Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Merrill A. Me Peak

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col John B. Sams, Jr.

Editor Col Keith YV. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson. Contributing Editor Marvin YV. Bassett, Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie. Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think- ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi- cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. A rticles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Fail 1990, Vol. IV, No. 3 AFRP 50-2

Editorial 2

For the Composite Wing Gen Merrill A. McPeak. USAF 4

Officer Professional Development for Lieutenants Lt Col Bruce L. Ullman, USAF 14

The United States and the Lavi Lt Col James P. DeLoughry, USAF 34

Doctrinal Conflict over the Word Aerospace Lt Col Frank W. Jennings, USAFR. Retired 46

Air Rescue Service: A Direction for the Twenty-first Century? Capt Edward B. Westermann, USAF 60

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 77 Notams Notices of Interest 94 Contributors 95 EDITORIAL

Facing the Challenge Ahead

S tremendous changes occur through- creases, it may be prudent to shift much ol out the world, the time has come for our counterair and interdiction capability A us to consider the possibility of reshapinginto the reserves and move the latter’s our force structure to better face the threats short-notice forces to the active com- of this new era. Specifically, how can we ponent. Thus, the forces best able to deal best prepare for contingencies short of war with imminent threats would be on active yet remain mindful of our NATO commit- status, and those designed to combat less ments? Perhaps we need to reverse our immediate, though very real, threats current force structure by emphasizing our would be found in our reserves. capabilities for special operations, limited The Soviet threat of the last 45 years is war, and airlift in the active force while decreasing. Rather than shout wolf in an moving some of our forces for general war attempt to maintain a capable military, we into the reserves. As Lord Archibald P. should realize that the diminished Soviet Wavell reminds us, “The ideal officer conventional threat allows us to turn our should be afraid of nothing, not even a attention to other current threats. Part new idea.” of this realization entails being willing to As the threat in Europe decreases and challenge long-accepted assumptions we consider removing large numbers of about our force structure. It may also our forces, we must nevertheless be able to involve shifting some long-cherished mis- return those forces to the theater quickly if sions within the force. But our job is to they are needed. Such an operation would meet today’s threat, not to refight old require a substantial amount of airlift. At threats. Is my suggestion the answer? the same time, we need to realize that Perhaps, perhaps not. More importantly, operations like those in Grenada and though, the Air Force needs to address the Panama have become a very real part of issue. If we simply try to shrink the our military activities. They too require existing force without considering our that we be able to conduct heavy airlift mission, we won't end up with the type and wage limited war. For the most part, of force we need, regardless of its size. these capabilities exist in our reserve It strikes us that the pages of Airpower forces. Meanwhile, much of our active Journal are an ideal starting point for force is dedicated to interdiction and an open discussion of our future Air counterair operations. As the likelihood Force. MAK of large-scale conventional conflict de-

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- would publish such rot. I thought the Air Force spondence should be addressed to the Editor. was attempting to minimize rampant careerism Airpovver Journal. Walker Hall. Bldg 1400. and concentrate on job performance. You must Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the not agree. right to edit the material for overall length. Lt Col Paula A. Bernard, USAF Makakilo. Hawaii PROMOTION FLAK In his otherwise fine article, Gen Dale O. Smith I write to express my outrage at the publication eloquently and no doubt unwittingly revealed of "How to Get Promoted" (Spring 1990). the true reason for his failure to be selected to The Airpovver Journal is "the professional higher rank. In the process, he has done much journal of the United States Air Force." It de- damage to the careers of our bright young of- clares inside the front cover of each issue its ficers who, absent his bad advice, might easily charter as a forum for “innovative thinking on be our future leaders. While I concur in much military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force struc- of this thesis. I must violently disagree with ture. readiness, and other national defense mat- two points he seems to make: don't risk your ters.” For the life of me. I can’t comprehend neck by sticking it out for your troops and learn where an article with the following principal to be a flattering, gushing toady. points fits within that charter: I too have sat on many boards, including • develop a nice-guv aura: those that recommend three-star candidates to • look for opportunities to compliment; the chief. Take it from me, such attitudes shine through and the board will be quick to pass on • show gratitude: and to a more deserving candidate. • look for recreational opportunities with your bosses. Lt Gen Otto J. Glasser. USAF, Retired Sarasota. Florida The article is a professional embarrassment in this forum. The quality of the material needn’t be judged: the topic itself is grossly in- appropriate. We are the service whose officer I notice on the inside cover of the Airpower corps is most attacked by our peers as careerist. lournal that the magazine is "designed to serve The lead article of the issue of our professional as an open forum for presenting and stimulat- journal is entitled "How to Get Promoted." Per- ing innovative thinking on military doctrine, haps the measure of the editorial offense is strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and whether the publication of the article reflects other national defense matters." an irony or a distressing truth. With this guiding purpose in mind, let’s look The need for a serious periodical with the at the article in the Spring 1990 issue entitled charter of Airpoiver Journal is too great to toler- “How to Get Promoted." I read the article twice ate this dilution of purpose. just to make sure it wasn’t written “tongue in cheek.” I don't know when the article by Gen- Lt Col Tim E. Moreland. Jr.. Missouri ANG eral Smith was written, but he is clearly out of Chesterfield. Missouri touch with the Air Force of today (and hope- fully yesterday as well). The article is nothing more than an advertise- When I read this article. I checked the cover ment for self-serving careerism. He speaks of date to make sure 1 hadn't picked up a 20-year- promotion as an end in itself. There is no men- old issue. After I read General Smith's bio and tion of an Air Force member serving a purpose saw the generation to which he belongs, I un- greater than himself. There is no mention of the derstood why he might write such smarmy fact that promotions are given not just to satisfy drivel. What I don't understand is why you Continued on page 72

3 FOR THE COMPOSITE WING

G en Mer r il l a . M c Pea k, USAF A Note from Li Gen Charles G. Boyd, Air University Commander: The following article was written by General McPeak while he was CINCPACAF, and at a time when there appeared no likelihood he N THE Pacific—and elsewhere—our would be the chief of staff. The article was warfighting concept often calls for the here at AU awaiting publication of the next is- creation of composite force packages sue of the Airpower /ournal at the time he was nominated for the new post. General McPeak These packages consist of a variety oi immediately called me to withdraw the article Itypes of aircraft—attackers, fighters, with the explanation that although it clearly tankers, AWACS, reconnaissance, defense expressed his views as a theater air component suppression, etc. We will accept here the commander, if it appeared in print under his authorship as chief of staff, it might have a normal usage and affectionately call the somewhat different impact on the readers and composite force package a “gorilla.” tend to quell the very debate it was intended to precipitate. In short, he did not want to bring undue influence on an idea that needed to be examined openly and objectively within our institution. Our disappointment here at AU was keen for we felt the article, and the idea it contained, was of great importance, particularly at this moment in our rapidly changing history as we think through how best to fashion our Air Force to deal more effectively with evolving national defense needs. Therefore, I asked Gen- eral McPeak to reconsider publication the provision of a clear foreword which scribed the circumstances of authoring- time and organizational placement tunately. he relented. FOH THE COMPOSITE WING 5

Flying in a gorilla can be interesting and sweep, more electronic warfare support, exciting work. The job of mission com- and so forth. A further, substantial com- mander is particularly demanding. But we plication arises from the fact that the plan- often practice the execution part of this ning is done at the theater Air Force com- problem at Red Flag. Cope Thunder and ponent commander’s Tactical Air Control elsewhere, so we have developed some Center (TACC) and the constituent parts of corporate expertise and a body of lessons the gorilla are spread out at a number of learned. The focus here is on higher bases, perhaps widely scattered through- echelon command and control. How are out the theater. In addition, command ar- gorillas planned and ordered up? Can we rangements are likely to be complex. rely on our command and control struc- Tankers, heavy bombers and Strategic Air tures to wrork? If not. what should be done Command subordinated reconnaissance about it? The purpose of this article is to assets will be tasked through a SAC ad- address these questions, drawing from re- vanced echelon (ADVON). If the gorilla cent experience in the Pacific. The con- supports friendly ground forces to be clusions reached would seem to have ap- jumped in or air landed, then a separate plication wherever we must undertake MAC organizational structure may be operations against capable opposition. involved. With enough time for coordination, all these planning difficulties can be over- Manufacturing a Gorilla come. We do. in fact, put together gorillas that deal with precisely these complex- In theater air warfare, our most difficult ities. The SAND EAGLE exercises con- operational planning problem is to build a ducted by 12th Air Force are an example. gorilla. And. unhappily, the tougher the Contingency arrival operations that open target is to attack, the more complex the Red Flag and Cope Thunder exercises are planning problem. For instance, longer another. But these efforts have a hand- range to the target means more tankers; crafted character. For instance, PACAF modern defenses mean more CAP and starts concept planning for each of Cope Thunder’s contingency arrival operations six months in advance of execution. We then negotiate a series of milestones so that, two months prior, we can have a con- ference for face-to-face planning with all participants. Two weeks before the opera- tion. the mission commander briefs the numbered air force commander. Ob- viously, this kind of lead time will not be available in actual combat. We will likely put together a gorilla on the first day of the war and then do the same thing daily—or more often—until the target environment becomes permissive. Let’s take a more detailed look at some of the command and control (C-) problems we are likely to encounter.

Theater Beddown In theater, our contingency plans call for locating combat and support aircraft at for- 6 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 ward bases. Some aircraft are already at ATO at least 12 hours before the start of projected operating locations in peacetime; the execution day. some aircraft relocate in theater; still other This may seem like lots of lead time, but aircraft flow into the theater from CONUS in practice the transmission problem is not bases. Some of the deploying aircraft will a simple one. It calls for a system of reli- beddown on bases with dissimilar aircraft able, secure, inter-operable, high speed to form composite units. A squadron of, communications and ADP connections be- say, F-15s will fly to an F-16 base and be- tween the central tasking authority and come part of the host wing. Some de- each tasked base. Such a system does not ployers will beddown with host units, but now exist in the Pacific, or elsewhere, in retain separate command structures. This my experience. might be true for tanker or airlift units It is not that we have paid no attention coming to a fighter base. Finally, some air- to the problem. In the Pacific, we have craft will go to bare bases or collocated op- worked hard to lay out a C2 system archi- erating bases (COBs) on which there is no tecture, buy hardware, write software and normal peacetime theater host. It is the re- procure the links to lash the system to- quirement to integrate air operations based gether. Under a program nicknamed CON- in this complex configuration that creates STANT WATCH, we have now spent 12 the need for a sophisticated C2 apparatus. years and about $200 million trying to do all this, and the results are not encourag- ing.1 Suffice it to say that the communications/ADP part of the C2 sys- The Air Tasking Order tem supporting ATO distribution in the The mechanism used to provide daily Pacific is marginal at best and shows no tasking to all the bases and units support- sign of achieving satisfactory status in the ing the theater air campaign is the Air near term. Thus, there is often a consider- Tasking Order, or ATO. The ATO gives de- able lag from transmission of the ATO by tailed instructions to each unit, answering higher headquarters and its eventual re- the questions of who does what, where ceipt in usable form by all the tasked and when. The ATO contains an enormous units. amount of information. Targets, TOTs. ordnance loads and fuzing are all spec- ified. Identification routes and procedures. The 72-Hour Planning Cycle IFF squawks and radio frequencies are di- The 36 hours we need from transmission rected. Air refueling times, altitudes and of the ATO to the end of the execution day contact points are established. There may represent the second half of the planning be a long’section of “SPINS,” or special in- and execution cycle. The first 36 hours are structions. Rules of Engagement are often taken up with intelligence gathering and stated or amplified in some way. In assessment, friendly unit status reporting PACAF exercises, a typical ATO runs to 50 and tracking, force apportionment plan- closely spaced pages, and can be much ning and approval, and ATO preparation. longer. It is worth noting that the battle situation Naturally, the ATO must be received by and friendly force status are likely to the tasked units in time for it to be read change more or less continuously, with the and understood—no small task for a docu- effect that the ATO, when eventually ex- ment of its length and complexity—and in ecuted, is quite likely to have been over- time for the unit to generate and load air- taken bv events. This may not be a disaster craft, select a mission commander and air- if the force is well led and alternate crews, do flight planning and target study, courses of action have been briefed and are coordinate with other units, etc. As a understood. In this regard, the fact that ex- rough guide, we would like to transmit the ecuting forces come from various bases FOB THE COMPOSITE WING 7

and may not have much experience oper- Naturally, getting this and all the other ating together robs the mission com- required reporting done eats up time and mander of much flexibility to call audibles talent at each base. Moreover, upstream re- at the line of scrimmage. Note also that porting competes to use the same often change in the battle situation is not such a antiquated communications and ADP sys- difficult problem for the less complex tems used bv downstream ATO transmis- combat operations. For instance, aircraft sion. And, by the way, for the tasking to be allocated to close air support or air defense effective, the information must be accu- can be tasked for alert, then scrambled as rate. Our common sense tells us that if we needed during the execution day. It is the limit ourselves to only a few important planning for more complex operations, data points, we are much more likely to like the composite force package, that may get good information. The more data re- lose its relevance through obsolescence quired, the more people involved, and the during a 72-hour planning and execution less attention unit commanders can devote cycle. to the reporting process. It is a disgrace that modern air forces are This is a very troublesome problem. still shackled to a planning and execution There is an unlimited amount of data cycle that lasts three days. We have available on status of friendly forces. Our hitched our jets to a hot air balloon. Even fear of making a mistake impels us to col- when this lackluster C2 system works lect and process all we can. The data base properly, we are bound to forfeit much of thus established will never be more than the combat edge we know accrues to air- an abstraction of the real situation, accu- power because of its great flexibility and rate to a greater or lesser degree. But, pos- speed of response. sessing what looks like comprehensive knowledge, we are tempted to give de- tailed guidance to the only person who has a chance to achieve genuine understand- ing of the local situation—the commander Status of Forces on the scene. To say we should avoid The question of friendly force status is doing this is not to argue that higher worth examining at greater length. Because echelons should be uninformed. It is, so much detail is contained in the ATO. rather, a clear call for disciplining our in- tasking headquarters must have com- formation requirements and for retaining a prehensive knowledge of unit status at healthy scepticism about how close our each base. This fact imposes a consider- data base corresponds with reality. able reporting workload on the bases. To It is obvious that all the above also ap- cite only a few examples, each commander plies with great force to estimates of en- submits a daily situation report (SITREP). emy force status, the distinction being that The operations function reports on force our side is presumed to cooperate in generation, launch and recovery, as events providing the information (an assumption occur. Logisticians try to report in real worth testing from time-to-time). Here time on munitions and POL status, spare again the problem is the commander’s parts and spare engine status, etc. Unit in- (and staff’s) discomfort with a funda- telligence submits intelligence summaries mental human condition: we can never (INTSUMs) at 12-hour intervals, together know everything. The approach adopted— with the whole panoply of mission reports to collect and process all we can—is very (MISREPs). Search and Rescue reports, re- expensive and, in any case, often seems to connaissance results, etc. Installation sup- build an impregnable fortress of trivia port personnel report on casualties, facility around information of real importance. status, non-combatant strength and Thus, the need to discipline information situation.2 requirements extends to intelligence as 8 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 well as to our own operations. However, in Summary of the Problem both these matters we have no real choice so long as we insist on providing such In brief, on the eve of actual operations, comprehensive direction as is ordinarily we plan to move our combat units into a included in the ATO. Microtasking re- new basing configuration, one that dis- quires microinformation. tributes the capabilities needed to accom- plish our most difficult missions among several bases. We then intend to rely on sophisticated Cz mechanisms to order up Building a Tactical Air Control Center packages that integrate the needed ca- pabilities. Thus, our present concept gives The normal crew complement of a TACC rise to the requirement for detailed, cen- is likely to be quite large. This is true in tralized direction. There are lots of reasons part because of the requirement to crunch to doubt that we can in fact provide effec- all the incoming data. It is also true be- tive, detailed, central direction under cause command and control is not a single stressful conditions. discipline but a hybrid that requires con- tributions from a number of specialties: communications, computers, information handling and display, civil engineering, weather, security, intelligence, operations, The Composite Wing etc. Most of these specialties must be represented in the TACC, together with the There is an alternative operating con- manpower to tear the facility down, move cept. In outline form, it calls for us to it and set it up again, if it is mobile. Natu- create composite wings that include, at rally. the TACC must be manned for 24- one base, under one commander, all the hour, 7-day a week operations, which resources needed to form composite force means the equivalent of at least two full packages. Such wings would not be staffs is needed. needed everywhere, but should be based at Competence is required in all parts of the locations from which we are most the TACC, but is of special importance in likely to launch such operations.3 There the intelligence and operations planning would likely be a considerable variation in staffs. Thus, as things now stand, we are the composition of such wings but, for il- obliged to put some of our very best peo- lustrative purposes, let us postulate a com- ple in these essentially overhead functions posite wing equipped as follows in table 1. if we are to expect success in combat. Much may be said about the operational We cannot afford and do not have fully advantages of such a wing, but of primary manned TACCs in peacetime. Those avail- importance is the prospect it presents of able in the CONUS for deployment over- being able to reform the command and seas rely on augmentation to get full up control system by cutting back sharply on 24-hour staffing. TACCs in-place overseas the need for detailed guidance from above. are largely paper organizations to be acti- The composite wing commander can be vated as needed and manned from the given“mission type” orders. For instance, management and combat operations staffs he is told simply to attack a certain target of numbered air force and theater during a certain time period. He reports MAJCOM headquarters. Because these that he can or cannot do it. If he cannot, he headquarters are small—and getting asks for the help he needs. So much for 50 smaller—our plans call for rather substan- page ATOs and volumes of unit status tial CONUS augmentation of theater reporting. TACCs. For any large scale contingency, The Air Force has had composite units there will be sharp competition for the in the past and there are even some con- limited manning resource. temporary examples. A modest instance is FOR THE COMPOSITE WING 9

Table 1 Possible Makeup of Composite Wing Capability Aircraft Multi-Role 24 F-16C Night Under Weather Attack 12 F-16C LA N TIRN Long Range Precision Guided Munitions 12 F-15E Air Superiority 24 F-15C Air Refueling 6 KC-135R Surveillance Control 3 E-3

ound in the many Air National Guard by savings that will accrue through scaling lighter units that are authorized a C-130 or back our C2 apparatus.4 >ome other aircraft for administrative air- However, there are some points that ift support. We are about to form a com- should be made about cost. First, 1 know of posite wing in Korea, when the OA-lOs no actual data on cost differentials. Is the io w stationed at Suwon move to Osan and composite wing 10%—or 15%, or 13.4%— oin with the F-16s of the 51st Tactical more expensive to operate? Some research ighter Wing. However, the best example may be called for here so that we are better of a composite wing is provided by the able to judge the options. modern aircraft carrier, where the typical I suspect that such research would show ieck loading creates a true composite unit that the cost differential is driven by the vith a range of capabilities tailored to the degree of intermediate level aircraft main- mission. tenance we wish to do in each case. If we wish to do extensive intermediate level maintenance, cost savings will accrue The Cost Issue rapidly to the monolithic wing. However, I favor a move towards two-level mainte- We tend to think about combat wings in nance for all our wings, composite or oth- terms of their force structure equivalents. erwise. This would offload elaborate inter- That is, a tactical fighter wing is 72 author- mediate level equipment requirements, ized aircraft of a single type. Indeed, it is improving deployability. We could also not uncommon to find ourselves actually downsize the maintenance establishment bedded down in this monolithic configura- at wing level, including removal of consid- tion. The reason is cost. It is sometimes erable overhead. Retaining only organiza- said that we cannot afford to operate like tional maintenance in the wing permits us the Navy. to contemplate returning flightline mainte- It is logical to assume that consolidation nance to the flying squadrons, increasing of like units yields economies of scale. unit cohesion. Obviously, there are some Therefore, we ought to acknowledge at the costs associated with two-level mainte- outset that composite wings may be some- nance. In particular, we would need to in- what more expensive to operate and that crease spare parts holdings. These costs the added costs may not be entirely offset would be relatively small for systems like 10 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL FALL 1990

the F-16C and F-15C, where our reliability Improving the Odds in Combat and maintainability efforts are beginning The case for the composite wing rests on to show a return in the form of sharply its improved performance in combat. Nat- lower break rates. urally, commanders of composite wings Finally, on this matter of cost, it is worth possess a much increased capacity for in- noting that many of our bases already op- dependent action if contact with higher erate several types of aircraft. For instance, headquarters is lost. table 2 shows the current base loading at Forming composite wings also reduces Kadena Air Base. the vulnerabilities now created by our con-

Table 2 Current Base Loading at Kadena Air Base Command Aircraft Pacific Air Forces 72 F-15C Tactical Air Command 3 E-3 Strategic Air Command 13 KC-135 Military Airlift Command 6 C-12 3 HH-3 Air Force Special Operations Command 3 HC-130

Until quite recently, we also operated centration of combat capabilities. If at- RF-4Cs and SR-71s at Kadena. We had pro- tacked in our peacetime configuration, an grammed to introduce F-16 aggressors at opponent might find all our Wild Weasels the same base. at one base, all our precision guided muni- Thus, at Kadena, we have created, in tions capability at another, all our tactical effect, a large composite base. Whatever it reconnaissance aircraft at still another, and costs to operate in this configuration, we so forth. are already paying the price. A composite alignment ought to involve Kadena.is certainly not the only such us in a great deal less preconflict unit case. We have composite bases in many lo- shuffling, reducing theater airlift needs cations, especially overseas. Take a look at during a period when airlift resources will the ramp at Howard, or Elmendorf. What be stretched thin. we have not done, by and large, is to build Aside from the light it sheds on the cost composite characteristics into the design issue, the situation at Kadena illustrates of the organizations. Five MAJCOMs ex- another aspect of the problem: no one tend command tentacles into Kadena (see really runs Kadena and, therefore, we table 2). There would seem to be some po- fritter away the opportunity to give mid- tential to reduce administrative costs level officers experience in melding the through streamlining this arrangement if various elements of airpower and develop- we are willing to face the real (but, in my ing a comprehensive vision of air warfare. view, manageable) problems associated Contrast this with the knowledge and with building composite units from the qualifications gained in similar circum- ground up. stances by our Navy and Marine Corps FOR THE COMPOSITE WING 11

counterparts. As already noted, our cur- location where we wish to operate com- rent contingency plans call for us to create posite units. This is probably the case, for modest composite wings at some bases by instance, with the E-3 AWACS. It is surely preconflict redeployment of fighter units. the case with electronic warfare and strate- Commanders of the wings thus formed gic reconnaissance assets. In other words, will do some serious on-the-job training we may never be able to achieve all the ad- jnder less than optimum circumstances. vantages claimed for the composite wing Finally, a very important operational ad- concept. This limitation should not stop vantage of the composite wing arises from us from trying to improve the odds for the friction-filled nature of war. On this combat success. And, when a tasked com- point, we are unlikely to improve mander must look for outside help, higher Clausewitz: headquarters would be well advised to Everything in war is very simple, but the stay with“mission type”orders to all units. simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties ac- The commander at base X can be told to cumulate and end by producing a kind of place a certain capability at the disposal of friction__ Countless minor incidents—of the commander of base Y for a certain the kind you can never really foresee— combine to lower the general level of period, details to be coordinated by the performance— commanders involved. Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper. Conclusion Our warfighting concept has to take ac- count of the fact that almost nothing ever We are likely to face our toughest com- works right. As with the game of golf, our mand and control challenges in the early moments of any combat with reasonably only real hope is to make smaller mistakes. capable opposition. As things now stand, The composite wing makes smaller mis- our operating concept is to task a large takes because it works and trains together in peacetime. It becomes proficient at group of strangers to join up and get ac- planning and executing force packages. It quainted on their way to the target. In- knows the playbook. In other words, it can bound, they must coordinate and synchro- exploit the inherent flexibility of airpower. nize some of our most difficult tactical Moreover, the people live together. Fam- operations. This employment concept is ilies know one another. Thus are formed bad enough, but the planning and C2 struc- the cohort links that are themselves a deci- tures on which the concept relies are very sive, war winning factor, in my view. We likely to fail under stress. get a glimpse of the possibilities at Cope We should abandon for now the idea Thunder or Red Flag, where we see per- that we can trust complex planning and formance improve daily as we get to know cumbersome C2. To the degree possible we each other. should gather the resources needed to ex- ecute projected missions at specific in- stallations under unitary command. We Resource Availability should then give air commanders “mission For a few capabilities, we do not have type” orders and let them get on with the enough resources to station some at each job.

Notes 1 Fixing theater C2 turns out to be more like a problem in A ray of hope springs from the recent move to take respon- metaphysics than engineering. It is not obvious that elegant sibility for operating field C2 systems from Air Force Com- solutions are achievable by devoting the appropriate amount munications Command and give it to line commanders. The of thought and money to the problem. In my view, we can long term effects of this action are bound to be positive. and should lower our expectations for system perfectibility. 2. By my count, each operating base in the Pacific must 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 submit in wartime 185 reports of various kinds— 15 PACAF CONUS-based composite wings. Such wings would be avail- and 170 higher headquarters directed. The“good news" is able to deploy the whole range of air capabilities to any part that peacetime operations require even more reporting. We of the world. This fits well with the integrating vision now have worked hard to reduce the reporting workload hut. ob- offered by the concept of “Global Power—Global Reach.” viously, much more needs to be done. 4. A recent analysis done by RAND Corp. concludes that 3. Thus, composite wings would more likely be estab- the cost differential may be about 3%. If so. it is in the range lished overseas, at the forward bases. CONUS-based wings of normal variation from wing to wing in the present, mono- could remain in a monolithic configuration, with the mission lithic configuration. The RAND briefing materials are avail- of sending squadrons forward as needed. However, it seems able at headquarters. PACAF. to me there would be great value in having at least some

. . . BUT HOW DO I SUBSCRIBE? EASY . . . • Just write the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. • Tell him you want to subscribe to AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5. • Enclose a check for $9.50 ($11.90 for international mail). • Spend a year enjoying four quarterly issues mailed to your home or office. Military Air Power Compiled by Li Col Charles M. Westenhoff The latest book from Air University Press is very different from its previous publications. Designed as a pocket-size ready reference that will fit in fatigues or flight suits. Military Air Power is a collection of quotations for military professionals. The chapters consist of thoughts on “Air Power." “War." “Technology." “Principles of War," and “Command." Within each chapter, the quotations are arranged by topic—for example, a section is devoted to each of the accepted principles of war. In choosing quotations. Colonel Westenhoff said that his primary criterion was the clarity with which each one expressed its major point. Taken together, these collected thoughts raise as many questions as they provide answers. If military history teaches us anything, though, it is that easy answers are often wrong. The questions posed in Military Air Power reflect the enduring challenges of the profession of arms. The book will be available in early December. Organizations and individuals outside the US government can place their orders with the Superintendent of Documents. US Government Printing Office. Wash DC 20402. US government organizations can order from AUCADRE/PTP. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532.

13 OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR LIEUTENANTS

Lt Col Bruce L. ULLMAN, USAF*

N AUGUST 1987 Gen Larry D. Welch. that promoted “careerism” over “profes- Air Force chief of staff, approved the sionalism" and to recommend changes in creation of the Officer Professional De- those processes. velopment (OPD) Working Group un- Although the resulting changes were Ider the auspices of the deputy chief of ambitious and beneficial, they missed the staff, personnel. This group, headed by the mark in one important area—the institu- deputy director of personnel plans, was di- tionalizing of newly commissioned of- rected to work in tandem with the Officer ficers. The OPD Working Group concen- Evaluation System (OES) Group. The OES trated both on reducing careerism and on Group had been formed earlier at the Air promoting professionalism, but it may not Force Military Personnel Center to exam- have devoted enough effort to defining the ine those institutional processes in the Air latter. The result was that certain initia- Force personnel and education systems tives critical to the overall effort were not approved. Had the case for these initia- tives been made more strongly and pre- "This article is the 1990 winner of the Air sented in a sociological context, the result War College Award for Excellence. may have been different.

14 OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 15

Force with the OPD and OES groups in 1987-88. The OPD Working Group made 25 recommendations from assignment and utilization policy to military education. These were presented to General Welch on 12 January 1988. He subsequently took the OPD initiatives to two Corona meetings of the Air Force senior leadership to get ma- jor command reaction, and he also di- rected that they be presented to the Air Force Council. The majority of the initia- tives were approved and implemented by the appropriate functional offices of pri- mary responsibility beginning in 1989. Officers outside the Air Force have also recognized the detrimental effects of ca- reerism. In August 1986 Lt Col Roger A. Wrolstad of the US Marine Corps wrote Philosophy of Officer that reform, whatever its source, should be Professional Development directed at “one common human charac- teristic that has a disastrous effect on the The OPD philosophy is grounded in the idea that it is better for the Air Force (or military’s ability to perform in battle— careerism.” He called it the “taproot of any military service), and therefore better military disintegration.”1 Wrolstad blamed for the nation, if its corps of officers be- careerism on three things: the conservative haves in ways that support larger, institu- nature of soldiering, which is charac- tional goals in peace as well as in war. But terized by resistance to change; modern what kinds of behavior characterize this materialistic society, which requires tan- “institutional" orientation? What kinds of gible evidence of success; and, most of all, behavior are “anti-institutional?” the peacetime system itself “in which ca- A general answer to the first question reerists soon realize that advancement is can be found in popular American culture. assisted by their ability to create an illu- The public we serve knows what “service” sion of professional competence” through means when it comes to the military. Tom artificial measures. He went on to list four Wolfe illustrates the point in The Right major effects of careerism that erode mili- Stuff: tary effectiveness: sycophancy, which They looked upon themselves as men who springs from cronyism and the desire to at- lived by higher standards of behavior than ci- tach oneself to a “sponsor”; superficiality, vilians, as men who were bearers and pro- which reduces complex ideas and hard tectors of the most important values of choices to cliches and gives style triumph American life, who maintained a sense of over substance; personal aggrandizement discipline while civilians abandoned them- selves to hedonism, who maintained a sense above that which is normally associated of honor while civilians lived by opportun- with rank and status; and selective ac- ism and greed.3 countability, with one’s loyalty being given to superiors or one's career rather James Webb does the same in A Country than to the institution.2 Such as This: Wrolstad recommended a treatment that I go anywhere in the world they tell me to go, begins with a recognition of the problem any time they tell me to, to fight anybody and then applies a servicewide regimen they want me to fight. I move my family any- from the highest levels down to the grass where they tell me to move, on a day's roots. This was precisely the way General notice, and live in whatever quarters they as- Welch approached the problem in the Air sign me. I work whenever they tell me to 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

work__ I don’t belong to a union and I don't strike if I don’t like what they’re doing to me. And I like it. Maybe that’s the difference.4 The opposite of this selfless dedication to service is a kind of freedom available only to civilians. It is not necessarily the freedom to live by hedonism, opportun- ism, or greed, but the freedom to behave in ways that are motivated by more self- serving stimuli—money, comfort, personal power, and prestige. In the civil sector this comes from the world of work, from the occupation. In general, we judge success in an occupational sense by how well we perform the specialized tasks associated with the occupation. Does this mean that the concepts of institutionalism and oc- cupationalism are mutually exclusive, that the perfect military man is unconcerned with occupational expertise, and that the civilian professional has no institutional loyalty or values? We characterize both as professionals, but what do we mean by that? What mix of institution and occupa- tion is the best in the military profession, and how do we decide which behavior falls into which category? Charles Moskos introduced the institu- tional/occupational (I/O) thesis in 1977. To Moskos, “An institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, that is, a pur- pose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good.’’5 through unions) and determine their rela- Members of an institution see themselves tive value in terms of skill in the specialty. following a calling, being apart from the They are motivated by extrinsic rewards rest of society, functioning in a culture un- such as pay and identify more with like der rules that are unique. They identify specialists outside the employing organi- primarily with those who share this zation than with the interests of the orga- uniqueness, regardless of what tasks each nization itself or its other members in performs in support of the institution. other specialties. They are motivated by internal and intrin- Since we are not a militaristic society, sic rewards and compensated largely “in- we cannot expect the civilian world to kind.” provide recruits who already have (or even On the other hand, “An occupation is understand) the professional military per- legitimated in terms of the marketplace. spective. We must protect the unique as- Supply and demand ... are paramount.”6 pects of our institution from dilution in Members of an occupational group see the society in which we are immersed. themselves as sharing a set of skills and The infusion of ... people with moral and tasks designed to accomplish certain de- ethical backgrounds that may differ consider- finable ends. They have some say in com- ably from military concepts of ethics and mo- pensation and working conditions (usually rality can erode professional effectiveness OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 17

Values traditionally expected of military officers are most obvious in war. During an extended period o fpeace, however, Perhaps, then, a certain amount of oc- the Air Force must instill those values in new officers who may cupationalism in the military is inevitable. have only a vague understanding of their chosen profession. Should we be concerned with it? Does it actually hurt the institution and the na- tion? If so, just how much of it can we and cohesiveness. For these reasons, the pro- stand? fession must set clear moral and ethical pat- terns linked with the best patterns in society. Also, because it is not the military's job to change society, we must accept the burden of Effect on the Mission socializing new members while not allowing The traditional military picture of a ourselves to become isolated from society at tight-knit, highly professional and altruis- large. The real issues are ... the intensity and tic team like that described in the quote extensiveness of the civil-military interface and the moral and ethical codes that society from The Right Stuff has been the ideal for provides for the profession__ Thus, the centuries. This type of military institution, moral and ethical patterns of the military all other things being equal, has always profession must be linked with society on been more effective than a mass of individ- the one hand and stem from the unique pur- uals collected temporarily for the purpose pose of the profession on the other.7 of conducting a war. Even in the modern 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

age of citizen armies pioneered by the in peacetime, when the immediate con- levee en masse at the end of the eighteenth sequences of such dollar-driven behavior century, there was a highly cohesive of- do not appear to directly affect the security ficer corps to hold the troops together and of the nation. Losing these people and motivate them to make the ultimate sacri- their motivation would have a very real fice. Battles have doubtless been won both effect on readiness. Some sociologists even by sheer force of numbers in men and ma- feel that an I/O orientation may explain at- teriel and by brilliant generalship alone, trition rates.9 but when both sides are evenly matched in Finally, excessive occupationalism and terms of tangible assets, it seems reason- identification with the civilian sector can able to expect the army with the greater in- deprive the United States of the extremely stitutional identification to have the supe- valuable opinion of its professional mili- rior commitment to winning. tary. If the military leadership eventually A danger in placing too much reliance functions and thinks like the larger so- on occupational motivators to perform a ciety, who will advocate the uniquely mil- military mission is that these purely ex- itary point of view when critical decisions trinsic rewards “may create behavior that on national policy must be made? Even if will not be performed in the future except we cannot expect a high level of institu- for even greater extrinsic rewards. Extrin- tionalism in the entire military establish- sic rewards, moreover, can weaken intrin- ment, we must have an officer corps to sic motivation.”8 In the extreme, this could mean that a military member, used to monetary reward for performing a crit- If junior officers are fortunate, they will find mentors whose ical task, might be reluctant to perform traditional military values and professionalism they can emu- that task if outside forces reduced or elimi- late. But the Air Force cannot rely on such a haphazard nated the reward. This is even more likely approach to leadership development. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 19

lead it that is as institutional as we can If indeed the management of violence make it. (as opposed to its execution) is an exper- The I/O thesis is particularly relevant to tise or competence that most military of- the Air Force because of its reliance on ficers must have and that expertise or com- technological specialization as well as its petence is exercised best in an institu- relatively short history and subsequent tional environment, OPD should be de- dearth of tradition. According to Frank R. signed to recognize this common sphere Wood, the Air Force and its officer corps, and build the institutional perspective that "because of their extensive use of technol- supports it. Although this was one of the ogy ... tend to be most susceptible to in- underlying aims of the OPD Working creasing specialization and a diffused Group, its charter was limited to only sense of purpose.... They face the greatest those institutional processes embodied in pressure for occupationalism.”10 the Air Force officer personnel and educa- tion systems. The OPD philosophy, now officially ar- ticulated in Air Force Regulation (AFR) 36-23, Officer Professional Development, attempted to place the institution and its Goals of Officer mission first, using a professional officer corps whose abilities and effectiveness Professional Development vary with seniority. General Welch committed the Air Force Professional development includes those ac- to OPD in 1988 to address the erosion of tions and experiences that enhance an of- officer professionalism and dedication to ficer's ability to perform his or her job and service that is explained at least partly by thereby contribute to the mission of the Air the I/O thesis. Among other things, OPD Force as level of responsibility increases. was designed to encourage Air Force of- An officer’s professional development in- ficers to behave in a way that puts the in- volves gaining the necessary depth and stitution ahead of the individual and to breadth of experience to improve perfor- permit them to apply the military’s special mance and potential.... The most important indicator of potential is the way the officer expertise in support of national security performs daily in his or her job. This per- objectives. But, as Samuel P. Huntington formance includes the quality of the specific asks, “What is the specialized expertise of work ... and ... more universal qualities the the military officer? Is there any skill com- officer possesses.13 mon to all ... and yet not shared with any Under OPD, the “depth” mentioned civilian group?”11 What makes the military above is the primary objective of the com- officer’s profession unique and relates it to pany grade years and involves training and the institutionalism that promotes co- “work that enhances (both) career-specific hesiveness and effectiveness? professional competence and provides op- At first glance ... the officer corps appears to portunities to develop leadership abil- contain many varieties of specialists, includ- ities.”14 “Breadth” involves experiences ing large numbers which have their counter- outside the specific career area and nor- parts in civilian life. Engineers, doctors, mally includes career-broadening and staff pilots, ordnance experts, personnel experts, assignments. It is most appropriate for se- intelligence experts, communications nior majors and lieutenant colonels and experts—all these are found both within and without the modern officer corps__ Yet a only rarely for captains. Colonels require a distinct sphere of military competence does balance of depth and breadth with a wide exist which is common to all, or almost all, range of leadership experience and skills. officers and which distinguishes them from While the above describes the assign- all, or almost all. civilians. This central skill ment context of OPD, the role of profes- is ... the management of violence.12 sional military education (PME) is to “par- 20 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

allel and support the requirements of This carries a different connotation than appropriate jobs.” It should “universal qualities an officer possesses,” build upon a solid foundation of officership which could include qualities not exclu- laid during precommissioning. The unique- sive to the military profession. ness of the profession and the particular When describing the appropriate profes- values and culture of the military officer sional activities of a company grade of- corps are the bedrock on which all future ficer. the OPD Working Group wished to professional development is based. The focus convey the equal importance of career- for company grade officers should be on de- specific competence and leadership veloping the skills needed to enhance their qualities common to all officers. In AFR career specific competence, to include officer 36-23, this became “career-specific profes- leadership. Therefore, leadership and com- munication skills are paramount, and are a sional competence” and “leadership abil- primary focus of the Squadron Officer ities.” The addition of the adjective “pro- School, the Air Force’s company grade PME. fessional” implies that it is the specialty While building on the foundation laid by that makes one a professional, not mem- earlier instruction, the focus for the field bership in the officer corps. The substi- grades and, therefore, of Intermediate Service tution of “abilities” for “qualities” implies School should shift somewhat to the effec- that leadership in a military context is a tive management of people and resources as menu of skills rather than the virtual well as those skills required for effective staff way of life it should be for a military work. Lieutenant colonels and colonels must professional. understand not only the skills taught in earlier PME, but also the elements of aero- While these differences may not seem space force employment and the policy con- very important, they indicate a denigration siderations that drive them. This is the role of the value of more universal officership of the highest level of PME. Senior Service qualities, particularly at the junior level, in School. In the final analysis, the appropriate favor of an emphasis on skill-specific per- role of PME in officer professional develop- formance. In other words, while OPD’s ment is the right PME at the right time with overall goals are institutional, it seems to the right focus.15 contradict itself with respect to the officer At first glance, the OPD philosophy and with less than four years of commissioned role of PME seem consistent with the service. Officership is treated as a worthy goal of enhancing institutionalism in the foundation to be taught prior to commis- Air Force. However, a comparison be- sioning but is then moved to the back tween the OPD philosophy as originally burner while the officer concentrates on written bv the OPD Working Group and learning an occupational skill. the words that now appear in AFR 36-23 is troubling. When discussing the ‘‘most important indicator of potential” (the behavior for which the officer will be rewarded), AFR Formative 36-23 identifies daily job performance, which includes ‘‘the quality of the specific Commissioned Years work” as well as ‘‘more universal qualities Most of us believe we form the bulk of the officer possesses." The original intent our personalities very early in life. The of the OPD Working Group was that the same can be said for those who aspire to Air Force should reward both performance be military officers. Officer candidates of primary duty (rather than peripheral ac- bring preconceived ideas about the mili- tivities or “square-filling”) coupled with tary into the Air Force Reserve Officer the officership attributes common to the Training Corps (AFROTC), the USAF profession of arms that the OPD Working Academy (USAFA), and Officer Training Group called “universal officer qualities.” School (OTS); but these ideas are modified OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT l\ by the education and experience that fol- ate lens. The OPD Working Group felt that low. OPD recognizes that one of the most precommissioning can best support OPD important functions of all precommission- by developing the correct mind-set in new ing programs is to instill in the potential officers—one that orients them toward be- officer a sense of what the commission havior that emphasizes the institution really means. This focus on the respon- rather than the individual. sibilities of officership is appropriate for The essence of the OPD recommenda- the precommissioning level because it is tions for precommissioning programs was fundamental to all that follows and must that the focus of all must be on officership, be instilled early, so that subsequent expe- on developing a self-image or state of mind riences can be seen through the appropri- that recognizes the unique roles and re- sponsibilities of the professional commis- sioned officer. This included an emphasis on service vice self (a calling, not a job), Newly commissioned A ir Force officers typically find that their fewer rights and more responsibilities than jobs occupy most of their time: thus, they have little chance to learn about professional responsibilities until they attend a civilian executive (being subject to both Squadron Officer School. By then, however, they often resist military and civil courts), restrictions on those military values because they may already be following a fraternization, leadership over manage- careerist path. ment, the importance of teamwork, the re-

A A j^F W&- ^ 22 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 sponsibilities of command, and recogni- college (one of the reasons every commis- tion that one is an officer first and a sioned officer must be a college graduate) specialist second. The OPD Working and in precommissioning programs. Un- Group agreed that the basis of officership fortunately, the Air Force’s perceived need lies with values and traditions established for technically specialized degrees for in military history, embodied in military many career fields significantly narrows leaders of the past, and forged in war. commissioning opportunities for those Other subjects would continue to be with a broader, less technical college taught, but officership was to be the cen- education. “Specialized career patterns tral theme at the entry level. can detract from (Huntington’s) first phase Col Wayne Gosnell complained over a of expertise (and therefore) ... military per- decade ago that the Air Force was making sons might neglect to obtain the broad occupationalists of its junior officers, but background necessary to serve as the foun- he did not blame the precommissioning dation for expertise.”19 programs. He believed that the best officer- Gosnell relates that he was constantly ship education could not possibly lay the reminded, both before and after commis- necessary groundwork for an institutional sioning in the early sixties, that he was an outlook unless it took place in a real-world officer first and a pilot second. He sus- military context. pected that in 1980 most young pilots saw their roles in reverse. Gosnell places the blame for this overidentification with Air The precommissioning programs can at best Force specialty on “the almost total ... plant the seeds from which professional, dedicated, competent military officers de- emphasis placed upon occupationalist per- velop. The feeding and nurturing which al- formance during (the) first few years of lows this development to take place must be service.”20 Now, 10 years later, OPD seems done during the first few years of active mili- to have legitimized that complaint. tary service. It is during these years that the While OPD emphasizes “depth develop- young officer moves from the classroom and ment” for company grade officers in policy theory to the “real” Air Force and begins to documents, it also rewards it very directly. learn what his profession is all about.16 The OES is a part of OPD that is highly performance oriented. Although the per- By “profession” Gosnell did not mean formance that is evaluated on both the Per- flying an airplane (although he himself formance Feedback Worksheet and the was a military pilot) or programming a company grade Officer Performance Re- computer. To him, professional expertise port (OPR) includes areas related to of- is gained through Samuel Huntington’s ficership. the emphasis is on specialty two phases of professional education: “the skills. The officership evaluations on the first imparting a broad, liberal, cultural OPR are simply “pass/fail." The officer background, and the second imparting the either meets the standards (the vast major- specialized skills and knowledge of the ity) or does not. The parts of the OPR that profession.’’17 However, the specialized truly communicate relate to performance skills referred to by Huntington do not of primary duties. mean occupational skills, since these do Descriptions of the mission of the unit to not define the profession of arms. “The which the ratee belongs and the job the second ... phase of professional education ratee performs in support of that mission ...is given in special institutions operated set the stage for “Impact on Mission Ac- by or affiliated with the profession it- complishment.” which is “designed spe- self.”18 These educational institutions are cifically ... to document performance not flying or technical training schools; unique to ... primary duties."21 While this they are PME schools. type of performance is again mentioned in The first phase of education to gain pro- the instructions for the “Rater (and Addi- fessional competence should take place in tional Rater) Overall Assessment(s).'' there OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 23 is no specific guidance on other types of comments that evaluate the ratee's officer- performance that demonstrate purely of- ship as long as the comments do not touch ficer qualities. This despite the fact that on some prohibited area. Nevertheless, paragraph 3-3.d in AFR 36-10, Officer from the policy guidance in AP'R 36-" 0 to Evaluation System (OES), says, “OPRs are the fact that “Job Knowledge” comes assessments of both duty performance and ahead of both "Leadership Skills” and performance as an officer.” However, the “Professional Qualities” on both forms, very next entry, paragraph 3-3.e, adds, the perception that the OES is designed to “OPRs document each officer’s unique reward specialty performance in the com- qualities and abilities as demonstrated in pany grade officer above all else is clear. job performance” and fails to identify any The reasons behind this approach to other kind.22 None of these rules prohibit evaluation are understandable. Evaluation based on “ticket-punching” or "square- filling” activities unrelated to the appro- priate pursuits of a junior officer is dis- couraged by the OES, as it should be. Un- T/ie Air Force's heavy emphasis on technology and its close working relationship with civilian contractors make Air Force fortunately, it leaves little room to evaluate officers especially susceptible to the pressures of oc- the officer on how well he or she knows cupationalism and values the profession of arms. 24 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 Nevertheless, one might legitimately ask Professional Military why the precommissioning programs can- Education in Officer not provide a strong enough officership foundation to weather the occupational Professional Development storms of the formative commissioned years. The answers lie in diversity and According to current OPD guidance, an time. While the three programs have generally officer’s first formal professional education standardized curricula, they have too little outside his or her specialty comes at the in common to guarantee the same prepara- first tier of PME. The OPD initiatives with tion to every second lieutenant. USAFA respect to PME were conceived and pre- conducts its precommissioning instruction sented originally as an integrated four-tier in an essentially military context over a program built on the foundation provided four-year period, interspersing officership by the precommissioning initiatives. instruction with academic instruction. This PME philosophy of building on the Without arguing the merits of the aca- foundation laid by precommissioning demic curriculum (technological versus education was official policy in the three- liberal arts) the Academy has the best op- tier system before OPD. While Air Force portunity to develop a solid professional PME has undergone many changes as the foundation in officership. OTS has the result of OPD, such as increased resident military environment but must do its job opportunity and a decoupling of the res- in only 12 weeks. Albeit formal training ident selection process from promotion and net the “real” Air Force, it shares an boards, the building-block approach has advantage with USAFA in that graduates not changed. of both programs usually go directly on to OPD divided the officer corps into four active duty. relatively distinct phases with different AFROTC produces the largest number of education needs: newly commissioned of- officers. Its major weaknesses are the over- ficers, company grade officers, field grade whelmingly civilian context in which the officers, and colonels. Newly commis- instruction is given (except at schools like sioned officers need solid grounding in of- Texas A&M University, Virginia Military ficership: company grade officers need the Institute, Norwich University, and The Cit- leadership qualities necessary to carry out adel) and diversity of instruction from de- their jobs through supervision of others: tachment to detachment. Despite the fact field grade officers (defined as majors and that lesson plans are the same for all, the lieutenant colonels) need the knowledge relative isolation of AFROTC units (in- and perspective to add breadth through cluding multiple field training locations) career-broadening assignments such as makes total uniformity of instruction diffi- staff jobs (including those on joint staffs): cult, if not impossible. Therefore, the mes- and colonels need an ability to think in sage the officer candidate receives on of- even broader and more global terms in ficership is as much a function of the order to prepare themselves to develop individual AFROTC instructor as it is of strategy and plan for and conduct the joint AFROTC as a whole. employment of aerospace forces in war. Finally, AFROTC graduates have, in the The OPD recommendations for PME recent past, been subjected to delays of were based on these educational needs several months before being allowed to and assumed all officers would complete come on active duty. These delays, cou- all phases of PME at the appropriate times. pled with up to a year of flying or techni- The OPD Working Group was responsible cal training, put a great deal of distance be- for changes in all three current PME levels tween the officership instruction in the and recommended a fourth to bridge the precommissioning program and the first gap between precommissioning and taste of the operational Air Force. Squadron Officer School. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 25 Professional vironment of their formative commis- sioned years, the OPD Working Group rec- Military Education ommended institutionalizing a lieutenants for Lieutenants professional development program (LPDP) at every command. To provide minimal Based on the belief that each level of competition with the unit-level integration PME must build on the previous level, the necessary for success in the first assign- OPD Working Group felt that the most crit- ment, to interfere as little as possible ical education level was the first. It not with essential depth development, and to only provides the foundation upon which encourage decentralization, the proposed all subsequent PME is based, but it is also LPDP encompassed the following elements: the lens through which every aspect of a. A common core of information that the military profession is subsequently recognizes that all lieutenants have the viewed. In short, officership, introduced in profession of arms in common and that precommissioning, must be kept fresh and focuses on those things that make the pro- alive until it is formally reinforced in SOS. However, the realities of these early years fession unique—the responsibilities and make this extremely difficult. restrictions a military officer accepts: no The OPD Working Group recognized a fraternization, health and welfare of subor- serious gap in officer education between dinates, limitations on political activity, precommissioning and SOS that allows conflict of interest rules, 24-hour-a-day young officers to interpret their first, for- duty, representing the Air Force to the ci- mative active duty experiences through (in vilian community, force of orders, officer- some cases) an incorrect perspective. As noncommissioned officer relations, integ- Gosnell explained, it is imperative that rity, setting the example in both word and lieutenants interpret their environment as deed. All would be tied to and in prepara- professional military officers, not ex- tion for the common SOS experience. civilian college students who have just b. Enough flexibility to allow relearning been taught a particular skill. During the the unique elements of the profession in a often extended period between commis- local (and more believable) context. For sioning and completion of formal training, example, lessons would be taught using fa- the young officer is in an environment in miliar wing organization situations, by which he or she is surrounded either by ci- senior wing leadership instead of other vilians or by other officers engaged in junior officers. The teaching method could learning the same skill and destined for fit the needs of the unit to which the lieu- similar jobs. tenant is assigned—class meetings in This narrow focus during the formative squadron day rooms, central classrooms, commissioned years can easily dull identi- officers clubs, etc.—and would be taught fication with all officers past and present, full time in two or three days or part time rated and nonrated. Air Force and non-Air over a longer period. Force who share the profession of arms. It c. Length that would not take away from is much too easy after being recruited with depth development. Therefore the entire incentives related to the chance to fly course should not exceed 25 hours, should rather than to simply serve as an officer, be tailored to fit the schedule of the pri- waiting months for an undergraduate pilot mary job, and should be given as soon af- training class, and spending another year ter arrival in the unit as possible. in pilot training to believe that one’s d. Protection from being subverted into profession is “pilot” and not “military a vehicle for unrelated ancillary training or officer.” for instruction not directly related to pure, To firmly reestablish the officership blue-suit officership.23 foundation that must carry lieutenants While the LPDP concept was approved through the necessarily specialized en- in spirit, some major commanders ex- 26 A/RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 pressed concern that mandating what ap- rated 10 task areas lowest: employs disci- peared to be another level of PME in the pline, reads (understands) others, moti- first few years could be seen as undermin- vates others, corrects behavior, gives nega- ing the effort to focus lieutenants on their tive feedback, engages in team building, primary jobs. This initiative was therefore determines appropriate response, assigns not included as part of the Air Force-wide responsibility, follows up, and offers per- changes produced by OPD and left to the sonal counseling. According to my conver- discretion of each major command.24 sation with Colonel Boyer in October 1989, the same survey administered to Recent History of USAFA graduates of the class of 1982 and Lieutenants Professional their supervisors produced the same results. Development Programs While leadership and officership are not While some commands used lieutenants synonymous, in the military context they programs prior to OPD, they were neither share several characteristics. An officer standardized nor focused on officership. In who is reluctant to employ disciplinary the early eighties the most common LPDP measures, motivate subordinates to was the program developed and run out of achieve unit goals, correct inappropriate the Air University (AU) Leadership and behavior, or spend time building an effec- Management Development Center (LMDC). tive team is failing as a leader. He or she is Due to fiscal constraints that reduced man- also demonstrating a failure to grasp the power at LMDC (renamed the Center for special requirements of officership. The Professional Development—CPD—by the type of discipline unique to the military time OPD was born), the course material must be judiciously and consistently was suffering in currency and quality. employed by the officer corps. Troops The initial OPD recommendation for a must be motivated to risk their lives on the lieutenants program temporarily re- orders of their officers, counterproductive vitalized the concept of LPDP at Air Uni- behavior must be eliminated before it can versity. CPD and SOS sponsored a paper affect mission accomplishment and cost on the subject by Lt Col Steve Boyer, a re- lives unnecessarily, and few military ob- search associate at the Center for Creative jectives can be attained by individual ac- Leadership. Boyer’s Company Grade Pro- tions. In fact, it could be argued that of- fessional Development Program (CGPDP) ficership is simply the unique context in is a course designed to address areas of which an equally special kind of leader- low competency in leadership and man- ship takes place. agement skills that were identified by a While CPD was struggling with funding needs assessment. The assessment was for their LPDP and the CEC and Boyer done by the Commissioning Education were compiling and analyzing their data, Committee (CEC) from 1986 to 1988 and several major commands remained very included 2.300 first lieutenants with at interested in some type of education for least three years active duty. lieutenants. In the fall of 1989 I asked 11 The CEC needs assessment found “that commands about their programs. Nine re- by the third year of active duty, many sponded. By and large, these commands junior officers, while technically talented, had used the LMDC/CPD LPDP and con- are ‘leadership impoverished.’” These de- tinued to run it (or a similar, locally tai- ficiencies are evident in their abilities to lored program) without outside assistance. motivate, provide negative feedback, as- For example, Military Airlift Command sign responsibility, and give personal (MAC) has used the LMDC/CPD LPDP counseling to subordinates.25 since 1984, and eight of 12 MAC bases are Specifically, responses from both 2,300 currently conducting the program. lieutenants and their 2,300 supervisors However, when and if the CPD course is OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 27

discontinued. MAC has no plans to sub- vices. There are many similarities in the stitute a program of its own design. Tacti- way in which they approach the subject, cal Air Command (TAC) does not have any beginning with the fact that structurally programs at any base though some wings none makes as clear a separation between have used the LMDC/CPD LPDP in the education and training as does the Air past. Their command education staff be- Force. Virtually all education and training lieves that lieutenants professional de- is the responsibility of the Training and velopment should be left to individual su- Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the pervisors. Strategic Air Command (SAC], Army; of the chief, naval education and on the other hand, has embraced the con- training in the Navy; and of the deputy cept of lieutenants education. commander for education and training, SAC began developing its LPDP almost Marine Corps Combat Development Com- immediately after the February 1988 Co- mand (MCCDC) in the Marine Corps. All rona meeting at which the OPD initiatives three services conduct precommissioning were presented. A few months later, the programs, as well as basic and advanced SAC staff contacted members of the OPD officer courses for O-ls and 0-2s related to Working Group and asked for an outline of their military occupational specialty subject matter relating to officership. They (MOS). There are differences, however, in were provided with an outline for a 20- how these courses are integrated. hour sample course. The initial SAC pilot The Army conducts both screening and LPDP was very similar to the OPD Work- training/education in its precommission- ing Group’s outline. Headquarters SAC/ ing programs in a manner very similar to DPAE suggested that the military portion the Air Force’s. The instructional program of the program be supplemented with a is based on the first of three levels of mili- management skills portion taught by civil- tary qualification standards (MQS I). New ian professors and contracted out to a col- lieutenants then attend basic courses lege or university much like the older Min- taught by the various branches where a uteman Education Program. This two-part common core of instruction geared to pla- LPDP was tested in early 1989 and was ap- toon level (MQS II) is integrated into proved SAC-wide later that year. branch training and given the branch fla- In an effort to interest other commands vor. MQS III is integrated into the ad- in their approach to LPDP. SAC briefed its vanced course at the company/battalion program to the Worldwide Personnel Con- level and covers many subjects that the Air ference in September 1989. The response Force addresses in SOS. This approach was largely characterized by polite inter- would be similar to the Air Force’s inte- est. but there was no rush to jump on the grating a common core of instruction in bandwagon. The less than enthusiastic re- officership/leadership into all Air Training action may be due in part to the percep- Command (ATC) technical and flying tion that the SAC LPDP involves a civilian training programs. Those subjects common contract. The education services officer at to all Army officers are covered at all three one large command commented that “we MQS levels and are designed to build on don’t have the money to contract a pro- each other, each in a different military gram like SAC's.” Unfortunately, the civil- context: and according to an official 1988 ian portion of the SAC LPDP may have, at TRADOC letter, “serve as the vehicle for least for some, overshadowed the more integrating the efforts of our schools, units, valuable (and cheaper) military part. and the individual officer.’’26 The respon- sibility for MQS at all levels lies with the Lieutenants Education in Center for Army Leadership at the Com- Sister Services mand and General Staff College, Fort Leav- enworth, Kansas. The professional education of lieuten- While it is somewhat difficult to pick ants is addressed in all three sister ser- out those subject areas of MQS II that re- 28 /URPOVVER JOURNAL FALL 1990 late specifically to officership, the follow- damental role of their education/training ing are part of the core of instruction given process is teaching what it means to be an to all Army lieutenants: officer. Motivation in this direction is crit- ical. It is exemplified in a comment I re- Ethical Solutions The Officer as Role Model corded during a briefing to Air War Col- Professional History of the Army lege students by a Marine general officer Responsibilities of the Profession of Arms intimately acquainted with training and The Professional Army Ethic education: “If someone comes to us be- Leadership Doctrine cause he wants to fly the F/A-18, we don’t Duties. Responsibilities, and Authority of Of- want him— We only want people who ficers (including Officer-NCO Relations) want to be officers of marines.” Military Law27 The Marine Basic Officer Course teaches The goals of Navy precommissioning are many subjects common to Air Force pre- similar to those of the Army. After com- commissioning programs and SOS, but at a missioning, all unrestricted line officers time when most Air Force officers are re- receive a one-week leadership and man- ceiving instruction only in their specialty. agement education and training (LMET) Made up of almost 1,560 academic hours, course as part of basic skill training. LMET its purpose is “to educate the newly com- is given in conjunction with the Division missioned Marine officer in the high Officer Basic Course at either Coronado, standards of leadership traditional in the California, or Little Creek, Virginia. Avia- Marine Corps in order to prepare him for tors, submariners, and surface warfare of- the duties of a company grade officer in ficers receive the LMET tailored to their the Fleet Marine Force — ”28 Two of its respective specialty basic course. The three main goals are “to develop an under- LMET was developed under contract by standing of and commitment to the leader- identifying the qualities and competencies ship responsibilities and standards of con- that characterize the successful division ducts expected of a Marine officer” and junior officer (initially in surface warfare) “to educate the officers on the structure, and designing a curriculum to teach these values, and philosophy of the Marine qualities and competencies. Corps and, thereby, to develop a unity of According to comments made to me bv purpose shared by the entire leadership of the training program coordinator, chief of the Corps.”29 The course provides appro- naval technical training, LMET is largely a priate “knowledge, attitudes and values,” survival course designed to teach skills for and “the officer students are continually the first-time supervisor. There are only exposed to and taught those intangible about 1.5 hours of contact time devoted to traits and characteristics that distinguish subjects directly related to officership: them as Marine officers.”30 team building, ethics, and values. About 20 hours of instruction are specif- The Marine Corps uses its precommis- ically related to issues that apply to of- sioning programs primarily for screening. ficership in any military service. They Once they have commissioned a phys- include ically and mentally qualified and moti- Meaning of the Commission vated lieutenant, he or she is sent to the Challenges to Future Leadership basic course for officers taught at Quantico Professional Reading Program Marine Base, Virginia. Since the Marine Responsibilities of Leadership Corps is relatively small, all officers attend Military Professionalism Role of the Staff NCO the course at Quantico and receive the Fraternization same instruction. MOS training takes place Demands of Combat on an Officer at advanced courses in and out of the Ma- Speaker on Motivational Military Leadership rine Corps. Marine Corps History The Marines believe that the most fun- Adherence to the Code of Conduct31 OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT Z9 confronted with mixed signals, par- Conclusions ticularly after commissioning. The Air Force needs to send a consistent message As world events move the United States to all of them from the very beginning. Air Force closer to a smaller, tighter active That message should be that they are of- force constrained by budgetary limitations, ficers first and specialists second; that they the requirement for a totally dedicated and are practitioners of the profession of arms professional officer corps increases. The before they are programmers or personnel officer corps will be most effective as a rel- experts; that serving a greater good is bet- atively small, closely knit cadre that stud- ter than serving themselves; and that they ies and understands the unique aspects of have more of those things that really mat- the military profession so it can lead and ter in common with other officers than train future forces that may be called up to with civilians who happen to share their augment the standing forces. Military of- occupation. ficers cannot afford to be peacetime career- OPD in its present form does not send ists or bureaucratic managers of human that message clearly. As long as the Air and material resources like many of their Force uses occupational opportunities like civilian counterparts. Similarly, officers the chance to fly a fighter or work in a must avoid too much identification with state-of-the-art engineering lab as recruit- their occupational counterparts in the so- ing incentives, it starts off behind the insti- ciety at large or be prepared to lose that tutional power curve. Then, despite dis- which sets the professional military apart. parities in environment and duration, the No matter how well the case for an insti- precommissioning programs do their best tutional versus an occupational officer to teach the common officer characteristics corps is made, there is no longer any way and responsibilities. But commissioning it can be totally institutional. The peace- brings complications. Some officers re- time environment in which it operates, the main in a civilian environment and forget search for a credible threat in the era of the message, most go to flying or skill Gorbachev, and the society from which its training where the common bonds of of- members come and in which they must ficership may rarely be mentioned. All ar- live all dictate a degree of integration with rive at their first assignments with occupa- civil institutions that military profes- tional skills fresh in their minds and the sionals cannot avoid. The most reasonable institutional lessons of officership a fading goal should be to minimize occupational memory. integration and maximize the institutional If that memory is revived, it is done by aspects of the profession wherever and mentors, individuals (usually superiors) whenever possible. who believe in the profession of arms and OPD was a good start. To a large degree, who lead by example. This is the best way it put the house in order in those person- to teach officership and make it stick: and nel and education areas that touch every it makes a lasting impression wherever it officer. It reversed the trend toward cen- is used. The problem is that not every tralized control and execution that kept of- junior officer has such a mentor. It is pos- ficers from exercising real leadership as sible that in too many cases the mentor military professionals, and it provided a who makes the biggest impression is actu- structure that encouraged and rewarded ally an occupationalist. This is most likely appropriate behavior, and that made sense. in first assignments where role models But OPD is only three years old and still tend to practice the same specialty as the has some problems. lieutenants. Despite the opinions of many observers, The occupational tendency is reinforced a substantial number of young officers by some of the tenets and realities of OPD. seem to be on the right track. They seem to The lieutenants' focus is to be on “depth sense what is expected of them but are development.” This, by itself, is clearly oc- 30 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 cupational. The fact that depth is to be wide program should be the same every- built on a solid and constantly reinforced where, the way it is taught does not have foundation of officership seems to have to be. An LPDP (or whatever one calls it) been lost in the shuffle. OPD in its present must have a local or command flavor to be form leaves the impression that officership really true to the philosophy of OPD. is something you learn about before you are commissioned and then becomes sub- Recommendations ordinate to depth until promotion to ma- jor, when both become subordinate to The Air Force must make some adjust- gaining breadth of experience. Even the of- ments missed by the OPD Working Group ficership aspects of leadership are put off and implement the OPD initiative on the until at least the four-year point when the education of lieutenants that was not ap- SOS eligibility window opens. The OES proved. This will provide the best oppor- reinforces this perception by appearing to tunity for the officer corps of the future to encourage evaluation on purely occupa- maximize institutionalism. This also tional performance for lieutenants. means deciding that the Air Force wants It is therefore not surprising that a sub- its officers to be military professionals first stantial number of junior officers approach and communicating that desire clearly and their first career decision point with a de- consistently from the beginning of their tached view of their place in the military. careers. They have not been presented with the all- The Air Force must put less recruiting or-nothing requirements of a true institu- emphasis on occupational incentives like tionalist to either accept or reject but in- flying and explain the often unpleasant as- stead make their decisions based on a cost- pects of officer responsibilities to officer benefit analysis. candidates even at the risk of turning them Though there is no way to guarantee that away. The lower accessions expected in every lieutenant will get the message and the future may make the 1990s the best arrange his or her priorities accordingly, time to begin this approach. The Air Force some kind of common “reblueing” is at might also look at Huntington’s first phase least part of the answer. Both the Army of expertise and try to bring in officers and the Marines use this approach, believ- with broader backgrounds in the liberal ing that officership/leadership must be arts. Perhaps the range of specialties that taught when the young officer is develop- require an engineering degree is not as ing his or her self-concept as a profes- great as previously supposed. sional and in conjunction with skill OPD needs to make a clear statement of training—perhaps to offset occupational the value of officership throughout one’s tendencies. career and communicate it widely, starting A common core of instruction to rein- with AFR 36-23 and AFR 36-10. The im- force institutional officership is critical pression that depth development is the during these formative years, and it cannot only worthwhile pursuit of the company be left to mentors who may be passing grade years must be changed and officer- on the wrong perspective. However, I do ship made number one at all levels, with not believe it is ATC’s job to do it for depth the focus in the early years only to the whole Air Force. While today’s OPD preclude broadening too early. In the same has missed the mark in some ways, its manner, the OES should reintroduce some emphasis on decentralization and unit/ measure of professional qualities, if only command identification is right on target. to the extent that these qualities specifically Officership is infinitely more believable in enhance unit mission accomplishment. a practical or operational rather than an ar- Finally, the Air Force should implement tificial training context. While the subject a mandatory LPDP along the lines of the matter and objectives of such an Air Force- original OPD Working Group initiative. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 31

This concept is pure blue-suit, designed to When these beliefs and values become part produce an emotional as well as an intel- of every officer, their continuation can be lectual response. It must be flexible and safely left to informal mentors. But until make the most of local leadership and sit- that time arrives, some formal steps are uations. The core content, once developed, needed. The need was articulated 10 years would have a very long shelf life since the ago by Gen B. L. Davis, commander of Air unique aspects of the military profession Training Command, and, unfortunately, do not change often. Responsibility for de- has not changed: veloping the core, as well as suggested I have a disquieting feeling that perhaps our lessons and support material, is rightly the officer training programs have not met our province of Air University. However, each needs in terms of what an officer is all about. command should have complete freedom ... The young officers really don't seem to of execution as long as every lieutenant re- grasp that a military organization is uniquely ceives the course, the core subjects are different from any other institution in this covered, and the program is not diluted by country. ... A common finding among our any other type of training. young officers is that they have never heard These recommendations refine the OPD that their purpose in serving ... is to lead concept with regard to junior officers. forces on or over the battlefield or support those who do. They recognize the research and discus- sion about I/O theory and other concepts As we drift toward the job concept and away of military professionalism that have oc- from a military rank system ... it’s no wonder cupied many respected social scientists our young officers keep comparing “options” over the past 20 years. They also reflect in the private sector—the only difference the beliefs and goals of true military pro- some of them see is a change of clothes. fessionals, even if they do not take the In my view, we should review our officer time to think of their profession in these training curriculum to insure it meets our terms. Military institutionalism, however basic officer needs—leadership, military his- desirable, must be taught to the young so tory, how our ground and sea forces are that they may pass on these same beliefs employed, as well as the meaning of a com- and values to those who follow them. mission and officership.32 □

Notes 1. Roger A. VVrolstad, "Careerism and Military Reforms." 13. AFR 36-23. Officer Professional Development. 1 Janu- iMarine Corps Gazette. August 1986. 26. ary 1989. 1-2. 1-3. 2. Ibid. 14. Ibid.. 1-la. 3. Tom Wolfe. The Right Stuff (New York: Farrar. Straus. 15. Ibid., l-3c. Giroux. 1979). 39. 16. Wayne L. Gosnell. "The Air Force Is Making Occupa- 4. fames H. Webb. A Country Such os This (Garden City. tionalists of Its Junior Officers." research paper (Maxwell N.Y.: Doubleday. 1983). 39. AFB. Ala.: Air War College. 1989). 2. 5. Ibid.. 16. 17. Quoted in Hudson. 9. 6. Ibid.. 17. 18. Ibid. 7. James Brown and Michael J. Collins, eds.. M ilitary 19. Martin T. Daack and Charles S. Knode. "Trends Affect- Ethics and Professionalism. A Collection of Essays (Wash- ing the Future of Professionalism in the Air Force," research ington. D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1981). 9. paper (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. 8. Charles C. Moskos and Frank R Wood. eds.. The Mili- April 1987). 10. tary More than Just a Job? (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon 20. Gosnell, 14. Brassey's International Defense Publications. 1988), xiii. 21. AFR 36-10, Officer Evaluation System. 1 August 1988. 9. Ibid.. 34. 19. 10. Ibid.. 27. 22. Ibid.. 18. 11. Quoted in Jere H. Hudson. "The Vocation of Arms as a 23. Compiled from various draft documents used by the Profession." research paper (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Com- OPD Working Group, most of which were written by the mand and Staff College. June 1967). ll author. f 12. Ibid. 24. Decision by the chief of staff and transmitted verbally 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 to the OPD Working Group in February 1988. 27. Ibid., atch. 2. 25. Stephen P. Boyer. "A Program to Institute a Company 28. Department of the Navy, 'Program of Instruction for Grade Professional Development Program (CGPDP) within the Basic Officer Course" (Marine Corps Combat Develop- the United States Air Force" (Paper submitted to the USAF ment Command. 21 September 1988). 1-1 Research Associate Program, Headquarters USAF XOX. June 29. Ibid.. 1-2. 1989). 3. 30. Ibid.. 1-3. 26. Army Training and Doctrine Command, letter, subject: 31. Ibid. "TRADOC/ATTC-OP (350). undated. 1. 32. Gosnell. 1.

Writing for the Airpower Journal

Over the years and throughout the Air Force civilians are the hands-on various units to which the editors of Air- experts. Since you deal with war and the power Journal have been assigned, we preparation for war, you have the ideas we have known many people who debated need to hear. We can’t guarantee we’ll whether or not to write an article for the print what you write, but we’ll help you in Air Force’s professional journal. Most every way we can to achieve that goal. decided not to do so for a variety of reasons. They only want to hear about ops. Not I’ll get hammered! This was the reason so. We interpret the term operational level heard most often. People perceived that of war very broadly. It is how we fight. speaking out was something Air Force And that depends on how we train, how members shouldn’t do and that those who we operate our logistics systems, how did suffered for it. They felt that if they we manage and lead our people— in short, wrote, even for an approved Air Force all the day-to-day functions that create publication, their commanders, their major a capability to apply combat power command, or the Air Force as a whole effectively. would take actions to show disapproval. Convinced? We hope so. If you are, the As you may have read in our premier issue next step is to write an article that has a (Summer 1987), Gen Larry D. Welch, then good chance of being published. First, Air Force chief of staff, addressed this write on a topic you are familiar with, issue in a most positive light. The Air either because you have worked in that Force recognizes the need for its members area or because you have a special interest to speak up and write about the profession in it. Don’t try to guess what topic the Air- of warfare, even if that means writing that power Journal “needs” an article on. We the US Air Force could be doing it better. don’t work that way. Likewise, don’t stop We can’t guarantee that someone won’t just because you saw an article on your oppose your views, but it is not Air Force subject in a recent issue. We review each policy to penalize its people for writing in article on its own merit, and yours may a publication. So go ahead and share your offer a new perspective. thoughts with your fellow airmen. Second, don’t try to solve the problems of the world in one article. We look for “They” don’t publish “regular people” articles of between 2.500 to 5.000 words like me. Just try us! With the Journal (approximately 15 to 25 typewritten, dou- focusing on the operational level of war, ble-spaced pages). So concentrate on a spe- we hope to see more and more articles cific area. A topic such as “Defending coming from the people who know what against the Soviets” is too broad. “Effec- they’re talking about—people like YOU. tive Use of Air Base Ground Defense The officer corps, enlisted personnel, and Teams” is more appropriate. Next, be straightforward in your writing. them, don’t let that deter you from writing. Don’t try to make it look more impressive You may have supporting illustrations that by using multisyllable words where are more appropriate than those available they’re not needed, but don’t shy away to the editors. If not, press ahead. from sending your readers to the diction- Once you’ve written your article, send it ary when necessary. Remember that your to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker readers are probably not as familiar with Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We’ll the subject of your article as you are. Write assess it for publication. If we like your to your audience. Organize your thoughts effort but think it needs some rewriting, in a logical way, and stick to the subject. we’ll work with you to make it a stronger Cite sources and data where appropriate article. If we decide not to publish it, we’ll (endnotes are in addition to the 15 to 25 let you know why, rather than simply pages). Papers containing unsupported sending you a short thanks-but-no-thanks assertions are not the type that get letter. Because we want the best profes- published. sional journal possible, we will go out of Finally, if possible, send photos, maps, our way to assist you. That’s what we're and other appropriate illustrations that here for, but it’s your journal. Now get out support your article. If you don’t have there and write. □

I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good arti- cles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are inter- ested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don't let the lack of those keep you from writing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length— about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to expand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force personnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging arti- cles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532.

33 THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAVI Lt Col |ames P. D eLoughry, U SA F

N F E B R U A R Y 1980 the Israeli govern- ment announced plans to develop a low-cost, low-technology, primarily ground-support aircraft—the Lavi—to I replace its aging A-4 and Kfir inventory.1 Seven years later, the Lavi program was formally canceled as a result of divisive debate within Israel and heavy pressure from the United States government. The history of the Lavi is noteworthy, not so much because it documents the cancellation of the most costly Israeli weapons program ever attempted, but be- cause it reveals the heavy involvement of the United States in the aircraft’s financing and development. Over $2 billion of US aid and the latest US technology went into UNITED STATES AND THE LAVI 35

the Lavi project.2 An examination of the jobs, encourage aerospace workers to stay history of the Lavi program, the back- in Israel, lead to high-technology offshoots ground and extent of US involvement, and and products for export, and lessen US po- the effect on US interests suggests that US litical influence over Israel.5 Moshe Arens, participation in the project was ill con- former defense minister and a vice presi- ceived and executed. dent of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), builder of the Lavi, pointed out another advantage of an Israeli-produced aircraft: It “would be ... exclusive to Israel's inven- History of the Program tory.” unlike advanced US aircraft, which The 1973 Arab-Israeli war shattered the are found in other Middle Eastern air myth of Israeli military invincibility: the forces.6 Israel estimated that develop- intelligence warning system failed, ground ment costs'would be $750 million and that defenses were overrun, discipline and mo- each aircraft would cost $7 million to bilization were major problems, almost manufacture.7 In 1980 the Israeli govern- 500 main battle tanks were destroyed, and ment approved the Lavi program. The the Israeli Air Force lost close to one-third United States supported the project in of its frontline combat aircraft.3 Postwar principle and was willing to allow Israel to analysis led to planning for an aircraft spe- use its foreign military sales (FMS) credits cifically designed to attack ground targets. to buy US components for the Lavi.8 The Kfir was an interim solution based on In 1982, however, the concept of the the French Mirage III, but as the seventies Lavi as a replacement for the A-4 abruptly came to an end. Israel realized that it needed a new plane.4 The Lavi was to be produced in Israel. Home production would create needed 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 changed: “The aircraft was changed to a nated, the US would set far-reaching pre- high performance fighter-bomber capable cedents in the areas of FMS and technol- both of close support and of air defense ogy transfer and would finance over 90 and air superiority missions.”9 According percent of the Lavi’s development costs. In to Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli defense 1987, because of the massive outlay of US minister, the Israeli Air Force demanded money on the Lavi, both the GAO and the the change, telling IAi, “If you want to de- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) velop this aircraft, make it better than were commissioned to study the program. what we have now.”10 Arens commented GAO estimated the cost per aircraft at that “the original concept of an A-4 re- $17.8 million and OMB at $22.1 million.16 placement was an unusual one and not Pressure was mounting within both Is- very good__ It would have had to be can- rael and the US to cancel the program. In celed sooner because it would not have Israel, critics included members of the been a survivable aircraft."11 The Israeli army and the air force who saw huge seg- government authorized prototype con- ments of the defense budget being eaten struction for the revised Lavi in 1982, with away by a plane that was years away from full-scale development starting in October development (after seven years, only two of that year. Production goals specified at prototypes had been produced) and mil- least 300 aircraft and 60 combat-capable lions of dollars over cost.17 US critics pro- trainers.12 jected that by 1990 spiralling Lavi costs On paper, the Lavi was becoming very would consume nearly half of all military similar to the F-16 and F-18. In reality, assistance funds to Israel. Even worse, the however, Israel possessed neither the tech- Lavi would compete against US aircraft in nology nor the capital required for such a world markets.18 project. According to a 1983 General Ac- Finally, on 30 August 1987, the Israeli counting Office (GAO) study, cabinet voted 12 to 11 (with one absten- tion) to cancel the Lavi program.19 The Israel will be significantly dependent on US cancellation was devastating to the Israeli technology and financing for major portions aerospace industry. According to Moshe of the aircraft. Israel will also require US ap- proval for the planned third country sales be- Keret, president of IAI, most of the 4,000 cause of the US engine and the significant IAI employees (including 1,500 engineers) amount of US origin high technology used in assigned to the Lavi program would have the Lavi’s airframe construction, avionics to be laid off.20 The cancellation was also a and planned weapons system.13 blow to the country’s pride and prestige because development of the Lavi was the Examples of this technology include Pratt biggest project ever undertaken by Israel. and Whitney PW1120 engines; graphite Ironically, the Israeli military ordered ad- epoxy composite materials: electronic ditional F-16s to replace the Lavi—an idea countermeasures (ECM) parts: radar- originally proposed by US industry execu- warning receivers and their logarithms: tives well before the Lavi program was un- wide-angle, heads-up display; programma- der way.21 ble signal-processor emulator; flight- Although Israel lost a symbol of tech- control computer; single-crystal turbine nological prowess, it gained access to the technology; and computer and airframe latest US aerospace technology, obtained system.14 sophisticated US aerospace industry By 1983 the estimated research and de- computers—which have a variety of other velopment (R&D) costs for the Lavi had in- uses—and gained irreplaceable experience creased to approximately $1.5 billion, and in state-of-the-art aeronautical processes.22 the cost per aircraft had jumped to $15.5 Indeed, in 1988 Israel surprised the world million.15 At this time, the US began with its first space launch.23 More than a unique involvement with the Lavi likely, the technology and experience program. Before the project was termi- gained from the Lavi project, together with UNITED STATES AND THE LAV1 37

space technology acquired in joint Strate- and we concur that FMS was intended for gic Defense Initiative research with the the purchase of goods and services in the US, provided Israel with the technological United States to support U.S. firms.”27 base for this achievement. Had the Lavi remained a low-cost re- placement for the A-4 and Kfir fleet, issues such as technology transfer and the appro- priateness of FMS use would not have US Involvement arisen. However, by 1982 the concept of in the Lavi Program the Lavi had changed considerably. Israel desperately needed the technology to pro- US involvement with the Lavi began in duce the upgraded aircraft and the money 1980 when Israel requested that the two to finance production. There was only one countries coproduce an engine for the new place to look for both technology and Israeli fighter. The US agreed but de- financing—the United States. Israel then murred on Israel’s request to use FMS began an all-out effort, using whatever credits for the Lavi in Israel.24 The position means were necessary, to get what it of FMS credits in the overall picture of US needed. aid to Israel is crucial to understanding the effect of the Lavi program on US interests. American aid to Israel falls into two The Technology Issue categories—recurring and nonrecurring. At the time the Lavi program was termi- FMS credits are an example of recurring nated, US contractors were building ap- aid.25 According to the GAO. these credits proximately 40 percent of the aircraft’s to Israel serve two major purposes: to re- systems. According to Defense Minister affirm US political support and to ensure Rabin, 730 US firms were either sub- the adequacy of Israel’s security.26 The contractors or vendors on the program.26 GAO made another point which became a The issue of technology transfer was a major area of contention between Israel prime point of contention, and Israel ini- and segments of the US government: tially found itself at odds with the US “DOD [Department of Defense) believes State Department and Department of De- 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 fense.29 To resolve this roadblock, Israel the wing and tail design (composite con- played on the personal relationship be- struction), and released production tech- tween Israeli minister of defense Arens nology licenses for the servo actuators and and US secretary of state George P. Shultz. flight control computers.”33 By 1984 phase According to an investigative report in I and phase II technology license requests the Washington Post, Pentagon officials were approved, and phase III requests had been instrumental in blocking several were nearing approval.34 critical licenses for technology transfer.30 During the course of the Lavi’s devel- In 1983, though, Arens—former Israeli am- opment, Israel was able to take advantage bassador to the United States—became Is- of US R&D on a variety of systems such as rael’s defense minister. Arens was one of derivative engines, composite-materials the original champions of the Lavi and technology, avionics, and ECM for the had made many friends during his tenure F-15, F-16, and F-18.35 In addition to in Washington. According to the report, the formal technology licenses and Marvin Klemow, Washington’s representa- the plethora of US subcontractors and tive for IAI, flew to Tel Aviv with Dan vendors, who also provided direct insights Halperin, the economics minister at the into the US aeronautical system, Israel Israeli Embassy in Washington. Klemow pursued another source of technological recalled advising Arens to go over the information: scientific exchanges. “In heads of Defense Department officials: March of 1984 the U.S. and Israel signed a “Our strategy should be that the Pentagon Memorandum of Agreement concerning doesn’t exist. This is a political de- exchanges of scientists and engineers, and cision— We should go to State and the cooperation in research, development, pro- White House.’’31 Halperin is reported to curement and logistics support for selected have urged Arens to call Secretary Shultz d e f e n s e e q u i p m e n t . ” 36 H e r e w a s y e t a n - to “expedite three crucial licenses which other area where technology transfer was the Pentagon was holding up.” According not only possible but encouraged. Whether to Halperin, “Arens made the call, and or not Israel obtained data on aerospace in a few days the first licenses were technology pertinent to the Lavi program approved.”32 through scientific exchanges is unknown. In April 1983 the Reagan administration However, the source was available and approved license requests for “phase I of certainly could have been used to do an

TABLE US FOREIGN MILITARY SALES Fiscal Year In Israel In the U S 1985 $250 million $150 million 1986 $300 million $150 million 1987 $300 million $150 million 1988 $400 million $150 million

Source: Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance Facts." Congressional Research Briefing, 16 June 1989, 6, 8-10; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1985— Hearings and Mark Ups, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1984, xiv. UNITED STATES AND THE LAVI 39

end run on any bureaucratic obstacle. The business lobbyist, and a staff member of relative ease with which Israel obtained the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee licenses for technology transfer indicates controlling foreign aid. Reportedly, this that barriers erected by the US bureau- meeting produced a plan for an amend- cracy were no match for a concerted Israeli ment allowing a major exception to US effort. The best example of Israel's tactics, policy so that FMS could be spent in Israel however, involved its pursuit of funds for for the Lavi.43 Congressman Wilson ac- the new plane. knowledged that he asked the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the influential pro-Israel lobbying group in Washington, to draft the language for the Funding for the Lavi amendment.43 AIPAC has repeatedly The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the played a major role in shaping US policy vehicle for FMS funding, permits offshore regarding Israel and the Arab world. The procurement only if it will not adversely extent of AIPAC’s influence is such that it affect the United States. It also restricts has on at least two occasions been directly funds for building foreign defense indus- involved in negotiations with the US State tries except in special cases, such as help- Department concerning foreign policy is- ing to rebuild European defense industries sues: the proposed sale of Stinger anti- after World War II and making a one-time aircraft missiles to Jordan and the location allowance for Israel to produce the Mer- of the US Embassy in Israel.44 The funding kava tank.37 request, an amendment to the fiscal year The Israelis had wanted to use FMS 1984 Continuing Budget Resolution, asked funds for R&D in Israel since 1979. for $150 million more than IAI required However, successive US administrations and committed US financing to the Lavi.45 had disapproved their requests, and there Further, the amendment allowed Israel to was little hope for approval in 1983.38 But spend $300 million of US FMS funds for Congress was a different story. the Lavi in the United States and $250 mil- In an article for the Middle East Journal, lion in Israel.46 Duncan Clarke and Alan Cohen noted that The amendment was introduced in "the congressional process that resulted in November 1983, just prior to the Christmas American support for the Lavi was rushed recess,47 and involved lobbyists from all and superficial. The substantive issues quarters. AIPAC mounted a major effort to raised by the project were examined by the get the legislation passed, sending written Defense and State Departments but were memoranda to every member of the House not weighed carefully (or at all) by Con- and Senate and calling upon key members gress.”39 This indictment of Congress’s of the appropriate committees.48 Pro-Arab role in the Lavi project comes up often in lobbies worked the other side of the issue, criticism of US funding of the Israeli as did representatives from US aerospace fighter.40 firms such as Northrop Corporation and Having been repeatedly blocked by the General Electric, which objected to US Pentagon in their quest to use FMS credits funds being used to finance an aircraft that in Israel for the Lavi, Israeli officials in the might compete with their own.49 fall of 1983 took their case directly to Con- However, four days after its introduction gress. According to a Washington Post in the House (and with no committee hear- study of the Lavi, Rep Charles Wilson of ings and little debate), the Lavi package Texas, a friend of Moshe Arens and a key was approved.50 According to Representa- member of the subcommittee responsible tive Wilson, the only controversy con- for appropriating foreign aid, advocated cerning the Lavi had to do with which congressional funding of the Lavi.41 The congressmen would get credit for the chronology of events included a meeting amendment when it passed.51 between Representative Wilson, an Israeli Nevertheless, DOD and the State Depart- 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

ment still vigorously opposed the Lavi. people question whether the program was especially the related FMS issue. In fact, in in the best interests of the United States. early 1984 DOD was able to delay the re- lease of funds by interpreting the amend- ment to mean that Israel’s $250 million were for production rather than R&D.52 Effect of the Lavi Again, heavy lobbying succeeded in affirming that the funding was indeed to Program on US Interests be used for R&D.53 Thus, Israel cleared the Four consequences of the Lavi program final hurdle, opening the way for further (1982-87) suggest that this project did not funding with FMS monies (see table). serve the best interests of the United By 1987 rising costs, as evidenced by the States. These include (1) transfer of ad- GAO and OMB estimates, had put the Lavi vanced technology, (2) unprecedented use program in serious trouble in Israel and of FMS credits. (3) loss of American jobs, the United States. Consequently, the US and (4) perpetuation of a pro-Israel bias. raised the procurement amount in Israel for fiscal year 1988 to $400 million to pay Lavi cancellation costs and to substitute Transfer of Advanced Technology the purchase of 75 to 100 F-16Cs over the According to a 1983 GAO report. “Israel next three to four years (see table).54 Over more than any other country has been the course of the Lavi project, the US gov- provided with a higher level of military ernment invested over $2 billion of tax- technologies having export potential.’’55 payers' money, established foreign policy On more than one occasion, this technol- precedents, and transferred sensitive tech- ogy transfer occurred over the objections nology. Feelings are still raw in many of DOD and US aerospace firms and quarters of the US government over the placed Israel in a more advanced tech- way the Lavi issue was handled, and many nological position than even the closest UNITED STATES AND THE LAVI 41

US allies, such as Great Britain and West that outlined plans to sell the aircraft to Germany.56 third world countries.5-1 Further, Moshe A 1983 study of the Israeli defense in- Keret, the head of IAI, stated in 1987 that dustry raises another point about sharing IAI had no specific customers in mind but technology with Israel: that by the mid-1990s the Lavi "would be able to speak for itself in export competi- A number of U.S. companies have expressed tions. [At that time,) it might be possible to concerns that doing business with an Israeli sell a stripped version of the aircraft in the company would probably result in all of the export market.’’60 While there is no firm U.S. company's ideas and designs being ap- evidence indicating that Israel has offered propriated without proper compensation. The U.S. company could expect to find itself the Lavi or its technology to other nations, competing with its own technology and de- some open source reports suggest that the signs in the international marketplace.57 People’s Republic of Ghina has purchased a sophisticated Lavi radar system and is Although this sentiment may be too gener- seeking Lavi avionics.61 alized, it represented the feelings of some US industry officials, based on prior expe- rience with the basic Sidewinder and Use of FMS Credits A1M-9L air intercept missiles.58 Both GAO and DOD believed that the pri- Despite assurances to the contrary, Israel mary purpose of the FMS program was to probably would have exported the Lavi be- support US firms by buying US goods and cause of the small domestic market and services.62 Thus, the fact that Israel was the immense national stake in advanced- able to finance 90 percent of the Lavi’s technology exports as a means of financial R&D—much of it in Israel—with FMS recovery. The Washington Post report on credits from the United States was a sore the Lavi revealed the existence of an IAI point with many US government officials marketing document of the early 1980s and aircraft manufacturers.63 Northrop, for 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

example, built the F-20 Tigershark without Northrop’s experience is a grim example benefit of government funds, exporting the of what can happen when the US govern- fighter to third world markets where it ment supports a foreign competitor rather would have to compete with the Lavi. In than a US company acting in good faith all, $1.5 billion of Lavi financing went di- and with reasonable expectations of prof- rectly to Israel to support its industry and itability. Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally economy—money that could have been of California, the representative from spent in the United States.64 Northrop’s home district, raised a similar In 1983 the GAO noted that, because of point during congressional hearings in the Lavi precedent, the US might be hard 1984 on the Middle East aid package. He pressed to refuse similar treatment to other was told that much of the money used to countries: build the Lavi would be spent in the US.70 We take no position on the level or terms of As we have seen, however, that sum repre- assistance to Israel, but believe the prece- sents only a portion of the money and jobs dents being set by the liberalized method in that US firms could have enjoyed had FMS implementing the program could be a prob- funding been used as intended by DOD lem if other recipient countries ask for simi- and GAO. lar concessions.65

Indeed, the US now extends several Perpetuation of a Pro-Israel Bias unique aspects of Lavi funding to other countries: (1) cash-flow financing for mul- There is a strong perception in the Arab tiyear purchases (now used in Egypt and world and in some quarters of the US gov- Turkey), (2) FMS loan-repayment waiver ernment, specifically the Department of (now given to Sudan and Egypt), and State and DOD, that US Middle East policy (3) FMS offsets and FMS drawdowns (re- is skewed towards Israel at the expense of quested by other countries).66 US interests in the rest of the region. This perception is the result of decades of spe- cial treatment for Israel, and the Lavi pro- Loss of American fobs gram served to reinforce that view. After all, by supporting the Lavi, the United One can argue that, because of coproduc- States financed the expansion of the Israeli tion and subcontracting with Israel, the arms industry despite the fact that Israel Lavi program created far fewer jobs in the again had invaded Lebanon, laid siege to US than it should have. For example, sta- Beirut, and used US-supplied weapons in tistics for the year 1985 show that the US an offensive role. Further, a special com- authorized $400 million of FMS for the mission had cited senior Israeli military Lavi, but'only $150 million of that was personnel, including the defense minister, spent in the United States. That $150 mil- for failing to anticipate and prevent the lion produced between 3.780 and 4,659 massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and American jobs. However, 10,080 to 12,424 Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut.71 What jobs would have been created had all $400 other signal could the Arab world receive million been spent in the United States.67 than that the United States did not con- Furthermore, on 17 November 1986 sider those events serious enough to halt Northrop terminated its F-20 Tigershark cooperation with Israel? program after receiving no financial On several occasions, the United States support from the US government.68 Al- has been unfairly accused of complicity in though Northrop canceled the program for military actions undertaken by Israel, such a variety of reasons, including lack of sales as the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in to the US Air Force, $1.2 billion of private 1981, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, investment and 2,000 American jobs were and the attack on Palestine Liberation Or- lost, nevertheless.69 ganization (PLO) headquarters in Tunis in UNITED STATES AND THE LAV1 43

1985. AIPAC has even used these accusa- as the ill will generated among other tions to encourage closer cooperation be- Middle Eastern allies, is testimony to an tween the two countries, arguing that they ill-conceived, hastily executed policy. Fur- should reap the advantages of a closer rela- ther, the pattern of behind-the-scenes ma- tionship since everyone assumes that they neuvering that typified the project is eye- are cooperating anyway.72 In the case of opening and indicative of the overwhelm- the Lavi, though, the cooperation was ex- ing support enjoyed by Israel in Congress, plicit and acknowledged. the influence of Congress on foreign pol- Last, by supplying such massive aid for icy, and the ease with which bureaucratic the Lavi, the US was in effect freeing Is- roadblocks can be overcome by a skillful, raeli money for the war in Lebanon—a determined effort. conflict that provoked widespread disap- The Lavi story is not a happy one proval in the Arab world and flew in the for any of the participants, and its face of US policy in the Middle East. Thus, termination—while justified on both fi- US declarations about its evenhandedness nancial and political grounds—left bitter and its desire for peace in the region did feelings in many quarters. The Lavi repre- not ring true to moderate Arab states. sented a dream for Israel and galvanized tremendous support and enthusiasm. Completely redesigning the aircraft in 1982 proved to be a fatal flaw, leading to major cost overruns and drawing the Conclusion United States into the role of major part- The United States made a serious error ner, banker, and provider of technology. when it became directly involved in the The Lavi project was not in the best inter- Lavi project with Israel. The resultant loss ests of the United States, and we should of US technology, money, and jobs, as well have recognized that fact in 1983. □

Notes 1. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 10. Brown, 22. Europe and the Middle East. Foreign Assistance Legislation 11. Ibid. for Fiscal Year 1985—Hearings and Mark Ups. 98th Cong.. 12. US Assistance. 55. 2d sess.. 1984. 55: David A. Brown. "Israelis Review Deci- 13. Ibid. sions That Led to Lavi Cancellation." Aviation Week 6- Space 14. "U.S. Nears Lavi Transfer Approval." Aviation Week Sr Technology 127. no. 11 (14 September 1987): 22. Space Technology 118. no. 2 (10 january 1983): 20-23; Bab- 2. Comptroller General of the United States, US Assistance cock. 22. to the State of Israel (Washington. D.C.: Government Ac- 15. US Assistance. 56. counting Office. 1983), 55; Clyde R. Mark, "Israel: US For- 16. John D. Morrocco, "GAO Report on Lavi Indicates eign Assistance Facts.” Congressional Research Briefing. Spending Will Exceed Cap." Aviation Week 6- Space Tech- IB85066, 16 June 1989. 11-13." nology 126, no. 9 (2 March 1987): 20. 3. Dana Adams Schmidt. Armageddon in the Middle East 17. Richard Barnard. "Lavi: Israeli Technology as an En- (New York: John Day Co.. 1974), 209: Richard F. Nyrop. ed.. gine of Economy." Defense 5. no. 52 (3 December 1984): 3: Israel: A Country Study (Washington. D.C.: American Uni- Clarke and Cohen, 25; William M. Kehrer, "US Funding for versity Press. 1979), 242. the Lavi Project: An Examination and Analysis," Middle East 4. Charles R. Babcock. "How the US Came to Underwrite Insight 3. no. 6 (November-December 1984): 17. Israel's Lavi Fighter Project." Washington Post, 6 August 18. Michael Mecham, "U.S. Increases Pressure on Israel to 1986. 1; Keith F. Mordoff. "Israelis Producing New Version Abandon Lavi," Aviation Week 6- Space Technology 127. no. of Kfir." Aviation Week S• Space Technology 118, no. 22 (30 7 (17 August 1987): 21. May 1983): 134. 19. David Brown et al.. "IAI Proposes Flight Test Program 5. Duncan L. Clarke and Alan S. Cohen. “The United to Extract More Data from Lavi," Aviation Week 6- Space States. Israel and the Lavi Fighter." Middle East Journal 40, Technology 127, no. 10 (7 September 1987): 22: David Brown no. 1 (Winter 1986): 18-19. et al.. "Decision to Cancel Lavi Divides Israel." ibid. 6. Donald E. Fink, "Israel Renews Debate on Lavi Develop- 20. Brown et al., "IAI Proposes." 22; Brown et al.. "Deci- ment." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology 126. no. 22 (1 sion to Cancel," 22. June 1987): 19. 21. Mecham, 21; David Brown et al., "Lavi Cancellation 7. US Assistance. 56. Sets Back Pratt’s PW1120 Engine Program,” Aviation Week fr 8. Ibid., 57. Space Technology 127. no. 10 (7 September 1987): 24. 9. Brown. 22: Clarke and Cohen, 17; US Assistance, 55. 22. Barnard. 3. 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

23. "Israeli Satellite Launch Sparks Concerns about Mid- 49. Kehrer. 11; Clarence A. Robinson. Jr.. “US Companies dle East Missile Buildup." Aviation Week 6- Space Technol- Oppose Lavi Aid," Aviation Week & Space Technology 118. ogy 129. no. 13 (26 September 1988): 21. no. 7 (14 February 1983): 16-18. 24. US Assistance. 57. 50. Legrand and Shuey, 29. 25. Ellen B. Laipson and Clyde R. Mark. "Israeli American 51. Babcock. 22. Relations," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief. 52. Healy, 4. IB82008. 20 June 1989. 14. 53. House, Foreign Assistance Legislation, 374. 26. US Assistance. 6. 54. Mark. 6; Mecham, 21. 27. Ibid.. 42. 55. US Assistance, iii. 28. David A. Brown. "International Partners Sought to 56. Clarke and Cohen. 28. Complete Lavi." Aviation Week & Space Technology 127. no. 57. Julian S. Lake. “Israeli Defense Industry: An Over- 11 (14 September 1987): 23. view.” Defense Electronics 15. no. 9 (September 1983): 98. 29. Babcock. 22; "U S. Nears." 22. 58. Clarke and Cohen. 22. 30. Babcock. 22. 59. Babcock. 22. 31. Ibid. 60. Brown. "Israelis Review." 23. 32. Ibid. 61. Near East and South Asia. Foreign Broadcast Informa- 33. LrS Assistance. 56. tion Service, 11 April 1988. 31; ibid.. 15 April 1988, annex. 34. House, Foreign Assistance Legislation. 39. 2: China Report, ibid., 22 April 1988, annex. 1. 35. "U.S. Nears." 20-23. 62. US Assistance, 42. 36. Clarke and Cohen. 27. 63. Morrocco, "GAO Report," 20. 37. Linda Legrand and Robert Shuey, “A CRS Analysis of 64. Mark. 6-9. the Employment Effect of Spending Foreign Military Sales 65. US Assistance. 76. Credits outside of the United States.” Congressional Re­ 66. Mark, 5-7; US Assistance. 76-77. search Service, 3 June 1985. 1-2. 67. Legrand and Shuey. 9. 38. Kehrer. 12: Babcock. 22. 68. “Northrop Concludes Investments in F-20 Program," 39. Clarke and Cohen. 28. Northrop Corporation press release. 17 November 1986. 1. 40. Kehrer. 10-11: Babcock. 22; Melissa Healy. "Israelis 69. "Northrop Concludes." 1; "USAF Selects Northrop Spar with State and Defense over Lavi Funds." Defense Week ATF Design: Chooses to Modify Existing F-15 Rather Than 5, no. 11 (13 February 1984): 4. Buy New F-20's." Northrop Corporation press release. 31 Oc- 41. Babcock. 22. tober 1986. 4. 42. Ibid. 70. House. Foreign Assistance Legislation. 13. 43. Ibid. 71. The Beirut Massacre: Complete Kahan Commission Re­ 44. John Goshko. "Increasingly Active AIPAC Draws In- port (New York: Karz-Cohl. 1983). 68; Laipson and Mark. 12: creasing Fire." Washington Post. 10 April 1984. A17. US Assistance. 78. 45. Babcock. 22. 72. Martin Indyk, C. Kupchan, and S. J. Rosen. "Israel and 46. Mark. 6. the US Air Force," in AIPAC Papers on US Israel Relations 47. Kehrer, 11: Clarke and Cohen. 29. (Washington. D.C.: AIPAC. 1983). 23. 48. Kehrer, 11; Clarke and Cohen. 31. Basis of Issue

AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, is the profes­ sional journal of the Air Force. Requirements for dis­ tribution will be based on the following:

I copy for each general on active duty with 3 copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit the US Air Force and Air Reserve Forces. down to squadron level. I copy for every 5 active duty US Air Force 3 copies for each air attache or advisory officers in grades colonel through captain. group function. I copy for every 15 active duty US Air Force 1 copy for each non-US Air Force, US gov­ officers in the grade of first lieutenant. ernment organization. I copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve I copy for each US Air Force or US govern­ Forces office of public affairs. ment library facility.

If your organization is not presently re­ ceiving its authorized copies of the Air- power Journal, submit a completed AF Form 764a to your publications distribu­ tion office (PDOJ. Note sample below. The Editor

fPRESS HARD WHEN USING BALL POINT PENI SHORT TITLE ANO DATE UNIT OF RON CLASS SYMBOL REQUISITION REQUIREMENT AFR.P 50-2 E A (JMOAS P (-)COPIES TO. fr om: y o u R o p p i c E ADDRESS FOR FORMS USE ONLY MONTHLY USAGE Your base, pd o OR CUSTOMER ACCOUNT ON HAND representative REMARKS R. Q. REQUISITION ESTABLISH NEW REQUIREMENT F0F* I Q U A R TE R LY | EMERGENCY DEPOT USE ( ------)COPIES OF AFRP 50-2, AIRPOWER JOURNAL

DATE PREPARED SIGNATURE AND TITLE

" 784. FOflMS ’24A RON AND RQMT REQUEST

45 DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD

Al

HEN THE word air/space be- Lt Col Frank W. Jennings, gan inserting itself into the USAFR, Ret ired lexicon of the military world W in 1957, it was welcomed warmly by some as a useful term for what appeared to be a new concept and, at the same time, was rejected and ridiculed by others. In the following year, the Air Force re- A. fined air/space to aerospace. By com- o* bining the words air and space and de- scribing the earth’s atmosphere and the' regions beyond it as one operational me- w *>*( dium, the Air Force created a term that symbolized a new meaning. Yet, 33 years r after the word gave wings to the concept, * o % aerospace is still misunderstood and often °f . a. misrepresented. S/ ) - ; -A J / - ° / o SA-,' ^ A, f. O c4 o, 6a > % ? 0„ e A %

S' 'v vS / . O, °>7 % (Z °r c, 0 cv. c /2 - ^ '. DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD AEROSPACE 47

Its application to doctrine, to space op- setts and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen erations. and to the assignment of roles Thomas D. White—and, again, between and missions among the military depart- McCormack and Maj Gen Dwight E. Beach, ments is still being debated, even within the Army’s director of air defense and spe- the Air Force. A review of the genesis of cial weapons in the Office of the Deputy the concept by the term’s originator seems Chief of Staff for Military Operations. in order—even many years overdue.1 The hearings on “Missile Development Last summer, the widely respected jour- and Space Sciences” were conducted b nalist and Pulitzer prize-winning author the House Committee on Science and A Russell Baker wrote in his nationally syn- tronautics. When the Air Force chief < dicated column: staff was questioned on 3 February 19T> part of the testimony went like this: In World War II there was an American hvmn to bombing. It ended exultantly with Mr. McCormack. General, on the light sin the words, “Nothing can stop the Army Air still, the matter that I would like to get inti Corps!” Not even the end of the war, as it mation about, because the word “aerospa< turned out. War over, the Army Air Corps is something new to me and I know that h shed its old Army skin and turned into the significance from the Air Force angle, whei US Air Force. was that coined? Along came rockets carrying atom bombs. General White. Within the last year and 1 Here was a devastating new form of artillery the Air Force. 1 am willing to add. I woul that could deliver doomsday swift as light- like to explain it if you wish. ning. It made the Air Force’s lumbering old bombers as obsolete as the battering ram. Mr. McCormack. I appreciate that it w,r coined by the Air Force. I imagine with: Control of the new superweapons (and their that space that many of these conflicts b< sweet billion-dollar budgets) might logically tween the Air Force and the Army and li have gone to Army artillery. To avert this Navy in outer space would be very easily at catastrophe, which would have reduced it justed from the Air Force angle because e\ to a minor power, the Air Force invented erything then will come under "Aerospace aerospace. General White. Well, 1 do not think the con What it did was simply invent this brand flicts are as serious as some people woul new word: "aerospace.” It was silly, but silli- like to make them. Mr McCormack. ness often works wonders on Congress. "Aerospace” embodies the idea that air and Mr. McCormack. I noticed you stressed the space, the airless void beyond earth and air. word throughout your whole statement, so i were one and the same. Since air was the Air assumed this morning there was some sig- Force's domain, did it not follow that space nificance in this wording. Why not call il was too? Of course not. unless you could say “space-aero?” "aerospace" without laughing.2 General White. That is a little more eupho- You can’t justly fault Mr Baker for mak- nious, perhaps. ing this statement for three reasons: (1) it’s Mr. McCormack. You notice I say “on the been “common knowledge” for decades light side.” I can see where it developed, that the Air Force invented aerospace as a however. We will see what the future holds ploy to massively enlarge its operational as to the term "aerospace” and the claim for responsibilities and jurisdiction; (2) the its jurisdiction....3 Air Force did get the long-range missile Six days later, on 9 February 1959, Con mission: and (3) there has been no clear gressman McCormack questioned Army Air Force explanation of exactly how and general Beach: why the term was originated. Mr. McCormack. We have heard witnesses ol What Russell Baker wrote in 1989 re- another service use the term “aerospace. calls the colloquies during congressional What service do you think should have over- hearings 30 years earlier between Con- all responsibility for military space gressman John McCormack of Massachu- activities? 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

General Beach. Well, I never heard of that aerospace also is in keeping with the 1959 term before. I always heard of “armospace." definition spelled out in Air Force Pam- Mr. McCormack. Well, we encountered it the phlet (AFP) 11-1-4, Interim Aerospace Ter- other day, a very sweet term, a very all- minology Reference. The Air Force’s 1959 embracing term. As 1 said to somebody in the ‘‘terminology reference” had been its first Army, whoever coined it ought to be made a effort to develop a coordinated definition full general. But my question is, what service of aerospace. It was compiled in coopera- do you think should have overall respon- tion with the entire Air Staff under the sibility for military space activities? leadership of O. T. Albertini of the Direc- General Beach. Congressman McCormack, I torate of Administrative Services and dis- don’t believe any one service should have over- tributed throughout the Air Force and to all responsibility. It should be a national effort. key defense agencies. As General [Maj Gen W. W.) Dick has outlined, Yet, the definition in the Joint Chiefs of the Army has specific requirements in space, and our position is that no single military de- Staff Publication 1 , Department of Defense partment should be assigned sole responsibility Dictionary of Military and Associated for military space operations....4 Terms—which carries endorsements by the Department of Defense, NATO, and the Developing military doctrine as it ap- Inter-American Defense Board—does not plies to aerospace has not been easy for the acknowledge a single medium but speaks Air Force or the rest of the Defense Depart- of ‘‘two separate [emphasis added] en- ment. In fact, even today, the Air Force’s tities.”8 Thus, one could reason that it official definition of aerospace differs from does not recognize Air Force primary en- the one used by the Department of Defense titlement to the realm beyond the at- and endorsed by the other services. mosphere but leaves “space” as an “en- From the beginning, the Air Force de- tity” open to the claims of any military fined aerospace as “an operationally indi- department. visible medium consisting of the total ex- This may have been unintentional, but panse beyond the Earth’s surface.” That’s adoption of the official Air Force defini- the way it was defined in an Air Force tion would have made unambiguous the glossary in October 1959.5 question of roles and missions in aero- The current Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, space. Under the JCS definition treating Aerospace Doctrine of the United Basic “space” as separate from “air,” the assign- States Air Force, states that ment to the Air Force of the primary re- aerospace is the total expanse beyond the sponsibility among the armed forces “to Earth’s surface; it is the multidimensional gain and maintain general air supremacy” operating environment where Air Force could be ignored as it related to space. forces can perform all of their missions__ Assignment to the Air Force of the air Space is the outer reaches of the aerospace supremacy role had been the result of the operational medium. In fulfilling US national National Security Act of 1947 and the Key security objectives, the Air Force has the pri- West Agreement of 1948, which provided mary responsibility for maintaining the for the effective strategic direction of the United States' freedom to act throughout the aerospace.6 armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration As can be seen, the doctrine manual re- into an efficient team of land, naval, and affirmed, 25 years later, the Air Force’s air forces. original ‘‘single operational medium” con- The “roles and missions” were spelled cept. It states further: “Throughout this out in March 1954 in Department of De- manual, ‘aerospace’ and ‘air’ are used in- fense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the terchangeably. The use of ‘air’ should not Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of be construed as a more limited treatment Staff—“the Functions Paper.”9 of the aerospace medium.”7 Today’s use of It seems certain that those who negoti- Jen Thomas D. While. 11 was during his tenure as Air Force Thief of staff (1957-1961) that the term aerospace was matured.

ated the roles and missions agreements in 1948 and later did not intend to limit the altitude of air operations or to fix a bound- ary for Air Force operations beyond the earth’s surface. However, today, in the minds of some people, the primary respon- sibility for the total aerospace mission re- mains unclear. The approved DOD definition of aero- space, as published in JCS Pub 1 in 1986, is as follows: Of. or pertaining to, the earth’s envelope of atmosphere and the space above it: two sepa- rate entities considered as a single realm for activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles which will travel in both entities.10 Unfortunately, the definition is incorrect in stating that space is “above” the at- Aero-Space, n. Of or pertaining to the earth’s mosphere. If you were to look at our planet envelope of atmosphere and the space above from the Moon you would see that the it, the two considered as a single realm for Earth’s atmosphere and its contiguous re- activity in the launching, guidance, and con- gions are not only “above” the Earth, but trol of ballistic missiles, earth satellites, di- “under” and “beside” it. Aerospace is ac- rigible space vehicles, and the like.12 tually beyond the surface of our globe, not The interpretation of “two separate en- merely above it. tities,” as implied in Heflin’s definition It seems evident that writers of the DOD and also in the JCS Pub 1 definition of definition—which also is echoed in the aerospace—instead of “an operationally aerospace definition of bv NASA in its indivisible medium”—has been in conten- 1965 dictionary—adapted the definition tion from the early days of its use by the written by Woodford Heflin, editor of the Air Force. widely admired and indispensable United Secretary of the Air Force James H. States Air Force Dictionary, which was Douglas gave the Air Force’s rationale in published as an “unofficial” guide by the 1957 before the Senate Armed Services Air University’s Research Studies Institute Committee when he said that in 1956. The Heflin definition of aero-space the Air Force has been engaged in explora- seems also to have influenced several com- tions of outer space and all of the associated mercial dictionaries, including one by the technical fields since the end of World War Oxford University Press in 1972.11 Heflin’s II. In cooperation with the NACA [National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, fore- definition appeared in Interim Glossary: runner of NASA], we have had a continuous Aero-Space Terms, which he compiled in program in research aircraft with the objec- February 1958 and published in March. tive of experimental flights at ever-increasing Here is his definition: speeds and altitudes. It was with the first of

49 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

these aircraft, the X-l, that man, in 1947, first In the article, Col Kenneth A. Myers and exceeded the speed of sound. With the X-2, Lt Col John G. Tockston argued that man first soared to altitudes of more than 20 miles. The current model of these aircraft un- military missions that are now (or will soon der development is the X-15, which should be) conducted in space should subscribe sep- permit man to fly at speeds greater than one arately to elements of a “fundamental doc- mile each second and altitudes above 100 trine” for military forces. Once space is rec- miles. ognized as a distinct realm of military operations, it can be more effectively inte- 1 recount this continuity of development grated with other US defense forces by a efforts to illustrate the fact that there is no well-articulated environmental and organiza- easily recognized boundary between the at- tional doctrine for space forces.16 mosphere and space [emphasis added). The one merges into the other and we must learn The authors’ description of the charac- to use both. The techniques and develop- teristics of the space medium is reminis- ments involved in the X-15 are one path to cent of the air power doctrines of Giulio man’s flight into space. The X-15 is a step to- Douhet in 1921: ward a manned satellite.13 The concept propounded by top Air The pervasiveness of space forces reflects the ethereal nature of their operations and Force civilian and military leaders since capabilities. The space medium is all- 1957 that there is no clearly defined opera- encompassing—surrounding the media of tional dividing line between atmosphere land, sea, and air. This fact permits an om- and space is still being questioned nearly nipresence or a proliferation of space forces 30 years later. for support of defense requirements at any In 1983. Lt Col David Lupton, USAF, Re- air or terrestrial location.17 tired, wrote in Strategic Review: They write also that “space control be- There are three major doctrinal pitfalls in the comes a prerequisite to the success of air, aerospace concept. First, it places dissimilar land and naval forces in battle."18 forces—air, space and ballistic missile— under the same doctrinal umbrella. This gen- Douhet wrote in his influential book. erates spurious doctrinal issues such as: “Is Command of the Air: space a place or a mission?’’ Second, the con- [In a future war] the side dominated from the cept assigns the characteristics of air forces air would have to fight an unequal fight and to space and ballistic missile forces. In doing resign itself to endure implacable offensives. so, it perpetuates the myth that space forces Its army and navy would have to function are merely high-flying aircraft, notwithstand- with bases and communication lines inse- ing 25 years of experience to the contrary. Fi- cure, exposed to constant threat, against an nally, it generates a semantic fog which com- army and navy with secure bases and lines of bines with the normal confusion over roles communication. Its sea traffic would be cut and missions that accompany doctrinal de- off at the ports. All the most vital and vulner- bates to obscure thoroughly the fundamental able points in its territory would be subject issues.14 to cruelly terrifying offensives.19 Two Air Force officers wrote an article in the Winter 1988 issue of Airpower Jour- One of the chief criticisms of Air Force nal that had as its objective doctrine regarding aerospace stated by Myers and Tockston is that “the ca- not only to focus on the invalid applications pabilities of airplanes are ascribed to satel- of air doctrine to space capabilities but also lites.”20 Another criticism is that the Air to prescribe those “unalterable truths” that Force contends that “no boundary sepa- actually characterize military space opera- tions. Instead of being extrapolated from air rates air from space.”21 experience, these concepts are based on fun- If these criticisms are true, then ob- damental knowledge that has been well viously whoever in the Air Force is pro- tested and proven by military space practi- claiming that satellites are much like air- tioners during the past quarter century.15 planes, or that no boundary separates air DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD AEROSPACE 51

The Bell X-l (formerly the XS-1) was a rocket-powered closely related operational environments. experimental plane built for transonic flight. Piloted by Capt Charles Yeager, it made its first supersonic flight Yet, in the case of the employment of on 14 October 1947. naval forces, both environments require nautical know-how, technology, and expe- rience. Although the surface and subsur- face operations are contiguous and often from space, not only does not understand interdependent, both are conducted in aerospace doctrine but has strayed far from separate realms and call for different vehi- the concept explained and expounded by cles and tactics. But both remain distinc- Gen Thomas White and many others since tive naval specialties, and the Navy over- the 1960s. comes the hindrances of the physical No one knows better than the US Air environment in operating effectively Force that the atmosphere and the space throughout the full expanse of the sea. beyond it are different environments and Naturally, much has had to be learned in that the vehicles that travel in one or both the 33 years since the aerospace concept realms must be designed to meet special was first observed and articulated. And a operational, tactical, and strategic de- great deal has been learned about space mands. But the Air Force has always operations since that time. Technology has contended that operationally there is no leaped ahead. But nothing has invalidated effective obstruction between the the basic idea of an operational con- environments. tinuum, even though a vehicle operating Air power experts know this about aero- both in the atmosphere and in orbit must space just as naval experts know this about meet different requirements in each realm. the sea: there is a distinct difference be- The Air Force has demonstrated for dec- tween the surface and the subsurface of ades the use of the aerospace medium for 52 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

terrestrial operations: electronic communi- Canan quotes Maj Gen Charles G. Boyd, di- cations; ’“flight paths” of intercontinental rector of plans for Lt Gen Jimmie Adams, ballistic missiles; orbiting satellites and Air Force deputy chief of staff for plans their recovery by aircraft in flight; the and operations (XO): launching of large payloads into space; the use of transmissions from satellites to give We can’t think of the future without thinking us special information about activities on about space— Most, if not all, of the mis- earth; and numerous other earth opera- sions that we perform in the atmosphere to- tions that depend on aerospace. day we will be able to perform in space. Before too long, the National Aero-Space We should not turn to performing them from Plane, or transatmospheric vehicle space just to be able to say we can. However, (TAV)—known also as the X-30—will as technologies evolve, and if they make it demonstrate this operational continuum. possible for us to do our missions more effi- ciently, more effectively, and at less cost You have only to read the voluminous from space, then we must do so, whether writings on space and aerospace in past is- those missions be close air support, interdic- sues of Air Force publications going back tion, offensive counterair. defensive coun- to the 1960s to see how forward-looking, terair, or whatever.24 open-minded, and willing to change the Air Force has been in the never-ending up- So now, after 33 years of facing skepti- dating of its thinking on aerospace cism and even ridicule, the Air Force is doctrine. still speaking of the earth’s atmosphere For example, in a series of articles on and the space beyond it as an opera- aerospace force in the 1960s, published in tionally indivisible medium. the combined Winter and Spring 1960- Was aerospace invented by the Air 1961 issues of the Air University Quarterly Force in order to steal the strategic missile Review, the editors say that mission from the Army, as Russell Baker seems to have indicated last summer?25 the roles of the strategic force, the tactical Was it dreamed up deliberately by the Air force, the defense force, and the strategic air- lift force will progressively become less sepa- Force as a stratagem for denying the space rate and distinct. By the end of the decade, mission to the Army and Navy, as Con- their missions probably will be, at a mini- gressman McCormack intimated 30 years mum, global in range, cislunar in altitude, ago? hypersonic in speed. Already in the areas of No. I can tell you how it started because concept, of command and control, of over-all I was the first person—as far as I have been military tasks and missions, there have been able to discover—to write of the at- foreshadowings of overlap and merging of mosphere and space as a continuum for the lines of demarcation between these use by US military vehicles, to combine responsibilities.22 the words air and space, and to use aero- That was a respected Air Force view space as a single unhyphenated word. It three decades ago. More recently—last happened almost by chance in October year, in fact—James W. Canan, senior edi- 1957. when I was an Air Force civilian tor of Air Force Magazine, stated that writer and editor preparing features and editorials that were mailed to base news- the Air Force is moving to endorse indivis- papers throughout the Air Force.26 ible airpower as official writ. It is updating Since 1954. I had been writing informa- the doctrine by which it lives, the doctrine tional. educational, and motivational fea- for employing airpower. In the process, dis- tures and editorials for Air Force base tinctions long drawn between strategic and newspaper readers about the importance tactical airpower and between the combat lo- of the Air Force mission and how depen- cations of air and space are going by the dent it was on dedicated people. Many of wayside.23 these articles talked about the vast regions DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD AEROSPACE 53 beyond the earth's surface in the realm the view that (1) envisioned earth as a planet Air Force was charged with protecting.27 observed from somewhere in space, At that time, there were two writers for (2) stressed that operations in space must the Air Force News Service (AFNS) in the be earth-oriented, and (3) based its under- Internal Information Division of the Office standing of the Air Force’s mission on the of the Secretary of the Air Force. Our of- DOD 1954 "Functions Paper,” which fices were on the fifth floor in the C Ring spelled out the primary and collateral re- in the Pentagon. Flint DuPre wrote the sponsibilities of each of the armed forces— news, and I wrote the editorials and fea- land, sea, and air. tures. The review process for our releases In support of the national policy at that was minimal. time, which was to avoid wasteful du- As I look back, I can see that (although plication of resources and systems and to I was unaware of it at the time) these improve effectiveness, the DOD directive editorials and features had a point of on functions gave each of the military de- partments primary responsibilities related to their traditional realms of expertise. The The Bell X-2 is shewn being raised into its position below the bomb bay of a Boeing B-50 “mother plane." Carried aloft Army was charged with seizing, occupy- by the B-50 and released at the desired altitude, the ing, and defending land areas; the Navy’s rocket-powered X-2 achieved supersonic speeds as it probed assigned function was "to gain and main- the thermal barrier. tain general sea supremacy”; and the Air 54 AIR POWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

Force’s assignment was “to gain and main- greater. From there on out, the space distance tain general air supremacy.” is measured in feet, then miles, then in many Beginning in August 1954, these weekly millions of light years. So, “to maintain gen- informational and motivational editorials eral air supremacy”—even in 1954—is a mighty big assignment. In 1964 it will be an or features often spoke of the vast opera- even bigger job.28 tional realm for which Air Force people had the prime responsibility—the enor- Other editorials had similar messages: mous reaches of the sky. To gain and maintain general oir supremacy, For example, on 6 August 1954, readers the Air Force has to keep ahead of any possi- of Air Force base newspapers were told in ble enemy throughout the boundless air an AFNS editorial: ocean around our Earth.29 The Air Force’s job is as big as the sky and its future as unlimited as space— The Air Force has primary interest in all operations An artist's conception of a North American X-I5 being in the air. Now, when you consider how released from the wing o f a Boeing B-52. The X-15 was the much space is involved when you speak of product of a joint Air Force/Navy/National Aeronautics and "the air,” you can see what a big job the Air Space Administration program to build a manned aircraft Force has. The area of the Earth is about 197 that could fly at speeds up to Mach 7 and reach altitudes million square miles, and the area of the air over 250.000 feel. Like the X-l and X-2. it had to be immediately above it is, of course, even launched in midair from a mother plane. DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD AEROSPACE 55

One hundred percent of the Earth’s surface is space vehicles” as well as air and space surrounded by air. And that is one of the rea- vehicles. This editorial stated, in part: sons why the Air Force has such a giant- sized job.... The Air Force must be able to So this idea—that if you control the land you exert its tremendous striking power any- control the space above it—is contrary to where there’s air— It’s a job as big as the basic air doctrine and does not stand up un- sky— 30 der experience__ What happens to air offen- Air doctrine is an ever-developing set of sive forces—airplanes, missiles, or air/space principles. Today it involves astronautics as vehicles of the future? According to this well as aeronautics—the science of the oper- “new” theory they would be rendered com- ation of spacecraft as well as the science of pletely ineffective. The defense would be in- aircraft. (Both sciences include missiles as vulnerable. Defense would be 100% effec- well as other kinds of air and space tive__ It is the overall Air Force mission to “gain and maintain general air supremacy.” vehicles.)31 This air mission is not confined to any alti- tude. It includes the farthest reaches of the The italicizing shown here is in the origi- “air”—far into space. The American people nal article and can be seen as the first step have given us the primary responsibility for in combining the words air and space and this__ The Air Force believes that in the aero and space. event of war in the missile era, “air defense But the first actual combining of the two measures, coupled with strong air coun- words was in an AFNS editorial inspired terblows against the sources of the enemy’s by a public statement of an Army general. strength, will provide the best security.”3-1 In testimony before the Senate Subcom- mittee of the Committee on Appropria- In March 1958 an AFNS feature reported tions on 12 June 1957, Lt Gen James M. on the new term in the unofficial Interim Gavin, chief of research and development Glossary: Aero-Space Terms, published for the Army, had made the statement that earlier in the year at the Air University. “in the missile era. the man who controls Although unofficial, the hyphenated term the land will control the space above it in the glossary was the first use in print of [emphasis added]. The control of land aero instead of air to denote the air/space areas will be decisive.”32 He repeated this concept whose development was begun at later in speeches that were quoted widely. Air Force headquarters in 1954.35 He said he believed that, with the advent To correct the record, and for historical of the new surface-to-air missiles, the day accuracy, I must point out here that the of 100-percent perfect air defense had Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aero- arrived. space Use, published by the National Of course, this statement flipped on its Aeronautics and Space Administration in head the traditional Air Force doctrine, 1965, is incorrect when it states under its first published at the Army’s Air Corps definition of aerospace: “The term aero- Tactical School in 1931. In a textbook ti- space first appeared in print in the Interim tled The Air Force was this dictum: “ Vic- Glossary: Aero-Space Terms (edited by tory is practically assured to the com- Woodford Agee Heflin) published in 1958 mander whose air force has gained and at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force can maintain control of the air. ” 33 Base, Alabama.”36 A historic AFNS editorial of 29 October In truth, the combined term, air/space, 1957 responded to General Gavin's state- was first printed in Air Force base news- ment without mentioning his name. The papers, beginning in 1957, after release in general’s apparent belief that the military AFNS editorials and features. Reference to could control the vastness of space from air/space forces was printed also in the De- the land somehow evoked for the editorial cember 1957 USAF Information Services writer the thought that weapon systems of Program Bulletin, a monthly newsletter the future would have to include “air/ published by the Office of Information 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

Services, Office of the Secretary of the Air 1966, persisted in repeating its first defini- Force.37 tion, even though Air Force headquarters And the first use of the unhyphenated had published officially in 1959 its signifi- term aerospace was in an AFNS release on cantly different definition of aerospace in 8 July 1958. The feature referred to “pi- Air Force Pamphlet 11-1-4.39 loted and unpiloted air and aerospace ve- Throughout 1958, Air Force News Ser- h i c l e s . ’ ’38 T h e f i r s t u s e i n a n A i r U n i v e r s i t y vice introduced a variety of new aerospace glossary of the unhyphenated aerospace terms: the Nation’s aerospace arm, aero- came later, in 1959, in The Aerospace space power, aerospacecraft, aerospace of- Glossary, by Woodford Agee Heflin. The fense, aerospace defense, and aerospace Second Aerospace Glossary, published in warfare. During that time I had many dis- cussions about air/space and aerospace with Air Force speech writers in the E Ring of both the fourth and fifth floors of The United States is currently engaged in a research the Pentagon. The first general officer to program to develop a national aerospace plane capable of use the air/space term in a speech was Lt Mach 30 speed and single-stage-to-orhit space flight. This transatmospheric vehicle (TAV). or X-30. would be a Gen C. S. Irvine, Air Force deputy chief of combination spacecraft and conventional air transport that staff for materiel, who spoke before the Na- could operate equally well on transcontinental routes or at tional Defense Transportation Association the fringes of space. The illustration below depicts one in Washington on 21 November 1957. Gen- artist's concept of the TAV. eral Irvine said that we have not

A iHHH DOCTRINAL CONFLICT OVER THE WORD AEROSPACE 57

deluded ourselves into believing that the 16 May 1958 in a speech to the Los An- types of ICBMs now being developed will be geles Chamber of Commerce. In an article the ultimate weapon. In fact, the most knowl- in the August 1958 Air Force Magazine, he edgeable airpower proponents—within the used aerospace publicly for the first time. Air Force as well as those civilians who are This was in reference to Soviet aerospace working closely with us—recognize the real power. The Air Force used the term more possibility that the dramatic vehicles of to- and more frequently in 1958 and adopted day may not play a significant role in the “Aerospace Power for Peace” as its slogan next war. It is well within reason that air/ space ships will fight the next major conflict, in January 1959.41 and that control of space will determine Today, in 1990, the Air Force describes victory. its primary realm of operations as aerospace—“the total expanse beyond the This, by the way, reminds me of a fallacious statement recently published in a national Earth’s surface.” This is the domain first magazine to the effect that "he who controls called to the attention of Air Force mem- the land will control the space above it.” bers in August 1954, when they were told, Such a twist of words is a 180-degree rever- “The Air Force’s job is as big as the sky sal of proved fact, as any student of air/ and its future as unlimited as space.” ground warfare knows. Until air—or space— It’s interesting that the single word aero- supremacy is achieved, the land itself can al- space still has the power after three dec- ways be made untenable. ades to arouse bitterness and ridicule. We are concentrating the bulk of our imme- More than likely, this is because the true diate output on day-to-day defense effective- reason for the development of the term has ness. However, as a natural continuation of been so frequently misunderstood and Air Force responsibilities, we have active re- often misconstrued. Its genesis has never, search endeavors aimed toward both manned until now, been explained. ballistic vehicles and the so-called space platforms. What power surges in a single word, that it can move whole nations, if but heard! These will take their place in the logical pro- “By words the mind is winged,” said the gression of air/space weapon systems.'10 Athenian poet and dramatist Aris- Introduction in the late 1950s of the tophanes.42 Aerospace is actually a guile- :erm air/space filled a definite need for an less and logical concept expressed in a expression denoting the operational me- word that came naturally to the mind as dium that was just beginning to be actively one could clearly see mankind’s tech- probed and traversed with missiles and nological horizons expanding. satellites. Since then, its utility has Aerospace been confirmed by the adoption and gen- Is another word eral use throughout the world of the term For sky. aerospace. From here, It would be a mistake to give any indi- It goes beyond, vidual the credit for the Air Force’s adop- Where planets ply. □ tion of the term. Credit must be shared by all those who instantly recognized the term as one whose time had come. It was welcomed and used by virtually every Air Notes Force official who saw the need to match 1. News release. Air Force Service Information and News Air Force terminology with the new tech- Center/Public Affairs, "Frank Jennings Receives AFA Citation of Honor." Kelly AFB. Texas. 1985. nology that had expanded the operational 2. Russell Baker. "Stealth Most Probably Will Sneak Past environment that everyone in the past had Budgets." Son Antonio Express-News. 25 August 1989. 5-C. always called "the air.” 3. House. Missile Development and Space Sciences: Hear- ings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 86th The Air Force chief of staff, Gen Thomas Cong., 1st sess., February and March 1959. 76-77. D. White, first used the term air/space on ’ 4. Ibid.. 247. 58 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

5. AFP 11-1-4, Interim Aerospace Terminology Reference. 30. AFNS. “USAF Must Go 'Anywhere There’s Air. 30 October 1959, 2-3. editorial no. 55-17. 11 February 1955. 6. AFM 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States 31. AFNS. "What Good Is 'Air Doctrine'?” editorial no. Air Force, 16 March 1984, 2-2. 57-6, 21 February 1957. 7. Ibid., viii. 32. Senate. Making Appropriations for the Department of 8. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, Department of De­ Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1958. and for fense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 1 January other Purposes: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the 1986. 8. Committee on Appropriations. 85th Cong.. 1st sess.. 12 June 9. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. Functions of 1957. 869. the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 16 March 33. Quoted in Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate. eds.. 1954. The Army Air Forces in World War II. vol. 1, Plans and Early 10. JCS Pub 1, 8. Operations. January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: Univer- 11. R. W. Burchfield, ed., A Supplement to the Oxford sity of Chicago Press. 1949), 46. English Dictionary, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). 34. AFNS, "Will Missiles Stop Any Air Offense?" editorial 12. Research Studies Institute. Interim G lossary: Aero- no. 57-39. 29 October 1957. Space Terms, ed. Woodford Agee Heflin (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 35. AFNS. feature no. 31-58. 21 March 1958. Air University. 1958). 36. William H. Allen, ed.. Dictionary of Technical Terms 13. Senate. Inquiry into Satellites and Missile Programs: for Aerospace Use. NASA SP-7. 1st ed. (Washington. D.C.: Hearings before the Preparedness investigating Subcommit- National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1965). 7: tee of the Committee on Armed Services. 85th Cong.. 1st and see also page ix of introduction. 2d sessions. November and December 1957 and January 37. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. USAF Informa­ 1958. 841-42. tion Services Program Bulletin 4, no. 12 (December 1957). 14. Lt Col David Lupton, USAF. Retired, “ Space Doc- Also refer to the releases that contained the word air/space in trines." Strategic Review. Fall 1983. 37. the bulletins of November 1957 and January 1958. These bul- 15. Col Kenneth A. Myers and Lt Col John G. Tockston, letins provided official guidance to information officers and “Real Tenets of Military Space Doctrine,” Airpower Journal, base newspaper editors throughout the Air Force. Winter 1988. 55. 38. AFNS. feature no. 70-58. 8 July 1958. 16. Ibid.. 58. 39. Aerospace Studies Institute. The Second Aerospace 17. Ibid.. 59. Glossary, ed. Woodford Agee Heflin (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air 18. Ibid.. 64. University. 1966). 4. The glossary has a disclaimer that "per- 19. Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air. trans. Dino sonal views or opinions expressed or implied in this publica- Ferrari (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1983). tion are not to be construed as carrying official sanction of 202-3. the Department of the Air Force or the Air University.” (p. ii) 20. Myers and Tockston. 59. In acknowledging sources for his 1966 dictionary. Heflin 21. Ibid. names only the three publications that he had produced and 22. "Part II: Combat and the Aerospace Force.” Air Univer- the NASA Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aerospace Use. sity Quarterly Review 12. nos. 3 and 4 (Winter and Spring While saying that "the Glossary is intended as a reference 1960-1961): 52. source, particularly for Air Force people." the author makes 23. James W. Canan. "Global Power from American no mention of AFP 11-1-4 published in 1959. Shores." Air Force Magazine. October 1989. 38. 40. Excerpt from speech by Lt Gen G. S. Irvine on 21 24. Ibid.. 40. November 1957 before the National Defense Transportation 25. Baker, 5-C. Association, 21 November 1957. Washington, D.C., as quoted 26. Brig Gen H. J. Dalton. Jr., director of public affairs. Of- by AFNS. feature no. 92-57. 10 December 1957. fice of the Secretary of the Air Force, to Maj Gen H. D. 41. "The Air Force slogan used during 1959 will be con- Armstrong, USAF, Retired, letter, subject: [Origination of the tinued through 1960. 'U.S. Air Force—Aerospace Power for term Aerospace], 25 February 1980. Peace' should be used wherever appropriate to keep Air 27. "Frank Jennings Receives AFA Citation of Honor." Force members and the general public aware of the Air 29-30. Force's primary area of responsibility in the Nation's land- 28. Air Force New's Service (AFNS). "The Air Force Job Is sea aerospace military team." Letter in Air Force Information Big!” editorial no. 54-1. Office of Information Services. Office Policy Letter for Commanders 13. no. 8 (1 December 1959). 3, of the Secretary of the Air Force, 6 August 1954. signed by Maj Gen Arno H. Luehman, director of informa- 29. AFNS, "Our Job in Seven Words." editorial no. 54-3. tion. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 20 August 1954. 42. Aristophanes. The Birds (414 B.C.). line 1447. SUMMER 1990 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Lt Edward H. Feege, Jr., USN for his article NATO Air Operations after Arms Control

Congratulations to Lieutenant Feege on his If you would like to compete for the Ira C. selection as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for Eaker Award, submit an article of feature the best eligible article from the Summer 1990 length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, issue of the Airpower Journal. Lieutenant Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. The award is for Feege receives a $500 cash award for his con- the best eligible article in each issue and is tribution to the Air Force’s professional open to all US military personnel below the dialogue. The award honors Gen Ira C. Eaker rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- and is made possible through the support of ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or the Arthur G. B. Metcalf Foundation of equivalent. Winchester, Massachusetts.

59 AIR RESCUE SERVICE A Direction for the Twenty-first Century?

Capt Edward B. West er ma nn, USAF

The Air Rescue Service was established in 1946 ... and has served the USAF proudly since its inception. Rescue’s worth has been proven time and again—996 combat saves in Korea and 2,780 in Southeast Asia__ Since then, our rescue resources have slowly declined to the point that we have only limited ca- pability__ We will continue to press forward on several fronts to ensure that the USAF has an effective rescue capability. Our goal is to again be able to say with confidence, “These things we do that others may live.” —Gen Duane Cassidy Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command AIR RESCUE SERVICE 61

capability, avionics for pinpoint naviga- tion, active/passive detection, and defen- sive systems) are necessary to fulfill the CSAR mission. The command decisions made in the next two to three years will set the course of the ARS for the next 10 to 15 years. Throughout the history of the ARS, it has either received the necessary equipment/materiel to accomplish its mis- sion or accepted something less. If the lat- ter holds true, the burden for successful mission completion in hostile theaters of the next century would fall to aircrews limited by 1970s and 1980s technology. In order to understand the problems faced by the ARS today, one must briefly review the history of this organization. The establishment of Headquarters Air Rescue Service on 13 March 1946 was a re- sponse to the need for a peacetime search and rescue (SAR) capability involving USAF fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets. The aircraft inventory was a mixture of B-29s, C-47s, OA-lOs, L-5s, R-5s (later H-5s), and AT-lls. In the succeeding three years, these assets would assist in disaster relief within the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas, as well as extend their mission to the recovery of downed US aircrews in areas such as Nicaragua, Greenland, and Bermuda.1 With the out- break of the Korean War in June 1950, the ARS was sent into Korea to conduct an ill- defined CSAR mission. By using a com- bination of sheer guts, good luck, and a learn-as-you-go mentality, the ARS logged hundreds of combat saves and was respon- sible for the evacuation of 9.898 United Nations personnel by the end of the war.- During the war, the helicopter per- HE establishment of a new Air Res- formed superbly in rapidly extracting cue Service (ARS) in August 1989 at downed aircrews and evacuating wounded McClellan AFB. California, con- or besieged personnel. Its performance led fronts the US Air Force with the to a growing awareness and appreciation Tchallenge of organizing and equippingof a the unique capabilities of rotary-wing viable combat search and rescue (CSAR) aircraft for the conduct of CSAR opera- arm for operations into the twenty-first tions on the battlefield. The development century. Not only must the Air Force de- of the H-19 as a replacement for the H-5 cide what type of aircraft the service re- expanded the helicopter’s promise by quires but also which critical capabilities providing a more capable and longer-range (e.g., air refueling, night/adverse weather platform, dramatically demonstrated by 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

the transatlantic crossing of two H-19s in By committing to a peacetime-only SAR July 1 9 5 2 . With the cease-fire agreement force, the USAF displayed a lack of fore- in Korea came a drawdown of CSAR sight and/or failure to recognize the need forces, and the ARS reverted to its more for viable CSAR. conventional role of peacetime SAR and By the end of 1960, the ARS was a skel- disaster relief. eton command consisting of three squad- The postwar years, however, were not rons and 1,450 personnel.9 It continued to devoid of drama. In a number of cases, provide worldwide support in missions in- fixed-wing amphibious rescue assets re- volving commercial/military aviation or covered both commercial and military shipping disasters, and emergency disaster flight crews shot down in the vicinity of relief. At home the ARS supported the Na- the USSR and the People’s Republic of tional Aeronautics and Space Administra- China.•* While fixed-wing aircraft enjoyed tion’s fledgling space program and as- the spotlight, rotary-wing counterparts sumed the local base rescue (LBR) mission proved their worth in such diverse roles as with the new HH-43—a small, lightweight providing support to avalanche victims in rescue helicopter of the type called for by Austria and flood relief in Iraq.5 The Operation Wring Out. The reemergence of worldwide exploits and capabilities of a viable CSAR capability would again de- ARS forces did not go unnoticed by au- pend on the direct involvement of US thorities in the United States, who recog- forces in a theater of conflict: The US pres- nized them by establishing the first Na- ence in Southeast Asia (SEA) prompted tional Search and Rescue Plan in March the organization of the most effective com- 1956.6 bat rescue capability that a wartime theater The object of the plan was to provide had ever known. central coordination for all SAR opera- Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in tional assets within the CONUS. The August 1964 and the ensuing rapid worldwide employment of rescue assets buildup of American forces in SEA, the not only provided good public relations in Air Force tasked the ARS with establishing the world community, but also cultivated four provisional detachments, two to be a talented cadre of fixed-wing and helicop- stationed in the Republic of Vietnam ter crew members. But the decision by (RVN) and two in Thailand. In the follow- Headquarters USAF to proceed with Oper- ing 11 years, the ARS—subsequently the ation Wring Out continued a cycle of Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service drawing down CSAR capabilities in a (ARRS)—flew a combination of HU-16s peacetime environment while leaving little (amphibious aircraft), HH-43B/Fs, CH-3s. or no provision for the future employment HH-3s (later HH-53s) and logged 4,120 or training of ARS assets for a hostile en- saves, including 2.780 combat saves.10 In vironment.7 Indeed, the USAF enunciated so doing, it became one of the most deco- this policy in a 1958 ARS directive that rated air-mission elements in the SEA the- mandated reorganization: ater. boasting one Medal of Honor and 38 Air Force Crosses awarded to its crew members.11 In SEA the ARRS demon- strated the utility of daylight combat res- ARS will be organized, manned, equipped, cue operations involving combined fixed-/ trained, and deployed to support peacetime rotary-wing assets in a low-to-medium air operations. threat environment.12 No special units or specially designed air- In 1964, though, the ARS was ill pre- craft will be provided for the sole purpose of pared to conduct CSAR operations in wartime search and rescue. Southeast Asia. CSAR tasking was left to Wartime rescue operations will be dictated the local base rescue assets—the HH-43Bs. by the capabilities of equipment used for Although well suited for LBR operations, peacetime SAR.8 this small, lightly armored, underpowered AIR RESCUE SERVICE 63 aircraft was completely inadequate for ex- craft considered “an adequate aircrew res- tended operations in a combat environ- cue vehicle.”u ment. especially in the thin air of the Viet- With the introduction of the air- namese highlands. The introduction of the refuelable HH-3E in June 1967 and the de- HH-43F in September 1964 increased the livery of the HH-53 (the first helicopter capability of the airframe by providing an specifically designed for CSAR operations) improved power plant, increased range, later that year, the ARRS began to build its and additional armor protection for the reputation as the world’s finest combat brew and vital aircraft systems. Despite the rescue force. However, the ARRS con- introduction of the HH-43F. rescue forces tinued to be plagued by its own short- ,vere not adequately prepared for the con- sightedness, even as new tactics and doc- duct of CSAR operations in Vietnam, as trine for combined rescue operations were 5arl H. Tilford, Jr., explains in his history developed. As late as October 1970, Col nf the rescue effort in Southeast Asia: Frederick V. Sohle, commander of the 3d •Still [despite the HH-43F] the rescue mis- Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, sion in Southeast Asia suffered from inad- would say, “Our development ... has been equate forces, nonexistent doctrine, and a history of relearning lessons already 11-suited aircraft.”13 Not until July 1965 learned by someone else, but who unfor- did t he ARS r e c e i ve its f i rst CH- 3C. an ai r- tunately could not or did not document it for others to profit by.”15 This lack of doc- umentation and the inability to integrate an institutional memory among ARRS Early in its history, the ARS used fixed-wing aircraft during forces (with the possible exception of the etime to rescue both civilian and military accident vic- pararescue force) would detrimentally af- This peacetime orientation, however, hampered its per- fect CSAR units into the 1980s. Conse- formance during combat, as is the case today. quently, the CSAR mission became subor- 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 dinate to daily support and auxiliary contingency/rescue operation proved to be mission roles. However, if one lesson can the death knell of the ARRS. Even more be drawn from the SEA conflict, it is that ironically, no ARRS helicopter units par- we needed an effective CSAR force. Unfor- ticipated in the operation. tunately. we did not learn this lesson well The aborted mission to rescue the hos- because ARRS assets experienced the same tages in Iran dramatically demonstrated neglect and lack of funding which plagued the need for close, realistic coordination its predecessor. and planning of joint-service operations. The withdrawal of US combat forces As usual, it is easy to speculate after the from the SEA conflict was reminiscent of fact about what we could have done dif- the massive drawdown of CSAR assets that ferently to make the mission successful. occurred following the Korean War. After No doubt, the ARRS Pave Low III aircraft Vietnam, a few notable rescue operations was better suited to the operation. But the took place, such as the deployment of ARRS helicopters aboard the USS Saipan in June and August 1979, in support of a possible emergency evacuation of US per- sonnel in Nicaragua following the Commu- Between the Korean and Vietnam wars, the ARS extended its nist takeover.16 However, such missions coverage to the high seas—witness this rescue of US Armj occurred infrequently. Ironically, a classic personnel from a tugboat off the coast of Okinawa in 1956. AIR RESCUE SERVICE 65 modified Marine Corps H-53 was used in- the entire operation was critically depend- stead, for two possible reasons: either the ent on helicopters. As a result of the Pave Low system was not yet ready for this botched operation, the Air Force trans- type of mission because it had just ferred all ARRS HH-53Hs (Pave Low 111 finished lengthy operational testing or the aircraft) to the 1st Special Operations H-53 was used to placate the Marine Wing (SOW) in May 1980. This transfer 3orps.ir Certainly, one must concede that signaled the end of the ARRS’s role in Pave Low aircrews, who were trained in CSAR and precipitated the present enmity he CSAR arena and routinely relied on between “’rescue drivers” and “special op- I-130s in their daily operations, were the erators.” ogical choice for this type of mission and Thus, the ARRS was left with an aging lad a better aircraft with which to conduct fleet of UH-1 (various series), CH-3, and t. Whatever the case, one point is clear— HH-3 aircraft. In effect, the ARRS had no means to accomplish the CSAR mission in the threat environment of the 1980s and 1990s. just as the Polish cavalry of 1939 was an effective force within its own rhe increased range and lift of the amphibious H-19 sig- lificantly improved the ARS's capability. But the Air Force's borders but completely inadequate when eorganization of ARS after the Korean War decreased the confronted by German tanks, so too had escue service's effectiveness. the ARRS become an anachronism in a 66 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

world where contingency and rescue oper- pipeline of CSAR-trained aircrew members ations relied on high-tech avionics and and limited the combat rescue role to a to- split-second timing. A 20-year-old aircraft tal of four overseas HH-3 units and a like the H-l, with 1960s and 1970s avi- stateside MH-60 squadron. Furthermore, onics, was no longer useful. Nevertheless, the latter was unsure whether it would be the HH-3 continued to provide a measure affiliated with ARRS or special operations. of effectiveness because of its air-refueling This is the situation in which the new capability and the use of night vision gog- ARS finds itself today. Questions must be gles (NVG). The latter allowed aircrews to answered about the training, manning, and operate under the cover of darkness, thus equipping of planned ARS units. Perhaps decreasing their vulnerability in low-to- the most important question is whether to medium threat environments. employ these assets in a theater of conflict Although ARRS no longer had the air- or in support of contingency operations. craft to conduct modern CSAR operations, it did at least have the foresight to con- When I look forward, I see conventional tinue to train crews in the CSAR environ- warfare— low-intensity conflict in particular— ment, with emphasis on NVG operations. as the most likely battlefield of the future. However, the inactivation of the H-l CSAR —Gen P. X. Kelley units in September 1987 closed a valuable Commandant of the Marine Corps AIR RESCUE SERVICE 67

In Korea, the 3d Air Rescue Squadron could pick up injured personnel (left) and rapidly transport them to medical facilities (right), substantially increasing their chances of survival.

The primary mission of the ARS is to conduct search and rescue operations dur- ing both peacetime and wartime. This mis- sion requires a global capability, which, in turn, mandates a long-range rotary-wing or vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) air- craft (e.g., V-22). Because the Air Force withdrew from the V-22 program in favor of the MH-60. the long-range requirement will have to be met by an air-refueling ca- pability. Further, the likelihood of flying long distances and the probability of oper- ating in and from remote third-world areas require a precise navigation capability in- dependent of civil/commercial systems. And if crews are to operate at night or in bad weather in unfamiliar—possibly mountainous—areas without detailed :harts or maps, they must rely on the global positioning system (GPS) for satel- lites. Specifically, the Navigation Satellite GPS navigation, improved NVG and/or Tracking and Ranging (NAVSTAR) system LANTIRN will permit sustained CSAR op- is vital to a rescue force looking to pursue erations in current and future threat en- worldwide operations into the twenty-first vironments. Further, these capabilities :entury. Clearly, the present generation of must be enhanced by an avionics package night vision goggles will not be adequate designed to detect threats. Daylight rescue for rescue operations past the mid-1990s. operations in SEA were protected by a But advances in NVG technology have search and rescue task force (SARTF). improved aircraft night operations. In fact, which used supporting fixed-wing aircraft :he development of NVG for jet aircraft has to locate survivors and suppress hostile provided better in- and out-of-cockpit fire. Although SARTF may still have a technologies which can substantially in- place in certain threat environments, we :rease rotary-wing crew performance. must recognize that the proliferation, im- However, we must not tailor the helicopter proved lethality, and portability of surface- SSAR mission to rely solely on NVG tech- to-air missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artil- nology. Rather, we must integrate terrain lery (AAA) jeopardize this method of following radar (TFR), forward looking in- recovery. A night/adverse weather ca- frared (FLIR), and—most importantly— pability, however, meets these challenges. low altitude navigation and targeting in- Aircraft operating at night and/or in bad frared system for night (LANTIRN) tech- weather are less susceptible to threats from nology into the CSAR force. LANTIRN is visually targeted systems. Furthermore, now available to the fixed-wing force (e.g., upon penetration to the recovery area. F-16) and—with further modifications for CSAR helicopters must be able to identify helicopters—could provide a vital upgrade radar-directed SAM and AAA threats. This to CSAR aircraft in the mid- to late 1990s. would allow recovery crews to use terrain Capabilities such as air refueling, TFR. masking or ingress/egress route deviations to avoid or reduce threat exposure. Fi- nally. we should augment this passive ca- pability with active electronic counter- measures (ECM), either in-cockpit or in conjunction with standoff, fixed-wing as- sets used during the recovery portion of the CSAR operation. The high-tech capability outlined here is available today and could enhance CSAR operations considerably. It facilitates pen- etration of the threat environment without extensive MiG combat air patrol (M1G- CAPJ. forward air controller (FAC), and A-lE ("Sandy”) firepower support, which were so typical and necessary in SEA. Ad- ditionally, it makes possible single or two- ship helicopter CSAR operations at night or in adverse weather—environments which significantly decrease the detect- ability of rescue assets. Finally, when re- covery crews use this capability in con- junction with in-cockpit ECM and/or standoff threat assistance by ECM or airborne warning and control system (AYVACS) aircraft, they dramatically im- prove their chances for successful recovery of a downed aircrew. Properly equipping and training CSAR personnel to operate independently in a hostile environment gives us the extra ben- efit of having a force which would be ide- ally suited for such secondary missions as the evacuation of US military personnel and or civilians in flash points throughout the world. Additionally, this force could perform low-visibility and clandestine op- erations as well as support the National Search and Rescue Plan as it pertains to peacetime operations involving the civil- ian population. However, the CSAR force’s aptitude for clandestine operations may re- new a long-standing rivalry between the rescue and special operations commu- nities.

Neither the ARS's equipment nor its doctrine was suited to the war in Vietnam during its early stages. Available rescue aircraft were loo small and lightly armored for the hostile combat environment of Southeast Asia. AIR RESCUE SERVICE b

ARS and special operations must recog- Since the introduction of rotary-wing nize that cooperation is essential. For ex- aircraft into the Air Force inventory, many ample, some missions come exclusively people have been reluctant to regard heli- under the purview of special operations, copter pilots and their aircraft as “real pi- but others require ARS assets (e.g., lots or real aircraft.” The tendency to focus helicopters). Thus, rescue forces could on the needs of the fixed-wing force has provide capable assistance in operations often left the rescue service—particularly such as embassy evacuations, weather/ its helicopter assets—out in the cold. The reconnaissance team insertions or extrac- type of rescue force outlined here requires tions, and so forth. Certainly, both forces a significant outlay and investment of Air would benefit from mutual trust and coop- Force funds. However, one of the political eration. However, it is not their rivalry that realities of the 1990s is that the Depart- poses the greatest barrier to achieving a ment of Defense will once again have to do viable CSAR capability. more with less. The tightening of fiscal re- sources will require planners at the high- The H-43 Pedro did a good job of performing the missions for est echelons of the fixed-wing force to which it was designed—fire fighting and local base rescue. have enough foresight to commit resources Combat, however, required an aircraft with different that will enable the Air Force to continue a capabilities. viable CSAR capability into the twenty- The UH-I Huey has become a symbol fo r lifesa\'ing of Army troops in Vietnam. Nearly 20 years later it still provided local base rescue and utility transport for USAF's air rescueforces.

The HH-3 Jolly Green Giant was a welcome sight to downed aircrews in Vietnam. Its size, range, and air refueling capability made it an excellent combat rescue aircraft. AIR RESCUE SERVICE 71

first century. One thing is certain: we can Notes no longer afford to have our CSAR air- 1. Donald D. Little. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Ser- vice. 1946-1981 (Scott AFB. 111.: Office of History. Military crews operate only with area maps, NVG, Airlift Command. 1983). 1. unsecure radios, and a basic, commercial 2. Ibid.. 3. instrument/navigation package. Thus 3. Ibid.. 8. 4. Ibid.. 11. equipped, no one could be expected to 5. Ibid. perform successful recoveries in a threat 6. Ibid.. 12. 7. Operation Wring Out provided for the establishment of environment. We can no longer conduct a number of small detachments equipped with lightweight CSAR operations in the style of the Viet- helicopters to perform local base rescue. nam era. Instead, we must now prepare 8. Earl H. Tilford. Jr., Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia. 1961-1975 (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force His- our forces for combat in the increasingly tory. 1980), 16. complex and lethal environment of the 9. Little. 18. twenty-first century. □ 10. Ibid.. 24. 11. Ibid.. 26. 12. Although the ARKS attempted a few night rescues, they succeeded only under the most advantageous circum- stances. The HH-53 Pave Low III system was thus developed to meet the need for a night/adverse weather capability. 13. Tilford. 61. 14. Ibid.. 69. 15. Ibid.. 94. 16. Little. 56-57. 17. A group headed by Adm J. L. Holloway, former chief of naval operations, reviewed the rescue attempt. It found that Although designed specificcdly for combat search and rescue, "the appropriate helicopters and their maintenance ca- the HH-53 Super Jolly now belongs to the special operations pability should have been joined with an operational unit community, a situation that clouds the future ofcombat search compatible with mission requirements." Aviation Week 6- and rescue. Space Technology. 1 September 1980. 44-46. 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

Ricochets It was with great dismay that I read General Continued from page 3 Smith’s article in the Spring 1990 issue of Air- power Journal, The article is a prime example the individual, but to meet the needs of the Air of the attitude that is rampant in the Air Force Force. There is no mention of the fact that those and harmful to the Air Force. According to who do a good job and have demonstrated a ca- General Smith, it doesn’t matter so much what pacity for greater responsibility generally do get you know, but whom you know. More impor- promoted. While not everyone can be selected tant, it matters who knows you. If this is a for 0-6 or flag rank, good people are generally natural by-product of an excellent professional recognized up to that point where the percent- performance, it is healthy and should be en- ages by necessity eliminate some good ones. couraged. If it is a result of hanging out in the There is no mention of the new evaluation sys- officers club and strategic name-dropping, it is tems developed for both the officer and enlisted dishonest and unprofessional—something we ranks with a greater emphasis placed on job as an institution should discourage. performance. At a time when the Air Force may have to If General Smith truly believes what he fight for its very existence, we, and it. deserve writes, then his own achievement of two-star better than to give it officership based on popu- rank is testimony to nothing more than his abil- larity. Young officers deserve better guidance ity to golf with the big boys and flatter the boss than “fill the right squares and be seen in the just prior to OER time I would hope that there right places.” We are desperate for substance in is more substance to his career than that! the Air Force. If the attitude evidenced by Gen- I hope this article is one of a kind in the Air- eral Smith’s article is the wave of the future, power Journal. Referring back to the stated pur- perhaps our motto should change from “fly, pose of the APJ. I fail to see the relevance of the fight and win" to “look good, but don’t look too article to military doctrine, strategy, tactics, deep.” force structure, readiness, or any other national Capt Kelley C. Westenhoff, USAF defense matters. In fact, I fail to see any rela- Ramstein AB, West Germany tionship of the article to air power. In my opin- ion, the predecessor to the APJ, the AU Review suffered its demise because it lost sight of its purpose. It lost focus and ultimately failed to be relevant to its readers. It ended up being read only in barber shops rather than in fighter and I read with a great deal of interest General bomber squadrons, where the readers ought to Smith's article on “How to Get Promoted.” I reside. The issue is not whether the APJ should was impressed that a retired general officer be kept an open forum; it is whether APJ would take the time to address a vital career should remain relevant and stick to its stated concern so directly. My suspicion is that hun- purpose. dreds of officers will eagerly digest the words Lt Col Donald O. Ross. Jr., USAF the general offered. Headquarters USAF, Washington. D.C. My interest held throughout General Smith's presentation; however, it was joined by a rising level of disappointment with the apparent focus on the mechanics of personal enhance- ment. General Smith starts with what seems to After reading this article I seriously looked be a token doffing of the cap to performance as hard for some evidence that it was a joke of “only one of many prerequisites" to promotion. some sort. What is an article on promotion The quick dismissal of performance as a first strategy doing in a journal on “military doc- among equals in the promotion business is a trine, strategy, tactics,” and so forth? To make frustrating contradiction to all we've heard matters worse, the article blatantly advocates from senior Air Force leadership during the Of- obsequiousness over performance, in direct ficer Performance Report discussion over the contradiction to the policies General Welch has last couple of years. If performance is the key— worked so long for. An absolutely disgraceful the fundamental measure of potential—then 1 article. believe General Smith has done the officer Col Ronald N. Jackson. USAF corps a disservice by relegating it to coequal Lackland AFB, Texas status with the other factors he mentions. RICOCHET S 73

General Smith's discussion of the importance plistic, misleading, and form the essence of my of liking your job is fine. I agree. If Air Force personal disappointment. Common courtesy folks don’t like what they’re doing they should and respect for achievements and seniority are go do something else. But I think that assess- qualities that ought to form integral parts of any ment should be reserved for the broad category military professional’s character. Positive of the job (pilot, missile maintenance officer, strokes are valuable both up and down the administrator, etc.), not just the task at hand. In chain—but though the general cautions us to be my short 12 years of service I have from time to “sincere,” he cites examples that are anything time encountered tasks that were frustrating. but. I’ve been in more than one setting where Expressing that frustration in the proper con- someone has tried the general’s approach to text and with a forward-looking attitude is an conversation—the knowing looks on the part of essential aspect of stress relief and is funda- others present have clearly communicated the mental to the health of a combat-ready force. distinct distaste most people have for contrived The boss who cannot recognize those expres- compliments, no matter how sincere the tone of sions of frustration for their true meaning will voice. make seriously flawed assessments of promo- It’s probably apparent that I hope not to sub- tion potential. I think it was General of the scribe to the general’s theories on promotion Army Omar Bradley who spoke of the funda- enhancement. I probably won’t ever make it to mental right of the American soldier to com- two stars. I may not make it to silver oak leaves. plain. I believe he was on target. I do hope that I’ll be able to be rewarded for When the general moves to his explanation of doing the absolute best job I can do. 1 also hope the tragedy of the “unfortunate events” that that senior Air Force leadership will continue stand in the path of promotion, I must agree down the path of emphasizing performance that there are times when one seemingly minor that has been so carefully charted over the last decision or circumstance, one well beyond the two years. control of the officer, has resulted in an in- Maj Howard W. Moffatt, Jr., USAF stantaneous halt to that officer’s career. I sup- Lackland AFB. Texas pose that’s the price we pay for being profes- sionals in an environment that demands that we make decisions. 1 know a first-class officer (now retired) who probably was denied his first star because somebody threw paint on an air- 1 am sure that by now you have received a plane that was parked on his flight line—even number of letters concerning Maj Gen Dale O. though the airfield perimeter, the flight line, Smith’s article in the Spring issue of the APf. and the plane were all guarded by host-country Undoubtedly some writers questioned the rele- troops. There are probably as many stories like vance of using one-third of the article as an that as there are officers who haven’t made four apologia for not being promoted to three stars. stars. Others probably take exception to the number But when General Smith moves from his an- of specific superficial “tricks” he suggests to ecdotal discussion to drawing the conclusion endear one to his or her bosses. that it’s risky “if you stick out your neck too What concerns me most, however, is not far," he leads the reader to conclude that get- what he says but rather what he does not say. ting promoted is more important than doing the Significantly, not once are the qualities of hon- right thing. Military history is littered with the esty and integrity mentioned. In almost every careers of officers who have decided they must book, article, and speech touching on the pro- risk those careers by sticking their necks out fessional military officer, these are the core (Gen Billy Mitchell’s name springs to mind). character traits deemed essential to effective One of the tragedies of a peacetime force is that leadership and to reaching positions of great re- it tends to breed “safeness." While I do not ad- sponsibility. Yet General Smith does not even vocate reckless risk taking as the path to suc- hint at them. Another key quality invariably cess in combat, I do think General Smith’s arti- cited is care and concern for your subordinates. cle may generate an atmosphere among new It is almost a tenet that the higher you go and officers who will become concerned over taking the broader your responsibilities become, the a risk—on anything. more “you gotta take care of the folks that get The general’s positive recommendations the mission done.” Again, not a peep from (“What can you do to get promoted?”) are sim- General Smith. There are a number of other 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

qualities that are frequently deemed desirable feelings and sensibilities. But like mercy, it for leadership such as a sense of humor, self- blesses him that gives and him that takes. discipline, communicative skills, physical I took this tack because of the alarming ten- health, etc., but none of these are mentioned. dency in modern America to laud offensive so- By now the crux of my problem with General cial sloppiness—of attitudes toward seniors Smith’s article must be clear. If the time-tested that merge on downright rudeness. Too much qualities for leadership don’t deserve even off- of this virus has infected the Air Force, and hand mention in an article on how to get pro- it is dangerous to good order, morale, and moted, what does? Certainly not how to ad- discipline. dress the boss’s wife; or advice on why golf is I wince when a gas station attendant or a doc- important. tor’s clerk calls me by my first name. Those The disconcerting thing about General subject to such rude informalities don’t forget Smith's article is he obviously believes what he the slight no matter how well the gas is wrote. The frightening thing is he may be right. pumped or the doctor’s records are kept. In- Col Michael E. Heenan, USAF deed, impolite people who deliberately fail to Maxwell AFB, Alabama recognize rank are out of step with the times. Egalitarianism, at the heart of communism, has proved a dismal failure worldwide. People are not cogs in a machine but social animals conscious of their stations in life. They GENERAL SMITH RESPONDS invent many subtle ways to protect their rank, from private dining rooms to parking places. 1 was surprised that some officers took offense at my essay on “How to Get Promoted,” but I Those who fail to recognize and appreciate their rank do so at their own peril. Toadyism or think their reaction makes my point that too lit- insincere flattery will certainly backfire, but tle consideration is given today to good man- ners and courtesy. What has this got to do with heartfelt expressions of regard and respect will go far. military doctrine and readiness? Everything. Probably no institution on earth is so steeped Many characteristics of a good officer are givens, such as honesty, integrity, and respon- in protocol and stylized good manners as the sibility. If an officer should fall down in any military. Certainly no institution is more con- of these fundamental criteria, he should be cerned with rank. It must be accepted and de- ferred to. Only thus can a military unit con- dumped, not graded. But job performance is harder to define. It's a subjective judgment tinue to operate with a chain of command in the face of combat losses and the confusion of made by a human being. A favorable regard for battle. When this cohesive force of military dis- the one being graded will never be harmful. cipline degrades, the unit becomes a worthless mob. Courtesy and good manners build loyalty and morale. They provide the lubrication that keeps a military machine running smoothly and en- EDITOR’S NOTE: The response to ”How to Get thusiastically. With this kind of spirit the mili- Promoted" is both gratifying and encouraging. tary mission is enhanced. Without it we en- though perhaps not for the reasons many might courage defeat. And who can deny that good expect. Comment on the substantive content of rapport with one's boss does not help one to do an article can clearly (and properly) be en- a good job? trusted to authors and readers, as evidenced by My article was a short essay touching on only the letters above. However, many readers also one route on the road to promotion. Indeed, express concern about the appropriateness oJ there are many more, and most have been writ- the issue, and it does seem proper for the editor ten about a thousand times. What I tried to do to address the propriety of publishing any was show that a life-style of basic courtesy and piece on promotion. A service's underlying good manners is a valuable personal asset fre- doctrine and institutional attitudes are directly quently overlooked. This is not “careerism.” reflected in whom that service promotes and the pejorative buzzword that describes an of- how those promotees are selected. Personnel is- ficer who is more concerned with his promo- sues directly affect combat effectiveness as tion than with the Air Force mission. In fact, much as do operational doctrine or logistics courtesy is a sincere concern for someone else’s matters and should be thrashed out in a profes- MCOCHETS 75 sional journal such as ours. Therein lies the en- cause of a lack of Axis fighters to attack. The couraging aspect of the current exchange of fighter aircraft turned to dropping bombs to views on promotion. have anything to do at all. Lt Col Raymond F. Hain III, USAFR Federal Way. Washington

CAS/BAI AIRCRAFT SELECTION I read Dr Richard Hallion’s “Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assessment" (Spring BEKAA VALLEY KUDOS 1990) with some interest. I spent a year in Viet- I write to you concerning the Winter 1989 Air- nam as a forward air controller (FAC) during power journal article “The Bekaa Valley Air the spring offensive of 1972 and have some in- Battle, June 1982: Lessons Mislearned?” and its terest in air support for the close-air-support author. (CAS) role. I started to read this article thinking that I As a result of my year in combat, 1 must dis- would find there a simple story of a historic air agree with his point number 8: “The fighter- battle in the Middle East. Instead I found that bomber has always performed more satisfac- the writer was a young falcon, perhaps rehears- torily in the CAS/BAI [battlefield air interdic- ing intellectually to become a ripe staff officer tion] role than the special-purpose attack air- in his future career, indeed, I imagine he'll be- plane.” My experience in Vietnam suggests just come a mature officer long before lie imagined the reverse. The ubiquitous F-4 was the last air- he would. I was happily surprised to read a plane 1 really wanted to see for a CAS mission. deep analysis that could have been produced Any aircraft in the attack category was better, by an air command and staff officer. especially when the “black boxes" were work- Please congratulate Cadet Hurley on my be- ing. The attack aircraft were designed for the half. I enjoyed each paragraph and heartily type of work needed to support the Army when agree with his core content. they were in shooting range of the other side. The F-4 was designed for fleet defense for the Comodoro Jose C. D’Odorico, Retired Navy with the CAS role added later on. Yes, the Fuerza Aerea Argentina F-4 does well in the BAI role because it carries Buenos Aires. Argentina a heap of iron, but where the iron hits the ground isn't as critical as in a CAS mission. I worked many situations in which the F-4 HOLES THE could have been as much trouble for the "good IN AIR CAMPAIGN guys” as for the "bad guys" on the ground be- Last summer during in-processing at ACSC, cause of its inability to match an attack air- when 1 picked up my copy of The Air Cam- craft’s accuracy. Attack aircraft were sent most paign: Planning for Combat by Col John A. of those times. Warden III. I was intrigued. It seemed like it Occasionally I did see an F-4 perform bomb- might be a good little guide. Then I read it. I ing with excellent accuracy, but it proved to was sorely disappointed. I assumed ACSC had have a highly proficient pilot at the controls. made it required reading during our Conven- Given the minimum safe distances for most tional Warfare Phase to ask the students, "What ordnance carried in Vietnam, the F-4 could not is missing from this picture?" Before I did my match an attack aircraft for a troops-in-contact required analysis of the book. I read a few re- situation. views including yours in the Fall 1989 APJ. I For a tactical emergency, anything will do. was stunned! Your reviewer called it “a block- But that doesn’t mean that the fighter-bomber is buster of a book, clearly written and intensely almost always better than the attack aircraft. interesting.” I wondered if we had read the I wonder about the basis for his remarks same book. But then I found that other re- about the preference of both the Axis and the viewers were equally laudatory. Nevertheless. 1 Allies for fighter-bombers over attack aircraft. vehemently disagreed. The straw that broke the Could that preference have been one of neces- camel’s back was two weeks ago when I got my sity rather than utility? The Axis had insuffi- copy of the 1990 Air University (AU) Suggested cient aircraft to do the job of close air support Professional Reading Guide. The Air Cam- while the Allies, at least in the last stages of the paign: Planning for Combat is a new entry. In war, had no other jobs for the fighters to do be- this case 50,000 Elvis fans can be wrong. 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

This book is dangerous. It is dangerous be- Battle, follow-on forces attack, in which tactical cause it is so full of holes yet has been so well air is the prime player), preferring to "avoid received by the military professional com- using terms that recently have come into vogue munity. The book is dangerous because future but are still too esoteric to be widely under- leaders may read it and think they have some- stood or useable ... such as forward line of own how expanded their knowledge of how to plan troops.” Unbelievable! In 1978 I would have ac- an air campaign. It is dangerous because it may cepted that statement. In 1988? No way. potentially lead planners into a false sense of 3. Colonel Warden’s lessons from history are security. They may feel that since they have out of date and are often contradictory. Most checked off all the requirements of this poor analysts would agree that the air campaign of analysis their jobs are done. the future will not remotely resemble World What's wrong with The Air Campaign? My War II, yet the majority of examples are taken primary complaint is that it is written from the from it. There is some treatment of the air war overtly biased viewpoint of a fighter pilot who in Korea but almost nothing from Vietnam, sees the planning for an air campaign through a which he calls “an anomalous war.” I contend "soda straw.” Specifically: that that type of air war is likely in the future. Lessons from the Battle of Britain make up a 1. Colonel Warden omits several Air Force large percentage of the book. But here Colonel missions that are absolutely essential to any air Warden points out at least five contradicting campaign. There is no mention of strategic examples as to what led to the British victory. I bombing (unless we believe that's covered by could have accepted his arguments except that his tactical mission of "distant interdiction"), a not one of the five examples hits the mark. necessary tool at the operational level. There is There are turn generally accepted factors that al- not a word on airlift at either the strategic or lowed the RAF to prevail in 1940: Hitler, tactical level. In fact. Colonel Warden’s only through Goring, poorly employed his Luftwaffe mention of the logistics tail, in general, is the (failure of leadership): and the technological necessity to disrupt that of the enemy. As the advantage the British had with radar allowed review of The Air Campaign in the September them to employ the principles of mass and ma- 1989 issue of Parameters correctly points out, neuver. Colonel Warden didn't mention either "Command and Control [C2j needs more atten- of those two. tion." The brains, the hub of a theater air cam- There is a dire need for someone in the Air paign, are covered in only a few paragraphs Force to take the time to write a good book on that read like an afterthought. The list goes on: how to plan the air campaign. Colonel Warden no words on combat support or air base oper- saw that need and made an excellent start. I ability and survivability. Where is electronic commend him for that. But “start" is the key combat? People who spend their lives in SEAD word. What is unconscionable, in my mind, is [suppression of enemy air defenses] and EW that The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, [electronic warfare) would be surprised to read so full of gaps, is being embraced as a master- that “the only really effective counter to an air- piece by people who should know better. craft is another aircraft.” It’s easy to criticize. And, since I'm no expert. 2. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat I really don't like doing it. Could I do better? flies in the'face of current Air Force doctrine. No, I could not. However. I think Colonel War- Colonel Warden's thesis for quickly getting air den can. The Air Campaign needs to be revised supremacy rests on numerical superiority. But to be made more complete. To assess its major mass/economy of force does not necessarily deficiencies across the spectrum of Air Force equate to numbers advantage. We have spent missions, I suggest that he ask ACSC for copies 20 years building an Air Force that is tech- of better analyses of the book by the class of nologically superior but numerically inferior. '91. His revised manuscript should go for crit- How does one plan an air campaign in which ical review to CADRE and to the faculties of the "numbers are so important that a primary goal various AU courses that teach air campaign of the operational commands ought to be to planning. The Air Force needs a succinct guide make sure his forces outnumber the enemy ev- for employing air power. The Air Campaign: erytime they meet”? This may work in a small Planning for Combat is a beginning. war but not conventionally. Colonel Warden Maj Richard W. Taylor, USAF never mentions low-intensity conflict, AirLand Maxwell AFB, Alabama net assessment

The Limits of Air Power: The American Bomb- air doctrine start to appear. Under the umbrella ing of North Vietnam by Mark Clodfelter, of strategic deterrence we began a restructuring New York 10022: Free Press. 1989. 297 pages. of our forces to be able to fight in these smaller $22.95. conflicts. New training concepts appeared and forces were equipped for a new mission. We Having read a number of reviews of this well- saw the genesis of such specialized units as the researched book, 1 looked forward to reading it. Green Berets, the Riverine force, and the Jungle I was not disappointed with the depth of the Jim Air Commandos. We developed a new good, solid historical examination of the politi- acronym—COIN (counterinsurgency). Our mili- cal and military events that led to the decisions tary schools started teaching the subject but few on the use of air power in the Vietnam War. professors were prepared to teach it. Our lim- Having flown in the Rolling Thunder campaign ited military experience in small conflict in the (1966-67). I found it most interesting to read of 1920s had been forgotten, overshadowed by the the political interaction, indecision, and con- mighty endeavor of World War II. troversy on the missions my comrades and I Just as we entered World War II unprepared flew. The book brings to light the reasons for for the task ahead, so did we enter the Vietnam our frustrations in not being able to attack en- War. Air power had proven itself to be a critical emy airfields and air defense sites. Had we element in the success of battles. Naturally air known the reasons, I fear our frustrations power was the only element that could be used would have been much more severe and our against North Vietnam since the political deci- morale would have suffered greatly. sion was made that we would not try to con- Once beyond my renewed disappointment quer the North, just convince the North Viet- with our elected and appointed leaders of that namese that they should stop supporting the era, I looked to the central thesis of this book. Vietcong insurgency in the South. In Mark Clodfelter’s own words, “I am endeav- Mark Clodfelter uses military and civilian oring to portray how the indelible stamp of Air consumption statistics to justify his thesis that Force strategic bombing doctrine affected the the strategic view of air power espoused bv air war against the North, and how doctrinal Mitchell, Douhet, and later Arnold, Spaatz, and convictions established long before Vietnam Eaker could not have had an impact on the colored air commanders' perceptions of bomb- North’s will to continue to fight. The North just ing effectiveness.” did not need as much in military supplies as One would have to admit that restricting his larger forces need in a major conflict. Lacking thesis to that one conclusion presents a strong in this thesis and assessment, however, is the case that our air leaders’ strong doctrinal con- effect the total destruction of all the infrastruc- victions were faulty. But we can perhaps better ture targets and the mining of harbors would understand their convictions if we go back in have had early in the air campaign. Like the po- air power history just a few years, to a time litical leadership of the time, Clodfelter has ex- when all of our forces were severely reduced af- pectations that such a strategic bombing cam- ter World War II and Korea and our national paign must have immediate, almost overnight, policy was one of massive nuclear retaliation results when in fact that degree of expectation by air power. The decade of the 1950s saw a na- is unrealistic. tional resolve to stay out of conventional con- The original 96 targets recommended by the flicts overseas and to deter our enemies by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for Rolling Thunder threats of nuclear devastation. The next decade were admittedly infrastructure targets. showed us the error of our ways when small, However, all of the targets were never approved local conflicts demanded our attention and for attack. Had they been, one can only specu- showed that our military forces were not pre- late whether the North would have come to the pared. trained, or equipped to fight in this dif- negotiating table earlier. They certainly did ferent environment. when a new administration’s political objec- At this point, we see the modifications to our tives changed the course of the war and the

77 78 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

Linebacker campaign rained destruction on gets with real significance were struck in the many of the very “infrastructure” targets rec- North. The People’s Republic of China and the ommended earlier by the JCS. Soviet Union had gone their separate ways and This reviewer can only hope that Mark Clod- were now each independently looking for im- felter will write another book, taking into con- proved relations with the United States. sideration all of the restraints on land, sea, and Just as important, the war had been in its air forces with a view to the future of armed early years an insurgency that required such a conflict for our military forces. He has done us small amount of support from the North that all a great favor with this book because he has even extreme levels of conventional bombing stimulated thinking about our past and our op- couldn't reduce the flow enough to hamper portunities for the future. He has graphically guerrilla operations. Actually, as Clodfelter in- told the story of political indecision in the use dicates, the Vietcong received most of their of military force for limited objectives. I thank support from indigenous sources in South Viet- him for all of this and look forward to future nam. But by 1972, especially with that year's books in his name. Easter offensive, Hanoi was waging a conven- Gen Charles L. Donnelly. |r., USAF, Retired tional war requiring vast logistical resupply Arlington. Virginia from "stockpiled goods and overland transpor- tation” that was vulnerable to air attack. Perhaps more important. Nixon's war goals in 1972 were quite different from Johnson’s The Limits of Air Power: The American Bomb- earlier objectives. Johnson's goal as specified ing of North Vietnam by Mark Clodfelter, in National Security Action Memorandum New York 10022: Free Press, 1989, 297 pages. (NSAM) 288 in March 1964 had been “an inde- $22.95. pendent non-Communist South Vietnam." By 1972 a war-weary United States only wanted “peace with honor,” meaning that it would dis- I k n o w you d o n ' t ha ve m u c h t i m e f or r e a d i n g engage but would “not abandon the South to an and you may be tired of hearing about Vietnam, imminent Communist takeover.” but you just "gotta” read this book. It's about us The author contends that these changed cir- today as much as it is about the guys who flew cumstances set the stage for Linebacker IPs "downtown Hanoi.” effectiveness. Clodfelter says that "bombing Maj Mark Clodfelter has a PhD in history and 'worked' in 1972 because it was the proper in- teaches at the US Air Force Academy, but don't strument to apply, given Nixon's specific goals let that scare you off. He has an important mes- and the political and military situation that sage about how air power was misapplied in (hen existed." Vietnam. He also shows that things haven't The implication is that “strategic bombing” changed much. You need to know that and was not the right tool prior to 1972. How can why. that be? From the days of the Air Corps Tactical After Linebacker II. which "dropped 20.000 School through World War II, and even to this tons of bombs on Vietnam's heartland in eleven day. we have institutionally accepted the doc- days." the previously uncooperative North trine that air power could always win a war Vietnamese went back to the bargaining table (any war, limited or unlimited) by striking the with such eagerness that less than a month later vital industrial centers of an enemy's heartland. a peace agreement was signed. Lots of us "blue After all, wasn't that the theory that led to the suiters" thump our chests and say, “See, we establishment of the LIS Air Force as an inde- ended the war in a week and a half with strate- pendent service in 1947? Perhaps the most im- gic bombing and we could have done it back in portant lesson to be learned from this book is 1969 or even 1965 just as easily." that air power is a powerful tool but only when Not so fast, Clodfelter says. Things were dras- used properly. Just as you use a hammer to tically different in 1972 than they had been pound in nails rather than to saw boards, you earlier. President Lyndon Johnson felt he had to must use air power to achieve objectives under consciously limit air power to avoid direct Chi- circumstances appropriate to its capabilities nese or Soviet involvement with the potential and limitations. Clodfelter says it this wav: for direct superpower confrontation and nu- “What I hope emerges from this book is a real- clear war. But by 1972, President Richard ization that conventional air power's effective- Nixon had received indications that neither the ness as a political instrument varies according Chinese nor the Soviets would interfere if tar- to many diverse factors.” NET ASSESSMENT 79

Yes, tactically we were very good in Vietnam. The blockade of Berlin marked the first direct But as the author states. "In the final analysis, confrontation between the West and the Soviet the supreme test of bombing’s efficacy is its Union in the post-World War II era. The United contribution to a nation's war aims.” We’ve got States, France, and the United Kingdom re- to understand that air power has limits—limits sponded to the Soviet siege with an ingenious in what it can do and limits in the conditions means of maintaining the allied presence in a under which it can do it. Even the most cock- city cut off from the rest of Western Europe sure fighter pilot knows the importance of stay- without provoking combat. American and Brit- ing within the limits of the jet’s flight envelope. ish fliers operated a complex shuttle service be- Stay within those parameters and amazing tween West Germany and Berlin for some fif- things can be done; stepping outside brings dis- teen months between June 1948 and September aster. We need to know the strategic and politi- 1949. hauling more than 2.3 million tons of cal parameters for effective use of air power at supplies to the better than 2 million inhabitants least as well. of Berlin. This sustenance allowed the Western Because we are likely to fight future wars allies to maintain their presence and influence against enemies more like the Vietcong guer- in the city, if only by their fingernails, while rillas than the Third Reich’s panzers (or the So- diplomats worked on a settlement. viet Union’s frontal armies for that matter), we Ann and John Tusa’s book especially pre- must understand the limits of air power in lim- sents the events of the Berlin blockade and air- ited wars so we can avoid what the author re- lift as an epic struggle between nations. Written fers to as “the prospect of an aerial Verdun.” from a decidedly British viewpoint—John Tusa You really "gotta” read this book! is a journalist with the British Broadcasting Corporation—The Berlin Airlift contains a Lt Col Richard B. Clark, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama rousing story of individual heroism and high drama. It reads like a classic western, with good guys (the Western allies) and bad guys (the So- viets and East Germans) and anecdotes about how these two forces clashed. Like any good The Berlin Airlift by Ann and John Tusa. western, the ending was predictable as the New York 10022: Atheneum Press, 1988, 445 Americans and their allies ultimately defeated pages, $24.95. the Soviets. The Berlin Airlift will be of more interest to Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of nonspecialist readers than to students of Berlin 1948, Its Origins and Aftermath by D. M. airlift historiography, although those knowl- Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin. Novato, Cal- edgeable about many aspects of the crisis will ifornia 94949: Presidio Press, 1988, 247 still benefit from the Tusas’ descriptions of the pages, $14.95. British contributions to the airlift. The authors Anniversaries typically spark the recon- thoroughly researched British records and ana- sideration of historic events in all manner of lyzed that aspect of the story, a particular area popular ways, from reenactments to ceremonies that has been slighted in previous studies of the to historical publications. The fortieth anniver- crisis, and they present their findings better sary of the Berlin airlift in 1988 was no excep- and with more verve than any earlier work. The tion. Ann and John Tusa's The Berlin Airlift position of the British government in the crisis: and D. M. Giangreco's and Robert E. Griffin’s the development, organization, and operation Airbridge to Berlin are only two of the many of the British task force flying airlift missions; publications about the episode appearing as a and the British role in negotiating the lifting of result of the anniversary. These studies note the blockade are well documented in The that the Berlin blockade represented a titanic Berlin Airlift. struggle between two blocs of nations with di- There are, however, several fatal flaws that vergent ideologies that nearly plunged the make The Berlin Airlift as reported by Ann and world into another major war. More important, John Tusa less useful than I would have liked. however, each work concentrates on the First, the authors devote more than 150 out of a intensely human experience of the crisis, de- total of 379 pages of text to the actual blockade scribing the problems and successes of the per- of Berlin. While this prefatory material deals sonalities involved. Both books create vivid im- with the Berlin question and general relations ages in words and pictures of the crisis for a between the two power blocs that confronted largely popular audience. each other at Berlin in 1948-49, it seems exces- 80 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

sive when measured against the size of the understand the origins of the Berlin crisis of whole book. I would have anticipated a more 1948-49 but do not dwell on it, as did the expeditious handling of earlier foreign relations Tusas. Instead, their narrative concentrates on a and a greater emphasis on the airlift itself. description of the events of the airlift itself, the Second, no clear picture of the American side diplomatic story of its resolution, and a brief of the airlift can be gained from reading the history of the city since 1949. They assert that Tusas’ book. The organization of the 1st Berlin no other city has been the center of East/West Airlift Task Force, which managed the Ameri- controversy as has Berlin in the post-World can effort, receives short shrift, as does the War II period. The blockade and airlift, unique operational approach developed to Giangreco and Criffin suggest, was only one of order airlift flow. There is almost nothing about several crises involving the city, and these con- Maj Gen William H. Tunner, the American frontations will not abate until the unique sit- commander who more than anyone understood uation of a divided Berlin is resolved. the possibilities and especially the limitations The most important contribution of Airbridge of airlift and who organized the operation for to Berlin, however, is the more than 300 black- the success it achieved during the winter of and-white photographs that illustrate the vol- 1948-49. Brig Gen Joseph Smith, who initially ume. Many have never been published before, commanded the Airlift Task Force and oversaw and they depict well the trials and hopes of the the early success of the operation, is not even people of Berlin during the blockade. The pho- mentioned. The Tusas offer no sophisticated tographs put an entirely new face on the events discussion of the pattern of operations, the na- of the Berlin airlift and are alone worth the ture of logistics and maintenance, command price of the volume. and control, force structure, and C-54 acquisi- Both The Berlin Airlift and Airbridge to tion from outside of Europe to augment the air- Berlin have their strengths and weaknesses, as lift fleet. From an operational perspective, this do all publications. Neither, of course, will re- book's discussion of the American airlift effort place W. Phillips Davison's The Berlin Block- is at best superficial. Indeed, the book should ade: A Study in Cold War Politics (1958) and have been retitled to indicate that it dealt especially Avi Shiaim’s The United States and largely with the British aspects of the airlift. the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949: A Study in Finally, the book has a scholarly apparatus Crisis Decision-Making (1983). both outstand- that proves next to useless. A mere five pages of ing analyses of this foreign policy crisis. But bibliography, omitting some of the most inter- these new books package the basic story in a esting and useful works on the subject, were readable format that will be useful to a general used as the basic references for the book. Even readership. As such, in spite of weaknesses worse, the chapter notes are especially confus- most notable in the work of the Tusas. these ing because they have no page numbers for any two new books should find an audience among published sources. Since the majority of the ref- individuals interested in the history of airlift. erences are for published works, this shortcom- Most important, the events discussed in both ing is particularly troublesome. No one will be The Berlin Airlift and Airbridge to Berlin dem- able to reconstruct the thought processes of the onstrate how military airlift can assist foreign authors as they review the text, and I must ask. policy execution. The experience revealed the Was that the intent in omitting them? To the unique capabilities of air transport in a non- credit of the Tusas. however, they have mined combat environment. Since then military airlift, the Public Records Office in the United King- which was proven to be a viable option in the dom and have, as their chapter notes demon- Berlin crisis, has been used with increasing strate. offered several new insights relative to frequency. British participation in the airlift based on Dr Roger D. Launius these records. Scott AFB. Illinois I f o u n d Airbridge to Berlin an entirely dif- ferent type of book and ultimately one that is more satisfactory. Designed exclusively as pop- ular history, it still provides a valuable rein- terpretation of the event. Authors Giangreco and Griffin have succeeded admirably in pre- Assignment Pentagon: The Insider’s Guide to senting a graphic depiction of the airlift, this the Potomac Puzzle Palace by Maj Gen Perry time from a decidedly American perspective. M. Smith, USAF. Retired. McLean. Virginia They relate the diplomatic history necessary to 22102: Pergamon-Brassev's International De- NET ASSESSMENT 81

fense Publishers, Inc., 1989, 288 pages. sues: “Avoid being a sycophant. Curb your per- $25.00. sonal desire for self-aggrandizement and power. Be prepared to be fired.” General Smith’s Assignment Pentagon pro- Chapter 6, "Where Were You When the Page vides an informative, nostalgic primer on duty Was Blank?: the Agony and Ecstasy of the Ac- in the most powerful building in America. Hav- tion Officer,” is the "gospel” according to ing served five years there, I found myself reliv- Smith—but it was never said better. Every fu- ing some of the unforgettable experiences asso- ture “iron major” and action officer (AO) ciated with the tour. For those who aspire to should take heed because the guidance here duty in the “Gon,” the book should be read, comes from a former “big boss” who has seen highlighted, paper clipped, and earmarked like the best and worst. When he says, "Don’t fall in your favorite novel. But it is not fiction: it is love with your program or don’t assume you simply the best truth you’ll ever read about the are wiser than the big bosses,” listen up! Pentagon. It doesn't dig up the dirt, so don’t ex- The 0-6s and GS-15s who run the branches pect a lot of juicy stories. What it does do is and divisions are sometimes forgotten because open the door to every level of service—from of the “legwork" of the AOs, but in chapter 7, the GS-1 clerk typist to the secretary of defense. "The Branch and Division Chief: A Forgotten Like General Smith’s tremendous guide to Breed,” General Smith singles them out as key effective leadership, Taking Charge, this book leaders wdth a critical role in the policy-making is loaded with anecdotes, management and process and in the future careers of their subor- leadership principles, and get-ahead techniques dinates. His comments w'ould benefit those in that can be applied effectively to private as well and destined for these important jobs. as public service. Just substitute "IBM ” or Forget what you’ve heard in the past about “General Dynamics” or even "First National duty in JCS. In chapter 11, The Joint Staff, Gen- Bank” for the word Pentagon, and you can bet eral Smith gives us the latest, and it’s good that the guidance will be right on target. news. He covers the uniqueness of joint duty The mystique of the Pentagon touches vir- from promotion potential to survival skills. tually everyone who has not served there. From Good stuff for any “purple suiter”! a glimpse of the River Entrance on nightly news Chapter 25, "Military Ethics in the Pen- to headline stories about defense spending tagon,” is a short chapter that sums up the abuses, the media tantalizes the public with vi- secret to maintaining one’s integrity while sions (and myths) of what goes on around the E muddling through the political and bureaucra- Ring and in the bowels of the (rat-infested?) tic quagmire that envelops legislative and basement. Assignment Pentagon pulls the cur- budgetary dealings between the Pentagon and tains and shows what life in the “city” is really the Congress: don’t lie! tike. And it is a city! Banks, restaurants, sub- Assignment Pentagon also deals with family ways, megabuck businesses—it’s all there. Gen- life in the Washington area. General Smith eral Smith covers the present-day realities of covers house hunting, sightseeing, job oppor- both the physical plant and of doing business tunities for spouses, educational opportunities, in the Pentagon, and he concludes with his and much, much more. It is the complete guide view of what the Pentagon of the 1990s will be to a Pentagon tour. Those of us who have like. In between, he has left us with two dozen served there would have benefited greatly from chapters that will amaze, educate, and greatly its wisdom. Those of you expecting to serve entertain those who want to know' more about there must read it. It is a scholarly, easy-to-read the military “head shed.” I would like to single book written by a great leader who was totally out a few chapters that I found especially "in touch" with his profession—and its people. enjoyable—and informative. Chapter 3. “Rules of Thumb: Helpful Hints Lt Col Ben C. Pittman, USAF Maxwell AFB, Alabama on How to Get Ready to Work. Survive, and Thrive." is a checklist for adjusting to the building and for working with its people. Gen- eral Smith comments on commonsense areas that are important everywhere but critical in the Pentagon: "Be sure of your facts. Don’t Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General by waste time reinventing the wheel. When you Phillip S. Meilinger. Bloomington, Indiana promise, deliver. Know when to say no." He 47405: Indiana University Press, 1989, 279 also addresses some frequently "untouched” is- pages, $27.50. 82 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

There are few people as enshrouded in mys- that none of this eliminates the value of an im- tery as Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of portant work that resurrects a critical but oft- staff from 1948 until shortly before his death in forgotten age and displays it to us in all of its 1953. Few men played as pivotal a role in the fearsome vibrancy. The fact is, however, that formation of the USAF, running of the Berlin Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General is blockade, delineation of nuclear defense policy, less about the man’s life than his times. establishment of the CIA, prosecution of the air The book is well written and incorporates an war over Korea, and other historical develop- impressive number of primary and secondary ments. Colonel Meilinger of the history depart- sources. It makes interesting and highly infor- ment at the US Air Force Academy has at- mative reading. I commend the book to all Aii tempted to shine a light on the general’s life Force officers who should know where they and in doing so to illumine his times. His work came from and why. covers a period and subject matter badly in Maj Bill Nikides, USAF need of detailed study, while at the same time Langley AFB, Virginia it curiously leaves one even more aware of the fact that we still do not know the man. The book chronicles the general’s life, from his youth in Lowell, Massachusetts, through his undistinguished years at West Point to his ten- A Country Made by War: From the Revolution ure between the world wars as a pursuit pilot, to Vietnam—The Story of America’s Rise to climaxing with his notably diverse career as a Power by Geoffrey Perret. New York 10022: general officer. We are given testimony by old Random House, 1989, 629 pages, $22.50. friends, family, acquaintances, and colleagues in order to understand this shadowy man re- Every military officer needs to have a bash membered for little other than his handsome and dependable military history of the Unitec visage. The period of his life as fighter pilot is States in his or her professional library. The particularly instructive in showing a basic vari- problem is to separate the many facile populai ance from the strategic bomber club that gener- histories from the more serious general studie; ated most of the early Air Force’s seminal and then to make a reasonable choice among thinkers. While he eventually became a mem- the various titles that have been offered ovei ber of the club, his earlier experiences tended the last few years. to give him a more balanced perspective con- A good general history must show respect foi cerning the capabilities of air power. its subject, be reasonably complete, and articu- The majority of the work is spent describing late enough to be actually read. Not being a his tenure as Air Force chief of staff. The book seminal academic treatise, it should at least be effectively focuses needed attention on the intellectually respectable, the author showing period between the end of the Second World as much familiarity with the military classics as War and the advent of the Korean War. Van- with the numerous popular secondary sources denberg’s critical role in the origin of the USAF on the topic. Most important, the author must and its ascent as a preferred tool of national have something to contribute, some thought-out policy in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki viewpoints that are beyond the common inter- becomes a’pparent to the reader as Meilinger pretations. A book like this is useful, not for the mines the general’s correspondence, official abstruse or practical military questions that it records, congressional transcripts, and other resolves but for the ones that it raises. primary sources. The book also achieves its By these standards, Geoffrey Perret’s book is greatest success in this regard. The author’s a good choice. Perret is not a military historian, work is laudable in all but one respect. but a professional writer with leanings toward Despite having written a successful and valu- history; his earlier Days of Sadness, Years of able book, the author still fails to get closer to Triumph: The American People, 1939-1945 the man. his motivations, flaws, and complex- was a well-received account of life on the ities. This discrepancy is exacerbated by American home front during World War II. In Meilinger’s unwillingness to criticize Vanden- his newest book, he has done his research berg. Criticisms that are addressed are briefly homework, and his writing skills stand him in discussed and usually summarily dismissed. good stead. A Country Made by War features a This literary quarantine serves to present Van- fast-moving narrative that is detailed enough to denberg in two-dimensional rather than three- furnish a thoughtful overview of the nation’s dimensional light. It must be added, however. military experiences from the first days of com- NET ASSESSMENT 83

bat in the Revolution until the American evacu- ber 1917 Leon Trotsky proclaimed the provi- ation of Vietnam. Perret's text is fluent without sional government as having fallen, which is being glib, and his battle scenes are vigorous. correct, but he then footnotes the date as 26 Oc- At the same time he is no mere storyteller but tober 1917 by the old Russian calendar, which writes best in the strategic sense, relating one is wrong; the date was 25 October. On page battle and campaign to another and showing 327, in speaking of the apolitical nature of Rus- both within the sociomilitary context of the sian military tradition, he says that one excep- times. tion was the "unsuccessful Decembrist revolt in Throughout the book, Perret finds numerous 1820__ ” The actual date was 1825. A more opportunities to present his pet themes. Most of glaring and obnoxious example occurs on page these are orthodox themes, but he maintains 118 when the author in discussing the Battle of them with fresh-faced vigor: the American tra- Moscow' in December 1941 notes that "on 8 De- dition of relying on a small professional cadre cember Japan attacked the United States"! 1 to be fleshed out by a large citizen militia in found myself unwittingly pouring over my Rus- wartime is valid and effective: firepower and sian history books to verify that I had not be- scientific weaponry can solve most ills: an edu- come senile since leaving school. If errors are cated military is a successful military. He is un- made on major dates, how can one trust the in- usual in his insistence that the United States formation on lesser-known historical episodes has not been as ill-prepared for most of its wars as told by the author? as tradition holds, and he maintains a healthy A second major flaw' in the book is a series of skepticism of the current trend of management gross misstatements of fact for which the author versus leadership. Lively interpretations of peo- must bear direct responsibility, either through ple and events are scattered throughout the ignorance or lack of clarity. On page xiv. in text, and the capsule sketches of numerous per- speaking of Soviet geography and its implica- sonalities are vivid and accurate. If there is no tions for Soviet naval strategy, Moynahan states room in this book for leisured and meticulous that “the Barents and Murmansk Seas never examination of new' ideas, at least there are fre- freeze.” Not in any book or map, whether So- quent provocative insights that the professional viet or Western, was I able to find the Mur- reader must deal writh. mansk Sea. I presume that the author w'as talk- Perret's book is more serious than Robert ing about the Beloye More (White Sea). Another Leckie’s popular The Wars of America (Harper example is found on page 119. When speaking & Row, 1968) or Allan R. Millett and Peter Mas- of the fighting in World War II, he says “the low'ski’s For the Common Defense: A Military Russian refusal to sign the Geneva Convention History of the United States 1607-1983 (Mac- had a powerful effect on the Germans.” Indeed, millan, 1984), both of which stress battlefield it would have been hard for the Russians to action and are found in most libraries. have signed the Geneva Convention of 1949 in Dr Raymond L. Puffer early 1942! It is this reviewer’s opinion that the Norton AFB, California author is not referring to the 1864 Geneva agreement on the care of the w'ounded, or pris- oners of war, under the auspices of the Red Claws of the Bear: The History of the Red Cross. The author does not specify this, and the Army from the Revolution to the Present by 1864 Geneva agreement w'as just that—an Brian Moynahan. Boston 02108: Houghton agreement, not a convention. Regardless, the Mifflin Company, 1989, 468 pages. $24.95. Russian government was one of the signatories of the agreement, and the Soviet government Despite the ambitious claim of its title as a did sign the Geneva Convention. Another ex- history of the Red Army. Claws of the Bear is ample occurs on page 294 w'hen Moynahan dis- nothing more than a journalistic account of cusses the world’s response to the Soviet inva- events in Soviet history. The book suffers from sion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and says. a series of major flaws that seriously detract “There was blanket condemnation ... from the from any inherent value that this book may West and from the Chinese, Rumanian, have. Yugoslav and Albanian Communist parties. First, either through careless editing, w'hich The Chinese voted against the Russians in the is amply evident throughout the book, or UN Security Council.” This is true except that through hurried writing, many dates given for it was the Republic of China (Taiwan) that major historical events are wrong. For example, voted against the Soviets and not the People’s on page six Movnahan states that on 7 Novem- Republic of China (PRC) as the paragraph 84 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 quoted might lead us to believe. The PRC did Eastern European uprisings of 1953 in Berlin not take its place in the United Nations until 25 and of 1956 in Hungary again are told from the October 1971. point of view of the German and Hungarian A third major flaw of the book is structural. participants primarily, and no account or anal- There are footnotes for items that are not of any ysis is given of their impact on the Soviet consequence, and there are no footnotes when armed forces. For the most part, that is the ma- citing various statistics. For example, on page jor problem throughout the book. The book is 29 Moynahan informs us that Leon Trotsky, the not a history of the Soviet armed forces but father of the Red Army, while escaping from Si- rather accounts told primarily by outside or in- berian exile in 1902 read Homer’s hexameters cidental observers of events in which the Soviet on his westward journey. Moynahan then foot- armed forces participated. notes this to tell us not the source but that The book is not, however, totally devoid of Trotsky was reading a Russian translation of good points. It is easily readable and entertain- Homer, whereas former British Prime Minister ing (I do not mean that pejoratively) because Harold Macmillan read Petrarch in the trenches the author does convey the “feel” of events. His in World War 1 in its Greek original. On the description of the fighting at Stalingrad and other hand, in a chapter titled "Die in Kiev,” Kursk, from an individual soldier’s point of Moynahan refers to the German dependency on view (mostly German), is quite good and one horse-drawn transport by stating on page 100 . really gets an idea of w'hat it must have been that "the Germans used 2.5 million horses on like. Also, the Soviet search for the atomic the Russian front, relying on them more and bomb. Project Borodino, is better detailed and more as their ragtag collection of trucks wore documented vis-a-vis other parts of the book. out. One artillery regiment, for example, had 69 There follows a well-w'ritten and again better- different types of lorry, many of them captured documented chapter titled “Nikita: The Rocket in France and the Low Countries.” There is no Man," which describes Nikita Khrushchev’s footnote citing the source of this statement. Nor efforts in developing the Soviets’ missile is there a footnote citing sources for the state- capabilities. ment that "General Pavlov’s Western Army The good points of the book in no way can Group fell into the first of two gigantic German compensate for its major material and struc- encirclements. At Bialystok, the Germans cap- tural flaws, some of which w'ere addressed in tured 150,000 prisoners. 1,200 tanks and 600 this review. The publisher of the book did not guns. In the Minsk pocket, the Russians lost properly edit the book, as evidenced by the 287,704 men as POWs, 2,585 tanks and 1,400 map on pages 120-21 depicting Soviet forces guns.” The rest of the book follows the same er- presently operating outside Soviet borders ratic pattern in the use of footnotes. The source while the text is describing the Russian coun- material used is also somewhat sparse and in terattack at Moscow' in 1941-42; the title of the some cases of doubtful value for the topic ad- chapter is “I Want a Child, Soon.” Of course dressed. An example of this is a chapter on this is cleared up later on pages 330-31 where, Joseph Stalin’s biography and rise to power: its in the discussion of “Red Elite,” there is a map title: "The Steel Monster.” The author uses depicting the major offensive operations of the only three sources for his sweeping assessment Soviet armed forces, 1941-45—the vagaries of of "Stalin.'the boy from the Georgian seminary” book publishing, I presume. More grievous, the who would for “the coming quarter century ... author attempted to w'rite a book on a subject dominate the Red Army.” for which he is ill-prepared to write about, Last, a fourth major flaw and perhaps the namely the history of the Soviet armed forces. most serious is that the book is not really a his- For a better treatment of the subject I recom- tory of the Red Army but rather a series of epi- mend Soviet Military Thought Series no. 19, sodes in modern Soviet history that are in some “Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Orga- cases totally irrelevant to the subject. A chapter nizational Development." translated under the titled “A Lunch at the Lubianka," referring to auspices of the Air Force Intelligence Service, the infamous KGB prison in central Moscow, is or The Armed Forces of the USSR, by Harriet really an account of the Communist takeovers Fast Scott and William F. Scott. As for Claws of in Eastern Europe. However, these episodes are the Bear, at $24.95, its military contribution to not told from the point of view of the Soviet the study of the Soviet armed forces is nil. A re- army, or even the Soviet Union itself, but rather sounding nyet on this one. from the point of view of the indigenous Com- Capt Gonzalo I. Vergara, USAF munists themselves and their opponents. The Castle AFB. California NET ASSESSMENT 85

Technology and War by Martin Van Creveld. Creveld points out with devastating clarity (are New York 10022: Free Press, 1989, 342 pages. you listening, Mr McNamara?) that “nothing is $22.95. less conducive to victory in war than to wage it on technological principles—an approach Van Creveld has produced yet another mar- which, in the name of operations research, sys- velous volume concerning often-misunderstood tems analysis, or cost/benefit calculation ... aspects of warfare. The present volume rests on treats war merely as an extension of technol- the simple premise that war "is completely per- ogy.” (p. 319) Van Creveld has earlier made the meated by technology and governed by it.” (p. point that “when the chips are down, there is 1) Certainly this is not a startlingly new no rational calculation in the world capable of thought. However, the author expands the tra- causing the individual to lay down his life. On ditional horizon for investigation far beyond both the individual and collective levels, war is the well-known military •'gadgets” and in- therefore primarily an affair of the heart." (p. cludes the often-overlooked impact of “civil- 314) ian” technologies. In sum, it is a book jam-packed with im- Arranging his book in broad developmental portant insights on military affairs—highly “eras” (“the age of tools,” “the age of ma- recommended. chines,” ”the rise of technological systems.” etc.). Van Creveld has synthesized a challeng- Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF ing interpretation of military history from an Maxwell AFB. Alabama impressively broad array of sources. For the most part, his treatment is masterful, providing valuable insights as to how diverse strains of Unguided Missiles: How America Buys Its technological development came together to Weapons by Fen Osier Hampson. New York produce important, and sometimes surprising, 10110: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989, military results. 370 pages, $19.95. Of particular interest is the chapter in the modern era entitled "The Invention of Inven- The recent scolding Defense Secretary tion.” Van Creveld points out that "a transition Richard Cheney gave to Gen Larry D. Welch. took place from a situation in which inventions Air Force chief of staff, for negotiating a strate- were ... exceptional ... accidental and unex- gic missile deal with Congress reminds us that pected, to one in which technological change the theme of Hampson’s book is as current as ... became the normal state of affairs.” As a re- today’s news. Hampson, a Canadian academic, sult, the author continues, "war itself became has spent several years at Harvard’s John F. an exercise in managing the future.” (p. 218) In Kennedy School of Government participating a later chapter entitled "Integrated War," Van in the Avoiding Nuclear War Project. Like Creveld comes to the startling conclusion (sup- many critics, he identifies recurring inefficien- ported by historical example and solid logic) cies in weapon system development time (too that “the effectiveness of a new weapon ... may long), cost growth (too high), and program be due to the fact that ... it has not yet been in- changes (too numerous). He has added a power- tegrated with all others.” Further, he points out ful critique of executive collusion and congres- that “there exists a point beyond which integra- sional micromanagement, which he claims tion ... will lead to diminishing returns.” (p. causes these problems. 281) The book is organized into two parts. The Airmen will be disappointed by Van Cre- first part is made up of three chapters giving a veld’s cursory and uninspired treatment of air general analysis of the weapon acquisition cy- power, particularly when compared with the cle, how the Pentagon pieces together the de- quality of the rest of the volume. One is left fense budget, and the process by which Con- with the strong impression that he has not stud- gress produces the defense authorization and ied air power to the extent and depth that he appropriations acts. The second part examines has studied land power and sea power. In this six case studies of specific weapon programs, shortcoming, he is far from alone among civil- including the Trident submarine and missile, ian scholars of military affairs. MX and Midgetman, the B-l bomber, the air- Such disappointment will be short lived, launched cruise missile, the Ml tank (written however, and more than offset by his brilliant by Nicholas Swales), and the Strategic Defense concluding chapter, “The Logic of Technology Initiative (SDI). Rather than an original study, and of War,” which should be required reading this work is best understood as a synthesis of for every military officer. It is here that Van the secondary literature on defense acquisition. 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

It relies heavily on extensive quotations from tion in the incrementalism creeping into the Gordon Adams, Ronald Fox, fames Fallows, Al- budget-making process. Much of his thinking exander Kossiakoff, Arnold Kanter, Jacques here echoes the Packard Commission. If con- Gansler, and others. gressional behavior over the last 20 years is any At the heart of Hampson’s study is a discus- indication, one can expect to see Congress con- sion of the role of America’s political institu- tinue to jealously guard its prerogatives. tions in distorting efficient weapon system ac- Hampson is better at seeing the big picture quisition. Hampson sees this effect as deeply than at telling the story of the individual rooted in the structure of American political weapon systems. The Trident story, for exam- authority. When the founders assigned the cen- ple, left me confused about basic funding and tral government authority over the formation, milestone decisions. Similarly, the SDI discus- direction, and support of military forces, they sion, which is the longest chapter, had an un- intended the system of checks and balances be- digested quality, reading like so many chrono- tween executive and legislative branches to logical entries. While the MX discussion is guarantee that military preparedness would be particularly adroit, the author is not par- “supremely political and controversial.” If I un- ticularly effective in relating his case studies to derstand him rightly, the legislature was a bul- his more general thesis and recommendations. wark against excessive military procurement. Neither collusion nor congressional micro- The author argues that this constitutional vi- management was an obstacle in every case. Be- sion has gone wrong because the system of cause he focuses on political controversy, he checks and balances has given way to excessive has little to say about problems with the Pen- collusion between the executive and legislative tagon's management of particular programs, branches. Cooperation and consensus-building which may be a fruitful means of reform. These among and between the military services in the criticisms aside, anyone interested in how the formation of their budget and between the Pen- republic goes about the politics of arming itself tagon and Congress in the budget process have should read this book. produced a situation where trade-offs and basic Dr Julian DelGaudio resource allocation questions are ignored and Los Angeles AFB. California “political and bureaucratic accommodation takes precedence over administrative and economic efficiency." He sees in the situation a dangerous loss of political accountability. Because compromises tend to water down The Masks of War: American Military Styles priorities and spread scarce resources too in Strategy and Analysis by Carl H. Builder. widely among competing programs, Hampson Baltimore, Maryland 21211: Johns Hopkins recommends turning the budget process into a University Press, 1989. 240 pages, $10.95. “zero-sum game.’’ He would like to see a greater adversarial relationship within the ex- The Masks of War is a fairly short work that ecutive between the Pentagon and the Office of on the surface seems to have a conclusion seek- Management and Budget, although he does not ing facts to support that conclusion instead of explain h,ow this might be implemented. the reverse. The overuse of the book’s title Whether his bite-the-bullet approach would throughout the chapters gives the appearance of have the effect he intends remains problematic. a high school paper in which repetition alone is It might intensify the struggle for resources al- used to make the point. ways below the surface of the politics of However, beyond the amateurish way of weapon acquisition. It may be the collusion he building the book around its title, this study by fears was temporal, a product of the Reagan era Carl H. Builder (sponsored by the Rand Corpo- defense-spending binge. Will collusion persist ration) is a well-organized, well-documented, in the austerity of the Bush years? and very readable effort that can be used by its The author has ample criticism for Congress. readers to understand why military leaders Some of his most interesting evidence points function in the manner they do. This book up the secular trend toward congressional over- should be mandatory reading for every officer sight of defense issues. He wants reforms to assigned to the Pentagon or other joint-service curb the intrusiveness of the legislature through activity that requires frequent contact with multiyear budgeting, although he recognizes members from other services. When members the potential loss of flexibility this might im- from different services debate topics, it is ex- pose on the services. He also calls for a reduc- tremely useful to know what the other service NET ASSESSMENT 87 members' background, environment, and pur- vices' basic strategies are. The limited, original pose revolve around. thoughts by Builder require a great deal of As an Air Force member, I can only relate the quoted material. Air Force strategy revolves truth of what is in this book to how the author around "command of the air” and the assump- portrays the Air Force. His research into the tion that independent air power can be decisive focus and institutional concerns of the senior in battle. Navy strategy has had to be revamped and middle leadership of the Air Force is quite in this century. The Navy used to build its often on the mark and almost never off base. strategy based on its being “America’s first line Therefore, I must presuppose that he is as accu- of defense.” However, with the advent of air rate in his portrayal of the Army and Navy as power, nuclear weapons, and missiles, the he is of the Air Force. The Marines and Coast Navy’s claim on the defense of the nation has Guard are not part of his analysis. lost credence. Since the 1950s, the limited navy The author divides his work into five basic of the Soviet Union has led to the American sections—‘•Personalities." "Strategy." ‘‘Anal- Navy not having a viable enemy to defend ysis.” "Implications," and “Prospects”—and he against. Hence, the Navy’s strategy now re- evaluates the services in terms of each of these. volves around deterrence and its own nuclear The first section is probably the most illumi- force. The Army does not profess strategy but nating. Much of the remainder of the book offers the AirLand Battle doctrine because the revolves around his determination of the soldier supposedly thinks in terms of theaters “altars of worship.” or the raison d’etre of the or battles and not the world. services. The “Analysis" section defines and then The Navy's altar is that of tradition, dating shows analyses of operations, systems, and re- back to its British origins. As the only service quirements. A short discussion of the services’ with its own army. navy, and air force, the attitudes toward analysis is summed up by a Navy has an independence the other services potentially classic fictional analysis of toilet pa- can only envy. At times, the Navy acts as if its per requirements. interests are superior to the interests of the na- The most disturbing section is the "Implica- tion because the Navy will always be there. tions’’ section. The different attitudes of the The Air Force’s altar is that of technology. services as they conceive and plan for conflict Builder paints the officer corps (particularly the is revealing. The Navy desires to defeat the So- pilot force) as a loose-knit organization of inde- viet Union in a conventional war at sea. The pendent operators held together by a love of Air Force has its bomber pilots and fighter flying and expensive toys. Current losses in the pilots fighting each other to divide up scarce pilot force to the airlines can be traced directly resources to fight both an intercontinental to this love of flying over service to the nation. nuclear war with bombers and a European con- The toys that the Air Force loves most are those ventional war with fighters. Airlift forces and that require a person to fly them. Rockets, mis- missileers are scarcely mentioned and are not siles. drones of all kinds are forever secondary considered critical to the institutional Air to an air-breathing flying machine. Force. The Army conceives of a ground war in The Army's altar is that of service to the na- Germany that it cannot win, will probably lose, tion. While that sounds very good. Builder in- and will hopefully create a standoff condition. dicates that the Army unfortunately forgoes The Army lives under the shroud of “another what may be best for the Army or best for the Vietnam” and is fearful of another wartime de- nation in order to be “the nation’s obedient and feat. The budgetary side of planning is then dis- loyal military servant.” Whether it is building cussed with the services' interests being the de- the Panama Canal, running the Civilian Conser- termining factors and not the best interests of vation Corps, quelling riots, or actually fighting the nation at large. Even the Army, with its po- battles against a foreign enemy, the Army does tential major benefits from “joint planning,” is the nation’s bidding. The Army is at more of a unwilling to aggressively pursue jointness in disadvantage because of its dependence on the monetary matters for fear of rocking a shaky ca- other services to accomplish its mission. It maraderie boat with the Navy and Air Force. needs the Navy for sea lift and the Air Force for The final section, “Prospects,” deals with the both airlift and close air support. Without the services’ attempts to define themselves in the other services, the Army cannot hope to func- nuclear era. None of the services likes the tion well in a shooting war. changes in its system that these weapons have The “Strategy" section attempts to define wrought. The Strategic Defense Initiative is the strategy and then to determine what the ser- next unpopular big-budget item that must be 88 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990 borne by one or more of the services at the ex- Rather, much of the daily life of an AVG mem- pense of those things most cherished by the in- ber was filled with paperwork, disease, and just stitution of the individual service. Star Wars plain boredom. cannot be flown by a human, cannot defeat the Through the use of personal and candid diary Soviet navy at sea, and is not part of the his- entries, the readers soon begin to feel as if they toric Army’s main branches of artillery, armor, are engaged in a direct conversation with the and infantry, which balance the Army’s outlook author. They find themselves being drawn into to the nation's defense. the cockpit, the hospitals, clubs, and hostels as In summation, The Masks of War is an excel- each day brings something different. lent how-government-operates-in-the-long-term Bond shares his innermost feelings with his book. It is rather easy reading, although cer- readers. He suffers doubt (“Have I done the tainly not juvenile in its approach. It is not right thing by joining the AVG?’’); fear (“Sud- about a particular administration or even a denly 1 became terrified. Those dirty bastards period of time, but about how the long-term will strafe me like they did Henry Gilbert at leaders of the institutional services have their Rangoon’’): and loneliness (“Going to bed early dreams, ideas, and visions created and molded. tonight and thinking a lot of Doris”). Lt Col Dean H. Haylett, USAF A Flying Tiger’s Diary is an excellent first- Yokota AB. Japan hand factual account of what it was really like to be a fighter pilot in the organization known as the “Scourge of the Japanese.” General Bond has succeeded in telling his story in a most per- sonal and accurate way. While not filled with page after page of highly thrilling descriptions of aerial combat, the book is a complete, con- A Flying Tiger’s Diary by Maj Gen Charles R. cise overview of the good and bad times of a Bond, Jr., USAF, Retired, and Terry H. Flying Tiger. I would highly recommend this Anderson. College Station, Texas 77843: book as a companion to others written about Texas A&M University Press, 1989. 248 the AVG. It’s an accurate account of one of the pages, $12.95. more prominent groups of warriors in modern times. Through General Bond’s diary, one can General Bond’s story of the American Volun- gain a true insight into the individuals who teer Group (AVG), more commonly known as made up the AVG. Overall, it was truly re- the Flying Tigers, is an eyewitness, first-hand, freshing to find an author who was willing to comprehensive account of the men who at- tell his story, good or bad, as it actually tempted to stem the advance of the Japanese in happened. the early part of World War II. SMSgt Danny J. Mason, USAF Unlike other books about the same subject, Misawa AB, Japan Bond utilizes his private diary as the basis for his story. The readers are introduced to the AVG as the author departs San Francisco on his The Fight for the “Malvinas": The Argentine way to China. From this beginning, they are Forces in the Falklands War by Martin treated to the excitement of crossing the Pacific Middlebrook. New York 10010: Viking Press. and arriving in a strange country halfway 1989, 321 pages, $24.95. around the world to fight a war. Intermixed with the excitement of air-to-air Numerous books and a plethora of articles combat are private thoughts about the organiza- have been written on the Malvinas/Falklands tion. the difficulty of living in less than ideal War. The present work is of special interest in surroundings, waiting for an enemy who may that Martin Middlebrook, a British writer, or may not come, the problems of obtaining and gained his information on the Argentine scene maintaining enough aircraft to effectively ac- from participants in the conflict. The author complish all assigned missions, and dealing has the enviable distinction of being the first with life and death. British military historian to receive an Argen- In a gut-level manner. Bond tells his story to tine visa since the war. Middlebrook conducted the reader in the I-was-there manner. The interviews with army and navy personnel but reader is told in a candid, frank way how the the air force refused to cooperate. Coverage of life of an AVG member was far from being as air operations was obtained, however, from glamorous as it has been previously depicted. written accounts by combat pilots that were NET ASSESSMENT 89

made available to the author by an Argentine tino on 11 June. By the afternoon of 14 June, air force officer. Interviews were also held with the Argentine forces in Port Stanley capitu- naval pilots. lated, and Brig Gen Mario Benjamin Menendez Martin Middlebrook has impressive creden- surrendered his 12,700-man force to Maj Gen tials that lend sound credibility to this work. Jeremy Moore the following day. The fatal Ar- He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society. gentine battle casualties amounted to 655, com- His previous book on the Malvinas/Falklands pared to 255 on the part of the British (includ- War. Operation Corporate: The Falklands War ing three Kelpers). (later published in paperback as Task Force), Martin Middlebrook has an appealing style of was based on visits to island battlefields and on writing that enables the reader to enjoy and ap- interviews with the British military as well as preciate details of battles, logistics, and air-sea- with the local inhabitants (Kelpers). Mid- land warfare—subjects that might otherwise be dlebrook also has a series of nine books to his dry and boring to the uninitiated. He never credit that cover decisive aspects of World loses sight of the human element and effec- Wars I and II. including The Bomber Command tively employs it in a judicious manner. The War Diaries. He also shares his expertise in clarity of his work is enhanced by the employ- military history with sightseers at European ment of a dozen maps, almost 50 photographs, battlefields, where he acts as tour guide. and an order of battle of Argentine units in the In the present book under review, the author appendix. provides the reader a most interesting, read- Having recently returned from a visit to able, and informative account of a war that Buenos Aires, the reviewer saw the prominent should not have occurred. He cites Argentine roadside signs on both the departing and arrival noncompliance and frustration with British reg- sides of the route from Ezeiza International ulations coupled with suspicions and overreac- Airport that proclaim "Las Malvinas Son Ar- tions on the part of the British in the South gentinas.” Although negotiations between Brit- Georgia crisis as sparks that set off the con- ain and Argentina continue, the Malvinas/ flagration. A national plan had been in the Falklands issue remains unresolved. Works making by the Argentine junta to recover the such as the present one are positive contribu- Malvinas before January 1983—the sesquicen- tions to an understanding of the necessity of tennial of the British takeover of the Falklands. preventing a recurrence of this tragic conflict. The South Georgia crisis upset the national Dr Bynum E. Weathers plan timetable but. at the same time, gave the Maxwell AFB. Alabama junta a face-saving mandate to launch Opera- tion Azul (Blue) on 28 March 1982 for the re- covery of the Malvinas. The Ace Factor: Air Combat and the Role of From the initial landing of Argentine forces Situational Awareness by Mike Spick. An- in the Falklands (2300 on 1 April) to the cap- napolis. Maryland 21402: Naval Institute ture of Port Stanley/Puerto Argentino (0800 on Press, 1988, 208 pages, $19.95. 2 April) to the occupation and establishment of administrative control over all of the Malvinas The thesis of The Ace Factor is that situa- and South Georgia (on 4 April), the author tional awareness is the key factor that separates provides the reader a vivid account of the Ar- the high-scoring aces from the mass of lesser gentine four-day "blitzkrieg.’’ The "phony combat fighter pilots. Mike Spick writes, peace" ended on 1 May with an attack on the "Some mysterious ingredient appears to exist Stanley airfield runway by a British Vulcan in the few, and if this could only be identified, bomber from Ascension Island that had been the whole business of selecting fighter pilots refueled en route by Victor tankers on its nearly would be revolutionized." (p. xiv) He later 4.000-mile run. A fleet of Sea Harriers from air- writes, "The ace factor is part inborn and part craft carriers soon thereafter continued the at- learned." (p. 31) tack. D day for the British landing forces was 21 In the chapter on the First World War, Spick May. and five days later they moved out of the begins to make a good case for his belief beachhead in the direction of Puerto Argentino. that the key factor is situational awareness. The defeat of the Argentine garrison at Goose However, he loses his focus in recounting Green on 29 May opened the way for the Brit- events from the Second World War. By the end ish assault against Port Stanley. The slow but of the book, the author has failed to show that steady movement of the British main force situational awareness is the distinguishing fac- brought them to the outskirts of Puerto Argen- tor any more than is discipline, aggressiveness. 90 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

leadership, or a dozen other important The emotionalism and militancy of the work attributes. probably emanates from the authors’ original Even had he shown “situational awareness” purpose of writing it. The writers had not orig- to be the “ace factor," his book would be of lit- inally intended to write a comprehensive his- tle practical value. Introducing his thesis. Spick tory of veterans reentering society after war. As describes situational awareness as “the ability Severo and Milford explain, “It was not our of the pilot to keep track of events and foresee original intent to assume the burden of re- occurrences in the fast-moving, dynamic sce- searching ten postwar periods and more than nario of air warfare” (p. xiv) but concludes in two hundred years of American history in order the epilogue that the factor is “that indefinable to achieve our goal.” Their goal was to research something.” (p. 169) He has not told the reader and highlight what they considered the govern- how to recognize the fighter pilot who pos- ment’s shabby treatment of Vietnam veterans sesses the “inborn” portion nor how to help complaining of the aftereffects of contact with that young man obtain the “learned” portion of Agent Orange. It was in placing these contem- the ace factor. porary events in their historic context that the Other books by or about fighter aces give the writers discovered a pattern of unexpected reader a better sense of the attributes that make consistency. great aces of a few fighter pilots. Dedication to As the writers’ research pointed out, young the task of learning about fighter tactics, American men and women have, on many oc- weapons, aircraft, forces, and pilots is neces- casions, heeded their nation's call to arms and sary for the would-be ace. South African group marched off to very uncertain futures amidst captain “Sailor” Malan, a 35-victory ace in the the sound of pious rhetoric and promises of jus- Second World War, in the ninth of his 10 rules, tice and reward for their sacrifice. They soon and Col Raymond F. Toliver and Trevor J. Con- found out that the nation’s gratitude rarely ex- stable, in the first chapter of Fighter Aces, men- tended to them after the war was over or after tion characteristics that provide better guidance they left service. Severo and Milford mustered for individual fighter pilots and for air forces in an impressive body of evidence spanning two trying to create aces than does an indefinable centuries of conflicts from Shay’s rebellion af- single ace factor. ter the American Revolution, the draft riots Maj Thomas Bradley, USAF during the Civil War, abominable treatment of Maxwell AFB. Alabama diseased soldiers returning from Cuba at the turn of the century, to government stonewalling after the Vietnam War. They encountered ex- ample after example of neglect, broken prom- ises. lies, and hostility. Nor is the guilt that of the government alone. The authors argue con- vincingly that the military services themselves The Wages of War When America’s Soldiers and even common citizens have reacted to the Came Home— From Valley Forge to Vietnam fighting men with almost incomprehensible in- by Richard Severo and Lewis Milford. New sensitivity and ingratitude. Needless to say. the York 10020: Simon and Schuster, 1989, book should be of sobering interest to those in, 495 pages. $21.95. or formerly in, uniform. Three lusty cheers and a kyrie eleison (“Lord, The Wages of War should be read by all mili- have mercy”) to Severo and Milford. This un- tary personnel. If you wish to serve, do it for likely team of a New York Times journalist and love of country and devotion to duty. Protect a conservation attorney has written one of the your loved ones and your way of life. As Severo most emotionally compelling and convincing and Milford have so ably pointed out, do not defenses of the common soldier ever written. It expect great thanks and greater glory for the is a politically charged, angry, indignant, and to effort. More than anything else, the book my mind left-leaning book that contrasts the should serve as a healthy antidote to recruiting soldier's self-sacrifice in war with his all-too- that focuses so heavily on the material compen- often disgraceful treatment when he came sation for what should be nearly sacred duty. home. 1 don't care about their politics. Severo Hopefully the book can contribute in some wav and Milford present the case for veterans’ rights to the end of the military "me generation." with a fury and conviction born of overwhelm- Maj Bill Nikides, USAF ing evidence. Langley AFB. Virginia NET ASSESSMENT 91

Red Army by Ralph Peters. New York 10020: the Kremlin. Interestingly, the only avowed Simon and Schuster. 1989. 337 pages, $18.95. Communist in the book, the political officer in the doomed airborne unit, overcomes his fears and becomes a real soldier and leader when he This superb book is by far the best of the has to take the place of fallen officers in his Soviet-invasion-of-Western-Europe-type novels unit. His suicide is the result of his being a part started by Sir John Hackett’s The Third World of the Communist party structure. As it be- War. It is refreshingly well written, free of the comes apparent that NATO forces will retake pages of acronyms and technological rapture the town, he realizes that he will, as the politi- that plague many of the more recent military cal officer, be held responsible for the slaughter novels. Like Stephen Crane and James Webb, of a group of British prisoners. whose Red Badge of Courage and Fields of Fire. Red Army is an emotionally difficult book to respectively, are among the finest military nov- read. The good guys do not win in the end. The els ever written. Ralph Peters knows that the final scene in the book is of the Soviet marshal men who fight the wars, not their gadgets, are watching American helicopters cover the with- the proper focus of literature. drawal of American armor units to their cease- What makes this book so fascinating is that it fire positions. Peters is not afraid to raise diffi- is written entirely from the Soviet perspective. cult questions. In the other books of this genre. We get an intimate glimpse of life in the Soviet NATO always wins. It is always a close thing, army, from the front commander to two hapless but we manage to pull it off in the end. Here conscript privates who spend the war hiding. the close thing is an American counterattack The author’s exhaustive knowledge of the So- that almost succeeds. The Soviets are going to viet military is evident in every page. There is be tough opponents. Peters knows this. The indeed much to learn from this entertaining reader is not allowed the usual comfort of the novel. The front commander's preattack brief- oft-repeated '“weaknesses” of the Soviet army. ing to the front commanders, as well as the Spetsnaz and the operational maneuver group plan's execution throughout the book do more concept give lie to the stereotype of the plod- to bring an understanding of the Soviet concept ding, unimaginative Soviet soldier. We get no of the operational maneuver group to life than comfort there. Their equipment may be inferior any textbook could. Listening to the Soviet to ours, but they have lots of it and, more im- commander and his chief of staff discuss the lo- portant, the will to use it. Technology does not gistical problems they are encountering due to come to the rescue either. In Peters’s novel as NATO’s bombing of the resupply systems—as in life, there is no deus ex machina to ensure a an air raid is taking place—is just one of the happy ending. We should neither underesti- reasons this novel is so interesting. mate the Soviets, nor project our way of think- Red Army is also a profoundly challenging ing on them. The stakes are far too high to book as well. Peters does such a good job of indulge in wistful thinking. Ralph Peters’s building empathy that the reader can find him- thought-provoking book should be read by self immersed in the Soviet viewpoint. The every officer. characters in the novel are real people, not one- dimensional figures. The reader can relate to Capt Kevin Shannahan, USAF them easily: they are portrayed as men much Castle AFli. California like us. We grow to know the characters as people—the airborne commander whose expe- riences in Afghanistan as a young officer shaped him forever, the artillery commander Passchendaele: The Tragic Victory of 1917 by whose pride in his craft goes back to the Impe- Philip Warner. New York 10022: Atheneum rial Russian Army. Some the reader will like Press. 1988, 269 pages, $24.95. and respect. Even the most hardened combat veteran read- That is what makes this superb novel so chal- ing this, Philip Warner’s vivid 17th war vol- lenging and useful to the military reader. It has ume, will agree that Passchendaele was proba- been said that the final step in maturity is un- bly the most extraordinary and macabre battle derstanding an opposing viewpoint—and why of World War I. It began on a low-lying Belgian it is held. Red Army does just that. The Soviets’ plain that had been reclaimed from swampland motivations are a mixture of professional pride by an intricate system of dikes and canals. and a recurring idea that they were fighting for Ceaseless bombardments and rain turned most Russia, regardless of the current occupants of of the battlefield into a deep, slimy muck. The 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1990

Allies alone lost 90,000 men who were never pects prevalent in World War II. Wolfe has accounted for, having been swallowed up by done an admirable and thorough job. the morass. The polluted, liquid mud was so Wolfe provides the reader with the history of difficult to traverse that duckboard “roads” the 81st TCS through both the unit diaries and (zeroed in by German guns) were necessary to the veterans’ own statements about various as- bring up replacements. Finally seeing the bat- pects of the unit’s operations and life. From the tlefield, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the unit’s formation and training in the United British chief of staff, wept as he exclaimed, States to its movement across the Atlantic to “Did we really send men to fight in this?” Britain and later to France, one gets a feel for Warner uses eyewitness accounts to portray the excitement of the young men as they ven- the incredible lack of understanding by head- ture into new lands, training, combat, and quarters staff members of the conditions and transport missions. The reader not only “expe- their continuing efforts in the face of failure. riences” the C-47s but also gains useful insights The book’s comprehensiveness and careful ac- into the aerial dimension of the ground war be- curacy make it an important source for subse- cause of the gliders they towed. quent analyses of military leadership. The On the human side, the reader is made a reader is impressed that few of the objectives party to the distinction and status problems en- assigned by the generals could ever have been countered by the TCS personnel. Were the achieved without the bravery of individual sol- glider pilots infantry or air force? What was it diers. particularly recipients of the Victoria like to be treated differently than powered- Cross. aircraft pilots? What were the feelings about the The battle was further distinguished by the rank issues? Were TCS pilots second rate to story of the mining of Messines Ridge, which fighter and bomber pilots? Status played a role culminated in the detonation of a million among enlisted, too. Rank came quickly for pounds of explosive. The blast, which tore some, but the stripes came slower for the tech- apart virtually impregnable German defenses, nical NCOs who arrived later in the unit. All was heard in London. this is discussed years later with less rancor but The text is preceded by three chapters of his- still with some feeling. The risks and respon- torical background that set the stage for the sibilities taken seem to demand something reader who is unfamiliar with “the war” and its other than a third-class status. context. It is supplemented by useful footnotes Wolfe describes the supply, maintenance, and by several chapters that describe the bat- and administrative side of running the organi- tlefield today and the plight of support person- zation, especially since there were so few ca- nel, trench soldiers, and the German reer personnel to do these tasks. The citizen air- adversaries. men did not do too badly. Some luck rode with Warner's definitive work makes fascinating them, to be sure. They did seem to fit into the reading and should be included in any short “Great Crusade” and did their tasks well. The World War I bibliography. author devotes considerable space to showing Maj Thomas C. Blow II, USAF the TCS side of airborne operations since other Beale AFB. California historians have found it easy to blame all air- borne catastrophes on these brash and young kids. Pages are devoted to the missions and the contribution, in a results-oriented sense, of the Green Light! Men of the 81st Troop Carrier troop carriers. The airdrops and glider opera- Squadron Tell Their Story by Martin Wolfe. tions of Normandy. Operation Market Garden, Philadelphia 19104: University of Pennsyl- Southern France, the dash across France, the vania Press, 1989, 498 pages, $36.95. Battle of the Bulge, and the operation to cross the Rhine are all carefully examined and evalu- An emeritus historian from the University of ated from the TCS perspective. Pennsylvania’s history department who was The book is interesting. The reader will get also a former radio operator in the 81st Troop the feel of changing engines, cursing the lack of Carrier Squadron (TCS) has written a unit his- self-sealing fuel tanks when tracers are rising tory with a difference. Being a historian, the au- from the ground toward the aircraft, the terror thor evaluates some of the controversies that of trying to get the glider into a small field surrounded airborne operations, the reactions when several others have the same thought, to various aspects of the war from the TCS going into town on pass, undergoing venereal viewpoint, and the technical/organizational as- disease inspections at 0500, and living in a tent

notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncom- mercial nature should be sent to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Bldg 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

Air University Review Index bama. Grants up to $2,500 are available for qualified applicants who will visit the center The Air University Press is in the process of for research during fiscal year 1991. Applicants publishing a complete index of the Air Univer- must have a graduate degree in history or sity Review (1947-1987). This reference work related fields, or equivalent scholarly accom- will contain an author index, a title index, and plishments. Their specialty should be in aero- a cross-referenced subject index. Any Air Force nautics, astronautics, or other military-related or other government organization, college or areas. A wide variety of military-related topics university library, or similar organization with may be covered in the proposed research. Pref- a need for this index can be placed on distribu- erence will be given to those proposals that tion. Requests for distribution and other involve the use of primary sources held at the inquiries should be addressed to Maj M. A. center. Applicants may request an application Kirtland, AUCADRE/RI, Walker Hall, Bldg from the commander, USAF Historical Re- 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Major search Center, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6678. Kirtland can also be contacted at DSN 875-6629 The deadline for submission of applications is or (205) 293-6629. 31 October 1990.

Historical Research Center Grants Army Aviation Convention The United States Air Force Historical Research The Army Aviation Association of America Center (USAFHRC) has announced the avail- will hold its annual convention from 10-14 ability of research grants to encourage scholars April 1991 in Saint Louis, Missouri. For more to study the history of air power through the information contact AAAA, 49 Richmondville use of the center’s US Air Force historical doc- Avenue. Westport CT 06880-2000 or call (2031 ument collection, located at Maxwell AFB, Ala- 226-8184.

94 contributors

Headquarters Air University and as a fac- ulty member at Squadron Officer School (SOS). At Headquarters USAF. he was chief of the Professional Education Pro- **<*•» #» grams Branch and the Joint Personnel Policy Branch, deputy chief of staff. Per- sonnel. Colonel Ullman is an award-win- T 5 ning graduate of Air War College and a e distinguished graduate of SOS and Air ' Command and Staff College. ** w Tf ■A- 0 *

Lt Col James P. DeLoughry (BA. Manhattan College: MA, University of Lancaster. Jen Merrill A. McPeak (BA. San Diego United Kingdom) is chief. Intelligence Itate College: MA. George Washington Division. 1st Tactical Fighter Wing. University) is chief of staff of the US Air Langley AFB. Virginia. He has worked on *orce. A career fighter pilot, he has com- several Mideast crisis teams at the Pen- manded at nearly every operational level: tagon and was assigned as a Mideast politi- light, squadron, group, wing and num- cal-military analyst at Headquarters US ered air force. He has also served as an ae- European Command. Stuttgart. West Ger- on officer on the Air Staff: ACOS. Current many. Colonel DeLoughry is a graduate of tperations. AAFCE: chief of staff. USAFE: Air War College and Armed Forces Staff •CS. Plans. TAC: and DCS. Programs and College. esources. USAF. He was commander in bief. Pacific Air Forces. Hickam AFB. awaii. when President George Bush nom- lated him to his current position. General (cPeak is a graduate of the Armed Forces taff College and the National War College. Lt Col Frank W. Jennings, USAFR. Retired, has had various civilian jobs during his 38 years of Civil Service. He was editor of the semimonthly Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, known throughout the Air Force as the "Blue Letter.” for more than a quarter of a century. Colonel Jennings served as chief of policy and programs. Internal Information Division. Office of Public Affairs, in the Office of the Sec- retary of the Air Force.

Capt Edward B. Westermann (USAFA) is an exchange instructor helicopter pilot with the German Air Force. Ahlhorn German Air Force Base. Federal Republic of Germany. He has been selected for a master's degree sponsorship by the Col Bruce L. UJlman (BS. Rutgers Uni- •rsitv: MA. New York University: MPA. Department of History at the US Air Force Academy. Captain Westermann has uburn University at Montgomery) is signed to the Tactical Air Combat Opera- published in Approach magazine and the MAC He is a distinguished graduate Jns Center at Langley AFB. Virginia. He Flyer. is also served as assistant chief of staff at of the US Air Force Academy and the Defense Language Institute.

95 CANT WAIT TO ORDER THE AIRPOWER JOURNAL??? NOW YOU CAN PLACE YOUR ORDER BY PHONE AND CHARGE IT!!! By calling (202) 783-3238, you can order a subscription to the Airpower Journal, ISSN: 0897-0823, stock number 708-007-00000-5, and charge it to your MasterCard or Visa card. Subscriptions are $9.50 annually ($11.90 for international mail). If you prefer, you can mail your order to the Superintendent of Docu- ments, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402. Payment by check, money order, or credit card is acceptable. If you pay by credit card, be sure to include your card number and type (MasterCard or Visa), expiration date, and your signature for authorization. Col Kenneth ). Alnwick, USAF. Retired. Kapos Associates Lt Col Donald R. Baucom. USAF, Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr.. USAF. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Military Airlift Command Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF, Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR. Retired, Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn. Chief, Office of Air Force History

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823), Air Force Recurring Publication 30-2. is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available from the Superin- tendent ol Documents, US Government Printing Office. Washington DC 20402. Annual rates are S9.5G domestic and Si 1.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal. Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB At. 36112-5532. Submit double- spaced. typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are DSN 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322.