Cold War Alaska Hummel.Pdf

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The U.S. Military as Geographical Agent: The Case of Cold War Alaska Author(s): Laurel J. Hummel Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Jan., 2005), pp. 47-72 Published by: American Geographical Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034309 Accessed: 26-08-2014 00:35 UTC

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This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions THE U.S. MILITARYAS GEOGRAPHICALAGENT: THE CASE OF COLD WARALASKA*

LAUREL J.HUMMEL

ABSTRACT. Alaskawas strategicallykey to theU.S. defenseplan during the cold war(1946- 1989).As such,it was thescene of an enormousand sustainedmilitary investment, the effect of whichwas amplifiedby Alaska's undiversified economy, sparse development, small resi- dentpopulation, and marginalizedpolitical status at thebeginning of theera. The strong militarypresence affected Alaskan demographics, economic development, and infrastruc- tureand figuredprominently in theadmission of Alaska to the union in 1959. The high profile andlong-term presence of the U.S. military had such a dramaticaffect on thecourse of Alaska thatthe result was tantamountto a "militarizedlandscape." Keywords: Alaska, cold war, his- toricaldevelopment, militarized landscape.

1tthe beginning of World War II, Alaska's mostly primary-sector economy shifted dramaticallywhen the territory was catapultedto strategicimportance in thePa- cifictheater as bothan air-corridorconnection to theSoviet Union, then a U.S. ally, and keyterrain that needed to be keptout ofJapanese hands. Defense expenditures in Alaskatotaled more than si billion between 1941 and 1945(USARAL 1969). Atthe end ofthe war, defense spending pushed Alaska into a periodof uncertainty.Alas- kanshad little confidence that the main prewar extractive industries, especially min- eral mining,would recoverin timeto preventeconomic malaise and massive out-migration(Whitehead 1998). Forestry, fishing, and mininghad been shut down duringWorld War II, fromthe diversion of male labor, interruption ofnormal trade and manufacturingpatterns, and, in thecase of goldmining-a significant part of themining industry at thetime-the War Production Board order that closed down all gold-miningoperations in thecountry. Butthe enormous military undertakings in Alaskaduring the cold war ensured Alaska'sfuture and set thestage for statehood, which otherwise would likely not haveoccurred until the discovery of oil on theNorth Slope in 1968.According to theAlaska historians Claus Naskeand HermanSlotnick, "the Cold War rescued Alaskafrom economic depression and obscurity"(1987, 131). The buildup was con- ditionedby the quickly changing international security picture, the national strate- giesthat addressed it, and rapidtechnological changes. It broughtimmediate and enormoustransformation toAlaska in manytangible and intangibleways. In terms ofconstruction and infrastructureexpansion, the military investment peaked early in thecold war,during what one observerdubbed "the frantic fifties" (Woodman 1999,lo9). This discussionfocuses on the U.S. military'srole as a powerfulgeo- graphicalagent between 1945 and 1959,the year of Alaska's entry into the union as

* Theauthor wishes to gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance of Francis A. Galgano. * DR. HUMMELis an associateprofessor of geographyat theU.S. MilitaryAcademy, West Point, New York 10996-1695. TheGeographical Review 95 (1): 47-72, January 2005 Copyright@ 2006by the American Geographical Society of New York

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 48 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW theforty-ninth state. The degree of military influence remained very strong throughout thecold war period, and evenin thepost-cold war epoch the military continues to rankamong Alaska's top employersand is the major conduitfor federal spendingin thestate (Case 1999;Goldsmith 2000; Friedand Windisch-Cole2002; Haycox2002; Schell2002).

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND ALASKA'S EMERGING ROLE At theclose of WorldWar II, theSoviet Union moved quickly to neutralizeGer- manyand transform central Europe into a bufferzone against the West by establish- ing pro-Sovietregimes in EasternEurope (Walker 1994). Although the cold war beganas a confrontationofconventional military forces in Europe,it evolved into a globalcontest of strategicnuclear arms as theSoviet Union began rapid developmentof nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and missilesin responseto forward deploymentof U.S. B-29"atomic bombers" (Ambrose 1993; Hoffecker and Whorton 1995).The August 1949 detonation of the first Soviet nuclear bomb, followed by the Communisttakeover of mainland China, created enormous domestic political pres- sureon theU.S. militaryto reassessearlier estimates that the Soviet Union would notbe ableto launch a successfulattack with nuclear weapons and long-range bomb- ersuntil 1955. The administrationof PresidentHarry Truman responded with Na- tionalSecurity Council Resolution 68, calling for a peacetimemilitary mobilization to meetthe rapidly increasing international threat (Schaffel 1991). The invasionof SouthKorea by Communistforces in 1952provided further incentive to stepup militarypreparations. The United States embarked on a hastyand majorexpansion ofconventional as wellas strategicnuclear forces around the world (Ambrose 1993) andon developmentof new strategies for detection, interception, retaliation, standoff, and showdownagainst the "Red Menace." Alaska figured prominently in thosede- fenseplans. Withthe Soviet Union defined as theprimary enemy, Alaska gained strategic significancebecause of its location (Denfeld 1996). Central to earlycold war think- ingwas the"polar concept," based on thesimple geographical truth that the short- estdistance between the United States and theSoviet Union-and vice versa-was a straightline across the polar region (Figure i). Recognizedin the1930s by Gen. Billy Mitchell,one of theearliest and mostvocal proponents of airpower, as thekey to futureair wars (Pagano 1998), the polar concept garnered new attention as techno- logicaladvances eventually rendered the continental United States a vulnerabletar- get.The perceiveddanger of transpolarattack triggered planning for systems of advancedwarning and interception across northern North America and made Alaska a strategicair center for basing and commandingthe required forces. Alaska'sproximity to theSoviet Union was key for another reason as well:Close enoughto registerseismic anomalies through the ground and via airborneplat- forms,it allowed the United States to monitorthe ambitious Soviet nuclear testing program.Alaska's strategic value also includedits geologicalwealth: It possessed tenof the sixteen minerals crucial to thecreation of cold war industrial and military

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 49

PEKIN, ALASKAAS A FORWARD E U STAGINGAREA MOSCOW NADYM To K AKTKtI V'KUT~

/AR 150 OPNH N 00 jI -,,,-

'~P4~DA SPACIFIC Ot NAUTICAL OCEAN MILES, ANCHORAGETO: YYR ALANTIC Anadyr 905 OCEAN Archan e 3,253 Chicago 2,483 DRO Copnhqen 3,518 300 onoalutu 2,482 60 London 3,902 Migadan 1,703 Moscow 3.789 Murmansk 3,001 isoAi 459 Nadoym 2,973 ~r6~ New York 2,930 Norilsk 2,598 Peking 3,468 Provide1iya 662 San Fanisco 0 ,742 1ea9ttl 9,249 Seoul 3,278 Tokyo 3,004 Vladivostok 2,878 Vorkuta 2,950 Yakutsk 2,152 AEATTLE 1500 NEW YORK },6,OLUL VCHICAO0~ 60 ~S~N FRANCISCO

120 9O0

FIG.1--An Alaskan view of coldwar political geography. Maps likethis showing Alaska's proximity to potentialfoes and alliesbordering the polar route helped to justifythe U.S. militaryinvestment in Alaska.Source: Adapted from Cloe 1984.(Cartography by Robert A. Getz,U.S. MilitaryAcademy) products(Nielson 1988). This mineralsupply, combined with Alaska's perceived "barrenness"and remotenessfrom the continental United States, attracted federal authoritieswho wantedto base nuclearand chemicalactivities of all sortsin the region,including nondefense detonations under the Atomic Energy Commission's PlowshareProgram as wellas declaredmilitary-related detonations, experimental nuclearpower, and chemical-weaponstesting.' In addition,Alaska was theonly place where U.S. forcescould traindomesti- callyfor ground and air combatin cold-weatherconditions similar to thosefound in the SovietUnion. Despite military leaders' pronouncements that air-delivered nuclearweaponry was thefuture of warfare, no one trulybelieved that the mission of ground forcesto keep and hold terrainwas obsolete (USARAL 1972).Whether in preparationfor a manneddefense of Alaska or foran invasionof Sovietterritory, Americansoldiers had to trainto fightin extremeArctic conditions. With an area morethan twice the size of Texas, Alaska offered relatively unlimited space for bases, militaryairfields, bombing ranges, air and groundmaneuvers, and experimenta- tion in Arcticengineering: an enormousdefense laboratory of largely"unin- habited"-exceptby Alaska Natives-and uncontested land. Alaska was set to become,

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 50 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW as theAlaskan historian Stephen Haycox (200la) vividlydescribed it, a "strategic freeworld defense redoubt."

CHARACTERISTICS OF "MILITARIZED" ALASKA The hustlethat characterized the buildup of cold war Alaska was markedmore by confusionand countermandingplans than by a singlevision and focusedeffort. The nationalstrategic plan and theinvestment it drovein Alaskachanged several timesand fora numberof reasons,among them advancements in intelligence- gatheringabilities, which in turnamended the degree and typeof perceived threat, and thelong duration of diplomatic hostilities on an ever-changingworld stage of small"hot wars" shadowed by the constant specter of totalwar. The mainreason forthe changes was therapid evolution of weaponstechnology. Early in thecold war,nuclear bombs and the evolutionof long-rangebombers and jet fighters broughtabout a "heartland"concept of Alaskan defense, with ground forces mostly relegatedto theprotection of bases and surface-to-airdefense sites. This firstde- fenseplan, and thewar machine it drove,was one of detection,interception, and first-lineretaliation. As missiles became the largest perceived threat by the late 1950s, a ballistic-missileearly-warning center was built,bringing with it $360 millionin defensecontracts (Nielson 1988). Missiles based in thecontinental United States replacedAlaska-based bombers and all the people and equipment supporting them. The territorial,then congressional, delegation knew the importanceof keeping Alaskain theforefront of nationalstrategy: When defense planners turned their attentionaway from Alaska, outcry and protest often ensued, and efforts were made to keepAlaska in Americans'and Americandecision makers' minds by promoting a perceptionof Alaska as thecountry's "Guardian of theNorth," "Gibraltar of the North,""Northern Bulwark," or, alternatively, "Coldest Front" (Lewis 1959; USARAL 1965;Sherwood 1967; Wise 1982; Cloe 1984;Naske and Slotnick1987; Nielson 1988; Denfeld 1996; Seidler 1996). The politicallobbying, as wellas otherfactors described above, kept interest in Alaskastrong, but theever-evolving national plan resultedin an almostconstant stateof turmoil as Alaska'sdefense infrastructure "was built and repeatedlyrebuilt as militaryconcepts changed" (Rogers 1962, 63). This renderedsome installations obsoletebefore they were activated; in some extremecases they were abandoned forthe nextproject even before they were completed. The resultwas a cold war militarizedlandscape that existed in palimpsestform, itself having been laid in part ontoa modifiedcultural landscape resulting from Alaska's strategic role in thePa- cifictheater of World War II.

POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHICS

In termsof rawnumbers, the expansion of Alaska's population was led bysoldiers or civiliansengaged in militaryconstruction and operations(Whitehead 1998). In the1950s, the most active period of military buildup, active-duty military personnel averagedjust under 21 percent of the total Alaskan population, ranging from a high

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 51 ofalmost 26 percentin 1952to 15.4percent in 1959(Alaska Industry 1972; Mason 1974)(Table I). Laterin the era, numbers of personnel assigned to Alaska fell, due to the"increasingly complex and sophisticated military hardware" that required less manpower(Naske and Slotnick 1987,138), but the number never fell below the 20,oo000 mark.The early-eradata enumeratedmilitary personnel but failedto reflectthe

TABLE I-MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ALASKA, 1940-1989

NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF ACTIVE-DUTY ALASKA' S MILITARY TOTAL POPULATION PERSONNEL POPULATION ASSOCIATED WITH YEAR IN ALASKA OF ALASKA THE MILITARY

1940 1,000 75,000 1.3 1941 8,000 1942 60,000 1943 152,000 1944 104,000 1945 60,000 139,000 43.1 1946 19,000 103,000 18.4 1947 25,000 117,000 21.4 1948 27,000 126,000 21.4 1949 30,000 132,000 22.7 1950 26,000 138,000 18.8 1951 38,000 164,000 23.1 1952 50,000 196,000 25.5 1953 50,000 212,000 23.5 1954 49,000 218,000 22.4 1955 50,000 221,000 22.6 1956 45,000 220,000 20.4 1957 48,000 228,000 21.0 1958 35,000 213,000 16.4 1959 34,000 220,000 15.4 1969a 32,000 283,000 25.9 1979a 23,910 404,500 18.0 1989a 25,782 536,848 17.3 a In lateryears, as moredata became available, the percentage included linked population segments;for example,military dependents and employees.See thetext for further explanation. Sources:DOD n.d.; Rogersand Cooley1963, 7, 8; AACDCS/C 1970; 1976, 10-11; 1977,4; 1978, 4; 1979, 4; 1983,4; 1984, 11,13-14; 1985,23; 1988, 9, 14; Bowen 1970, 5, 22, 25, 38; 1971, 3-4; Alaska Industry1972; MasoN 1974, 8; Crow 1975, table 1; AC DCS/C 1990, 10-12; Fried 1996. muchlarger numbers of persons associated with the military. This linked popula- tionincluded immediate family members of active-duty personnel, Defense De- partmentcivil servants and their families, employees ofthe services'nonappropriated fundbusinesses (such as thebase exchange and commissary), Alaska Army and Air NationalGuardsmen as wellas militaryreservists and their families, and military retireesand their families. Based on partial data from a numberof sources, the true

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MAJOR SiteLove COLD WAR BASESIN FORT WAINWRIGHT

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Fairbanks CANADA

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IN9 1- e le 'I i er FORTRICH RDSON BASESITE a %ir,t 412A~ce~vko EZAME*NDOPFfi 4urn "a'n AirDefense Summit [A Miii Site ARMYINSTALLATION chorage 3 era AIRFORCE INSTALLATION AirDefense Site Point AIRDEFENSE SITE ALASKARAILROAD

FIG.2-Major cold warmilitary bases in Alaska.Fort Richardson and ElmendorfAir Force Base, alongwith Fort Wainwright and EielsonAir Force Base (originallycalled "26 Mile Field"),contrib- utedto theconcentration of Alaska's growing population around the urban areas of Anchorage and Fairbanks.The map also showsthe locations of eightair-defense artillery sites built to protectthe majorbases. Source: Adapted from OHA 1996. (Cartography by Robert A. Getz,U.S. Military Academy)

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 53 proportionofmilitary-associated persons in Alaska during the 1950s has been esti- matedat between 40 and45 percent (DOD n.d.; Rogers and Cooley 1963; AAC DCS/C 1970;Bowen 1970, 1971; Alaska Industry 1972; Mason 1974;Crow 1975; Fried 1996). Thisestimate isconservative, inthat it does not include the considerable number of peoplewho came to Alaska seeking the employment opportunities the defense in- dustrypromised. Themilitary effort changed the demographics ofAlaska in several important ways. First,it affected the ethnic makeup. Prior to 194o, Alaska's population of 75,000 was dividedabout evenly between Alaskan Native Americans and Caucasians. By 1950, theproportion ofAlaska Natives to total population had declined to one in four as thepopulation climbed to 138,ooo.A decadelater, with a totalpopulation of more than220,oo000, Alaska Natives were only one-fifth ofthe resident population (Chance 1962;Whitehead 1998). In additionto greaternumbers of Caucasians, the defense buildupbrought the first significant numbers of Blacks, first in all-Black units during theWorld War II constructionofthe Alaska Highway and then in an increasingly multiracialmilitary force. The preponderance ofmales relative tofemales also dropped fromthe time when Alaska's workforce overwhelmingly comprised fishermen and miners.This occurred not because defense and defense construction were not male dominatedbut because the postwar military had enacted new policies that encour- agedfamilies to accompany their military members. Most military people and their spouseswere of childbearing age, so the military-associated population was increased bya multiplierofthree to four. Concurrently, school enrollments inAnchorage and Fairbanks-locationofthe four largest cold war bases and home to approximately 80 percentof the military population-soared (AAC DCS/C 1970). Themilitary efforts also encouraged concentration ofpopulation within Alaska andincreased urbanization, as military population and construction were focused on Anchorageand Fairbanks (Figure 2). Anchoragemushroomed from a populationof about30,000 to morethan 82,000 between 1950 and 1960, an increaseof almost175 percent,fueled by the growth of ElmendorfAir Force Base, home of the AlaskanAir Command and the Alaskan (Joint Services) Command, and of Fort Richardson,headquarters of U.S. ArmyAlaska (Browne 1953; Atwood 1957; ACPC 1958; ACOC 1961;Rogers and Cooley 1963;U.S. Census Bureau 1995). Similarly,the populationof Fairbanksand its immediate environs, which constitute Fairbanks NorthStar Borough, more than doubled during the same period, from a populationof about 23,000ooo to more than 49,000. Thisgrowth was largely spurred by the presenceof Ladd Air Field, which later became the Army's Fort Wainwright, and 26 MileField, which developed into Eielson Air Force Base (Cooley 1954; Sullivan 1971; FNSB 2005).

STANDARD OF LIVING The cold warmilitary boom attractedAlaska-theater veterans eager to returnto a placewhere they could get a fresheconomic start, as wellas menand theirfamilies broughtby or enticedby defense construction. These new Alaskans were different

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FIG.3-Schmidt's Beer van-cum-military housing, 1949. UntilAnchorage could expand to accommodatethe influx of people drawn by the booming defense industry, itwas plagued by highly inflated laborcosts, a severeshortage of habitable dwellings, and overcrowdedschools. The labelaffixed to the originalphotograph identifies this converted van as beingoccupied by "an enlistedman, his wife and child."(Reproduced courtesy of theAlaska State Archives) fromthe "sourdoughs" and gold-rushminers of old.2They were generally search- ingless for the traditional Alaskan homesteading experience of living off the elec- tricalgrid than for the "lower-forty-eight" standard of amenities to whichthey were accustomed(Hilscher and Hilscher1959; Rogers 1962; Denfeld 2001). Most of them weremembers of the"mid 20thcentury urban industrialsociety" (Naske and Slotnick1987,137) who expected contemporary standards of community living and service.These new, expectant residents provided impetus for increased services in twoways: They helped to createa criticalmass, which assisted economies of scale and enabledthe establishment of amenities;and theyexponentially increased po- liticalpressure to providethose services (Hilscher and Hilscher1959). Ironically,the defense boom initiallydecreased, not increased, the standard of living.Military bases could not build family housing fast enough to accommodate thefamilies pouring in, so theyturned to thelocal economyin searchof housing. The resultin the early1950s was a severehousing shortage in Anchorageand Fairbanksand resulting astronomical housing costs. Military families lived in shoddy conditions:Shanty towns of "wanigans"-military Quonset huts with Arctic entry- ways-andmakeshift shacks sprang up overnight,housing excess military families as wellas anynewcomer who could not afford the exorbitant rents elsewhere, in the unlikelyevent that a vacancyeven existed (Figure 3).

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FIG.4-This home on the road system near Glennallen, Alaska was once owned by a memberof the coldwar-era Ground Observation Corps, who added the two-story cupola to afford better-and cer- tainlywarmer-air observation. Although observers in Alaskatended to taketheir task seriously in viewof the widely held belief that they were part of the country's "Northern Bulwark," such material modificationswere rare. (Photograph bythe author, November 2001)

Defenseconstruction also resulted inthe explosive growth of labor unrest, which eventuallyled to therise of organized labor in Alaska. Defense spending substan- tiallyincreased labor costs in an alreadyhigh-cost area (Haycox 1989; Seidler 1996), artificiallystimulating the demand for labor and pricing out some locally owned businesses.Federal paychecks attracted workers from mining, forestry, and fisher- ies,retarding the reestablishment ofthe natural resource-based industries that hadlargely shut down during World War II (Rogers1962; Spence 1995; Seidler 1996). Butdemand increased for the products of local agriculture to supply the greatly expandedpopulations of Fairbanksand Anchorage, especially given the exceed- inglylong shipping times for fresh produce and the new consumers' demands. In general,the rapid influx of people and demands of a verycompressed construc- tioncycle initially overwhelmed the rudimentary infrastructure. Alaska "strained to accommodatethe realities of militarization and crash development" (Nielson 1988, 181).

RESIDENTS PARTICIPATION Alaska'scivilian population was incorporated into the defense effort in a personal way,as membersof the Ground Observer Corps. Although the Ground Observer Corpswas not unique to Alaska, the degree of participation was-one of every 220

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residents(Allen 1993). Alaskans felt the immediacy ofthe global confrontation and a senseof purpose in a landonly 50 air miles from the Soviet Union. Formed in 1953 as a stopgapmeasure, the corps comprised volunteers who spent shifts looking into theskies for enemy aircraft. Because telephone service throughout the territory was sparseand long-distance service practically nonexistent, many observers belonged to an amateurradio network, and somedesigned an elaboratecommunications planusing searchlights and Morse code (ADN 1955). As an exampleof the dedica- tionof these volunteers, one participant inthe village of Glennallen built an obser- vationcupola onto his home (Denfeld 1996) (Figure 4). Uniqueto the Alaskan cold war experience was the incorporation ofthe Alaska Nativepopulation into the defense machinery as soldiers of the Alaska Army Na- tionalGuard, 207th Infantry Group. As with the Ground Observer Corps, Alaskans' participationas citizen-soldiers wassimilar to what was occurring inthe lower forty- eightstates. The distinctive aspect was the recruitment, organization, and training of Native-onlyunits, or "Eskimo Scouts," as theywere dubbed.3 These Native American unitswere based in fifty-one ofAlaska's "bush" (off the road network) villages, con- centratedin thewest and northwest (Alaskan 1959; USARAL 1972;Woodman 1999). "Standingmukluk to mukluk" with their Soviet enemy (Bedard 1987) and described byU.S. Sen. Ted Stevens as Alaska's"eyes and ears on theground" (Bedard 1987), theseAlaska National Guard units had the singular mission of constant reconnais- sanceof their home areas for possible Soviet activity. This mission made specific use oftheir intimate knowledge of the environment and local people, for many were subsistencehunters and whal- ersand virtually all were life- long Alaskans (Fay 1955; Alaskan1959; Robertson 1989). Althoughthe Eskimo Scouts'"peacetime" role was reconnaissance,incase of invasion their assignment wouldescalate into a high- stakesgame of cat and mouse, withthe mission of reporting covertintelligence while evad- ingcapture (Figure 5). Their FIG.5-A coldwar-era recruiting poster targeted at Alaska militarytraining was accom- Natives.In theAlaska Territorial Guard, these troops provided plishedthrough interpreters, groundreconnaissance of thewestern and northwesternpe- because AlaskaNatives of as wellas assistancein rescue many riphery Alaska, operations limited and cold-weathertraining of regularnon-Native troops. Ad- had only knowledge ditionaltraining took place at the headquartersin Nome, ofEnglish (USARAL 1972). The Bethel,and Anchorage.Free trips to theselarger cities and relationshipbetween the accessto theiramenities were also recruitingtools. (Repro- AlaskaNatives in the duced courtesyof theAlaska Army National Guard, Public guard Affairs) militaryservice and the U.S.

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Armywas seenby the army as a mutuallybeneficial one. Knowingthe terrain and how to navigateand survivein theArctic, the EskimoScouts provided valuable trainingto active-dutyarmy units in Alaskaand performedground-level recon- naissancein a territorytoo vastand formidablefor regular troops. NativeAlaskans participating in theguard and theeconomic and culturallife of thebush villages that were home to guardarmories were undoubtedly changed by theirexperiences. Some of theNational Guard armory outpost buildings became interwovenwith community life as gatheringand social centers(Williams 2000ooo; Coy 2002). EskimoScouts received a smallbut regularincome, which potentially alteredthe subsistence- and barter-basedportions of thelocal economythat were significantat thetime. Most Eskimo Scout meetings, training, and reportsutilized theEnglish language, which up to thattime had beenused only to a limiteddegree in thesmaller bush settlements.In addition,the hierarchical and uniquemilitary culturewas overlaidonto preestablished Alaska Native social structures. Opinions aboutthe nature of the effects of thiscultural interface vary within the Native and non-Nativecommunities: "Westernizing" has been not only decried as invasiveand damagingbut also toutedas a valuableteacher of (Western-style)"responsibility" (Kawagley1995; Williams 2000). To be sure,the existenceof EskimoScout units broughtabout a greaterdegree of interfacebetween two cultures that, until then, had had limitedcontact-the Westernized military and traditionalNative Alaskan ways(Williams 2ooo; Hummel200oo2). AlaskaNatives were affected by cold war military activities in more ways than just theirparticipation as EskimoScouts. Environmental damage to Nativelands and peoplehas been well documented (Nielson 1977; Armstrong 1978; Simon and others 2001).The twomost widely known instances are theunderground nuclear explo- sionsconducted between 1965 and 1971 by the Department of Defense and the Atomic EnergyCommission on AmchitkaIsland and theexperiments in preparationfor the anticipatednuclear detonations that were to constitutethe Alaskan portion of the PlowshareProgram, code-named "Project Chariot" (Rock 1962; PointHope 1992; Vandegraft1993). In addition,Alaska Natives were shown little respect during the planningand conduct of several early cold war-era military projects. A mostnotable examplewas theplanning phase of ProjectChariot, when Ifiupiat neighbors in the nearbyvillage of Point Hope were not briefed by Atomic Energy Commission officials untiltwo years after the project had begun, and then only in incompleteand danger- ouslymisleading ways (Chance 2002; O'Neill 1994).Another controversial project wasthe Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory's study of thyroid function and itsrelation to cold-weatheracclimatization, in which Alaska Natives were used as humanmedical subjectswithout properly derived, informed consent (NRC 1996; BHBC 1997).

WORKFORCE AND ECONOMY The totaleconomic effect of militaryactivities during the cold war was staggering. The Departmentof Defense'sexpenditures in Alaskawere just under $450 million in 1950 and by1953 had grownto $512 million(Baliles 1974; Whitehead 1998). Mili-

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 58 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW taryand civilianworkers for the Department of Defenseaccounted for more than half of the Alaskan workforcein 1952. In 1951defense-related construction alone provided15 percentof private-sectorincome in Alaska,more than twice the national proportion(Bowen 1970). A 1961 guide to Alaska put it simply:"Almost ev- erythingthe state has todayit owes to militaryspending" (Kursh 1961, 212). The sameyear, the Anchorage-based joint services command, Alaskan Command, sur- passed$3 billionin totalinvestment in Alaska(Crow 1975). The defenseindustry was the biggestemployer and biggestspender from1940 to 1970 (Haycox 200olb), overtakenby the oil industrywhen the North Slope fields started producing in 1977 (Seidler1996). The trans-Alaskapipeline was thefirst major nonmilitary construc- tionproject ever in thestate. Militaryconstruction peaked in 1954,most of thehousing needs having been metand majorbases well on theway to completion;expenditures for military and civilianconstruction from 1949 to 1954had averaged$250 million per year (Naske andSlotnick 1987). Defense-dominated contract construction continued as thelarg- estsource of private income through 1959, accounting for one-fifth to one-thirdof all privateincome thatyear (Bowen 1970;Fried and Huff1984). Althoughdirect defense expenditures and employmentshares in Alaska'stotal revenueare straightforward, themultiplier effect of total contribution to thestate's privatesector economy is not.The wagesand salaries,profits, and otherincome sharesof private businesses selling to themilitary are normally included in the business or nongovernmentalsector of the state'seconomy (Rogers 1962), making these effectsdifficult to gauge. HarryKursh (1961, 213) estimatedthat two-thirds or more ofAlaska's private business income was generateddirectly or indirectlyby defense and,further, that about one hundredjobs werecreated in Alaskafor every million dollarsof construction contracting. Whether one is conservativeand takesinto ac- countonly direct federal expenditures or invokesa multiplier,the result is indisput- able:The consequencesof coldwar defense investment for Alaska's economy were substantialand longlasting.

STATEHOOD Thereis ampleevidence that Alaska's strategic value to theUnited States and roleas "Guardianof theNorth" was a majorfactor in itsadmission to theunion in 1959 (Gruening1967; Haycox 2001oa).Foremost, and ironically,the national defensein- dustrygave the territory the population base and economythat convinced many lawmakersthat Alaska was capableof sustaining itself in thefuture without federal "life-support"subsidies (Bowkett 1989). The cold warbrought a differentdemo- graphicgroup to Alaska,people who "protestedbeing demoted to second class status"(Hilscher and Hilscher1959, 105) and agitatedfor self-government. Active-duty militarypeople lobbied their congressional delegations at homefor Alaskan statehood (U.S. Congress1953; Bowkett1989) and votedaffirmatively in overwhelming numbersin a 1958congressionally mandated plebiscite (Gruening 1967) (Figure 6). Militarynecessity and Alaska'sstrategic role in thecold war were a keyjustification

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FIG.6-Members of a B-47crew from Eielson Air Force Base, near Fairbanks, hold copies of a local newspaperproclaiming Alaska's admission as theforty-ninth state. Military investment and influence weremajor factors in Alaska's 1959 statehood in many ways. The 35,00ooo servicemen and women sta- tionedin Alaska were allowed to vote in a 1958plebiscite, and they overwhelmingly affirmed admission.(Reproduced courtesy of the Eleventh Air Force History Office)

forstatehood and were advanced in thestrongest terms to Congressby military leaderssuch as DouglasMacArthur, Henry Arnold, and Chester Nimitz (U.S. Con- gress1953; Rogers 1962). Giventhe linkage of federal military needs to Alaska's statehood, the perspec- tiveof some state founders as expressedat thefortieth-anniversary meeting of the constitutionalconvention seems a bitunusual. The historian John Whitehead (1998) reportedthat former delegates were asked whether the cold war military buildup wasa considerationduring the drafting ofthe constitution. Oddly, the first response wasin thenegative; however, further reflection included comments that the mili- tarybuildup "freed the population" from its former dependence on themining andfishing industries, which in the past had involved themselves interritorial poli- ticsand engaged in self-servingand intense lobbying (Whitehead 1998, 198). One couldargue that, as thenumber-one industry and employer inAlaska, the military hadlittle need for lower-level lobbying; ithad a stronggrip on thestate, and with statehoodcame an unprecedented method of continued defense control. President DwightEisenhower's misgivings that some of Alaska's federal military installations

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Barrow, could somehowbe compromisedby PrudhoeBay N statesovereignty prompted a caveat in the finalstatehood bill. The McKay ALASKA S Line was a *ome drawn,demarcating huge -gr 0F.irb e areanorth of the Yukon River and west ofa pointon theAlaska Peninsula that t.1 norage vadez could be withdrawnas neededfrom *Seward . stateto federal forthe uneau jurisdiction pur- McKayLine pose of national defense(Bowkett THE McKAYLINE 1989;Whitehead 1998) (Figure 7).

INFRASTRUCTURE FIG. 7-Concernthat Alaska's federal military in- stallationsmight be compromisedby statesover- the$2 billionof construction was suchthat it took the Lineto win Despite eignty McKay the federal PresidentEisenhower's support. The linedelimited spendingby government thatpart of Alaska which could be withdrawnfrom duringWorld War II (Naske 1986), thestate to federaljurisdiction for national defense. Alaska'sinfrastructure remained too Everythingnorth of the Yukon River and westof a to thefrenetic defense pointon theAlaska Peninsula was markedfor po- sparse support tentialfederal control. Thus, Alaska's movement to effortof the cold war (Naske and statehoodwas conditionalupon deferenceto de- Slotnick1987). The hundredsof mil- fenseinterests. Chad Parkerand (Cartographyby J. lions of dollarsper yearfor defense RobertA. Getz,U.S. MilitaryAcademy) constructionmostly supported facili- tiesdesignated for use bythe military (Bowen 1970). Two petroleumpipeline sys- temswere constructed exclusively for military use (USARAL 1968). Perhapsequally importantwas thespinoff construction funded in theprivate sector, as demandled to the establishmentof civilianhousing, businesses, and utilitiesto supportthe influxof civilians,civil servants, and militaryhoused off base who constitutedap- proximately75 percentof Alaska's nearly200,000 residentsin the earlycold war years(AT 1955a, 1955b). Infrastructure improvements as a resultof the militarypres- encechanged how Alaskans were able to live,work, communicate, and travel. The increaseddefense presence led to the1948 authorization of a roadnetwork to interconnectthe major bases. This six-year-long road-building and road-main- tenanceprogram cost more than $125 million,more than three times the total amount allottedover the previous forty-three years (Naske 1986). Most of theexisting road systemhad been built in response to World War II defenseneeds-the Alaska-Canada MilitaryHighway, constructed literally by the hands of soldiers. Because the Alaska Road Commissionhad severelycurtailed maintenance and improvementsto the systemof sled roads and trailsdue to increasedair travel, in 1947only 2,785 miles of pavedand unpavedroads existed, 1,720 miles of which were unconnected local systems(Rogers 1962; Naske 1986). Within ten years, more than 5,100oo miles of mostly pavedroads connected the military's major bases and logisticalcenters in south- centralAlaska (Rogers 1962). Untilthe oil boom and constructionof thetrans- Alaskapipeline in themid-197os, building and financingthe road system had been "accomplishedby, influenced by, or carriedout in supportof, the needs of military

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 61 forces"(USARAL 1972, 78). Eventhe justification for Alaska's state ferry system, the AlaskaMarine Highway, and itsconnection of southeasternAlaska to themilitary headquartersin south-centralAlaska was based on nationaldefense (Naske 1986). The selectionin 1948of a colonel"on loan" fromthe armyas commissionerof roadsfor Alaska (Naske 1986) demonstrates the influence of the military in thede- velopmentof Alaska's road grid. TheAlaska Railroad, running between Seward and Fairbanksand Alaska's chief sourceof inlandfreight hauling, had an averagedaily capacity of 1,500tons- insufficienteven fornormal (nondefense) requirements (DOI 1956;Naske and Slotnick1987). Consisting of obsoleterolling stock and unsafetracks, it was re- ferredto bythe commander of U.S. ArmyAlaska as a "470-milestreak of rusting junk" (Worden 1947,28). Rehabilitation,extensions, and improvementsbegan in 1949,including a linkto 26 MileField (later Eielson Air Force Base), near Fairbanks, whichat thetime had no road accessat all. Althoughthe militaryinitiated and almostsingle-handedly drove railroad-system enhancement, it did notreceive ev- erythingit desired,including a railroadlink to thelower forty-eight states (Wood- man 1999). Atthe start of the cold war, Alaska's ports were not remotely capable of handling theinflux of militaryconstruction materials and supplies,which came mostlyby sea fromSeattle. The choiceswere the ports of Seward,Whittier, Anchorage, or Valdez-eachone insufficientin its own way.The portof Anchorage suffers from icingproblems in thewinter and from36-foot tides-second on thecontinent only to theBay of Fundy.Seward was 74 "crowmiles" from the new headquartersin Anchorage,considerably more by the one poor road or the antiquatedrailroad. Woodwormshad causedsevere damage to Seward'sdocks, which required frequent replacements(Naske and Slotnick1987). Valdez was ice freeyear-round, but haul- ingsupplies up and overthe Chugach Mountains and throughthe Wrangell Range wasa dauntingprospect. Whittier was onlyabout 50 milesfrom Anchorage and ice freeyear-round, with port facilities built during the war by the army,but it had beenclosed since the end of World War II andwas famouslyplagued by high winds and almostcontinuous precipitation. The armycentered its efforts and fundson all of theports except Anchorage, possiblyin thehope thatthe civilian economy would be strongenough to support facilityimprovements there. The portsof Sewardand Valdezwere rebuilt, and the road and railroadlines connecting them were vastly improved; they soon accom- modatedall sizes,types, and quantitiesof militaryand civilianfreight (Kennedy 1982). The portfacilities at Whittierwere reopened in 1948on an emergencybasis and improvedover the nexttwelve years with railroad yards, two new docks,ware- houses,a power plant,an engineterminal, petroleum storage facilities, and utilities (Denfeld 1994;Taylor 2ooo; USACEAD 2002) (Figure8). The armydiscontinued use of the facilitiesshortly after completing construction in 1960 because the road system (improvedby the army) had been upgraded to the point thatWhittier's port and itstenuous linkwith the restof Alaska-a singlerailroad line througha moun-

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 62 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW taintunnel-was superseded by highways. Whittier was offered almost in totality for leaseto thecivilian business community (Woodman 1999). Internationalairports at Anchorage and Fairbankswere built with federal funds startingin 1949,explicitly because military leaders decided that, for security reasons,commercial aviation should no longeruse air forcebases or armyairfields (AAC 1958). The CivilAeronautics Authority considered it inadvisableto enlarge existingairfields in thecities due to theirproximity to militarybases (Woodman 1999),so new facilitieswere built from scratch. Additionally, rural airfields were builtor lengthenedand upgradedin supportof the large number of military instal- lationsbeing established across vast areas unreachable by the road system. Sixteen of the ruralairfields were made all-weather,day-and-night navigable by thelate 1950swith the addition of militaryTactical Air Navigationequipment (HQ 18o4th n.d.;AAC 1958). Althoughthe Civil Aeronautics Authority's analogous VHR Omni- DirectionalRange / TacticalAir Navigation program eventually made it to many otherrural airfields, allowing instrument-landing approaches in bad weather,the military'snavigational aid programsignificantly enhanced opportunities for civilian residentsand businesses,who wereallowed to use thesixteen state-of-the-art airfields (AAC 1958; HQ USAF 1958; Memorandum ... 1958). Communicationsinfrastructure in Alaska began with the military's establishmentof theWashington-Alaska Military Cable and TelegraphSystem in theearly 19ioos.The militaryallowed commercial and nonmilitary traffic on thatsystem, thus establishinga long history of civilian use ofAlaskan military communications. Re- namedthe "Alaska Communications System" (ACS) and upgradedto wirelesstech- nology,its use byresidents continued except during World War II (Alascom1992). The ACS,run by the air force, had responsibilityon thecivilian side for the long-line system"serving the civilian populace" and forcommercial operation of the Alaska Railroad's communicationfacilities (Alaska Railroad n.d.; AFCS1967, 2; Woodman 1999).During the early years of the cold war, the ACS inaugurated a uniqueservice forpeople in remoteareas-at bush homesteads,in isolatedmining and fishing camps,and on theGulf of Alaska. With its "bush-phone service'," the ACS operated fourteenstations equipped with two-way radio communications. A daily schedule was maintainedwith each subscriber,and ifhe or she failedto respondto a call, search-and-rescuecrews would investigate (USARAL 1972). A secondstrategic com- municationssystem, "White Alice," provided reliable multichannel circuits to re- motemilitary installations and to Alaskanvillages beyond the reach and capability ofthe ACS. Congress decided that the military should divest itself of theovertaxed and outdatedACS system, and in 1969it passedthe Alaska Communications Dis- posal Act to authorize privatizationof the entirenetwork (Salley n.d.; Reynolds 1988;Woodman 1999). Forty-sevensites, 715 miles of long line,the microwavesys- tem on the Aleutian Chain and southeasternAlaska, ocean cables, and an ocean cable ship were all put up forsale (Woodman 1999). Not untilthe ACSwas sold to theRadio Corporationof America in 1971did Alaska possess a civilian-owned,civilian-operatedcommunications system-and even then it was militaryin origin.

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FIG.8-Soldiers unloading at thePort of Whittier for duty in Alaska,circa 1950s. An ambitious upgradeof Whittier's facilities, which had been developed during World War II, was undertaken after 1948.The port was the entry point of large numbers of military personnel and supplies until the improvedroad system provided more reliable connectivity than Whittier's famously bad weather and singlerailroad line allowed. (Reproduced courtesy of U.S. Army Alaska)

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE MILITARY Alaskawas greatlyaffected by theestablishment of a researchinfrastructure sup- portingscience, engineering, medicine, and warfare. The newand morelethal tech- nologiesof the cold war,combined with the perceived likelihood that the polar greatcircle was a potentialweapons-delivery route, focused attention on theArctic theaterof operations. Scientists within the defense establishment saw the Earth as a laboratoryin whichto designand test new weapons systems, improve communications,and supportground troops (Leslie 1993). ThatArctic environments had re- ceivedscant attention in thepast lent an increasedsense of urgencyto a scientific questfor knowledge about building, operating, and fightingin cold environments. Interestfocused on Alaska,among other Arctic and Antarcticplaces, and milita- rizedit further.In 1948the Office of Naval Researchestablished the Naval Arctic ResearchLaboratory (NARL) in Barrow,Alaska, the northernmostsettlement in NorthAmerica. The NARL'Smission of"research in all appropriatescientific fields relatedto theArctic environment" (Britton 1964, 44) meantprimarily those fields thatdirectly benefited the cold war military effort. However, all government-spon- soredresearch was welcome, as wasthat undertaken by any of the academic institu- tionsthat held the contractfor operating the NARLover the years: Swarthmore College,Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Alaska (Britton 1964; Reed

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FIG. 9-The NavalArctic Research Laboratory, together with Alaskan Air Command, militarized thepack ice of theArctic Ocean as wellas Alaska.Working from Alaska, the military established at leastseven research stations on floatingice islands.T-3, also knownas "DriftStation Bravo," pictured here,was establishedaround 1958 and was transferredin 1962 to becomethe U.S. NavyUnderwater SoundLaboratory. (Reproduced courtesy of theEleventh Air Force History Office) and Ronhovde1971). Barrow, a mostlyAlaska Native village of about400 inhabi- tants,saw itspopulation increase by 25 percentduring the summer season, when theNARL brimmed with researchers undertaking studies in marineinvertebrate zo- ology,vascular plant taxonomy, ecology, underwater acoustics, and othersubjects. The NARL'Spresence was notlimited to Barrow;research was conductedat many outpostsnorth of the Brooks Range and on at leastseven drifting research stations, builtand maintainedon hugeice floesin theArctic Ocean (Britton1964; AT 1970; Wise1978) (Figure 9). Anothermilitary research institution was theArctic Aeromedical Laboratory, basedfrom 1947 to 1967at LaddAir Force Base (nowFort Wainwright), just outside Fairbanks.Its mission was to carryout researchin themedical and relatedsciences in orderto increasethe combat efficiency and preservethe health of militaryper- sonnelin Arcticclimates (Air University n.d.). A "humanfactors laboratory," most of itsresearch subjects were military men testing various diets, clothing, and gear forthe five internal departments of environmental medicine, physiology, biochem- istry,protective equipment, and psychology(AAC 1961). However,the laboratory exposedAlaska Natives to Westernscience in a verypersonal way. From a fieldsta- tionbased out in a WorldWar II-vintage "Jamesway hut" in theNative village of AnaktuvukPass, the laboratory conducted long-term studies of adaptation to Arc-

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 65 ticcold by Alaska Native.4 Specifically, the research was designed to studythe role of thethyroid gland in acclimatizationto cold.The studyused iodine-131,a radioac- tivemedical tracer, to measurethyroid activity in 102Alaska Native subjects (NRC 1996; Reuter1997). Accusationsof unethicalpractices were made againstthe air force,including that Native subjects were strong-armed into participating without theirinformed consent. The laboratory'sunscrupulous testing practices constitute one ofthe bases for continued criticism of the Defense Department's cold war poli- ciesand actionstoward Alaska's Natives and Nativelands (Armstrong 1978; Simon and others2001). Alaskawas thesite of thefirst field-built nuclear reactor in theworld. A field- assembledprototype Stationary Medium Power Reactor, the SM-1Awas experi- mentalon twofronts: Not only was it the first reactor built on-site, it was also a feat of engineeringthat proved a nuclearpower plant could be builtand operatedin a subarcticenvironment (B. Johnson1996). The reactorsupplied nuclear power for thearmy's Fort Greely, about 90 milessoutheast of Fairbanks and nearthe town of DeltaJunction, for exactly ten years, at whichtime it became the first nuclear plant everdecommissioned (Fasnacht and others1992). Doubtshave been raised as to thesafety of the surrounding people, animals, and environmentdue to severalpossible radioactive exposures during the reactor's decadeof operation (W. R. Johnson 1993; ATSDR 1999; Buske, Miller, and Eckstein 200ooo). Claimsthat radiation was released focus on sixpossible sources, including improper solid and liquidwaste disposal, use of radioactivesteam for heating, and several accidentsassociated with defective control rods. One citizens'advocacy group has accusedthe army of concealing the primary mission of the SM-1A as a producerof nuclearmaterials for use in small-scaletactical nuclear weapons (Buske, Miller, and Eckstein2000). Despiteassertions that health problems resulted from the SM-iA program,the Department of Defensehas longdenied the presence of unacceptable levelsof hazardous materials and has hailedthe experiment as a landmarkscientific success(USARAL 1972; B. Johnson1996; Mighetto and Homstad 1997; Woodman 1999). The SM-1Awas not theonly new technologytested at FortGreely. The army conducted,denied, then admitted a seriesof secretopen-air tests of chemicaland biologicalwarfare agents at its GerstleRiver test site and the nearbyDelta River watershedon theFort Greely grounds between 1963 and 1967 (Fineberg 1972; Simon and others20oo1; Kelley 200oo2; Ruskin2002). Specifically,GB (sarin)and VX nerve agentcold-weather dissemination testing was conducted,as wellas therelease of tularemia,a bacterialagent (DOA 1976). Thus, Fort Greely holds the distinction of beingthe only place in the United States, other than Utah's Dugway Proving Ground, wheregerm-warfare agents are acknowledgedto havebeen testedin theopen at- mosphere (Fineberg1972). Cold warmilitary scientific work helped to developthe Fairbanks campus of the Universityof Alaska.The university'sGeophysical Institute, which was originally envisagedas a programof American-Soviet-Canadian cooperation in Arctic science, developedinto a researchfacility to meetthe military's requirement for geophysical

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 66 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW research.Not onlywere defense needs in partresponsible for the creation of the institute;according to thehistorian of scienceRonald Doel (1997),the institute be- camea leaderin interdisciplinarycooperation because of those needs, as questions posedby thecold wardefense establishment demanded work that spanned tradi- tionaldisciplinary boundaries. Evidence indicates that the defense industry's require- mentsdrove the University ofAlaska to createAlaska's first doctoral program and to establishother scientific programs in permafroststudies, oceanography, botany, zo- ology,Arctic biology, and geology(Davis 1992; USACE CRREL 2002). Cold war defenseresearch and practicalexperience led to advancesin Arctic engineering.Research conducted by militaryagencies and academicpartnerships withthe nascent University of Alaska, Fairbanks and theAtomic Energy Commis- sion,combined with the practicum of planning, building, and maintaininga huge networkof installations of varying size and functionsalong with the logistics facili- tiesand infrastructureto support them, led to significantadvances in Arcticengi- neering.It is doubtfulthat Alaska's next boom industry, North Slope oil production, wouldhave occurred as quicklyas it did withoutthe scientific, research, and engi- neeringlegacy of the cold war military.

TOWN-UNIFORM RELATIONS AND THE ROAD AHEAD As thedefense establishment moved into Alaska at a rapidpace and becamein- volvedwith local and territorial/state leaders, the military became a significantforce in the community.The interactionbetween the military and civilianworlds was definable,but it affected Alaskans in waysthat are difficult to measure.The military presencewas ubiquitous in thelargest cities, Anchorage and Fairbanks;men in uni- formbought and rentedhousing, shopped in stores,ate in restaurants,drank in bars,and supported a red-light district that had officially closed years before (Atwood 1957;Naske and Slotnick1987). School enrollmentsincreased markedly, as did stu- dentturnover rates from families who weretransfered every year or two (Naske and Slotnick1987). Military units volunteered in local organizationsand heldben- efitsfor local civiliancharities (USARAL 1976). Althoughthe military actively supported community projects, its very presence generatedunease in manyquarters. Some Anchorage residents resented living dur- ingthe age of McCarthyismin whatlooked like, if it did notuniformly feel like, a police state (AT 1954a). Other citizenslamented a boomtown out of control,com- pletewith housing shortages, steep price increases, and thevarious forms of vice thattraditionally accompanied young men on liberty(AT 1954b). Acrossrural Alaska the military took an activerole in firefighting,search-and- rescue operations,earthquake assistance, and victimextraction. This involvement extendedto annual airbornedelivery by "Santa" of holidaygifts to childrenin the most remotevillages (USARAL 1969; AAC MAD 1976; Woodman 1999). The Armed Forces Radio Network,provided for the soldiersand sailorsat remotestations, became a communicationshub formany communities(Kursh 1961).Soldier-hobby- istsbegan raisingsilver salmon on base, whichwere then "airmobiled" in 450-gallon

This content downloaded from 137.229.78.190 on Tue, 26 Aug 2014 00:35:05 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions U.S. MILITARY AS GEOGRAPHICAL AGENT 67 bucketsunder army helicopters for stocking in lakes;this fish-smolting facility was givento theAlaska Departmentof Fish and Game in 1976 (Woodman 1999). In one yearthe Alaskan Air Command,quartered mostly in Anchorageand Fairbanks, provided$2 millionfor state and local activities, from emergency medical aid to the Scout-O-Rama,from police-dog demonstrations to supplyingthe village of Fort Yukonwith clean water when the village well was dry (AAC MAD 1976). Theseactivi- tiesundoubtedly were motivated in partby a desirefor positive public relations. But theyalso reflecta genuineconcern on thepart of militarypersonnel to deal positivelywith observable needs in thelocal community.And the good will engen- deredin the civilianpopulation by charitableand serviceactivities clearly was beneficialto themilitary. Off-base engagement with community life was justone facet,but an importantone, that helps elucidate the military's extensive role in the cultureof coldwar-era Alaska. Alaska'sgeographical position, climate, and trainingenvironment gave it the highestpriority for enormous military investment during the cold war.Cold war militaryinvestment, after previous military investment during World War II, laid thefoundation for Alaskan economic development. Road and railroadnetworks, portsand airfields,pipelines, the ferry system, facilities and objectivesfor science, engineering,and militaryresearch, and thelong-line communication system were directresults of cold warmilitary interests. The physicalpresence of thecold war militaryhas becomeless distinct over time. It has been supplantedby a largeU.S. militaryforce restructured to fight the war on terrorism.The coldwar cultural landscape,at one timemarked by 548 militaryinstallations across Alaska-ranging in size fromindividual, isolated structures to self-containedcities-has become less visiblebecause many installations from that era havebeen closedor clearedaway. Althoughthe military's investment is now less literallyembodied in the cultural landscape,through other means-economic development, politics, demographics, socialconstruct-the cold war military profoundly influenced contemporary Alaska. The military'sinvestment in Alaskaduring the cold war is an exampleof the poten- tialof the military to actas an agentof geographical change. Today,the military continues to makeits presence felt in a numberof measur- ableways, which deserve closer study by geographers and others:the economy, po- liticalgeography and possiblerelated changes brought about by military voters, the complicatedrelationship between the military and Alaska Natives, and theincreas- ingnumbers of military retirees who arereturning to settlewhere they served during the cold war.Although the end of the cold war saw a reductionin military investmentcommensurate with "peace dividend"downsizing and reductionsin force,the currentforce restructuring and augmentationcaused by the war on ter- rorismand the invasion of Iraq have once again increasedthe number of military troopsand defenseexpenditures. As of 2003 Alaska ranksnumber one among U.S. statesin per capita federalspending-fully one-third of the state'seconomy is driven by it-with defensespending the largestsingle component, contributing 25 percent of all federalfunds (Goldsmith and Larson 2oo3). The federalgovernment remains

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numberone amongAlaska's employers (Goldsmith 2ooo; Fried and Windisch-Cole 2002; Goldsmithand Larson 2003). Half (about 16,6oo00)of those federaljobs are active-dutymilitary, and theyare augmented by twice as manycivilians in support positions (Case 1999; Hollander 2002a, 2002b). Althoughthe 2005 Base Realign- mentand ClosureCommission recommended a streamlining of EielsonAir Force Base,which would mean a lossof military and civilianjobs, the army has increased itspersonnel needs in Alaskawith the establishment of one newbrigade and the augmentationof another.Interior Alaska's Fort Greely is now hometo a testing rangefor long-range interceptor missiles within the nascent and controversialna- tional missiledefense system (Hollander 2002a, 2002b). Allsigns-the national missile-defense test bed, new troop alignments and combat structures,increased infrastructure to support cross-Pacific military air move- ments,and sustaineddefense ties with technical research programs at the University ofAlaska-indicate that the military is findingnew, post-cold war ways to continue itspresence in Alaska,at thebehest of powerfulAlaska Sen. Ted Stevensand with thesupport of a largelydependent business community. Investigators in all disci- plineswould do wellto initiateresearch, add to theliterature, and offertheir own contextualizationsofAlaska's ongoing military legacy.

NOTES 1. The PlowshareProgram was theU.S. AtomicEnergy Commission's plan to developpeaceful usesfor nuclear explosives in thelate 1950s. Plowsharewas ostensiblya program in whichphysicists actedas engineersto enhanceand correcta "slightlyflawed planet" (O'Neill 1994, 25), not to facilitate thenuclear-weapons program. In reality,the program was born in partdue to broadeningopposition to thehazards of abovegroundnuclear-weapons testing and was administeredby thecommission's Divisionof Military Applications. Dan O'Neilladdresses Alaska's intended role in thePlowshare Pro- gramin TheFirecracker Boys (1994). 2. "Sourdough"is a termused byAlaskans to describelong-term residents, "real" Alaskans as opposedto newcomers,who are knowntongue-in-cheek as "Cheechakos." 3. "EskimoScouts" is a termof indeterminate origin used to describerural-based units made up exclusivelyof Alaska Native men and women.The use of theterm "Eskimo" was mostlikely initiated bya non-Nativemember of the Alaska Army National Guard, for it incorrectlylumped together Na- tivesof Ifiupiat, Koyukon, Gwichin, Central Yupik, Siberian Yupik, and Ingalikheritage. "Eskimo" is a wordfrom the Algonquin people of easternCanada, but it was adoptedby whites and routinelyused byAlaskans, including Alaska Natives. Though an imprecisedescriptor of many Native National Guard members-becauseEskimo are normallyconsidered to inhabitonly the seacoasts of theArctic and subarcticregions-the "Eskimo Scouts" moniker stuck. Most of thesame units are in existencetoday and are usuallyreferred to simplyas "Scouts." 4. A Jameswayhut is a longand rathernarrow structure, typically with a canvasskin over metal orwooden supporting arches. The supportscreate a roundedceiling that extends in one archfrom the groundup. Seen fromthe front, the hut thus describes a semicircle.Jamesway huts were created for temporaryuse butwere often found to be quitehardy.

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