Elite Allies, Social Movements and the Case of Violence Against Women

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Elite Allies, Social Movements and the Case of Violence Against Women Performing Allyship: Elite Allies, Social Movements and the Case of Violence Against Women in Morocco Asma Ali Farah Department of Politics and International Relations and Philosophy Royal Holloway, University of London Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Relations by the University of London. 2017 Page 1 of 395 Declaration of Authorship I, Asma Ali Farah, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated. Asma Ali Farah 22.09.2017 Page 2 of 395 Abstract In the literature on social movements, elite allies occupy an important place in conceptualisations of political opportunity structures. Yet the ways in which elite allyship is performed has not been systematically examined and remain under-theorised. In this thesis, I seek to remedy these shortcomings in the scholarship and further our understanding of the role of elite allyship for social movements. First, drawing on a meta-analysis, I find that elite allies are not a strong predictor of policy change favourable to social movements. I then draw on the case of violence against women in Morocco in the post-Arab Spring era, to uncover why this might be the case. I use content analysis and semi-structured interviews to examine how a range of elite actors interact with Moroccan women’s groups and coalitions, and how the latter interpret their participation. I find that women’s groups and coalitions in Morocco benefit from the presence of a range of elite actors that perform different acts of allyship. These include the articulation of claims aligned with those of women’s groups and coalitions, the provision of moral resources and the use of double mobilisation. Despite these performances, women’s groups and coalitions in Morocco do not perceive many of these actors to be performing elite allyship. Rather they see elite allyship as involving the provision of a wide range of resources, collaboration with activists and substantial leverage against other elite actors. Moreover, they see effective allyship as coming from representative and democratic institutions, rather than unelected and unaccountable ones. Thus, both the source of elite allyship and its characteristics matter. Page 3 of 395 Acknowledgements I would like to start by thanking all those who provided research guidance, funding and facilities. I would like to thank my supervisors, Profs. Oliver Heath and Sandra Halperin, for their support and insightful comments. I would particularly like to thank Oliver for his confidence in me, enthusiasm in my research project, and support during stressful times. I am indebted to my advisor, Dr. Kaat Smets, for being extremely generous with her time. Kaat has helped me refine my meta-analysis and provided helpful suggestions for my research. Kaat has also been a source of emotional support. I am very grateful to have had her as an advisor. I would like to thank Royal Holloway, its department of Politics and International Relations, and the University of London, for their financial support, in the form of travel and research grants. I would particularly like to thank Royal Holloway for offering me a Reid Scholarship to pursue my research. I would also like to thank my research participants for their time and invaluable information, as well as the Scuola Normale Superiore (SNS), in Florence, for hosting me as a visiting student. I benefited immensely from the workshops on social movements at the SNS, as well as discussions with other researchers. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the countless individuals who have provided me with much needed emotional support. Special thanks also go to Btissam Aboubichr, Huda Al Sahi, Evronia Azer, Sophia Tianyu Zang, Suelen Rocha, and Jamie (Kim Hyunmin). I am grateful for their support, encouragements and generosity. They are fantastic individuals and I wish them all the best in life. Page 4 of 395 Table of Contents Declaration of Authorship................................................................................................................................. 2 Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................... 4 Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................. 5 List of Tables and Figures................................................................................................................................. 8 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 9 1.1. Thesis Purpose and Contribution ...................................................................................................... 9 1.2. Research Questions ........................................................................................................................ 13 1.3. Elite Allies, Social Movements and Policy Change ......................................................................... 14 1.3.1. The Significance of Elite Allies for the Policy Outcomes of Social Movements .......................... 14 1.3.2. Elite Allyship As Performance: Representation, Resources and Strategies .................................. 15 1.3.3. Elite Allyship As Perception: The Significance of Social Movements’ Evaluation ...................... 20 1.4. Opportunities, Social Movements and Policy Change: A Clarification ............................................ 21 1.5. Research Design ............................................................................................................................ 27 1.6. Violence Against Women in Morocco ............................................................................................ 29 1.7. Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................................. 33 2. Elite Allyship and Social Movements: A Theoretical Framework............................................................. 38 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 38 2.2. Defining Elite Allies ...................................................................................................................... 38 2.3. Elite allies, social movements and favourable policy outcomes ....................................................... 42 2.4. Identifying sources of elite allyship ................................................................................................ 47 2.5. Elite Allyship in Morocco and Institutional Constraints .................................................................. 57 2.6. Performances of Elite Allyship ....................................................................................................... 66 2.6.1. Elite Allyship and Political Representation ................................................................................. 66 2.6.2. Elite Allyship Through Coalitions .............................................................................................. 70 2.6.3. Elite Allyship and the Provision of Resources ............................................................................ 72 2.6.4. Elite Allyship and Double Mobilisation ..................................................................................... 78 2.7. Perceptions of Elite Allyship .......................................................................................................... 82 2.8. The Usefulness of Elite Allyship in the Middle East and North Africa ............................................ 83 2.8.1. Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa ...................................................................... 84 2.8.2. Managing Authoritarian Constraints........................................................................................... 86 2.8.3. Reinforcing Authoritarianism..................................................................................................... 90 2.9. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 91 3. Opportunities, Mobilisation and Policy Change: A Meta-Analysis ........................................................... 93 3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 93 Page 5 of 395 3.2. Data ..................................................................................................................................................... 94 3.3. Method ................................................................................................................................................ 99 3.4. Measurement of Concepts .................................................................................................................. 102 3.5. Sample Overview..............................................................................................................................
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