United Nations FIRST COMMITIEE, 655th GENERAL MEETING Wednesday, 4 November 1953, ASSEMBLY at 10.30 a.m. EIGHTH SESSION Official Records New York

CONTENTS could only be accounted for by a deal between the Kuo­ mintang clique and General Li l'vii. The Kuomintang Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression bandits in Burma, indeed, demanded that Chiang Kai­ against it by the Government of the Republic of China: shek and the United States should legitimize their de­ report of the Government of the Union of Burma (continued) ...... ] 53 predations, arrange for a cease lire between themselves and the Burmese army, and secure as a demarcation line the Salween River. Following the Burmese Govern­ Chairman: l\lr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium). ment's rejection of that impudent demand, the Kuo­ mintang generals had resorted to the tactics of obstruc­ tion. 2. The representative of the Kuomintang, in his state­ Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding men t to the Joint Military Committee, had attempted aggression against it by the Government of the to represent the bandit Li Mi as a hero. The repre­ Republic of China: report of the Government sentative had reported that the Kuomintang had per­ of the Union of Burma (A/2468, AjC.ljL.69, suaded approximately 2,000 men to accept evacuation A/C.lj L.70, A/ C.ljL.7l) (continued) to Taiwan (Formosa) and had declared that it was [Item 25] * beyond the power of his so-called Government to effect 1. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist a complete evacuation on the grounds that it did not Republic) said that the statement of the representative have full control over the Kuomintang troops and of Burma and the documents available to the Committee that the greater part of the latter consisted of local made it clear that the negotiations in Bangkok had inhabitants of various border areas between China not yielded any affirmative results and that General and Durma. The proposal for a make-believe repatria­ Assembly resolution 707 (VII) had consequently not tion, Mr. Kiselyov declared, was designed to strengthen been implemented. The Kuomintang clique headed by the position of the Kuomintang on the occasion of the Chiang Kai-shek and those who protected him were consideration of that question by the General As­ responsible for the fact that the Kuomintang bands sembly. Even that proposal, however, was subject to the reservation that only those willing to be repatriated had not been disarmed and withdrawn from Burma. The Joint Military Committee composed of representa­ would be transferred to Taiwan. Since orders were tives of the United States, Thailand, Burma and the not a matter for discussion in an army, that reserva­ Kuomintang had failed to achieve any affirmative re­ tion was designed to frustrate evacuation altogether. sults; indeed, the obstructionist tactics of the Kuo­ 3. The refusal of Li Mi and his generals to withdraw mintang representatives in it had foredoomed it to their troops from Burma showed that those bands failure. Quoting the terms of a preliminary agreement, would remain on Burmese territory, on the pretext as reported by the Press on 30 May 1953, he noted that they were waging a struggle against the Chinese that even that agreement, which was couched in very Communists, although in reality they were nothing general terms, had angered the Kuomintang generals. but bandits and opium traders. In the circumstances, A so-called delegation of "jungle" generals invited to there could only be sympathy for the fully justified Bangkok by the committee had reportedly declared, on indignation of the Burmese people and of world public its arrival, that the troops of General Li Mi were opinion against the regime of terror instituted by the not prepared to withdraw from Burma and had termed Kuomintang troops in the part of Burma they occupied. the General Assembly resolution calling for such with­ The depredations of those bands involved not only drawal as irregular and unreasonable. On the follow­ Burmese villages but also Burmese cities. In that ing day, 30 June 1953, in answer to that statement, the connexion, he cited various reports in the Press con­ head of the Burmese delegation to the committee had cerning the activities of the bands, which had also declared that if Li Mi's troops were not evacuated endeavoured to corrupt the local population by means from nurma on the basis of the resolution, the Burmese of opium. forces would press their fight against them to the 4. The situation made it only too clear that the time point of their destruction. On 16 July 1953, a Press report fr om Taipeh stated that Li Mi had told Chiang had come to put an end to the crimes being committed Kai-shek that he would never issue an order for the against the Burmese people by the bankrupt Kuomintal?g evacuation of the soldiers under his command from clique. The activity of the Kuomintang troops m northern Burma, but at the same time had recognized Burmese territory constituted aggression, which had that Chiang Kai-shek was his commander. The con­ taken the form of a refusal by the Kuomintang clique tinuing presence of Kuomintang bands in Burma thus in Taiwan to order its generals to submit to disarming and internment in accordance with international law. In *Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General that connexion, Mr. Kiselyov recalled that irrefutable Assembly. evidence of Chiang Kai-shek's direct control of the 153 AjC.ljSR.655 154 General Assembly-Eighth Session-First Committee ------·------·------··--·------Kuomintang troops in Burma had been submitted by The United States representative, in the letter addressed the Burmese delegation at the seventh and current to the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/ sessions of the General Assembly. In that connexion, L.71), had referred to the communique~ issued in Bang­ he cited from various documents submitted bv the kok on 29 October by the Joint Military Committee. Burmese delegation, which made it quite clear that the According to it, 2,000 of the foreign troops on Durmese Kuomintang troops in Burma were equipped, con­ territory would he, evacuated, the Government of the trolled and trained by the Kuomintang clique in For­ Republic of China would refuse to recognize those mosa. Mr. Kiselyov quoted from an article elated 12 failing to agree to be evacuated, and that Government May 1953, in the United States periodical The Re­ would furnish no supplies to those declining repatria­ porter, giving details of the supplies and equipment tion. His delegation was happy to join other delegations furnished to the troops in Burma, and stated that if in thanking the Governments of the United States and the Chinese Nationalist forces which were openly Thailand for their help in bringing about those en­ intervening in the internal affairs of Burma were couraging results. deprived of supplies and disciplined military cadres, 9. Referring to the statements made hy the representa­ the task of the Burmese Government would be con­ tive of China and by the Chinese Minister for Foreign siderably facilitated. Affairs on 8 October 1953, Mr. Lucet paid tribute to 5. An unedifying role was played in the whole affair the personal efforts exerted by I\Jr. Tsiang. However, by the Government of Thailand, which allowed passage it was obvious that the Chinese Government could not through its territory of armaments and equipment abdicate all responsibility in the matter. He recognized for the Kuomintang bands in Burma. Noting that his that in official statements from Formosa orders had delegation had pointed that out at the seventh session, been given to the troops involved to heed the views he observed that it was no accident that the Kuomin­ of the United Nations; but those statements indicated tang representative in the Committee should thank the that Chiang Kai-shek and his ministers continued to Government of Thailand for its services. exert some influence on those troops. As had been 6. The attempts of the Burmese Government to pointed out by the representative of New Zealand secure through diplomatic channels the withdrawal ( 654th meeting), there had been no word of any per­ or internment of the Kuomintang troops had, unfor­ sonal orders by Chiang Kai-shek to those who used or tunately, not led so far to any favourable results. It abused his name, although such an appeal would clearly was incumbent upon the General Assembly to take have a most felicitous effect. It had also been pointed concrete measures to put an end to the indubitable ag­ out that the troops involved obviously had resources gression of the Kuomintang in Burma. The continued much beyond the proceeds of opium smuggling or the toleration of Chiang Kai-shek and his generals by sale of local ores. His delegation 'vas willing to believe certain countries had aroused legitimate and world­ that the Chinese Government had ceased to encourage wide criticism, since such conduct constituted an ob­ the sending of subsidies, victuals and arms to General stacle to the progress of the Burmese people and had Li l\Ii's soldiers, but considered that an appeal from served to aggravate the situation in the Far East. Formosa to the numerous and wealtlw Chinese colonies There hacl been further proof that the Kuomintang in the bordering States, asking them-to heed the terms clique was visibly provoking a new war and that it of the l:nited Nations resolution, would probably do was the most evil enemy of peace and of the security much to reduce the resources of the forces involved. of peoples. Cessation of assistance and of deliveries of 10. The situation was nevertheless quite encouraging, arms ancl equipment to the Kuomintang would make and the Chinese Covernment should he thanked for the it impossible for them to maintain themselves in Bur­ efforts it had made, despite many difficulties, in reaching mese territory and to continue their hostile acts directed the decisive stage marked hy the conzm1111iq11c of 29 against a l\Iember State of the United Nations, acts October 1953 (l\jC.ljL.71 ). His delegation was even that were contrary to the Charter. more aware of the fact that the Burmese Government 7. l\1r. L1.'CET (France), recalling his delegation's was unable to declare itself satisfied as long as hostile part in the efforts made at the seventh session to find troops remained in its territory. a just anll equitable solution to the problem. stated 11. The resolution of 23 April 1953 ( 707 (VII)) that France could not fail to note that the free and remained valid, and, in view of the substantial improve­ independent State of Laos, with which it was associated ment in the situation, there was no need to strengthen in the framework of the French Union, was directly it or to contemplate the condemnation of the Govern­ on the harder of the trouhle zone. ln supporting the ment of the Republic of China as an aggressor. The Assembly's resolution ( 707 (VII)), his delegation complete liberation of lhtnna from foreign troops should had wished to show its understanding of the irritation be realized gradually under international control but felt hy the Burmese Government at the presence on without constraint. In that connexion, he welcomed the Burmese soil of the troops of Ceneral Li l\Ii, which statement of the United States representative ( 654th constituted an infringement on the territorial integrity meeting) reganling continued consultation.s with the of Burma as well as a serious threat to the domestic parties concerned. The matter should contmue to re­ tranquillity of that country. Recognizing the inter­ ceive the vigilant attention of the General Assembly. national character of that deplorable situation, his 12. Mr. POPOVIC (Yugoslavia), recalling the posi­ delegation was sympathetic to a young State which, in tion taken by his delegation at the seventh sessio?, difficult circmnstances. was striving to maintain its stated that its views had undergone no change. It still sove:eignty and to consolidate its democratic and eco­ felt very strongly that the presence of the Kuomintang nomic progress. troops on Burmese soil, their depredation against the 8. It must be recognized that substantial progress Burmese population, and their hostilities, often in con­ had been made towards the solution of the problem junction v>ith other rebel elements, against the armed since the adoption of the General Assembly resolution. forces o£ the Union o£ Durma, constituted a serious 655th Meeting-4 November 1953 155

violation of the territorial integrity of a Member State, disclaiming any responsibility for those troops. In and a constant obstacle to its efforts towards consolida­ view of those disavowals his delegation might be for­ tion and progress. The situation arising from the flagrant given if it lent no greater credence to future disavowals. Kuomintang aggression was fraught with the gravest Indeed, the measure of influence the Taipeh Govern­ danger for peace and security, particularly because ment was able to exert over its troops in Burma ap­ of the strain it placed on Burma's relations with neigh­ peared to be in direct ratio to the degree of pressure bouring States. Mr. Popovic observed that any lingering brouo-ht to bear upon it. A mild resolution had brought doubts as to responsibility of the Kuomintang authorities some"' 2,000 troops under that influence, and a stronger in Formosa must have been finally dispelled by the over­ one might well have increased the number. whelming evidence submitted. His delegation had never had such doubts and had never concealed its profound 15. In the circumstances, the General Assembly must clearly see to it that the authorities on Formosa were sympathy for the valiant Burmese nation, victim of the aggression. not permitted to make a mockery of its unanimous will. It must ensure that aid to the invading troops should 13. His delegation had supported what had been the cease forthwith and that they be withdrawn speedily and Mexican draft resolution (A/C.l/L.44/Rev.2) in the effectively. It must make sure that the extraordina~y hope that, although couched in very restrained and patience and forbearance of the Burmese people, the1r cautious terms, such an overwhelming expression of the scrupulous adherence to United Nations principles and Assembly's views would carry enough moral weight to procedures, and their faith in the Charter .shou~d not .go bring about a fundamental change in the situation. It unrewarded ; otherwise there would be httle mcent1ve had done so with misgivings, however, and would for small and independent nations to turn to the Orga­ have supported the stronger and more explicit Bur­ nization in their hour of need. mese draft resolution (A/C.l/L.42) had that proposal i been put to the vote. 16. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said that the unfor­ tunate and intolerable situation in Burma was an 14. Events had onlv confirmed those misgivings. instance of the penalty that small nations, ow~ng to While it would be unfair to say that nothing had been military weakness, generally had to pay for .h.avmg ~s done. the Joint Military Committee set up in Bang­ neighbours powerful States who would utilize their kok encountered at the outset the blunt refusal of the resources without consideration or compensation. Thus, Kuomintang generals to leave Burmese territory and as the Chinese representative himself had a~mitted, the the evasive tactics of the representative of the Formosa disarmament and internment of 30,000 Chmese troops authorities on the committee. Meanwhile, according to had been accomplished in Indo-China because the Gov­ The Times of London of 19 September 1953, the clan­ ernment of that country had had the power to ~nforce destine airlift had continued to provide the Kuomintang such conditions. In Burma, disarmament and mtern­ forces with more formidable weapons than anything ment had been evaded because the Burmese Govern­ that the Burmese army possessed. That situation had ment had not been sufficiently strong. Realizing that finally compelled the Burmese representatives to with­ its ultimate hope must lie in collective action of the draw from the Joint Military Committee. Only when United Nations, the Burmese Government had appealed the General Assembly was about to take the matter to the latter for assistance against the aggressor. It up again, with the probability of adopting a stiffer course was disappointing that the only result of the resolution of action, had the Kuomintang representative apparently of 23 April 1953, adopted unanimously ?Y the G~neral had a change of heart. The implication drawn by M:. Assembly, had been a promise by the. Chmese Natw!lal­ Tsiang and certain other representatives from the opti­ ist Government to evacuate 2,000 of 1ts 12,000 guenllas mistic statement issued by the committee on 29 Oc­ from Burma. In view of the Chinese representative's tober 1953 (A/C.l/L71) was that everything had statement that his Government exercised very little been more or less settled and that the whole affair had control over these guerrillas, the Burmese must .treat in consequence ceased to he a source of concern to the with a degree of scepticism all pledges of. the Chmese United Nations. Such optimism appeared at least Nationalist Government regardmg the w1thdrawal of premature. Only if the General Assembly resolution 2 000 rruerrillas. And, in view of the Chinese repre­ had re.11ly been implemented would there be cause for s~ntati~e's account of the difficulty with which the agree­ congratulation. Dut no claim was made that even a single ment to evacuate those 2,000 guerillas had been ex­ member of the invading forces had been withdrawn tracted from the guerilla leaders, it was no wonder from Burmese soil. There was only the promise that that the Burmese Government viewed the assurances some of them would soon be withdrawn. Even if that with great misgivings, particularly in t~e light of the promise was taken at face value, which it was admittedly Chinese representative's statement that hts Government difficult to do, in view of the Kuomintang's past record had lost all control over the forces. Moreover, as had in that respect, five-sixths of the forces operating in been pointed out, General Li Mi had reportedly de­ Burmese territory would remain. Since they were to be clared that his men would fight on, regardless of the "disavowed", according to the statement, it was clear pressure of the Chinese Nationalist Government and that they were to remain and continue their hostilities other external pressure forcing them to .leave Burmese and aggression on a very slightly reduced scale. The territory and return to F.or~osa. Only tlme could show fact that the number of troops involved in the aggres­ which of those two confliCtmg statements would be be­ sion might become somewhat smaller and might be lieved. Despite the praise\~orthy endeavo~rs ?f the under different command did not in any way alter the Chinese Government and Its representative, It ap­ fact of aggression or affect the gravity of the situation. peared that the Chinese Nationalist Government could Nor, for that matter, would any disavowal lessen the uot or dared not control the force which it had created de()'ree of responsibility of the authorities on Formosa in Burma. fo; the aggression against Burma. In any case, for quite some time, those authorities, despite abundant 17. Even assuming the successful evacuation of the and conclusive evidence to the contrary, had been 2,000 guerillas, it was by no means clear that the hard 156 General Assembly-Eighth Session-First Committee core of the guerilla forces would have been liquidated, of China (A/C.l/L.69), he noted that, whereas a particularly in view of the statements of General Li Mi direct and close link between Li Mi and the Formosa and his followers. Despite those doubts, the Burmese Government had been proved and recognized, the Gen­ Government had expressed its gratitude to the United eral Assembly was being asked to give recognition to States and Thailand for their efforts and would not the fact that that link had been cut and that, thereby, hinder the evacuation of these 2,000 guerillas, although the Formosa Government's responsibility had come to it did not accept that withdrawal as a solution and an encl. Mr. Najar asked what would be the situation would hold the Chinese Government in Formosa respon­ of the Government of the Union of Burma, which sible for the evacuation of the remainder of the troops. deserved the warmest support, if that course were fol­ The views of the Burmese must be shared by every lowed. The Burmese Government would still be faced delegation that had supported the General Assembly with an army of 10,000 trained and equipped men on resolution 707 (VII). Nothing could release Taipeh part of its territory. That army, resolved to find supplies from the responsibility for evacuating or disarming on the scene, would be quite prepared to engage in all and interning the guerillas, a responsibility of its own sorts of military operations both inside and outside creation. Pointing out that the disarming and intern­ Burma, regardless of the grave complications that might ment of 30,000 troops in Indo-China must have been ensue, and would he resolved to interfere in Burma's ordered and sanctioned by the Chinese Government in internal affairs. The Government of Burma would Formosa, Mr. Cooper said that the argument of the therefore have to engage, on its own territory, in a Chinese representative in the case of Burma was un­ real war of liberation against an army which, although acceptable. It would have been justifiable if the reduced, would theoretically have been detached from Chinese Government, although claiming lack of control its origins. Such a state of affairs could not be repre­ of the troops, had issued orders to General Li Mi and sented as constituting progress as compared to the his forces to surrender their arms and submit to situation prevailing in April last. internment. There was no record of such orders. If such orders had been given, while they would not have 21. The General Assembly and its Members could exert efforts to prevent such a regrettable development. relieved the Chinese Government of direct responsi­ The undertakings assumed had undeniably resulted bility, they would at least have exonerated it from any from the pressure applied by the Organization. While complicity in the actions of its generals in Burma and would have demonstrated its peaceful intentions towards he did not wish to minimize the efforts made by the the Burmese Government. The Chinese Nationalist Gov­ Formosa Government or the difficulties which it would encounter, those difficulties were minor when compared ernment had not done what it could have done with a with those facing the Burmese Government in its own 10odicum of exertion. territory and with the dangers to international peace 18. In conclusion, 11r. Cooper expressed appreciation and security implicit in the situation. It would be both of the endeavours of the Governments of the United unfair and inadmissible to relieve the Government of States and Thailand, as well as of the new attitude Formosa. which bore the basic responsibility for the assumed by the Chinese Government. The delegation situation, of that responsibility. That Government was of Liberia welcomed. the assurance that the guerillas far from having exhausted the possibilities open to it, refusing repatriation would be disavowed. and the General Assembly was entitled to ask it to make new efforts to achieve more substantial results. 19. Mr. NAJAR (Israel) said that his delegation's The Government of Formosa should reconsider its views on the matter had not changed since the question attitude. That Government should urgentlv reflect on had been de hated at the seventh session. He intervened the situation and, above all, take the nece~sary action only to comment on the substantial developments that to restore peace in Burma. If that was not done, the had supervened since the adoption of the General Organization and its Members could only state mo~e Assembly resolution on this question. Vlhether the precisely and more actively their views on the responsi­ changes that had taken place should he regarded as hility and liahility involved. favourable depended upon the attitude of the Govern­ ment of Formosa and the development of the debates 22. Mr. COTE (Canada) said that in the debate in the General Assembly. held at the seventh session on the question his delega­ tion had maintained (GlOth meeting) that the pres­ 20. Recalling the position taken hy the delegation of ence in Burma of approximately 12.000 Chinese Na­ China at the seventh session ( 605th meeting) in res­ tionalist forces under General Li 1'-'1 i · s cnmmand had ponse to the Burmese charges, l\lr. Najar observed that placed the Burmese Government in an intolerable P.o­ the picture of the situation given by the representative sition. The Canadian delegation had expressed Its of China a few days before (653nl mectin~) was sympathy with the Burmese Government's predicament entirely different. Undertakings declared to be impos­ and had expressed the hope that the Nationalist Govern­ sible six months before had been solemnlv assumed. ment of China would cause the eventual withdrawal of The commitments undertaken by the Government of those forces from Burma. It had been tlw helief of his Formosa regarding the men of General Li Mi's army delegation at that time that the Burmese Government represented a substantial change in the situation. The would not press for a formal condemnation of the Chi­ \Vorcls of appreciation expressed in that regard to nese Nationalist Government, and that a solution could the United States and Thailand were well deserved. he found hy negotiation between the interested parties. However, the optimistic picture of the results achieved might give way to pessimism in the light of the Gov­ 23. On that occasion the representative of the Union ernment of Formosa's declaration that it had completely of Burma had not opposed the modification of his lost control of the balance of the Nationalist Chinese original proposal and he had exhibited thereby a forces illegally in occupation of Burmese territory. Re­ restraint which the Canadian delegation had hoped ferring to the statement of 8 October 1953 by the Min­ would lead to the peaceful solution of the problem. ister for Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist Government It was a matter of considerable concern to the Ca- 655th Meeting-4 November 1953 157

nadi~n delegation when the representative of Burma evacuation. The Egyptian delegation hoped that the had mformed the Committee that no solution had yet partial evacuation would be the first step towards the been reached, that the Chinese Nationalist forces in complete evacuation of all Chinese troops. Burma continued to receive supplies from Formosa through Thailand, and that their evacuation was not 29. A very clear statement made by the representative in sight. of China left no doubt that his Government would con­ tinue to exert all its efforts to bring that matter to a 24. The Canadian delegation, on the other hand, was happy conclusion and afford complete satisfaction to happy to note that, due to the efforts of the United the Government of Burma. States and Thailand, assurances had been given regard­ 30. Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) said that the i~g the evacuation of some 2,000 troops and their fami­ question before the Committee concerned the sovereign­ lies, and that the Burmese Government had decided to ty and territorial independence of a Member of the suspend its operations against the foreign troops until United Nations and it also related to the maintenance 15 November. of international peace and security. The question was 25. The Canadian delegation agreed with the repre­ being considered for the second time by the General sentative of the Union of Burma that the partial eva­ Assembly and it was now necessary for the Assembly cuation of troops did not constitute a final solution, to take steps to halt the attack upon the sovereignty of and that the Republic of China could not disclaim fur­ Burma. ther responsibility. The Canadian delegation was of 31. The Burmese delegation had offered numerous the opinion that it was a moral duty of that Govern­ documents and proofs which constituted ample evi­ ment to disarm the remaining forces. dence that the Chiang Kai-shek band in Burma got 26. The problem before the Committee was how to its supplies and orders from abroad. That band was deal effectively with an intolerable situation which occupying a portion of Burma, violating its frontiers and could threaten. the peace of the whole area. His delega­ terrorizing and murdering its people. That had been the tion believed that genuine preliminary steps were being situation since 1950, when, following the defeat of the taken at the present time, and it noted with satisfaction Chiang Kai-shek forces by the victorious Chinese re­ the continuing interest of the United States Government volution, the remnants of the Kuomintang troops had in finding a satisfactory solution. Because of the present crossed the Burmese frontiers. In violation of the developments, the Canadian delegation felt that it would established principles of international law, those troops be appropriate for the Committee to note that the posi­ had refused to lay down their arms, and had resisted tion taken by the General Assembly at the seventh ses­ the attempts of the Burmese Government to intern sion still stood. The Committee could note that them. effective preliminary steps were being taken, emphasize 32. Since that time, a number of border provinces of the necessity of finding a solution satisfactory to Burma, Burma had been under the control of those armed and express the hope that Burma would be able to bands which had received help from the Taiwan clique, report to the Assembly at an early date that General strengthened their ranks numerically, and increased Assembly resolution 707 (VII) had been satisfactorily their military equipment. Their presence in Burma implemented. constituted a danger not only to Burma, but also to 27. Mr. CHAMANDI (Yemen) said that after the peace in that whole region. General Assembly at its seventh session had adopted 33. In accordance with the resolution adopted at unanimously a resolution on the question, it had been the seventh session of the General Assembly (707 the hope that, through the good offices of some of the (V Joint Evacnation Committee. The troops \VOttld 655th Meeting-4 November 1953 159

then cross the border to Mae Sai in Thailand and be After they had left Burmese soil, his Government would taken to another staging point at Mae Chan. From hope to be able again to consult with the interested there they would be transported by truck and bus to parties regarding any further action, and he could Lampang to board planes for Taipeh. All arrangements assure the members of the Committee that as long as for handling the troops after their entrance into Thai­ the countries directly concerned continued to find the land would be carefully directed by the Government of efforts of the United States Government helpful, it Thailand. would stand ready and willing to render whatever 44. In conclusion, Mr. Carey wished to say once service it could. again that the President of the United States himself 45. The CHAIRMAN declared the list of speakers was interested in the question, and that the interest of closed. his Government in the problem would not cease with the present evacuation of troops and their dependants. The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

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