Discourse on Metaphysics G. W. Leibniz Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought.—-The division into sections is Leibniz’s; the division of some sections into paragraphs is not. Leibniz wrote brief summaries of the 37 sections of this work, but did not include them in the work itself. Some editors preface each section with its summary, but that interrupts the flow. In this version the summaries are given at the end. First launched: September 2004 Last amended: July 2007 Contents Sections 1–13 1 Sections 14–23 9 Sections 24–37 17 Leibniz’s summaries 27 Discourse on Metaphysics G. W. Leibniz Sections 1–13 1. The most widely accepted and sharpest notion of God that saw everything that he had made·, and, behold, it was very we have can be expressed like this: good’ (Genesis 1:31)—Scripture treats God as like a man; God is an absolutely perfect being; but its purpose in doing this appears to be to get across the but though this is widely accepted, its consequences haven’t point that a thing’s excellence can be seen by looking just been well enough thought out. As a start on exploring at the thing itself, without reference to the entirely external them, let us note that there are various completely different fact about what caused it. Reinforcing that point is this one: ways of being perfect, and that God has them all, each in the works must bear the imprint of the workman, because the highest degree. We also need to understand what a we can learn who he was just by inspecting them. I have to perfection is. Here is one pretty good indicator: a property say that the contrary opinion strikes me as very dangerous, is not a perfection unless there is a highest degree of it; and as coming close to the view of the Spinozists that the so number and shape are not perfections, because there beauty of the universe, and the goodness we attribute to cannot possibly be a largest number or a largest thing of a God’s works, are merely the illusions of people who conceive given shape—·that is, a largest triangle, or square, or the God as being like themselves. Furthermore, if you say ·as like·. But there is nothing impossible about the greatest Descartes did· that things are good not because •they match • knowledge or about omnipotence [here = ‘greatest possible power’]. up to objective standards of goodness, but only because God So power and knowledge are perfections, and God has them chose them, you will unthinkingly destroy all God’s love and in unlimited form. It follows that the actions of God, who is all his glory. For why praise him for what he has done, if he supremely—indeed infinitely—wise, are completely perfect. would be equally praiseworthy for doing just the opposite? This is not just metaphysical perfection, but also the moral Where will his justice and wisdom be, kind. His moral perfection, so far as it concerns us, amounts if there is only a kind of despotic power, if reason’s to this: the more we come to know and understand God’s place is taken by will, and if justice is tyrannically works, the more inclined we shall be to find them excellent, defined as what best pleases the most powerful? and to give us everything we could have wished. [Leibniz here relies on his view that it is through reason that we learn 2. Some people—·including Descartes·—hold that there are what things are good.] And another point: it seems that any no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things, act of the will presupposes some reason for it—a reason or in God’s ideas of them, and that in calling the things God that naturally precedes the act—·so that God’s choices must made ‘good’ all we mean is that God made them. I am far come from his reasons for them, which involve his knowledge from agreeing with this. If it were right, then God would not of what would· be good; so they can’t be the sources of have needed after the creation to ‘see that they were good’, as the goodness of things. That is why I find it weird when Holy Scripture says he did, because he already knew that the Descartes says that the eternal truths of metaphysics and things in question were his work. In saying this—·‘And God geometry, and therefore also the rules of goodness, justice, 1 Discourse on Metaphysics G. W. Leibniz and perfection, are brought about by God’s will. Against this, in accordance with sovereign reason. For the view that they seem to me to be results of his •understanding, and no God sometimes does something without having any reason more to depend on his •will than his intrinsic nature does. for his choice, besides seeming to be impossible, is hardly 3. Nor could I ever accept the view of some recent philoso- compatible with his glory. Suppose that God, facing a choice phers who have the nerve to maintain that God’s creation between A and B, opts for A without having any reason for is not utterly perfect, and that he could have acted much preferring it to B. I see nothing to praise in that, because all better. This opinion, it seems to me, has consequences that praise should be grounded in some reason, and in this case are completely contrary to the glory of God. Just as a lesser we have stipulated that there is none. By contrast, I hold evil contains an element of good, so a lesser good contains that God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be an element of evil. To act with fewer perfections than one glorified. could have done is to act imperfectly; showing an architect 4. The love that we owe to God, above all things, is based that he could have done his work better is finding fault with (I think) on our grasp of the great truth that God always it. Furthermore, this opinion goes against holy scripture’s acts in the most perfect and desirable way possible. For a assurance of the goodness of God’s works. ·That goodness lover looks for satisfaction in the happiness or perfection of can’t consist simply in the fact that the works could have the loved one and of his actions. Friendship is wanting the been worse; and here is why·. Whatever God’s work was same things and not-wanting the same things. And I think like, it would always have been good in comparison with it will be hard to love God properly without being disposed some possibilities, because there is no limit to how bad to want what he wants, even if one had the power to get things could be. But being praiseworthy in this way is hardly something different. Indeed, those who are not satisfied with being praiseworthy at all! I believe one could find countless what God does are like malcontent subjects whose mind-set passages in the holy scriptures and the writings of the holy is not much different from a rebel’s. These principles lead fathers that support my opinion, and hardly any to support me to maintain that loving God requires a certain attitude the modern view to which I have referred—a view that I to everything that happens to us through his will: not just think was never heard of in ancient times. It has arisen passively accepting it because one has no alternative, but merely because we are not well enough acquainted with the being truly satisfied with it. I am saying this about the general harmony of the universe and of the hidden reasons past; for we shouldn’t be quietists about the future, stupidly for God’s conduct; and that makes us recklessly judge that waiting with folded arms for what God will do, as in the many things could have been improved. Furthermore, these fallacy of ‘the argument for idleness’ (as the ancients called moderns argue—subtly but not soundly—from the false it). So far as we can judge what God wants, in a general way, premise that however perfect a thing is, there is always we should act in accordance with that, doing our very best to something still more perfect. They also think that their view contribute to the general good, and in particular to adorning provides for God’s freedom, ·through the idea that if God and perfecting the things that concern us—the things that is free, it must be up to him whether he acts perfectly or are within reach. The outcome may show that in a particular not·; but really it is the highest freedom to act perfectly, instance God didn’t want our good will to have its effect, but 2 Discourse on Metaphysics G. W. Leibniz it doesn’t follow that he didn’t want us to do what we did. costs him nothing—even less than it costs a philosopher ·or On the contrary, as he is the best of masters, he never asks scientist· to invent theories out of which to build his imag- more than the right intention, and it is up to him to know inary world—for God can bring a real world into existence when and where good intentions should succeed.