THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL and EXTREMIST GROUPS in LATIN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS for UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION By

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION by

Jenna R. Frost A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of George Mason University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy [Subject]

Committee:

A. Trevor Thrall, Director Suzanne M. Robbins, Committee Member Jimmie Jacobs, Committee Member A. Trevor Thrall, Program Director Deborah Boehm-Davis, Dean, College of Humanities and Social Science Date: Spring Semester 2014 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

The Nexus Between Criminal and Extremist Groups in Latin America: Implications for Unconventional Weapons Acquisition A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

Jenna R. Frost Doctor of Chiropractic Texas Chiropractic College, 1981

Director: A. Trevor Thrall, Professor Biodefense

Spring Semester 2014 George Mason University Fairfax, VA

This work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noderivs 3.0 unported license.

DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my wonderful husband Richard for whom no amount of appreciation is enough for his complete love, understanding, and patience. This dissertation is also dedicated to my mother Jeneva Akin Lewis, PhD who instilled in me the value of learning and education, and my father Joseph Lewis who taught me the importance of persistence and dedication. I would like to thank Dr. Denise Baken who has provided me with invaluable guidance and support throughout this process. No amount of words can adequately describe the appreciation I have for her assistance.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Drs. Thrall, Robbins, and Jacobs for their guidance and counsel. You were invaluable to me throughout this process.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page List of Tables ...... vii List of Figures ...... viii List of Equations ...... ix List of Abbreviations ...... x Abstract ...... xiii Chapter One: Introduction ...... 1 Chapter Two: Literature Review ...... 4 Introduction ...... 4 Theory and Framework ...... 6 Factors Influencing Interest in Unconventional Weapons ...... 8 Extremist Groups' Interest in Unconventional Weapons ...... 10 Collaborative Relationships ...... 15 Business Needs Promoting Collaboration ...... 17 The Collaborative Incubator of Latin America ...... 18 Collaboration within the Drug trade...... 19 Collaborative Criminal Activities ...... 20 Specific Cases of Criminal Group Involvement in Smuggling and Trafficking ...... 21 Social Network Analysis ...... 27 Chapter Three: Methodology ...... 30 Principles of Social Network Analysis ...... 30 Networks ...... 32 Components for Analysis of Social Networks ...... 33 Representation of Social Network Data ...... 34 Network metrics ...... 36 Analysis of Criminal and Extremist Networks ...... 39 Population...... 41

Data Collection ...... 43 Research Design ...... 45 Chapter Four: Results ...... 51 Extremist capability...... 51 Criminal-Extremist Relationships ...... 55 Pathways...... 64 Critical Entities ...... 73 Chapter Five: Discussion ...... 81 Findings and Discussion...... 81 Interest ...... 82 Critical Entities ...... 87 Limitations of the Study ...... 88 Direction for Future Study ...... 89 Chapter Six: Conclusion ...... 92 Introduction ...... 92 Findings ...... 92 Implications ...... 93 Contributions of the Study ...... 96 Conclusion ...... 96 Appendix One: Actors and Affiliations ...... 97 Appendix Two: Extremist Affiliations ...... 102 Appendix Three: Criminal and Extremist Organizations and Affiliations ...... 105 Appendix Four: Definitions ...... 109 References ...... 113

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page Table 1 Network Analysis Levels ...... 34

Table 2 Sociomatrix Example ...... 36

Table 3 Common Network Metrics ...... 37

Table 4 Common Node Metrics ...... 38

Table 5: Characteristics of Selected Extremist Groups ...... 41

Table 7 Examples of Data Types Collected ...... 44

Table 8 Category Type and Information Collected ...... 45

Table 9: Actor and Entity Relationship Weights ...... 46

Table 10 Cluster Composition Resulting from Newman's Clustering Algorithm ...... 57

Table 11 Criminal and Extremist Illicit Activities by Cluster ...... 59

Table 12: Cohesion by Cluster ...... 60

Table 13 High Betweenness Actors to Other Clusters ...... 62

Table 14 Pathway Scores ...... 67

Table 15 Al Qaeda Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways ...... 68

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page Figure 1 Centrality, Closeness: Agent x Agent ...... 53

Figure 2 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent ...... 55

Figure 3 Composition of Cluster Actors from Newman's Grouping Algorithm ...... 56

Figure 4 Centrality, Betweenness: Agent x Agent...... 61

Figure 5: Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity ...... 62

Figure 6 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent ...... 63

Figure 7: Centrality, Eigenvector: Entity x Entity ...... 64

Figure 8: Entity-to-Entity Criminal Network ...... 65

Figure 9 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity...... 66

Figure 10 Centrality, Total Degree: Entity x Entity ...... 74

Figure 11 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity...... 75

Figure 12 Criminal Pathways...... 76

Figure 13 Pathways with Harb and Makled Removed ...... 77

Figure 14 Pathways with Harb, Makled, and Da Costa Removed ...... 78

Figure 15 Pathways with Bout Removed...... 79

Figure 16 Pathways with Barerra-Barerra Removed ...... 80

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LIST OF EQUATIONS

Equation Page Equation 1 Betweenness Centrality ...... 40

Equation 2 Closeness Centrality ...... 40

Equation 3 Eigenvector Centrality ...... 40

Equation 4 Degree Centrality...... 41

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia...... AUC Central Intelligence Agency...... CIA Drug Enforcement Agency...... DEA Drug trafficking organization...... DTO Euskadi Ta Askatasuna...... ETA Federal Bureau of Investigation...... FBI Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia...... FARC National Liberation Army...... ELN

ABSTRACT

THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITION

Jenna R. Frost, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2014

Dissertation Director: Dr. A. Trevor Thrall

This dissertation reveals relationships between criminal and extremist groups in

Latin America to determine which relationships enable extremists to acquire unconventional weapons or weapons material using criminal network pathways. The research is based on a holistic approach to examine proliferation pathways enabled through networked relationships. Social network analysis is used as the methodological approach to identify key relationships in the network. Data collected for the study were obtained from journal articles, congressional testimony, U.S. government reports, U.N. documents, and news sources for the time frame covered in the dissertation 1998-2013.

This research shows the importance of understanding the ramifications of relationships between criminal and extremist groups in Latin America and their impact on security issues for the United States.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Latin America is a microcosm of unlikely alliances between indigenous and transnational non-state groups and their global networks. A myriad of indigenous and transnational criminal and extremist groups take advantage of the ineffective security in the region and the endemic corruption of public officials to engage in profitable illicit activities as a means of financial support. Engagement in the same activities and use of the same facilitators serve as avenues for contact and collaboration. Conventional wisdom states that collaboration between criminal and extremist groups is unlikely because criminal groups are profit driven and extremist groups are politically driven (L.

Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). However, open source literature indicates that collaboration does occur, initiated by world events.

With the conclusion of the Cold War, extremist groups were compelled to identify alternative funding mechanisms and seek collaborative relationships capable of providing reliable streams of income. No longer were extremist groups' state sponsors reliable economic backers (Cornell, 2007). Following the events of September 11, 2001 the international community instituted programs to impede state sponsors' ability to provide funding avenues to their proxies, further exacerbating extremists' abilities to procure income (Cornell 2007). As a result, extremist groups expanded beyond their traditional sources of income through unconventional funding mechanisms and relationships. By

1 collaborating with criminal groups, extremists gain access to sustainable funding sources and opportunities to acquire other commodities.

They also gain access to criminal groups' networks of members and contacts.

Some of these criminal groups have been known to traffic in unconventional weapons material through attempted sales or by adding weapons material to their list of acceptable commodities to traffic. Using criminal groups' established and trusted collaborative relationships, extremist groups gain opportunities to use the services of criminal groups' global networks for financial gain or for acquiring commodities to further the groups' short- and long-term goals.

The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the implications of criminal and extremist groups' business relationships in Latin America and the way in which those relationships contribute to acquisition of unconventional weapons materials. Social network analysis served as the methodology employed to examine this issue. Through social network analysis, one may identify key groups and relationships, and determine which illicit activities are causes for concern. Three main arguments developed through this methodology comprise the dissertation. First, extremist groups' capability to acquire weapons materials should be based on the groups' organizational and military abilities, in addition to the groups' religious ideologies and stated expression of intent of weapons usage. Second, drug trafficking is the key illicit activity used to establish relationships between criminal and extremist groups; those relationships are at the group rather than at the individual level. Third, drug trafficking has a role in the pathway for extremist to acquire weapons materials using criminal groups' global networks. The arguments show

2 that drug trafficking is not just an illicit, profitable activity but has implications for diverse relationship development and can result in engaging in activities with security consequences. Finally, the dissertation seeks to determine which extremist groups in

Latin America are the most capable of acquiring weapons materials using their business relationships with criminals to access criminal groups' global networks.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter contains an overview of the literature surveyed for the study, beginning with the introduction to the problem, which gives rise to the theories servings as a framework for the dissertation. Next is the review of the literature used to examine extremist interest in unconventional weapons or weapons materials, collaborative criminal and extremist group relationships, illicit activities in which criminal and extremist groups engage, and criminal group involvement in trafficking cases.

Concluding the chapter is an overview of the use of social network analysis by the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

Introduction

World leaders have been concerned about the possibility of extremist groups gaining access to unconventional weapons and weapons materials at least since the

1990s. Dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s not only affected citizens within the country but resulted in unease among global leaders about the security of the former

Soviet Union's unconventional weapons, materials, and stockpiles. Their concern was that the turmoil created by the dissolution would distract Russia and their former satellite states' from properly safeguarding their extensive biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and stockpiles (Rensselaer Lee, 2003). Because Russia and its former Soviet

4 states had conducted research into the development of unconventional weapons, global leaders were concerned on two fronts. They were concerned (a) that the materials and stockpiles would be targets for diversion or theft by criminal or extremist groups and (b) that criminal groups would obtain the materials or weapons and transfer them to extremist groups for construction of unconventional weapons (Grier, 2001). Criminal cases involving nuclear and radiological trafficking cases were validation of the global communities' fears (P. L. Williams, 2005). These trafficking cases served to focus the global communities' concern that criminal groups could directly or indirectly facilitate acquisition of materials or weapons and provide them to extremist groups (Auerswald,

2007).

The global communities' disquiet, which continued well after the Soviet Union's dissolution, has grown in recent decades. On September 28, 2001 the U.N. Counter-

Terrorism Committee met to observe the 10th anniversary of the Security Council's passage of resolution 1373. With this resolution, the Security Council called for measures to combat global terrorism highlighting the U.N.'s apprehension about criminal acquisition of unconventional weapons and weapons' materials (Nations, 2001b). In their statement on the observance of the passage of the resolution, the committee expressed its concern about the existence of “the close connection between terrorism and transnational organized crime, including trafficking of illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.” (Nations, 2001a). More than a decade later, the worry expressed by the committee has aligned with a greater anxiety among the global community about the

5 implications of relationships between criminal and extremist groups. President Barack

Obama addressed these concerns in his speech to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in

Seoul, South Korea, stating that progress was being made on preventing nuclear proliferation. However, he also expressed concern that extremists and criminals were continuing to pursue nuclear material ("President notes progress on anti-nuclear terror efforts," 2012).

The implications of criminal and extremist relationships for weapons acquisition have continued to vex researchers because of the limited data available exploring criminal group involvement in trafficking cases and the limited literature indicating criminal groups assist extremist groups in acquisition. The data that are available have been sufficient for some researchers to conclude criminal group involvement in trafficking cases. However, data to indicate that criminal groups have provided extremists with any type of weapons or weapons materials has been limited. Because no available research or data directly links criminals providing extremist groups with unconventional weapons or weapons' materials, authors and researchers have had to formulate theories based on prior research and available data.

Theory and Framework

The theory used to ground this dissertation and serve as a framework for the study was derived from the literature and limited prior research concerning the main arguments employed in this study. A survey of the literature revealed an extensive body of literature and theories on criminal and extremist group collaboration. Opinions differed as to the characteristics of their collaborations. For example, some of the authors

6 subscribed to the theory of "confluence and convergence", others believed that the groups morph from one group type to another (Hubschle, 2011). Despite these differences in opinion, the one main consensus among the authors was that collaboration does exist, with Latin America frequently mentioned by authors as an example of a region where significant collaboration in illicit activities occurs. Collaboration in illicit activities can be an initial step in collaboration into other more serious realms with national security implications. The literature and data contained information on criminal group involvement in unconventional weapons material trafficking cases and details of criminal and extremist group collaborations in a multitude of illicit activities, resulting in some researchers theorizing that criminal groups are likely pathways or facilitators for extremists' access to unconventional weapons or materials. The literature on criminal extremist relationships and the potential for criminal group involvement in trafficking cases also resulted in some authors hypothesizing that criminal groups are likely facilitators for unconventional weapons or materials acquisition because the criminal groups surmise that the profit potential is high. Although no evidence was found to document this facilitation, some authors theorized that engagement in common illicit activities and the opportunities for financial gain can potentially encourage new areas of collaboration.

Extremist groups engaged in collaborative illicit activities require sufficient infrastructure and organizational capacities to operate their illicit businesses profitably.

These groups could conceivably use these operational elements to gain access to unconventional weapons or materials. Limited research existed on extremist group

7 characteristics influencing their decision to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons.

However, one recent study on factors affecting groups' decisions revealed that the groups' military and organizational structure plays more of a role in their decision making processes than does religion, as had been previously thought (Asal, Ackerman, &

Rethemeyer, 2012).

These theories served as the basis for development of the framework for this study in which Latin America was shown as being a base for diverse groups to intersect through criminal activity, giving impetus to collaboration in a host of illicit activities.

Illicit activities, especially the drug trade, have offered opportunities for criminal and extremist groups to engage in those high-profit activities that ensure steady income streams. Extremist groups choosing to engage in illicit activities have not been limited by their ideologies and have understood that by engaging in high-profit illicit activities, they can perpetuate their groups and, thus, fulfill their goals and objectives. Engagement in high-profit illicit activities has also necessitated that these groups have established organizational structures sufficient to ensure the full functioning of their business activities. As criminals and extremists engage in illicit activities, especially the drug trade, they have become part of a community in which the players and their levels of knowledge and skills are known. This greater community has afforded opportunities for collaboration in their respective areas and for extremist groups to tap into a global network of contacts they can use to accomplish their groups' objectives.

Factors Influencing Interest in Unconventional Weapons

The literature showed that one should consider a number of factors when examining the potential for extremist groups to use unconventional weapons, and any combination of which may affect these groups' decision. Many experts believed that religion is a factor in determining if an extremist group will seek to acquire material or weapons and to what degree they will do so (Parachini, 2003). However, in a study by

Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer conducted to determine which influential factors affect an extremist group's decision to use unconventional weapons, they found that religious ideology does not forecast an extremist group's pursuit or use of such a weapon (Asal et al., 2012). The authors concluded the size and capability of an organization have more impact on such decisions (Asal et al., 2012). Asal et. al (2012) drew on data obtained from the Monterrey WMD Terrorism database on extremist groups who have used or attempted to use unconventional weapons during 1995-2005.

The data showed that three religiously centered ideological groups (Al Qaeda,

Hamas, Hezbollah) and two politically centered groups (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA] and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia [FARC]) had used or tried to use unconventional weapons. According to the database, ETA, FARC, and Hamas had effectively used unconventional weapons; Al Qaeda and Hezbollah had attempted to use unconventional weapons (Asal et al., 2012). Perhaps with the exception of ETA, the other significant extremist groups in the database Al Qaeda, FARC, Hamas, and

Hezbollah have the size, infrastructure and organizational capacity to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons.

Both Kibaroglu and Parachini argued interest in unconventional weapons is only one indicator and should not be the sole identifier of an extremist group's potential to use unconventional weapons or the threat they pose (Kıbaroğlu, 2009; Parachini, 2003).

Extremist groups might deliberately hide their desires to use unconventional weapons to conceal their true motives or to avoid drawing undue attention to their actual desires or capabilities. Additionally, extremist groups that initially eschewed the use of unconventional weapons might change their tactics and decide that the use of unconventional weapons may be needed to fulfill their goals. Kibaroglu posited that the capability to use unconventional weapons is derived not only from an extremist group's known intent but also from its military capabilities. He argued that basing their capability solely on known intent may result in obfuscating the groups' true capability

(Kıbaroğlu, 2009). Parachini, whose views align with the findings of Asal et al. (2012), noted that additional factors for determining the use of unconventional weapons are the views held by the group and the group's technical ability (Parachini, 2003).

Extremist Groups' Interest in Unconventional Weapons

Examination of the existing literature revealed documentation of extremist groups' interest in acquiring unconventional weapons and material. Al Qaeda was identified as one such group. Its interest in unconventional weapons and material has been well documented and extensively explored beginning, with Osama bin Laden's proclamation in 1998 that it was his duty to obtain and use a weapon of mass destruction (Mowatt-

Larssen, 2010):

"Acquiring [WMD] weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on

Muslims." (Auerswald, 2007).

Hamas and Hezbollah issued similar statements when they declared that these weapons are acceptable if used to destroy Israel (Friedman, 2012). Land reported that individuals with differing theological and ideological affiliations who met together agreed with the acceptability of using any form of unconventional weapon and of associating with any type of individual as long as those individuals could facilitate jihad

(Land, 2003). Bin Laden held the similar belief that these types of weapons offered the chance to destroy the West's domination and global influence to enable the establishment of a caliphate (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). The literature suggested that Bin Laden attempted to carry through with his goals to secure material and build a weapons program.

The focus in the bulk of the literature was Al Qaeda because that group has expressed a desire for unconventional weapons and has shown its capability to conduct lethal and high-profile attacks. Reports from the CIA and others indicated that Al Qaeda pursued the goal of purchasing material and strengthening the group's weapons programs.

Both Gunaratna and Perl stated that Al Qaeda made several attempts to buy enriched uranium, including attempts to purchase uranium from South African sources (Gunaratna,

2002; Perl, 2003). Its weapons program was not limited to research involving biological

11 and chemical agents; it also included nuclear and radiological research and development.

Al Qaeda pursued research and development of dirty bombs and of ways to increase lethality using a combination of explosives and radiological material (Perl, 2003).

Gunaratna stated that Al Qaeda actively sought to recruit individuals with science and technical training to assist its nuclear weapons program (Gunaratna, 2002). One such effort to engage individuals with technical abilities involved the attempted recruitment of an Egyptian scientist for research on construction of a nuclear bomb (Gunaratna, 2002).

These attempts at recruitment and research showed a high level of intent and capability; however, other extremist groups' intents and capabilities were not as clearly understood.

Many authors pointed to Hezbollah as another group with the capabilities to conduct lethal and high-profile attacks. In July 2012, Matthew Olsen, Director of the

National Counterterrorism Center, stated that given Hezbollah's global operations and its connections with Iran and its leaders, the group should be considered a threat on par with

Al Qaeda (Levitt, 2013). This sentiment has begun to take hold with authors such as

Arena and Rudner who noted Hezbollah's global reach and military capabilities. (Arena,

2006; Rudner, 2010). These two authors believed that because of its financial, logistical and military acumen, Hezbollah is very capable of deploying unconventional weapons should they choose to do so (Arena, 2006; Rudner, 2010). Arena proffered that

Hezbollah is one of a handful of extremist groups with the resources, capability, and global reach to direct and perpetrate an attack on any worldwide target (Arena, 2006).

Hezbollah's military capabilities, according to Rudner, have dramatically increased with the group's purchase of advanced rockets and surface-to-air missiles (Rudner, 2010).

These factors show that Hezbollah's pronouncements and activities deserve to be examined closely.

Parachini argued that extremist groups from Africa, Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East should be evaluated for their intents and capabilities (Parachini, 2003).

In Latin America, he specifically cited FARC and Hezbollah as targets for extensive review (Parachini, 2003). Cronin, and Schmid and Wesley concurred that further scrutiny of groups such as FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah should be undertaken because these groups, like Al Qaeda, have the requisite networks of contacts, funds, and organizational capacities to acquire materials and deploy weapons (Cronin, 2002; Schmid

& Wesley, 2006).

Experts believed that FARC is attempting to expand its arsenal by searching for asymmetric weapons; these experts felt that FARC is likely to use unconventional weapons in light of the expansion of "their goals, tactics and methods" (Russell & May,

2008). This concern was validated in 2008 when the Colombian military raided a FARC camp and found an email in one of the computers they seized that stated FARC had acquired 50 kilograms of uranium ("Colombia Seeks to Keep Nuke Material Out of Rebel

Hands," 2010). Reports indicated Raul Reyes, a senior FARC member, traveled to

Romania in 2008 to purchase enriched uranium from a representative of Semyon

Yukovich Mogilevich, a leader of Solntsevo, a Russian organized crime group ("FARC

Seeking Uranium for a Dirty Bomb," 2008; Galca, 2008).

FARC was suspected in two other cases of using forms of unconventional weapons material. In the first case, FARC was thought to have equipped its weapons

13 with some form of chemical agent (Bartolome & Espona, 2002; Parachini, 2003). In the second case, FARC was suspected of attacking a police installation with hand grenades equipped with explosives and cyanide (Bartolome & Espona, 2002). In conducting autopsies on the decease policemen, authorities determined that the officers died from pulmonary edema associated with chemical exposure (Bartolome & Espona, 2002).

These incidents served to underscore the need to examine extremist groups beyond those with known or stated intent that have the capabilities to obtain unconventional weapons or weapons materials.

The literature included only limited information on Hamas' interests in chemical weapons and did not include information on the group's interest in other types of material and weapons. Stern highlighted Hamas' interest in chemical weapons based on reports from the CIA that stated Hamas was continuing to improve its ability to handle chemical weapons and its deployment capability (Stern, 2001). As the existing research showed, researchers and policymakers argued that attention needs to be directed to other extremist groups, both Islamic and non-Islamic, that have similar interests in weapons material or deployment capabilities (Parachini, 2003).

The literature also indicated that the intelligence and law enforcement communities must not focus solely on one extremist group. Rather, they must expand their examination to include those organizations with financial and organizational capabilities, the types of groups that are likely to engage in collaborative relationships with criminal groups that can be of financial and logistical assistance.

Collaborative Relationships

Researchers have thoughtfully examined the degree to which criminals and extremists are likely to interact and/or collaborate in activities given their divergent interests. Traditionally, criminals were thought to be profit driven and did not want to draw undue attention to their activities from law enforcement. Extremists, on the other hand, had political or ideological objectives to seek better representation of their constituencies or the replacement of established governments with ones that share their political objectives or religious beliefs. Although some researchers argued that extremists will not participate in criminal activity, Fosson argued that extremists use

"taqiyaa" to justify their engagement in criminal activities (Fosson, 2008). A sanctioned practice "taqiyaa" refers to lying to advance Islam or to keep Muslims from harm.

Extremists use this practice to conceal their true actions, thoughts, and feelings from those outside their group to accomplish objectives that belie their true selves or motives

(Fosson, 2008). Extremists who practice "taqiyaa" believe God judges them for their true feelings, not by their actions or behavior, permitting them to engage in illicit activities to further their cause (Fosson, 2008). In addition, extremists who engage in

"taqiyaa" may collaborate with criminal groups as long as they do so for the purpose of their greater goals. Nonetheless, extremists might be disinclined to collaborate with criminal groups because of deeply held ideological reasons or because they have met their financial needs through charitable donations or state sponsors (Perri & Brody,

2011). Those who do decide to collaborate might do so because they need to sustain themselves financially or supplement their incomes.

Some extremist groups who have transitioned the structure of their organizations from hierarchical to cellular must sustain themselves by engaging in criminal activity

(Stern, 2003). Because cellular organizations must finance themselves, they might turn to crime as a means to fund their groups and future attacks. The cell responsible for the

Madrid bombing was frequently cited as an example of a cellular group that used proceeds from criminal activity, specifically the sale of hashish, to fund its attack

(Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007; Jacobson & Levitt, 2010). Other groups, such as

Hezbollah, engaged in criminal activity to supplement their incomes to purchase sophisticated weaponry and to fund future attacks (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007;

Kaplan, 2005). Incentives for criminals to collaborate were similar to those of extremists.

The quest for profits has become the motivation for extremist groups' associations with criminal groups. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs within the U.S. Department of

State, proffered that collaboration can be summed up as largely profit driven (Johnson,

2010). Some criminals might be unconcerned with who their associates are as long as the profits are high (Johnson, 2010). Others might see collaboration as an opportunity to charge higher than normal fees for their services because providing services to extremist groups is deemed high risk (Johnson, 2010). However, criminal groups might also shy away from collaboration because the potential profit may not be commensurate with the risks associated with collaboration (Perri & Brody, 2011). Criminal groups might be unwilling to risk disrupting their relationships with corrupt government officials who

16 may view those collaborative relationships as indirect assistance to extremists (Perri &

Brody, 2011).

Business Needs Promoting Collaboration

Illicit operations have similar business needs to those of licit operations. Thus, extremist and criminal organizations could be motivated to collaborate because of their business and skill set needs (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007; Lal, 2005; Makarenko, 2004;

Perri & Brody, 2011). For example, just as businesses need to ensure they are functioning optimally and may seek relationships with other businesses or organizations that can assist them, extremists may need criminals to provide them with access to black market contacts to acquire unconventional weapons or they may need the services of trusted institutions to hide the source of their money (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007; Lal,

2005; Makarenko, 2004; Perri & Brody, 2011). Several authors identified logistical assistance as a key incentive for collaboration (Fosson, 2008; Lal, 2005; Makarenko,

2004; Perri & Brody, 2011). According to Fosson, such assistance provided by transnational criminal organizations is invaluable to extremist groups (Fosson, 2008).

Because many criminal groups' operations involve the covert movement of illicit commodities through established smuggling routes or front companies, extremists can take advantage of these avenues to move weapons to their members or to move operatives into the United States (Farah, 2007). Collaborative relationships based on logistics and skill set needs have been seen most often in regions with ineffective law enforcement and government oversight.

The Collaborative Incubator of Latin America

Collaboration between criminals and extremists has often been observed in nations or regions with significantly lax law enforcement and endemic corruption, conditions that exist in much of Latin America. In many of these regions, large underground economies or illicit markets controlled by criminal groups have emerged, encouraging collaboration so that extremists can obtain access to potentially closed markets (Berry et al., 2003; O'Malley, 2006; L. Shelley, 2005). These nations have frequently evidenced ineffective enforcement of their existing laws and endemic corruption of law enforcement and government officials, factors that result in environments in which criminals and extremists can operate without fear of reprisals and, in some instances, with the assistance of government and law enforcement officials

(Berry et al., 2003; O'Malley, 2006; L. Shelley, 2005). Hutchinson and O'Malley, as well as a number of other researchers, identified Latin America, specifically the tri-border area

(TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, as a region exhibiting such factors

(Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). The TBA is infamous for its ineffective law enforcement and thriving licit and illicit business climate. Both of which are attractive to criminals and extremists seeking a conducive business climate (Hudson, 2003).

Hutchinson and O'Malley posited that the hospitable conditions within the TBA have resulted in a myriad of criminal and extremist groups using the region to conduct business. These groups might also develop cooperative relationships in this region based on business and financial needs (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). Other countries in Latin

America, such as Mexico and Colombia, have had similar problems with corruption

18 among their government officials and the enforcement of their laws. The extensive production of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin and geographical proximity to important markets have also been factors in attracting drug trafficking and transnational criminal and extremist groups to these countries where they form bases and then being forging cooperative relationships with one another (Hudson, 2003).

Collaboration within the Drug trade

Chawla et al. (2011) asserted that the drug trade is the vehicle that serves to bring together disparate groups of drug traffickers and criminal and extremist groups (Chawla et al., 2011). According to the 2011World Drug Report issued by the U. N. Office on

Drugs and Crime, traffickers and criminal groups work cooperatively to establish global networks to facilitate the buying, selling, and transporting of drugs in multiple countries and continents (Chawla et al., 2011). Extremists have become engaged in drug trafficking activities because of their high profit potential. Jacobson and Levitt, citing statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), stated that 19 of the 43 groups designated as terrorist groups are involved in the global drug trade (Jacobson &

Levitt, 2010). The statistics also revealed that up to 60% of extremist groups with no official terrorist designation are involved in the drug trade in some capacity (Jacobson &

Levitt, 2010). Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah have been cited frequently as having varying degrees of participation in drug trafficking (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007;

Hudson, 2003; Jacobson & Levitt, 2010). All three groups initially became involved in drug-related activities by providing security for drug shipments (Cornell, 2007; Jacobson

& Levitt, 2010; Steinitz, 2002; E. Thomas, 2001).

Several authors believed that FARC and Hezbollah were more extensively involved in drug-related activities than other extremist groups in Latin America

("Authorities After FARC Leaders Involved in Drug Trafficking," 2010; Dishman, 2005;

Jacobson & Levitt, 2010; Steinitz, 2002). These two groups began producing drugs and conducting their own trafficking operations (Jacobson & Levitt, 2010; Sanderson, 2004;

Steinitz, 2002). Daremblum and Ehrenfeld contended that FARC, Hezbollah, and other drug trafficking Islamic groups seized on opportunities resulting from their drug-related activities to establish cooperative relationships with Latin American drug trafficking groups (Daremblum, 2011; Ehrenfeld, 2006). Drug trafficking organizations, especially those with global networks, provided extremist groups with an array of opportunities to increase their access to more drug markets, and to establish contacts for their black markets (Ortiz, 2002). Once these relationships were established, cooperation in other illicit activities could occur (Berry et al., 2003).

Collaborative Criminal Activities

Shelley et al. contended that three general areas besides drug trafficking are the impetuses for criminal and extremist group being introduced to one another and developing collaborative relationships: the production of fraudulent documents, use of arms suppliers, and the use of financial specialists and institutions (L. Shelley et al.,

2005). Fraudulent documents are an important tool used by criminals and extremists to avoid proper identification, to escape government watch lists, and to conceal the nature of cargo (Gartenstein-Ross & Dabruzzi, 2007). Arms suppliers are typically well connected and are willing to provide weapons or weapons-related materials to any type of client,

20 including extremist groups (L. Shelley et al., 2005). For example, Mohammad bin Saleh bin Hmeidi, the leader of a Balkan crime group, willingly supplied weapons to criminal groups and to diverse extremist clients, including the ETA, Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Islamic extremist groups (L. Shelley et al., 2005). Similarly, the Italian crime group

Camorra, was willing to enter into an agreement with the ETA to obtain drugs in exchange for missile launchers and ammunition (L. Shelley et al., 2005). The third area of likely introduction is the use of the same financial specialists and institutions (L.

Shelley et al., 2005). These individuals and institutions are known for their skill and discretion in hiding and legitimizing ill-gotten profits making their services highly prized.

Some of the literature suggested that collaboration between criminal and extremist groups is increasing. Shelley et al. asserted that such collaborations are, "growing deeper and more complex" (Fosson, 2008; Perri & Brody, 2011; L. Shelley et al., 2005) Fosson attributed the increasing collaboration to high profits and sustainable income acquired through criminal activity and drug trafficking. Because of the profitability of criminal activities and the unabated appetite for drugs, diminished cooperative relationships must be considered unlikely.

Specific Cases of Criminal Group Involvement in Smuggling and Trafficking

A review of the literature on trafficking on unconventional weapons materials shows the majority of cases concern nuclear and radiological materials rather than biological or chemical. The two cases of biological and chemical trafficking mentioned in the literature occurred in the former Soviet Union republics (Ouagrham-Gormley,

2007). In the first case, individuals in Ukraine attempted to traffic a nonpathogenic form of the Ebola virus in 2002 (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). The second case involved mustard gas trafficking in Georgia in 2003 (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Because of insufficient information, whether the perpetrators were amateurs or members of criminal groups could not be determined (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Determining interest in biological or chemical materials or a market for such materials exists has also been hampered by the limited data available, including few reports of incidents involving such materials.

Reviews of nuclear and radiological trafficking in which criminal groups were involved were more numerous. Two important reviews examined trafficking incidences to determine criminal and extremist groups' interest in nuclear and radiological material

(Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007; Zaitseva, 2007). The authors reviewed pre and post-9-11 nuclear and radiological incidents to identify the type of perpetrators involved and the types of material smuggled. Their data sources included the Database on Nuclear

Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources and three publications by the Center for

Nonproliferation: the NIS Export Control Observer, the International Export Control

Observer, and the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Abstracts (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;

Zaitseva, 2007). Most of the cases documented involved inexperienced smugglers who stole low enriched uranium, radioactive isotopes and scrap metal for the value of the metal housing the material (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007). Both Zaitseva and Ouagrham-

Gormley concluded that criminal groups did have interest in nuclear and radiological materials and were involved in trafficking of those materials (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;

Zaitseva, 2007). Although criminal groups' involvement in these cases was small, it was not insignificant. In their review and analysis from the Center for Nonproliferation

Studies, Schmid and Wesley confirmed Zaitseva's and Ouagrham-Gormley's conclusions

(Schmid & Wesley, 2006).

The literature reflected debate concerning the beginning and degree of criminal group involvement in trafficking incidences. Most of the literature contended that criminal groups did not show interest in involving themselves in nuclear and radiological trafficking in the 1990s at the height of the Soviet Union's dissolution (Schmid &

Wesley, 2006). Some researchers believed that criminal involvement was limited to inexperienced and opportunistic individuals (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007; Schmid &

Wesley, 2006; Zaitseva, 2007). However, based on their analysis of trafficking cases during 1999-2005, Schmid and Wesley concluded involvement was small (Schmid &

Wesley, 2006). One concrete example of criminal group involvement was the Italian mafia's attempted sale of a 10-kilogram fuel rod in 1998 (Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 2001).

Two of the leading agencies collecting data and maintaining databases on trafficking incidences were the IAEA and Interpol. The IAEA, a United Nations affiliated organization, has been monitoring use of nuclear-related technology to ensure the technology is not used for nefarious purposes. The IAEA Incident and Trafficking

Database contains 2,331 incidences of "unauthorized possession and related criminal activities" between1993 and 2012 related to nuclear or radiological material smuggling or trafficking (Matishak, 2011; Webb, 2013). The IAEA broadly deemed the incidences as

"unauthorized possession" or loss by theft or poor inventory record keeping (Webb,

2013). However, some of the incidents revealed the involvement of sophisticated nuclear traffickers rather than amateurs seen in some of the smuggling cases (Webb, 2013).

The Interpol database, Project Geiger contains 115 incidents of uranium or plutonium theft or loss, as well as cases involving theft or loss of similar unconventional weapons material ("Illicit Trafficking of Nuke Materials Documented: Interpol Chief,"

2012; Lippert, 2008). The agency has documented 30 cases involving radiological trafficking linked to organized crime (Lippert, 2008). The involvement of criminal groups in these trafficking cases has resulted in increasing alarm concerning their roles in the process.

Several authors described the trafficking process as entailing three stages, each with a distinct role. The first stage is that of the supplier, the individual with access to the materials and the ability to acquire them (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand, 2003).

These individuals may be current or former military members, civilian employees, or individuals with access to facilities where the material is available (Hastings, 2012;

Zaitseva & Hand, 2003). The second stage is that of intermediary between the supplier and buyer, a role associated with criminal groups (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand,

2003). The third stage is that of buyer or "end-user" for the material, which may be a nation, or an extremist or separatist group (Hastings, 2012; Zaitseva & Hand, 2003).

Although all of the roles in the process affect material acquisition; the criminal groups' roles as intermediaries serve several functions. Lee and Hastings provided perspectives on the functioning of the intermediary. Both noted the importance of the

24 role in the acquisition process but differed on the functioning of the role. Lee believed the intermediary's role is more than a simple broker for transactions; the intermediary can actually be the driving force behind the theft or diversion of material (Rensselaer Lee,

1997). Hastings believed intermediaries are more likely the logistical coordinators of the illicit material black market (Hastings, 2012). He compared their function to individuals involved in arms and drug trafficking networks in which coordinators or brokers know the locations of safe smuggling routes (Hastings, 2012). As logistical coordinators, these individuals have trusted relationships in place that are willing to facilitate the covert transportation of illicit commodities regardless of their true nature (Hastings, 2012).

Other researchers offered different opinions on criminals' roles' as intermediaries and their motivations for becoming involved. Shelley and Orttung and Williams contended criminals are more directly involved in trafficking the material themselves, considering nuclear or radiological material as just another commodity with a high profit potential (L.

Shelley & Orttung, 2006; P. Williams, 2007). In a paper issued by the Institute of

International Affairs, London, England, Schmid and Wesley, reached the same conclusion (Land, 2003; Schmid & Wesley, 2006). The paper suggested that another reason for criminal groups' more direct role is the perception that nuclear and radiological material is easily disguised and transported (Land, 2003). On the other hand, Schmid and

Wesley believed that criminal groups may be dissuaded from involvement if the risks for detection are greater than trafficking any other illicit material (Schmid & Wesley, 2006).

However, the profit potential for trafficking in these commodities may outweigh any potential risks.

The literature showed support for the contentions of several authors that criminal groups view nuclear and radiological trafficking as another commodity they can add to those they already traffic (Rensselaer Lee, 2003; L. I. Shelley, 2006; P. Williams, 2007).

Some extremists groups may be enticed to traffic in these types of material because of their profitability, ease of transport, and lower risk of detection by corrupt or underpaid security and border guards ("Islamists and the Russian mafia," 2002; P. Williams, 2007)

Lee noted that many of the criminal groups involved in nuclear trafficking are concurrently involved in arms and drug smuggling. Ouagrham-Gormley and Zaitseva highlighted this assessment by providing instances of nuclear and radiological trafficking cases in which authorities also seized arms and drugs (Ouagrham-Gormley, 2007;

Zaitseva, 2007). Additional instances of nuclear smuggling were detected in areas that contained established smuggling routes for arms, cigarettes, and drugs (L. Shelley &

Orttung, 2006). According to Johnson, criminal groups, especially those with sophisticated smuggling and trafficking networks such as arms dealers and drug traffickers are inherently suited to trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials because of their financial means and organizational capacities (Johnson, 2010). Lee and

Williams explored two cases of nuclear and radiological trafficking by Russian and

Turkish trafficking groups. In both cases, the groups were established traffickers in other commodities: the Russian traffickers were known to traffic precious metals and radioactive material; the case Turkish traffickers were deeply involved in trafficking antiquities and nuclear material (R. W. Lee, 1998; P. Williams, 2007).

Established networks of criminal and trafficking groups have been necessary for the movement and dispersion of commodities, including nuclear and radiological material. The Royal Institute of International Affairs issued a paper on criminal groups' involvement in nuclear and radiological trafficking, highlighting criminal groups' adeptness at bringing together diverse groups and individuals to facilitate their interests

(Land, 2003). This adeptness has been especially evident in individuals and groups involved in the drug trade. Shelley and Orttung maintained the drug trade is the common activity that serves as the link for groups involved in smuggling and trafficking in arms, metals, cars, and other commodities (L. Shelley & Orttung, 2006). Because many of these groups are transnational, they have found it advantageous for their organizations to form collaborative ties with one another. These forged relationships have enabled the groups to facilitate their operations by managing drug routes, moving drugs, and brokering business arrangements with other criminal groups (Bulgaria Extradites 2013,

Mexican Cartel 2008, Nicasio 2008). One example of this type of cooperation was the collaboration between Camorra, an Italian crime group, and the Mexican Los Zetas drug trafficking organization to acquire drugs and negotiate drug transport (Dudley, 2012).

Thus, criminal groups have benefited from cooperative relationships both in terms of business acumen and the contacts and opportunities afforded through collaboration with diverse groups.

Social Network Analysis

To appreciate these relationships fully, researchers must use appropriate methodologies to assist with their understanding. Social network analysis has been

27 widely employed in the social sciences as an important tool to identify key actors and to gain insight into the way relationships function (van der Hulst, 2009). Some authors have recognized its utility for use in other disciplines, believing it could be used as an accompaniment to traditional methodological approaches (Perliger & Pedahzur, 2011).

Sparrow has often been cited as one of the first researchers to understand the merit of using this methodology in criminal and intelligence research (Koschade, 2006; Sparrow,

1991). Krebs has been widely recognized as one of the first researchers to use social network analysis to study extremist networks using a real world example, the Al Qaeda cell responsible for the attacks on September 11 (Koschade, 2006; Krebs, 2002). In his study, he used the methodology to examine the groups' structure and identify key players.

Thus, social network analysis has been used increasingly by the intelligence and law enforcement communities to study the functioning and destabilization of extremist covert networks and to forecast likely outcomes of extremist interactions (Carley, Dombroski,

Tsvetovat, Reminga, & Kamneva; Dombroski, Fischbeck, & Carley; Koschade, 2006).

In identifying these key elements through social network analysis, the intelligence community and law enforcement has gained direction for targeting actors who warrant further examination (Koschade, 2006; Schwartz & Rouselle, 2009; van der Hulst, 2009).

Another important function provided by social network analysis has been the ability to map actors and their relationships, creating a roadmap not only identifying obvious relationships, but also uncovering unexpected relationships (Klerks, 2001). With this mapping function, investigators have been able to determine which actors have

28 relationships, access to certain resources and information, and the activities in which the actors and their ties engage(Klerks, 2001; Krebs, 2002).

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

The chapter is a description of how the research was conducted, including data collection techniques, selection of the population to be studied, and discussion of the research design. This chapter begins with an overview of social network analysis to familiarize the reader with the methodology and its foundation principles. The chapter also contains a description of the components in social network analysis and the process by which the data is represented in social networks. This includes an exploration of the use of centrality metrics to analyze the relational data in social networks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the use of social network analysis in this study.

Principles of Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis is a quantitative and qualitative methodological approach to evaluate social networks that incorporates elements from the academic disciplines of sociology, social psychology and anthropology (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Social network analysis is based on the premise that a network contains entities that have relationships between and among themselves (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Emanating from these relationships, and expounding them are relationships with different entities, resulting in a social network formed by actors and their relations (Knoke & Yang, 2008;

Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Social network analysis is employed to examine the relational structure of actors and their relationships or ties: a fundamental principle emphasizing that social networks consist of relationships patterns among the entities present in a network (Knoke & Yang,

2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Although individual actors' attributes are of secondary importance in network analysis, they can be used to gain insight in identifying the patterns and composition of the actors' relationships (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005;

Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In this study, the researcher collected data on the relationships of the identified population to measure the actors' network ties (Hanneman

& Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

The collection of network data also includes structural and compositional variables. Structural variables were used to provide insight into understanding the entities' actions rather than their attributes and thus to measure the specific ties between pairs of actors and to identify the most appropriate measures for the study (Knoke &

Yang, 2008). Compositional variables, such as an actor's age or religious affiliation were used to measure the attributes of the individual actors, not their relationships (Wasserman

& Faust, 1994). These variables were standard types of descriptive information used in the social and behavioral sciences (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Social network analysis assumes the importance of relationships in networks and that relationships can have wide-ranging impact on an entity's social network. For instance, relationships may affect an entity's decision making and beliefs, or facilitate actions (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Network relationships can affect a myriad of actions. Relationships can facilitate the flow of information and

31 movement of resources throughout a network, thus facilitating a network of entities that attain collective interests and goals (Knoke & Yang, 2008).

Networks

Three important elements comprise the fundamental building blocks of social networks. First, a network must contain actors and the ties among all of the actors.

Second, it must contain a representation of the actors and their links in either a sociogram or a graph. Third, it must contain a sociomatrix that represents the value of the actor ties.

Sociomatrices are an additional way to represent network data, allowing researchers to conduct mathematical matrix calculations (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Mathematical calculations, such as transposing a matrix or matrix addition are useful to researchers in identifying patterns among the actor ties and in simplifying multiplex relations

(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

A node in a network may be defined as either an individual or a collective entity.

Examples of collective entities are businesses, groups, and nations. The types of relationships that can exist between actors or collective entities are wide ranging and are characterized by the context of those relations. Most relationship may be categorized into one of the following: emotion (likes/dislikes), communication, affiliation, family, role

(boss/employee), and transactions (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Because networks are reflective of the relationships between and among entities, a network can be based on friendship, family, or group affiliation. Some or all of these types of networks may exist in a studied population. Thus one must note that the

32 relationship connecting a pair of actors is the property of those actors and may disappear if the actors dissolve their connection (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Networks can be complex and convoluted. Network analysis allows for this in that not every actor has to have a direct link to every other actor in the network. In some networks, few or no links may exist between some pairs of actors (Knoke & Yang, 2008).

Thus, networks may reflect a wide range of structure, from dense networks with all entities connected to sparse networks with few connections among the entities (Knoke &

Yang, 2008).

Components for Analysis of Social Networks

Data for these kinds of studies must be collected from the specified population for the relationship studied. The relationship serves as the context in which the population is analyzed. For instance, if individuals are asked to name their most immediate and more distant relatives, the context of the relation is family. However, instances arise in which one or more relationships warrant analyzing. In such situations, for example, the network may have two individuals who are brothers, involved in a business partnership. In analyzing such a scenario, researchers might explore the effect of family relationships on business decisions.

The focus of the research informs the network level to be analyzed. Researchers may begin at the level of the actor and of all the actors to which the individual is directly connected. They may then analyze dyads, triads, actor subsets or the whole network

(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). See Table 1.

Table 1 Network Analysis Levels Measurement level Definition Application

Used to strength of actors' relationships with other actors in the network and to provide information about a network relative to the networks size, Actor Individual density, and centrality

Used for identifying the existence of a relationship between a pair of actors and characterizing the Dyad Pair of actors relationship (i.e., strong, lengthy)

Triad Three actors Used to measure balance and transitivity

Subset of actors in a Used to measure distance, cliques, and cohesive Subset network subgroups

Uses all possible relations in the network to explain All entities and their network structure and to identify important roles Network relations and patterns in the network Note. From Introduction to Social Network Methods(p.), by R. A. Hanneman and M. Riddle, 2005, Riverside: University of California; Social Network Analysis (p.), by D. Knoke and S. Yang, 2008, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; and Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications (p.), by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Representation of Social Network Data

Researchers must construct a representation of relational social network data using graphs and matrices. Graphs, the most basic method of representing social network data, indicate actors as nodes and actor relations as edges when used to model social network data (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In graphs, an edge may be directed from one node to another, may indicate mutuality, or may simply represent a co-occurrence or co-present between a pair of actors (Hanneman & Riddle,

2005). An edge represented by a line with or without arrowheads indicates the presence of a connection between nodes. No arrowhead pointing to a direction, suggests the presence of a relation between two nodes and is a non-directed graph (Knoke & Yang,

2008). When an arrowhead is present, the representation is a directed graph that shows a

34 node is directing the relationship (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For instance, in a friendship network, if Mary chooses Jim as a friend, the arrowhead points to Jim. Mutuality of edges is represented with arrowheads on both ends of the line indicating the existence of two directed ties. Mutuality of ties indicates that a pair of nodes chooses each other (Knoke & Yang, 2008). In the previous example, a friendship network is present if both Mary and Jim choose each other as best friends.

Although directed ties are useful in indicating which nodes choose others, they do not fully capture all of the data. This is rectified by assigning values to the relationships.

Researchers may assign a number of values to relationships to indicate the type of relationship that exists. For example, an edge may be signed to indicate a negative tie

(i.e. one node dislikes another node), a positive tie (i.e. one node has a favorable opinion of another node), ordinal (i.e. indicates the level of the tie intensity) or valued (i.e. assessed at the interval level (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).

Graphs are very useful to researchers in visualizing data about a studied population. Through visualization, researchers can obtain concrete pictures of actual network structure and identify patterns that exist in the networks. However, one of the limitations of graphs to conduct mathematical calculations on graph data (Knoke &

Yang, 2008). Thus, matrices are used more commonly for representing network data.

Matrices contain the same information graphs contain but are better for handling complex levels of analysis, including the accommodation of mathematical computations, such as algebraic notation (Knoke & Yang, 2008). However, matrices are considered by many to be less "user-friendly" (Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

A matrix is a table in which the same sequences of actors are recorded in both the rows and columns. Actors in the rows are the senders of the relationships; actors in the columns are the recipients of the relationships. A matrix becomes a sociomatrix when relational details are added, as shown in Table 2. The relational data are recorded as numerical values in the cells of the sociomatrix (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Binary metrics are the most basic type of numerical values recorded in sociomatrices (Wasserman &

Faust, 1994). Binary data represents the presence or absence of relationships and are coded as one if a relationship is present or zero if a relationship is absent (Wasserman &

Faust, 1994). Data may also be recorded in the sociomatrix cell relative to the value of the relationships. Values may be assigned based on the strength of the relationship. For example, data may be collected about the frequency with which actors meet, the number of emails exchanged, or the strength of friendship. The values vary from zero, indicating ambivalence to negative values, indicating dislike.

Table 2 Sociomatrix Example Mary Tom Alice

Mary 0 1 0 Tom 1 0 1 Alice 0 0 1 Note. Based on binary data with 1 = presence of a tie and 0 = absence of a tie.

Network metrics

A number of metrics are applicable for analyzing social network data (see Table

3). Depending on the goals of the study, researchers may use network metrics to study

36 individual actors, trace network changes over a specified time frame, identify actor's network positions, identify network clusters, or to analyze networks as a whole (Hansen,

Shneiderman, & Smith, 2011). With some network metrics, researchers may examine that actor's connections to others in the network. For instance, centrality and its variants, closeness, betweenness, and degree are commonly used metrics in social network analysis to identify important actors in a network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). These metrics are also applicable at the group level to compare networks to identify key actors and the "heterogeneity" of the network actors (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Table 3 Common Network Metrics Metric Definition Application

Describes the degree to which nodes are connected in the Density network and the degree to which a Identifies cohesive network is centered on one actor. subgroups.

Identifies the manner in Describes the degree to which the which the network structure network is centered on important enables an actor to gain Centrality identified nodes. importance.

A series of nodes and lines in which each node is incident to the Enables the calculation of line before and after it in the distance between two actors Walk series. (nodes).

Examines the connectivity of a graph and identifies which nodes and lines are important A walk where all nodes and lines in that connectivity. Enables are different. A path may be the calculation of distance Path shorter than a trail. between two actors (nodes)

Examines the connectivity of a graph and identifies which nodes and lines are A walk where all lines in the important in that Trail network are different. connectivity.

Examines the connectivity of a graph and identifies which nodes and lines are important in that connectivity. Identifies cohesive Identifies the shortest path subgroups. between two actors and issued for Geodesic distance identifying the diameter of the Identifies the diameter of a graph. graph. Note. Created based on information from Analyzing Social Media Networkds with NodeXL: Insights from a Connected World (p.), by D. L. Hansen, B. Shneiderman, and M. A. Smith, 2011), Amsterdam, Netherlands: Morgan Kaufman; Social Network Analysis (p.), by D. Knoke and S. Yang, 2008, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; and Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications (p.), by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Graph metrics have a number of applications for appraising network structures

(see Table 4). As in matrices, graphs can indicate measurements of the various levels of actor, dyad, triad, subgroup or the whole network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Density is defined by the number of ties that are present in a graph; this measurement is useful for representing simple networks and for estimating subgroup cohesiveness (Wasserman &

Faust, 1994). Walks, paths, and trails are important metrics in identifying the proximity of actors to other actors in the network. With these metrics, researchers may identify favorable avenues among the nodes for communication flows or resource transfer.

Table 4 Common Node Metrics Metric Definition Application Betweenness centrality Measures the degree to which Forecasts brokers, a node is closest to two other gatekeepers; identifies nodes. power and accessibility. Closeness centrality Measures the distance a node Indicator of tie strength. is to each node in the network. Forecasts time of movement of ideas, resources, and so forth, from an actor through the network. Degree centrality Measure for the cumulative Forecasts amount of ties to a node. movement of ideas, resources, and so forth; ability to influence.

Eigenvector centrality Identifies the important node Identifies popular actor; by assigning scores to the identifies midpoint of other nodes in the network. large cliques. Clustering coefficient Measures the probability that Identifies how two acquaintances of a node connected is the node's are in fact acquaintances of network. one another.

Analysis of Criminal and Extremist Networks

Social network analysis is a mathematical methodological approach by which researchers can diagram actors and their relationships and apply metrics to those relations. The methodology has a myriad of applications, including the study of communication flows within organizations and identification of key players in businesses, and co-authorships among academics. Social network analysis also has become an investigative tool in the fields of terrorism and criminology (Carley; van der

Hulst, 2009)(Carley; van der Hulst, 2009). By applying this method to terrorism and criminology, researchers may aid in uncovering and identifying key actors and their patterns of behavior and interaction among other actors. By discovering key actors, analysts or researchers may identify the appropriate metrics needed to disrupt networks of extremists and crime groups.

In this study, social network analysis and statistics of central tendency and dispersion were the methodological approaches used to identify three things: (a) extremist actors capable of acquiring material to be used in the construction of unconventional weapons, (b) relationships between criminal and extremist actors that could be used as pathways to weapons material, and (c) criminal actor pathways through

39 which extremist groups could access crime groups' global network to acquire weapons material. The four centrality metrics employed in this study to identify key actors were consisted of betweenness, closeness, Eigenvector, and degree. The formulae for these metrics are shown in Equations 1-4. Centrality metrics are the basic measurements used in network analysis for analyzing organizations and social networks (Borgatti, Carley, &

Krackhardt, 2006). Central actors reside at key points within the network and are, thus, able to direct communication, move commodities, or liaison with other actors

(Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Equation 1 Betweenness Centrality

From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Equation 2 Closeness Centrality

From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Equation 3 Eigenvector Centrality

From "Some Unique Properties of Eigenvector Centrality," by P. Bonacich, 2007, Social Networks, 29, 555-564.

Equation 4 Degree Centrality

From Social Network Analysis Methods and Applications, by S. Wasserman and K. Faust, 1994, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Population

The population used in this study consisted of indigenous and transnational criminal and extremist individuals and organizations with ties to Latin America. Ties were defined as having operational functions in Latin America through business dealings, business or social contacts, physical operations, or members in residence. Criteria for criminal and extremist group selection included having business relationships with other criminal and/or extremist groups in Latin American countries, having global contacts, having members present in Latin American countries, and having a demonstrated interest in or capability to acquire or use unconventional weapons. As shown in Table 5, three of the extremist groups had a religious affiliation and three were politically active.

Table 5: Characteristics of Selected Extremist Groups Group Religious affiliation Politically motivated Indigenous to Latin America

Al Qaeda X

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) X

Fuerzas Armadas X X Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC)

Hamas X

Hezbollah X

Irish Republican Army (IRA) X

Extremist groups used in the study had varying interests in biological, chemical, or nuclear material (Gunaratna, 2002; Perl, 2003; Stern, 2001; G. Thomas, 2008a;

Turbiville, 2004). As shown in Table 6, Al Qaeda appeared interested in all three types of materials. The other groups had more limited interests. Although Hezbollah was not considered to have sought unconventional weapons material, the group is frequently mentioned as one of 50 extremist groups with the military and organizational capability to deploy a nuclear weapon (Allison, 2010). Thus, Hezbollah was included in the study based on their significant military and organizational capabilities.

Table 6 Extremist Groups’ Interest in Unconventional Weapons Materials

Weapons material

Group Biological Chemical Nuclear

Al Qaeda X X X

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) X Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC) X

Hamas X

Hezbollah X

Criminal individuals and groups chosen for this study appear to have demonstrated interest in nuclear material or were known to have trafficked in nuclear material. The researcher could not find an instance in the open source literature of criminal trafficking in biological or chemical material. Table 6 lists the criminal entities involved in the sale and trafficking of nuclear material.

Data Collection

The researcher undertook an extensive review of available primary and secondary open source English language literature, supplementing this material with Spanish language literature. Literature for the data collection was not limited to Latin American- centric sources and was broadened to include sources from and about other countries and regions. The purpose of broadening the search was that many of the reports concerning both of interest unconventional material and weapons and attempt to obtain them occurred outside of Latin America. Additionally, because many of the criminal and extremist individuals and organizations were transnational, having global networks and reach, accessing as many sources of literature as possible was imperative to obtain pertinent data. Thus, data were collected on criminal and extremist individuals and organizations that might not have had direct ties to Latin America, but that might have had ties to actors or organizations that did and that could play pivotal roles in providing pathways to unconventional material or weapons acquisition.

Many of the literature sources, especially journal articles, did not contain useable data. The most useful data were obtained from government sources, such as witness testimony before Congressional committees, court documents, and indictments. Other

43 sources with relevant and timely data were found in news sources and news aggregator sites. Much of the literature used for the study contained data from the years 1998-2005.

The data from this time period were still relevant because the selected actors and groups chosen for inclusion in the study care were still pertinent and involved in their respective communities. However, the researcher continued to collect data until 2013 to ensure that current data were considered in the study.

The researcher obtained an exhaustive collection of descriptive data on actors, organizations, relationships, activities, and resources that were used in the construction of adjacency matrices (see Table 7 for the types of data collected). Data on individuals and organizations, as well as on any organization to which they were affiliated were collected to obtain the names of individuals and groups that might be tied through activities, such as trading weapons for drugs or facilitating shipment of commodities. Additional descriptive information was obtained to identify the types of relationships that existed between actors, actors and organizations, and organizations (e.g., Was the relationship an authority relationship of leader operative or a relationship of co-conspirator? See Table

8). The relationship served as a basis for establishing existing ties between the actors and organizations.

Table 6 Examples of Data Types Collected Category Examples

Names of members of crime or extremist groups. Names of individuals who Actor may be facilitators, sympathizer, etc. for crime or extremist groups.

Organization Names of crime or extremist groups.

Activities engaged in by crime or extremist groups, by group members or by Activity individuals who may be facilitators or sympathizers, etc. of those groups.

Table 7 Category Type and Information Collected Category Information

Actor–actor Relationship type

Actor–organization Actor role; relationship type

Actor–activity Activity type (e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering)

Possession/sale/trafficking/training/program oversight of biological, Actor–resource chemical, nuclear material

Organization–organization Role; relationship type

Organization–activity Activity type

Organization–resource Possession/sale/trafficking of biological, chemical, nuclear material

The initial data collection resulted in a large network of ties between actors; actors and organizations; and organizations. The researcher conducted a preliminary data review to eliminate duplications. A second data review was conducted to refine the data set by eliminating actors and organizations with limited ties to other actors and organizations. The resulting data from these reviews were used for construction of matrices in social network analysis.

Research Design

In this relational study, social network analysis was conducted using the refined data collected through the data collection process. The data served three purposes. First, the data were used to identify ties between actors to determine which actors were the most capable of acquiring unconventional material or weapons. Second, the data were used to identify the crucial criminal and extremist business relationships that could be

45 used to obtain material or weapons. Third, the data were used to identify how essential criminal groups were to the acquisition process. Actor and organization relationships were weighted according to the strength of each relationship type (see Table 9). For example, the weight might reflect authority relationships of leader operative or the co- conspirator relationship of two actors in an extremist plot.

Table 8: Actor and Entity Relationship Weights Relationship Weight Relationship Weight Relationship Weight

Family .9 Peer .54 Transportation .45

Leader .8 Friend .53 Trainer .44

Member .7 Finance .52 Enforcer .43

Planner .6 Broker .51 Advisor .42

Coordinator .59 Facilitator .50 Teacher .41

Recruiter .58 Supplier .49 Host .40

Collaborator, conspirator, codefendant .57 Specialist .48 Sympathizer .39

Partner .56 Logistics .47

Associate, affiliate, ally .55 Security .46

The collected data were then used to construct two adjacency matrices containing information about actor ties, and actor and organization ties: an actor-to-actor matrix and an entity-to-entity matrix. The entity-to-entity matrix contained data on the relationships between criminal and extremist actors, organizations, and actors and organizations. The researcher then obtained the core networks using ORA to calculate centrality metrics.

Centrality metrics of boundary spanner, betweenness, closeness, and degree are applied to the two matrices to obtain the core networks. The purpose of using these metrics was to avoid bias in the selection of actors, organizations and their ties for inclusion in the study.

Three research questions were developed to test the hypothesis that criminal and extremist groups in Latin America have business relationships that enable extremist groups to obtain unconventional weapons or weapons materials using criminal groups' global network:

1. Do extremists involved in criminal activity in Latin America have the

capability to acquire unconventional weapons or weapons materials?

2. Do business relationships exist such that extremists could obtain

unconventional weapons or weapons materials through criminal groups'

global network?

3. Do business relationships exist such that extremist groups could obtain

unconventional weapons or weapons materials through criminal groups'

global network?

To address the first question, an adjacency matrix was constructed consisting only of extremist actors. This was accomplished by partitioning the criminal and extremist actor-to-actor core network using the attribute partition tool in Organizational Risk

Analyzer (ORA). Closeness and Eigenvector centralities were then applied to the extremist actor-to-actor network.

Closeness centrality was used to identify the extremist actors most capable of acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear material. This metric is a measurement of the geodesic distances of actors to identify the proximity one actor has to all other actors in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Short distances indicate the quickness with which an actor can converse either directly with other actors or indirectly through a limited number of liaisons (Knoke & Yang, 2008). Close proximity to others enables the actor to identify contacts quickly for material acquisition, giving the actor an advantage over other actors. Closeness centrality resulted in identifying those extremist actors closer to actors that had knowledge of sources for weapons material.

Eigenvector centrality was used to measure an actor's direct and indirect relationships with other actors and to assign relationship weights based on the centralities of other actors in the network (Bonacich, 2007). Actors who ranked highly in

Eigenvector centrality were influential because of their associations to highly connected actors. This metric resulted in identifying those actors with sufficient social capital to effectuate transactions for weapons material.

The second question designed to test the hypothesis concerned determining the criminal and extremist relationships based on mutual engagement in illicit activities. To address this question, two adjacency matrices, an actor-to-actor matrix and entity-to- entity matrix were constructed consisting of criminal and extremist ties. The entity-to- entity matrix was partitioned using the attribute partition tool in ORA to construct a network composed of criminal and extremist actors and organizations. The purpose for

48 the creation of these different matrices was to determine whether business relationships existed at the actor-to-actor or the entity-to-entity level.

Newman's clustering algorithm contained in ORA was applied to the actor-to- actor network to determine the existence of communities of criminal and extremist actors.

Newman theorized that networks are composed of groups that, if broken apart, will be partitioned along lines of commonality, thus forming communities around the coalesced nodes (Newman, 2006). The application of the algorithm resulted in clusters of actors based on the denseness of their ties to one another (Newman, 2006). Denseness is used to identify actors who have something in common, such as memberships in the same organization or participation in the same activity (Newman, 2006).

The clustering algorithm uses the modularity method to find clusters based on the actual clusters' ties subtracted from the anticipated number of ties present in a similar group of ties projected to be present in a similar group (Newman, 2006). Large positive modularity values indicate cluster presence in the network (Newman, 2006). Cohesion within the clusters was determined once actors were grouped into clusters. Clusters that are cohesive have numerous, frequent, or intense ties between actors when compared to non-members (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Centrality metrics of betweenness and Eigenvector were then applied to the actor- to-actor and entity-to-entity networks to identify key criminal actors or entity relationships essential for providing extremists access to criminal groups' local and global networks. Betweenness centrality resulted in identifying those criminal actors serving as connectors between clusters. These actors were influential to the extent that within their

49 positions they function as brokers for transactions between actors in the clusters giving them power to either enable or to impede a transaction. Eigenvector resulted in identifying criminal actors with sufficient influence to provide avenues for extremist actors to access criminal groups' local and global networks.

The third research question concerned determining whether criminal and extremist groups' business relationships enable extremist groups to use criminal groups' global network to acquire unconventional weapons and weapons materials. To address this question, the entity-to-entity matrix was partitioned using the attribute partition tool in ORA to obtain a core network consisting only of criminal actors and organizations.

Betweenness centrality was then used to identify criminal entities that served as middlemen in the acquisition pathway.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS

This chapter contains the analysis of the results of the study to determine whether the hypothesis was valid and whether the questions served to test the hypothesis properly.

The research had three goals: (a) to determine which extremist organization or organizations have the capability to acquire unconventional material and weapons, (b) to determine which criminal and associate relationships are essential to extremist organizations for material or weapon acquisition, and (c) identify those criminal and extremist organizations' relationships that are crucial for the acquisition pathway. The study revealed that the hypothesis was correct and resulted in the identification of several extremist groups besides Al Qaeda that are equally capable of acquiring unconventional weapons and materials. The findings showed that although criminal and extremist business relationships occurred, they are based on organizational levels of actor- to- group and group-to-group, not on an actor-to-actor level. The results also indicated that through those relationships, extremist groups gain access to criminal groups' global networks.

Extremist capability

The study revealed that indigenous and transnational extremist groups with operations in Latin America have the capabilities to acquire unconventional material and

51 weapons. The top ranking actors were either members or individuals who held leadership positions with extremist groups Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, FARC and Hamas, respectively.

Hezbollah had more members ranking in the top 20 than did the other groups.

Results of applying closeness and Eigenvector centralities to the extremist actor- to-actor network indicated little variance from the mean.

Closeness centrality revealed that the top 20 high-ranking actors were members of

Islamic groups Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, or Hamas or of non-Islamic extremist groups FARC and ETA. The top six highly ranked actors had relationships with both Hezbollah and Al

Qaeda. Of interest was that Hezbollah, an extremist group infrequently considered to be interested in unconventional weapons or material, scored higher for closeness centrality than Al Qaeda, a group whose views on the acceptability of unconventional weapons use is well known.

Scores for Hamia, a member of Hezbollah, and Al-Salam, a member of Al Qaeda were close (0.261 and 0.257, respectively), highlighting the capabilities of both groups' members. Sergei Malyschew, a member of Al Qaeda, scored well below Hamia and Al-

Salam. Malyschew, believed to be an expert in handling chemical weapons for Al

Qaeda, scored lower than the other actors, perhaps because his organizational position may not afford him as many opportunities to make contacts to acquire chemical material

("Chechen and Colombian rebels said settling in Spain," 2006). The actors ranking higher than Malyschew were either leaders or held similar high ranking positions in their organizations. Because of their high ranking positions, they are more likely to have access to important information by virtue of their leadership positions. Actors proximally

52 nearer to other actors in the network had quicker access to important information traversing the network or were able to identify useful contacts quickly.

In Figure 1, Actors 7, Barakat, through 20, Torres, scored from 0.185 to 0.179, respectively, for closeness centrality. This close ranking suggests all these actors have similar access to contacts for weapons material acquisition.

Figure 1 Centrality, Closeness: Agent x Agent

Eigenvector centrality resulted in high scores for 17 FARC members possibly reflecting their extensive contacts within and outside Latin America. Saenz (1.0) and

Escobar (.94) were almost evenly divided in their rankings. Saenz and Escobar's higher scores in comparison with the other actors associated with FARC may reflect their leadership roles: Saenz is the commander in chief of the entire organization; Escobar is

FARC's global representative. Silva, a secretariat of FARC, who met with a representative of Sermon Mogilevich to negotiate the purchase of uranium, ranked in the

53 middle (G. Thomas, 2008b). His lower score, as compared with Saenz's and Escobar's scores, may reflect his lower organizational position within the group. As top leader of his organization, Saenz can maintain contact with equally high ranking actors and develop relationships with such actors. As FARC's international representative, Escobar has access to leaders and influential members of international groups.

All of the top ranking actors were members of FARC with the exceptions of

Abelrahman, Barakat, and Issa. These actors all have relationships to Islamic extremist groups. For example, Barakat, a leader of Hezbollah, has relationships with Al Qaeda, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, and FARC ("About 50 Alleged Extremists Were Investigated in the Triborder Region," 2005). Of interest is that although Abelrahman and Barakat also have relationships with FARC, Issa is the only actor whose relationships are solely with

Islamic extremist groups.

The results from closeness and Eigenvector metrics (Figure 2) suggest that both

Islamic and non-Islamic extremist groups have similar access to weapons material. Six actors scored highly in both closeness and Eigenvector centralities. However, Barakat outranked them all. This may reflect his extensive collaborative and financial relationships with Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, al-Gama'a Islamiyya, and FARC, which afford him proximity to these organizations and influence within them.

Figure 2 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent

Criminal-Extremist Relationships

Criminal and extremist actors engage in a myriad of illicit activities from drug trafficking to counterfeit goods. The study revealed five clusters of criminal extremist relationships. Drug trafficking was the only illicit activity in which all five clusters engaged. All of the clusters were cohesive, indicating that links among the actors within the cluster were stronger than links to actors in other clusters.

Application of Newman's grouping algorithm to the actor-to-actor network resulted in the division of the network into five clusters as displayed in Figure 3. Most of the actors in the clusters were associated predominately with one or more groups; however, the study showed actor associations with other groups: for example, although

Cluster 1 contains actors associated with Hezbollah or members of Hezbollah, actors associated with Al Qaeda and the Zaiter Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) were also present. Cluster 2 consisted predominately of actors associated with FARC or its

55 members. Cluster 3 was composed of actors associated with Al Qaeda or its members.

Cluster 4 was consisted of criminal actors associated with the Los Zetas DTO and Oficina da Envigado, and Cluster 5 consisted of both criminal and extremist actors associated with Mexican DTOs and the extremist group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).

Figure 3 Composition of Cluster Actors from Newman's Grouping Algorithm Yellow represents Hezbollah; blue is Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), green is Al Qaeda, red is Los Zetas Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and Oficina da Envigado, and aqua is Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and Mexican DTOs.

Tables 10 -11 show the categorical data related to the criminals and extremists in each cluster and the activities engaged in by both types of actors. Percentages based on the categorical data were calculated using ORA to identify the number of actor types in each cluster. The sums of the percentages for Clusters 2 and 5 did not equal 100% possibly because the actors may have had multiple values (e.g. an actor engaged in both arms and drug trafficking).

Table 9 Cluster Composition Resulting from Newman's Clustering Algorithm No. of % % Cluster Actor types Group association members criminals extremists

FARC, Islamic Jihad, ETA, PIRA, Hezbollah, AQIM, Da Costa DTO, North Valley DTO, Los Rastrojos, Italian mafia, Russian crime groups, Harb drug trafficking and money laundering network, Oficina da Envigado, Criminals, 1 extremists Colombian DTO, Solntesvo 55 40 60

Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC, AUC, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Criminals, Mexican drug cartels, Italian 2 extremists mafia, Colombian DTO 54 40 59

Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, FARC, al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, 3 Extremists Al-Mukawama, Hamas 17 0 100

Los Zetas DTO, Joumaa Money laundering network, Oficina da Envigado, 4 Criminals Colombian DTO 5 10 0

Mexican DTO, Criminals, 5 extremists AUC 3 66 33

Illicit money laundering and trafficking in arms and drugs were the main illicit activities in which cluster actors engaged as shown in Table 11. Drug trafficking was only illicit activity in which all cluster actors engaged. Cluster 1 consisted predominately of extremist actors. Those actors engaged in seven different types of illicit activities, the greatest activity being money laundering. Cluster 1 criminal actors were more heavily involved in drug and arms trafficking, followed by money laundering. Cluster 2 was almost evenly divided between criminal and extremist actors. These actors were engaged in five activities, with drug trafficking being the greatest illicit activity for both criminals and extremists, followed by arms trafficking. Cluster 3 consisted entirely of extremist actors engaged in drug trafficking and forged documents, with forged documents being the greater of the two. Cluster 4 consisted solely of criminal actors who engaged in drug trafficking and money laundering. Cluster 5 consisted of both criminal and extremist actors who engaged in drug trafficking.

Table 10 Criminal and Extremist Illicit Activities by Cluster

smuggling

cy (%)

Type of % membership Arms trafficking/supply (%) Drug trafficking/supply (%) Counterfeiting (%) Forged documents (%) Money laundering (%) Pira Stolen goods (%) Hum (%)

Criminal 40.00 27.27 72.72 9.09 9.09 13.63 0.00 0.00 — Extremist 60.00 0.00 9.09 9.09 6.06 24.20 12.12 3.03 —

Criminal 38.88 66.66 66.66 — 0.00 33.33 — — 4.76 Extremist 42.58 21.73 60.86 — 4.34 4.34 — — 0.00

Criminal 0.00 — 0.00 — 0.00 — — — — Extremist 100.00 — 5.88 — 11.76 — — — —

Criminal 100.00 — 60.00 — — 40.00 — — — Extremist 0.00 — 0.00 — — 0.00 — — —

Criminal 66.00 — 100.00 — — — — — — Extremist 33.00 — 100.00 — — — — — —

Cohesion in the study was determined by using the External-Internal (E-I) index in ORA after completion of clustering using Newman's grouping algorithm. The E-I index for each cluster was calculated using the number of links outside the cluster less the ties inside the cluster divided by the total of both the external and internal cluster ties

(Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). The index values can range from 1, indicating all of the ties are internal, to -1, indicating all of the ties are external (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988). All of the clusters showed cohesion indicating the ties between the actors were numerous or frequent. Cohesion was highest in Clusters 1 and 2, clusters associated with Hezbollah and FARC, respectively.

Table 11: Cohesion by Cluster Cluster Internal link count External link count % internal links

1 1178 196 85.74

2 1175 199 85.52

3 96 81 54.24

4 5 4 55.56

5 3 2 60.00

Centrality metrics of betweenness and Eigenvector were then applied to the actor- to-actor and entity-to-entity networks. Closeness centrality had only a slight deviation from the mean indicating the mean was not adversely affected by the outliers.

Eigenvector centrality had very little deviation.

Betweennness centrality revealed those criminal actors serving as connectors between clusters in the network. Actors scoring highly were essential liaisons for information or knowledge who were dispersed throughout the network (Wasserman &

Faust, 1994). Because of their ability to connect with other actors, these actors could identify sources for material or direct an actor to a knowledgeable source. As expected, actors ranking highly in betweenness centrality--Mehri, Harb and Barakat--served as connectors between clusters. The only exception was Fontan, whose position lies within

Cluster 2, which was predominately associated with FARC. His geographic location lies on the largest number of paths through which an actor must pass. Because of his location within the cluster, he appeared to be the broker for the actors within the cluster to the rest of the network.

Figure 4 Centrality, Betweenness: Agent x Agent

Betweenness centrality for the entity-to-entity network ranked actors Mehri,

Fontan, Harb, and Barakat highly. A comparison of the results for the entity-to-entity and actor-to-actor networks, Barakat's and Fontan's rankings were reverse. This probably reflects the addition of the organizations and their ties. The highest ranked organizations were FARC, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, followed by ETA. Barakat established relationships with FARC, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda, all of which scored higher in betweenness than ETA, indicating that the organizations lay on the shortest paths to the other nodes in the network. Although Fontan had relationships with FARC and ETA, he had only one relationship with an organization that scored highly for betweenness.

Figure 5: Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity

Table 12 High Betweenness Actors to Other Clusters Name Actor type Cluster Connects to cluster

Mehri Extremist 1 2, 3

Fontan Extremist 2 1

Harb Criminal 1 2, 4

Barakat Extremist 1 2,3

Eigenvector centrality revealed the identity of actors whose influence was sufficient to facilitate current or future business relationships. Actors connected to other highly connected actors had influence because of their associations with other highly influential actors, enabling them to have access to a broader level of trusted contacts that could possibly provide avenues for access to criminal groups' local and global networks.

Barakat, Harb, and Makled, in order of descending importance, scored highly for

Eigenvector centrality in both the actor-to-actor and entity-to-entity networks. Barakat's score is understandable given his associations with the high profile extremist groups

Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and FARC and to the criminal groups Oficina da Envigado, the

North Valley, and Colombian DTOs. Makled's slightly lower score reflects his ties to fewer actors who are predominately associated with FARC and Hezbollah.

Barakat's and Harb's higher scores for betweenness and Eigenvector centralities reflect the number of ties to other influential actors and their abilities to access more than one cluster in the network. With their access to other parts of the network, they have entree to the wider community of actors, thus increasing their potential to forge business relationships.

Figure 6 Centrality, Eigenvector: Agent x Agent

Figure 7: Centrality, Eigenvector: Entity x Entity

Pathways

A review of all available pathways for the groups revealed that most groups needed one contact and one to two intermediaries. Pathways allow extremist groups to utilize their relationships with criminal groups to acquire nuclear material. Although Al

Qaeda and FARC both had direct contacts with procurers, Al Qaeda had more direct contacts than did FARC. The remainder of the extremist groups--ETA, Hamas, and

Hezbollah--required one contact and one to two intermediaries to reach their procurers.

Figure 8: Entity-to-Entity Criminal Network

To identify criminal actors and entities with the abilities to function as intermediaries, betweenness centrality was applied to the entity-to-entity network. The results showed minimal deviation from the mean, indicating the mean is not adversely affected by the outliers.

Betweenness centrality revealed two criminals, Harb and Da Costa, and four criminal groups--'Ndrangheta, Russian and Italian mafias, and Colombian DTOs -- ranked highly for this metric. Harb scored significantly higher than the second ranked actor Da Costa. Harb's higher score probably reflects his position in the network, where he serves as the liaison for the two large clusters to the criminal network. In contrast, Da

Costa only serves as the liaison between one large cluster and the criminal network. The criminal groups' higher rankings in comparison to the other criminal and drug trafficking groups is understandable given their geographic position within the criminal network.

Figure 9 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity

Pathways allow extremist groups to take advantage of criminal groups' global networks of contacts. The pathways most likely involve relationships based on trust. For example, FARC is more likely to utilize its established criminal business relationships to

66 acquire nuclear material than it is to use untested and potentially untrustworthy relationships. In the present study, the researcher constructed a chart to illustrate the extremist criminal procurement pathways. The chart showed the number of intermediaries extremists needed to reach criminal entities with procurement capability.

The researcher then assigned a score to each procurement pathway according to the number of intermediaries needed. Rankings ranged from .98 for those with no access to nuclear material. Table 15 shows the pathways.

Table 13 Pathway Scores No. of intermediaries required Score

0 (direct source) .98

1 .97

2 .96

3 .95

4 .94

5 .93

6 .92

No pathway .91

Tables 16-25 show the rankings and summaries for criminal intermediary pathways for Al Qaeda, ETA, FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah, respectively.

Table 14 Al Qaeda Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

Chinese mafia — — .91 Chiriboga Mogilevich .94 Harb Solntesvo .94 Mehri Colombia DTO Italian mafia .94

Abadia Bout DaCosta DTO Russian crime .94

Alcala Mogilevich .94 Harb Solntesvo .94 Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman Colombian DTO Italian mafia .94

Chiriboga Mogilevich .94 Fundamentalist Latin Harb Solntesvo .94 American businessmen Colombian DTA Italian mafia .94

Mogilevich .95 Harb Solntesvo .95 Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95

Barrera-Barrera Da Costa DTO Russian crime .95

Mendoza Da Costa DTO Russian crime .95

Bout Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman Da Costa DTO Russian crime .95

Mogilevich .95 Barb Solntesvo .95 Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95 Mogilevich .95 Joumaa Solntesvo .95 Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95 Makled Da Costa DTO Russian crime .95

Turkish mafia .95 Fundamentalist Latin Mexican DTO Russian crime .95 American businessmen ’Ndrangheta Italian mafia .95

Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

Mogilevich .95 Harb Solntesvo .95 Bout Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95

Turkish mafia .95 Mexican DTO Russian crime .95 Mara Salvatrucha ’Ndrangheta Italian mafia .95

Mogilevich .96 Solntesvo .96 Colombian DTO Italian mafia .96 Italian mafia .96 Russian crime .96 Fundamentalist Latin Solntesvo .96 American businessmen Mexican DTO Mogilevich .96

Al-Aal, Issa, Abelrahman Da Costa DTO Russian crime .96

Russian crime .96 Mogilevich .96 Solntesvo .96 Italian mafia .96 Mara Salvatrucha Mexican DTO Camorra .96

Da Costa DTO Russian crime .96

Chechen mafia .98

Solntesvo .98

Russian crime .98 Bout Mogilevich .98

Table 21: ETA Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

Mogilevich .95 Albanian mafia Solntesvo .95 Camorra Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95

Russian crime .96 Chechen mafia .96 Italian mafia .96 Da Costa DTO Turkish mafia .96

Mogilevich .97

Solntesvo .97

Italian mafia .97

Makled Turkish mafia .97

Russian crime .97

Turkish mafia .97

’Ndrangheta Italian mafia .97

Table 22: FARC Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

Makled Da Costa DTO Russian crime .96

Russian crime .96 Italian mafia .96 ’Ndrangheta Turkish mafia .96

Mogilevich .97

Russian crime .97

Solntesvo .97

Italian mafia .97

Mexican DTO Camorra .97

Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

’Ndrangheta Russian crime .97

Table 23: Hamas Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways

Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score

Panamanian Muslim businessmen Mogilevich .94 Harb Solntesvo .94 Dahroug Colombian DTO Italian mafia .94

Makled Aksu Da Costa DTO Russian crime .95

Russian crime .96 Italian mafia .96 ’Ndrangheta Turkish mafia .96

Mogilevich .97 Russian crime .97 Solntesvo .97 Italian mafia .97 Mexican DTO Camorra .97

Bin Hmeidi Italian mafia .97

Table 24: Hezbollah Direct Contact and Criminal Intermediary Pathways Direct contact Intermediaries Procurer Score Iykeboro Saade Mogilevich .93 Harb SoIntesvo .93 Zaiter DTO Colombian DTO Italian mafia .93

Joumaa Mogilevich .94 Harb Solntesvo .94 Los Zetas DTO Colombian DTO Italian mafia .94

Mogilevich .95 Harb Solntesvo .95 Hijazi Colombian DTO Italian mafia .95

Russian crime .96 Italian mafia .96 Mexican DTO ’Ndrangheta Turkish mafia .96

Mogilevich .96 Solntesvo .96 Harb Colombian DTO Italian mafia .96

Makled Da Costa DTO Russian crime .96

Mogilevich .97 Solntesvo .97 Italian mafia .97 Mexican DTO Camorra .97

Da Costa DTO Russian crime .97

Table 25 Summary of Criminal Intermediary Pathways for Five Extremist Groups % of pathways

No. of intermediaries

Group Direct contact 0 1 2 3 4 5

Al Qaeda 8 2 — 28 44 20 — ETA — — 50 29 21 — — FARC 12 — 65 24 — — — Hamas — — 46 23 8 4 — Hezbollah — — 28 32 14 14 14

The pathways tables reflect the centrality rankings of Harb and Da Costa, showing their roles in the procurement pathways. Also of note is the mirroring of the betweenness centrality rankings relative to the importance of the criminal groups--

'Ndrangheta, Russian and Italian mafia, and Colombian DTOs--in facilitating nuclear material transactions.

Critical Entities

Degree and betweenness centrality metrics were applied to the entity-to-entity network to determine which criminal entities' removal significantly affects the procurement pathways network. The standard deviation from the mean was not significant.

As shown in Figure 10, Harb scored highly for both degree and betweenness centralities. Harb's higher rankings on both centrality metrics indicate that he can access information and contacts and that he has sufficient influence to broker relationships. His

73 removal could have a great impact on the ability of the cluster to access criminal groups, as shown in Figures 13.

Removing Makled and Da Costa further disrupts the continuity of the network, as shown in Figure 13. Makled's removal impacted the ties between the two clusters, but did not have the same effect as removing Harb. With Makled's removal the two clusters were still tied together and continued to have access to criminal groups provided by Harb.

Removal of Da Costa has minimal impact on disruption of the network because the two clusters were still connected to the rest of the network (see Figure 14).

Figure 10 Centrality, Total Degree: Entity x Entity

Figure 11 Centrality, Betweenness: Entity x Entity

Figure 12 Criminal Pathways

Figure 13 Pathways with Harb and Makled Removed

Figure 14 Pathways with Harb, Makled, and Da Costa Removed

Despite Harb's, Makled's, and Da Costa's high rankings, their removal and the subsequent removal of their direct and indirect links did not disrupt the network. The network did not become disconnected until Bout and Barrera-Barrera were removed.

Bout ranked higher than Barrera-Barrera because he can maintain the continuity between the two largest clusters and to the criminal entities. Betweenness centrality revealed

78 removing Bout disrupted the connections between the two clusters, as shown in Figure

15. However, one cluster was still connected to the rest of the network. Barrera-Barrera was the sole link between the remaining clusters to the rest of the network. Removing him finally resulted in disrupting the network, as shown in Figure 16.

Figure 15 Pathways with Bout Removed

Figure 16 Pathways with Barerra-Barerra Removed

CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

This chapter contains an overview of the findings obtained from the study and discussion of the meanings of those findings in the context of potential policy implications. Also discussed are the limitations encountered during the study. The chapter concludes with a discussion on future research that may extend the understanding of the topic.

Findings and Discussion

The key findings of the study indicate that business relationships result from participation in illicit activities and link criminal and extremist groups. The resulting relationships enable extremists to procure unconventional weapons or materials using criminal groups' global network of contacts. These contacts acted as intermediaries between those who want to buy unconventional commodities and those who wish to purchase them. To get the weapons or materials they seek, extremists needed to use two to four intermediaries to reach their procurement contact. The study also indicated that four extremist groups in Latin America are similarly capable of acquiring unconventional weapons or materials. These groups were characterized as subscribing to both religious and political ideologies.

Interest

The study showed that extremist groups with criminal collaborative relationships, but with differing ideologies and motivations are similarly capable of acquiring unconventional weapons and materials. Al Qaeda, FARC, Hamas, and Hezbollah all have similar capabilities and are established groups with global networks that have substantive financial and organizational capabilities. These groups are also key purveyors of terrorism.

The literature reviewed contained an extensive examination of Al Qaeda relative to its interest in unconventional weapons, materials, and capabilities to deploy unconventional weapons. The study revealed support for such concerns about Al Qaeda' capabilities documented in the literature. Certainly, the core of Al Qaeda continues to be a national security threat despite the decimation of its leadership. The group also continues to be a threat because of its ability to inspire affiliates who may express a desire for unconventional weapons.

However, the findings underscore the need to broaden focus and scrutiny to other extremist groups. Several key dynamics, such as groups' organizational and military abilities, financial sustainability, and networks of contacts are worthy of exploration. All of the groups deemed similarly capable are key purveyors of terrorism, with substantive global contacts and engage in high profit criminal activities. Although similar in organizational, military, and financial capabilities, these groups are dissimilar in motivations. Three groups--Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah--are motivated by religious ideology: one group, FARC, is motivated by politics. As indicated in the literature, this

82 finding shows that religious ideology is not a sole determinant in the acquisition or usage of unconventional weapons. The findings also suggest that, in addition to intent, a full review of extremist groups' networks and their financial, operational, and military capabilities is necessary to fully understand these groups' potential. Because of the underpinnings of the factors that affect acquisition and usage of unconventional weapons and weapons material, policy makers must avoid having tunnel vision and refrain from focusing substantial effort and money on only a limited number of suspected extremist groups. In addition, the findings of this study revealed a range of group characteristics that need to be explored. By incorporating intent with groups' operational and military capabilities, policy makers can gain a big picture view of groups' potential for acquisition, enabling policy makers to identify and focus on those groups that pose substantial security risks. This big picture view is especially important because extremist groups may be able to enhance their military capabilities by engaging in activities that result in alternative sources of income, allowing them to modify their goals and objectives to respond to current events and government policies.

Collaborative Relationships

The study showed that criminals and extremists engage in cooperative relationships to varying degrees in three principal illicit activities: money laundering and trafficking in arms and drugs. Through these activities, groups could enhance their profits and promote their respective business interests. However, drug trafficking was the only illicit activity in which both criminals and extremists engaged.

Criminal activity, especially drug trafficking has a three-fold purpose for extremist groups. First, is a means to fund these groups' operational expenses to ensure they can perpetuate themselves. Second, criminal activity, specifically drug trafficking, is a major revenue source for financing terrorism. Third, criminal activity is an effective non-violent way to attack the West. As shown in the literature, the finding suggests some extremist groups, such as Hezbollah, view drug trafficking as a potent non-military method to destroy the United States and Western countries. Through drugs, these groups attack the citizens of these nations from within without engaging in military tactics or risking damage to the group (Dishman, 2005). The drug trade encompasses many components, including crop cultivation, chemicals for drug production, drug transportation, security for drug transportation, and drug distribution. Opportunities for collaboration can occur at any point in this process, depending on the particular business needs of the groups involved. Because of its transnational nature, the drug trade, as the literature suggested, has a unique effect of bringing together dissimilar groups. For example, producing crops and manufacturing drugs in one country, then transporting them through multiple nations and across borders for global distribution may involve several groups, each with different skills and needs, to effectuate the process. Findings from the study included both examples of this process and identification of the key roles

Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah play in connecting these networks. The findings showed FARC and Hezbollah have the greatest involvement as brokers between the overall network and criminal groups. This is understandable and is indicative of their

84 degree of involvement in drug-related activities that enable the establishment of global network of contacts.

Cooperative relationships between criminals and extremists are important to understanding network formation and the implications of such networks. The law enforcement and intelligence communities need to recognize how alliances between and among criminal and extremist groups form, how these groups interact with one another, and how they integrate to form networks. These networks of alliances are excellent sources for supplying commodities and services, providing both criminals and extremists with avenues to fulfill their groups' needs. This aspect of having multiple paths to find whatever a groups needs--whether drugs or conventional or unconventional weapons--is quite valuable.

The drug trade is very important in establishing relationships and in providing extremists with significant funding sources. With profits from the drug trade, extremists can finance their operational needs, acquire weapons, recruit new members, and plan and execute multiple attacks, making it difficult for law enforcement and counterterrorism officials to keep ahead of extremist groups' acquisitions and operations. A more sinister consequence of collaboration, which is difficult for law enforcement and counterterrorism officials to anticipate, is the ability of extremists to move weapons and operatives into and out of nations and regions. The transnational nature of the drug trade results in widening opportunities for establishing relationships between criminal and extremist groups that can be used for current or future operational assistance.

Effective policies to combat terrorism must include policies that address the criminal component. Such policies must include monitoring the drug trafficking-related activities of criminals, extremists, and their associates. Through such monitoring, authorities can determine criminal and extremist collaboration and identify participation in the different aspects of drug- related activities. For example, authorities can determine how the groups are collaborating relative to shared smuggling routes, facilitators, and coordinators for drug transactions and shipments. Once these are determined, authorities can look for weak points to exploit and identify weak actors and relationships to target to disrupt relationships and networks. By addressing the criminal aspect of terrorism, law enforcement and the intelligence communities will be deterring the proliferation nexus with terrorism.

Pathways

The drug trade has evolved from being only a means to make money through supplying individuals with narcotics to a global industry with networks of knowledgeable contacts able to procure any requested commodity and to address any business need.

This reach is reflected in the roles that criminals and criminal groups played as critical elements in the proliferation pathways. The study showed that transnational drug trafficking and criminal groups, including those indigenous to Latin America, play key roles as intermediaries. As shown in the literature, through these pathways the drug trade has become intertwined in economic, political, and national security issues. The breadth of this illicit activity has implications for law enforcement and national security policy development relative to unconventional weapons deterrence and procedures to target

86 effectively those individuals or groups that may be vulnerable in the acquisition pathways. All of the extremist groups included in the study participate in the drug trade to some extent. Some extremists have business relationships with more than one criminal or drug trafficking group which provides extremists with multiple avenues for procurement using trusted business contacts. By developing multiple relationships, extremists provide themselves multiple avenues for procurement using trusted business contacts which is quite important should one or more of their contacts be compromised by law enforcement or targeted counterterrorism actions. As shown in the study, with the exceptions of Al Qaeda and FARC, very few extremist groups have direct relationships with criminal sources; most of them need one contact and one to two intermediaries.

This indicates that the relationships between buyers and sellers are not close; they must rely on trusted business relationships among the network actors and criminal intermediaries. The finding is supportive of the literature, which suggests that criminal intermediaries are an important part of the procurement process between buyers and sellers and serve as part of a "transactional network" of contacts with knowledge of trusted and reliable associates who can be relied upon to procure whatever weapons and materials that are requested (Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 2001).

Critical Entities

Criminals are an integral part of the proliferation pathway in their roles as brokers and influencers. Critical actors provide avenues for other actors in the network. Their removal can result in severely impairing extremists' abilities to connect with other

87 network actors, making commodity acquisition difficult or impossible. Even when network actors can access other avenues, they may be deterred from doing so because of the degree of difficulty.

Deterring extremists from obtaining unconventional weapons is the goal of the law enforcement and intelligence communities. To do so, these communities need to identify critical and vulnerable actors and relationships in the network to impair criminals' abilities to obtain weapons and materials and provide them to extremists.

Identification of these actors is also valuable because of the information they can provide, information regarding impending transactions or the identities of other actors in the network worth monitoring.

Limitations of the Study

The data collection phase of the study revealed the limitations encountered in studying covert networks. Obtaining specific data, such as the names of individuals associated with groups, participating in activities, or collaborating with other actors or groups, was often difficult. Because only limited data on criminal or extremist groups and their activities were available in academic journals alternative sources for data, such as news accounts, government documents, and think tank reports were required. The data that were collected frequently contained information on the groups' activities, but not on the specific actors involved. Often the literature included references to reported activities but did not include the identities of the perpetrators, whether they were individuals or groups. The preponderance of the literature only indicated that an individual had some sort of relationship with a group; it did not reveal whether these were member-to-member

88 associations. These limitations could be due to the lack of specific information contained in the sources used or to the fact that the information was simply not available. Fosson stated that criminal and extremist groups are often compartmentalized to prevent compromising the larger group and its goals; thus managers of cells for criminals and extremist often do not know the real names of cell members.

Similarly, limitations existed in terms of collecting data relative to specific criminal involvement in unconventional weapons materials trafficking. Because no previous research on this subject existed, the researcher had to rely on the small number of reports and news accounts available to obtain this information. Another contributing factor limiting data collection was the restrictions on access to databases containing trafficking cases. The researcher needed to rely on the reports compiled by researchers to obtain information on trafficking cases.

Despite these limitations, the study was not adversely impacted. Sufficient data were available to counter the limitations on data collection. The findings from the study relative to criminal and extremist collaboration were convergent with the relevant available literature. Because there is little publicly available research or limited literature about acquisition pathways involving criminals, assessing whether data collection limitations adversely affected the findings was difficult. However, sufficient data were available to conduct the study appropriately.

Direction for Future Study This dissertation showed the importance and ramifications of relationships between criminal and extremist groups, including one example of an acquisition pathway

89 beginning with extremist intent and capability and concluding with criminal relationships to facilitate the transaction. Therefore, this dissertation could serve as a starting point for the examination of other extremist groups with capabilities to acquire weapons and materials. However, as shown in the study, in future examinations of other extremist groups, the focus should not be solely on one group, as was the case in much of the literature focused on Al Qaeda. Instead, future research should include examinations of politically motivated and religious groups with known intent and capabilities. As this study showed in identifying the similar acquisition capabilities of Al Qaeda and

Hezbollah, researchers, law enforcement, and intelligence communities, must explore all factors in determining capable extremist groups, especially when intent is unknown.

Examination of other potential acquisition pathways should be explored. In the existing literature, which laced concrete examples, authors addressed the problem by generally identifying potential types of groups of people and businesses that could be involved. Although this dissertation has revealed one potential pathway, others undoubtedly must exist. Researchers could collect relevant open source data to develop other potential pathways using concrete examples of individuals, groups, businesses and their attendant relationships. Researchers could map these relationships to facilitate understanding of the magnitude of the problem.

These suggestions represented just a few avenues researchers should consider exploring. Because the problem is complex and involves many components, each stage and component in the process must be examined. Doing so should result in a better

90 understanding of the problem as well as the development of measures to disrupt the cycle of proliferation.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This chapter contains an overview of the study, including a synthesis of the findings; policy implications resulting from the findings; and policy recommendations for counterterrorism and counter-proliferation. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the contributions of the study.

Introduction

The study was designed to identify business relationships between criminal and extremist groups to determine if those relationships result in pathways to obtaining unconventional weapons and weapons materials using criminal groups' networks of contacts. To accomplish this, the focus of the study was on discovering which extremist groups in Latin America had the most capability to acquire weapons and materials, identifying criminal and extremist group relationships, and determining which criminal relationships served to facilitate the acquisition process. Social network analysis was the methodology used to meet these objectives.

Findings

The findings of the study were consistent with existing theory and the literature concerning the main arguments in the study and served to elucidate criminal acquisition pathways. The study revealed a deeper understanding of the problem in determining that

92 multiple Islamic and non-Islamic extremist groups in Latin America have similar acquisition capabilities and by showing the implications the drug trade has beyond revenue generation for criminals and extremists. The study showed that extremist groups' participation in drug-related activities is central to their organization and that similarly capable extremist groups are actively engaged in drug-related activities. These illicit activities served as conduits for criminal and extremist interaction, information transference, and collaborative relationships. Through these collaborative relationships, extremists had access to avenues to acquire weapons and materials and for criminal intermediaries to procure the commodities using trusted relationships. The study showed extremists required one to four intermediaries to reach their procurement contacts. By providing a deeper understanding of the problem through examination of its components, the findings revealed a roadmap for law enforcement and intelligence communities to use in future investigation and development of national security policy issues.

Implications

The study served to highlight the role of nations and regions with entrenched criminal activities and illicit drug trade industries in fomenting collaborative relationships between criminals and extremists. Many of these nations and regions have endemic corruption and lax law enforcement, which are attractive to criminals and extremists who use these hospitable conditions to engage in illicit activities, fundraise among the diaspora communities, and to plan future attacks. Latin America, the case in point, has provided a haven for an amalgamation of indigenous and transnational criminal and extremist groups of differing ideological ilks. These groups have used the region to

93 pursue their interests, often forming cooperative relationships with one another to further their objectives, and posing implications for U.S. national security.

Latin America has become more of a security concern because of the presence of extremist groups with known vociferous anti-American and anti-Israel sentiments operating in the region. These groups and their members have participated in egregious attacks against the United States and its allies abroad and in Latin America. These groups, which are well organized, have enhanced their military capabilities through collaborative criminal relationships and profits derived from criminal and drug activities.

The combinations of these factors have revealed serious implications in terms of establishing profitable revenue generators and using facilitators to provide introductions to global networks of cooperation. These groups can leverage revenue and networks to acquire unconventional weapons or materials or to acquire needed expertise or skill sets.

These dynamics also revealed significant concerns for law enforcement and intelligence communities tasked with preventing future 9/-11 types of attacks in the U.S. homeland. Extremists emboldened with significant financial capabilities obtained from drug proceeds have developed the potential to acquire sophisticated unconventional weapons through their criminal relationships. These relationships and networks could serve not only as a means to purchase weapons and materials but also as avenues for their transportation. A number of illicit transportation avenues exist, most of them previously established criminal smuggling routes and methods. For example, weapons and weapons materials could be transported along established smuggling routes used by drug and human traffickers. These routes have already been vetted by the traffickers to avoid

94 confrontation with law enforcement. As another potential transportation avenue, extremists could use front companies to transport extremists' weapons and materials covertly in cargo by disguising them as licit commodities. An especially worrisome possibility, weapons, materials, and operatives could also be transported through existing or newly created sophisticated drug tunnels that run from Mexico into the southern

United States. These drug tunnels have been especially problematic because commodities can be easily transported and disseminated throughout the United States before they are discovered by U.S. law enforcement.

The real-life examples of collaboration and proliferation pathways studied in this research have resulted in insight into potential avenues to explore in countering terrorism and proliferation. Although the findings indicated potential for collaboration between extremist and criminal groups, they did not suggest that criminals will willingly assist extremists or that extremists will attempt to acquire weapons or materials using criminals as their procurement contacts. Criminals could refrain from cooperating with extremists because of fear of reprisals from local or international law enforcement authorities; they could also refrain from assisting them for fear of destabilizing economic or population sectors important to the bottom line of their business. Extremists, on the other hand, might not attempt to obtain unconventional weapons or materials simply because conventional weapons will suffice for the type of attacks they plan to execute. Rather, the concern for the United States should be the potential threat proliferation and national security posed by networked relationships. Thus policy makers should develop counterterrorism and counter-proliferation policies to address the potential threat posed

95 by extremists seeking to ramp up the lethality of their attacks using unconventional means.

Contributions of the Study

The study served as a holistic examination of the acquisition process, from extremist group intent and capability to procurement channels. The literature surveyed for this study was qualitative in nature and focused on the separate elements of the acquisition process. This study was an empirical investigation of the problem of unconventional weapons acquisition. Exploration of the problem involved the examination of each component of the acquisition process through one real life example:

Hezbollah's use of its business relationships with Mexican DTOs to reach Sermon

Mogilevich, a Russian mobster whose representative met with FARC to negotiate the sale of uranium. Also included was a cumulative examination of the components to determine their implications. The study has served to add to the literature a deeper understanding of criminal and extremist groups' roles in the acquisition process, tying the components together using concrete examples from a very real possible situation.

Conclusion

Criminal and extremist collaborations and their contribution to network formation have become serious security threats to U.S. national security through enhancing extremist groups' capabilities and procurement powers. By understanding of these implications, law enforcement and intelligence communities should be armed with sufficient knowledge to craft effective countermeasures to thwart the potential consequences of criminal activity and collaboration.

Appendix One: Actors and Affiliations

Actor Affiliation

Abadia, Juan Carlos Ramirez FARC Abadallah, Ali Hassan Hezbollah Abdul, Kalim Ad Raja Al Qaeda Abeirahman, Idriss AQIM, FARC Aksu, Cetin Hezbollah Al-Aal, Muhammad Abed Abd AQIM, Islamic Jihad, FARC Albert, Maria Remedios Garcia FARC Alcala, Major General Cliver FARC Ali, Khalid Hussein Al Qaeda Al Ghazi, Tareq Mousa FARC Al Kassar, Monzer FARC, Islamic Jihad Al-Liby, Abu Faraj Al Qaeda Al-Masri, Sharif Al Qaeda Al-Salam, Said Jan Abd Al Qaeda Alvaran-Velex, Alvaro AUC, Mexican DTOs Assad, Sheik Suhail Hezbollah Ayestaran, Jose Lorenzo ETA, FARC

Baez, Nestor Da Costa DTO Ballouk, Ali Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Banol-Ramos, Yarlei FARC Barakat, Ahmad Akraam Hezbollah Barakat, Ahmad Assad Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, FARC Barakat, Hassan Ali Hezbollah Barakat, Hattem Hezbollah Barerra-Barerra, Daniel FARC, Los Rastrojos, North Valley DTO Becerra, Joaquin Perez FARC Berro, Ibrahim Hezbollah Bikacem, Harouni Lotfi Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Balkan crime groups, ETA, Islamic Bin Hmeidi, Mohamad bin Saleh extremist groups, Italian mafia, PIRA Biro, Muhammad Hezbollah Blanco-Puerta, Edgar Fernando AUC Borda, Christian Fernando AUC Bout, Viktor Al Qaeda, FARC Briceno, Jorge FARC

Actor Affiliation

Calle, Freddy Torres FARC Camorra Associate Camorra crime group, Mexican DTOs Cano-Flores, Aurelio Los Zetas Castano, Jorge Chiriboga, Oviedo Nuria Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Connolly, Niall FARC, PIRA

Da Costa DTO, FARC, Hezbollah, Russian Da Costa, Luis crime groups Dahroug, Mohamed Dahroug Al Qaeda, Hamas Damnjanovic, Tomislav Italian mafia

Echeverry, Londono Rodrigo FARC El Din, Sheik Khaled Rezek El Sayed Take Hamas, Hezbollah El Shukrijumah, Adnan G. Al Qaeda Escobar, Rodrigo Granda FARC

Fadel, Sheik Mounir Hezbollah Fayad, Sohbi Mamoud Hezbollah Fayed, Salhed Mahmoud Hezbollah Fontan, Arturo Cubillas ETA, FARC Fundamentalist Latin American Muslim Al Qaeda, Colombian DTOs, Hamas, businessmen Hezbollah, Mexican DTOs

Godoy, Luis Felipe Moreno FARC Gogeaskoetxea, Ibon ETA

Hamajo, Maher Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Hamdan, Moussa Ali Hezbollah Hamia, Talal Hezbollah Harb, Abbas Hussein Ayman Joumaa network Colombian DTOs, FARC, Harb drug and money laundering ring, Hezbollah, North Harb, Chekry Valley DTO, Oficina de Envigado Harb, Dib Hani Hezbollah Harb, Zacaria Harb drug and money laundering ring Henareh, Siavosh Hezbollah Hijazi, Kassem Hezbollah Hodroj, Hassan Hezbollah

Actor Affiliation

Ibarguen-Palacio, Jorge Abel FARC Issa, Oumar Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC Iyekhoro, Raymond Davies Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO

Ayman Joumaa network, Colombian DTOs, Joumaa, Ayman Hezbollah, Los Zetas, Oficina de Envigado

Kan’an, Fawzi Hezbollah Karaki, Hasan Antar Hezbollah Kassir, Abdallah Hezbollah Khasraji, Iman Tareb Al-Mukawama

Makki, Bassam Gharbi Hezbollah Makled, Walid FARC, Hezbollah Malyschew, Sergei Al Qaeda Mardirossian, Paul FARC Marin, Pedro Antonio Marin FARC Marquez, Ivan FARC Martinez-Guillen, Hector Antonio FARC McAuley, Martin FARC, PIRA Al Qaeda, Al-Mukawama, Hamas, Mehri, Ali Khalil Hezbollah Mendieta, Jorge Enrique Rodriguez FARC Mendoza, Nelson Da Costa DTO Merhi, Moustapha Khalil Hezbollah Al Qaeda, Camorra crime group, FARC, Mogilevich, Sermon Yukovich Mexican DTOs, Solntsevo Mohammed, Khalil Sheikh Al Qaeda Monaghan, Jim FARC, PIRA Morales, Edgar Gustavo Navarro FARC Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Mukhlis, El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed Group, Islamic Jihad Harb drug and money laundering ring, Murillo, Diego Fernando Oficina de Envigado Muskhab, Abu Al Qaeda

Naboulsi, Hassan Hezbollah Nasr, Jameel Hezbollah Nasrallah, Hasas Hezbollah Nassereddine, Abdallah Hezbollah Nassereddine, Oday Hezbollah

Actor Affiliation

Obeid, Kais Hezbollah Olaskoaga, Jose Ignacio ETA, FARC Omar, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Al Qaeda Orozoco, Maximiliano Bonilla EIN, Los Zetas, Oficina de Envigado

Padilla, Omar Arturo Zabala FARC Panamanian Muslim businessmen Hamas, Hezbollah Paracha, Saifullah Al Qaeda Paz, Sheik Karim Abdul Hezbollah

Qasmani, Arif Al Qaeda

Rabbani, Mohsen Hezbollah Ramirez, Gerardo Aguilar FARC Reda, Salman Hezbollah Rios, Ivan FARC Rojas, Noe Suarez FARC

Saade, Maroun Hezbollah Saenz, Guillermo FARC Salazar, Victor Manuel Vargas ETA, FARC Saleh, Hassam Hezbollah Saleh, Mazen Ali Hezbollah Shakuri, Gholam Qods Forces Silva, Henry de Jesus Rangel FARC Silva, Luis Edgar FARC, Solntsevo Smulyan, Andrei FARC

Tabataba’I, Mohsen Hezbollah Tariq, Nazmut Al Qaeda Taruk, Zulkuf Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Torres, Guillermo FARC Toure, Harouna AQIM, FARC

Umeh, Chigbo Peter FARC

Wehbe, Bachar Hezbollah

Yassine, Saleh Abdul Karim Hamas Yousef, Jaml FARC, Hezbollah

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Actor Affiliation Zaiter, Houssein Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Zaiter, Hussein Mustafa Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Zaiter, Rady Hezbollah, Zaiter DTO Zaiter, Raza Hezbollay, Zaiter DTO Zamora, Ruben FARC Zengotitabengoa, Andoni ETA

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APPENDIX TWO: EXTREMIST AFFILIATIONS

Extremist group Affiliation

Abadallah, Ali Hassan Hezbollah Abdul, Kalim Ad Raja Al Qaeda Abelrahman, Idriss AQIM, FARC Al-Aal, Muhammad Abed Abd AQIM, Islamic Jihad, FARC Albert, Maria Remedios Garcia FARC Ali, Khalid Hussein Al Qaeda Al-Liby, Abu Faraj Al Qaeda Al-Masri, Sharif Al Qaeda Al-Salam, Said Jan Abd Al Qaeda Assad, Sheik Suhail Hezbollah Ayestaran, Jose Lorenzo ETA, FARC

Banol-Ramos, Yarlei FARC Barakat, Ahmad Akraam Hezbollah Barakat, Ahmad Assad Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, FARC Barakat, Hassan Ali Hezbollah Barakat Hattem Hattem Becerra, Joaquin Perez FARC Berro, Ibrahim Hezbollah Briceno, Jorge FARC

Connolly, Niall FARC, PIRA

Dahroug, Mohamed Dahroug Al Qaeda, Hamas

Echeverry, Londono Rodrigo FARC El Din, Sheik Khaled Rezek El Sayed Take Hamas, Hezbollah El Shukrijumah, Adnan G. Al Qaeda Escobar, Rodrigo Granda FARC

Fadel, Sheik Mounir Hezbollah Fayad, Sohbi Mamoud Hezbollah Fayed, Salhed Mahmoud Hezbollah

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Extremist group Affiliation

Fontan, Arturo Cubillas ETA, FARC Fundamentalist Latin American Muslim businessmen Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah

Gogeaskoetxea, Ibon ETA

Hamdan, Moussa Ali Hezbollah Hamia, Talal Hezbollah

Ibarguen-Palacio, Jorge Abel FARC Issa, Oumar Al Qaeda, AQIM, FARC

Kan’an, Fawzi Hezbollah Kassir, Abdallah Hezbollah Khasraji, Iman Tareb Al-Mukawama

Makki, Bassam Gharbi Hezbollah Malyschew, Sergei Al Qaeda Marin, Pedro Antonio Marin FARC Marquez, Ivan FARC McAuley, Martin FARC, PIRA Al Qaeda, Al-Mukawama, Hamas, Mehri, Ali Khalil Hezbollah Mendieta, Jorge Enrique Rodriguez FARD Merhi, Moustapha Khalil Hezbollah Mohammed, Khalil Sheikh Al Qaeda Monaghan, Jim FARC, PIRA Morales, Edgar Gustavo Navarro FARC Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Mukhlis, El Said Hassan Ali Mohamed Group, Islamic Jihad

Naboulsi, Hassan Hezbollah Nasr, Jameel Hezbollah Nasrallah, Hasan Hezbollah Nassereddine, Abdallah Hezbollah Nassereddine, Oday Hezbollah

Obeid, Kais Hezbollah Olaskoaga, Jose Ignacio ETA, FARC Omar, Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Al Qaeda

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Extremist group Affiliation

Padilla, Omar Artuoro Zabala FARC Panamanian Muslim businessmen Hamas, Hezbollah Paracha, Saifullah Al Qaeda Paz, Sheik Karim Abdul Hezbollah

Qasmani, Arif Al Qaeda

Rabbani, Mohsen Al Qaeda Ramirez, Gerardo Aguilar FARC Reda, Salman Hezbollah Rios, Ivan FARC Rojas, Noe Suarez FARC

Saenz, Guillermo FARC Salazar, Victor, Manuel Vargas ETA, FARC Saleh, Hassam Hezbollah Saleh, Mazen Ali Hezbollah Shakuri, Gholam Qods Forces Silva, Luis Edgar FARC

Tabataba’i-Makki, Mohsen Hezbollah Tariq, Nazmut Al Qaeda Torres, Guillermo FARD Toure, Harouna AQIM, FARC

Yassine, Saleh Abdul Karim Hamas

Zamora, Ruben FARC Zengotitabengoa, Andoni ETA

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APPENDIX THREE: CRIMINAL AND EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND AFFILIATIONS

Extremist Organization Crime group/mafia DTO group

Colombian, Gulf, Los Albanian, Balkan, Bulgarian, Zetas, Camorra, Italian, Russian, ’Ndrangheta South American, Turkish Mexican, Sinaloa ETA, FARC

Chechen, Chinese, Mara Salvatrucha, Russian, Al Qaeda Solntsevo FARC

Colombian, Mexican, AQIM Moroccan FARC

Albanian crime Bulgarian, Camorra, Chechen, Chinese, Italian, Colombian, Serbian, Groups 'Ndrangheta, Turkish South American, Serbian

Ayman Joumaa Harb drug and money Colombian, Los Zetas, Network laundering ring Oficina de Envigado Hezbollah

Balkan arms

Dealers Camorra ETA, PIRA

'Ndrangheta, Camorra, Balkan crime groups Italian

'Ndrangheta, Albanian, Bulgarian crime groups Serbian, Turkish PIRA

Albanian, Balkan arms dealers, Italian, 'Ndrangheta, South American, Solntsevo, Gulf, Los Zetas, Camorra Turkish Mexican ETA

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Extremist Organization Crime group/mafia DTO group

Chaldean organized crime group Sinaloa

Cheaitelly/El Khasa crime group Colombian and Mexican

Albanian, East European, Italian, Mexican human smuggling rings, Russian, Chechen mafia Turkish Al Qaeda

Chilean mafia Islamic Group

Chinese human Mexican human smuggling smuggling rings rings

Al Qaeda, Chinese mafia Albanian, East European PIRA

'Ndrangheta, Albanian, Ayman Joumaa Network, Cheaitelly/ElKhasa crime group, East European, Harb drug and money laundering AQIM, ETA, Colombian DTOs ring, Italian, Solntsevo Moroccan, Serbian FARC

FARC, Da Costa DTO Hezbollah

East European crime Colombian, South groups Chechen, Chinese, Italian American FARC

European crime groups PIRA

'Ndrangheta, Balkan arms FARC, Hamas, ETA dealers, Camorra Colombian PIRA

'Ndrangheta, East European, Colombian, Da Costa, Al Qaeda, Harb drug and money Gulf, Los Rastrojos, AQIM, ETA, laundering ring, Russian, Mexican, North Valley, Hezbollah, FARC Solntsevo Sinaloa, Tijuana PIRA

'Ndrangheta, Camorra, Gulf DTO Italian Los Zetas FARC

ETA, Hamas Mexican Hezbollah

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Extremist Organization Crime group/mafia DTO group

Harb drug and money FARC, laundering ring Ayman Joumaa network Colombian, North Valley Hezbollah

Ayman Joumaa network, Lebanese, Mara Salvatruch, Harb drug and money Da Costa, Los Zetas, Hamas, Islamic Hezbollah laundering ring, Lebanese Mexican, Zaiter Jihad, FARC

Chilean, Ming crime family, Islamic Group Sung-I

Islamic Jihad Hezbollah

Albanian, Balkan, Camorra, Chechen, East European, 'Ndrangheta, Russian, South Colombian, Gulf, Los Italian mafia American, Turkish Zetas, Mexican, Sinaloa

Lebanese mafia Hezbollah

Los Rastrojos DTO Mexican, Sinaloa FARC

'Ndrangheta, Ayman Joumaa Los Zetas DTO Network, Camorra, Italian Gulf Hezbollah

Al Qaeda, Mara Salvatrucha Mexican, Sinaloa Hezbollah

Camorra, Cheaitelly/El Khasa, Italian, Mara AQIM, FARC, Salvatrucha, 'Ndrangheta, North Valley, Los Hamas, Mexican DTOs Russian, Solntsevo Rastrojos Hezbollah

Mexican human Chechen mafia, Chinese smuggling rings human smuggling rings

Ming crime family Islamic Group

Moroccan DTOs Colombian AQIM

Harb drug and money North Valley DTO laundering ring Mexican FARC

Harb drug and money Oficina de Envigado laundering ring, Ayman DTO Joumaa Network

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Extremist Organization Crime group/mafia DTO group

Balkan arms dealers, Bulgarian, Chinese, PIRA European ETA, FARC

Chechen, Italian, Mexican, South Al Qaeda, Russian crime groups 'Ndrangheta, Turkish American, Da Costa FARC

Serbian DTO Albanian Colombian

'Ndrangheta, Chaldean organized crime group, Sinaloa DTO Italian, Mara Salvatrucha Los Rastrojos FARC

Colombian, Al Qaeda, Solntsevo Camorra Mexican FARC

South American crime 'Ndrangheta, Camorra, groups Italian

Albanian, East European, South American DTO Russian

Sung-I Islamic Group

Tijuana DTO FARC

'Ndrangheta, Albanian, Bulgarian, Russian, Camorra, Turkish Chechen, Italian

Zaiter DTO Hezbollah

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APPENDIX FOUR: DEFINITIONS

Agent

Individual members of either a criminal or extremist group.

Arms trafficking

Engage in the illicit sale and movement of weapons into a country, region or area.

Boundary spanner

A network analysis term indicating a node is able to connect nodes or parts of the network together.

Boundary spanner potential

A network analysis metric that indicates the potential capability of a node to connect nodes or parts of a network together.

Broker

Individual or group acting as a middleman between individuals or groups.

Business relationship

Relationship that facilitates the business process.

Capability

Individual's or group's capacity or potential to pursue a course of action.

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Crime

Illegal or illicit activity.

Crime group

Organizations or individual members of an organization involved in any illegal or illicit activity.

Drugs

Illegal substance, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin.

Drug trafficking

Engage in the illicit sale and movement of illegal drugs into a country, region or area.

Extremist

Individual or group with political ideologies that use violence to impair the activities or policies of the current political governing system. Extremists will be defined as an individual or group who commit violent acts to achieve their political, ideological or religious goals or to incite fear. These actions can be committed against civilians, governments, or property.

Extremism

Violent acts perpetrated against civilians, governments or property for political, ideological or religious purposes or to incite fear within governments or civilians.

Facilitator

Individual, who contributes to an act or activity, provides assistance to an individual or group provides a safe haven.

Fundamentalist Muslim Businessmen

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Term refers to individuals but used as a collective term when referring to them.

Fundraiser

Individual who raises money to provide to extremist groups.

Group

Individuals who collectively are members of the same organization.

Intent

An individual's or group's goal or objective to pursue a course of action.

Islamic

Individual who is of Arab descent or a group whose members are composed of individuals who are of Arab descent. An individual or group who adheres to the teachings of Islam and who adheres to the belief that Islam should be incorporated into a political system.

Latin America

Mexico and Central and South America.

Money laundering

Process or activity to conceal the source of money earned from an illegal or illicit activity.

Network

Individuals, individual members of groups, or groups who conduct business, activities, training or services with other individuals, groups or with individual members of a group.

Node

Entity comprised of an individual, groups of individuals or organizations.

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Supplier

Individual or group who provides a service or commodity.

TBA

Tri-border region in South America comprised of the contiguous borders of Argentina,

Brazil, and Paraguay.

Training

Procedure to increase the level of expertise in an activity.

Transnational

Organization that operates globally.

Unconventional weapons capability

Demonstrated interest and/or organizational capacity to acquire, produce, purchase or train others in the use or construction of biological weapons.

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BIOGRAPHY

Jenna R. Frost received her Doctor of Chiropractic degree from Texas Chiropractic College in Pasadena, Texas. Following graduation, she was the owner and sole practitioner of Inwood Forest Chiropractic Clinic in Houston, Texas. Her later employment included positions with Congressman Bill Archer (R-TX), 7th District as district representative in his Houston office before moving to Washington, DC to work in his Washington office as a legislative aide. Upon his retirement from public office, she assumed the position as Professional Staff Member with the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Social Security. Her subsequent employment was as a Congressional Liaison with the Office of Legislation and Congressional Affairs for the Social Security Administration.

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