Saving Dialectic through Plato’s Philebus

by Benjamin J. Reed

A Senior Essay submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Bachelor of Arts in the Integral Curriculum of Liberal Arts.

Michael Riley, Advisor

Saint Mary’s College of California March, 2011 Reed 1

“If I say that it is impossible for me to keep quiet because that means disobeying the god, you will not believe me and will think I am being ironical. On the other hand, if I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue everyday and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for men, you will believe me even less.” (Socrates in the Apology, 38a)

Introduction

The Philebus ends where few other Platonic Dialogues do, with a concrete and definite answer. At the end of a long and intricate discussion, Protarchus and Socrates come together and declare an answer to the question: what is the good? Unlike most dialogues, which end in a state of confusion—not necessarily without its benefit, but a state of confusion nonetheless—the Philebus soars above, coming not only to a concrete conclusion, but a conclusion about the good. How then does this dialogue achieve an answer when so many have not, and what is Plato trying to show us with this stark contrast in results?

What is Dialectic?

In order to see how the Philebus is able to succeed where most dialogues fail, this essay will focus on this essay will focus on the dialogues of the Philebus, the Parmenides and the Euthydemus. Of the three, only the Philebus manages to present a satisfactory conclusion to its conversation. The form of the narrative and the subject of inquiry is not what sets these dialogues apart. The Philebus and Parmenides both investigate the forms and the one. The Philebus and the Euthydemus both examine knowledge and virtue. Like most Platonic dialogues, these three also follow the same general form. After a brief exposition which establishes context each dialogue settles into a conversation, not just any type of conversation, but a conversation which aims to be dialectical. If there is any reason as to why the Philebus succeeds where other dialogues fail, it must be because of

Reed 2 the conversation that takes place within it, its dialectic. What is it that makes the

Philebus’ dialectic better, or at least more successful, than the other dialogues? More generally, what is dialectic and how is it practiced? These questions are at the heart of why the Philebus stands apart, and answering them will be the focus of this essay.

The dialectical discourse seen in the Parmenides and Euthydemus raise certain questions about the way in which dialectic is executed. They also bring up questions concerning the very possibility that dialectic can exist as a valid form of inquiry. The

Philebus, in contrast, offers the hope of an answer to these questions. Somehow the process which is so vital to establishing a firm foundation for the good in the Philebus is also responsible for the confusion and disillusionment found in the other two dialogues.

A closer examination of each dialogue in turn will explain exactly why the Philebus, and its form of dialectic, succeeds when the others fall short.

Part 1 - The Parmenides

The Parmenides presents the reader with a story about a Socrates who is much younger than the one seen in the majority of Plato’s works. This younger Socrates is only just beginning his career as a philosopher. The Parmenides contrasts this image with that of Parmenides, the leading philosopher of the previous generation, and his accomplished disciple Zeno. Parmenides and Zeno both hail from Elea and just happen to be visiting

Athens at the time. This dialogue raises several questions about dialectic, while also showing how dialectic can be useful.

A Benefit of Dialectic

Parmenides, who at this time is already a celebrated philosopher in Greece, holds as a central tenet that everything in the world is one. Socrates, on the other hand, has a

Reed 3 brand new concept that he believes is the foundation of all: the concept of a form “itself by itself” in which all objects partake (Parmenides, 128e). While the concept of the forms will later come to be a cornerstone of Socrates’ philosophical theory, at this stage in his life it is nothing more than a vaguely formed idea. What follows from Socrates’ conversation with Parmenides is the absolute dismantling of young Socrates’ idea

(Parmenides, 130-134e).

Parmenides rightly points out to Socrates that he is “trying to mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of the forms, too soon… before you have been properly trained” (Parmenides, 136c). The concept of the forms that Socrates brings with him for discussion is too primitive to hold up to examination. The idea of the form in itself is not a bad one, one which is brought up time and again throughout the Platonic

Dialogues. At the time of the Parmenides, however, it is still an unfinished and untested idea. When asked whether forms apply only to some things, like the good and beautiful, or to all things, like mud and hair, Socrates admits that even though the thought has troubled him, “when I get bogged down in that, I hurry away, afraid that I may fall into some pit of nonsense and come to harm” (Parmenides, 130e). These questions, all valid, do indeed lead to a pit of nonsense, or at least to bizarre arguments which become untenable (Parmenides, 134e).

Here Parmenides’ dialectic presents us with the positive aspect of dialectic. When

Socrates is forced to answer another’s questions, the absurdities within his idea of the forms come to light. Left by himself, or at least without a partner in discourse who is willing to push him—that is, without dialectic—Socrates would have continued to have lived in ignorance, shying away from the questions that frighten him. Dialectic is what

Reed 4 brings the tough questions to the fore, and prevents people from living in self-imposed ignorance. The second part of the Parmenides will serve largely as a demonstration of this property of dialectic

First Problem and Definition of Dialectic

This positive property of dialectic does not make the dismissal of Socrates’ forms any less troubling. Anyone who is even only remotely familiar with Plato’s writings knows that an account of the forms is one of the cornerstones of Socrates’, or at least

Plato’s, philosophy. The implications of the nonexistence of forms are far reaching. To borrow the phrasing of Aristotle, all things which we encounter in the world are particulars. Knowledge about a particular can only, by definition, apply to that particular.

In order to know anything about things in general we must have knowledge not only about that which is not particular, but particular things must also relate in a definite and unchanging way to these general principles. Not only that, but the general principles must be unchanging and eternal, otherwise knowledge is fleeting. To use Socrates’ phrasing of the problem, as stated in the Philebus:

Socrates: Such a person assumes the task of dealing, not with things eternal, but with what comes to be, or has come to be? Parotarchus: Undeniably. Socrates: So how could we assert anything definite about these matters with exact truth if it never did posses nor will posses nor now possesses any kind of sameness? Protarchus: Impossible. Socrates: And how could we ever hope to achieve any kind of certainty about subject matters that in themselves do not possess any certainty? Protarchus: I see no way. Socrates: Then there can be no reason or knowledge that attains the highest truth about these subjects! (Philebus, 59a-b)

For Socrates these unchanging principles, from which all particular things partake, are the forms. Without the forms, Socrates is left with no philosophical base to

Reed 5 stand on. As Parmenides points out, dismissing the idea of the forms “will destroy the power of dialectic” (Parmenides, 135c).

So far a definition of what dialectic is has not been given, either by this paper or by Plato. From the above statements (what Socrates says in the Philebus and what

Parmenides says in the Parmenides about the forms and dialectic), however, at least a provisional definition can be made. The forms are those eternal things from which other subjects derive their consistency. Since dialectic is obviously an inquiry into some sort of truth which relies on the forms, dialectic must be the process by which reason “attains the highest truth”, this being knowledge of the unchanging. Until greater insight into the nature of dialectic can be gleaned, this preliminary definition will have to suffice.

With the above definition of dialectic, or at least partial understanding, an alarming question arises. If Socrates cannot prove the existence of forms, or even define what they are so that they may exist hypothetically, how can dialectic exist? This problem, the lack of justification for the existence of forms, is the first problem of dialectic. This is the most important question concerning the nature of dialect. Not only does this problem cast doubt about dialectic, but also about knowledge in general.

Second Problem of Dialectic

Like the older Socrates in other dialogues, Parmenides has not lost faith in dialectic. Do not give up on dialectic, but “…put your [Socrates’] back into it and get more training…” is what he recommends. Even participating in something as mundane as what “people think useless—what the crowd call idle talk”, will help (Parmenides, 135d).

Despite being unable to validate the existence of forms, and thus of dialectic, Parmenides offers to give Socrates a demonstration of dialectic. It is important to note that this

Reed 6 demonstration is given on the faith, so to speak, that the existence of forms will in fact be validated. Dialectic is like an a-priori principle, one whose existence is attested to by both philosophers of Athens and of Elea. Just because Socrates’ first attempt to define or validate the forms failed does not mean that dialectic is worthless, nor does it mean that they do not exist.

Unlike the previous discussion, the demonstration which Parmenides promises takes place between Zeno, one of Parmenides’ disciples, and Aristotle, one of Socrates’ friends and fellow young philosopher. The demonstration centers on how one should approach any thesis dialectically. The topic chosen for discussion is the one. After

Socrates had his concept of forms examined, something central to his philosophy, it is only fitting that Zeno chooses to analyze the one, something equally central to

Parmenides’ philosophy.

The demonstration of dialectic concerning the one further reinforces the lesson that Socrates has already learned. It approaches the nature of the one from no less than nine different points:

1-If the one is, what are the negative consequences

2-If the one is, what are the positive consequences

3-If the one is as the previous two conclusions stated, what are the consequences

4-If the one is, what are the positive consequences for other things

5-If the one is, what are the negative consequences for other things

6-If the one is not, what are the positive consequences for the one

7-If the one is not, what are the negative consequences for the one

8-If the one is not, what are the positive consequences for other things

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9-If the one is not, what are the negative consequences for other things

Each approach leads to a different, and often contradictory or impossible conclusion. For instance, the conclusion drawn from the first point in examination results in a one which “is not named or spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything that is perceive it” (Parmenides, 141e-142a). When examined from the second perspective a mutually exclusive conclusion is drawn, that it is in fact possible to have “knowledge and perception of it [the one]…and a name and an account belong to it”

(Parmenides, 155d).

The conversation between Zeno and Aristotle demonstrates how easy it is to come to a definite conclusion, only to have it refuted by an unconsidered approach. It happens eight times in the discussion about the one. This conversation also demonstrates the importance of considering all facets of an idea, even if the conclusions render the idea untenable, as Socrates was too afraid to do with his idea of the forms.

Most agree that the concept of the one is, at least before reading this dialogue, an easy one to grasp. After all, no one would profess not to know what one is. Things like the forms or justice are acknowledged to be less concrete concepts to grasp or even believe in, but not the one. This makes Socrates’ attempt to introduce the idea of form with such little investigation into its properties, attributes, and effects laughable. Just look how complex the one is. This example is meant to inspire Socrates, and presumably also the reader, to believe that dialectic is important and worth practicing. Even after coming to grasp the ways in which this dialogue corrects some of the mistakes that Socrates made, the demonstration of improved dialectic hardly seems very noteworthy.

The dialogue ends almost at the same spot where Socrates’ flawed dialectic left

Reed 8 him, without an answer but still a need that there be one. This is the demonstration given to Socrates to inspire and encourage him to practice dialectic and devote his time to philosophy. Instead of inspiring, the dialogue confuses. If dialectic can only bring knowledge as far as the conversation about the one does, it is a wonder that Socrates, or anyone else for that matter, gives it much credence. This is the second problem of dialectic: how can dialectic be a valid method of inquiry if it leads to such contradictions?

Socrates’ encounter with Parmenides is an interesting one. The dialogue Plato presents showcases one valuable principle of dialectic, but also brings forth two potentially devastating questions about the nature and worth of dialectic. At the end of the dialogue we certainly get the feeling of one step forward, two steps back. No matter how important it is to fully examine an idea, what good does it do if A) it does not allow us to make any judgments beyond a given particular, and B) even if did, all we get is a confusing mess of contradictions! These are not the only questions raised about dialectic.

More questions are to come in the Euthydemus.

Part 2 - The Euthydemus

The Euthydemus describes an encounter between Socrates and two “all around fighters” who are capable of fighting both physically in the arena, and verbally in the law courts (Euthydemus, 271c). Adding to their repertoire, they have just recently learned to fight eristically as well. Their names are Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and they declare to Socrates and his friends that they are the people best able to teach virtue. In order to demonstrate their wisdom they agree to inspire Clinias, a young man, to love wisdom and virtue. In the discussion which follows they not only fail to do this, but their abuse of

Reed 9 philosophy leads at least one man to doubt the worth of philosophy as a whole.

Third Problem of Dialectic

From the very start of their conversation with Clinias, Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus have no other aim than to best him in argument. For them, discussion is nothing more than combat, with a winner and a loser. Every question which they pose to

Clinias is set up so that “whichever way the boy answers he will be refuted”

(Euthydemus, 275e). All of their arguments lead to absurdities which trouble Clinias.

This does not trouble the two fighters in the least. Both of them are happy to engage in arguments which lead Clinias to conclude it is the ignorant who learn, the wise who learn, and neither of the two who learn (Euthydemus, 275d-277c). Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus shift their position on the truth as fast as they can to refute Clinias.

In a way this conversation is similar to the one between Aristotle and Zeno. The nature of those who learn proves as elusive as the nature of the one. There are several key differences though. First, Zeno was just as much at a lost as Aristotle was. In this dialogue it is clear that Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are in charge, and that neither one of them are troubled in the least about the contradictions. Second, there is no competition between Zeno and Aristotle. Euthydemus and Dionydodorus clearly believe that there is a competition here. Third, and most important, the conclusions of the Parmenides do not rely on intentionally flawed logic, as Socrates shows the logic so far used does.

Socrates, seeing how bad things are going for Clinias, and that his faith in dialectic is faltering, makes an attempt to save both him and dialectic from Euthydemus and Dionysodorus by explaining to him what is happening.

“They are doing exactly what people do in the corybantic mysteries when they enthrone a person they intend to initiate. If you have been initiated you know

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there is dancing and sport on these occasions; and now these two are doing nothing except dancing around you and making sportive leaps with a view to initiate you presently. So you must now imagine yourself to be hearing the first part of the sophistic mysteries.” (Euthydemus, 277d-e; my italic)

Plato, through Socrates, is speaking both to Clinias and to the reader. He is letting both of them know, without a doubt, that the previous discussion is not Dialectic. Instead,

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus practice a form of discourse which consists of “fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, whether true or false”; this discourse is called eristic (Euthydemus, 277b). Eristic discourse has no regard for the truth, its sole focus being the refutation of others. As such it is different from dialectic, which concerns itself only with the truth of the unchanging. Plato is also making a special point to reader, letting him know why the whole discussion in this dialogue is taking place. Simply put, the Euthydemus is giving an example of eristic discourse, and the effect that such discourse has on the pursuit of the truth and virtue. This brings up the third problem of dialectic: If dialectic is so easily turned into eristic discourse, what hope is there of dialectic ever reaching or maintaining the truth?

Second Definition of Dialectic

After telling Clinias which type of dialogue he was engaging in with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Socrates provides an example of proper dialectic. The ensuing discussion between Socrates and Clinias goes a long way towards proving the worth of dialectic. Instead of having wisdom flit about, at one time the domain of the learned, at other times the domain of the ignorant, Socrates and Clinias come to the conclusion that:

“it seems likely that with respect to all the things we called good in the beginning, the correct account is not that in themselves they are good by nature, but rather as follows: if ignorance controls them, they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they are more capable of complying with a bad master; but if good sense and wisdom are in control, they are greater goods. In themselves, however,

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neither sort is of any value.” (Euthydemus, 281d-e)

Just as Socrates is able to sum up the nature of eristic discourse within the dialogue, here

Socrates is able to sum up conversation in general. When guided by wisdom, or dialectic, it can lead to immense good. When guided by ignorance, as we saw with Socrates in the

Parmenides and with Clinias in Euthydemus, it leads nowhere. Without the guidance of

Socrates and his art of dialectic, Clinias is helpless in his pursuit of virtue. Even Socrates, when he tries to defend Clinias a second time from eristic discourse, is unable to resist falling into contradiction when faced with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ eristic art.

This only helps to reinforce the third problem of dialectic. It is now possible, however, to expand the provisional definition of dialectic. Eristic is in direct opposition to dialectic.

Since eristic only deals with making the truth appear false and the false appear true, dialectic must be concerned with making the truth appear true, and the false appear false.

To give a new rendering of the definition of dialectic: dialectic is an investigation into true knowledge of the “highest truth”, not apparent or false knowledge (Philebus, 59b).

The Fourth Problem of Dialectic

As soon as the conversation returns to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and despite Socrates’ earlier assurances to Clinias, it picks up right where it left off. Again

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus use Clinias’ ignorance to lead him into a state of contradiction and confusion, similar to, but not the same as, the state Socrates is in at the end of the Parmenides.

It is clear that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have little regard for the pursuit of dialectic. So far as we can tell, they are only interested in confusing Clinias and showing off the power of their new-found art. Not only does their eristic art not lead them to the

Reed 12 truth, but referring back to the Parmenides also shows just how detrimental Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ eristic discourse is to the development of dialectic as a whole.

Euthydemus, Dionysodorus and eventually Clinias and Ctesipus have no problem with the contradictions that they come to. More troubling though is that Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus receive a standing ovation not only from their followers, but also from

Socrates’ companions for the contradictions that Socrates is thrown into (Euthydemus,

313b). Gone is the exhortation to discover the truth that is in the Parmenides, where the assurance remains that even though our examinations lead to contradictions, we are still progressing towards the truth. In its place we now have an exhibition of entertainment, of dialectic reduced to nothing but arguing. Even the fear of contradiction no longer exists.

Instead, one of the followers of Euthydemus leaves with a skill for speaking which is pleasant to its followers, absurd to strangers, and possibly deadly to philosophy (as Crito will show). It is little wonder that Clinias, ignorant of the type of discourse which these two men specialize in, would be doubtful of philosophy. If these two men can refute

Socrates, what is the point of philosophy?

The discussion which ends the Philebus demonstrates the final point. Crito becomes disillusioned with the whole process of philosophy, when he sees what a mockery is made of dialectic. Crito has two young sons who he wants to raise in the best possible way. Whenever Crito is with Socrates, he can see nothing better for his sons than to teach them philosophy. When he sees people like Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, and all other educators of the youth, “every last one of them strikes me [Crito] as utterly grotesque”, and he can see no value in teaching his sons philosophy (Philebus, 306e-

307a). From what has happened above, it is easy to see why. This brings us to the fourth

Reed 13 problem of dialectic, namely, what is the worth of dialectic and why should I practice it?

Socrates gives a partial answer to Crito:

“Then don’t do what you ought not to, Crito, but pay no attention to he practitioners of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself: if it seems to you negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you to be what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practice it, both you and yours, as the proverb says.” (Euthydemus, 307b-c)

The same holds true for dialectic as well as medicine, gymnastics, and all other arts. The questions brought against dialectic make it apparent that dialectic is either a failed science, or has not yet been practiced correctly. Each attempt, whether made in earnest as in the Parmenides or made in mockery as in the Euthydemus, has fallen short of the mark. Each attempt leaves the reader with questions about dialectic and philosophy in general, while still providing us with a few useful insights and brief flashes of brilliance. In order to truly evaluate the worth of dialectic, and answer the fourth question, we must see it practiced without any of the taint of the previous dialogues.

Part 3 - The Philebus

The Philebus is Plato’s answer to the questions brought forth in the Parmenides and the Euthydemus about dialectic. The first part centers on the argument between

Socrates, Philebus and Protarchus. The second part introduces the problem of the one and many and introduces the concept of the unlimited and limit. The third part consists of the dialectic proper, focusing on the nature of pleasure, knowledge, and the good. Like the previous dialogues, each of these sections are addressed in order.

Fifth Problem of Dialectic and its Answer

The beginning of the Philebus is quite similar to the Euthydemus, with both of them featuring an argument: whether “knowing, understanding, and remembering” is

Reed 14 what is good for all, as Socrates believes, or if the “good for all creatures is to enjoy themselves, to be pleased and delighted” as Philebus believes (Philebus, 11b). The beginning of the Philebus is also similar to the end of the Euthydemus, in the sense that one of the participants in the argument has given up. By the time the Philebus begins,

Philebus has already thrown in the towel, not conceding that his position is wrong, only that he no longer cares to argue (Philebus, 11c). Argument has, once again, led to nothing.

The Philebus records none of the argument which leads to Philebus’ disinterest in the topic at hand. What it does record is a conversation between Socrates and a new and willing partner, Protarchus. It is Protrchus, and not Philebus, who will argue on behalf of pleasure. Despite the new partner, the same problem from before the dialogue begins is still at work. Both Socrates and Protarchus engage in an argument about the good. As an investigation into the truth of things, their argument about the good makes just as much progress as the previous argument did. The first half of their time spent arguing is focuses only on the criteria for declaring a winner, hardly something which would seem to aid an investigation into the truth. (Philebus, 11d-12b) The other half occupies itself with

Socrates pointing out the flaws in Protarchus’ arguments, and Protarchus stubbornly refusing to change his view in light of these observations (Philebus, 12c-14a). The only thing that Protarchus and Socrates actually agree on is that both of their arguments are flawed in the same way, a fact which Protarchus agrees to only because it does not put either one of their positions at an advantage. Thankfully this argument is short-lived, for both of them agree, and more hopefully realize, that they “are not contending here out of love of victory for my [Socrates’] suggestion to win or for yours [Protarchus’]”. Instead

Reed 15 they agree to “act together as allies in support of the truest” answer (Philebus, 14b). Only after agreeing to work together, and not in opposition, is progress made in their investigation of the good. This introduces both the fifth problem of dialectic and its answer: If the participants in dialectic argue against each other, how can dialectic proceed? The answer is that it cannot, and that dialectic must be a joint endeavor between its participants not for victory, but for the truth. If any further proof of this is needed, all one must do is reread the Euthydemus.

Third Definition of Dialectic

For the first time in this essay Plato has provided an answer to a question concerning the worth and practice of dialectic. With this clarification, the definition of dialectic becomes clearer. Dialectic cannot be practiced by a group of people who are not willing to work honestly and together with one another. Even if one was to attempt to practice dialectic by himself, the same caveat applies, that he must be honest with himself.* With this in mind, the definition of dialectic is made clearer. Dialectic is a joint and earnest investigation into the true knowledge of the highest truth.

Answer to the Third Problem of Dialectic

With cooperation established between Socrates and Protarchus, dialectic proper can begin. At the center of investigation is the good, and how it relates to knowledge and to pleasure. But before Socrates and Protarchus can even begin discussing even one of them, Socrates brings before them a topic which he insists must be resolved before their investigation can move forward.

The subject is not a new one, appearing at the very beginning of this paper and

* Socrates does not act honestly when he lets himself ignore the problems of his theory of forms in the Parmenides. In effect he deceives himself.

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Socrates’ journey into philosophy: the problem of the one and many. It is the dispute over the one and many which first prompted Socrates to introduce his idea of the forms as a young man in the Parmenides. The forms, as well as the nature of the one, are left unresolved in that dialogue, a problem which must be resolved in order for dialectic to be possible (Parmenides, 135c). This is of course no simple task, “for that the many are one and the one many are amazing statements, and can easily be disputed” (Philebus, 14c).

The answer to the question of the one and many, and their contradictions, is twofold. First, Socrates refuses to allow himself and Protarchus to “make a one, haphazardly, and a many, faster or slower than they should”, as advocated by those

“clever ones” who love their ability to manipulate every side of a statement, and involve others in confusion (Philebus, 17a and Philebus, 15d-16a, respectively). The last dialogue examined, the Euthydemus, immediately springs to mind at these words of Socrates, and with it the third problem of dialectic—eristic discourse. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus rushed not only Clinias but also Socrates into quick distinctions. Socrates has clearly learned much from his lessons under those two (Euthydemus, 272b-d). His first warning to Protarchus is that they not do the same thing with their investigation of the one as

Clinias and he himself did in their investigation into knowledge with Euthydemus and

Dionysodorus. This advice also provides an answer to the third problem of dialectic.

To prevent their falling into error, Socrates refuses to address the contradictions brought up in the Parmenides, “they are agreed by everybody, so to speak, to be no longer even worth touching” (Philebus, 14d). Indeed, these contradictions could only help to serve eristic discourse, not a dialectical one. Dionysodorus does something similar when he exploits the ambiguity of the word “learn” with Clinias (Euthydemus, 277e). At the time

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Clinias did not have the wisdom to see the distinction. In a sense, he gave an answer

“haphazardly”. The dialectical thing to do, as opposed to the eristic and ignorant, would have been to refuse to answer such a question, or at the least refuse to answer it before clearing up the ambiguity. This effectively removes the question of whether dialectic can examine its subject in a non-eristic manner.

Answer to the First Problem of Dialectic

In accordance with this principle, Socrates focuses only on the distinction that will aid their investigation of pleasure and knowledge. As Socrates states it, the investigation will focus on this:

“…that whatever is said to be consists of one and many, having in its nature limit and unlimitedness. Since this is the structure of things, we have to assume that there is in each case always one form for every one of them, and we must search for it, as we will indeed find it there. (Philebus, 16d)

It is not an examination into the one or the many, themselves by themselves, which will help Socrates and Protarchus in determining the good, pleasure, and knowledge, but an examination into the unlimited and limit. Socrates makes a distinction between what people say and what the actual natures of things are. When people say that all things are one and many, what they are really saying is that things have the unlimited and the limit. This distinction will become clearer with the following examination. Now, unlike in the Parmenides, the conversation is focusing on the actual nature of things that are, or at least how Socrates now believes them to be.

In order to examine the unlimited, the one, and the many which fall between them, Socrates introduces four concepts: 1) the unlimited, 2) the limit, 3) the mixture of these previous two, and 4) the cause of the mixture.

1) In essence, Socrates defines the unlimited precisely as those things which have no

Reed 18 limit. Unlimited does not mean objects which can be infinitely divided up into smaller parts, like the bounded line AB. Instead the unlimited is that which has no boundary, while still being divisible into a multitude of distinct parts, or into many as Socrates calls them. Examples that Socrates gives of this kind are the more, the less, hotter, colder, stronger, weaker, and as we will see shortly, pleasure (Philebus, 24a-d). To say it again, the unlimited are those which have no limit.

2) By limit, Socrates means the equal, the double, “and all that is related as number to number or measure to measure” (Philebus, 25a-b). The double, since it is double, cannot admit of increase or decrease, it cannot become more double since it is limit.

3) The mixture of these two is also nothing more than its name would imply, a combination of the limit and the unlimited, of combining measure with the unmeasurable.

The mixed, according to Socrates, are the “common kind”, the overabundance of which is astounding (Philebus, 31c and Philebus, 26c).

4) In order for there to be a mixing of the unlimited and the limit, there naturally must be a mixer, unless we admit of some sort of random atomic swerve to account for the generation of the third category. The mixer, then, is the cause of the mixed.

Socrates immediately uses these four categories to classify the three areas of investigation before him: Pleasure, Reason, and the Good. Pleasure on its own, itself by itself, has no limit. It is able to admit of the more and the less; “pleasure is thereby assigned to the boundless”, that is, the unlimited (Philebus, 28a). Reason, in contrast to pleasure, “belongs to that kind which is the cause of everything” (Philebus, 30d). The universe, both Socrates and Protarchus agree, is by nature not random and left to chance.

Instead it is ordered by reason, all things in the universe following indisputable roles.

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Since the universe is guided by reason, and the universe is the cause of all that is, reason must be the cause. The Good which Socrates and Protarchus are investigating is not the good, itself by itself. Instead the good which they are investigating is the best mixed life which one can aspire towards, a life composed of reason and pleasure (Philebus, 23a-e).

“We will, I think, assign it to the third kind, for it is not a mixture of just two elements but of the sort where all that is unlimited is tied down by limit” (Philebus, 27d).

This third distinction, of the good as being of the third kind, requires a little more clarification than the other two. It is easy to see that the mixed life is mixed It is not clear that it is mixed in the same way as the third category. The good life undoubtedly contains pleasure, so it contains the unlimited. But where does the limit arise which Socrates mentions?

Of the four cases which Socrates gives examples of, the examples of limit are least vague. Double is a very specific and easy to grasp concept. It is a specific measurement signifying that some object A is contains twice the given measurement of

B. Double existing on its own without relation to other things, however, seems impossible. Limit then requires something else besides itself. In defining the mixed state,

Socrates asks:

“Is it not true that in sickness the right combination of the opposites establishes the state of health?…And does not the same happen in the case of the high and the low, the fast and the slow, which belong to the unlimited? Is it not the presence of these factors in them which forges a limit and thereby creates the different kinds of music in their perfection?” (Philebus, 25e-26a)

Answer affirmatively as Protarchus does and limit arises naturally from a combination of unlimiteds, as if to say that the third case, the mixture, is not so much a mixture of limit with unlimited, but of unlimited with unlimited. By containing both reason and pleasure

Reed 20 the good life must of necessity have limit, since reason combined with the unlimited pleasure “forges a limit”. Thus it is wholly appropriate and necessary that the good life is classified in the third category as a mixed thing, along with music and anything else formed by a multitude of unlimiteds (the limit arising naturally, thus causing it to be of the mixed sort).

This natural limit makes the importance of the unity of the unlimited all the more apparent. The unlimited, when combined with other unlimited, creates a limit. In essence, the unlimited has become limited. But it is not the unlimited, itself by itself, which is limited, for this would be impossible. Instead it is only a part of the unlimited which is contained within mixed things. This part of the unlimited, however, is no different from the unlimited from which it is limited. For example, number is an unlimited thing, allowing the more and the less. If limit is added to number a result, such as the number 5, is produced. 5 is limited, but this does not stop it from being part of the unlimited that is number. In the same way pleasure, though only part of it may be found in the mixed good life, is still unlimited. To continue the quote that opened this section:

“And once we have grasped it [an unlimited], we must look for two, as the case would have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is.” (Philebus, 16d)

Pleasure present in the mixed life is of one kind. Pleasure present in a pained life is of a different kind. Each mixed life contains pleasure, but the factors which limit it are different in each case. Therefore, pleasure in each mixed life is limited in a different way.

In order to determine the winner of the argument, as well as arrive at the truth of what pleasure it, pleasure must be examined from all possible aspects. The pleasure of the good life and the pleasure of the pained life, while still being of the same unlimited

Reed 21 pleasure, will necessarily be different. These are the many unities, which Socrates and

Protarchus must determine, that make up the unity that is pleasure.

The analysis of pleasure in all its unities does not need to be examined in order to realize that Socrates and Protarchus have here the solution to the first problem of dialectic. In the Parmenides, Socrates’ theory of the forms, the only theory that he could conceive of which allows the attainment of knowledge beyond that of particulars, is invalidated. Now, however, he has the unlimited and the limit as two eternal and unchanging ideas of which all objects in reality partake.

The Forms and Another Definition of Dialectic

Is the unlimited so different from Socrates’ concept of the forms? Further examination of this question reveals yet another important fact. All things which have limit, and thus exist actually, partake of the unlimited, from which their being is derived.

Since the unlimited are, by definition, things themselves by themselves—otherwise there would be something to limit them—it is not unfair to restate the previous sentence thus:

All things which are partake of the forms, from which their being is derived. Protarchus, without knowing it, has agreed to the existence of the forms, and of their external properties.

As a second instance of proof for this statement, consider what Socrates says of the forms in a dialogue which is not the subject of this paper: “Each of them is itself one, but because they manifest themselves everywhere in association with actions, bodies, and one another, each of them appears many” (Republic, 476a). The equality between forms described in the Republic and the unlimited described here is undeniable. Form and the unlimited are synonyms for the same eternal and unchanging thing.

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The answer to the first problem of dialectic, first brought up in the Parmenides, is clear. The idea that forms could not exist, and that dialectic must therefore be impossible, is disproved. At the foundation of this resolution are two things learned from the

Parmenides and the Euthydemus. The Parmenides showed that we must fully examine the consequences of all conclusions, as we just did above, and the Euthydemus demonstrated the danger of rushing to conclusions, and of giving credence to questions which have no place being asked. With these two ideas in mind, Socrates has not only resurrected the idea of the forms, but has also made dialectic possible. Dialectic as now understood is: a joint and earnest investigation into the true knowledge of the unlimited, limit, and their mixture.

Answer to the Second Problem of Dialectic

It is not enough to simply mark off pleasure as unlimited, state that the good life must have some part of it, and leave it at that.

“For we must not grant the form of the unlimited to the plurality before we know the exact number of every plurality that lies between the unlimited and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each kind of unity into the unlimited and let it go.” (Philebus, 16d-e)

This knowledge of the plurality of the unlimited is not obvious. It requires a special method of investigation to determine the attributes of the unlimited. As defined above, that method is Dialectic.

The unlimited provides all objects with a connection to the unchanging. This does not mean that all objects which partake of a given unlimited, such as pleasure, partake of the entire unlimited. All objects can only partake of a portion of the unlimited. Socrates is quite prophetic when he says above that we must assume that there is one form for everything (since this allows dialectic), and that our investigation into things will consist

Reed 23 of looking into the gradations which the unlimited provide to limited things.

The investigation into pleasure and knowledge which follows is not entirely new in style. It shares the thoroughness of inquiry of the Parmenides, as well as caution against ignorance of the Euthydemus. The dialectic in the Philebus is more of a synthesis of these two ideas with a third, that it is a rushing “straight from the one to the unlimited” that makes “all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each other in dialectical or only in eristic discourse” (Philebus, 17a). Socrates and Protarchus are extremely careful in their examination of pleasure. They look at it alone, linked with pain, and even existing only as an absence of pain (similar to how the one in the Parmenides is examined by itself and in connection with other objects). They do the same with knowledge and reason, examining knowledge of the practical as well as of the universal.

The good life is examined in the same way, as a mix of pleasure, knowledge, and anything else which is necessary to make it the best possible. The process is too long and thorough to present in much detail here. Suffice it to say that the method of inquiry from the Parmenides, minus the eristic influences of the Euthydemus, is on full display.

This process is what allows the Philebus to end not with confusion or doubt, warnings or disillusionment, but with a firm and comprehensible answer. “If we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth” (Philebus, 65a). From these three unlimiteds, whose existence within the good is shown to be beyond doubt, a ranking of qualities within the good life is made. First is measure. Second is the well proportioned and beautiful. Third is reason and intelligence. Fourth is science, art, and right opinion. And fifth is pleasure.

Not only do we get an answer to what is the good, but we also get an answer to which of

Reed 24 the two, pleasure or knowledge, is closest to the good. This answer, beautiful as it is, stands as an answer to the second problem of dialectic.

Yet another doubt about the power of dialectic is put to rest as a result of this dialogue. Gone is the confusion of the Parmenides, and the problem of the one. In its place is the unlimited and the good. Also absent is the eristic discourse and strife of the

Euthydemus, replaced with prudence, knowledge, and partnership. Perhaps most encouraging of all is how the dialogue as a whole ends. In the Parmenides the reader is left with silence between Aristotle and Zeno. In the Euthydemus Socrates is left speechless while Ctesippus concedes the argument. The Philebus, however, ends with a challenge to Socrates, a challenge made by Protarchus on behalf of the youth of Athens.

Protarchus: We are all agreed now that what you said is as true as possible, Socrates. Socrates: So will you let me go now? Protarchus: There is still a little missing, Socrates. Surely you will not give up before we do. But I will remind you of what is left! (Philebus, 67b)

Part 4 - What is Left What is left between Protarchus, his companions, and Socrates is never stated.

Instead the dialogue, like the process of dialectic, is left open. What is left for us, however, is more concrete. The Parmenides, Euthydemus, and Philebus provide us with both questions, attributes, and answers about dialectic. From these an accurate sketch of what dialectic is emerges.

Dialectic Defined

Dialectic is a conversation between people, an investigation into the “highest truth” of things. It has as its foundation a belief in certain unchanging things from which all other limited things partake. These unchanging things are the forms, or the unlimited.

These unlimiteds are also the very same truths which dialectic seeks to discover.

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Dialectic is not an easy process. Each of the three dialogues examined presents a different variation of the dialectical process. The Euthydemus is unable to provide knowledge of the unchanging because it is marred by eristic discourse and a lack of discernment on Clinias’ and Socrates’ part. The Parmenides, in a similar manner, is also unable to provide an answer about either the forms or the one. In examining the forms,

Socrates’ thought lacked the thoroughness required to understand the forms. In examining the one, Zeno and Aristotle fail to realize that they are pursuing their question from the wrong angle. The one which they discuss is not the one which they want to discuss—the pure, unchanging, unlimited one.

In both dialogues the failure to reach the highest truth is caused by ignorance.

Clinias and Socrates are both ignorant in how to deal with eristic discourse in the

Euthydemus. Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle are all ignorant about the forms which they are trying so hard to examine in the Parmenides. To draw from a passage cited earlier, “if ignorance controls them,” in this case “them” including discourse, “they are greater evils than their opposites, to the extent that they are more capable of complying with a bad master” (Euthydemus, 281d). Both the Euthydemus and Parmenides have ignorance at their core, and both leave the reader confused and unsatisfied, so much so that after reading them he may, like Crito, lose all faith in philosophy. This would undoubtedly be a great evil.

The Philebus is different. The largest difference between the Philebus and the other two dialogues examined is the lack of ignorance on Socrates’ part. The first thing

Socrates does is reestablish the forms, here called unlimited. Next he analyses pleasure, knowledge, and the good. Throughout the dialogue Protarchus is continually asking

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Socrates to explain why he asks certain questions, unable to see how they connect to the larger discussion. Each question posed by Socrates, however, has a purpose. The seemingly useless discussions, like the unlimited, have a clear and necessary purpose and prove to be the most essential. To finish the quote from above, “if good sense and wisdom are in control, they are greater goods” (Euthydemus, 281e). Adding to this what has been said before, and dialectic is a joint and earnest investigation, guided by reason, which arrives at true knowledge of the unlimited, limit, and mixed.

The Final Question

With dialectic defined, there is only one question yet answered. “What is the worth of dialectic?” It is impossible to address this question without having first defined dialectic. Now that it is defined, what can be said is the worth of it?

On the surface, things do not look good for the worth of dialectic. Judging solely by results of these three dialogues, its success rate is one out of three when it comes to achieving its aim. This success rate carries over to its practitioners. Aristotle from the

Parmenides becomes a tyrant of Athens, Clinias is never seen to practice dialectic after being introduced to eristic, and Socrates himself is put to death in part because he practices dialectic. Even if one only judged the worth of dialectic based solely on the

Philebus, the only dialogue to present perfected dialectic, the results are still not encouraging. Philebus, after all, says that he will never place pleasure below anything else as the chief good for man (Philebus, 12a). He is not interested in dialectic, and no result from it will change his mind. It is also clear from the interactions between

Protarchus and Socrates that Protarchus has no chance of ever coming to the same conclusion as this dialogue without Socrates. What good is dialectic if it either A) its’

Reed 27 conclusions are so easily dismissed, or B) it seems impossible for the average person, or even above average person, to practice it successfully?

This criticism is, on the surface, convincing. But cannot the same be said of almost every other science? The end of the Euthydemus brings this up explicitly, as has already been pointed out. Is it a slight against physics if it takes a Newton to understand it? Or if the heliocentric theory is dismissed by the uneducated, does this lessen its truth?

No, but it also does not prove the worth of dialectic either. Instead it is the science itself, for dialectic is surely a science into the highest truth, which must justify itself. Not only this, but it is up to each person to decide the matter for himself. If like Philebus you see no worth in dialectic, then I doubt that anything I say would convince you otherwise.

Only a thorough examination of the thing itself can prove its worth.

It is the aim of this essay to provide as much knowledge as possible about the practice of dialectic. In order to do this, questions and answers concerning dialectic have been brought forward, taken from the most famous example of dialectic—the Platonic dialogues. Hopefully this work has helped to clarify just what it means to engage in dialectic, and that with this you, the reader, can decide on the worth of dialectic, guided by wisdom and not ignorance. If anything that Plato wrote is true, it is that this decision—whether or not one should pursue dialectic, be concerned with the highest truth, be a philosopher—is of paramount importance. This decision ought to be made out of truth and not ignorance.

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Works Cited

All works cited in this essay come from:

Plato. Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997.

Apology. G.M.A. Grube. Page 33.

Parmenides. Translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Page 359- 397.

Philebus. Translated by Dorothea Frede. Page 398-456.

Euthydemus. Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague. Page 708-745.

Republic. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve. Page 1102.