Needs a Passport: The Struggle of Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia for Religious and Ethnic Recognition Across

National Borders number 4 fall 2011 encounters Thien-Huong Ninh Abstract 133

This article examines how Vietnamese Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple in Phnom Penh are motivated to rebuild links and networks with their religious center in Vietnam after decades of isolation from each other.1 is a Vietnamese syncretistic that emerged in the French colony of Cochinchina during the early twentieth century. In 1927, the religion was formally brought to Cambodia. During the next four decades, Caodaists struggled to transplant their religion to a new society, including efforts to construct the Kim Bien Temple to house the Caodai Foreign Mission. However, during the late 1960s and 1970s, regional political instability and heightened anti-Vietnamese feelings led to their ties to the Caodai Holy See in Vietnam being cut and to the uprooting of Vietnamese Caodai religious life in Cambodia. After the fall of the Khmer Rouge government at the hands of the Vietnamese military in 1979, Caodaists began returning to Cambodia in large numbers and slowly revived religious life at the Kim Bien Temple. The greatest challenges faced by Caodaists are ethnic and religious exclusions. By 1991, their Kim Bien Temple had lost more than three-fourths of its land to local businesses and residents. Between 1992 and 1993, Caodaists were able to halt the land encroachment temporarily and gained religious recognition from the Cambodian government with assistance from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). However, the property dispute was left to be resolved in court, and Caodaists did not pursue legal action until 2003, when they formally re-established ties with the Holy See in Vietnam. By this time, Cambodia–Vietnam relations had improved and in turn had tempered anti-Vietnamese feelings in Cambodia. Within this context, religion had re-emerged and replaced ethnic discrimination as a legal basis for denying protection to Caodaists. Thien-Huong Ninh On November 28, 2006, Caodaists in Cambodia met with a group of Caodai dignitaries and communist cadres from Vietnam to transfer the tomb of Pope Pham Cong Tac from their temple to Toa Thanh Tay Ninh, the “Holy See” of the syncretistic Caodai religion in Vietnam. Despite Vietnamese governmental infiltration and control over the religious center since 1975, Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple in Phnom Penh remained loyal to Toa encounters Thanh Tay Ninh in their homeland. They believed that they were acting in accordance with the wishes of Pham Cong Tac, who wrote in his will that he hoped to return to his homeland only when it was “free, peaceful, and 134 united.” Meanwhile, they turned a blind eye to their co-religionists in the United States, who were organizing demonstrations and protests against the event, including a visit by a delegation to King Norodom Sihamoni of Cambodia. This article examines how an immigrant religious congregation rebuilt networks with its religious center in the homeland after decades of disconnection.2 It addresses three questions: (1) How is the Caodai temple in Cambodia motivated to realign with the Toa Thanh Tay Ninh, the Caodai Holy See, in Vietnam? (2) How does it foster forms of collaboration and how does it negotiate conflicts? (3) How does it shape this homeland orientation within the contexts of Vietnam–Cambodia regional politics and transnational relationships with Caodaists in the United States? The article examines the conditions under which cross-border religious ties emerge and how they facilitate the trajectory of integration for Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia. Migration scholars have generally argued that ethnic groups benefit from cross-border religious engagements.3 Through these forms of participation, ethnic groups capitalize strategically on their cultural assets and cope with the challenges of adaptation in host societies, such as exchanging resources with ethnic co-religionists in other countries in order to sustain local congregational activities.4 As Alejandro Portes (1999) has argued, transnationalism is not a process separate from assimilation, but an “antidote to the tendency towards downward assimilation.”5 However, can ethnicity be fully “optional” or “strategic” if it is structurally fixed? In Cambodia, Vietnamese may act, perform, and speak to pass as local Khmers, but face structural barriers that systematically exclude them on the basis of ancestry.6 In particular, they have been restricted by the lack of Cambodian citizenship. Without proper legal documentation and the lack of knowledge of Khmer, they can not easily find employment outside of their ethnic occupational niches, are vulnerable to poverty, and are not allowed to own property.7 In comparison to other ethnic groups, Vietnamese face more challenges in countering discrimination despite the large influx of their population after 1979.8 For example, Chinese in Cambodia have been able to shed their foreign status and gain full Cambodian citizenship. This is in part because they have demonstrated their loyalty and have established relations with Cambodians through their shared history of immense suffering under the Khmer Rouge genocide, in contrast to many Vietnamese who fled to Vietnam to escape this tragedy. The systemic exclusion of Vietnamese is grounded in Cambodia’s geopolitical insecurities. Vietnamese are perceived by Cambodians as having a long history of territorial invasion, since all of southern Vietnam was once part of the Khmer kingdom. Their presence today is seen as a threat to the country’s post-colonial nation-building project.9 Maps showing the southern region of Vietnam as a part of Cambodia continue to be displayed at many 135 public sites, including the Royal Palace and the National Library in Phnom Penh. Meanwhile, ethnic Vietnamese are still called by the derogatory racial epithet “youn” to reinforce their perpetual outsider status even if they may have lived in Cambodia for as many as four generations.10

Background of Caodaism

Caodaism emerged within the context of French colonialism in Cochinchina (the southernmost colony of French Indochina) during the early twentieth century. Its founders worked for the French colonial government and had learned Asian and European forms of spirit communication. In 1920, Ngo Minh Chieu became the first disciple to receive séance messages from the Venerable Cao Dai while he was posted as a district administrator by the French colonial government on the Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam. Coincidentally, five years later in Saigon, three younger servants, Cao Quynh Cu, Cao Hoai Sang (Cu’s nephew), and Pham Cong Tac, also received messages from the Venerable Cao Dai, urging them to establish a new religion uniting , , and with elements of . The four men met in early 1926 and began formulating plans to propagate the religion. On October 7, 1926, they submitted an official declaration of Caodaism to the Governor of Cochinchina, along with the signatures of 27 Caodai leaders and 247 members.11 They never received a reply from the Governor, but nevertheless proceeded to hold an inaugural ceremony on October 18, 1926 in Tay Ninh Province, approximately 100 kilometers northwest of Saigon, near the Cambodian border.12 Cao Đài in Vietnamese literally means “high palace,” referring to the Supreme Palace where the Venerable Cao Dai reigns. Caodaists emphasize that their religion originated in direct séance communications from God and not through human intermediaries.13 They often told me that God’s representation in the form of the Left Eye is not distinguishable by race, gender, and class. As such, Caodaism encompasses teachings of tolerance that are aimed at creating universal harmony between Western and Eastern philosophies, , and . Caodaism’s pantheon of religious teachers includes Confucius, Jesus Christ, Ly Thai Bach, Buddha, Laotzu, and Thien-Huong Ninh the Boddhisattva Kwan Yin. Its saints include Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat Sen, French philosopher Victor Hugo, and Vietnamese poet Nguyen Binh Khiem. The Caodai religion is organized or structured according to the Religious Constitution of Caodaism (Pháp Chánh Truyền), which was given to Caodai leaders by the Venerable Cao Dai through séance messages in 1926. There encounters are three administrative branches: (1) the Council of the Great Spirits, which is invisible and which consists of saints who had lived moral human lives; (2) the Legislative Body, which acts as the bridge between the human and 136 spiritual worlds; and (3) the Executive Body, which is responsible for all administrative and activities. These three administrative branches have equal powers and must act in accord to maintain harmony within the religion. Each branch has a religious hierarchy, with specified roles for functionaries and with a limited number of dignitary positions. Nominations to higher positions and promotions must gain approval from the Venerable Cao Dai through séances. However, since the 1975 communist takeover in Vietnam, the Caodai congregational structure has been reorganized. The three branches of governance have been combined into a state-sanctioned Council of Governance. Moreover, as séances have been prohibited, all candidates for leadership positions must be appointed by, or must have approval from, the government. The Caodai Holy See (Toà Thánh Tây Ninh), the religious headquarters, was built between 1932 and 1953 in a once deserted jungle area of the French-established Cochinchina state. Since its founding, it has attracted thousands of new inhabitants, the faithful and non-faithful alike, who flocked in large numbers to the religious center to receive not only religious blessings but also to seek safety from political and social unrest (Edwards 2007). According to many Caodaists, the Holy See’s eclectic and colorful architecture is a manifestation of the Venerable Cao Dai’s culturally multifaceted and universally encompassing teachings. Its impressive structure and design have been replicated by Caodai temples throughout the world to underline the connection with the original temple and as an expression of submission to the Holy See’s central authority.14 The Holy See oversees all religious activities connected with the religion, from text publication to membership registration and religious .15 Currently, Caodaism claims about 2.5 million followers in Vietnam, mostly concentrated in the south, in the Tay Ninh province.16 Vietnamese had been migrating to Cambodia as early as the 1800s, and had brought Caodaism to the country not long after it was declared a religion in 1926. According to a 2003 report by the Cambodian Ministry of Cults and , Caodaism has approximately 3,000 followers in the country.17 Caodaists in the country informed me that most of their co-religionists in Cambodia attend the Kim Bien Temple because of its central location. However, this number is probably fluid because of the continual flow of migration to and from across the border with Vietnam. Interviews with respondents reveal that most current active members at the Kim Bien Temple are either returning Vietnamese who fled to Vietnam during the 1970s or more recent Vietnamese immigrants who have now permanently resettled in Cambodia. Irregular members constitute the majority of the congregational membership. Most of them either live in Vietnamese ethnic enclaves far from Phnom Penh or frequently travel back and forth between Vietnam and Cambodia. The communist takeover of Vietnam in 1975 forced thousands of Cao- 137 daists to flee Vietnam and to transplant their religion in new societies. The largest Caodai community outside of Vietnam is in the United States; it has approximately 20,000 members, the majority of whom are living in California.18 Almost all Caodai followers are ethnic Vietnamese. During the course of my two-year fieldwork, I met only one non-Vietnamese Caodaist in Cambodia and heard about five others in the United States.

History of Caodaism and the Kim Bien Temple in Cambodia

In April 1927, approximately six months after the official declaration of Caodaism as a religion, the Pope of the Legislative Body, Pham Cong Tac, was transferred to Cambodia by his French employers. Pham Cong Tac decided that this provided an opportunity to lead a Caodai delegation to Phnom Penh.19 In Phnom Penh, he engaged in a series of exchanges with the spirit of Victor Hugo, using the phoenix-headed basket (đại ngọc cơ) and the more alphabetic planchetteti ( ểu ngọc cơ).20 Pham Cong Tac was instructed to form the Caodai Foreign Mission, with Victor Hugo as the Spiritual Chief. By this time, there was already a sizable group of Caodaists engaged in missionary activities in Cambodia.21 They were tolerated, but were also under the close surveillance of the Cambodian authorities and the French protectorate. In 1930, Caodaists in Cambodia purchased a piece of land on No. 37 Pierre Pasquier Avenue (present-day Monivong Avenue) in Phnom Penh to build the second largest Caodai temple, smaller than only the Caodai Holy See.22 The inaugural ceremony of the temple was held on May 22, 1937, the death anniversary of Victor Hugo, with Pope Pham Cong Tac and other prominent Caodai dignitaries in attendance. It was used as the headquarters of the Caodai Foreign Mission and formally established a structural bridge with the Holy See, which Khmers had been legally prohibited from visiting by this time.23 In addition, it functioned as an important temporary sanctuary for Caodai and non-Caodai Vietnamese fleeing the political upheavals and conflicts in Vietnam throughout the twentieth century.24 In June 1954, after Cambodia gained independence from France, Caodaists were forced by the Cambodian government to relocate their temple. Caodaists protested against the official plan to build the Military Thien-Huong Ninh Royal Direction of Veterinary Medicine on their land, but failed to stop the Cambodian government. Pham Cong Tac discussed the conflict with the Cambodian leader, Prince Sisovath Monineth, on their return flight from the Geneva Conference and gained his sympathy in their attempts to negotiate a compromise. As a result, on October 24, 1954, the Cambodian government signed a encounters letter of agreement stating that Caodaists would receive three lots of land (180 meters x 60 meters) on Toul-Svay-Prey in District 5, the present-day location of the Kim Bien Temple on Mao Tse Tung Street. The construction 138 of the temple began in 1955 and was completed a year later. However, the Cambodian government threatened repeatedly to demolish the temple because Caodaists had not received the appropriate permission for its construction. The dispute was taken to court and finally ended in 1962, when the mother of Prince Sihanouk intervened to support the Kim Bien Temple.25 During the 1950s and 1960s, Cambodia sought to remain neutral in the wars in Vietnam, between communist-led North Vietnamese, anti-communist South Vietnamese, the French, and the Americans. As a result, it avoided provoking political hostility with its neighbors by tolerating the presence of ethnic Vietnamese and Caodai religious activities within its territory. During these decades, the Kim Bien Temple became a refuge for a number of Caodai leaders from Vietnam, including Pope Pham Cong Tac, who were caught in the crossfire of hostilities with the Catholic-controlled Ngo Dinh Diem government of South Vietnam.26 However, the situation changed drastically after 1969, when King Sihanouk publicly accused Vietnamese of siding with Vietnamese communists and of fueling internal political agitation in his country. A year later, he was ousted by the US-supported Lon Nol regime. However, anti-Vietnamese rhetoric remained central to nationalist discourse and rhetoric across the political spectrum.27 It resulted in roughly a thousand casualties and the expatriation of 450,000 Vietnamese to Vietnam between 1970 and 1975.28 The Khmer Rouge toppled the Lon Nol government in 1975. Under its rule, which lasted until 1979, Cambodia expelled and killed nearly all remaining Vietnamese. The Kim Bien Temple was completely abandoned during this period. Caodaists began returning to Cambodia in large numbers after the fall of the Khmer Rouge government at the hands of the Vietnamese military in 1979.29 Many Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple told me that they were struggling to survive in Vietnam. They never had enough food because Vietnam, like Cambodia, was ravaged by war. Although they had received a piece of land from the Caodai Holy See, they did not know how to use it effectively. At least in Cambodia, they said, they had access to plenty of fish in the river and did not have to fear starvation. In addition, many returnees and recent Vietnamese immigrants saw more economic opportunities in Cambodia than in Vietnam. Caodaists recollected that the Khmer Rouge regime had killed many skilled Cambodians, leading to an employment vacuum during the postwar recovery period. As a result, they could easily find well-paid jobs in construction, plumbing, and electronics, which continue to be occupational niches of Vietnamese in Cambodia even today.

Motivations for Mending Inter-Temple Networks: Ethnic Animosity and Religious Marginalization 139 Although the Vietnamese government halted the Khmer Rouge genocide in 1979, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia between 1979 and 1989 has left the Khmers with some bitter memories. For example, while I was in the field, I learned that Cambodians continue to circulate a story about a group of Vietnamese soldiers who killed three Cambodian men and used their heads as stands for a stove. Stories like this framed the nationalist anti- Vietnamese discourses heard during the political elections held immediately following the departure of the Vietnamese military, leading up to the 1994 anti-immigration law that targeted ethnic Vietnamese.30 The Vietnamese- installed government of Prime Minister Hun Sen has gradually tempered anti-Vietnamese feelings since the late 1990s. However, Khmer–Vietnamese tensions continue to linger, although they are expressed much more covertly. For instance, Vietnamese and Cambodians alike have privately told me that most Cambodians would not vote for Hun Sen because he allows ethnic Vietnamese to stay in Cambodia.31 Caodaism, despite its of and , reinforces Cambodian–Vietnamese ethnic divides. As a religion from Vietnam, it has been perceived by Cambodian rulers as a Vietnamese political movement with colonial ambitions.32 Moreover, Caodaism’s Sinicized rituals, cultural practices, and linguistic usages are quite strange to Cambodia’s Indianized society, such as the emphasis on wearing Vietnamese traditional dress at religious ceremonies and the chanting of in Vietnamese. These differences have further accentuated Caodaism as a threat to Buddhism, Cambodia’s , and to its synonymous identification with the Khmer heritage. Consequently, Caodai religious life at the Kim Bien Temple is constantly on the edge of dissolution. First, Caodaists have been forced to practice their underground. They have to conduct their religious activities clandestinely, such as restricting the use of traditional religious instruments exclusively for important ceremonies and meditating quietly. Second, in their attempts to sustain the temple and their religious rituals, the community has faced economic challenges. A leader at the Kim Bien Temple informed me that since donations are voluntary, the temple rarely collects enough financial support to pay for utilities, food, and objects. Thien-Huong Ninh Leaders must often step in to help financially. The financial restraints exist in part due to the economic deprivation of Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia. A Caodaist informed me that he could save enough money to visit the temple only once every two months instead of twice a month as required by religious laws. He said that the cost of transportation and the donation to the temple prevented many Caodaists from attending the temple regularly. encounters Third, Caodaists lack political leverage to protect and defend themselves. This is particularly evident in their struggle to reclaim and protect the Kim Bien Temple’s property. They alleged that between 1979 and 1989, the 140 Cambodian Military sold many of the temple’s buildings to Khmers. At the same time, local Cambodians continued to trespass onto the temple grounds and to desecrate its sanctity, such as placing a toilet in front of the tomb of Pope Pham Cong Tac. In 1989, Kim Bien Temple representatives requested the ward-level Cambodian government to intervene in the matter but did not receive a reply.33 In 1990, they submitted a similar letter to the government in Phnom Penh.34 In the letter, they stated that “the activities of the citizens [who trespassed on the land of the Kim Bien Temple] as described above constitute violations of the right to religious freedom of [the] Caodai faithful and does [sic] not respect the order of the Cambodian Government, in its relations with citizens in its country and of the world with regards to religious freedom and civility.” In addition, the Caodaists emphasized “the deep level of collaboration between citizens of Cambodia and Vietnam, especially for those Caodai faithful who see Cambodia as their second home.” However, their request for protection from the Cambodian government was ignored. By 1991, the temple had lost more than three-fourths of its purchased land to local businesses and residents. Its original area of 180 meters x 60 meters was reduced to 25 meters x 27 meters. On May 1, 1991, a local Cambodian killed two elderly Caodai with a tractor as they tried to stop him from demolishing a pole on the temple’s compound. Caodaists were outraged by the tragedy, but, in the atmosphere of anti-Vietnamese nationalist feelings after the departure of the Vietnamese military, they silenced their outcry for fear that it would provoke even more violent aggression.35 In February 1992, Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple saw a glimmer of hope when the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) arrived in Cambodia. UNTAC worked with the Cambodian government to establish the Ministry of Cult and Religion (MOCAR). The initiative removed the control of the Cambodian socialist party over religious life and reduced restrictions on religion. It also institutionalized transparent legal mechanisms for certifying religious groups and for safeguarding their well-being.36 Within a few months, Caodai representatives approached UNTAC for assistance with their attempts to seek legal recognition and to reclaim the Kim Bien Temple’s property. UNTAC took the matter seriously and ordered the International Civilian Police to protect the temple and its leaders.37 In letters exchanged with Cambodian politicians, UNTAC reminded them that “the Supreme National Council of Cambodia has formally adopted legislation with regard to the rights of free association including by religious groups”38 and pressed the MOCAR Minister to “fully endorse the recognition of the Caodai religion to resume its practices.”39 Thereafter, UNTAC also requested the Cambodian authorities to cease all construction on the temple’s property until its case had been resolved.40 Although the construction stopped for a short time, it continued and the Kim Bien Temple had to remind the Cambo- 141 dian government to intervene multiple times.41 The dispute also provoked King Sihanouk to send a letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen on behalf of the Kim Bien Temple, urging him to help the “ethnic Vietnamese of the Caodai religion.”42 These external and internal political pressures forced MOCAR to recognize Caodaism as a religion in 1993, but left the property dispute to be resolved in court.43 However, Caodaists did not trust the legal system. Leaders of the Kim Bien Temple informed me that the legal expenses may well have been affordable, but that they could not win the case without paying exorbitant bribes. As a result, within the next ten years following the departure of UNTAC in September 1993, they did not pursue court action to reclaim the property of their temple. They remained ethnically isolated from, and religiously marginalized in, Cambodian society.

Cross-Border Temple Collaborations: Political and Leverage within Regional Politics

The Kim Bien Temple saw an opportunity to exercise legal leverage through Vietnam during the late 1990s, at a tune when Vietnam had institutionalized mechanisms to support Vietnamese in Cambodia and to officially recognized Caodaism. Vietnam had often publicly expressed its concerns over anti- Vietnamese attacks in Cambodia, but it did not pursue a concrete course of action until the two countries improved relations. In 1998, Vietnam and Cambodia established a joint border committee to resolve one of the most contentious issues between the two countries.44 This partly paved the way for Cambodia’s acceptance into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the end of December 1998 in Hanoi, effectively ending its isolation from its neighbors. As the bilateral relationship progressed, the Vietnamese government gradually became much more involved in Cambodia’s internal affairs concerning the well-being of Vietnamese in the country. It replaced the leadership of the Overseas Vietnamese Organization (Hội Việt Kiều) in Phnom Penh and transformed the group into an arm of its embassy. This caused internal rifts within the organization and forced many members to distance themselves from it, including several Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple. A Caodaist informed me that only former Vietnamese Thien-Huong Ninh soldiers who had worked for the Vietnamese government during its occupation of Cambodia could hold leadership positions. This is indeed the background of the current president of the organization in Phnom Penh, who stayed in Cambodia after the Vietnamese military formally withdrew in 1989, and who married a local Cambodian woman. In 2003, the organization registered itself with the Cambodian government as the Organization of encounters Cambodian People of Vietnamese Ancestry (Hội Người Campuchia Gốc Việt Nam), although it continues to be informally referred to by its former name, Overseas Vietnamese Organization.45 142 In an interview, the current president of OCPVA in Phnom Penh denied any ties to the Vietnamese government. However, my conversations with local Vietnamese and a Web search of its activities revealed that the organization had received a significant amount of charitable funding from the Vietnamese government.46 The group had used the support to establish Vietnamese-language schools, to distribute food to local Vietnamese, and to provide assistance for business-related activities. Moreover, according to its president, OCPVA not only serves and represents Vietnamese who have become permanent residents of Cambodia, but also temporary Vietnamese migrant workers. As such, its role is expected to become increasingly significant in facilitating Vietnam–Cambodia relations as the border between the two countries becomes more porous.47 Meanwhile, Vietnam’s official acceptance of Caodaism as a religion in 1997 also signaled to the Kim Bien Temple that the country could be an important political ally.48 The recognition emerged within the context of Vietnam’s accelerated efforts to pursue economic globalization following normalization of relations with the United States in 1995. These undertakings propelled Vietnam to observe international mandates of human rights protection, including religious freedom. As a result, Vietnam loosened its restrictions on religious practices and institutionalized a transparent system of certification that protected “legitimate” religions while suppressing all “superstitious” activities (mê tín dị đoan).49 Following these changes, the Caodai Holy See rewrote its religious charter.50 It endorsed and reaffirmed modifications inCaodai religious life that the Vietnamese government had already enforced, including state involvement in religious ordination and the prohibition of “superstitious” religious practices such as séances. The Caodai Holy See also centralized authority within the religion under the newly established Council of Governance, all of whose members are appointed by the Vietnamese state. In 1997, the Caodai Holy See successfully gained recognition for Caodaism as a state religion of Vietnam. Vietnam’s increased involvement in Cambodia’s internal affairs con- cerning ethnic Vietnamese, and its recognition of Caodaism, prompted the Kim Bien Temple to seek its political support through the Holy See in the late 1990s. Several representatives of the temple began making regular trips across the border to meet with members of the Council of Governance in Tay Ninh. Among them was Mr. Ngo.51 He grew up in a Caodai family in Vietnam and emigrated to Cambodia in 1980 in search of economic opportunities. He obtained Cambodian citizenship through his marriage to a local Chinese Cambodian woman and, over the years, became fluent in Khmer. In 2001, a delegation of Caodai leaders from the Holy See visited the Kim Bien Temple. A year later, Mr. Ngo was ordained as a priest by the Holy See’s 143 Council of Governance. This entitled him to the highest position at the Kim Bien Temple, which had not had a Holy See-ordained leader for more than two decades. Thereafter, Mr. Ngo established the first Holy See-recognized Management Committee, with himself as its first president. On January 29, 2003, he registered the leadership body with the local Cambodian government and obtained its approval.52 In March 2003, the Kim Bien Temple formally declared its affiliation with the Holy See at a grand celebration of its newly established Management Committee. The event was attended by Caodai leaders from Vietnam as well as Cambodian and Vietnamese politicians, including representatives from the Organization of Cambodian People of Vietnamese Ancestry. The Kim Bien Temple has become a mediator of crossings between Vietnam and Cambodia as a result of its affiliation with the Holy See. It is a popular center that regularly welcomes Vietnamese Caodaists and non- Caodaists. Members often serve as tour guides to these visitors and play an important role in helping newly arrived Vietnamese to become familiar with Cambodian society. When I was in the field, I met two Caodaists from Vietnam who began living at the Kim Bien Temple while making plans to establish businesses in Cambodia. These cross-border exchanges have also benefited permanent Vietnamese residents. Several Caodaists at the temple informed me that they have re-established relations with lost family members and friends through meetings with visitors from Vietnam. They have also received generous support in the form of charity from Vietnam, including rice, money, and books. The Kim Bien Temple’s role as a cross-border mediator is also embedded within the politics of Vietnam–Cambodia relations. The temple has become a meeting ground for Cambodian and Vietnamese politicians, who visit regularly, not only to express friendship and financial support, but also to share news and discuss political matters. In turn, the temple’s Management Committee is responsible for informing the two governments on issues pertaining to religious life and to the position of Vietnamese in Cambodia. The committee is also obligated to facilitate exchanges between the two governments. For example, in August 2010, members of the temple were requested by the Holy See’s Council of Governance to lead a delegation Thien-Huong Ninh of Cambodian politicians, including the Minister of MOCAR, to attend the autumn Mother ceremony in Tay Ninh. Leaders of the Holy See welcomed the Cambodian politicians and introduced them to their Vietnamese counterparts. Although the two sides had met previously in private settings, this was the first time that they were meeting publicly, this time at the largest annual Caodai event in Vietnam. Mr. Ngo privately encounters complained to me that his temple had to bear the entire cost of bringing the Cambodian politicians to Tay Ninh. However, he also added that he hoped that through this visit he could gain their sympathy toward his temple. 144 As the Kim Bien Temple’s political outreach expanded through re- connections to the Holy See in Vietnam, it soon decided to flex its political muscles to reclaim its lost property in court. It successfully convinced Mr. Tran Quang Canh, a Tay Ninh Caodaist based in the United States, to con- tribute $4,000 toward the cost of the legal proceedings.53 On June 6, 2003, three months after it had celebrated the establishment of its first Holy See- recognized Management Committee, the Kim Bien Temple submitted letters to the Court of Phnom Penh concerning the continuing illegal construction on its property.54 It stated that the construction had stopped as a result of UNTAC’s order in 1993, but had recently resumed. On June 16, 2003, Mr. Ngo represented the Kim Bien Temple in a Phnom Penh court case demanding the return of property from the resident of house #288 on Mao Tse Tung Street. Mr. Ngo won the case in early July 2003 as well as its appeal later in the same month.55 However, the battle did not end. On February 16, 2006, the case was brought before the Highest Court of Cambodia.56 Recently, on September 9, 2010, Mr. Ngo lost the case. Caodaists told me that they had expected the defeat because they did not have as much money as the defendant to bribe the judge and politicians. The court’s recent decision reflects the continuing legal exclusion of Caodaism from state protection. In the case, Mr. Ngo advanced Decree 42, signed on November 27, 1993 by Hun Sen to defend the temple’s property.58 Under section 2 of the law, all governmental institutions and citizens must return property owned by religious bodies to religious leaders. However, the court supported the defense’s contention that the law refers only to formerly Buddhist-owned property, as specified under section 3, because Theravada Buddhism is the “national religion” whereas the “Caodai Religion is only a congregation . . . that does not have a relevant legal basis” in the law.59 In addition, the court’s letter stated that the property was “legally purchased,” with the relevant documentation provided, and therefore the “claimant cannot demand for the return of his ownership before 1979.”60 Within the context of close relations with Vietnam during the post- UNTAC period, religion has re-emerged and replaced ethnic discrimination as a legal basis for denying protection to Caodaists. Under the guidance and observation of UNTAC between 1992 and 1993, Cambodia signed international legislation pertaining to the right of free religious association and the recognition of Caodaism. However, the country remained hostile to Vietnamese on the basis of ethnicity, manifesting this hostility by, for example, explicitly excluding them from citizenship in the 1993 constitution and by passing the 1994 anti-immigration law that targeted Vietnamese.61 Cambodia’s legal attitudes toward religion and Vietnamese ethnicity have moved from one extreme to the other after the departure of UNTAC. As the 2010 court decision in the Kim Bien Temple’s case illustrates, Cambodia has not institutionalized legal mechanisms to protect religious groups and 145 their rights other than its state religion, Theravada Buddhism. Furthermore, by identifying “before 1979” as a temporal demarcation between legally protected and non-protected possessions, but without offering explicit reasons for this cut-off date, the court’s letter suggests that the Kim Bien Temple’s right to landownership in Cambodia is temporary. In contrast, Cambodia provides full and unrestricted protection to Theravada Buddhist sites and preserves their sanctity by demanding that they be returned to religious leaders. Religion rather than ethnicity, therefore, has become a legal basis for denying Caodaists protection within the context of the improved relations between Vietnam and Cambodia since the late 1990s.

Cross-Border Temple Conflicts: Religious Centralization and Restricted Global Outreach under the Eyes of the Religious Center

The legal leverage that the Kim Bien Temple gained from its relations with the Caodai Holy See was also marked by conflict. Many members of the Kim Bien Temple believed that the Caodai Holy See has been desecrated under the control of the Vietnamese government, beginning in 1975. In particular, they maintained that the establishment of the Council of Governance in 1977 violated the religious charter written by the Caodai founders. The council had concentrated Caodaism’s three separate and equal branches of governance into the hands of members appointed by the state rather than those chosen by Caodai through séances. However, these Caodaists have not dared to openly express their opposi- tion to the Kim Bien Temple’s Management Committee. They did not share with me the reasons for their reticence. Based on my observations, I gather that they fear for their survival. Most of them are poor and are dependent on the networks of support established through the Kim Bien Temple. Moreover, they value the identification card issued by the local government that recognizes them as a Caodaist. It is a legal form of protection that they can use in the face of interrogation about their faith. However, if they oppose the Management Committee, they would be expelled from the Kim Bien Temple and would not be permitted to register themselves with the Thien-Huong Ninh Cambodian government. For example, on February 16, 2009, two members of the Management Committee were formally forbidden from returning to the temple because they opposed the Holy See’s Council of Governance.62 The Management Committee interpreted their opposition as an attempt “to subvert” the temple’s leadership and as seeking to “divide the community of the faithful.”63 encounters The centralization of Caodaism under the control of the Council of Governance in turn had restrained the Kim Bien Temple from establishing and maintaining ties with co-religionists in the United States. When a 146 delegation of Vietnamese Caodaists and other followers from California and Texas visited the Kim Bien Temple in 2006, the temple welcomed the visitors and, as a friendly gesture, accepted their gift of a statue of Pope Pham Cong Tac. However, the temple could not fulfill the delegation’s request to install the statue permanently in its compound because of disapproval from the Caodai Holy See. Mr. Ngo explained, “The Holy See informed us that, according to religious laws, only it could house any statue of Pham Cong Tac. It is a blasphemy to have his statue elsewhere.”64 However, when I asked him for the details of the religious law, he said that the Holy See did not share this specific information with him. Currently, the statue of Pope Pham Cong Tac is enclosed in a glass case and concealed under a thick opaque sheet of fabric. It is hidden in the Management Committee’s private office. On June 12, 2009, the US-based Vietnamese delegation sent a letter on the letterhead of the “Vietnamese-American Republican National Heritage Federation Council of USA” requesting the Kim Bien Temple to return the statue.65 However, the Kim Bien Temple never replied. On November 10, 2010, one of the delegation’s members visited the temple but was not greeted by its Management Committee.66 Similarly, in 2006, the Kim Bien Temple did not heed co-religionists in the United States when they protested vehemently against the transfer of Pope Pham Cong Tac’s remains from Cambodia to Vietnam. According to Mr. Ngo, the temple had to collaborate with the Caodai Holy See because the Council of Governance had received approval and support from the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. As Mr. Ngo elaborated:

Everything had already been planned and so we had no choice but to accept and collaborate with the request [to transfer the remains of Pham Cong Tac]. Because of my prayers, along with a number of brothers in the Management Council and the Council of Governance, the event went smoothly and peacefully. Here in Cambodia they [the government] helped us by providing three ferry-boats . . . When we arrived to the other side of the border, our brothers and sisters were waiting for us in as many as 500, 700 cars. . . . So the Cambodia [government] side helped out a lot with security and we did not encounter any problems along the roads . . . the Vietnamese [government] side also supported this effort.67 The Kim Bien Temple’s relations with Caodaists in the United States could threaten Vietnam’s national agenda of economic liberalization. Ever since the country opened up its border and adopted the free-market economy in the late 1980s, the Vietnamese Caodai community in the United States, the largest one outside of the homeland, has had the opportunity to scrutinize Vietnam’s human rights records. The US community remained distant from the Caodai Holy See, accusing it of being an arm of the Vietnamese government, and it developed an independent international system of organization. In 1999, a group of Caodaists and Vietnamese members of 147 other religious groups presented their concerns regarding religious freedom in Vietnam to the US Congress. In 2004, the US State Department designated Vietnam as one of the “countries of particular concern” because of its violations of religious freedom.68 Thereafter, the Vietnamese government further relaxed its policies regarding religions in order to be removed from the blacklist. In 2006, it released a white paper, Religion and Policies Regarding Religion in Vietnam, to explain the government’s intentions to institute a stronger legal framework of religious recognition and to broaden its certification of religion to include .69 At the same time, it strengthened the grounding of Caodaism in Vietnam in order to counter and weaken the political leverage of Caodaists in the United States. In 2007, ten years after Caodaism was recognized as a religion, the Vietnamese government officially recognized it as “an indigenous religion of south Vietnam” (tôn giáo bản địa), with the publication of Pham Bich Hop’s state-sponsored work, People of the Southern Region and Indigenous Religions: Buu Son Ky Huong – Caodaism – Hoa Hao Buddhism (Người Nam Bộ và tôn giáo bản địa: Bửu Sơn Kỳ Hương - Cao Đài - Hòa Hảo).70 Although Caodaism has been locally known as a domestic religion among Caodaists and non-Caodaists alike, the book is a symbolic and political recognition of Caodaism in Vietnamese society. It reaffirms Vietnam as the root of Caodai religious life and practices, and in effect marginalizes the oppositional voices of anti-communist Caodaists in the United States. Today, the Caodai Holy See has become a stage for Vietnam to display Caodaism to the rest of the world in an officially monitored setting, distant from the protests of oppositional Caodaists. Tour agencies throughout Ho Chi Minh City offer one-day bus travel package tours to the Caodai Holy See and to the Cu Chi Tunnel. Usually, tourists arrive daily at 11.00 a.m. to observe the noon meditation session at the Holy See before heading to the Cu Chi Tunnel on their way back to Ho Chi Minh City. Often, they cannot interact with Caodaists due to language barriers. As a result, their introduction to Caodaism is limited to information about the religion given by tour guides. In addition to these daily visits, the Holy See also hosts important diplomatic meetings. In 2010, during the annual Festival of the Thien-Huong Ninh Great Mother at the Caodai Holy See, the Vietnamese government granted permission to the Holy See to receive cultural and political representatives from Cambodia and Bangladesh. State-owned national television stations interviewed the visitors and boosted Vietnam’s image as a country of religious tolerance. Members of the Kim Bien Temple resolved conflicts with the Caodai encounters Holy See by referencing the history of affiliation. They recognized their temple as “Model #2” (Mẫu 2) based on the Holy See, and stated that it had been planned as the second largest temple.71 A Caodaist referred to 148 the history of affiliation: “Our temple is far [from the Caodai Holy See], but the Revered Leader [Pham Cong Tac] came here [Cambodia] a long time ago to establish the Caodai Missionary Center here. The Caodai Holy See is the most important religious site, but the second most important one is here. The Revered Leader came here in order to spread the religion.”72 The Kim Bien Temple has had close ties to the Holy See since its establishment in the 1930s. However, political instability and change in Vietnam and Cambodia since the 1950s led to the gradual deterioration in these relations. By the end of the 1970s, the Kim Bien Temple had become completely isolated from its religious center. Consequently, it lost its religious title and was reduced to simply a community center. However, socio-political conditions became favorable for cross-border exchanges with the Holy See in the late 1990s, and since then Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple have sought to resurrect its religious status by restoring connections to the Holy See, even if it is under the control of the Vietnamese communist government. Furthermore, by drawing on the history of cross-temple ties, Caodaists in Cambodia affirmed the Caodai Holy See as the “root” (gốc) of their religion. They believed that since the Holy See is the religious center that manifests God, it is the origin of Caodaism. As such, all Caodaists must show continuous submission to it. As a Caodaist at the Kim Bien Temple elaborated, “[The Holy See] is our religious root. For any country that wants to establish Caodaism in its society, it must receive permission from the Caodai Holy See . . . Why is it like this? Because it was established according to divine mandates received by the Revered Leader [Pham Cong Tac]. No one would dare to disobey the orders of the Venerable Caodai.”73 From this position of loyalty and deference to the Caodai Holy See, Caodaists in Cambodia expressed sympathy with its struggle to survive under difficult conditions under communism. They understand that the Holy See must work with the Vietnamese government and should not dwell on the history of separation between state and religion. As a Caodaist at the Kim Bien Temple explained, “If we want to do anything, we must present a proposal to the Vietnamese government so that they would know. When they accept it and give us permission then we [Caodaists] would proceed . . . This is different from before, when the country was different. Religious groups had authority then. They could do anything they wanted and the government did not interfere. However, today’s situation is different.” By using “we” in discussing the situation of Caodaists in Vietnam, he asserted the importance of the affiliation with the Holy See and the existence of a global community of Caodaists. He suggested that Caodaists inside and outside Vietnam should sympathize with the Holy See’s struggle to survive in difficult conditions under communism because its struggle represents the struggle of all Caodaists. 149 Conclusion: Religion and Ethnicity in Local and Global Politics

Cross-border relations between the Kim Bien Temple and its Holy See have not facilitated the full inclusion of Vietnamese Caodaists into Cambodian society. Although the arrival of UNCTAC in the early 1990s did not safeguard ethnic diversity in Cambodia, it nevertheless established freedom of religious association as an international legal basis for Vietnamese Caodaists to protect and defend themselves in the country. However, the law did not institutionalize equal protection amongst different religious organizations. This oversight preserves the recognition of Theravada Buddhism as a state religion of Cambodia and secures the well-being of its institutions and activities. Simultaneously, it marginalizes non-state religious groups and their unique experiences in Cambodia. Since the late 1990s, as Vietnam– Cambodia relations have improved and as Vietnamese–Khmer animosity in Cambodia has lessened, this discrepancy in legal protection for Theravada Buddhist and other religious organizations has become much more visible than ethnic discrimination. Thus, despite the legal, cultural, and political leverage exercised by Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple as a result of their ties to the Holy See in Vietnam, Caodaism could not obtain protection equal to that of Theravada Buddhist groups in Cambodian society. Nevertheless, reconnecting with the Holy See is an act of healing for Vietnamese Caodaists in Cambodia, who have been traumatized by the history of multiple displacements, isolation, and marginalization. Experiencing ethnic violence and political persecution throughout the twentieth century, they have been crossing between their host society and their homeland, neither of which has embraced them fully. These moments of rupture have broken their transnational religious networks, disrupted their congregational organization, and affected their kinship relations. The re-establishment of affiliation with the Holy See in Vietnam in 2003 marks the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Caodaism. It breathes new life into Caodaism, encouraging Caodaists to bring the rest of the world to the roots of their religion in Vietnam. Thien-Huong Ninh Notes

1 The study analyzes preliminary ethnographic data collected in Cambodia (seven months), Vietnam (seven months), and the United States (eight months).

2 The study analyzes preliminary ethnographic data collected in Cambodia (seven months), Vietnam (seven months), and the United States (eight months). encounters

3 Fenggang Yang and Helen Rose Ebaugh, “Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and their Global Implications,” American Sociological Review 66(2), (2001): 269–88; Helen Rose 150 Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000).

4 Thuan Huynh, “Center for Vietnamese Buddhism: Recreating Home,” in Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations, ed. Helen Rose Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press: 2000), 44–66.

5 Alejandro Portes, “Conclusion: Towards a New World – The Origins and Effects of Transnational Activities,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(2), (1999): 471.

6 Stefan Ehrentraut, “Perpetually Temporary: Citizenship and Ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(5), (2011): 779–798.

7 C. Chou Meng Tarr, “The Vietnamese Minority in Cambodia,” Race and Class 34(2), (1992): 33–47.

8 Ehrentraut, “Perpetually Temporary,” 779–798.

9 Penny Edwards, Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation 1860–1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007).

10 Tarr, “The Vietnamese Minority in Cambodia,” 41.

11 Gabriel Gobron, History and Philosophy of Caodaism: Reformed Buddhism, Vietnamese Spiritism, New Religion in Eurasia. Translated from the French by Pham Xuan Thai (San Jose, CA: Anh Sang Phuong Dong Publication: 2007), 33.

12 Mohammad Jahangir Alam, “Cao Dai Understanding of God,” December 2008, accessed April 1, 2010 (http://english.caodai.net/index.php?option=com_content& view=article&id=78:cao-dai-understanding-of god&catid=35:Various%20Essays&Itemid= 60).

13 Merdeka Thien-Ly Huong Do, Cao Daiism: An Introduction (Perris, CA: Cao Dai Temple Overseas, Center for Dai Dao Studies, 1994), 3.

14 Christopher Hartney, “A Strange Peace: Đạo Cao Đài and its Manifestation in Sydney” (PhD diss., University of Sydney, 2004); Janet Hoskins, “Can a Hierarchical Religion Survive without its Center? Caodaism, Colonialism, and Exile,” in Hierarchy: Persistence and Transformation in Social Transformations, ed. Knut Mikjel Rio and Olaf H. Smedal (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2009; Jérémy Jammes, “Caodaism and its Global Networks: An Ethnological Analysis of a Vietnamese Religious Movement in Vietnam and Abroad,” Moussons 13/14 (2009): 339–58.

15 There are about a dozen other denominations of Caodaism, which all respect Tay Ninh as the first center of the religion, but which have followed their own paths under different leaders. Although no exact statistical counts are available at present, observations and conversations with Caodaists indicate that the Holy See-oriented Tay Ninh branch has approximately half of all Caodaists and the other denominations have the other half.

16 Janet Hoskins, “Can a Hierarchical Religion Survive without its Center?” 128. 151 17 Cambodian Ministry of Cult and Religion, “Numbers of Religious Followers and Institutions in Cambodia,” 2003.

18 Janet Hoskins, “Emigration, Exile and Exodus: Overseas Vietnamese Communities from the Perspective of Indigenous Religions” (paper presented at the International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Kunming, China, July 15–23, 2008).

19 Ngoc Duyen Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ” (The Kim Bien Temple in 80 Years), in Ban Tin Dao, 2006, accessed August 1, 2010 (http://vietngu.caodai.net/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154:thanh-tht-kim-bien-trong-80-nm).

20 Gobron, History and Philosophy of Caodaism, 91. This is an alphabetic divination board similar to an Oujia board. It is a flat round board, with the letters of the alphabet arranged in a fan formation, so that the spirit medium can simply turn a pointer to the different letters to spell out a message.

21 Edwards, Cambodge, 201.

22 Kim Bien Temple, “Brief history and blueprint, ‘The Caodai Temple and its centers in Phnom Penh (has been destroyed from 1975 to 12/31/1991)’.” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: December 31, 1991).

23 Edwards, Cambodge, 201.

24 Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ”

25 There were two other smaller Caodai temples by 1969: one in Chamkarmon (a present- day municipality of Phnom Penh) and the other in Battambang. See Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ” During my fieldwork, Caodaists at the Kim Bien Temple told me that they were unaware of these temples.

26 Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ”

27 Penny Edwards, “Imaging the Other in Cambodian Nationalist Discourse Before and During the UNTAC Period,” in Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-Keeping, ed. Stephen R. Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 56. 28

Thien-Huong Ninh Ramses Amer, “Cambodia and Vietnam: A Troubled Relationship,” in International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism, ed. N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 94.

29 Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ”

30 Ehrentraut, “Perpetually Temporary,” 789. encounters 31 Their comments suggest that Hun Sen has been voted in by local Vietnamese. My fieldwork indicates that many Vietnamese in Cambodia have been able to purchase their 152 voting identification and other documents through bribes. Ehrentraut (2011) has also made similar observations.

32 Edwards, Cambodge, 198.

33 Kim Bien Temple, “Letter to the Government of the Ward Tumnuptuc, Chamkamon District” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: December 19, 1989).

34 Ibid., “Letter to the Phnom Penh Government” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: January 18, 1990).

35 Ha, “Thanh That Kim Bien Trong 80 Nam . . . ”

36 John A. Marston and Elizabeth Guthrie, History, Buddhism, and New Religious Movements in Cambodia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004).

37 United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC), “Letter to Mr. E. Vetere, Provincial Director, Phnom Penh Province, Civil Administration, regarding the complaint from Mr. Ngo Khi Phu and Mr. Vor Vang Long” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: September 17, 1992).

38 Ibid., “Letter to Mr. Sim Ka, Mayor of Phnom Penh People’s Committee” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: November 23, 1992).

39 Ibid., “Letter to the Minister, Ministry of Religious Affairs, State of Cambodia” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: March 3, 1993).

40 Ibid., “Letter to Mr. Kry Beng Hong, Vice-Mayor, People’s Committee of Phnom Penh, regarding restraining order – Cao Dai Case, no. 280 Keo Mony Street, Chamkamon District” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: March 22, 1993).

41 Kim Bien Temple, “Letter to Mr. Samuth Thoeun, Vice Deputy Chief, District Chamkamon, regarding the ongoing construction on temple site” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: July 1, 1993). Ibid., “Letter to Mr. Kry Beng Hong, Vice President of Phnom Penh, regarding the ongoing construction on temple ground, against the order of UNTAC” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: August 30, 1993).

42 Norodom Sihanouk, Former King of Cambodia, “Letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: January 24, 1993).

43 UNTAC, “Letter to Mr. Kry Beng Hong, Vice-Mayor,” March 22, 1993. 44 Amer, “Cambodia and Vietnam: A Troubled Relationship,” 100.

45 Hiep Nguyen, “Đại hội người Campuchia gốc Việt Nam” (National Conference of Cambodian People of Vietnamese Ancestry, June 3, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011 (http://vov.vn/Home/Dai-hoi-nguoi-Campuchia-goc-Viet-Nam/20113/168544.vov).

46 Vietnam News Agency (Thông Tấn Xã Việt Nam), “Trường Việt Kiều ở Campuchia Hoạt Động Hiểu Quả (Vietnamese Language School Activities in Cambodia are Successful), July 27, 2010, accessed December 1, 2010 (http://www.baomoi.com/Truong-Viet-kieu- o-Campuchia-hoat-dong-hieu-qua/59/4618408.epi); Ibid., 400 Gia Đình Việt Kiều ở Campuchia bị Hoà Hoản” (400 Overseas Vietnamese Families in Cambodia Suffer from 153 Fire), March 29, 2004, accessed April 1, 2010 (http://vietbao.vn/Xa-hoi/400-gia-dinh-Viet- kieu-o-Campuchia-bi-hoa-hoan/10856383/157/).

47 In 2008, Vietnam and Cambodia signed a visa exemption agreement. On April 27, 2001, the state-run Vietnamese News Agency reported that Vietnam planned to open ten more auxiliary gates in the Tay Ninh province, bordering the Svay Rieng and Kompong Cham provinces of Cambodia. To date, these provinces have two international gates, four main gates, and ten auxiliary gates. See ASEAN Affairs, “Cambodia, Vietnam Sign Visa Agreement,” November 9, 2008, accessed August 1, 2010. (http://www.aseanaffairs. com/cambodia_vietnam_sign_visa_agreement); Vietnam News Agency, “Tay Ninh to Open More Auxiliary Border Gates,” April 27, 2011, accessed April 28, 2011 (http:// en.www.info.vn/society/more/24546-tay-ninh-to-open-more-auxiliary-border-gates- .html).

48 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Vietnam: International Religious Freedom Report 2004,” accessed April 1, 2006 (http://www.state. gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35433.htm).

49 Edyta Roszko, “Commemoration and the State: Memory and Legitimacy in Vietnam,” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 25(1), (2010): 1–28; Mathieu Bouquet, “Vietnamese Party-State and since 1986: Building the Fatherland?” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 25(1), (2010): 90–108.

50 Jammes, “Caodaism and its Global Networks,” 351–52.

51 This is a pseudonym.

52 Committee on Rituals and Religion of Phnom Penh, “Letter to the Kim Bien Temple regarding the establishment of a new Management Committee” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: January 16, 2003).

53 Mr. Tran Quang Canh first visited the Kim Bien Temple in 2001 along with the delegation from the Holy See. His father, Tran Quang Vinh, played an important role in the temple’s early years. He was a bishop who worked closely with Pope Pham Cong Tac on the religion’s missionary programs, as well as on founding the Caodai Army. He served briefly as the Minister of Defense of (southern) Vietnam in the early 1950s. The young Tran followed his father’s footsteps in the United States; he was the president of the Overseas Caodai Mission based in Washington, D.C. Jammes’s (2009) article notes that Mr. Tran’s global aspirations eventually encouraged him to re-establish ties with the Holy See. However, it Thien-Huong Ninh does not mention that the majority of Caodaists in the United States opposed Mr. Tran’s action and accused him of condoning the Vietnamese communist government’s control of the Holy See. This opposition gradually led to the disintegration of Mr. Tran’s organization in the early 2000s.

54 Kim Bien Temple, “Letter to the Court of Phnom Penh regarding the construction on temple ground” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: June 6, 2003). Ibid., “Letter to the Phnom Penh encounters Court requesting it to stop Mr. Kim Navan from building and engaging in business activities on temple property” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: June 25, 2003).

154 55 Court of Phnom Penh, “Decision letter stating the case application submitted byMr. Vo Quang Minh is accurate and legal” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: July 1, 2003). Ibid., “Decision letter stating ‘the court upholds the decision made on July 1, 2003’” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: July 30, 2003).

56 Highest Court of Cambodia, “Letter regarding case involving Mr. Vo Quang Minh and Mr. Kim Navan” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: February 16, 2006).

57 Ibid., “Decision letter regarding case between Mr. Kim Navan and Mr. Vo Quang Minh” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: September 9, 2010).

58 Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, “Decree #42: Decree Regarding the Fundamental Supervision of Temples and Their Properties” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: December 27, 1993).

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ehrentraut, “Perpetually Temporary,” 789.

62 Kim Bien Temple, “Blue Record Book of Temple Activities: Entry regarding the forbidding of Nguyen Thi Ngoc and Nguyen Ngoc Long from returning to the temple” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: February 16, 2009).

63 Ibid.

64 Mr. Ngo, Interview (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: June 12, 2010).

65 Vietnamese-American Republican National Heritage Federation Council of USA, “Letter to the Kim Bien Temple requesting the return of the statue of Pope Pham Cong Tac” (Irondequoit, NY: June 12, 2009).

66 Kim Bien Temple, “Blue Record Book of Temple Activities” (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: November 10, 2010).

67 Mr. Ngo, Interview (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: August 7, 2010).

68 U.S. Department of State, “Vietnam: International Religious Freedom Report 2004.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2004 69 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Religion and Policies Regarding Religion in Vietnam (Hanoi: Government Committee for Religious Affairs, 2006), accessed November 11, 2010 (http:// www.vietnamembassy.us/docs/Vietnam%20White%20Paper%20on%20Religion.pdf).

70 Bich Hop Pham, Người Nam Bộ và tôn giáo bản địa: Bửu Sơn Kỳ Hương - Cao Đài - Hòa Hảo (People of the South and Indigenous Religions: Buu Son Ky Huong – Caodaism – Hoa Hao Buddhism) (Hanoi: Religion Publishing House: 2007).

71 In August 2010, I visited the newly constructed Caodai temple in Dalat, Vietnam, and learned that it is now considered as “Model #2.” 155 72 Anonymous, Interview (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: June 12, 2010).

73 Anonymous, Interview (Phnom Penh, Cambodia: July 12, 2010).

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