TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD IN EARLY HELLENISTIC PROPAGANDA
Brian Bosworth
“The king, he said, should not do anything other than speak truth inhis relations with his subjects, and none of his subjects should think that the king does anything other than speak the truth.” The speaker is, of course, Alexander the Great, harshly reproving hismen for their distrust of his motives when he discharged their accumulated debts.1 He insists on reciprocity between his troops and himself. As a king he must speak the truth, and his subjects must take his words at face value. At first sight this is a paradox. Alexander made a speciality of deceit, as Arrian states in his final eulogy (“No one was more reliable in keeping pacts or agreements, or more secure from being trapped by the fraudulent”).2 He uses language which deliberately evokes Thucydides’ commendation of Themistocles. The Athenian statesman was the sub- tlest judge of the political situation both present and future, and could improvise with amazing skill at short notice. Themistocles was a master of intrigue, and was seen as the chief agent of the Persian defeat.3 In Arrian’s eyes Alexander had the same qualities. He had a supreme ability to fore- stall the enemy, and took the offensive before they even realised that there was a threat. Arrian is clearly thinking of episodes like the attack on the Malli in the Punjab.4 On that occasion Alexander crossed the desert east of the river Chenab and launched an assault at daybreak. The Malli had no inkling that he was in the vicinity, and the agricultural population
1 Arr. An. ..–; cf. D.S. ..; Curt. ..–; (with Yardley and Atkinson . –); Just. ..–; Plu. Alex. .; Mor. b–c. 2 Arr. An. ... Here Alexander does not deliberately act in bad faith. Arrian stresses the opposite: Alexander cannot be deceived, and consequently he has a talent for deception. Justin (..) has a more conventional view. It is Philip who is the master of deceit, who considered that no means of gaining victory were dishonourable. Arrian by contrast depicts Alexander as the ideal battlefield tactician, cool-headed and foresighted. 3 See particularly Th. .., with Hdt. .., in which Themistocles is extolled as the wisest of man in all Greece. So too the encomium at Th. ..– with Bosworth b . 4 Arr. An. ..–. See further Bosworth –. brian bosworth was beginning work in the fields. As a result Alexander was able to kill most of them without their attempting resistance. It was an impressive example of anticipation, but the attack did not involve open deception. That had been the story of an earlier engagement, when Alexander dealt with the Uxians of the Zagros mountains.5 On this occasion, according to Arrian, he made them think that he would give them the traditional gifts paid as passage money by Persian monarchs. He prescribed a rendezvous point “so that they could take the agreed payments from himself as well” (Arr. An. ..). The Uxians naively supposed that the agreement would be observed, and Alexander safely sacked their territory and massacred many of them in their beds. This was certainly-double dealing, but it was also the sort of imaginative generalship that minimised losses on one’s own side at the greatest cost to the enemy. The tactics were most vividly on display in the extermination of the Indian mercenaries at Massaga. Thedetailsvarywiththesources,butthereisgeneralagreementthat Alexander violated the terms of surrender. The Indians were cut down to a man. For Arrian the Indians themselves had disregarded the letter of the truce, and were attempting to desert rather than join Alexander’s army.6 That was taken as treaty breaking, giving the Macedonians the pre- text they needed to wipe out a group of men that had been particularly tenacious in their defence of the city.7 In the military context few people past or present would have objected to Alexander’s use of the strategic lie. He would not have thrown away hismen’slivesforthesakeofhismoralreputation.AdmittedlyPlutarch (Alex. .) terms the episode a blemish (κηλς) on his otherwise kingly record in warfare, but the Macedonians would hardly have objected to this flagrant example of bad faith. It removed Massaga’s most effective defenders and leftthe city practically defenceless. According to Arrian no more than of his men died in the whole length of the siege.8 This
5 On this controversial episode see Bosworth –; Briant –; –; cf. Speck There is considerable doubt about the actions in the Zagros passes, but scholars are now in general agreement that Alexander staged an ambush and executed it meticulously. 6 Arr. An. ..–; cf. Bosworth , . For other traditions see D.S. ..– ; Epit. Alex. – (a direct order to exterminate the mercenaries); so Plu. Alex. .–; Curt. .. (surrender of the city, but no reference to the mercenaries). 7 See Arr. An...,whereAlexanderprideshimselfonsavingthelivesofbravemen. The wording echoes a much earlier episode, at the capture of Miletus where Alexander saw that its mercenary garrison was prepared to fight to the last (An. ..), and concluded an armistice on condition that they joined his army. 8 Arr. An. ... There is an interesting parallel in the actions of Coenus over the