (Between late I also decided to reduce the scale of both January and early March.) unit and 2nd line motor transport, and to pro- 23 L.R.P. Brigade. (Early April.) vide an element within the infantry battalions Advance H.Q., 3 Special Service Brigade for carrying fighting equipment under con- (with No. 5 Commando and No. 44 Royal ditions when M.T. could not operate. Marine Commando). (February.) 50 Indian Parachute Brigade. (Early 140. 81 and 82 (West African) Divisions. In March.) May, at a conference attended by the G.O.C.- 2 British Division, which moved to Assam in-C., West Africa, I considered the advis- as follows:— ability of amalgamating these two divisions; 5 Brigade. (End of March.) for 81 Division, which had given up one of H.Q., 2 British Division and 6 Brigade. its brigades to Special Force, consisted only (Early April.) of two brigades. Owing, however, to the short- 4 Brigade. (Mid-April.) age of formations with which to carry out reliefs, I decided to retain both divisions, but Also a cavalry regiment, a medium regi- to effect certain changes in their organization. ment R.A., and two Indian battalions. These included:— 28 (East African) Brigade arrived in (a) The divisional artillery to consist of February and replaced 99 Infantry Brigade in one light regiment (three batteries of Ceylon, which reverted to India Command. 3.7-inch howitzers and one battery of 3-inch Headquarters, 21 Indian Division, consisting mortars) and one anti-tank regiment (three of a proportion of the H.Q. Staff and a few batteries, each of twelve six-pounder guns). ancillary units of the late 44 Indian Armoured Field regiments could not be formed, but Division, arrived in Jorhat (Assam) on the would be attached when required. 5th March. (b) A reconnaissance battalion to be in- cluded in each division. 268 Indian Lorried Infantry Brigade was (c) A proportion (25 per cent.) of the un- lent by India Command early in May (vide armed soldiers, who act as porters, to be paragraph 67). armed. 137. A skeleton Order of Battle of the West African resources did not, unfortun- undermentioned formations will be found in ately, admit of certain other desirable increases, the appendices:— such as the .inclusion of a Divisional Head- Appendix " A "—Skeleton Order of Battle quarters battalion. of 15 Indian Corps on the 1st January 1944, I also decided that 3 (West African) Brigade at the commencement of our offensive in of 81 (West African) Division should continue the Arakan. to be employed with Special Force. Appendix " B "—Skeleton Order of Battle I intended to bring these two West African of 4 Corps on the 8th March 1944, the divisions and the East African division, into date the Japanese launched their offensive line with the standard divisional organization across the Chindwin. (vide paragraph 142) in due course. Appendix " C "—Skeleton Order of Battle 33 Indian Corps on the 31st May 1944, when 141. Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops. that formation was engaged in driving the In order to secure uniformity, a standardised enemy from the Kohima area. War Establishment for a Corps Headquarters Appendix " D "—Skeleton Order of Battle and, also, a standard Order of Battle for Corps 11 Army Group on the 22nd June 1944, the Troops, is to be adopted. date on which this Despatch closes. 142. Standard Organization for Infantry Divi- sions. I have already briefly referred to the 138. The major re-organizations, which were desirability of having one standard organiza- finished, or which were begun; during the tion for all infantry divisions operating in this period covered by this Despatch were: — theatre of war, and for some time past I had 11 (East African) Division. been examining the possibility of this. Ex- 81 and 82 (West African) Divisions. perience had shown that, with our limited SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1367 resources, it was not practical to have a num- at the same tune, effecting a saving in man- ber of specialised formations such as Airborne, power. Assault, Armoured, Light, M.T., and Animal This matter is still being discussed with the and M.T. Divisions. Such a policy was not Commander-in-Chief, India, and will be re- only uneconomical, but circumstances inevi- ferred to again in my next Despatch.* tably forced their use sooner or later in roles for which they had not been trained or 144. Organization for the Movement and organized. Maintenance of Air Transported Formations. Recent experience has shown that there is an Early in May, I recommended to the urgent need for a permanent organization to Supreme Allied Commander that the policy of handle the movement and maintenance of having a Standard Division should be accepted, forces by air, instead of the improvisation that such a division to be capable of fulfilling all has hitherto existed. the rdles which it might be called upon to perform within South-East Asia Command, Such an organization must, obviously, be de- viz.: — signed to ensure the closest co-operation be- tween the staffs at the headquarters of the air (fl) Normal jungle fighting. force and the army concerned and, also, the (ft) Operations involving transportation staffs at the airfields affected. To achieve this, by air. four elements are required: — (c) Amphibious operations (though, for (a) An Army Link with the R.A.F. Head- this role, special training and the attachment quarters dealing with air transport. of certain special units such as beach groups, (ft) Joint Army and R.A.F. Air Despatch would of course be necessary). and Delivery Units at airfields. The Supreme Allied Commander gave his (c) An Airfield Maintenance Organization approval to my proposals and they have since to ensure that maintenance requirements at been accepted by the War Office and General airfields are met. Headquarters, India. In addition the forma- (d) Air Supply and Maintenance Com- tion of an airborne division has been agreed panies to deal with the packing, loading and to. ejection of supplies. Action to put this new policy into force is My proposals for an organization, which being taken in order to bring the maximum will produce the necessary continuity and flexi- number of divisions on to the standard organi- bility, are under consideration by Head- zation before the end of 1944. This organiza- quarters, Air Command, S.E.A.C., and General tion will include three infantry battalions per Headquarters, India. brigade (to be increased to four when practic- 145. Assumption of Full Control by 11 able, as is the case in the War Office Light- Army Group. As I have already stated in Scale Division for Far Eastern Theatres), two the opening paragraphs of this Despatch, Four- artillery regiments of 25-pounders (in place of teenth Army, together with Ceylon Army Com- the existing one 25-pounder and one jungle mand and the Indian Ocean bases of Addu field regiment in A. and M.T. divisions), Atoll, Diego Garcia and Cocos, came under one 3.7-inch howitzer mountain regiment of my command from the 16th November 1943, three batteries (instead of the present four- but certain administrative matters continued battery regiment), and one anti-tank regi- to be dealt with by General Headquarters, ment having an alternative armament of 3-inch India, until more staff became available for mortars (instead of the existing anti-aircraft 11 Army Group. My Headquarters, however, cum anti-tank regiment). The division will assumed full control with effect from the also include a reconnaissance battalion 1st May, 1944, with the exception of some organized on similar lines to the normal infan- administrative matters which were more con- try battalion, but with extra signal equipment, and, as soon as the manpower situation per- veniently handled by G.H.Q. India. mits, a medium machine gun battalion. PART IV—ADMINISTRATION. A major feature of the new Standard Division is the reduction in the number of 146. In order to view the administrative lorries, both in unit 1st line transport and in problem which confronted us in this Theatre 2nd line M.T. companies, and the introduction in its correct perspective, it is necessary to of a large number of jeeps. Eventually it is understand the background against which the hoped to have two types of vehicles only; the present organization developed. Eastern jeep and the 3-ton four-wheel-drive lorry Army, the forerunner of Fourteenth Army, (apart, of course, from a limited number of came into being at a time of reverses in Burma specialist vehicles). and unpreparedness in Eastern India. The whole of that rear organization, on which the 143. Re-organization of Armoured Forma- success or failure of an army depends, had tions. A review of the role required of tank therefore to be built up from nothing, under brigades operating in this Theatre led me to the most difficult conditions. While the early the conclusion that certain major changes in stages of this build-up have already been their organization were necessary. I considered described in Despatches from the India Com- that the value of these brigades would be mand, a brief recapitulation of the facts may greatly enhanced if (a) all regiments were re- be opportune here. equipped with medium tanks, (ft) a troop of flame-thrower tanks was included in each 147. Our strategy, in 1942, was defensive and squadron, and (c) an infantry battalion was our advanced bases were selected accordingly.. included in each brigade. By making certain The area of operations was, and still is, divided reductions in the existing establishment, it administratively into two fronts—Arakan and would, I decided, be possible to adopt this * Operations in Assam and Burma from 23rd June, re-organization of the armoured units, while 1944 to 12th November, 1944. B 2 1368 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

Assam—each of which is served by a separate 151. The Northern and Southern Lines of line of communication, connected by poor Communication areas are divided by the Garp lateral communications (though air supply is and Jaintia Hills and the only lateral communi- now an important factor which can be, and cation connecting them is the hill section of has been, used to unite these separate lines). the Bengal and Assam Railway. The natural advanced base for the Arakan 152. The whole area was without airfields front is Chittagong. This port was prepared and so low-lying as to render airfield construc- for demolition in 1942 and many "denial" tion difficult. It entailed, not only the trans- measures were actually carried out.. It only narrowly escaped being occupied by the portation of heavy tonnages of engineer stores, Japanese in the summer of that year; and in but also of coal, since much surfacing had to fact, our subsequent advance in October 1942, be done with burnt brick. when we passed from the defensive to the The move and maintenance of forces by ah*, offensive, began while Chittagong was still as well as our probable future commitments, under sentence of death. Both the port and have necessitated a large increase in airfield advanced base at Chittagong had then to be construction, but I shall deal with this subject developed while active operations were in pro- in greater detail later on. gress, and while they were both having to perform their administrative functions to the 153. I propose to deal with the work of my forces in the field. These forces rose to a Administrative Services under the following strength of two divisions, and, incidentally, had main headings: — a sick rate of over 6 per 1,000 per diem. Not (a) Adjutant-General questions. only was there no all-weather road in Arakan, (b) The Lines of Communication. but no road at all worthy of the name. We (c) Supply and Maintenance. were, therefore, compelled to rely largely on (d) The Engineering Effort. coastal shipping and inland water transport (e) The Civil Affairs Service, Burma. and, for many months, there was a serious shortage of both types of vessels. The diffi- Adjutant-General Questions. culty was eventually overcome to some extent 154. Manpower. The '* divisional slice *' in by the construction of a road which had to be this Theatre has averaged 56,000, excluding surfaced with bricks, the coal for which had civil labour, and 70,000 including it, whereas, to be imported from India. Ordinary metalling I believe, the " divisional slice " in Normandy was impossible, owing to the absence of stone. is 40,000. The high figure in the Burma cam- paign is mainly due to the large administrative 148. While we were on the defensive, Mymen- "tail", comprising numerous engineer and singh was being prepared as an advanced base, labour units, which are needed to overcome but was only about hah* finished when our the physical difficulties on our lines of com- strategy changed. We were not sufficiently munication. certain of success to discontinue construction and, in the light of subsequent events, it is 155. Reinforcements. The demand for rein- fortunate that we continued to build. forcements is heavy, owing to the high sick 149. On the Imphal Front, we had to con- rate which is, however, much lower than anti- struct a large advanced base in virgin jungle, cipated, and to the tune lag between demand under the most adverse climatic and weather and arrival, due to the distances which rein- conditions. This base at Manipur Road, or forcements have to cover over a long and in- Dimapur as it is sometimes called, had to different transportation system. start work while its construction was yet in- Reinforcement has been below wastage; but, complete. apart from, British infantry, in which tjie As a site for a base, Dimapur possessed shortage is most acute, it has not been so almost every conceivable disadvantage: heavy serious as to impair fighting efficiency. Broadly rainfall; unhealthy climate; and uneven ground speaking, the numbers available have been in (which did not become apparent until the dense excess of battle casualties, but 'they have not jungle had been cleared). Moreover, it lies on been sufficient to meet the total wastage and a narrow tongue of land between two rivers, thus keep reinforcement camps full. both of which are liable to overflow during the monsoon. To these local topographical dis- 156. British reinforcements for Fourteenth advantages must be added the further one of Army are provided by General Headquarters, the liability to interruption of the railway to India, from (a) the British Base Reinforcement Assam by the rivers and streams which pour Camp at Deolali, (&) personnel freed by the down from the huge catchment area of the disbandment of units, e.g. A.A. Brigades, and Himalayas, the foothills of which the railway (c) returning sick from hospitals in India. skirts. In 1942, the railway was cut by floods Except for (c), who go direct to reinforcement from the 24th June till the 30th November. camps in the Fourteenth Army area, drafts pass through 52 Training Brigade, where they 150. The railway system, which is metre carry out a two months course of hardening gauge, had never previously had to tackle more and jungle training. Indian reinforcements, than a moderately heavy seasonal load of from Regimental Centres and Depots, pass •cereals and tea. It now had to undertake a through either 14 or 39 Indian Training much increased load of civil traffic and had to Divisions to Fourteenth Army reinforcement be further pressed to meet the needs not only camps. There are twelve such camps in the of the large Imperial forces operating on the Army area, consisting each of two British and Northern and Southern Fronts, but also of the eight Indian Sections. Each Section is 300 Sino-American forces based on Ledo and, last strong, and the total capacity of each camp but not least, the air ferry service to China. is thus 3,000. Training staffs are available in Concurrently, road and river transportation each camp to keep reinforcements at a proper had been developed to take some of the strain. state of efficiency. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1369 157. The Medical Aspect—A. Organization, supply and evacuation has had to be entirely (a) The medical organization in Fourteenth by air. That the arrangements worked Army was originally based on the assump- smoothly is due both to the medical officers tion that the main operations would be concerned and to the skilful co-operation of forward of Imphal. Hospitals were conse- the R.A.F. quently, largely concentrated in the north and, (c) I have already mentioned how the evacu- in order to avoid evacuation down a long line ation of casualties by air from the Imphal of communication, they were sited well for- Front prevented a serious situation developing ward. The Japanese thrust against Imphal when certain hospitals had to be closed down. however, necessitated their removal, and a This air evacuation continued throughout the situation arose in which about twenty-five per operations about Imphal and was instrumental cent, of our hospitals became temporarily non- in saving many, lives. In addition to casualties, effective. This would have been serious had it two large General Hospitals were flown out not been for two saying factors: firstly, air with all their valuable equipment. transport provided a link between our northern and southern lines of communication, (d) The total number of casualties evacuated enabling casualties to be rapidly cleared to by ah- during the first half of 1944, from all hospitals serving the Arakan Front; and fronts, was over 24,000. Rapid and adequate secondly, the sick rate on both fronts fell far air transport facilities abolish at one stroke short of the estimate for which provision had the unsatisfactory and difficult clearance of been made. casualties down long surface lines of com- munication, with all their attendant disadvan- (b) In the south, where extensive operations tages. This method of moving the wounded had not been originally contemplated, and has a most beneficial effect on the morale of where the forces engaged were smaller, our the fighting soldier. hospitals had not been concentrated so far forward. 161. The Medical Aspect—B. Sick Rate. Considerable discussion took place early in The most satisfactory feature on the medical the year between 11 Army Group and General side has been the surprisingly low sick rate Headquarters, India, regarding the adequacy during the first six months of the year. The or otherwise of the hospitals. expected rise to 5 or 6 per 1,000 per diem has not happened and the rate in May was as low The decisions then taken proved to be sound as 3.1 per 1,000 including battle casualties. on the whole, in spite of our forecasts being wrong and of radical alterations in the lines of This is an almost incredibly low figure com- evacuation. Although there is still a decided pared with that for 1943, which was 6 per shortage of medical officers, and a serious 1,000 per diem; and, in spite of the seasonal shortage of nurses and nursing personnel, there increase of malaria, it has since dropped to has been no general shortage of hospital 2.9. accommodation, but anxiety is always present Since November 1943, food supply greatly in an unhealthy tropical theatre of war. improved, and more fresh meat, fruit and vege- tables became available. It is probable that 158. At the beginning of the year, facilities this improvement in rations has been a major for evacuation were reviewed, and as a result cause in keeping down the sick rate. of representations made by me to the Supreme Allied Commander, six hospital ships were 162. The most serious menace we have to allotted to Fourteenth Army. face, where disease is concerned, is of course malaria, and this can only be overcome by Further, a co-ordinating committee, invested unremitting effort and vigilance. The malaria with executive authority, which includes repre- rate, up till the end of June, has remained con- sentatives of 11 Army Group and General sistently low compared with last year. This is Headquarters, India, and of the many services remarkable, since operations have been affected, has been set up to deal in detail with carried out on a greatly extended scale, and the complicated problem of medical evacua- many more troops have been exposed to the tion. Its measures have so fair proved effec- risk of infection. If the same rate had obtained tive, notwithstanding the many problems which in Arakan and at Imphal from March to June have arisen. as in the same months of 1943, the effect on 159. One interesting feature of the recent operations would have been serious. fighting is that the medical units have found I attribute this satisfactory state of affairs themselves on occasions called upon to under- to four factors—firstly, better anti-malarial dis- take part of the responsibility for their own cipline ; secondly, the improved anti-malarial defence. That medical personnel had to fight organization which, under medical control and proved to be a necessity—it was not a question aided by the engineers, has freed certain areas as to whether -they should defend themselves, from the mosquito ; thirdly, the ample flow of but how best they could do so. anti-malarial supplies of all kinds; and last, but not least, improved morale, since troops 160. (a) The complicated problem of in good fettle look after themselves better in medical evacuation from Arakan involved every way than when they are depressed. the use of almost every conceivable form of transport. Hand carriages, mules, jeeps, ambu- The efficacy of D.D.T. as an anti-mosquito lances, D.U.K.Ws., sampans, flats, paddle spray is shortly being tested in the Kabaw steamers, hospital ships, ambulance trains, and Valley. light and heavy aircraft have all had to be 163. The Medical Aspect—C. Miscellaneous employed over one stage or another of the Medical Points, (a) There has been no notice- journey. able change in the physical standard of British (b) To and from 81 (West African) Division reinforcements, which can only be classed as operating in the Kaladan Valley, medical average. 1370 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

(6) The physical standard of young soldiers (c) Transportation difficulties originally pre- in the Indian Army has improved during the cluded the achievement of the target of twenty- period under review, particularly in combatant eight days leave per annum for Indian ranks, units. but these have since been overcome. 164. The Army Pathological Service suffers, 172. Morale and Welfare. The large in this Theatre, from the lack of laboratories. number of itroops who have taken part in The importance of accurate laboratory operations have gained confidence from their diagnosis requires no stressing. contact with the enemy. It is universally felt that the Japanese soldier, although a good in- 165. Dental facilities are altogether in- fantryman, is no match for our well-trained adequate. The accepted ratio of dental officers and well-equipped troops, supported by a to troops is one per 1,000 for British and one powerful air force. per 10,000 for Indian. The present ratio is one per 7,000 and 30,000 respectively. 173. The still inadequate but increased and, I may add, well deserved publicity now being 166. The present standard of training of given to this theatre of war, coupled with medical personnel in this Theatre does not the introduction of more amenities such as compare altogether favourably with that in mobile canteens, cinemas, wireless sets, sports others, but, taking into consideration the ex- equipment, a daily newspaper ("SEAC"), pansion which the Medical Services have under- and also visits from " Ensa", have all con- gone, and the acute shortage of medical officers tributed to the improvement in morale. Men in India, it is, I am sure, as good as can be are beginning to feel that they do not belong expected. Training is, I know, continuous and to " The Forgotten Army ". intensive in the India Command and the situa- tion is improving. In all my efforts to improve the lot of the British rank and file, I am closely in touch 167. The supply of medical stores, including with the Commander-in-Chief, India, whose drugs, has been most satisfactory. The con- troops share with mine in the severe handicaps sumption of mepacrine in Fourteenth Army as of climate, homesickness, and the feeling that a malaria suppressive has reached twelve the Burma Border is not, at present, the de- million tablets a month. cisive Theatre. In spite of all the steps that 168. The problem of providing adequate have been, and are being taken, the under- medical supervision for the large amount of current of feeling against service hi the East civilian labour employed in the Fourteenth still persists, and many " grouses " are still in Army area is being met at present, but it may evidence, though the spirit of the troops in become more difficult when civilian labour forward units is magnificent. forces have to be moved into re-conquered Among British troops, the most burning territory as our troops advance. question has been, and is, that of repatriation. In particular, the disparity in the terms of 169. The thirteen convalescent depots in 11 overseas service between the Army and the Army Group have proved their value as an R.A.F. is a continual source of grievance. The essential link between hospital and reinforce- ment camp. The "patients" in the British measures recently taken to improve this will, Depot at Kohima played a notable part in the it is hoped, allay some of the feeling that has defence of that place during the siege, though undoubtedly existed. such strenuous work had hardly been recom- 174. The chief anxiety of Indian troops, as mended as part of their convalescence. always, is the welfare during their absence of their families, but the leave situation is now Miscellaneous A.G. Points. satisfactory. The effect of enemy propaganda 170. Legal and Judicial, (a) As a result of on the Indian soldier has been negligible. the Supreme Allied Commander's Proclamation No. 1 of 1944, under which he assumed control 175. The work of philanthropic bodies such of re-occupied territory, British Military as the Red Cross, the Y.M.C.A. and Toe H Administration Courts have been set up in has been most valuable and I am very grateful Burma. indeed to the large body of voluntary workers (&) Arrangements have been made with who have contributed so much to the welfare General Headquarters, India, for assistance to of the troops, both British and Indian. be given to Fourteenth Army in the prosecution The Lines of Communication. of those suspected to be military traitors who 176. I have already referred to the Northern fall into our hands. More detailed interroga- and Southern Lines of Communication Areas, tion is now to be carried out at Forward but there are in fact three lines of communi- Interrogation Centres and the majority of cation supplying Fourteenth Army:— prisoners will be dealt with in forward areas. (a) The Assam Line of Communication, 171. Leave, (a) All British personnel have which has three railheads: that at Manipur had to be restricted to fourteen days leave Road, also called Dimapur, supplying the during 1944, owing to the lack of accommoda- Imphal Front; and those at Ledo and tion in suitable areas, and to transportation Chabua which supply the Chinese-American difficulties which can only be solved by the forces operating in Northern Burma, and provision of more aircraft. the air ferry route to China. (£) Representations were made that British (ft) The Eastern Bengal Line of Com- Service officers, both with British units and munication, which serves our bases in those seconded to the Indian Army, who were Eastern Bengal and the airfields in the Surma willing, should be granted home leave in lieu Valley, which are extensively used for air of repatriation. Many such officers have supply. valuable experience in jungle warfare and their Some flexibility between the Eastern retention is most desirable. Bengal and Assam lines of communication SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1371

is provided by the rail link between Lum- A proposal to erect a railway bridge across ding and Badarpur, but the capacity of this the Brahmaputra at Amingaon was rejected on link is limited owing to the gradients. the grounds that it would take too long to build. (c) The Arakan Line of Communication, The alternative was to increase the capacity which supplies IS Indian Corps southwards of the Amingaon—Pandu ferry, and this has from Chittagong. been done. The following paragraphs give a brief general description of these lines of communication, 180. The Eastern Bengal Line of Communi the difficulties which have been encountered cation. This line consists of three main and the measures taken to overcome them. routes: — (d) The sea route from Calcutta and Viza- 177. The Assam Line of Communication. gapatam to Chittagong. This line of communication has four main (b) From the Calcutta area -to the Eastern routes:— Bengal metre gauge railway system, either (a) The metre gauge rail route from by rail (via the Tistamukh wagon ferry), or Mokameh Ghat* to Amingaon, across the by inland water transport, or by a combina- Brahmaputra by wagon ferry, and onwards tion of both. This railway system converges to Dimapur and the American bases in the on Akhaura, and from there divides into two Ledo area. Stores arrive at Mokameh Ghat branches. The northern branch serves the by broad gauge railway from depots in Surma Valley airfields joining up with Northern and Central India. the Assam line of communication across the (b) The broad gauge route from Calcutta hill section of the railway between Badarpur to river ghats on the lower Brahmaputra and and Lumding, and the southern supplies the to transhipment stations of the metre gauge Chittagong area. route. The stores carried come from the (c) The road running south from the Calcutta Base Area and from Southern and Assam trunk road, through Shillong, Sylhet Western India. and Comilla, to Chittagong. (c) The river route. This includes an all water route up the Brahmaputra from 181. The difficulties encountered on this line Calcutta and, also, lifts between intermediate of communication are, as regards the rail- rail-served ghats on the Ganges and Brahma- ways:— putra. (d) The Eastern Bengal system is unable (d) A road, known as the Assam access adequately to cope with the increased lift to road, from Siliguri where it connects with airfields used for air supply. the broad gauge railway, to Bongaigaon on (b) The capacity of the hill rail link be- the metre gauge route. tween Badarpur and Lumding, which is. The control of the Assam line of communi- limited to only nine trains a day each way, cation rests with General Headquarters, India. with a nett load of 140 tons each. 178. Communications in Assam are compli- 182. The principal developments of the cated and rendered unreliable, by 'both operat-- railways in Eastern Bengal have been made ing and physical difficulties. The operating with a view to providing a supplementary rail difficulties are due to the fact that a far greater route for the Assam line of communication. load has been imposed on the railway than These include: — could be handled by the normal civil organiza- (i) The provision of additional crossing tion. The physical difficulties are due to the stations between the wagon ferry terminal seasonal liability of both road and rail com- at Bahadurabad and Badapur. munications to serious flooding, and also to (ii) Re-laying the hill section between the vagaries of the Brahmaputra. At some Badarpur and Lumding to permit of the use places, sudden rises in the river will wash away of more powerful locomotives and longer ghats, with all their connected installations, trains. completely; while at others, sand banks will In June, an investigation was carried out form and render them unapproachable by river by representatives of 11 Army Group; General craft. Headquarters, India; Headquarters, Supreme The operating difficulties have been over- Allied Commander, South-East Asia Com- come to a great extent by the employment of mand ; and the United States forces. Their military transportation units to assist the civil recommendations, which are already being staff. The control of a considerable section adopted, will increase line and terminal capa- of the metre gauge main line has been taken city throughout the whole system. over by the United States Transportation Corps 183. Chittagong Port. The limited capacity which has resulted in a great increase in of this port originally restricted the use of the traffic. The physical difficulties are being met direct sea route, but steady increase has been by the provision, where possible, of alternative obtained by improving the railway serving the means of communication. wharves, providing additional moorings and 179. Very extensive measures have been, and jetties, building more storage accommodation, are being, taken to improve the capacity of .this re-erecting equipment dismantled and removed line of communication. They include the under the denial scheme and by the supply of doubling of certain sections on both the broad more lighters. and metre gauge lines, the conversion of one The working of the port has also improved section from narrow gauge to metre gauge, as a result of its reorganization when Four- the construction of additional ghats and ferries, teenth Army assumed control on the 1st the improvement of existing facilities, and the February. provision of more river craft The stores imported have increased by 150 * " Ghat" means a landing stage. per cent, since November 1943. 1372 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

Further development is still going on and between Tumbru and the numerous jetties by March 1945, the port will have been ex- which have been constructed between this ghat panded to the maximum practicable extent. and Maungdaw 184. The Arakan Line of Communication. 187. Oil Pipelines. Oil pipelines are under This line supplies the area to the south of construction which will, of course, relieve the Chittagong, and the lack of all-weather roads load on other forms of transport. An American causes the burden to fall mainly on sea and 6-inch pipeline has been completed from river transport. There are two main routes: — Calcutta to North Assam and work on a simi- (a) By road, from Chittagong, via Ramu, lar line from Chittagong to the same area has to Tumbru at the head of the Naf River, been started. We are laying 4-inch pipeline and thence on to Bawli Bazaar and Maimg- from Chittagong to Imphal, via Manipur Road, daw. The road is all-weather up to Tum- which is nearly finished. The American line bru, with the exception of the section be- from Ledo to the Myitkyina area is being tween Chittagong and Dohazari. extended, and a British line from Imphal to (b) By water, from Chittagong to Cox's Kalewa will probably be built. Bazaar and Utakhali; from Chittagong to 188. Summary of Developments on our Lines Maungdaw direct; and by the Naf River of Communication. The main features have from Tumbru to Maungdaw. been:— In addition to the above, there were two (a) The increase in the capacity of the subsidiary sections of the line of communi- Assam line of communication. cation :— (b) The increase in the capacity of (i) On the Sangu and Kaladan Rivers, Chittagong. to support 81 (West African) Division. (c) The development of the capacity of. (ii) On the Mayu River, to support the left the sea and river line of communication flank of 15 Indian Corps. southwards from Chittagong, from 400 tons to 1,000 tons a day. 185. The main difficulties met with on this line of communication are the physical diffi- (d) The increase in air supply due to the culties of road contraction in an area which development of the airfields in the Surma is either mountainous or liable to inundation in Valley and the lines of communication the monsoons and where no stone exists; the leading to them. limited capacity of Chittagong and the very (e) The construction of oil pipelines. restricted capacities of Cox's Bazaar, Utakhali Supply and Maintenance. and Maungdaw ; and the shortage of craft on rivers, the mouths of which are under enemy 189. The base for our operations in Burma control. is, of course, India, and all imported or indi- genous stores pass through the Indian Reserve The diversity in the types of rivercraft em- Base Depots. ployed is another factor which causes added difficulties ; small coasters, ordinary tugs, " D " The stocks of stores which we intended to type diesel driven tugs of wooden construction, hold on both the northern and southern cargo flats, ramped cargo lighters, Eureka tow lines were sixty days' working stock plus boats, Higgins barges, a variety of country craft thirty days' reserve. fitted with outboard motors (with a horse-power Stores from the Indian Reserve Bases are ranging from 9.8 to 22), and last, but not least, delivered to Advanced Bases in the Four- the sampan. teenth Army area, which, for Arakan, are located about Chittagong and Mymensingh, 186. As on the other lines of communica- and, for the northern line, at Gauhati and tion, very considerable development has taken Manipur Road. place in Arakan. The road southwards from Dohazari has been converted to a fair weather 190. Arakan Front: During the last six two-way road as far as Maungdaw and an all- months, ail average of some 64,000 tons monthly weather one-way one as far as Tumbru. The has been moved through the port qf Chitta- development of the road to Tumbru to two- gong. A further 4,600 tons is shipped direct way all-weather standard is in progress. from Calcutta to the small ports south of Chittagong. The railway "lift" in this area, Our water communications have been im- ex India, has averaged, over the same period, proved by increasing the capacity of the ports 19,000 tons monthly. in the Cox's Bazaar area from 400 to 1,000 tons a day. Tumbru Ghat is also now cap- The northern part of East Bengal is served able of handling 1,000 tons daily ; and as soon by Mymensingh from which the requirements as Maungdaw was captured, Transportation of the air force, reserve formations in the Construction Units raised its daily capacity to district, and the air supply base airfields are 600 tons. met. The Chittagong depots supply the Arakan, Perhaps the most creditable feat, however, using road, sea and inland water transport. was the way in which much needed reinforce- ments of rivercraft were sailed into the Naf 191. Assam Front: For the first three months River. In spite of the fact that the mouth of of the year, the line of communication on the river was held by the enemy, Inland Water this front was unable to meet in full the Transportation Imits, during the early stages of heavy demands of both the British and United the winter operations, ran craft down the coast States forces. From the beginning of April and up into the river—air cover being pro- 1944, however, its capacity has been notably vided—to supplement the water transport which improved and it can now lift the full require- had been used the previous season. The river ments of the Allies; the tonnage having risen, fleet in the Naf was thus increased until it in the last six months, from some 3,800 tons was capable of handling 1,000 tons a day per diem to 5,200. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1373

From our railhead at Dimapur, a long road adopted which works throughout the twenty- line of communication leads up to. and four hours. Vehicles run independently, beyond, Imphal. Before the Japanese drivers being changed at intervals which give advance in March, a division was fighting be- them adequate rest. The following figures yond Tamu, which is 195 miles from rail- cover the month of January:— head, and another was engaged south of Tid- Number of task vehicles ... 1,321 dim. 300 miles from railhead. Imphal is 135 Tonnage delivered 47J304 miles from Dimapur. Total mileage run 4,463,454 Average daily mileage per 192. The maintenance of Special Force was vehicle 110 entirely by air. For this purpose, bases at Casualties: airfields in East Bengal were originally (a) Miles per accident ... 19,239 organized and stocked, but at a later stage (b) Vehicles evacuated ... 103 in the planning, the base was transferred to the Surma Valley, and from the airfields there At this tune, as already mentioned, divi- maintenance by supply-dropping and -landing sions had to be supplied up to 300 miles from railhead. Much of this is narrow and dangerous has been carried out throughout the operations. mountain road and I think the above figures 193. The building up of stocks on both demonstrate the efficiency of Indian lorry the northern and southern lines was a matter drivers. of some anxiety during the earlier part of the 197. The importance of labour in an un- period. On the southern line, the capacity developed Eastern Theatre cannot be over- of the port of Chittagong, in spite of progres- stated. The construction of hundreds of miles sive expansion, barely kept pace with the of railways, roads, and pipelines; the prepara- needs of the forces, while on the northern tion of new airfields and the expansion of line of communication, the total capacity existing ones; transportation works on the available until April was only just sufficient lines of communication, including port de- jfor maintenance. Reserve stocks of many velopment; the expansion of hospitals, commodities, especially petrol, fell to dan- depots and camps in rear areas, etc., all mean gerously low levels. an unending demand for more and more labour. 194. A supply difficulty which exists in both Assam and Arakan is that, with the excep- On the 1st May, the figure of organized tion of the rice crop which barely meets the labour employed by Fourteenth Army was needs of the civil population, no foodstuffs over 178,000, while demands for a further are obtainable in either area. In Bengal last 18,600 were under examination. In addition year, this caused famine; and in parts of to this, some 200,000 civilian (contractor) Assam the local inhabitants can barely sup- labour was employed on Army projects. These port themselves. This imposed on the Army figures include labour supplied to the United the need for importing fresh meat, vegetables, States forces. In spite of this total of nearly fruit, etc., from distant areas over difficult, 400,000, the deficit on this date was 31.400. lines of communication; and of having to 198. As regards supplies, the two most supply large quantities of tinned and de- pressing problems have been the provision of hydrated substitutes to rectify deficiencies in fresh foodstuffs, and of petrol. the fresh ration. I have already mentioned that dehydrated 195. I have already mentioned the extent meat and vegetables were being supplied to to which air supply has developed, but the meet the inadequacy of fresh supplies. I may subject is of such outstanding importance that add that every encouragement and assistance the following figures are of interest. From is given to units to grow their own vegetables the 8th to the 21st February, when the where this is practicable. Japanese attack severed the communications of A Local Resources branch of the staff, 7 Indian Division, a total of 923 tons of sup- assisted by an agricultural expert borrowed plies of all types was dropped on the sur- from the Government of Assam, which is rounded elements of that division. The bringing some 18,000 acres under vegetable month's total for February of air-dropped sup- cultivation, was established. Pig breeding, plies in Arakan was 2,710 tons. In April, goat rearing, and chicken farming have also the total tonnage dropped was: — been planned on an extensive scale. Arakan, 1,316 (for 81 (West African) Divi- sion in the Kaladan Valley). 199. The supply of petrol and lubricants, including those for aviation, has caused some Special Force, 1,073. anxiety. The monthly quantities, to be supplied From the 16th April to the 22nd June (the through Army channels, were estimated last date of the re-opening of the Kohima— May to exceed eleven and a quarter million Imphal road), the amount flown into Imphal gallons, of which nearly half was high grade for 4 Corps was 13,155 tons. Nearly 10,000 aviation spirit. casualties were evacuated by air from Imphal In spite of the progressive improvement in between these dates. the capacity of our lines of communication, which has been more than doubled since 196. The operation of road transport be- December 1943, it has not been found possible tween railhead (Dimapur) and Imphal, and as yet to do more than provide the quantities forward thereof, is also of interest. A " round for maintenance. The ever increasing demands the clock" or L.G.O.C.* system has been of our Allies in Upper Assam have continued to tax our oil resources. I do not foresee * L.G.O.C. = London General Omnibus Company (which was absorbed into the London Passenger much improvement in the situation until more Transport Board). pipelines have been finished. 1374 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

200. Before leaving the subject of supply and transferred from General Headquarters, India, maintenance, there are two matters which to 11 Army Group. There are eleven main deserve notice. airfields in this area, all of which have now The first is the projected reorganization of been completed to all-weather standard, with mechanical transport in the Royal Indian the exception of two which have been allotted Army Service Corps. At present, there are no a low priority by the Commanding General, less than eight types of M.T. units—an organi- United States Air Forces, China-Burma-India zation which is both wasteful in manpower, Theatre. and insufficiently flexible, as well as possessing other disadvantages. My recommendation to 205. Airfields in Ceylon are built by the General Headquarters, India, that the existing Air Ministry Works Department, but they eight types should be reduced to three, has remain the responsibility of the Chief Engineer, been accepted, and the new reorganization is Ceylon Army Command. There are nine main being adopted. airfields on the island, work on the improve- The second point of interest affects the Veteri- ment and extension of which continues. nary Service. In order that animals with Special 206. It would have been quite impossible to Force should not betray the position of our attain the target dates fixed for the completion troops in operations behind the enemy's lines, of this large-scale expansion by using normal a muting operation was performed. This has materials such as concrete. Use has, there- achieved its object and there has been no loss fore, been made of the new (and hitherto un- of efficiency. tried) bitumenized hessian (" Bithess ") process for the provision of all-weather standings and The Engineering Effort. runways. This material prevents water pene- 201. I have already described (with one ex- trating the ground which accordingly retains ception—the Ledo Road) development of the its full bearing capacity in wet weather. The railways, roads and pipelines and I have also experiment has already proved a success and mentioned airfield construction. The latter, may be of great value in future operations however, merits more detailed description. I in a Theatre where monsoon rainfall is so propose, too, to touch on bridging, which is so heavy. important in this Theatre, and, also, to discuss briefly the general problem of rapid road con- The magnitude of the engineering effort in- struction across mountain barriers or through volved in airfield construction may be judged thick jungle tracts, for on its solution the from .the fact that, for the American airfields success of future operations will largely depend. in North-East Assam alone, some 16,000 British military officers and men and 45,000 202. The Ledo Road. This road, which, in civil labour under British military supervision, conjunction with air supply, is the line of com- are employed. munication of General Stilwell's Chinese- American forces operating in Northern Burma, 207. River Crossings, (a) The problem hi has not been described because it does not this Theatre is complicated by the width of form part of Fourteenth Army's northern line obstacles (the Chindwin and Myittha Rivers of communication. It is, of course, entirely at Kalewa are some 330 yards and 200 yards under American control and, begun by British, across respectively in the .'dry season); the is being 'built by American engineers. speed of current; the great seasonal variation It is now " all-weather two-way" to just in water levels; and the presence of floating north of Shaduzup and the intention is to com- debris. Wide rivers can, of course, only be plete it through to Myitkyina in another three bridged quickly by using floating equipment, as months. Roadhead and railhead are to be at the construction of piers is a major engineering Namti, six miles north-east of Mogaung. task, but the factors mentioned above, especially fast currents, render the anchoring 203. Airfields. Airfield construction in the of floating bridges precarious. area under my control can be divided into three categories: construction in the Four- To overcome these difficulties, a bridge teenth Army area; construction in North-East (known as the Falls bridge) has recently been Assam for the United States Army Au: Force, designed and satisfactorily tested. It is com- which is primarily in connection with the air- posed of steel pontoons—widely spaced to lift to China; and construction in Ceylon. admit of the passage of debris—with a Bailey There were eighteen main airfields in the superstructure, and with a large gantry at each Fourteenth Army area last November. Since end to control the landing ibay during the that date, three more large fields have been marked variations which occur in water level. begun and the others have been made up to an Other measures, which are under investiga- all-weather standard. tion, include a proposal that only assault equip- For future operations, .as outlined by the ment should be carried in divisions, bridging Chiefs of Staff at the end of March, it became companies to be Army or Corps Troops. Ex- necessary to build airfields adequate to allow periments .are also being undertaken to pro- additional transport to operate during the mon- duce a standard type of vehicle capable of soon. In consultation with Air Command, carrying all bridging loads. South-Hast Asia, it was decided to increase (V) The alternative method of crossing rivers the capacity of fifteen of the existing twenty- by ferry assumes a special significance in this one airfields and to raise the standard to Theatre owing, not only to the width of gaps, admit of their use by Dakotas and certain types but to the fact that the water level is liable to of bombers. such sudden changes. 204. On the 1st April 1944, the respon- Ferrying is largely resorted to on the lines sibility for the completion and upkeep of the of communication, especially on the American airfields in North-East Assam was Brahmaputra. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1375

Speeding-up Communications. mand, assumed full judicial, legislative, 208. The rate of building all-weather roads executive and administrative responsibility for in mountainous or thick jungle country has all the territories of Burma which were then never -amounted to more than one third of a occupied, or might at any future time be mile a day. This is not fast enough to support occupied, by the forces under his command, a major land operation. The methods by which and he delegated to the Chief Civil Affairs movement can be accelerated, particularly Officer full authority to conduct on his behalf across physical barriers, are:— the military administration of the civil popula- (a) By the carriage of formations with tion in these territories. weapons and M.T. in aircraft and gliders. 212. Administration, (a) In the Fort Hertz (6) By cutting jeep tracks in advance of and Sumprabum Sub-Divisions of the the all-weather main road axis. Myitkyina District, the zone of military ad- (c) By the deployment of the maximum ministration began to expand in March 1944, possible engineer force and equipment, with Sumprabum itself being re-occupied on the the

In Arakan, there was the problem of villagers the Supreme Allied Commander, very close rendered homeless by military operations, and, administrative connection between the two at present some 50,000 civilians are being Commands would be necessary and indeed accommodated, supervised, and supplied under orders were issued by the Chiefs of Staff that the auspices of the welfare organization. the forces of S.E.A.C. would be based upon India. It was clear that the relationship be- 217. Representation in China. In November tween G.H.Q. India and 11 Army Group which 1943, an officer of the C.A.S.B. was, with the was formed to command and administer the approval of the War Office, attached to the British land forces of S.E.A.C. would have to staff of our Assistant Military Attache at be very intimate. Kunming (China) to advise on Civil Affairs matters generally and, in particular, on political The formation of H.Q. 11 Army Group was questions arising out of the operations of the slow, for while it was possible for the Com- Chinese forces over the Burma border from mander-in-Chief, India, to provide some of Yunnan. the officers and clerks required, it was clear that the majority of both would have to come 218. Future Commitments. While adminis- from outside India; and as the needs of other tering the relatively small area of Burma theatres of war were urgent many months which is at present under our control, we have elapsed before these officers and men could be also to look forward to the future, when the sent. It was, in consequence, impossible for whole of Burma is re-occupied and returns H.Q. 11 Army Group to move with H.Q. under British Military Administration. S.E.A.C. in April owing to shortage of staff, much of whose work had still to be done by With this in view, it has recently been G.H.Q., India. decided to combine into a single team the C.A.S.B. planning team and the Government The decision of the Supreme Allied Com- of Burma planning team, for the preparation mander to move his H.Q. in April, therefore, of a two-year plan covering, from every aspect, entailed the splitting—difficult for any staff the re-establishment of the administrative and however efficient—of H.Q. 11 Army Group economic life of Burma. This will, I hope, before it was fully formed, because it was ensure continuity, and a fair start for the necessary for me to be represented at Kandy. Administration when conditions permit of the I had to send my M.G. G.S., the most senior Government of Burma taking over the country officer on my staff, as I had no other officer from the C.A.S.B. of adequate experience. This was a grave handicap to the efficient formation and train- Tribute. ing of the staff and to me. I had in addition to 219. I referred in my introductory remarks send with him some 40 officers and the neces- on administration to the well known fact that sary clerks. As no, telephone communications the success or failure of an army is largely existed—the highest' priority telegrams took dependent on the efficiency of rear organiza- several hours and letters not less than 3 days tion. It follows, therefore, that the successes —consultation between my main H.Q. at which the Fourteenth Army has achieved are Delhi and the Advanced H.Q. at Kandy was attributable, in no small measure, to the mag- slow and difficult. nificent work of the rearward services. I have given some indication of the size and com- In addition to the work at Delhi, I had of plexity of the problems which have had to be course continually to visit the forward troops tackled. That they have been, or are being, and the Commander, Fourteenth Army, to solved, is due to the skill and determination control operations. I could only make displayed both by the Administrative Staff and occasional visits to Kandy, a journey to which Services of 11 Army Group and its subordinate from Delhi or Calcutta took more than 12 formations, and the Commander-in-Chief, hours, except in the fastest aircraft. I was India, and his staff who not only laid the compelled to do much unnecessary travelling. foundations on which we have built, but on whose administrative support we continue to I pointed out on several occasions the very depend. serious disadvantages of trying to control operations in Assam and Arakan from a H.Q. Location of Headquarters. more than 1,500 miles from either area, with- 220. I cannot finish this Despatch without out telephones, with slow telegraphic and long, referring to the difficulties by which I was and at certain times of the year unreliable continually hampered in commanding and ad- air communication; further that the Air Com- ministering 11 Army Group by the decision Imander responsible for the support of the of the Supreme Allied Commander to move Army would not be at Kandy. I continued his H.Q. to Kandy in Ceylon in April 1944.* to press for the establishment of H.Q. 11 Army Group at Calcutta. In August it was at last Before South-East Asia Command was set agreed that H.Q. 11 Army Group should move up in October 1943, the Commander-in-Chief, to the Calcutta area but much time had been India, commanded the land forces operating lost and the move could not be completed until against the Japanese and the roots of the the beginning of December, at which moment Army, which was predominantly Indian, were operations would be in progress. deeply embedded in India. It was obvious that, even after the transfer of command to Acknowledgements. • War Office footnote—The views of the Supreme 221. My thanks are due to many officers for Allied Commander and his reasons for the move to Ceylon are set out in Part A., paragraphs 12-14 of his their ungrudging assistance, but it is not pos- Report, " South-East Asia, 1943-1945." sible to mention more than a few of them. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1377 To General Sir Claude Auchinleck my APPENDIX "A" principal thanks are due, because without his wholehearted and generous support and wise Skeleton Order of Battle, 15 Indian Corps, advice, 11 Army Group could not have 1st January 1944. achieved success. I can never adequately 5 Indian Division. express my gratitude for all he has done. 9 Indian Infantry Brigade. I should also like to include in my thanks 123 Indian Infantry Brigade. to him my gratitude to his staff for their un- 161 Indian Infantry Brigade. selfish help during many months. 7 Indian Division. I wish also to thank Air Chief Marshal Sir 33 Indian Infantry Brigade. Richard Peirse, and the R.A.F. and the 89 Indian Infantry Brigade. U.S.A.A.F. for their magnificent support dur- 114 Indian Infantry Brigade. ing the fighting in Arakan, Assam and in 26 Indian Division. Central and Northern Burma. 4 Indian Infantry Brigade. Admiral Sir James Somerville gave every 36 Indian Infantry Brigade. assistance possible to the Army, though re- 71 Indian Infantry Brigade. sources did not permit of a major combined 81 (West African) Division. operation. 5 (West African) Infantry Brigade. Upon Lieut.-General Slim, Commander, 6 (West African) Infantry Brigade. Fourteenth Army, fell the brunt of operations Note: 3 (West African) Brigade formed part and well and truly did he stand up to the of Special Force. strain of the continuous and heavy fighting which began in February and ended in August. He remained unshaken during the Japanese APPENDIX " B " offensive and was quick to take advantage of Skeleton Order of Battle, 4 Corps, opportunities to counter-attack. To him is due 8th March 1944. the resounding victory achieved by Fourteenth Army this year. 17 Indian Light Division. 48 Indian Infantry Brigade. Lieut.-General Scoones greatly distinguished 63 Indian Infantry Brigade. himself in command of 4 Corps upon which the principal strain of the fighting fell during Note: This formation comprised only two the operations round Imphal between February brigades, but it included a Divisional Head- and June. Lieut.-General Christison in com- quarters Battalion, a Divisional Signals Bat- mand of 15 Indian Corps in Arakan first de- talion, and a Divisional Reconnaissance feated the Japanese in Burma. He has shown Battalion. fine qualities of leadership. 20 Indian Division. 32 Indian Infantry Brigade. Lieut.-General Stopford, Commander, 33 80 Indian Infantry Brigade. Corps, showed great staying power, professional 100 Indian Infantry Brigade. knowledge and dash in the operations which resulted finally in opening the Kohima—Imphal 23 Indian Division. road. 1 Indian Infantry Brigade. 37 Indian Infantry Brigade. To my own staff; officers, N.C.Os. and men ; 49 Indian Infantry Brigade. I owe the greatest debt of gratitude for their splendid support and their fine team work. 50 Indian Parachute Brigade (less one Bat- Always shorthanded, split into two with one talion). detachment 1,500 miles from the other, they 254 Indian Tank Brigade. have never failed to do the work which has continued steadily to increase. Note: For comparison with the Order of Battle of 33 Corps at the end of May (vide It is difficult to single out from so many first- Appendix "C"), the following formations rate officers and men, many individuals for must be added to those shown above: — special praise, but I must mention particularly 5 Indian Division (less 161 Brigade). my two principal Staff Officers upon whom fefl 89 Indian Infantry Brigade (7 Indian special responsibility. Division). Major-General I. S. O. Playfair, M.G., G.S., has been the greatest help to me throughout, APPENDIX "C" but especially after the staff was split in April when he went to Kandy as my representative. Skeleton Order of Battle, 33 Indian Corps, There, the whole responsibility for represent- 31st May 1944. ing my point of view to the Supreme Allied Commander fell upon him. I relied entirely 2 British Division. upon his unfailing judgment, strength of 4 Infantry Brigade. character and tact and he never failed me. 5 Infantry Brigade. 6 Infantry Brigade. Major-General E. N. Goddard, M.G.A., 7 Indian Division. II Army Group, must have carried one of the heaviest administrative loads in any theatre of 33 Indian Infantry Brigade. war. No man could have discharged his duties 161 Indian Infantry Brigade (from 5 with more unsparing devotion and no opera- Indian Division). tions could have succeeded if his work had not Note: 89 Brigade was under 4 Corps, and been of the highest standard. 114 Brigade en route from the Arakan Front. 1378 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951

268 Indian Infantry Brigade (Lorried). 20 Indian Division. 23 Indian Division. Lushai Brigade. 50 Indian Parachute Brigade. 3 Special Service Brigade (two Commandos). 33 Corps. Corps Troops: 2 British Division. 149 Regiment, R.A.C. 21 Indian Division. 7 K.O.Y.L.I. (less one squadron). 161 Brigade, 5 Indian Division. 11 Cavalry. 33 Brigade. 7 Indian Division. Headquarters 21 Indian Division. (late H.Q., 44 Indian Armoured Division). 15 Indian Corps. Note: This Headquarters, which had be- 25 Indian Division. come available on the disbandment of 44 26 Indian Division. Indian Armoured Division in India, assumed 81 (West African) Division. operational control of the lines of communica- CEYLON ARMY COMMAND. tion of 33 Corps. 11 (East African) Division. Garrisons of the Indian Ocean bases at APPENDIX "D" Addu Atoll, Diego Garcia and Cocos Skeleton Order of Battle, 11 Army Group, Islands. South-East Asia Command, 22nd June 1944. Note: i. 82 (West African) Division was FOURTEENTH ARMY. about to arrive. Special Force. Note: ii. The strength of forces in Northern 36 British Division. Burma not under the operational control of 4 Corps. 11 Army Group was:— 5 Indian Division (less 151 Brigade). Fort Hertz area 2,012 7 Indian Division (less 33 Brigade). American forces 65,784 17 Indian Light Division. Chinese forces 147,396 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 19 MARCH, 1951 1379

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