Should Democracy Be Promoted Or Demoted?

Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide

The Should Democracy Be Stanley Promoted or Demoted? Foundation

By Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul June 2007

Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of Johns Hopkins University and director of SAIS’ International Development program. Dr. Fukuyama received degrees from Cornell and Harvard. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation and a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996 to 2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.

Michael McFaul is the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he codirects the Iran Democracy Project. He is also the director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute and professor of political science at Stanford University. He is also a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

n his second inaugural address on January 20, did the toppling of these dictatorships send liberty 2005, President George W. Bush used the rippling through the greater Middle East as some Iword freedom 25 times, liberty 12 times, and Bush officials and supporters had hoped. Instead, democracy or democratic 3 times. Bush did not autocratic regimes in the region have used the enter the White House with a mission to promote excuse of terrorism (Egypt, Pakistan) or the freedom around the world. Rather, as a presiden- alleged threat of US invasion (Iran) to tighten tial candidate, he put forward a modest foreign autocracy. Outside this region, some countries policy agenda that eschewed nation-building. The have made some progress toward developing events of September 11, 2001, however, radically democracy (Georgia, Ukraine) but just as many jarred his thinking on the nature of international have moved toward greater autocracy. Freedom threats and triggered a fundamental reevaluation House concluded, “The year 2006 saw the emer- of his administration’s national security policy gence of a series of worrisome trends that togeth- that elevated democracy promotion as a central er present a potentially serious threat to the objective of his foreign policy agenda. stability of new democracies as well as obstacles to political reform in societies under authoritari- In the years since September 11, though, the an rule…the percentage of countries designated rhetorical attention devoted to the advance of free- Free has failed to increase for nearly a dom, liberty, and democracy has greatly outpaced decade….”1 In sum, then, Bush’s new attention to any actual progress in expanding democracy. To democracy promotion has not resulted in more date, democracy has failed to take hold in the two people living in freedom. countries where Bush ordered the forcible ouster of autocratic regimes: Afghanistan and Iraq. In its Not surprisingly, many in Washington on both 2006 survey of freedom around the world, the left and right are pressing for a change in US Freedom House labeled Iraq as “not free” with a 6 foreign policy objectives. Only those at the rating on a 1-7 scale (with 1 being most free and 7 extremes on both ends of the political spectrum being least free). Afghanistan barely earned the advocate the complete abandonment of democra- designation “partially free” with a 5 ranking. Nor cy promotion as a US foreign policy objective. 2 Instead, skepticism is largely couched as “real- Part Three outlines some new modalities for ism,” and a “return” to a greater focus on “tra- promoting democracy—including a return to ditional” US national security objectives. From several established practices—that can make this perspective, democracy promotion should US and international efforts to promote take a back seat to strategic aims such as secur- democracy more effective. ing US access to energy resources, building military alliances to fight terrorist organizations, The Case for Democracy Promotion and fostering “stability” within states. A parti- American Interests san gap has also emerged on this issue. In a No country in the world has benefited more German Marshall Fund survey released in June from the worldwide advance of democracy 2006, 64 percent of Republicans agreed that the than the United States. Not all autocracies are United States should “help establish democracy or have been enemies of the United States, but in other countries,” but only 35 percent of every American enemy has been an autocracy. Democrats concurred. Because of geography and US military power, most autocracies over the last 200 years have We do not reject the importance of focusing on lacked the capacity to attack US territory. But the more traditional goals of national security. the exceptional autocracies that became suffi- However, we do reject the simple assumption ciently powerful either did attack the United that there is a zero-sum trade-off between States (Japan, Al Qaeda) or threatened to these traditional security objectives and attack (Germany under Hitler, the Soviet democracy promotion. We also share the neg- Union, North Korea). Conversely, Great ative assessments of the Bush administration’s Britain and France do have, at least theoreti- efforts to promote democracy in the past few cally, the military capacities to threaten the years. However, our response to this mixed, if United States, but the thought of French or not disappointing, record of achievement is British attack is inconceivable simply because not to downgrade or remove democracy pro- both are democracies. motion from US foreign policy priorities. Rather, after presenting the case for why the The transformation of powerful autocracies United States should promote democracy, we into democracies has likewise served US suggest new strategies and better modalities national security interests. Most obviously, for pursuing this objective. the end of dictatorship and the consolidation of democracy in Germany, Italy, and Japan Our paper proceeds in three parts. Part One after World War II made the United States outlines the positive case for including democ- safer. Beyond keeping imperial and autocrat- racy promotion as an important component of ic leaders out of power, democratic consoli- US foreign policy. Part Two then presents the dation in these countries served as the basis counterarguments, followed by our reasons of US military alliances in Europe and Asia. for viewing them as ultimately unpersuasive. At the end of the 20th century, regime change in the Soviet Union ended the Cold War and The Stanley Foundation’s Bridging the Foreign greatly reduced this once-menacing threat to Policy Divide project brings together pairs of the United States and its allies. Russia today foreign policy and national security specialists lacks the military strength of the Soviet Red from across the political spectrum to find com- Army from 20 years ago. Yet Russia today mon ground on ten key, controversial areas of remains the only country in the world capa- policy. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of their organizations or ble of launching a massive military attack the Stanley Foundation. The series is coedited against American people on American soil. by Derek Chollet, senior fellow at the Center The threat of such an attack has significantly for a New American Security; Tod Lindberg, diminished because of regime change in the editor of the Hoover Institution’s journal Soviet Union. And it is not a coincidence that Policy Review; and Stanley Foundation pro- Russia has become more antagonistic toward gram officer David Shorr. the United States and the West at the same time that the current regime there has become But this is a hypothesis about the future based 3 increasingly authoritarian.2 on analogy, and not a certainty. In the long run, we expect consolidation of democratic regimes During the Cold War, some viewed the Soviet in the greater Middle East would increase the threat as so paramount that all enemies of legitimacy of the governments and thereby communism, including dictators, had to be reduce the appeal of anti-systemic movements embraced. They predicted that any political like Al Qaeda. In the shorter term, democratic change to the status quo in autocratic societies government throughout the region would would not produce democratic regimes and US increase internal stability within states since allies, but communist regimes and American democracies have longer life spans than autoc- enemies. There were enough examples of this racies. If democratic regimes ruled all countries trajectory—Cuba, Angola, and Nicaragua—to in the region, conflicts between states would be warrant worry. But these are the failed cases of less likely, and consequently demand for democratic transition, and US involvement in weapons, including weapons of mass destruc- the internal changes of these countries can tion, would decrease. Finally, a more secure hardly be called democracy promotion. In con- and stable region would reduce the need for a trast, successful democratic transitions did not US military presence, just as a Europe whole undermine US security interests. Transitions in and free dramatically reduced the need for Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, the Philippines, South American deployments in that region. And for Korea, Chile, and South Africa helped deepen major powers such as Russia and China, dem- American ties with these countries.3 ocratic development also should reduce the possibility that they would pursue balancing The parallels to today are obvious. Once again policies against the United States. facing a new worldwide ideological threat in the form of radical Islamism, American strate- In the short run, however, there are potential gic thinkers both in and outside of government risks for US security associated with demo- worry that political change in autocratic US cratic development in the greater Middle allies will produce theocratic regimes hostile to East. Without question, the toppling of the American interests. The concern is valid, but is Taliban regime in Afghanistan deprived Al often overplayed by the very same autocrats as Qaeda of a base of operations that had more they seek to retain to power. So far, successful assets than its current base in Pakistan. Yet democratization has never brought to power a this advantage for US strategic interests is not government that then directly threatened the a result of democratization. In fact, the diffi- national security interests of the United States cult process of developing democratic institu- or its allies. In the Palestinian Authority tions in Afghanistan has failed to produce (which is not a country), we are witnessing the stable government or a growing economy to first case of such a potential outcome. Hamas date—a situation that has created an opening seems to be capitalizing on its new status and for the Taliban’s resurgence. In Iraq, neither resources to threaten America and its allies. In democratic government nor an effective state the long run, however, participation in demo- has taken root. To date, the American people cratic institutions and the assumption of are not safer as a result of regime change in responsibility for governance might moderate Iraq. In both countries, US-led invasions Hamas or undermine its popularity. It is still brought about regime change. But because too early to assess the results of this transition these operations were neither launched to (see the discussion of Hamas below). bring democracy nor followed through toward that end, the resulting new or resur- The advance of democracy in Europe and Asia gent threats to US national security emanat- over the last century has made the United ing from Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be States safer—giving reason to hope that blamed on democratization in general or US democracy’s advance in other regions of the democracy promotion in particular. world will also strengthen US national security. 4 Elsewhere in the region, the limited progress suade other countries to support our foreign toward democratization in recent years is also policies. Apart from serving US strategic inter- tenuously tied to US security. The Cedar ests, democracy promotion is also the right Revolution and subsequent 2005 pullout of thing to do. Syrian troops from Lebanon raised hopes for stability there. Yet the Hezbollah-Israeli war in First and foremost, democracy is the best sys- the summer of 2006 underscored how prema- tem of government. Winston Churchill was ture these hopes were. Soon after President’s right: democracy is a terrible system of govern- Bush second inaugural speech, Egypt’s ment, but still better than all of the others that President Mubarak seemed to react by imple- have been tried. Democracy provides the best menting incremental political reforms. A year institutional form for holding rulers account- later, he rolled them back almost entirely, a able to their people. If leaders must compete development that has heightened tensions for popular support to obtain and retain within Egypt and strained US-Egyptian rela- power, then they will be more responsive to the tions. We have yet to see whether partial preferences of the people, in contrast to rulers reforms in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and who do not govern on the basis of popular sup- Morocco will lead to further incremental port. The institutions of democracy also pre- political liberalization or serve instead as cam- vent abusive rule, constrain bad rule, and ouflage for continued autocratic rule. The net provide a mechanism for removing corrupt or effect of these reforms on US security is still ineffective rule. Furthermore, democracy pro- entirely unclear. vides the setting for political competition, which in turn is a driver for better governance. We admit that we do not know whether the Like markets, political competition between analogy between democratization in the wider contending leaders, ideas, and organizations Middle East and democratization in other produces better leaders, ideas, and organiza- regions will hold and yield the same benefits. tions (which is the premise of the Bridging the The destruction of fascist and communist Foreign Policy Divide project). At a minimum, regimes and the emergence of more democrat- democracy provides a mechanism for removing ic regimes, first in Europe and Asia after bad rulers in a way that autocracy does not. World War II and more recently in Eastern The absence of political competition in autoc- Europe and the former Soviet Union, signifi- racies produces complacency, corruption, and cantly enhanced US national security. It is rea- has no mechanism for producing new leaders. sonable to expect a similar outcome in the wider Middle East; that is, the emergence of Second, democracies provide more, and more more democratic regimes in the most autocrat- stable, welfare for their people than do autocra- ic region of the world should also make the cies. Democracies avoid the worst threats to United States more secure. As we say, it is still personal well-being, such as genocide and an untested hypothesis. famine. Over the last several decades, democracies around the world have not produced high- American Values er economic growth rates than autocracies: “the Debates about democracy promotion cannot net effect of more political freedom on growth be couched solely as a balance sheet of materi- is theoretically ambiguous.”4 Instead, compared al benefits and liabilities for the United States. to democracies, autocracies produce both much American values must also enter the discus- higher and much lower rates of growth. For sion. Since the beginning of the American every China there is an Angola. Democracies republic, US presidents have to varying tend to produce slower rates of growth than the degrees invoked America’s unique, moral role best autocratic performers, but also steadier in international affairs. The loss of this identi- rates of economic development. The old con- ty, both at home and abroad, would weaken ventional wisdom that dictators are better at domestic support for US involvement in world economic modernization than the democratic affairs and undermine American ability to per- counterparts is not supported by data. Third, the demand for and appeal of democra- in Western Christianity, which proclaimed the 5 cy as a system of government are widespread, universal dignity of man made in God’s image; if not universal. Public opinion surveys of peo- thinkers from Tocqueville to Nietzsche have ple throughout the world, including the wider argued that modern democracy is simply a sec- Middle East, show that majorities in most ularization of Western values. There is no par- countries support democracy.5 Ideological chal- ticular reason why other civilizations based on lengers remain, such as the modernizing auto- other cultural premises should prefer democrat or Osama bin Ladenism. But compared to cratic government. Lee Kwan Yew and other earlier historical periods, these opponents of proponents of “Asian values” have argued democracy have never been weaker. that, given the poor performance of many democratic regimes in non-Western settings, this The United States, therefore, has a moral inter- form of government is distinctly less desirable est in promoting democracy. If democracy is than a growth-oriented authoritarian regime. the best system of government, demanded by the majority of people around the world, then Full consideration of this argument is beyond the United States should help promote its the scope of this paper. There are certainly seri- advance. Conversely, any US involvement in ous philosophical and political cases to be made sustaining autocracy is immoral. Obviously, against the universality of liberal democratic American leaders constantly face situations in values on a number of grounds. While accept- which immediate security interests require ance of democratic norms and basic human cooperation with autocratic regimes. But such rights has spread far and wide since the onset of policies should not be defended on moral or the Third Wave of democratization, there are ethical grounds. still parts of the world where they are openly rejected on cultural grounds. The Chinese gov- Engaging the Case Against ernment, various East Asian leaders and Democracy Promotion thinkers, Islamists of assorted stripes, and many Russian nationalists are among those arguing Three broad categories of reasons are offered that their cultures are inherently inimical to one for why the United States should not pursue or another aspect of liberal democracy. democracy promotion. The first is normative, based on the view that democracy is culturally We offer the following observations in con- rooted and not a universal good; the second tention. In the first place, democracy promotion prudential, concerning the principle of respect never implied the “imposition” of either liberal- for sovereignty as the basis for international ism or democracy on a society that did not want order; and the third also prudential, concern- it. By definition this is impossible: democracy ing the need for sequencing in the introduction requires popular consensus, and works only if of democratic reforms. the vast majority of a society’s citizens believe that it is legitimate. Democracy promotion is The first argument—that democracy is not a intended only to help reveal public preferences universally valid or desirable goal—has a in the society itself. Dictatorships often resort to number of proponents. Postmodernism and violence, coercion, or fraud to prevent those other relativist philosophies argue that there preferences from carrying political weight; are no universally valid political or institution- democracy promoters simply try to level the al orders because it is impossible to arrive at playing field by eliminating the authoritarians’ philosophical certainty per se. A more com- unfair advantages. mon assertion is that democracy is culturally rooted, and that societies with other cultural A second counterargument that is somewhat backgrounds may choose other forms of gov- more difficult to make is that human rights ernment as they wish. Samuel Huntington, and the democratic institutions that spring while preferring liberal democracy for the from them are immanently universal. In keep- United States, makes this kind of case.6 ing with the case made by Tocqueville in According to him, liberal democracy is rooted 6 Democracy in America, the historical arc There are countless variants of realist theory toward universal human equality has been today, united primarily in their opposition to spreading providentially for the past 800 democracy promotion as a component of for- years. It has now encompassed not just the eign policy. Some argue not from a world- Western, culturally Christian world, but has order point of view, but from the perspective spread and taken root in many other parts of of narrower American interests: the United the world as well—India, Japan, Korea, and States needs oil, security, trade, and other South Africa. This suggests that democracy goods that are compromised by an emphasis has spread not as a manifestation of a particu- on human rights or democracy. These views lar civilization’s cultural preferences, but have acquired particular resonance since the because it serves universal needs or performs Iraq war, which was seen as being driven by a functions that are universally necessary, partic- neoconservative agenda of democracy promo- ularly at higher levels of economic develop- tion and political transformation in the ment. One can argue, for example, that the Middle East. These critics would argue that procedural rules of liberal democracy guaran- US pressure for liberalization of political tee that governments behave in a transparent, space and calls for elections have brought to law-governed way and remain accountable to power groups like Hamas in Palestine, the people they serve. Even if a culture does Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Muslim not put a value on individual rights per se, lib- Brotherhood in Egypt, all of which are illiber- eral democracy is ultimately required for good al and hostile to US interests. There has been governance and economic growth. criticism especially of the Bush administration’s use of coercive regime change as a The second argument against democracy pro- means to spur the political transformation of motion is made by international relations the Middle East. “realists,” namely, that world order depends on states accepting the Westphalian consensus We make several arguments in response to the to respect each other’s sovereignty and mutual realists. The first has to do with prudence in agreement not to meddle in the internal char- means. To say that the United States should acter of each other’s regimes. The Westphalian promote democracy in its foreign policy does consensus arose out of Europe’s wars of reli- not mean that it should put idealistic goals gion following the Reformation, when ahead of other types of national interests at all European princes fought over the confessional times and places—or that it should use mili- allegiances of their neighbors. Peace was tary force in pursuit of these goals. Indeed, the obtained only when all agreed to a principle of United States has never made democracy pro- cuius regio, cuius religio, and noninterference motion the overriding goal of its foreign poli- in each other’s internal politics. cy. The Bush administration invaded Iraq primarily out of concern over weapons of Among contemporary writers, Henry Kissinger mass destruction and terrorism; democracy has been one of the most articulate and consis- promotion was a tertiary goal that received tent proponents of this view. Since his earliest heavier emphasis only ex post, when the other writings,7 he has argued that idealistic concern justifications for the war proved hollow. The with the internal character of other regimes United States has promoted democracy in leads to messianic crusades that in the long run places like Germany and Japan after World provoke resistance and undermine world War II, but only when in concert with its secu- order. The idealistic Tsar Alexander I pro- rity goals. In these cases, transformation of longed the destabilization of Europe begun by two former enemies into democratic countries the French Revolution. International peace did indeed align with US strategic interests, and stability reigned from 1815 to 1848 only and few realists would argue that the United due to the efforts of the arch-conservative States would have been better served by an Metternich to forge a balance of power in alternative policy. Europe, heedless of ideological concerns. The real trade-offs come in regions like the US security interests and its idealistic goals 7 Middle East, where the United States’ closest would thus seem to be false. strategic allies are autocracies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, or Egypt. The Bush In our view, the appropriate policy in response administration has made the general argument to this political landscape needs to be a calibrat- that the deep root cause of terrorism and ed one that takes account of particular circum- Islamist radicalism is the region’s lack of stances. There are some countries like Saudi democracy, and that promoting democracy is Arabia where there is no realistic democratic therefore one route to eradicating the terrorist alternative to the current authoritarian leader- threat. Natan Sharansky has argued that the ship, or where likely alternatives would clearly Oslo peace process was fatally flawed because be worse from a strategic perspective. In these the United States and Israel relied on Yasser cases, authoritarian allies indeed represent the Arafat’s authoritarian Fatah as an interlocutor, lesser of two evils. While quiet pressure on instead of pressing for democracy in Palestine Egypt to liberalize might be appropriate, pro- prior to peace negotiations.8 Prior to the inva- voking a major showdown to strong-arm Cairo sion of Iraq, some observers similarly hoped into permitting free and fair elections is not like- that a democratic Iraq would be a strategic ly to work. On the other hand, there is a dem- partner of the United States and recognize ocratic alternative to General Pervez Musharraf Israel. By this view, democracy, security, and in Pakistan—in the form of the newly created peace with Israel all went hand in hand. alliance between the Pakistan People’s Party’s Benazir Bhutto and former Prime Minister It is quite clear in retrospect that this reading Nawaz Sharif. While this group had an uneven of the sources of Arab radicalism was too record when they were in power, they have simplistic. The deep sources of terrorism are pledged to crack down on the Taliban in the much more complex than just the Middle Northwest Frontier Province and may indeed East’s democratic deficit. One can argue in prove to be more reliable allies than fact that it is precisely the modernization Musharraf. An open election in Pakistan process that produces terrorism and that would risk further gains by Islamist parties, more democracy is likely to exacerbate the but the country has a sizable middle-class elec- terrorism problem, at least in the short run.9 torate and significant public sentiment that is Many of the Iraqis who went to the polls in wary of an anti-Western course. the various elections of 2005 were Shiites who wanted not liberal democracy but Shiite Hamas in Gaza represents a more difficult power, and who have subsequently worked case, since it is not only illiberal but also com- to establish an Iranian-style Islamic republic mitted to the destruction of America’s ally in areas under their control. The winners of Israel. The strategic problem here is whether it democratic elections elsewhere in the region is better to have this group on the inside of a tend to be profoundly illiberal Islamist long-term peace and Palestinian state-building groups, who are also more hostile to process or outside as obstructionists. Hamas America’s ally Israel than to the authoritari- represents a significant part of the Palestinian an governments they would like to displace. electorate, and the party will continue to play The political tide in the Middle East is not an influential role in Palestinian politics running in favor of pro-Western liberal regardless of whether the United States and opposition groups. In addition, the United Israel accept it. A strong argument can be States’ authoritarian allies like Hosni made that it is better to relent to Hamas’ par- Mubarak of Egypt and Pervez Musharraf of ticipation in a government in hopes that their Pakistan have been quite clever at sidelining goals will moderate over time. It is, in any liberal opponents to accentuate the threat event, difficult to see how reliance on a cor- from the Islamist opposition. The assertion rupt Fatah government as in the past will help of President Bush’s second inaugural address bring peace or even a legitimate interlocutor in that there is no necessary trade-off between the Palestinian Authority. 8 The final argument against the current agenda incompetent, or self-serving. The vast majori- of democracy promotion concerns the ty of liberal or developmentally minded sequencing of democratic reforms, especially authoritarian regimes or leaders are clustered elections. State-building, creation of a liberal in East Asia, for reasons that probably have rule of law, and democracy are conceptually roots in the region’s Confucian culture. This different phases of political development, means, in practice, that in most of the world, which in most European countries occurred in exactly the same groups want both liberal rule a sequence that was separated by decades if of law and democracy; it is simply not an not centuries. State-building and creation of a option for the United States to promote the rule of law are more critical for economic former and delay the latter. development than democracy is. Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield have argued that A further problem with the sequencing strate- democratization’s early phases pose special dan- gy is that it presumes that the United States gers of promoting nationalism and illiberal pol- and other foreign powers can somehow con- itics.10 Authors from Samuel Huntington11 to trol democratic transitions, holding back pres- Fareed Zakaria12 have consequently argued that sure for democratic elections while pushing for US policy ought to focus on a broad governance rule of law and good governance. This vastly agenda and delay pushing for democracy until overestimates the degree of control outsiders a higher level of economic development has have over democratic transitions. The toolbox been achieved. This so-called “authoritarian for democracy promotion is more modest, a transition” has been followed by a number of subject that we will consider next. countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile, and is often recommended as a model for US Modalities of Democracy Promotion policy in regions like the Middle East. To argue that the United States has strategic and moral interests in the spread of democracy There is no question that such liberal authori- does not mean that the United States can tarianism has worked quite successfully in spread democracy. Domestic factors, not exter- places like Singapore, and even less liberal vari- nal forces, have driven the process of democra- ants, as in China, can boast impressive econom- tization in most countries. Consequently, and ic growth rates. If these countries eventually especially in light of the tragedy in Iraq, some follow the Korean and Taiwanese paths toward have argued that Americans can best promote a broadening of political participation, it is not democracy abroad by simply watching it devel- obvious that an accelerated democratic transi- op “naturally.” tion would bring about a better long-term result. In addition, there are specific instances We disagree. While we recognize the limits of (primarily in post-conflict/failed state settings) America’s ability to promote democracy where outside pressure for early elections abroad—limits that have become more severe arguably resulted not in the emergence of dem- in the past few years—we also know that US ocratic political parties, but rather the locking policies can be very important in helping nur- in place of the same groups responsible for the ture democratic development. The war in Iraq original conflict. has fostered the false impression that military force is the only instrument of regime change As Tom Carothers has recently pointed out, in the US arsenal, when in fact it is the rarest however, there are a number of problems with used and least effective way to promote dem- 13 the sequencing strategy. First, in most parts ocratic change abroad. A wiser, more effective of the world it is very difficult to find liberal, and more sustainable strategy must emphasize developmentally minded authoritarians on nonmilitary tools aimed at changing the bal- whom such a strategy can be built. The more ance of power between democratic forces and typical cases in Africa, the Middle East, and autocratic rulers and, only after there has Latin America have been characterized by been progress toward democracy, building authoritarian governments that are corrupt, liberal institutions. Restoring the American Example centrally in its decision to invade Iraq, coupled 9 Inspiration for Democrats struggling against with its general suspicion of international law autocracy and a model for leaders in new and international institutions, has encouraged democracies are two US exports now in short the perception that Americans do not believe supply. Since the beginning of the republic, the in the rule of law. Again, the merits of these American experiment with democracy provided claims about American behavior are debat- hope, ideas, and technologies for others work- able. But it is indisputable that America’s ing to build democratic institutions. Foreign vis- image abroad as a model for democracy has itors to the United States have been impressed been tarnished. by what they’ve seen, and American diplomats, religious missionaries, and business people who Therefore, the first step toward becoming a traveled abroad inspired others by telling the more effective promoter of democracy abroad story of America’s democracy. In the second is to get our own house in order. To begin half of the 20th century, when the United States with, the political costs to America’s credibil- developed more intentional means for promot- ity as a champion of democratic values and ing democracy abroad, the preservation and human rights outweigh the value of holding advertisement of the American democratic prisoners at Guantanamo indefinitely. The model remained a core instrument. facility should be closed, and the law passed last year on enemy combatant detentions Today this instrument needs repair. The should be repealed or amended. In place of American model has been severely under- legalistic attempts to pretend that the United mined by the methods that the Bush adminis- States does not engage in torture, a broader tration has used to fight the so-called global range of prohibited techniques should be war on terrorism. Irrespective of the legal par- explicitly defined and ruled out. More gener- ticulars that may or may not justify the indef- ally, the next president of the United States inite detention of combatants/terrorists at must demonstrate a clear commitment to Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, opinion polls restoring and perfecting the US democratic demonstrate overwhelmingly that most of the system of government. world views US detention policies as illegiti- mate and undemocratic. Thankfully, senior In parallel, our efforts at public diplomacy American officials did not try to defend the have to improve. inhumane treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 2004. The news media’s exposure of The United States cannot hope to recruit people the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib and to its side, or to the side of democratic values, if adherence to the rule of law through the pros- it does not pay attention to what non-Americans ecution of guilty soldiers was a first step in say they want, rather than what we think they correcting the problem. But the failure to hold should want. In the Middle East, many Arabs higher-level officials accountable for the have argued that America is disliked not for its breakdown in authority raised questions basic values, but for its one-sidedness in the about how seriously the United States took the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its lack of sym- issue, and the images of torture greatly dam- pathy for Palestinian aspirations. In Latin aged America’s international reputation. America, populist leaders like Hugo Chavez Furthermore, the debate surrounding the and Evo Morales have gained enormous sup- unauthorized wiretappings of American citi- port by promoting social policies aimed at the zens helped create an impression (false) poor, an issue that America’s democratic friends abroad that the US government will sacrifice in the region have largely ignored. The starting the civil liberties of individuals in the name of point for a better public diplomacy therefore is fighting terrorism—the very argument that to stop talking so much about ourselves and to autocrats across the world use to justify their start listening to other people, to compare the repressive policies. Finally, the Bush adminis- product we’re offering to the actual aspirations tration’s propensity for unilateralism, most of democratic publics around the world. 10 Indeed, in light of the Bush administration’s policy officials must reject the false linkage widespread unpopularity, it may be better for between cooperation and silence on human the United States to dramatically tone down its rights abuses whenever autocrats make it a public rhetoric about democracy promotion. precondition of engagement. Few friendly The loudly proclaimed instrumentalization of autocratic regimes have ever stopped working democracy promotion in pursuit of US nation- with the United States on a strategic issue of al interests (like the war on terrorism) taints mutual benefit because an American official democracy promotion and makes the United criticized their antidemocratic practices. States seem hypocritical when security, economic, or other concerns trump our interests in When it comes to autocratic regimes with democracy (as they inevitably will). Acting in which the United States is friendly, American concrete ways to support human rights and leaders have real leverage to press for evolu- democratic groups around the world, while tionary change, especially over countries speaking more modestly about American goals, dependent on US military protection or eco- might serve both our interests and ideals better. nomic assistance. Rather than coercing them, US officials must first try persuading our auto- The idealistic component of US foreign policy cratic friends that they can ultimately best pro- has always been critical to maintaining a tect their material and security interests by domestic American consensus in favor of a proactively leading a process of evolutionary strongly internationalist stance, so we do not change rather than by reactively resisting an recommend permanently abandoning this eventual process of revolutionary change. rhetorical stance. We have to recognize, how- American officials did exactly this, when they ever, that the Iraq war and other events relat- helped coax allies in South Korea, Chile, and ed to the war on terrorism have for the South Africa into embracing democratic moment tainted valid and important concepts change. Careful diplomacy in the Philippines like democracy promotion and democratic also helped keep the end of the Marcos dicta- regime change. This is the case not only for torship peaceful. foreign audiences but for many Americans as well. Until this perception changes, adminis- Paradoxically, the same logic of engagement trations will have to “sell” foreign policy to applies when considering the promotion of domestic audiences on different grounds. democracy in dictatorships hostile to the United States. Attempts to isolate or sanction Revitalizing Dual Track Diplomacy these regimes have rarely worked. Sanctions It is naive to believe that the United States against the apartheid regime in South Africa should only deal with other democracies. After only succeeded because the United States, all, in our own history, the creation of the Great Britain, and other European countries United States as an independent country had developed deep economic ties beforehand. required military assistance from France’s South African democrats, unlike the leaders of absolute monarchy. The alliance with Stalin’s the democratic movement in Iran today, also Soviet Union—perhaps the most diabolical wanted these sanctions. Because the United regime in human history—was necessary for States does not have significant trade with or victory in World War II. Today the wide range investments in Iran, Cuba, or Burma, sanc- of US security, economic, and environmental tions against these autocracies do little to help interests around the world necessitates diplo- the prodemocracy forces inside these coun- matic engagement with autocracies. tries. However, diplomatic relations with these regimes creates a more hospitable environ- Nonetheless, American policymakers can con- ment for internal democratic development.14 In duct relations with their counterparts in auto- the USSR, for instance, democratic forces cratic regimes, while simultaneously pursuing gained strength in the late 1980s when US- policies that might facilitate democratic devel- Soviet relations were improving, not earlier in opment in these same countries. US foreign the decade when tensions were high. With rare exception, polices that open societies and in the democracy promotion business, including 11 economies up to international influence have NDI and IRI. As USAID funds for democracy helped spur democratic change while policies assistance increased in the 1990s primarily in that isolate societies impede such progress. response to new opportunities in the former communist world, several for-profit contractors Reorganizing Democracy Assistance joined the democracy promotion business as For most of American history, US foreign assis- well. Eventually, tension developed between tance did not explicitly aim to promote democ- USAID’s leadership and USAID’s nongovern- racy. President Kennedy created the United ment grantees. Over the 1990s, USAID employ- States Agency of International Development in ees—that is, government officials—gradually 1961 to counter communism and Soviet foreign assumed greater responsibility for crafting assistance, but the focus was economic develop- democracy promotion strategies and treated the ment. Twenty years later, Ronald Reagan made NGOs as merely “implementers” of their ideas. democracy promotion a central objective when The recipients, and especially the NGOs, resis- he worked with Democrats in Congress to cre- ted the label of implementer and instead tried to ate the National Endowment for Democracy preserve their identities as independent actors. (NED) in 1983. At the time, however, NED’s The lines between government and nongovern- budget was a fraction of total foreign assis- mental actors, already blurred, became even tance. Importantly, NED also was not constitut- more ambiguous. ed as an organ of the US government. While receiving its budget directly from Congress (and After September 11, President Bush to his credit not through the State Department or USAID), increased general foreign assistance funding, NED established its own board, its own proce- including support for democracy promotion. dures for disseminating money, and made its Within the State Department, the Bush adminis- own decisions about whom it would and would tration established the Middle East Partnership not support. Initiative, which became a new funding source for democracy assistance programs, among oth- With the creation of NED came four affiliated ers. At State, the Bureau for Democracy, Human organizations: the National Democratic Institute Rights, and Labor Affairs received major increas- for International Affairs (NDI), the International es in its democracy assistance budget. The Republican Institute (IRI), the American Center Department of Defense also has become increas- for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS, for- ingly involved in democracy-related activities in merly the Free Trade Union Institute [FTUI]), Afghanistan and Iraq. To coordinate civilian, and the Center for International Private military, and intelligence operations in post-con- Enterprise (CIPE). These organizations all flict settings better, the Bush administration had ties to US nongovernment institutions: established the Coordinator for Reconstruction NDI to the Democratic Party, IRI to the and Stabilization, a new office within the State Republican Party, ACILS to the AFL-CIO, and Department but staffed with personnel on loan CIPE to the US Chamber of Congress. The idea from DoD, USAID, and other parts of the exec- behind these affiliations was that organizations utive branch. Most dramatically, under Secretary with democracy as a longstanding element of of State Condoleezza Rice’s new transformation- their missions could set their own agendas. al diplomacy initiative, the department is trying to reform the way in which foreign assistance is Over time, however, the US government has funded and delivered. The reform aims to consol- increasingly become a direct provider of democ- idate the funding accounts and to make strategic racy assistance. With the announcement of its planning about assistance the purview of the “Democracy Initiative” in December 1990, the State Department. As a first step, Rice created a Agency for International Development (AID) new position within the State Department: the made democracy promotion a core focus and director of Foreign Assistance, who also serves as soon became the main source of funding for administrator of AID. many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 12 This focus on how the government is organ- al security interest in providing an autocratic ized to provide democracy assistance is badly regime with military aid or antiterrorist assis- needed. The reform ideas to date, however, tance, but this aid must not be called democ- have not been ambitious enough. Any strate- racy assistance or development aid. gy for more effective democracy promotion must include significantly greater resources At the same time, no democracy assistance to as well as a reorganization of all US govern- nongovernmental organizations should come ment bureaus and agencies that are tasked from this new department—or from any other with providing democracy assistance. A new branch of the US government. Even if a new Department of International Development Department of International Development is not must be created, and its head must be a mem- established, this firewall between state-to-state ber of the Cabinet. All foreign assistance assistance and the aid given to nongovernmental resources currently funneled through other actors should become a guiding principle for agencies and departments—with the excep- democracy assistance reform. For instance, it is tion of military training and assistance— appropriate for the USAID or some other part of must be transferred to this new department. the US executive branch to fund a technical This new department would largely absorb assistance program for a justice ministry in a AID, as well as DoD post-war reconstruction foreign country under the rubric of a bilateral operations, rule of law training programs cur- government-to-government agreement. rently housed in the Department of Justice, agricultural aid now located in the Department Inevitably, conflicts of interest and misinter- of Agriculture, and the Millennium Challenge pretations of motives arise when the State Corporation. It is absolutely crucial that this Department provides direct financial support department be, and be perceived as, autonomous to an NGO in another country. Is this money from both the Department of State and the provided to aid democracy? Or is it given to Department of Defense. The mandate of this new advance a concrete US economic or strategic department would be very different from the tra- interest? Non-American NGOs, especially ditional missions of the military and diplomacy: those working in autocratic societies, are not regime destruction, but regime construction, increasingly reluctant to accept American including nurturing improved governance, eco- assistance for fear of being labeled a lackey of nomic development, and democratic consolida- the Bush administration or a spy for the tion. This separation of departments to fulfill United States.15 Such questions come up different missions will help each to deepen regardless of the exact origin of US funding. expertise in its respective field, and also clarify to Increased separation between the US govern- the outside world which arms of the US government and American funders of nongovernment are doing what. Soldiers should not kill ter- mental actors thus can only be for the better. rorists one day and teach Thomas Jefferson the This money for direct assistance to NGOs also next. Diplomats should not negotiate a basing must be protected from any punishments or agreement with a government one day and then conditionalities directed at the government of turn around and fund an opposition leader to that country. When the White House decides that same government. to cut foreign assistance to a country in order to change its behavior at home or abroad, US Once constituted, the new Department of funds earmarked to promote democracy International Development should direct and through nongovernmental actors must not be administer all assistance that is delivered part of the conditionality. directly to foreign governments. When the US government does provide direct assistance to a A vastly expanded NED would be one model. foreign government through this new depart- To assume this role, NED would have to pro- ment, it must be firmly conditioned on pursuit vide direct grants to all American providers of of development objectives. There will be situa- technical and financial assistance for the non- tions in which the United States has a nation- governmental sector, which will loosen its con- nection with its four main grantees and require Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as a strat- 13 more involvement with for-profit contractors. egy for maintaining an open, liberal capitalist NED would also need to open offices around order and avoiding a repeat of the protection- the world. Because both of these changes might ist-driven meltdown of the 1930s. Democracy dilute NED’s current mission, an alternative promotion was not an explicit objective of model would be the creation of a new founda- either NATO or the International Monetary tion, modeled after NED, but with a wider Fund. Member states in these institutions did mandate and a different mechanism for provid- not even have to be democracies. Nonetheless ing grants to both American organizations in NATO’s security umbrella, combined with the democracy promotion business as well as American assistance through the Marshall Plan direct grants to local NGOs around the world. and other subsequent programs, did help prevent communist coups in Western Europe; keep Democracy promotion should be placed in a the peace between formerly hostile countries broader context of promoting economic devel- within the alliance; and contain Soviet military opment, reducing poverty, and furthering expansion in Europe, which surely would have good governance. The four objectives are undermined democratic institutions. interlinked in multiple ways: good governance is widely accepted as a requisite for economic The stable security environment was con- growth, widespread poverty undermines dem- ducive to the deepening of democracy within ocratic legitimacy, growth reduces poverty, member states and for increasing economic democratic accountability is often required to and political cooperation among those states, combat corruption and poor governance, and later culminating in the creation of the growth creates a favorable climate for demo- European Union. This regional community in cratic consolidation. Good governance in turn helped inspire Eastern European dissi- recipient countries is also critical to maintain- dents to demand recognition of their human ing congressional and popular support for rights as outlined in Basket Three of the assistance programs. Nothing undermines Helsinki Final Act. NATO expansion after the support as much as the perception that US tax- collapse of the Warsaw Pact offered Western payer dollars are going into a proverbial Swiss multilateral connectivity to the new democra- bank account. The United States cannot limit cies in East Central Europe and served as a itself to the promotion of democracy; it must bridge as they prepared bids to join the also use its leverage to promote development European Union. The gravitational pull of the and good governance. These connections need European Union may be the most powerful to be reflected in how policy is articulated as tool of democratic consolidation in the world well. Senior foreign policy officials in the Bush today. The US security umbrella in Asia pro- administration rarely invoke values such as vided a similar facilitating condition for dem- equality and justice; yet historically, American ocratic development first in Japan, then South leaders have considered these ideas fundamen- Korea, and eventually Taiwan. More intermit- tal to shaping our own government. tently, the United States has also used its leadership within the Organization of American Enhancing and Creating International States to encourage democratic development Institutions for Democracy Promotion in Latin America. After World War II, the visionary American internationalists spearheaded the creation of a Given the success of these multilateral institu- military alliance—the North Atlantic Treaty tions in promoting democracy, it is striking Organization (NATO)—to contain the Soviet how little effort President Bush has devoted to threat in Europe, and crafted bilateral security creating new multilateral institutions or pacts with Japan and South Korea to thwart reforming existing ones to advance freedom. the communist menace in Asia. American lead- Since September 11, 2001, not one new major ers also launched the Bretton Woods agree- international organization has been formed to ments and its institutions, the International promote democratic reform. Nor has the Bush 14 administration devoted serious effort toward modalities of strengthening ties within the com- boosting existing international organizations’ munity of democratic states, be it through a new focus on democracy promotion. This neglect treaty or a new alliance.17 of multilateral institutions must end. Even the World Trade Organization (WTO) More than any other region in the world, the and other trade agreements must be viewed as greater Middle East is devoid of multilateral levers that help open up economies, which in security institutions. The United States, Canada, turn fosters democratic development. Excluding the European Union, and other consolidated countries such as Iran from the WTO only democracies should partner with their Middle hurts the democratic forces inside Iran who Eastern counterparts to establish regional favor more, not less, integration of their coun- norms, confidence-building measures, and other try into the world system. In some rare circum- forms of dialogue and political reassurance. The stances such as South Africa under apartheid, goal should be to establish a regional architec- economic sanctions have effectively pressured ture that will affirm human rights and promote autocratic regimes to liberalize. The list of fail- regional security based on the model of the ures—including decades-long sanctions against Helsinki process in Eastern Europe, which Cuba and Iran—is equally striking. As a rule of gave rise to the Organization of Security and thumb, the world democratic community Cooperation in Europe and extensive human should take its cues about sanctions from the rights monitoring within and across borders. democratic opposition in the target country.

The impetus for creating regional structures Strengthening International Norms must come from within the region, but the ini- The collapse of communism ushered in a giddy tiative should also be supported from the out- era for democracy promotion. Because so many side. Such efforts can draw inspiration and autocratic regimes disappeared at the same lessons from past experiences in Europe and time, new post-Communist regimes welcomed elsewhere. At the heart of the Helsinki process Western democracy promoters into their coun- was the recognition that true security depend- tries with few restrictions. Today the atmos- ed not only on relations between states but phere for democracy promotion is markedly also on the relationship between rulers and the different. The allegedly easy cases of democrat- ruled. Many Middle Eastern governments ic transition in East Central Europe have con- have signed statements committing themselves solidated and require no further assistance from to democratic reform, yet the Middle East democracy promoters. Autocratic regimes, at lacks a regime that can help empower citizens first weak after communism’s collapse, have to hold their rulers accountable to such themselves consolidated and now have the pledges at home and in their relations with means to push back. Finally, the war in Iraq has their neighbors. greatly tainted the idea of external regime change and put under suspicion all foreigners Beyond the Middle East, an expanded NATO working to promote democratic change. could be an important, stabilizing force in unit- ing democracies around the globe. ASEAN is a This new context requires a new strategy for regional organization that seems ready to adopt bolstering the legitimacy of democracy pro- more rigorous norms about democratic govern- motion and the defense of human rights. ment and human rights. The recently created Governments must come together and draft Community of Democracies got off to a bad start a code of conduct for democratic interven- by extending membership to nondemocracies. tions in the same way that governments and But the idea of a new multilateral organization the international human rights community committed to advancing democratic practices, be have specified conditions in which external it a revamped Community of Democracies or a actors have the “responsibility to protect” new “League of Democracies,” is needed.16 More threatened populations. A “right to help” boldly, American leaders must embrace new doctrine is needed. A starting point for this new normative regime would be the “right” to Endnotes 15 free and fair elections, which in turn would 1 Freedom in the World 2007: Selected Data legitimize international election monitors and from Freedom House’s Annual Global international assistance targeted at electoral Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties transparency. At the other extreme, a new (Washington: Freedom House, 2007) p. 1. international code of conduct could include strict prohibitions on direct financial assistance 2 For elaboration of this logic, see James to political parties, yet affirm the legality of Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “What To foreign assistance to nonpartisan NGOs. Once Do about Russia,” Policy Review, No. 133 these rules of the road are codified, signatories (October-November 2005), pp. 45-62. to such a covenant would be obligated to respect them. And if they did not, then the vio- 3 David Adesnik and Michael McFaul, lation would serve as a license for further intru- “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote sive behavior from external actors. Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 7-26. An internationally agreed-upon code of conduct for democracy assistance will constrain 4 Robert Barro, Determinants of Economics the activities of some US actors. But it will also Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study enable other kinds of activities and interven- (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) p. 58. tions. But in the long run, the United States and other democracies will only be effective in 5 Ronald Inglehart, “The Worldviews of Islamic promoting freedom abroad if we develop Publics in Global Perspective,” in Mansour international institutions that enhance mutual- Moaddel, ed., Worldviews of Islamic Publics ly beneficial cooperation, and then abide by (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 16; James the rules of these institutions in the conduct of Zogby, What Arabs Think: Values Beliefs and our foreign policy. Concerns (Washington DC: Zogby International, 2002); Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic In highlighting the moral and strategic impera- Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward tives for promoting democracy abroad, Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from President Bush has continued a longstanding Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,” tradition in US foreign policy that has deep International Journal of Comparative roots in both the Democratic and Republican Sociology, Vol. 43, Nos. 3–5, June 2002, pp. parties. Declaration of any important objec- 229-249; and the cluster of articles under the tive, however, must be accompanied by a real- rubric “How People View Democracy” in istic and comprehensive strategy for achieving Journal of Democracy, Vol. 12, No. 1, January it. Simply trumpeting the importance of the 2001, pp. 93-145. objective over and over again is not a substitute for a strategy. The tragic result of the gap 6 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of between objectives and strategies is that many Civilizations and the Remaking of World Americans are starting to view this goal as no Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). longer desirable or attainable. The next American president must do better. A more 7 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: effective strategy for promoting democracy and Europe after Napoleon (Gloucester, MA: human rights is both needed and available. Peter Smith, 1973).

8 Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (Balfour Books: 2006). 9 16 Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, The Stanley Foundation and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of The Stanley Foundation is a nonpartisan, pri- Democracy, Vol. 17, No. 2, April 2006, vate operating foundation that seeks a secure pp. 5-20. peace with freedom and justice, built on world citizenship and effective global governance. It 10 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: brings fresh voices and original ideas to Democratization and Nationalist Conflict debates on global and regional problems. The (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000); and Jack foundation advocates principled multilateral- Snyder and Edward D. Mansfield, Electing ism—an approach that emphasizes working to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to respectfully across differences to create fair, War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). just, and lasting solutions.

11 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in The Stanley Foundation’s work recognizes the Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale essential roles of the policy community, media University Press, 1968). professionals, and the involved public in building sustainable peace. Its work aims to con- 12 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: nect people from different backgrounds, often Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad producing clarifying insights and innovative (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003). solutions.

13 Thomas Carothers, “The “Sequencing” The foundation frequently collaborates with Fallacy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, other organizations. It does not make grants. No.1, 2007, pp. 12-27. Stanley Foundation reports, publications, pro- 14 McFaul, Milani, and Diamond, “A Win- grams, and a wealth of other information are Win Strategy for Dealing with Iran,” The available on the Web at www.stanleyfounda Washington Quarterly, Winter 2006-07. tion.org.

15 Akbar Ganji, “Money Can’t Buy Us The Stanley Foundation encourages use of this Democracy,” The New York Times, report for educational purposes. Any part of August 2, 2006. the material may be duplicated with proper acknowledgment. View this report online at 16 Senator John McCain proposed the idea of reports.stanleyfoundation.org. a new league of democracies in a speech at the Hoover Institution on May 2, 2007. Production: Amy Bakke and Margo Schneider

17 On these other modalities, see Tod Lindberg, The Stanley Foundation “The Treaty of the Democratic Peace,” The 209 Iowa Avenue Weekly Standard, February 12, 2007, pp. Muscatine, IA 52761 USA 19-24; and Ivo Daalder and James Lindsey, 563-264-1500 “Democracies of the World, Unite,” The 563-264-0864 fax American Interest, Vol. 2, No. 3, [email protected] January/February 2007, pp. 5-19.

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