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Researching Jihadist Propaganda: Access, Interpreta�On, & Trauma

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Researching Jihadist Propaganda: Access, Interpreta�On, & Trauma Researching Jihadist Propaganda: Access, Interpreta�on, & Trauma Charlie Winter RESOLVE NETWORK | MAY 2019 Researching Violent Extremism Series The views in this publication are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the RESOLVE Network, its partners, the U.S. Institute of Peace, or any U.S. government agency. 2 RESOLVE NETWORK RESEARCH REPORT NO. 1 | LAKE CHAD BASIN RESEARCH SERIES ABSTRACT This chapter explores three key challenges that arise in the context of research on violent extremist propaganda. While this chapter is focused specifically on research on violent extremist materials from jihadist groups,1 including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ), its lessons may be of use in research on other types of violent extremist propaganda. The chapter has three sections. The first addresses the fact that most primary sources in this area are difficult to access for large audiences. This is a significant barrier to entry for most researchers and means that those who do have access to online violent extrem- ist jihadist networks are beholden to accurately represent their observations. The next section deals with issues associated with intended meanings, polysemy, and subjectivity, addressing the issues that arise in analysis of violent extremist content. The last section focuses on trauma and the potential for research on IS, AQ, and other extremist propaganda to cause lasting psychological harm to researchers. This sec- tion also returns to the issue of researcher responsibility, specifically regarding when and how to make primary source materials available to others. This chapter aims to provide researchers of violent extrem- ism with a set of baseline considerations to take into account early in the research process, especially in the data collection and methodology selection stages. INTRODUCTION The jihadist propaganda research field has boomed in recent years2 due to two factors. First, the barriers to entry are lower today than a decade ago. As jihadists altered their online behaviors—using online platforms to further their reach and disseminate information and propaganda—they became eas- ier to track and monitor. Second, there is increased demand for research on extremist propaganda. The security risks associated with IS and AQ propaganda metastasized in the 2010s to such an extent that it became unignorable, deemed to be directly associated with terrorist attacks all over the world.3 This, in turn, incentivized research on the various causes and effects of extremist propaganda. As the field has matured, three significant research challenges came to the fore.4 The first is access. Back in 2013, 2014, and the first half of 2015, jihadist propaganda was easily accessible to nearly anyone. This ease of accessibility was due to the fact that, at that time, jihadist outreach efforts centered 1 The author uses the term “jihadist” to define violent extremist groups, including the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who define them- selves and their ideologies as Islamic and advocate for violent “jihad”. It is important to note that the term “jihadist” can carry multiple meanings and does not necessarily connote violence or violent extremism. 2 Bart Schuurman, “Topics in Terrorism Research: Reviewing Trends and Gaps, 2007-2016,” Critical Studies in Terrorism (2018); Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Audrey Alexander, and Nick Kaderbhai, “The Impact of Digital Communications Technology on Radicalization and Recruitment,” International Affairs 93, no. 5 (2017): 1233-49. 3 See, for example: Theresa May, “Home Secretary Theresa May on Counter-terrorism,” November 24, 2014, https://www.gov.uk/ government/speeches/home-secretary-theresa-may-on-counter-terrorism; David Cameron, “Prime Minister on ISIL at UN General Assembly,” September 29, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-on-isil-at-un-general-assembly; Theresa May, “Manchester Attack: Theresa May Terror Threat Speech in Full,” BBC, May 23, 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40023457.. 4 These challenges are based on the author’s own experience and perspectives as a researcher of jihadist propaganda. 2 RESEARCHING VIOLENT EXTREMISM | RESEARCHING JIHADIST PROPAGANDA around open, mainstream platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. However, since mid-2015, jihadists started to favor other, lesser-known, and less-accessible platforms, Telegram foremost among them. Today, jihadist propaganda dissemination is primarily carried out behind closed doors, on apps and sites that only a small number of researchers have access to. This has significant implications for the field. The second challenge is interpretation. With the move of propaganda to less accessible platforms, researchers who do manage to access relevant data can end up acting as gatekeepers to information. These gatekeepers play an important role in illuminating trends in online jihadist activities. However, with so few researchers accessing jihadist content, the risk is high that those gatekeepers with access may bring to light, either unintentionally or intentionally, only those aspects of jihadist media they con- sider especially important or problematic. This risks concealing other aspects of the material that eluci- date important findings or context and has significant implications for the field and puts a small group of people in a position to dictate what is happening on jihadist social media to the rest of the world, even though they may only be referencing a fraction of the total actual activity. Because of this phenome- non, content aggregators such as Aaron Zelin’s website Jihadology have never been more important.5 Notwithstanding their potential misuse by extremists, these content aggregators open access to jihadist propaganda to a wider audience of researchers.6 The third challenge is trauma. Jihadist propaganda can be extremely distressing, as its intent is to upset viewers. However, even the most violent materials are in need of consideration by researchers, because they not only help us understand what drives terrorism at an organizational and individual level, but also contain valuable intelligence insights on jihadist activities.7 The potential harm inflicted upon prac- titioners working on issues associated with violent extremism— those employed by law enforcement agencies or technology companies—are increasingly well-known.8 However, there is less awareness of how those same issues are or could be affecting academic researchers psychologically. This chapter explores these three key challenges in detail. After providing an overview of the literature on jihadist propaganda, the chapter addresses the issues of access, interpretation, and trauma for research 5 See www.jihadology.net, which styles itself as a “clearinghouse for jihādī primary source material, original analysis, and [a] translation service.” 6 This issue was hotly debated in late 2018 and early 2019. See: David Bond, “How Extremist Videos are Hitting UK Relations with US Tech Groups,” Financial Times, December 3, 2018, https://app.ft.com/content/53ce7e78-f480-11e8-ae55-df4bf40f9d0d; Graeme Wood, “Don’t Shut Down the Internet’s Biggest Violent Jihadist Archive,” The Atlantic, December 10, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ ideas/archive/2018/12/dont-shut-down-internets-biggest-violent jihadi-archive/577630/; “Hating in Plain Sight” On the Media, NPR, March 22, 2019, https://www.npr.org/podcasts/452538775/on-the-media. 7 See, for example this account of its potential benefits: “Jane’s Militant Propaganda Analysis,” IHS Markit (2019), https://ihsmarkit.com/ products/janes-militant-propaganda-analysis.html. 8 Andrew Arsht and Daniel Etcovitch, “The Human Cost of Online Content Moderation,” Harvard Law JOLT Digest (March 2, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/the-human-cost-of-online-content-moderation; Jennifer Beckett, “We Need to Talk about the Mental Health of Content Moderators,” The Conversation, September 27, 2018, https://theconversation.com/ we-need-to-talk-about-the-mental-health-of-content-moderators-103830. RESEARCHING VIOLENT EXTREMISM | RESEARCHING JIHADIST PROPAGANDA 3 on violent extremism. The author analyzes each issue in general before tying it to his own experiences. This discussion provides researchers with a set of baseline considerations to take into account early in the research process, especially in the data collection and methodology selection stages. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JIHADIST PROPAGANDA RESEARCH EFFORTS There are four main clusters of jihadist propaganda research, all of which can be impacted by all three of the abovementioned challenges. The first research cluster—bulk analyses of the volume of organi- zational output—is production-focused and characterized by Islamic State-focused studies, particularly from authors including Zelin, Milton, and Winter. Their respective efforts revolve around analyzing the archives of previous and current official jihadist media output, similar to Kimmage’s earlier examination of the strategic communications of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Islamic State’s predecessor.9 Their findings are consistent with one another: each identifies a net decline in the amount of propaganda that has roughly correlated with—but not been necessarily caused by—the so-called caliphate’s territorial contractions since 2015. The consensus, however, is not quite complete; an isolated account by Fisher contends that there has been no such productivity decline in the output of official jihadist propaganda.10 The next research cluster is content-focused and
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