Crossing the Penalty Area? the Dynamics of Chinese/Taiwanese Football
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Crossing the penalty area? The dynamics of Chinese/Taiwanese football Tzu-hsuan Chen (National Taiwan Sport University) Alan Bairner (Loughborough University) Abstract Despite being the global game, football has never been a popular sport in Taiwan (Republic of China). Instead, baseball, a legacy of Japanese colonization between 1895 and 1945, has fulfilled the role of the nation’s most popular sport. After the Chinese Civil War and the retreat of the Kuomintang to the island, Martial Law was in place for 37 years and civil society was severely suppressed during the period. Despite its marginal status, however, football was appropriated as an extension of the military apparatus. Furthermore, with the assistance of Hong Kong football players, the Republic of China team won gold medals in men’s football at both the 1954 and 1958 Asian Games. Yet, football still failed to take root in Taiwan. From the 1990s onwards, however, there have been football-related interaction between Taiwan and mainland China (PRC). Po-liang Chen, the captain of the Taiwanese national football team and four other national team players, currently play in the PRC with the employment of these Taiwanese players being impacted by the Chinese government’s fluctuating policy towards Taiwan. In such circumstances, the migration of these football players 1 has triggered a bifurcated sense of identity towards China. On the one hand, the Taiwanese people recognize the economic prowess of China and want to seize the opportunities this offers. On the other hand, football fans in Taiwan continue to develop a unique political and cultural identity distinct from their rival. This chapter examines the complex relationship between Taiwan and China through football in different eras to shed light on China’s ambition in relation to the development of football, with particular reference to the implications for Taiwan. 2 Introduction The Chinese Civil War split the Chinese into two politically-conflicted countries from 1949. Both claimed to be the legitimate representative of China in the international community. However, following decades of struggle, the People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter) has become not only the undisputed sole representative of China and but also a seemingly unstoppable global superpower. Across Taiwan Strait, 23 million people dwell on the island of Taiwan which continues to bear the fading name of the Republic of China, even though it has official diplomatic relationships with only 18 countries in the world. Yet, the PRC has still sought to accelerate its efforts to annihilate Taiwan/ROC from international spheres on numerous occasions. Sport, like many other aspects of these two political entities, provides a lens through which to observe the different stages of cross-strait relations. It also highlights the differences between the two sides. While table tennis is regarded as the national game for the PRC, baseball reigns supreme in Taiwan. However, football, the world’s most popular sport, has been a constant reminder, embodied in different ways, of both countries’ lack of ability when competing with the major football playing countries of the world. With China’s rapid rise in the global stage, President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the development of football and the growing influence of the Chinese Super League, ironically, further expose the impotence of the Chinese national team which has not 3 qualified for the FIFA World Cup since 2002. “Guo zu(國足)”, short for national football team, has been a laughing stock even among loyal Chinese football fans. In contrast, football has never been in the spotlight in Taiwan. Even though the national team’s performances have been even worse than those of its Chinese counterpart, it has not suffered the humiliation in the eyes of its fans, even when Taiwan’s FIFA ranking plummeted as low as the 191st in the world in 2016. Despite moving away the bottom in the past two years, Taiwan is still referred as a “football desert” by its own media and fans. Although the quadrennial World Cup probably offers an exception, it is perceived more as an entertaining global consumer capitalist spectacle than as a matter of nationalistic sentiment. While Taiwan continues to struggle with China in the international political arena, its athletes often operate under the radar and become an awkward embodiment of their country’s predicament in relation to their rapidly rising rival. This chapter aims to examine cross-strait dynamics through the lens of football at different stages of the China-Taiwan relationship. In the first three decades after the end of the Chinese Civil War, football, among other sports, became a battleground for the antagonism between Taiwan/ROC and China/PRC. The rivalry did not necessarily unfold on the playing field, as Chinese and Taiwanese men’s teams never played against each other. However, the game away from the stadium, that is, the quest for the right to 4 represent China, persisted. More recently, the migration of Taiwanese footballers to China embodies a new breed of Taiwanese nationalism, whereby the Taiwanese compromise by admitting the prowess of Chinese politics and economy, while simultaneously managing to maintain or even develop a distinct cultural identity. To dissect this seemingly paradoxical condition, literature on relevant issues, especially Taiwan/Chinese nationalism, must be considered first. Am I Chinese? Putting together pieces of the history of Taiwan from a national identity perspective is a daunting mission, especially in relation to China. Scholars from various fields including history, political science, cultural studies, sociology, etc. have sought understand this issue from various angles, with primordialism and constructivism being the two main opposing perspectives. From the perspective of primordial nationalism, bloodline is the most natural and basic human characteristic. As China’s President Xi Jinping said during his meeting with Taiwan’s then-President Ma Yin-jeou in their historic encounter in Singapore in 2015, “No force can pull us apart because we are brothers who are still connected by our flesh even if our bones are broken, we are a family in which blood is thicker than water” (J. R. Wu & Shen, November 7, 2015). This statement encapsulated the unwavering claim for a primordial connection between 5 the people of the two sides of strait regardless of their political and ideological differences. From this perspective, Tang‐shan (唐山,or Southeast China) has become the common root and origin of blood even for the ben-sheng-rens, or original-province people, whose ancestors have migrated from the mainland to Taiwan for economic reasons since the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644). These ancestors from Southeast China who crossed Taiwan Strait, commonly called the “black ditch” at that time and settled on Formosa, as Taiwan was formerly known, captured the collective imagination of the ben-sheng-rens, who compose about 70 percent of Taiwanese population. The interrelationship between two sides of strait is even more convincing for wai-sheng- rens, or external-province people, comprising around 10% of the Taiwanese population, who, having been exiled to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in 1949 along with Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT administration, have a stronger pan-Chinese identity. To sum up, the ancestors of ben-shen-ren could be summarized as economic immigrants and wai-sheng-ren as political immigrants. In general, there are five major ethnic groups in Taiwan’s ethnic imagination. They are Aborigine, Hakka, Holo and wai-sheng-ren, and new immigrants, mostly referred to as southeast Asians. For the aboriginal peoples, the other three ethnic groups are all “Han Chinese”. For most wai-sheng-ren, both Holo and Hakka are ben-sheng-ren, who have different historical memories and cultures from them. 6 Collective memories and the sense of common destiny are two pillars of nationalism (Weber, 1994). However, each group in Taiwan has a special characterization of its history. As is suggested by George Orwell’s (1949) famous quote from 1984, “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past”, without common historical ground, seeking a monolithic Taiwanese identity and future is a difficult challenge. That is why Taiwanese nationalism has to be explained through a different discourse of nationalism. More complex and flexible schools of thought regarding nationalism prefer a constructivist view. For them, even the concept of primordialism can be a consequence of social construction. The idea of so-called blood-relatives does not necessarily mean objectively verifiable kinship ties. A nation can be a socially constructed imagined community, “a deep, horizontal comradeship”, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail” (Anderson, 1991, p. 7). In addition, identity can be an empty shell viewed from a more radical post-structural view. The meanings of identity here are twofold. First, the discussion of subject is based on freedom. However, real freedom cannot contain any substantial content. Second, emptiness does not mean annihilation. The empty subject constructs itself by digesting objects to alter its interior and exterior relations. In other words, the emptiness is not a vacuum but a receiving and meaning‐creating space (C.-y. Liao, 1995). Consistent with this perspective, 7 Brown (2004) stresses that even the Chineseness that Taiwan possesses, or once possessed, is no longer synonymous with China’s official claim