Is the Opcw Implementing the Cwc Definition of Chemical Weapons?
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Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An Analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Linus Gustafsson Magnus Ranstorp Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Authors: Linus Gustafsson Magnus Ranstorp Swedish Defence University 2017 Swedish Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: An analysis of open-source intelligence and statistical data Linus Gustafsson & Magnus Ranstorp © Swedish Defence University, Linus Gustafsson & Magnus Ranstorp 2017 No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. Swedish material law is applied to this book. The contents of the book has been reviewed and authorized by the Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership. Printed by: Arkitektkopia AB, Bromma 2017 ISBN 978-91-86137-64-9 For information regarding publications published by the Swedish Defence University, call +46 8 553 42 500, or visit our home page www.fhs.se/en/research/internet-bookstore/. Summary Summary The conflict in Syria and Iraq has resulted in an increase in the number of violent Islamist extremists in Sweden, and a significant increase of people from Sweden travelling to join terrorist groups abroad. Since 2012 it is estimated that about 300 people from Sweden have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and, to a lesser extent, al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Even though the foreign fighter issue has been on the political agenda for several years and received considerable media attention, very little is known about the Swedish contingent. -
Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report)*
Pure Appl. Chem., Vol. 85, No. 4, pp. 851–881, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1351/PAC-REP-12-11-18 © 2013 IUPAC, Publication date (Web): 16 February 2013 Impact of scientific developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report)* Katie Smallwood1, Ralf Trapp2, Robert Mathews3, Beat Schmidt4, and Leiv K. Sydnes5,‡ 1Independent Consultant, Geneva, Switzerland; 2International Disarmament Consultant, 74270 Chessenaz, France; 3Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australia; 4Spiez Laboratory, 3700 Spiez, Switzerland; 5Department of Chemistry, University of Bergen, 5007 Bergen, Norway Abstract: This document represents the final report of discussions and conclusions arising from the workshop on Developments in Science and Technology Relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in Spiez, Switzerland in February 2012. Keywords: Chemical Weapons Convention; CWC; implementation; science and technology; Third Review Conference. CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overall findings and recommendations 2.2 S&T advances and their impact on the scope of the CWC 2.3 Developments that affect the practical implementation of the CWC 2.4 S&T advances specifically relevant to verification 2.5 S&T advances specifically relevant to protection against CW 2.6 The evolution of the international S&T environment 2.7 Extending support for the CWC via outreach and education 3. THE WORKSHOP 3.1 Overview and background 3.2 Convergence of chemistry and biology 3.3 New synthesis and toxicological analysis methods 3.4 Developing new materials and delivery mechanisms 3.5 Technical discussion 3.6 Advances in industrial production methods 3.7 Chemical safety and security: Possession, transfer, and acquisition 3.8 Defense against CW agents 3.9 Chemical safety and security: Engaging the chemical sciences community *Sponsoring body: IUPAC Executive Committee: see more details on p. -
Beurope and Eurasia Overview ______
bEurope and Eurasia Overview ________________________________________________________________________ “It is important . that those engaged in terrorism realize that our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world. It is our determination that they will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations throughout the world.” Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom BBC News July 8, 2005 __________________________________________________________________ Two terrorist attacks in London on July 7 and July 21 further focused European countries on the terrorist threat and prompted increased cooperation and efforts to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. The year was also marked by successes as terrorist networks were broken up by arrests in countries ranging from Denmark to Italy. European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign and continued to enhance their abilities, both individually and collectively, to deal with a terrorist threat increasingly seen as an internal one. The contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics were vital elements in the war on terrorism. European Union (EU) member states remained strong and reliable partners. International judicial cooperation advanced as EU members continued to enact and implement legislation for U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. The United 83 States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information- sharing capabilities. -
Detecting and Decontaminating Chemical and Biological Agents
Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and biological agents Policy document 06/04 April 2004 ISBN 0 85403 598 2 This report can be found at www.royalsoc.ac.uk ISBN 0 85403 598 2 © The Royal Society 2004. Requests to reproduce all or part of this document should be submitted to: Science Advice Section The Royal Society 6–9 Carlton House Terrace London SW1Y 5AG email [email protected] ii | April 2004 | The Royal Society Making the UK safer Making the UK safer: detecting and decontaminating chemical and biological agents Contents Page Summary 1 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Background to project 3 1.2 Conduct of project 4 1.3 Types and properties of possible agents 4 1.4 Types of possible incident 5 2 Priorities, concepts of use and implementation of detection systems 7 2.1 Detection, identification and monitoring 7 2.2 Activities and decision-making at different stages of an incident 7 2.3 User requirements and concepts of use 10 2.4 Current detection and monitoring technologies 10 2.5 Issues needing to be addressed 11 2.6 Key detection system requirements 11 2.7 Validation and implementation 11 2.8 Impacts on detection 11 2.9 Conclusions and recommendations 12 3 Issues relating to sampling 13 3.1 Introduction 13 3.2 Sampling strategies 13 3.3 Sampling issues needing to be addressed 14 3.4 Distribution of agent 14 3.5 Air sampling 15 3.6 Biological agent release 15 3.7 Chemical agent release 16 3.8 Conclusions and recommendations 16 4 Current capabilities and future needs of detection 17 4.1 Technologies for detecting -
The European Angle to the U.S. Terror Threat Robin Simcox | Emily Dyer
AL-QAEDA IN THE UNITED STATES THE EUROPEAN ANGLE TO THE U.S. TERROR THREAT Robin Simcox | Emily Dyer THE EUROPEAN ANGLE TO THE U.S. TERROR THREAT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Nineteen individuals (11% of the overall total) who committed al-Qaeda related offenses (AQROs) in the U.S. between 1997 and 2011 were either European citizens or had previously lived in Europe. • The threat to America from those linked to Europe has remained reasonably constant – with European- linked individuals committing AQROs in ten of the fifteen years studied. • The majority (63%) of the nineteen European-linked individuals were unemployed, including all individuals who committed AQROs between 1998 and 2001, and from 2007 onwards. • 42% of individuals had some level of college education. Half of these individuals committed an AQRO between 1998 and 2001, while the remaining two individuals committed offenses in 2009. • 16% of offenders with European links were converts to Islam. Between 1998 and 2001, and between 2003 and 2009, there were no offenses committed by European-linked converts. • Over two thirds (68%) of European-linked offenders had received terrorist training, primarily in Afghanistan. However, nine of the ten individuals who had received training in Afghanistan committed their AQRO before 2002. Only one individual committed an AQRO afterwards (Oussama Kassir, whose charges were filed in 2006). • Among all trained individuals, 92% committed an AQRO between 1998 and 2006. • 16% of individuals had combat experience. However, there were no European-linked individuals with combat experience who committed an AQRO after 2005. • Active Participants – individuals who committed or were imminently about to commit acts of terrorism, or were formal members of al-Qaeda – committed thirteen AQROs (62%). -
Bulletin 80 13 Dec.P65
THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues ISSUE NO. 80 SEPTEMBER 2008 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation BRINGING THE CBW CONVENTIONS CLOSER TOGETHER Julian Perry Robinson, Harvard Sussex Program In 1968, for reasons that are still not entirely clear, the United – people, other animals and plants – on a giant scale. The Kingdom proposed that biological weapons (BW) and Shady Grove field trials conducted by the United States off chemical weapons (CW) should in future be treated separately Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean during February and at the Geneva disarmament conference, and that the talks March 1964 are said to have demonstrated that, against caged should first concentrate on BW. That is what happened, rhesus monkeys, one single-seat aircraft could establish gradually. The international agreement that already existed disease-causing dosages of bacterial aerosol at sea level over in the field, the 1925 Geneva Protocol, had taken chemical nearly five thousand square kilometres. That was a biological and biological weapons (CBW) together. Their new separation weapon, but, as is described below, similar areas of led to the 1972 Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (the effectiveness were anticipated for future chemical weapons BWC) and then the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention as well. Urban areas of like size – the habitat of maybe (CWC), so in fact both types of weapon became outlawed, millions of people — might be no less vulnerable. So, as and it is possible that neither would have been without that casualty agents, there may in principle be some comparability parting of the ways. -
Swedish Citizen Oussama Kassir Found Guilty of Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda
United States Attorney Southern District of New York FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE May 12, 2009 YUSILL SCRIBNER REBEKAH CARMICHAEL JANICE OH PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (212) 637-2600 SWEDISH CITIZEN OUSSAMA KASSIR FOUND GUILTY OF PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO AL QAEDA LEV L. DASSIN, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that OUSSAMA ABDULLAH KASSIR, a/k/a "Abu Abdullah," a/k/a "Abu Khadija," was found guilty today of charges relating to his participation in an effort to establish a jihad training camp in Bly, Oregon, and his operation of several terrorist websites. KASSIR was found guilty of all eleven counts against him -- including, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; providing material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide material support to al Qaeda; providing material support to al Qaeda; conspiracy to kill or maim persons overseas; and distributing information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction -- following a four-week jury trial before United States District Judge JOHN F. KEENAN in Manhattan federal court. According to the superseding Indictment and the evidence presented at trial: KASSIR conspired with MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA, a/k/a "Abu Hamza" (hereafter "ABU HAMZA"), HAROON RASHID ASWAT, and others, to establish a jihad training camp on a parcel of property located in Bly, Oregon. As used by the conspirators in this case, the term "jihad" meant defending Islam against its enemies through violence and armed aggression, including, if necessary, through murder to expel non-believers from Muslim holy lands. The Bly jihad training camp was established as a site where Muslims could receive various types of training, including military-style jihad training, in preparation to fight jihad in Afghanistan or to continue with additional jihad training in Afghanistan. -
Methodology for Assessing States' Capacity for Countering the Hostile
Project Title: Methodology for Assessing States’ Capacity for Countering the Hostile Misuse of CBRN Knowledge and Materials Acronym: MASC-CBRN Reference: 860679 Call: ISFP-2018-AG-CT-PROTECT Consortium: Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Bulgaria Hochschule fur den Offentlichen Dienst in Bayern (BayHfoD), Germany Kentro Meleton Asfaleias (KEMEA), Greece Ibatech Technologia SL (IBATECH), Spain Gobierno Vasco – Departamento Seguridad (ERTZ), Spain Work Package: CBRN risk mapping (WP 2) Deliverable: D2.7 - Integrated directory on the CBRN risk spectrum Acknowledgement: The authors’ team would like to thank the members of the Evaluation and Monitoring Panel (EMP) set up as part of the MASC-CBRN initiative for the comments and suggestions provided at an earlier version of this report. This document was funded by the European Union’s Internal Security Fund – Police. The content of this document represents the views of the author only and is their sole responsibility. The European Commission does not accept any responsibility for use that may be made of the information it contains. 1 D2.7 – Integrated directory on the CBRN risk spectrum Table of Content Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 4 1 Preface ............................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Internal Security Fund Police (ISFP) .................................................................................... -
Official Series Document
OPCW Scientific Advisory Board Thirty-First Session SAB-31/1 3 – 4 March 2021 4 March 2021 Original: ENGLISH REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD AT ITS THIRTY-FIRST SESSION 1. AGENDA ITEM ONE – Opening of the session 1.1 The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) met virtually for its Thirty-First Session from 3 to 4 March 2021 via the Microsoft Teams platform. The session was chaired by Dr Christophe Curty, with Dr Andrea Leisewitz serving as Vice-Chairperson. Executive summary 1.2 Due to the current coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, this SAB meeting was conducted entirely in a virtual format. 1.3 This session focused on current and upcoming SAB activities, including preparations for the Fifth Review Conference,1 the newly established Temporary Working Group (TWG) on the analysis of biotoxins, planning for upcoming workshops, and renewing and fostering relationships with external partners. Dr Zrinka Kovarik and Dr Mostafa Ghanei presented their relevant research in the health effects of chemical weapons and countermeasures thereto. In addition, the Board received updates from Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) staff, and from representatives of the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO). 2. AGENDA ITEM TWO – Adoption of the agenda The SAB adopted the following agenda for its Thirty-First Session:2 1. Opening of the session 2. Adoption of the agenda 3. Tour de table 4. Establishment of a drafting committee 5. Welcome address by the Director of the Office of Strategy and Policy 1 The Fifth Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. -
Bulletin 68 24Jun05
THE CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Weapons Issues ISSUE NO. 68 JUNE 2005 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation ISRAEL, THE CWC AND THE “NEVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES”: UNIVERSALITY OBJECTIVE: THE CWC THREE YEARS A FTER THE VIEW FROM JERUSALEM ITS FIRST REVIEW CONFERENCE Eitan Barak1 Walter Krutzsch1 At the end of April 2005, the Chemical Weapons Convention The First Review Conference (RevCon) of the Organization (CWC) marked eight years since its entry into force (EIF). for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) had the No doubt, its outstanding growth from 87 to 168 members by task and opportunity to assess, further develop and restate late May 2005, with another 16 states yet to ratify the the nearly universal international consensus to ban and totally convention, indicates its unique success. For the sake of eliminate chemical weapons. For this consensus to prevail, comparison, the number of BWC members currently stands its principles must be upheld when challenged by political at 154 despite 30 years since its EIF. Although praise of the tensions, war and terrorism, and must be adapted to universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with its fundamental economic, scientific and technological changes. 189 members is widespread, a quick review reveals that eight An overall mobilization of governmental and public effort is years after its EIF in March 1978, the NPT had no more required to achieve this objective. In the light of these than 104 members. circumstances the RevCon was successful in that it did not In the interim, the Middle East has shown itself to be the end in disarray. -
Novičok. Případ Sergeje a Julije Skripalových
Případ Sergeje a Julije Skripalových Ladislav Středa Novičok Případ Sergeje a Julije Skripalových Ladislav Středa Praha 2019 Strana 1 Obsah str. Přehled zkratek ....................................................................................................................... 3 PŘEDMLUVA ....................................................................................................................... 4 ÚVOD .................................................................................................................................... 8 1 Co je to vlastně novičok .................................................................................................. 13 1.1 Látka se střední těkavostí (Intermediate Volatility Agent) ...................................... 14 1.2 Novičoky nebo látky série A .................................................................................... 15 1.3 Kdo je to Vil S. Mirzajanov ..................................................................................... 24 1.4 Vlastnosti novičoků .................................................................................................. 26 1.5 Struktura a reaktivita látek A-230 a A-234 .............................................................. 28 1.6 Další případy použití látek skupiny novičok ............................................................ 31 1.6.1 Otrava bankéře Kivelidiho .............................................................................. 31 1.6.2 Otrava muslimských vůdců ............................................................................ -
Open for Business?
open for BUSINESS? CORPORATE CRIME AND ABUSES AT MYANMAR COPPER MINE Amnesty International is a global movement of more than 7 million people who campaign for a world where human rights are enjoyed by all. Our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. First published in 2015 by Amnesty International Ltd Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom © Amnesty International 2015 Index: ASA 16/003/2015 Original Language: English Printed by Amnesty International, International Secretariat, United Kingdom All rights reserved. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for advocacy, campaigning and teaching purposes, but not for resale. The copyright holders request that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publishers, and a fee may be payable. To request permission, or for any other inquiries, please contact [email protected] cover picture: Farmers confront riot police at the site of the Letpadaung copper mine near Monywa in Central Myanmar on 22 December, 2014. On the same day a protester was shot and killed by police. Local people are protesting against forced evictions from their land to make way for the mine. Credit: AP photo www.amnesty.org CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................