Hurricane Jeanne: CARE Haiti’S Response to the Emergency Lessons Learned Workshop / After Action Review January 5 and 6, 2005

Hurricane Jeanne: CARE Haiti’s Response to the Emergency Lessons Learned Workshop / After Action Review January 5 and 6, 2005

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 BACKGROUND ...... 1 DESCRIPTION OF CARE’s EMEGENCY RESPONSE...... 2 Key Challenges ...... 3 Other Activities...... 4 Coordination. Cooperation and Support ...... 5 WORKSHIP METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS ...... 6 Participants...... 6 Schedule/Process...... 7 SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED...... 10 GROUP 5: LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ...... 17 GROUP 6: STAFFING ...... 18 ANNEX A: Action Plan...... 20 ANNEX B: Chronology of Events ...... 21 ANNEX C: Lessons learned – Media (Individual Perspective) ...... 23

INTRODUCTION

In order to evaluate the quality of CARE’s emergency response to Hurricane Jeanne in Haiti and to share what was learned across the CARE family, a lessons learned workshop was held at the Hotel Montana in Piétonville, on January 5 and 6, 2005. This report includes a brief overview of the events that took place from September to December 2004, a description of the workshop process and methodology, and a summary of the priority “positive” and “negative” lessons learned.

BACKGROUND

The approach of Hurricane Jeanne over Haiti was announced on Wednesday, September 15th, 2004. By Friday, there were heavy rains and tropical storms, which lasted until Sunday. The north and northwest regions experienced major flooding, with reports of between 2-3 meters of water and landslides in Gonaives, Port de Paix, Bassin Bleu, and Chansolmes, all of which are in CARE Haiti’s main operational areas. The number of confirmed deaths continued to rise over the next few days, including one CARE employee who drowned while trying to save others. CARE was able to locate and confirm the safety of all other staff by September 22nd.

Early assessments in Gonaives confirmed that the extent and scope of damage was significant, including destruction of at least 5,000 homes, massive loss of livestock, and widespread crop failure. The immediate relief needs were food, shelter and potable water. As the waters began to recede, a second issue was collection and burial of corpses, both human and animal. The hospital and morgue were extensively damaged and bodies were lying in the streets, where they decayed rapidly in the heat; combined with the water and mud conditions, this posed immediate and extreme health risks in a densely populated area. Although the scope of damage was not quite as great in Bassin Bleu, Port de Paix and other areas, the impact of the flood was great and food was a serious need. An estimated 170,000 people were severely affected, 130,000 in Gonaives and the rest in the remainder of Artibonite and Northwest Departments.

DESCRIPTION OF CARE’s EMEGENCY RESPONSE

Distributions of food, water and non-food items:

CARE was well positioned to undertake distributions as soon as the waters abated. Since they were already preparing for a drought response, they were able to divert food in the CARE Gonaives warehouse to a humanitarian aid operation with donor approval (USAID and Gates Foundation). Food distributions were based on verbal commitments from WFP and USAID to cover costs of operations and replenish food already in warehouse.

Targeted distribution in the beginning posed the risk of rioting, so CARE decided to do general distributions first. CARE identified 10 potential general distribution sites, opened the first one for bread and water distribution on Tuesday, September 22, then three more sites on Wednesday Sept 23 for family rations of grains, oil and pulses. Opening of new sites was limited by ability of MINUSTAH to secure the area (see security below).

Water was distributed in ½ liter sachets until water tankers started arriving. Then potable water was distributed at 11 kiosks for over 10,000 families a day. The ICRC and ACF helped ensure that water was treated and kiosks functional. CARE also provided SNEP with fuel to restart the water treatment and distribution plant in Gonaives.

Food and water distribution reached over 160,000 people, nearly the entire estimated population affected by the floods. General distributions were scheduled through October, despite pipeline disruptions due to poor road conditions (see access below), and strikes and political instability in Port au Prince, which closed the port and delayed the release of food.

Meanwhile CARE began planning targeted food distributions by November, as had been agreed with WFP. Local community leaders helped develop a list of the most vulnerable households. Local media broadcasts and press conferences helped raise public awareness of new program mandates and targeting criteria, in order to avoid the tensions and hostilities encountered during general distributions. CARE aimed to reach 85,000 people or 17,000 families over a four- month period with monthly rations.

Shelter

CARE employees and their families who had lost their homes and possessions were immediately housed and fed in the CARE compound (up to 350 people). Journalists and staff from CARE PaP, CI, and other NGOs also stayed there.

Key Challenges

Access and communication

Access to the town of Gonaives was severely limited until the flood waters went down. CARE Gonaives staff was initially grounded, and staff movement was limited in other affected areas. Thirteen WFP trucks with 40 MT of food were dispatched from PaP on September 22; a drive that normally takes 3.5 hours took over 8 hours and only 10 trucks had arrived by end of the day. The road remained in poor condition, with major parts a large shallow lake, and by October 7th it had collapsed completely. A detour route was extremely slow and large trucks were unable to pass. Use of UN helicopters was limited because MINUSTAH got priority.

Radio contact was consistent; phone contacts were intermittent with Gonaives, more consistent between Port de Paix and PaP. CARE Atlanta, other CI members and CARE Haiti were in regular contact.

Security

Safety of staff was always CARE’s main priority, while security was a major constraint to smooth delivery of humanitarian aid. For fear of creating chaos and possible danger for staff, food distributions were not begun immediately. All donated food and non-food items (from WFP and other INGOs) were stored in the CARE compound and the population was aware that more resources were coming in than going out initially, which raised tensions. Trucks carrying food in convoys had to struggle through desperate crowds to get into the compound and there were a few casualties. MINUSTAH forces posted at the CARE compound and at distribution sites routinely used tear gas to disburse crowds. While not

wanting to be closely identified with the military, CARE needed to ensure resources went to intended recipients while minimizing loss and looting.

As distributions became more efficient and streamlined, tensions decreased somewhat. However, political demonstrations, rioting and miscommunications often caused cancellation of distributions. There were almost daily attacks on trucks carrying humanitarian aid, usually with loss of materials and often wounding drivers. Attempts to break into the CARE warehouse required constant vigilance. Later on, organized attacks by armed gangs seemed to reflect a backdrop of political maneuvering to fill power vacuums in the town. CARE was prepared day-by-day to suspend operations in order to protect staff. Meanwhile, CARE staff engaged in high level discussions with UNOCHA, MINUSTAH and others to ensure that humanitarian activities could continue and that transition activities could begin as soon as there was a secure environment

Human Resources

CARE Gonaives staff members were recovering from their own flood-induced losses and trauma, while trying to undertake an enormous humanitarian aid operation. While some felt they could handle the emergency on their own, on September 29 a decision was made to reassign Gary Philoctete, Mission Development Director, to direct the response. CARE staff from PaP and Jeremie were redeployed to Gonaives, and other INGOs working in Haiti sent teams to help CARE with logistics and distributions.

CARE International provided numerous consultants for technical assistance, in the areas of rapid assessment, emergency coordination and program development, water and sanitation, proposal writing, warehouse administration and inventory, security, media support, and Food-for-Work/Cash-for-Work planning.

Other Activities

Health

Vaccinations (typhoid, hepatitis and tetanus) and health consultations were provided by CARE at shelters throughout Gonaives and the Northwest. Fortunately and perhaps as a result, there were no outbreaks or epidemics. CARE also provided nurses, vehicles, fuel and materials to local and international health teams in the Northwest. Health and sanitation education was provided to clean-up teams and over the radio, including messages about hand washing and limited contact with mud, dust and stagnant water.

Clean-up Activities

CARE was the first NGO to launch a Cash-for-Work municipal cleanup to collect and dispose of mud and garbage around houses, water points, streets and drainage canals. The operational plan includes harmonized standards re payment of work, tool packages and time of payments, to avoid conflicting approaches with others implementing CFW activities. CFW provides relief and income to the most vulnerable households in some of worst affected slum areas. Food-for-Work activities are on-going in the Northwest, using funding previously secured for drought relief.

Reconstruction and rehabilitation

CARE bid on and won a major RFA for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the Northwest and Gonaives issued by USAID. As a consortium with PADF and CHF as subs, this 12-month project is worth $22 million and starts in January 2005. Proposals for longer-term activities have also been submitted in the education, water and sanitation, and agriculture sectors.

Coordination. Cooperation and Support

CARE played a leading role in information, assessment, coordination and planning with UNOCHA, WFP, WHO, USAID, MINUSTAH and the rest of the international community, and proactively offered support to the Haitian government to enable their own coordination and mandates. CARE received widespread support from other INGOs working in other parts of Haiti, including World Vision, Save the Children, ACF, UNOCHA, CRS and Concern. Oxfam focused on water tanks and bladders, WHO focused on on-site aqua tabs and Clorox, while the ICRC managed identification of bodies and burial. The message was constantly reinforced that this was a joint effort, and not just CARE’s operational area.

CARE Haiti benefited enormously from external assistance and support from both CI and other donors. In addition to finding and sending consultants for technical assistance, proposals were submitted through CARE France, CARE Australia, CARE Canada, CARE UK, CARE Deutschland, and CARE USA. CARE Nederland identified and offered technical assistance. Among the many donors who responded rapidly and generously with both financing and material aid were the Gates Foundation DFID, OFDA, ECHO, CIDA, AusAid, the German government, USAID, and many private donors.

WORKSHIP METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

Workshop Objectives

• Identify the most important lessons learned about CARE’s emergency response in 2004, focusing on Hurricane Jeanne. • Begin an organizational learning process that will help CARE Haiti in the future to improve its emergency response and better satisfy its obligations to the Haitian citizens. • Contribute to a global organizational learning process for CARE regarding emergency response.

Participants

PaP SMT: Abby Maxman, Mohan Nepal, Cecily Bryant, Sandra St-Juste, Maryse Gourdet, Myrtho Opont, Sophie Perez, Lionel Poitevien, Gary Philoctete FHSU: Fenold Clerval (Project Manager), James Jean (Field Operations Manager), Ronal Ledux (Field Supervisor) Sante Gonaives: Vladimir Latortue (chauffeur), Hans Beauvoir (project manager), Youdeline Laguere (RTS) Sante Port-de-Paix: Marc Aurele Telfort (project manager), Laudie D. Medard (APM), Caroline Benoit (Administrative Assistant) Agriculture/Infrastructure: Joubert Hilaire (project manager), Dume Vilnor (Technical Coordinator), Yvon Messeroux (Project Officer), Willy Compere (DAP APM) Education: Wilner Termilus (Project Manager) Gonaives Admin: Jouthe Joseph, Corvil Roseline, Myrthil Faride, Alneur Surin, Claudel Mercy Jeremie Admin: Johanne Destin Port au Prince: Larousse Ceus, Altagrace Allen, Erique Dorlus, Reginalde Gerlus, Evelyne Dantica, Yves Laurent Regis Atlanta: Elizabeth Murkison, Jenny Bah, Lisa Smith, Catherine Toth, Howard Standen Other: Aitor Landa (CARE Nicaragua/CAMI), Sharon Bell (writer)

Facilitator - Kent Glenzer, supported by Jock Baker from the CARE International Emergency Group

Note: Due to the tsunami disaster in Asia, many CARE International staff were unable to attend. A report on media lessons learned by Rick Perera is attached as Annex C.

Schedule/Process

Preconference Planning: Prior to the workshop, Jock Baker, Abby Maxman, Cecily Bryant, and Kent Glenzer developed a rough draft workshop process and set of objectives. This was done via email and one teleconference call between Haiti and Atlanta. The workshop design was based upon designs, processes, and guidance from World Vision1, ALNAP2, and the OECD.3

Upon arrival in Haiti, Kent met with the CO’s SMT for about four hours. The purpose of the meeting was to finalize the workshop process and outputs. Much time was spent on determining the most appropriate working groups for the lessons learned exercise: with more than a dozen themes/topics that at least needed to be considered as staff ruminated about lessons learned, it was necessary to find effective ways to group these themes into no more than six small working groups.4

Wednesday morning: Introduction and Re-construction of a Chronology of Events during the Disaster

Definitions of Positive and Negatives Lessons Learned

A “positive” lesson learned is what we did well and should be repeated next time there is a similar occurrence, circumstances and context in Haiti, as well as actions that other countries should consider should they find themselves in a similar situation.

A “negative” lesson learned is what we did but would improve or not want to do next time in a similar context or circumstance.

Chronology of Events: The purpose of this exercise was to re-establish a common memory of the events that took place during and after the disaster, and

1 Mark Janz & Stuart Belle, “Lessons Learned in Emergency Responses: A Tool for Developing Lessons Learned and Facilitating Documentation Workshops, Version 2,” October 2002. Available at the Relief Forum Database, toolkit section, under lessons learned.

2 ALNAP, “ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action in 2003: Field Level Learning,” London: ODI, 2004. Also ALNAP, “A Comparative Study of After Action Revies in the Context of the Southern Africa Crisis,” Key Messages April 2003, available on the ALNAP website (www.alnap.org).

3 OECD, “Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies,” DAC. 1999.

4 The issue here, from a facilitation standpoint, is that the more small groups organized, the more time that is needed to do group presentations. In a two-day workshop, there is not enough time for 12 or more small groups to both work through lessons learned and to report out and have some substantive discussion. COs that wish to undertake the after action lessons learned workshop are wise to think hard about this easily overlooked structural component of the workshop.

create a sense of pride in the amount of work accomplished under extremely stressful conditions. Results of this exercise are attached as Annex B.

Wednesday afternoon: Small group meetings to identify positive lessons learned. The workgroups were:

1. Resource mobilization: Includes fund raising, marketing public relations, project conception, reporting, and relations with donors, government, other NGOs and our clients. 2. Decision-making/Leadership: Includes structure, communication, process and transmission of decisions. 3. Planning and Assessment: Includes the mission’s state of readiness, rapidness and quality of needs assessments, and CARE’s response/niches. 4. Project Implementation: Includes client services, project set-up, monitoring and evaluation. 5. Logistics/Security: Includes purchasing, warehouse management, and transport 6. Staffing: Includes recruitment, use of human resources from current programs, and management of staff, consultants and TDYers.

Instructions for group work:

• Chose a group in which you want to concentrate your efforts. (You will have an opportunity to contribute lessons learned in all areas as feedback during the group presentations.) • In your group, choose a reporter, who will write all ideas on the flipchart and present them back to the plenary group. • Begin with five minutes of individual work. Each group member should write down two lessons, keeping in mind the definition of lessons learned discussed in the plenary session. • Each member presents his or her ideas and the reporter writes them all down. As ideas are being presented, avoid any criticism or debate on their truth or value. Group members can only ask questions for clarification or understanding. Imagine this stage as structured brainstorming. • After all ideas have been presented, discuss the validity of the ideas. Is this really a lesson learned? Or is it just a hypothesis (i.e., there is some contradictory evidence)? Eliminate any ideas for which the group cannot come to consensus and write them on another flipchart page under “hypotheses” or “no group agreement.” • Combine ideas that are basically the same and rephrase the idea. • Prioritize the ideas by identifying the five most important. • Return to plenary for the next stage.

Thursday morning: Finish positive lessons learned and report back to plenary for presentations and feedback.

Thursday afternoon: Identify negative lessons learned in small groups and report back to plenary.

Instructions:

• Stay in your same group. • Analyze the feedback from the positive lessons learned and revise your original list to come up with no more than five positive lessons. • Chose another reporter. • Individually write down one “negative” lesson learned, keeping in mind the definition discussed in plenary session. • Use the following formula for identifying a “negative” lesson learned: 1) the situation/context within which we want to improve our actions, 2) what we did during the Jeanne emergency, and 3) what we are going to do the next time. • Follow the same discussion procedure as for “positive” lessons learned above.

Identification of next steps/actions (See Annex A).

SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

GROUP 1: MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. Putting in place a strategy to disseminate information up to the CI level (through contact persons at CARE-USA, recruitment of a local journalist, international press conferences, organizing and sending detailed sit-reps, media spots, integration of journalists) resulted in multiple benefits, in terms of security, fund-raising, CARE’s image, and public relations with local and international communities.

2. Having CI staff members on site for proposal writing brought in new ideas and assured a high quality of written materials, which permitted country office staff to focus on the emergency itself.

3. The emergency allowed CARE Haiti to approach and obtain funding from new donors (e.g., Australia, Switzerland, etc.), and call attention to Haiti in sectors not tied to the emergency.

4. During the two weeks following Hurricane Jeanne, despite the absence of the necessary data, CARE Haiti and CARE International were able to develop and finalize project proposals that were subsequently approved. The emergency brought out considerable expertise from within the mission itself, which should be developed and used to benefit both CARE Haiti and CI in the future.

Negative Lessons Learned:

1. Before the arrival of Hurricane Jeanne, despite numerous previous crises and the fact that Haiti is located in an at-risk zone, we had not prioritized the development of a risk management plan nor were we prepared for dealing with such disasters at either the national or international level. We should immediately begin putting in place such a plan, with the necessary external support, so that we can adapt EPP procedures and guidelines.

2. Three weeks after the hurricane, the skills of certain qualified staff had not been utilized. In the future, we should plan a meeting of all program staff (which has never happened before) immediately after the disaster to delegate and clarify each person’s tasks, and afterwards to establish better ties with regular programs. [Suggestion: develop a database that shows staff skills in the event of an emergency.]

3. Several days before starting the targeted food distributions, there was no documentation in place outlining community information strategies or orientation for staff involved in the process. The next time, such documentation must be developed in order to orient staff and inform communities before any changes take place in intervention strategies.

4. Two weeks after Hurricane Jeanne, CARE Haiti staff responsible for receiving non-food items (NFI) from abroad were having difficulty coordinating at the local level, i.e., no contact person (authorities) to facilitate the collection process at the airport. In the future we should have a protocol in place with local authorities to facilitate this process.

5. A month after the hurricane, CARE Haiti hired a local journalist without terms of reference. Next time, we should first establish the terms of reference before hiring any consultant or contractor. [Clarification: There was a TOR, it just wasn’t shared with everyone.]

Hypotheses (not everyone agreed):

• Did the pooled private funds from the USA correspond to the needs of the mission? • Was the mission consulted regarding the decision to: 1) fix the target at one million dollars and 2) to stop raising funds for Haiti/Jeanne?

Suggestions/feedback:

• Better define the relation between appropriate human resources and the mobilization of other resources (e.g., staffing) • Be more specific about new mechanisms developed, put precise guidelines in place beforehand for creating new projects and developing budgets • Hire a local journalist with clear and specific terms of reference that are shared with everyone. • Emphasize coordination with the entire international humanitarian community.

GROUP 2: LEADERSHIP/DECISION-MAKING

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. During the entire emergency period, the majority of our staff showed itself to be motivated, involved, willing, and hard-working, which helped with

decision-making and on-the-ground response. CARE should support such a culture, based on the organization’s principles, vision and values.

2. Four days after the flooding, CARE International was well aware of the situation and conscious of the scale of the disaster. They channeled CARE Haiti toward potential doners and human resources. They should be encouraged to do the same when there are disasters in other regions and missions.

3. During the entire period, the presence of self-criticism, self-evaluation, constant feedback and the openness of management allowed for correction of mistakes and re-motivation of employees. We should promote this culture of continuous reflection and willingness to make modifications throughout the mission to assure our efficacy.

4. Five days after the flooding, the CARE USA Board of Directors granted an advance to CARE-Haiti senior management for rapid start up of activities and to help with fund-raising. The Board should understand the value of this BEF (Board Emergency Fund) and continue the system, even expand it.

5. During the entire period, investment in information exchange (verbal and written) at all levels, from the disaster areas to the country office to CARE headquarters, contributed in general to fundraising at HQ and writing proposals for donors. This practice should be part of any future process.

Negative Lessons Learned

1. During the first 48-72 hours after the flooding, CARE Haiti put aside many normal procedures and made purchases without purchase orders, tender analyses or proforma invoices. Multiple advances of large amounts of money were made to the same person, and stock from other programs was appropriated for the emergency. Staff also received salary advances. In the future, there should be more structured, formal procedures specifically for emergencies, which would prevent potential auditing problems but still allow for innovative approaches.

2. After the flooding, because of the scale of the disaster in Gonaives, we did not sufficiently consider the size of the problem in the Northwest region. The next time, we must invest our resources equitably in all affected zones.

3. During the entire emergency period, management did not adequately communicate the range of available experts and their areas of expertise before sending them to the site. In the future, maintain a chart which is updated

weekly, showing all the consultants and a summary of their work plan before sending them to the site.

4. Two weeks after the flooding, there were two [management] structures: a) the structure that already existed in Gonaives b) the Emergency Management Team (ETL)

In future, we should:

• Set up a contingency emergency plan (preparedness plan) that is permanent and pyramidal, given the scale of the emergency • Ensure good communication about the new structure and involve the community in decision making • Continue/establish/reinforce a climate of mutual trust, which would facilitate all communication about the structure

5. The week after the flooding, many CARE staff members were disaster victims themselves and thus there was a lack of human resources in Gonaives. They were not were not sufficiently aware of the important role CARE had to play in such an emergency, and the implications for each member of the team. In the future, we must better prepare staff for a global response.

6. During the entire emergency period, there were mechanisms [within the international community] for coordinating activities, at least theoretically. In reality, coordination was mediocre, consisting mostly of meetings! In the future, we should actively advocate that all the actors involved actually carry out agreed on procedures.

GROUP 3: PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. In the Northwest, CARE staff was closely involved from the beginning with the coordination committee to identify needs rapidly with communities and organize a response to those needs. This collaborative approach permitted a good assessment and an adequate response, and should be replicated in the future.

2. Having a security chain and functioning communication at the institutional level was essential for crisis management. In the future, we must be sure this remains functional—tested, reinforced and adapted to new technologies and constraints.

3. From the beginning, a good assessment of limitations and needs regarding expertise allowed for a useful mobilization of human resources, which also created an opportunity for learning and sharing by both national and international staff. This should be repeated in the future.

4. In the absence of a contingency plan, the existence of a good management system in our regular programs allowed us to adapt and use it for rapid and effective response to the emergency. This should be continued in the future, in order to guarantee our capacity to apply a contingency plan and maintain our good credibility in the eyes of donors.

5. Overall, the availability of a staff that was experienced, motivated, involved and flexible permitted us to organize our immediate response effectively. This potential should be maintained and reinforced in the future by orientations that permit us to better structure and systematize our immediate responses.

Negative Lessons Learned

1. Throughout the emergency management, we did not establish a system for collecting data systematically. In the future, we should identify a focal point for early collection, processing and analysis of data, in order to guide programming and to assure rapid targeting of beneficiaries. [Comment: the positive lesson learned is that we do have a system in place to collect data about the rise and fall of prices of basic necessities.]

2. When Hurricane Jeanne hit, there was an early warning system for drought only. In the future, this system should be expanded, based on a risk assessment, which would permit identification of at-risk sites and dissemination of information in time for evacuation and for organizing or identifying those who will take charge.

3. SPHERE standards were not applied. In the future, we must assure that they are adopted, adapted to the local context, and applied during regular programming, as well as implementation and evaluation of the emergency response.

4. Overall, there was insufficient consultation with on-site staff and community disaster victims. In the future, we must assure that mechanisms for consultations are strengthened in order to prepare proposals. [A suggestion was to improve the depth, breadth and analysis of the CAMI assessment.]

5. The response to the emergency was carried out spontaneously, taking advantage more or less effectively of the staff’s experience and professionalism. In the future, we must develop and implement a preparedness plan.

Suggestion: Strengthen M&E capacity in outlying zones.

GROUP 4: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. In carrying out the targeted distributions, we informed the population of the objectives, approaches and methods of distribution. We also involved local authorities and community leaders in the selection of beneficiaries. This allowed us to reach the most vulnerable groups.

2. While implementing the entire emergency response, all CARE staff were affected and deeply involved. This allowed us to develop a rapid response despite the absence of an emergency team. This joint effort, team sprit and selflessness were critical to the success of the interventions.

3. Initially the humanitarian aid activities were marred by security problems and incidents, due to limited involvement of local authorities and lack of involvement/awareness of the population. Public service announcements and community meetings led to more involvement of local authorities (SNEP, TPTC) and of the local population. This in turn played a role in improving security conditions and decreasing the pressure on CARE.

4. During the implementation of the emergency response, we had daily meetings to discuss the progress of emergency activities. Despite not having a structured system, this allowed us to monitor results and make timely decisions. This is recommended for the future.

5. From the start of the distribution of water by truck and cleaning up the city of Gonaives, CARE consulted with and coordinated the work with other NGOs intervening in these same areas. This allowed us to have better coverage when distributing aid to beneficiaries. Working in partnerships is a key strategy for obtaining better results.

Negative Lessons Learned:

1. When we started up emergency distribution of food, we did not share information with the communities about our methods and criteria for

distribution. This resulted in incomprehension and frustration on the part of the population, and pressure on our staff. Next time it is strongly recommended that we inform the population (using the media and local structures) from the very beginning.

2. During the emergency, in order to avoid looting and stealing, CARE Haiti’s humanitarian activities were guarded by MINUSTAH personnel, who were not steeped in the mission’s philosophy and ways of working. This aroused frustration among beneficiaries, CARE staff and MINUSTAH. In the future, should it be necessary to use military personnel, we should orient them from the beginning regarding the organization’s vision and mission.

3. Because of the realities on the ground and the urgency of the activities to be undertaken, critical information did not always reach implementing staff in a timely manner (e.g., budget, contracts with donors). This resulted in trial and error at first. In the future, we should assure that we have good lines of communication from the beginning (identification of contact persons and setting up appropriate structures in the office to handle the emergency).

4. At the start-up of emergency activities, lines of responsibility and leadership for managing the emergency were not clearly defined. This resulted in misunderstandings, internal and external frustration, and a delay in the process of implementing activities. In the future, we should set up a structure right away to assure leadership at every level of activity.

5. During the emergency after Hurricane Jeanne, the areas around the city of Gonaives and the Northeast were given priority. Emergency aid outside of Gonaives was not sufficiently mobilized. In the future, we should do a better job of disseminating information about all the affected areas and strengthen our requests to donors in order to call their attention to these areas.

6. During distribution of non-food items (NFI), CARE began without a structure or a plan. This caused a chaotic situation both in terms of storing and distribution of items to beneficiaries. The next time, we should set up a management system from the beginning that is clear, orderly and well understood by all those involved. Specifically, we could adopt the system set up by John Solomon, adopt, modify and use a manual for management of NFI, and train staff on procedures in the manual. This could all be based on tools already available regarding management of food [and from other COs].

GROUP 5: LOGISTICS AND SECURITY

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. On the day of the flooding, our radio communication system, which was functional, allowed the Gonaives staff to share information about the situation. We should ensure that this system functions permanently, as well as alternative systems such as cell phones, satellite phones, etc.

2. During and after the flooding, the availability of a fleet of appropriate vehicles allowed us to save human lives and bring aid to victims throughout the community. We will continue to manage the composition and maintenance of our fleet. [It was suggested that CARE consider transportation by sea, either through maritime transporters or buying Zodiacs.]

3. When the arrival of Hurricane Jeanne was first announced (Wednesday, September 15th), the CARE Gonaives Security Committee met to take all the necessary preventive measures, i.e., evacuation of certain staff to Port au Prince, immobilization of staff and vehicles on site, shelter and safety of local employees, and raising awareness of local authorities and partners. We will continue to keep these security procedures active.

4. During and after the flooding, CARE staff members displayed exemplary commitment and availability. We should ensure that staff motivation remains at the highest level possible.

Negative Lessons Learned:

1. Immediately after the flooding, we reported the damage. But then we took too long to plan the distribution of food to victims. Next time we should have two parallel activities, i.e., one team meets to plan while the other team does the distribution.

2. After Hurricane Jeanne passed, we began a massive distribution of commodities under conditions that approached anarchy. In the future, we should plan and organize distributions in a manner that assures respect for human dignity [irrespective of the operating environment].

3. After Hurricane Jeanne passed, security measures and procedures for frequenting warehouses during storage of food and non-food commodities were not adequately controlled, which created pressure for those goods. In the future, we should display and apply procedures needed in such contexts.

4. In the days following Hurricane Jeanne, a large number of staff was assigned to the emergency (purchasing, arrivals and departures, distributions, trips, visits, etc). In the future, we should develop strategies for more rapid re- deployment of certain staff members for an emergency response.

5. The day after Hurricane Jeanne hit, we quickly made a huge amount of purchases without being sure we were following all procedures correctly. We should develop procedures that can be rapidly adapted to facilitate the process and related documentation.

Feedback:

• There is always a trade-off between rapid response and involving local authorities and others in the decision-making. • Avoid as much as possible the presence of military personnel inside CARE installations. • As part of on-going training of drivers, include basic, practical techniques for crossing rivers. • Develop staff training for ways to assure their own security. • Consider ways that CARE can fill in the gaps without doing everything itself. • CARE should urge authorities to develop plans that would reduce the impact of disasters on populations, as well as training for communities about their role in responding to and reducing the impact of disasters.

GROUP 6: STAFFING

Positive Lessons Learned:

1. Using human resources from regular programs in emergency projects greatly facilitated the harmonization between regular and emergency activities. It also helped make implementation faster.

2. Investing time and involving national staff in decision-making about the immediate emergency response translates into a feeling of ownership.

3. Recruitment of local staff from the disaster zone is another way to help the community to recover.

4. Taking advantage of a versatile and multi-talented staff to manage this emergency allowed the mission to obtain better results.

5. The targeted interface between CARE USA and CARE Haiti permitted rapid recruitment of international staff, thanks to a bank of human resources already assembled.

Negative Lessons Learned:

1. “Flooding victims”: Staff worked more than 20 hours a day, seven days a week. In the future, we should have a plan to rotate teams every 24 hours, which would allow better use of human resources and better time management.

2. The Gonaives management committee, having effectively assumed responsibility immediately after the emergency, communicated information to the central office in PaP, who then did not involve these employees in decision-making. The PaP office should, in future, refer back to the local team and take into account the work already carried out for better continuity.

3. When international staff members were recruited, there was no clear identification of needs, terms of reference were not spelled out, and the emergency staffing bank was not formally operational. In the future, for better time management and allocation of resources, we should identify genuine needs, define terms of reference, and regularly update the human resources bank.

4. During the flooding, some CARE employees lost their possessions and others lost relatives, not to mention the tragic death of one of our colleagues. While they did receive immediate aid, nevertheless they had to wait four months to get psychosocial support, which is one of the most important needs.

5. Within 48 hours after the disaster, we made the decision to shelter staff victims and their families in the CARE compound. However, the management of all these people was not completely effective. In the future, we should place limits on people in terms of time and space, and orient employees toward a rapid return to their homes.

ANNEX A: Action Plan

Action Person Responsible Date Develop the workshop report, Sharon Bell January 16 including chronology, workshop process, and outcomes Organize a task force and: Abby, Evaline, Yves-Laurent, End of March (a & b) a) Revise/finalize the lessons Jouthe, Sofie learned b) Develop action plans for applying lessons learned c) Develop a timeline to End of January (c) finalize the process for development of an action plan, including results of the external evaluation Translate and disseminate the Evaline January 17th workshop report to all participants All participants give feedback All participants February 1st on the report to the task force Organize mini-workshops at Trainers and project managers End of April project sites to share lessons learned and action plans

ANNEX B: Chronology of Events U.N./govt Vie des Pauvres CARE Haiti CARE International CARE EUA Bailleurs Autre ONGs Sept ¾ MINUSTAH a ¾ Pertubation economique, ¾ 19 Sept reunion de coordination a PAP ¾ Visites de support de president ¾ Recrutment de ¾ Propositions pour ¾ 20 sep, reunion de coordination commencé de socialique & ¾ 20 sep, reunion de coordination aux Peter Bell et d’autres high staff d’urgence Fondation Gates aux Gonaives travailler au psychologique Gonaives level staff Adeeb, Mario ¾ Reponse rapide et ¾ Mise en place de mecanisme CARE (inondation, perte de vie, ¾ Abby et Jouthe a l’exterieur lorsque ¾ CEG s’est forme et s’est reuni Flores, Cat Toth, decaisement coordenne de reponse Gonaives pertes de biens) l’ourogan venait por la premier fois a Genève. Yann, John immediate de fonds ¾ Reunions de coordination ¾ Debut vols ¾ Entre’aide et ¾ Retour du SOA Gonaives en Haiti ¾ Premiere appel de Solomon, Regis, des bailleurs reguliéres dans les secteurs de helicop hébergement des ¾ CARE Haiti est devenu le point focal conference pour l’ERWG Jan S. ¾ DFID 3 tranches en santé, assainissement, education, UN/govt. (acces affectés par d’autres référence a Gonaives ¾ Solidarité manifesté par la ¾ Collecte de fonds deux jours etc. limité) ¾ Premiere distribution de ¾ Integration facile et rapide des autres staff international au staff de OFDA, BEF ¾ Reponse financiére ¾ Support de ONGs locales, ¾ Visite premier vivres ONG grâce a la CARE national ¾ $1 million Board rapid international pour repondre minister ¾ Mort de 3000 personnes ¾ Point vital de la ville ¾ Mobilisation des ressources Endowment l’urgence depeché à a Gonaives et environs ¾ Centre d’hébergement, maison de’accueil materielles, financiers et approved Gonaives ¾ Inondation suite au pour les ONG, journalists, stockage des humains, et collaboration des ¾ Inondation suite au ¾ Representant cyclone Jeanne biens, etc. ressources: Australie, UK, cyclone Jeanne special du govt ¾ Quête de nourriture et de ¾ Vaccination des employees Allemagne, Canada, France, aux Gonaives produites de necessité ¾ $1 million Board Endowment approved Austria, USA ($5 million pour coordiner pour les pauvres ¾ Premiére distribution de vivres recus) l’urgence ¾ Distribution de l’eau et ¾ Solidarité du staff national victime ou ¾ Inondation suite au cyclone ¾ Gestion de de nourriture pas; hébergement des employés (800+) Jeanne cadavres ¾ Pertes total du biens et et families sinestrés (govt/Choix de moyens de production ¾ Reunion de securité Rouge ¾ Decapitalisation de ¾ Prioritization de l’urgence, re-focalisation ¾ Evacuation staff populations victims et du travail du staff, nouveaux procedures UN et augmentation de la de decaissement, achat, etc. embassades vulnerabilité des pauvres ¾ Mort d’un employee de CARE Gonaive ¾ Mise on place (Mitail Aldonais) Unité de Soins ¾ Pendant la periode de la crise, nous Medicaux (CARE staff) avons mangé du ble. ¾ 13-20 Sept Internet ne functionne pas au bureau PaP ¾ Inondation suite au cyclone Jeanne ¾ Distribution de l’eau et de nourriture ¾ Coordination entre CH and CUSA ¾ Prevention maladies immuno- controlables ¾ 3 semaines de travail sans repos, 20 hrs/jour ¾ CARE Gonaives recu au moins 20 journalists etranges

Vie des Pauvres CARE Haiti CARE International CARE EUA Bailleurs Autre ONGs Oct Deterioration de la situation socio- ¾ Recrutment de staff d’urgence Systematisation et prises de ¾ Solidarite manifeste par la ¾ Recrutment de staff ¾ Collaberation pour ameloration d’eau ¾ 2eme reunion de politique (5-20 Oct) decisions staff international au staff d’urgence, John Hoare, potable CAMI Distribution de l’eau et de nourriture ¾ Projets et communication formelle national Jeff G, Virginia Vaughn, ¾ Reponse financiere rapid ($500,000 des ¾ Reunions regulieres Risque d’une outré inondation 8 Oct ¾ Structure locale en place ¾ Messages de support Greg Brady, Canadians, $500,000 suisse) dan ¾ Deterioration de la situation socio-politique ¾ Levee de fonds parmi de Mobilization de ¾ sante, assainissement, ¾ Distribution de l’eau et de nourriture staff de CARE national et resources education, etc. ¾ Inaccessibilite de la route 8 octobre, blockage des international ¾ Reallocation de fons ¾ arrivage non- transports pour des urgence liee a la coordenne de ¾ Intensification de la vulgarization des activites d’urgance secheresse l’assistance ¾ Visite de Sophie ¾ 20 ONG arrives a Gonaives Nov Distribution de l’eau et de ¾ Passage de l’urgence al a rehabilitation, reoverture de Visite de Phillip Leveques Recrutment de staff d’urgence Reponse financiere rapid classes Simon nourriture ¾ Cash for Work commence ¾ Distribution cible de nourriture

¾ Distribution de l’eau et de nourriture ¾ Reponse a USAID RFA

ANNEX C: Lessons learned – Media (Individual Perspective) Haiti flood response 2004

As could be expected, the September floods triggered a brief, intense burst of media interest. We were relatively successful in channeling that into some worthwhile coverage for CARE Haiti’s work, both of the emergency response and to a lesser extent of longer- term programming. Much of the attention was a natural result of CARE’s dominant role as lead agency in Gonaïves, but several other elements were key to our success:

1) Availability and preparation of key staff for interviews: The Country Director, Mission Development Director, and several others made media a high priority. All had significant past experience with media and/or had had media training, and were able to provide the concise, colorful answers journalists seek.

2) Information: Staff were quick to provide the onsite press officer with up-to-date facts and figures (metric tons of aid delivered, numbers of recipients, etc.) Hard data are key to encouraging journalists to cite CARE in their reporting.

3) Speed of response: CARE staff were quick to meet most press demands, accommodating deadlines and returning calls promptly. CO and PR kept an eye on major international press coverage and responded quickly to errors or lapses in reporting.

4) CI cooperation: improved coordination between CI media officers, via the Communications Working Group (COMWG) and emergency media director Arnoud Hekkens, made it possible for staff on site to meet requests from media in various Northern countries quickly.

5) HQ backup: a freelancer in Atlanta served as backup to the field press officer, helping distribute press releases, research contact information for journalists, etc. This was a tremendous help in meeting media demands.

6) Communications infrastructure: all key CO staff had cell phones which functioned in the crisis area, making it easy to reach people on short notice for media requests. Internet service was good at the CARE Gonaïves sub-office (but not in PAP -- see below).

7) Transport: CARE was able to accommodate most journalist requests for transport, both locally (providing rides around the Gonaïves area) and nationally (transit by land between PAP and Gonaïves, and help facilitating seats on UN helicopter flights).

8) Physical accommodation of journalists: CARE Gonaïves was able to provide workspace, electric power, occasional use of telephone and Internet service, and even sleeping quarters for several journalists, making CARE the natural focal point of their reporting.

9) Photos: CARE was able to supply still images from the affected area to news media, many of which were eager for material since they had no personnel on site. Digital photos taken by staff, and later by a visiting freelance photographer, were e-mailed back to CARE USA HQ in Atlanta in short order.

10) Video: The press officer brought a small video camera into the field and shot footage; thanks to a staffer who hand-carried the tape back to Atlanta, it was available for transmission to broadcasters within a day. Availability of recent video is absolutely key to TV coverage. (Alternative options: (a) hire local freelance crew; (b) ask news crews to provide raw footage in exchange for access)

11) Feature story ideas: staff suggested ideas and sources for feature stories which the press officer was able to share with journalists, several of whom produced lengthy pieces prominently featuring CARE staff. Journalists covering a crisis are eager for ideas that help them “advance” the story and distinguish themselves from their peers – the best ideas link a current breaking news item with a broader or longer-term story about CARE programming (e.g.: floods linked to reforestation issue and charcoal-substitution efforts).

12) Coverage of Peter Bell visit: Visiting CARE USA President Peter Bell made himself available for numerous interviews; CO staff accommodated journalists by changing Peter’s schedule on short notice in order to do live interviews with CNN, for example.

13) Field trips/tours: Journalists responded to invitations for special press trips to the field (to tour flood-affected neighborhoods, food distribution sites, or in one case a day trip to Bassin-Bleu to see a tree nursery and reforestation programming). If staff time and vehicles can be spared, these can be a great tool for generating press interest.

14) Briefing sheets: We took a page (literally!) from World Vision, producing an update sheet with facts and figures on our response that could be easily handed to journalists on site.

Possible improvements:

1) Communications:

a) Continuity of phone numbers: If a press officer can’t be on the ground quickly, consider reserving a cell phone for him/her and giving it in the meantime to whoever will be answering press calls until he/she arrives – likewise, after the press officer leaves, his/her cell phone should continue to be answered. [This would have been easier in the last case if Rick had not allowed his local cell phone to be stolen in Gonaïves!]

b) Voicemail: Local cell phone was not set up for voicemail, meaning whenever it was out of range, it simply rang unanswered.

c) Internet: While service was excellent in Gonaïves, it was unavailable at the office in PAP (since corrected). Visiting press officer should whenever possible have access to reliable Internet service, whether at a CARE office or a hotel.

d) Satellite phone: The media officer satphone brought from Atlanta did not function in Haiti. If visiting staff will need satphones in the field, might be best to arrange them through CO or have them set up/tested by local technicians.

2) Feature stories: If time and staff had been available, more ideas/sources could have been generated to encourage journalists to report on other important stories (e.g.: find a way to link flood coverage to HIV/AIDS programming)

3) Spokespersons: If a few more staff had been prepared and briefed for interviews, it might have taken some pressure off the two or three who handled most requests. Conversely, on occasion staff who were not authorized or trained to speak to media spontaneously answered questions from reporters; this should be discouraged.

4) Press conference: CARE organized a press conference in conjunction with several other NGOs in PAP. While this may have been useful for cultivating inter-agency cooperation, press attendance was poor, probably not worth the effort invested by CO staff, including room setup, interpreter, etc. Lessons: (a) press conferences not held directly at the scene of the action may not be as effective; (b) press conferences may be more appealing if they offer access to out- of-the-ordinary spokespersons (e.g., visiting dignitary); (c) press conference might be justified if there are specific hard data to be released, e.g. results of a major assessment or study.

Rick Perera CARE USA Press Officer [email protected] +1 404 979 9453