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Mission to Haiti #3 Mission to Haiti #3 Robert A. Pastor The Carter Center March, 1995 Report on the Elections in Haiti, June 25, 1995 Executive Summary: Independent candidates and representatives from 27 political parties contested more than 2,000 municipal and Parliamentary postions in elections in Haiti on June 25, 1995. In the pre-election period, the Provisional Election Council (CEP) judged the qualifications of nearly 12,000 candidates, and disqualified about one thousand without explanations. The process was so prolonged and contentious that the ballots had to be changed up to the last days, and there were numerous mistakes. The CEP's erratic performance led three parties to boycott the election, and virtually all to question the CEP's judgment and independence. The unresponsiveness of the CEP to legitimate complaints raised by the political parties sowed seeds of distrust in the electoral process. The turn-out on election day was about 50% of registered voters. The U.N. provided a reasonably secure environment, although the ballot mistakes led to violence in several districts. There were many poll-watchers. The most serious problem was in the count. In violation of the law, election officials did not complete the count at the voting site or sign and seal the proces-verbaux - the summary of the results - and the ballot boxes. Of 13 elections that I have observed, the June 25th Haitian elections were the most disastrous technically with the most insecure count. I personally witnessed the tainting of about one- third of all ballots in Port-au-Prince. The best that could be said of the irregularities is that they did not appear to be a part of a centralized or coordinated effort. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to state that Haiti's problem was that no one seemed to be in control. In judging the election, one point of reference should be Haiti's history, and compared to 200 years of repression and dictatorship, the election represents a step out of Haiti's past. Whether it is a step forward or sideways remains to be seen. Some in the international community would close their eyes to this travesty, but that would be unfair to the Haitian people, who together with the political parties, are the ultimate judges of the election. Thus far, 21 parties - nearly all but Lavalas - condemned the election and called for its annulment even before the results showed that Lavalas had won so many of the elections. The international community should insist that the political parties' concerns be effectively addressed. Until then, the democratic process cannot go forward. This report recommends ways to salvage the election and regain the parties' confidence: (1) the criteria for re-holding elections should be expanded to permit more elections, and runoffs should be permitted for some Mayoral elections; (2) half of the CEP should be replaced by consensus candidates proposed by the parties; (3) a Multi-Party Commission should produce a report soon on specific ways to improve the electoral process; (4) a new electoral law is needed for a more effective, Permanent Elections Council; (5) mediation between the parties is essential; and (6) quick counts should be done. PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government is a group of 25 former and current Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas, chaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and based at the Carter Center of Emory University. The Council has been working to reinforce the democratic process in Haiti since 1987. With the National Democratic Institute, the Council monitored and mediated the electoral process in Haiti in 1990. From the moment of the military coup in September 1991 through the Carter-Nunn-Powell negotiation in September 1994, Council members worked behind the scenes to restore President Aristide to power. In mid-December 1994, former Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley and I visited Haiti, at President Aristide's invitation, and three months later, President Carter, Prime Minister Price, Senator Nunn, and General Powell visited to assess the situation and offer help. The delegations concluded that mediation between the political parties, the Election Council, and the government was more important to ensuring a successful election accepted by all the parties than observing the elections. But there was not wide enough support in Haiti for the Council playing the mediating role that it did in 1990, and so the Council decided not to send a large, high-level delegation to the elections on June 25, 1995. Nonetheless, because of the continued importance of Haiti's struggle for democracy to the Council and to the inter-American community, I was asked to visit Haiti and assess the electoral process for the Council and for those who are interested. This is my personal report to the Council and to those interested in Haiti. The election was monitored by many international groups, and most gave their judgment of the election before Haitian political parties offered their views and before the count was completed. This was unfortunate because the vote count was the most troubled aspect of an administratively disastrous election. All of Haiti's parties have now criticized the process, and virtually all but the Lavalas Platform, have called for the annulment of the elections. Unless these parties' legitimate concerns are addressed more effectively than they have been until now, then the election cannot be considered a step forward in Haiti's journey to democracy. This report offers some specific recommendations to gain the confidence of the parties and the public so that the next three elections this year will be an improvement on that of June 25th. To do the mission and write this report, I am grateful to Jean-Paul Poirier for his tireless assistance; to Kathryn Bacon, Harriette Martin, and David Carroll of the Carter Center; to OAS, U.N., and U.S. government officials, and to many Haitian friends, who represent the full political spectrum and who deserve better. Robert A. Pastor, Executive Secretary Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government July 17, 1995 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Executive Summary 2. Preface 1. Background 2. Pre-Election Political Context CEP-Induced Distrust and Confusion Security International Assistance 3. Election Day: Personal Observations Voting Procedures The Count Conversation with Mayor Evans Paul Chaos in the Street 4. Post-Election Day 5. The Positives and the Negatives 6. Conclusion and Recommendations 3. APPENDICES 1. Schedule of the Meetings of Dr. Pastor, Haiti, June 23-26, 1995. 2. List of the Political Parties and Coalitions of Haiti 3. Electoral Calendar - proposed (2/25/95) and as implemented 4. Letter from General George Fisher to Minister of Justice Joseph Exume, March 22, 1995 on the plot against Mirelle Durocher Bertin. 5. Haiti - Election Funding Sources 6. Ballots for Senator and Mayor of Port-au-Prince. (The latter ballot was found on the floor of the BED West on election night.) 7. "Irregularities Mar Electoral Process," News Release from the International Republican Institute, June 26, 1995. 8. Departure Statement, U.S. Presidential Delegation to Observe the Haiti Election, June 26, 1995. 9. Text of the Resolution of 20 Political Parties, June 29, 1995; "The Position of the FNCD," July 3, 1995. 1. Background Since 1987, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government, a group of 25 leaders from the hemisphere, chaired by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, has worked to reinforce democracy in Haiti. In October 1987, former President Carter, Prime Minister George Price, and I visited Haiti after the assassination of a political leader to try to get the electoral process back on track, but the military aborted elections the next month. In July 1990, Ertha Pascal Trouillot, the Provisional President, invited the Council to observe the December 16th election. The Council, working with the National Democratic Institute, played a crucial role in mediating disputes between the political parties and the Election Council, and in persuading the U.N. and the O.A.S. to send security advisors and numerous observers, and to conduct a "quick count". President and Mrs. Carter and I returned at the invitation of Jean-Bertrand Aristide for his inauguration on February 7, 1991, and offered him the Council's continued support and assistance. 1 Former President Carter's offer to the new President to assist in consolidating democracy did not elicit a response until after he was overthrown in a military coup on September 30, 1991. From then until September 16, 1994 when President Bill Clinton asked Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell to go to Haiti to negotiate with the Haitian military leaders, Council leaders actively worked behind the scenes to try to restore constitutional government to Haiti. Negotiations that weekend in September produced an agreement that led to the departure of General Raul Cedras and the return of President Aristide by October 15, 1994. In mid-December 1994, Michael Manley, former Jamaican Prime Minister and Council member, and I visited Haiti and reported to the Council that "despite severe social, economic, and security problems, Haiti has now the best opportunity in its 200 year history to forge a democracy and construct a free- market economy that will benefit all the nation's people." Many political leaders asked the Council to monitor the elections as it had in 1990. We encouraged the political parties and the President to reach agreement as soon as possible on a Provisional Elections Council (CEP), and the President named the members shortly after we left. President Aristide told us that he hoped the Council would be "partners" and invited Carter to Haiti to discuss this with him. 2 Based on that mission and subsequent communications, President Carter led a delegation to Haiti on February 23-26, 1995 that included Prime Minister George Price, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell, Dr.
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