Thesis submitted to EUROPE, LISBON, AND the board or examiners in partial fulfillment THE SECURITY- of the degree of Master of Arts in DEVELOPMENT NEXUS Conflict and Development
Gerben Willem van Dijk 01009060 Universiteit Gent 3rd of Augustus 2011
Promotor: Dr. J. Adam
Date of Submission: 3rd of August 2011
Program trajectory followed: (traditional) Thesis Writing
Word Count: 24.953
1 Table of Contents | G.W. van Dijk
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ...... 2 List of Abbreviations ...... 4 Abstract ...... 5 General Introduction ...... 7 Methodology ...... 9 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus ...... 10 1.1. Introduction ...... 10 1.1.1. Central Argument ...... 11 1.1.2. Background ...... 11 1.1.3. Analysis ...... 14 1.2. What Policy Implications? ...... 15 1.2.1. Policy options ...... 15 1.2.2. Analysis ...... 19 1.3. Operationalization ...... 20 1.3.1. The United Kingdom ...... 20 1.3.2. The Netherlands ...... 21 1.3.3. Canada ...... 23 1.4. Criticism ...... 24 1.5. Conclusion ...... 26 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty ...... 29 2.1. Introduction ...... 29 2.2. Discourse: Talking the Talk ...... 30 2.2.1. Development ...... 31 2.2.2. Security ...... 32 2.3. Walking the Walk? Organisational Background ...... 33 2.3.1. European Security ...... 33 2.3.2. European Development...... 35 2.4. Pre Lisbon: integration, coordination, subjugation? ...... 38 2.4.1. CMCO ...... 38 2.4.2. Institutionalization ...... 40 3.5. The money ...... 44 3.6. The missions ...... 45
G.W. van Dijk | Table of Contents 2
3.7. Conclusion ...... 46 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty ...... 50 3.1. Introduction ...... 50 3.2. Background of the Lisbon Treaty...... 51 3.2.1. The nexus in rhetoric post Lisbon? ...... 52 3.3. Changes under Lisbon ...... 54 3.3.1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy ...... 55 3.3.2. The European External Action Service ...... 56 3.3.3. DG DEVCO ...... 59 3.4. ECHO ...... 61 3.5. Conclusion ...... 63 General Conclusion ...... 67 Bibliography ...... 72 Appendix ...... 78 Appendix 1: Chances and risks of development – military co-operation from the perspective ...... 78 Appendix 2: Institutional organization of the CFSP/ESDP ...... 79 Appendix 3 : The European Commission and development assistance ...... 80 Appendix 4: Overview of ESDP missions between 2003 – 2009 ...... 81 Appendix 5: Chart of ESDP mission between 2003 – 2009 ...... 81 Appendix 5: Justification for budget of the European Union before the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty ...... 82 Appendix 6: Justification for budget of the European Union after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty ...... 85 Appendix 7 : Explanation of placing funds, institutions and positions...... 87
3 Table of Contents | G.W. van Dijk
List of Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific AIDCO EuropeAid Cooperation Office APF African Peace Facility CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CHG Civilian Headline Goal CHOD Chiefs of Defense CIMIC Civil Military Coordination CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management CMCO Civil Military Coordination COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CPCC Civil Planning and Conduct Capability DCI Development Cooperation Instrument DDR Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration DGDEV Directorate General for Development DG DEVCO Directorate General EuropeAID Development and Cooperation ECHO Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission ECJ European Court of Justice EC European Commission EDC European Defense Community EDF European Development Fund EEAS European External Action Service ESDP European Security and Defense Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EUMS European Union Military Staff EUMC European Union Military Committee EUSR European Union Special Representative FAC Foreign Affairs Council FPI Foreign Policy Instruments (Service) GAC General Affairs Council GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council HR/SG High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy/Secretary General of the Council of the European Union (old style) HR/VC High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice President of the Council of the European Union (new style) ifS Instrument for Stability NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OCT Overseas Countries and Territories ODA Official Development Cooperation OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PDC Policy Coherence for Development PSC Political Security Committee RELEX Directorate General for External Relations SSR Security Sector Reform TEU Treaty on European Union WEU Western European Union WUDO Western Union Defense Organization
G.W. van Dijk | List of Abbreviations 4
Abstract
On the 1st of December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty came into effect after all European Union member states had ratified the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty has been the last major institutional reform of the Union, and as such, completed a process that was started in Nice almost 10 years before. With the Union being the largest international donor of development assistance, and increasingly working on security affairs as well, the major institutional reforms included in the Lisbon Treaty provide for a timely analysis of the manner in which the Union has organized the interaction between its security and its development policy.
The link between security and development was one of the founding logics of the European Union itself. As economic integration preceded socio-economic development, armed conflict between the member states has become increasingly difficult to imagine. And this on a continent that has seen so many armed conflicts, two of which spiraled into world wars. With it being only a mere 65 years ago when war last devastated the continent, the premises that development and security go hand in hand has been firmly established in the European consciousness.
This research deals with the extent to which the European Union has adopted the logic of the security-development nexus, a theory which states that security and development policy, due to their impact on one another, should be organized in a holistic manner. Subsequently we examine the organizational direction the operationalization of the nexus has had within the European Union, based on a theoretical framework we develop in the first chapter of this thesis.
On the basis of an qualitative exploration of the Union‟s organization before and after the Lisbon Treaty, supplemented with a quantitative analysis of the EU‟s budget, we find that the European Union has indeed adopted the security-development logic. Furthermore we find that compared to the situation prior to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty the European Union has given more weight (and especially, more funds) to an increasingly integrated manner of interaction between its security and development policy. Furthermore, we find that „after Lisbon‟ security has become more important to the Union compared to development assistance, but has not trumped it yet.
5 Abstract | G.W. van Dijk
“Europe cannot confine itself to the cultivation of its own garden.” King Juan Carlos I of Spain
G.W. van Dijk | Abstract 6
“Development is crucial for collective and individual long-term security: they are complementary agendas and neither is subordinate to the other” (European Commission 2005:81)
General Introduction
On the 1st of December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty came into effect after all European Union member states had ratified the Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty has been the last major institutional reform of the Union, and as such, completed a process that was started in Nice almost 10 years ago. With the Union being the largest international donor of development assistance, and increasingly working on security affairs as well, the major institutional reforms included in the Lisbon Treaty provide for a timely analysis of the manner in which the Union has organized the interaction between its security and its development policy.
The link between security and development was one of the founding logics of the European Union itself. As economic integration preceded socio-economic development armed conflict between the member states has become increasingly difficult to imagine. And that on a continent that has seen so many armed conflicts, two of which spiraled into world wars. With it being only a mere 65 years ago when war last devastated the continent, the premises that development and security go hand in hand has been firmly established in the European consciousness.
There exists a large quantity of literature on the necessity and manner in which this interaction between security and development policy is necessary, how it can be arranged, and what potential dangers stem from a „wrong‟ kind of organization. This body of literature is known as the „security-development nexus‟. As will be discovered below, there have been increasingly calls for closer cooperation between the two policy fields, as it is repeated again and again that there cannot be security without development, and there cannot be development without security.
This mantra, about which more below, has had an incredible impact on the manner the interaction between the traditionally different policy fields has been organized. Some of the goals that are aimed for are increased effectiveness and increased efficiency in external relations of states, and as will be discussed below, international organizations, including the European Union. However, the paradigm has not been without its fair share of criticism, mostly based on the fear that one policy field (development) will be subjugated to another (security).
In this thesis, we will discuss the direction of and manner in which the European Union has organized the interaction between its security and development policy. This will require
7 General Introduction | G.W. van Dijk thorough analysis of the European policies, and furthermore the ability to place these developments along a time continuum. Our guiding question subsequently will be:
To what extent has the European Union adopted the security-development nexus and what direction has the operationalization of the nexus in the Union‟s foreign policy taken?
In order to answer this question this thesis contains three chapters; each in turn divided into three sections. In the first chapter the aim will be to create a searchlight operationalization of the security-development nexus theory. We do this by first sketching the background against which the theory was developed. The key different phases‟ of this development will be identified. Subsequently we will home in on the core theoretic axioms of the theory and the policy implications that stem from the theory. Finally we discuss how these implications have been implemented by 3 countries.
Having thus created a frame of reference, in the second chapter close attention is paid to the organization of the relevant policy areas of the European Union prior to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. We start the second chapter with analyzing the European Union‟s discourse on the security-development nexus by reviewing various policy documents. Subsequently we look into the evolution of European external policy through the security- development nexus lens, up to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty.
In the last part of this thesis we shine light upon the changes encapsulated in the Lisbon Treaty. We do this by first introducing the Treaty and the path that led to its eventual ratification. We also reestablish the rhetoric commitment by the Union to the nexus. The core of this third chapter is the discussion of the institutional reform of the external action of the Union due to the Lisbon Treaty. Closing of this third chapter we reflect on potential future steps the Union could take in relation to the security-development nexus.
After having created the theoretical framework in the first chapter, having discussed its applicability to the Union prior to the Lisbon Treaty, and subsequently its applicability after the treaty, we are able to answer our guiding question. This final extensive analysis to the direction the Union is taking with regard to the organization of its external action in relation to the security-development nexus is presented in the general conclusion of this thesis, which will also include an analysis of future obstacles and opportunities for the Union.
G.W. van Dijk | General Introduction 8
Methodology
The methodology, or way of doing things in this thesis stems from the general aim envisioned by this research: to increasing the knowledge of the manner in which the European Union‟s external action is organized and to be able to understand the direction this organization is taking. Stemming from this aim we adopted two strands along which this general aim will be researched.
First we will establish the theoretic frame of which we want to know the extent of, and understand the manner in which, the European Union has adopted it. This theoretic frame has been built on the basis of an extensive literature research. This literature research was based on the method proposed by Baarda, de Goede and Teunissen (2005) and follows a „snowball‟-accumulation strategy, meaning that the references made in the first text lead to the second and so forth. From this research we derive a model created by Bueger and Vennossen which we adopt and adapt for the visual representation of our findings.
Subsequently, the theoretical frame established in the first part of this thesis functions as a „searchlight theory‟ (Baarda, de Goede and Teunissen (2005:43) through which we examine the organization of the interaction between security and development of three relevant countries which have been chosen on the basis of their prominence in the subject literature. This review leads us to convey a frame of reference from which we derive three categories which sensitizes our research of the European Union. This means that the theoretic frame will be used as a lens through which we analyze the developments within the European Union and thus determine which phenomenon are of interest. These are subsequently presented in a table derived from the frame of reference based on the analysis of the three countries mentioned above.
The research is focused around a watershed event (the Lisbon Treaty) which allows us to compare the organization of the relevant policy fields of the EU in the „before‟ and „after‟ situation. This allows us to draw conclusions about the direction the Union is heading towards in relation to the theoretic framework. By understanding this „motion‟ we will be able, in the conclusion, to look forward to what might lie ahead for the European Union.
The two strands along which we analyze the European Union‟s organization include a discourse analysis on the one hand, and a review of institutional reforms on the other which is supplemented by an analysis of the European Union‟s budget. The discourse analysis is specifically focused on policy documents stemming from the EU. Furthermore, due to the topicality of the subject this will be supplemented with reports of interviews of high officials in the relevant sectors as well as (electronic) newspaper articles.
The key policy documents are identified by cross referencing in relevant (recent) academic literature. Secondly, regarding the analysis of the organizational reform we base our research on an extensive examination of primary recourses, academic articles as well as secondary resources in order to sharpen the analysis.
9 Methodology | G.W. van Dijk
Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus
1.1. Introduction
As was stated previously, this thesis is concerned with the direction of and manner in which the European Union has organized the interaction between its security and development policy. In order to get a clear idea about this we first need to understand what the fundamental philosophical basis of such an approach entails and what would be its historical groundings. The main underlying theory supporting such an approach has been identified as what has become known as the security-development nexus. To get a grasp of this theory this first chapter is devoted to understanding its underlying paradigms.
From the start it should be mentioned that, as with many concepts in the field op social- political sciences, the existence of a nexus between security and development means many different things to many different people. This chapter will thus try to touch upon these different underlying axioms, implications, and manners of operationalization. The question guiding us in this first chapter subsequently is:
How has the security-development nexus developed and what policy implications flow from it?
In order to come to a clear understanding of these paradigms this chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section we will investigate the historical roots of the concept. We will briefly address some of the key documents and analyse the context in which the concept was promoted and thus create a theoretical background for the study of the European Union‟s policies.
Subsequently, we will analyse the policy implications stemming from the concept in order to create the previously mentioned „searchlight theory‟ through which we later on will analyse the European Union‟s organization of its security and development policy. Furthermore we will discuss three examples presented by Bueger and Vennesson of how security and development have become entangled in recent years in order to come to a model of the manner in which the different policy fields have been made to interact which will subsequently be used in our analysis of the European Union.
Finally, we will take a look at how different countries have adopted and operationalized the concept in their foreign actions in order to create a frame of reference for our analysis of the European Union. Three countries will get special attention: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Canada. These countries have been chosen because they form the avant- garde with regard to operationalizing the security-development nexus.
We end this chapter by introducing some of the criticism and problems that have been identified in relation to the security-development nexus. These include substantial problems with regard to the causality between security and development as well as the possibility of one policy area (development) becoming subjugated to the other (security).
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 10
1.1.1. Central Argument
To give a clear starting point for this chapter on the nexus between security and development a paragraph is inserted here that reflects the central argument of the concept. Simply put, the central argument can be summarized as the notion that there can be no development without security and no security without development. A famous quote by the World Bank explains the nexus in the following way:
“War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles. Where development succeeds, countries become progressively safer from violent conflict, making subsequent development easier. Where development fails, countries are at high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war.”(World Bank 2003:1)
However, it should be noted that it is problematic to think of „security‟ and „development‟ as strictly different „things‟. The danger of reification is lurking. For example, Frances Steward noted that security is an aspect of development. (Stewart 2004:261) Later on in this chapter we will further address some of the difficulties stemming from this problem. However, having formulated the central interpretation of the nexus, we can now take a look at the historical development of the concept.
1.1.2. Background
In 2006 Neclâ Tschirgi noted that:
“The necessity of linking security and development has become a policy mantra. From the United Nations to the African Union, from the US National Security Strategy of September 2002 to Canada‟s 2005 International Policy Statement, from academic institutions to operational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there are vigorous calls for integrating security and development perspectives and policies.” (Tschirgi 2006:41)
But how has this mantra developed? Here we will uncover the historical formulation of how the concept of a nexus between security and development has been a phased process. The exact occasion when it was first recognised as such is difficult to identify. Roughly speaking, the development of the concept can be divided into three historical periods. The first stretching from the end of the second World War to the end of the Cold War, the second from the end of the Cold War to the start of the War on Terror, and the third period stretching from the start of the War on Terror up until now.
World War Two to End of Cold War
Traditionally the identification of the nexus between security and development has been seen as a phenomenon that only surfaced after the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent end of the Cold War. However, the ideas underlying the current nexus go back at least as far as the end of the Second World War. Indeed it could be argued that the very creation of
11 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk international development assistance as we now know it finds its origin in international security concerns, but this is a discussion for another time. Jude Howell notes that “Foreign aid has always been part of donor states‟ soft approach to pursuing foreign policy, military and commercial objectives.” (Howell 2006:123) In accordance with this, Nicholas Waddell notes that “links between security policy and development policy have, in varying forms and degrees, been ever-present but have ebbed and flowed according to changing geo-political trends.” (Waddell 2006:534)
One of the first foreign policy programs based on the security-development nexus rationale often noted in the literature is the development aid presented by the United States to various war effected (western) European states, which became known as the Marshall plan (officially the European Recovery Program). Although we should not discount the honest humanitarian concerns America had with regard to the fate of Europe, it is clear that the plan also had a political aim in preventing the rise of communism which by that time had been identified as a security-threat to the United States.
One of the clearest identifications of the links between (national) security and development and the subsequent coordination of various fields of external policy stems from 1950, when American political scientist H.D. Lasswell noted that: “Our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the coordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information and economics”. (Lasswell 1950:75)
This trend of development aid allocation not being free from political preference as such thus holds the roots of the security-development nexus. The Marshall plan was far from the only aid project during the Cold War to keep friendly regimes in power. This trend forms the base from which later aid again is politicized and securitized, during the period following the terrorist attacks on the 9th of September 2001.
End of the Cold War – Beginning War on Terror
The second period crucial for the conceptualization of the security-development nexus came with the crumbling of the Soviet Union. Many authors note this period as the actual period during which the nexus was first developed. (Tschirgi, Lund, Mancini, Waddell, Bueger, and Vennesson) For example the last two mentioned, Bueger and Vennesson claim that “Since the beginning of the 1990s, major international organizations and governments have emphasized the nexus between security and development and underlined the need to link security and development policies.” (Bueger and Vennesson 2009:3)
The imperatives during this period were clearly different from what they had been during the Cold War. It would seem that development aid was depoliticized somewhat and was further recognised as a goal in itself. Indeed development became the leading imperative, and (civil) war was identified as a central danger to this development. Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini note that: “the call for greater convergence between security and development policies emerged in response to the complex and interlocking humanitarian, human rights,
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 12 security; and development crises that confronted international policymakers in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.” (Tschirgi, Lund, and Mancini 2010:5)
The new focus during the period directly following the Cold War can be better understood when we look at the changing interpretations on the causes of war that arose during this period (famously called „new wars‟ by Mary Kaldor.) As overhauling ideological differences nor proxy-war theory could any longer explain the existence of conflicts new theories arose. These included Paul Collier and Auke Hoefler‟s „greed‟ model as well as the so called „grievance‟ model. 1
The nexus was also strengthened by the 1992 „Agenda for Peace‟, written by the then secretary general Boutrou-Boutous Gali. A final key publication placing the nexus between the two concepts was the 1999 book written by Mary Anderson, Do no Harm, which in its introduction pointy stated that:
“When international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict. Although aid agencies often seek to be neutral or nonpartisan toward the winners and losers of a war, the impact of their aid is not neutral regarding whether conflict worsens or abates. When given in conflict settings, aid can reinforce, exacerbate, and prolong the conflict; it can also help to reduce tensions and strengthen people‟s capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems.” (Anderson 1999:1)
Thus during the period directly following the Cold War, the nexus between security and development was openly recognised and adopted by international institutions mainly because of the newly found humanitarian space as international politics where no longer subject to superpower competition. Furthermore; it was recognized that the two concepts where linked so that one could not be worked on without taken the other into consideration. Furthermore, development aid was less of a political tool in comparison to what it had been before: thus development became a goal in itself instead of a foreign policy tool.
War on Terror – Now
Notwithstanding the earlier identification of the nexus between security and development, the majority of publications and the actual operationalization of the concept did not occur until after a watershed event: the terrorist attacks of 9 September 2001. Although some of the reorientation of development in general and security in specific can be seen as a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks, the changes taking place after 2001 cannot be exclusively explained as a consequence of these attacks.
In trying to explain the events of 9 September, next to religious fanaticism, one of the more structural factors identified was underdevelopment. Waddell explains that:
1 The essence being that grievances between different identity groups arise over socio-political- economic deprivation. 13 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk
“Underdevelopment has become re-problematized and is now seen to carry acute security implications for Western states. Since 9/11 in particular, there has been a reappraisal of the ramifications for Western homeland concerns, and for global security at large, of erstwhile „foreign‟ malaise and instability.” (Waddell 2006:537)
Thus this phase of the conceptualisation of the nexus refocused aid within what we have previously already identified as the central argument behind development aid during the Cold War: national security. Indeed, not only were security and development linked in countries far away, it became apparent that underdevelopment elsewhere might pose a security threat to the West. Howell expresses this sentiment in the following way: “In the field of development the global war on terror has highlighted the strategic relevance of foreign aid to both national interests and global security at a time when its ideological rationale in the post-Cold War era had almost disappeared.” (Howell 2006:121)
However, we should not see this most recent phase of the formulation of the security- development nexus simply as happening to the development sector. Indeed, Howell for examples points out the fact that even though development organizations were perhaps more limited in the ways they allocate their funds, their budgets increased substantially, if they could reasonably show a link between their work and international security. (Howell 2006:124)
This also led to the identification not only of underdevelopment as a security threat but also to reversing the logic: thus proposing conflict as a threat to development. For example, Chant and McIlwaine note that: “Critically important have been the attacks of „9/11‟ and „7/7‟ in 2001 and 2005 respectively, the „War on Terror‟ and the recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Linked with these, as well as other conflicts around the world, it is now acknowledged that war, conflict and violence are important development issues.” (Chant and McIlwaine 2008:52)
Thus the interaction between the two phenomenon was established and coordinated actions were subsequently promoted by for example the World Bank in its 2003 Breaking the Conflict Trap Civil War and Development Policy, which we already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, as well as by the then secretary general of the United Nations Kofi Annan‟s report to the General Assembly in March 2005. (Howell 2006:124)
1.1.3. Analysis
When we reflect on the history of the security-development nexus, we identified three different periods that where crucial in the development of the concept. When analysing these different phases it becomes apparent that the concept‟s content has changed over the years. Directly after the Second World War the coordination of the various policy fields was used by the United States in aiding the reconstruction of Europe. As discussed, the focus during this process was preventing the European states from sliding into the Soviet camp.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 14
Secondly, after the Cold War and the crumbling of the Soviet Empire, former Soviet-aligned states subsequently lost their aid sponsor. Filling this aid gap became a priority in preventing the eruption of various civil-wars and thus strengthening the American led „New World Order‟. Also, with the loss of the ideological underpinning of development aid compared to the Cold War, conflict was identified as a danger to development, which in turn was conceptualized more broadly and people-focussed.
Thirdly, after the events of 9-11, underdevelopment was once again identified as a danger to western national security. This gave development aid a new ideological imperative which it had not had during the years directly following the Cold War. Also, during this period, following the realisation of the links between security and development, increasingly calls were made to coordinate aid, security, and foreign policy. What this would look like from the security-development nexus is the next issue we will look into.
Today the core of the nexus can be summarized as follows: in many war-torn societies the processes of conflict and development are linked. As (economic) development seems a prerequisite for increasing security, but at the same time, improved security seems mandatory in order to create the situation necessary to stimulate (economic) development.
1.2. What Policy Implications?
Having discussed the historical development of the security-development nexus it becomes time to look at how the concept‟s underlying theory has been given shape and from that, how the concept has been operationalized in actual policy. To that end we will first discuss what policy implications have been suggested from the perspective of the identified nexus. Furthermore, we will briefly look at three theoretical frames which build on, or incorporate, the nexus. The specific aim being to create a model in which we can subsequently analyse the European Union‟s approach in the next chapters.
First it needs to be recalled that the nexus, partly due to the long historical development as well as the various actors that have been involved in shaping the paradigm, means many different things to many different people. When we go over the different conceptualizations this will become apparent, but in the final analysis of this section we will return to this point.
1.2.1. Policy options
As can be distilled from the previous section, the identification of the linkages between security and development have also had their repercussions for the way international action should be conducted. In a policy recommendation paper published by the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs it is noted that:
„This basic premise of the coherent approach is that all activities aimed at promoting security and development should be harmonised with one another, even if they are implemented in different phases. Reconstruction and sustainable development activities can only be successful if the society that they are targeting has achieved a guaranteed minimum level of security and is also making efforts to
15 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk strengthen the rule of law. Establishing a secure environment is primarily the responsibility of the military. However, a military „victory‟ does not constitute a political solution, and every military intervention has an – often disruptive – impact on local political relations. (AIV 2009:14)
In a 2009 publication Christian Bueger and Pascal Vennesson argued that there were three „major frameworks‟ that operationalized the linkages between security and development. The three frameworks they identify are Peacebuilding, Human Security, and the War on Terror. Crucially, they note that these frameworks differ in the answer they present to the questions whose security should be focused upon and whether this should be done by coordinating or integrating security and development policy. Here follows a brief review of these different frameworks, based on the publication by Bueger and Vennesson.
Peacebuilding
The concept of peacebuilding was introduced in the period directly following the end of the Cold War, which, as we have seen above, was one of the main periods of increasing attention to the inter-linkages between security and development, substantially based on the larger humanitarian space and the increased possibility that came with it to interpret conflict separate from larger ideological clashes. With the falling away of the Soviet Union and the Cold War rivalry the use of the UN Security Council changed considerably, allowing for a reorientation to more far reaching peace-keeping operations which became known as peace- building missions.
The grounding for the peacebuilding initiative comes from the previous mentioned Agenda for Peace in which Boutrous Boutrous Gali mentioned that peacebuilding missions should seek “to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” (Boutrous Gali 1992:32) Thus showing the focus on post conflict situations which carry a potential for a return to war if the root causes of the conflict were not resolved.
Roland Paris notes that in order to achieve the above mentioned goal described by Boutrous- Gali would involve “a wide variety of international actors – including national relief and development agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions, and other regional and international actors – engaged in a broad range of activities, from disarming former belligerents to providing financial and humanitarian assistance, monitoring and conducting elections, repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure, advising and training security personnel and judicial officials, and even temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country.” (Paris 1997:55) Thus peacebuilding should cover the fields of democratization, reconciliation, rule of law, security sector reform, economic development and governance.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 16
Human Security
The second framework that Bueger and Vennesson identify as stemming from the security- development nexus is Human Security. The concept of Human Security was most famously introduced in the 1994 United Nations Development Project‟s publication Human Development Index the publication stated that:
„The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. […]Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.‟ (UNDP 1994:22)
Notwithstanding the extensive discussions about the problematic operationalization of the framework (see for example Paris 2001) central to the concept is the interpretation of traditional development fields as security threats. Furthermore, the subject of security was changed from the nation state to the human being. This shift has for example, contributed to the signing of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, by 122 states and furthermore to the introduction of the so called Responsibility to Protect.
With regard to the broad definition given by the UNDP of human security, Glasius noted that little difference remained between security and development. Indeed, she states that “it is hard to maintain that there is any distinction left at all between human development and human security. What more would there be for development to achieve once humankind was secure in these seven ways?” (Glasius 2008:33)
Failed States and the War on Terror
The third framework identified by Bueger and Vennesson is what they call the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which was inaugurated after the events of 9-11. What they describe is also known as the „Failed States‟-framework, which, following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon has been formulated as it soon became clear that those responsible had been operating from Afghanistan. Thus within this context it was recognized that, to use a famous quote from the 2002 US National Security Strategy, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” (USA NSS 2002:1)
Without going into the specifics and the complexities of the Failed States framework (for further information on discussion on the different dimensions of state failure see Ignatieff 2002 von Einsiedel 2005, Engberg-Pedersen et al 2008:25, and Menocal 2008) what is important here is to mention that underdevelopment was introduced as a security threat. Thus, as has been mentioned above, development aid was reinvented as a security tool. Indeed, Bueger and Vennesson note that “In the framework there is clearly the idea that
17 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk development activities should be subordinated to the strategic and tactic goals of security thinking due to the construction of state failure as a threat.” (Bueger and Vennesson 2009:21)
Who‟s security and security, how?
The most interesting part of the Bueger and Vennesson article however, is the exercise they perform at the end of their article. They propose that each of the frameworks 2 can be understood from the perspective of who or what is perceived as the necessary object of security, as well as whether the framework supports what they call a divergent (suggesting coordination) or convergent (suggesting integration) set of practices. (Bueger and Vennesson 2009: 21)
In the figure below, Bueger and Vennesson present their interpretation of who or what the different frameworks take to be the referent object of security. It becomes clear they present the broad (wide) interpretations of the Human Security and Peacebuilding as mainly being concerned with the smaller units of analysis in the global south such as groups, peoples, regimes and individuals. With regard to the narrow interpretations of the same frameworks, they argue that these are still mainly concerned with the global south, but with larger units of analysis such as peoples, regimes, states, and regions. Finally, with regard to the Global War on Terror, they note that the object of security is located in the „north‟. Thus the framework is concerned with the security of what are generally considered the OECD member states.
(Source: Bueger and Vennossen 2009:23)
Next to that, the two authors discussed whether the different frameworks support a convergence or a divergence of security and development policy. From the figure inserted below it becomes apparent that they identify a convergence/integration focussed approach
2 What is significant to note here is that the two authors make a difference between the broad and narrow definitions of the Human Security as well as of the Peacebuilding framework. Again, without going into detail here, the discussion on the different frameworks can be found in the already presented literature. Basically it is concerned over the scope of issues that need to be included in the various concepts. With regard to Human Security for example, Francis Steward has argued that education should be included as a key figure for someone‟s security, where for other authors this clearly goes to far. (Alkire 2004) G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 18 in the Human Security framework thus suggesting that this framework implies a closer integration of the different policy fields. The same is said about the „Global War on Terror‟. Only with regard to the Peacebuilding Framework do the two identify a divergent/cooperation-focussed approach.
(Source: Bueger and Vennossen 2009:22)
1.2.2. Analysis
In this part of the chapter we have identified the general policy implications stemming from the security-development nexus as well as the operationalization of three theoretical frames building on the security development nexus. In this final analysis of the concept it becomes important to analyse the key fields involved in the operationalization of the concept and what the motivation and interests are which underpin different actors in this regard.
Some have argued that the military has been especially willing to incorporate civil reconstruction and development elements into its missions. For example, Homan notes that development projects have been used by the military as part of their „hearts and minds‟ campaign. (Homan 2010:260) However, as we have noticed before, Howell claims that many development organisations also welcomed the additional funds available with the popularization of the nexus and their additional role as peacebuilders. Furthermore, as development workers are increasingly the target of violent attacks (probably partially due to their politicised role in conflict areas) they are increasingly in need of protection.
When discussing the impact of the changes following the conceptualization of the various frameworks related to the security-development nexus, Bueger and Vennossen suggest far reaching possible implications. They note that: “These transformations could in the long run mean reforms, such as the transformation of military organizations into civil-military 19 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk intervention forces, or the re-organization of government from separate ministries of foreign affairs, development and defence into one (e.g. a ministry of crisis prevention, or of human security).” (Bueger and Vennesson 2009:11)
Indeed these would be significant transformations. So far, these have not occurred. However, the concept has been adopted by various governments around the world. In the next section we will discuss three countries which make prime examples of how this has been done and what impact this approach has had in relation to the organization of the external action of these countries.
1.3. Operationalization
Up to now the security-development nexus has been pioneered by three countries in specific: namely the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. As was found earlier in this chapter the United States already presented the logic of the nexus directly after the Second World War. However, the rationality was not operationalized in foreign policy to the extent it was in the three countries under review here. Thus albeit significant for the realisation of a nexus between security and development the US have been less important in the actual operationalization of the nexus.
1.3.1. The United Kingdom
Bueger and Vennesson note that in retrospect, „The UK was one of the first governments aiming at integrating security and development through their so called “joined-up” government approach.‟ (Bueger and Vennesson 2009: 30) In fact, this integration took place within a larger „joined-up government‟ programme under the first and second Blair administration. (Ling 2002:615)
Generally speaking, Tony Blair noted that “Many of the biggest challenges facing government do not easily fit into traditional Whitehall structures”. (PIU 2000:3). With regard to the subject matter it was found that the “UK‟s contribution to conflict prevention could be even more effective if it was co-ordinated across departmental boundaries.” (Bell 2003:6) Examples Blair gave of what joined-up governance should look like included the following, summed up by Ling as:
• Organizational change; • Shared objectives and policy indicators; • Merged structures and budgets; • Consultation to enhance synergies and • Joint teams (virtual or real); manage trade-offs; • Shared budgets; • Sharing information to increase mutual • Joint customer inter-face arrangements; awareness (Ling, 2002:625)
With regard to the specific security and development policy fields Drent and Zandee argue that the UK approach “can be regarded as best practice.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:21) Indeed the process has received different names, either as „joined-up‟ governance or later the „whole
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 20 of government‟ approach, but albeit minor differences in emphasis the key content with regard to the subject matter is essentially the same.
The first step the UK made with regard to conflict prevention within this framework of joined-up governance was the setting up of two Conflict Prevention Pools: the Africa Pool, which was to cover sub-Saharan Africa, and secondly, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, which was to cover the rest of the world. Louise Bell notes that: “The aim of the Pools is to integrate UK policy-making so that the three departments can develop shared strategies for dealing with conflict and make the practical programmes they fund as effective as possible.” 3 (Bell 2003:6)
In one of its reports, the Africa Conflict prevention pool affirms the underlying security- development logic which we have identified previously in this chapter: “Conflict in Africa remains one of the continent‟s biggest development challenges. The human, economic and development costs of conflict are immense. Without peace and security, development simply cannot take place.” Furthermore it expresses its commitment to “a holistic approach to supporting conflict prevention and resolution in Africa.” (ACPP 2004:III)
However, the key feat the United Kingdom has taken which has received most attention was the setting up of the Stabilisation Unit, originally called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit. The Stabilisation Unit is a permanent coordinating body set up by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which thus attempt to work together in the area of crisis management operations sharing a joint budget. (AIV 2009:36)
Although notable successes have been achieved by the close cooperation of the various institutions, in a House of Commons assessment whether the comprehensive approach worked well, it has been noted that the “familiar interdepartmental obstacles of different organisational cultures, different time frames (with the MoD wanting to reach results quickly, while the DFID is used to working on longer time-frames) and bureaucratic competency struggles came to the fore.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:22)
1.3.2. The Netherlands
The Dutch have attempted to come to an approach that recognizes the linkages between security and development after, already in 1993, then Minister Jan Pronk noted that “de verschillende aspecten van het voorkomen, de heersing en de oplossing van gewapende conflicten vereisen daarom een gecoordineerde inzet van buitenlands-politieke, defensive-politieke en ontwikkelings-politieke instrumenten.”4 (Pronk 1993)
3 The Three departments referred to here are the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Department for International Development. 4 „The different aspects of preventing, containing and resolving armed conflict thus require a coordinated use of foreign-political, defense-political, and development-political instruments.‟ (translation by author) 21 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk
However, the actual operationalization which follows from the above mentioned realisation has been far from straightforward. One of the earliest attempts to guarantee policy coherence with regard to Dutch external affairs comes with the appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as “co-ordinator for all foreign affairs of all Dutch Ministries.” (van Beijnum and van de Goor 2006:4)
Next to this appointment and hierarchy of foreign policy, the Homogenous Group of International Cooperation (HGIS) was set up in 1997, in order to create one budget overview for the various Ministries associated with external action. Van Beijnum and van de Goor note that “The HGIS aims to formulate a coherent foreign policy rather than combining the separate entities, therewith contributing to a more integrated foreign policy and stimulating inter-ministerial cooperation.” (van Beijnum and van de Goor 2006:4)
In accordance with this, the AIV noted that the Dutch coordination has taken shape in such a way that all the relevant political actors in The Hague have been involved, but that at the same time the ministerial autonomy has been kept intact, about which it is noted that “every ministry is responsible in principle for its own policy area”, with this understanding that „the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the power to coordinate activities in this areas.‟ (AIV 2009:37)
So, in contrast to the United Kingdom the Netherlands does not have a separate permanent supra-ministerial organ that combines the different policy fields, but has instead chosen for inter-ministerial coordination. On an administrative level, this coordination takes place in three steering committees: the Steering Committee for Security Cooperation and Reconstruction (SVW) … The Military Operations Steering Committee (SMO) … The Policy and Rule of Law Steering Committee‟. (AIV 2009)
With regard to these coordinating committees it should be noted that the Netherlands does not have a separate ministry or department for development in the sense that the UK has the Department for international Development (DfiD), thus coordination is not trans-ministerial, which, in theory, should make coordination easier. Furthermore, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there exists a Stabilisation Fund, which includes resources allocated for Official Development Assistance (ODA) as well as funds from the foreign policy budget (non-ODA). The aim of the fund is “to provide rapid and flexible support for activities that foster peace, security and development in countries and regions where violent conflicts are threatening to erupt or have already erupted.” (Fitz-Gerald 2006:116)
In this regard it should be mentioned that the Dutch Government has been trying to widen the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) definition of ODA. This aim was already mentioned in the 2003 coalition agreement. In 2005 these aims were partially achieved with the adoption of six additional fields eligible for ODA status. Notable with regard to this list is the close association with traditional security fields, especially the inclusion of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and disarmament activities. The list of fields added to ODA is inserted below.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 22
1 Management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure. 2 Enhancing civil society‟s role in the security system to help ensure that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance. 3 Security system reform to improve democratic governance and civilian control. 4 Supporting legislation for preventing the recruitment of child soldiers. 5 Controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 6 Civilian activities for peace-building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. (Source: Clive Robins 2005:22)
Homan notes that the Dutch government is continuing to lobby for an extension of these criteria, for example to include international peacekeeping missions, even as the Dutch government was planning to cut the development budget with 750 million euro. (Homan 2010)
1.3.3. Canada
A third country that has been part of the vanguard when it comes to coordinating the different policy fields with regard to the nexus between security and development has been Canada. In line with its leading role with regard to protecting human rights and as one of the key developers of the so called responsibility to protect, Canada was one of the first countries to adopt the 3D approach. Most of these developments happened in light of Canada‟s involvement in Afghanistan, although some experience was gained during the inter-ministerial cooperation during the 2004 Haiti crisis.
Crucial in actual operationalization of the 3D approach, or Whole-of –Government approach, has been the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), which was created in 2005 within the Department Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Its stated goal is “to help answer the growing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises – conflict or natural disaster related – and to coordinate whole-of- government policy and program engagements in fragile states, such as Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan.” (START website)
In order to perform this task mentioned above, the Task Force has a Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) at its disposal. In the fiscal year running up to March 2011 the GPSF consisted of 178 million dollar, which was distributed to its three programs: the Global Peace and Security Program (GPSP), the Global Peace Operation Program (GPOP), and the Glyn Berry Program (GBP). Furthermore it has also included a focus on getting other government braches involved such as the Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Correctional Service Canada (CSC) next to the Department of Defense and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
23 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk
On the issue of closer cooperation between the departments of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Trade and the CIDA is has been noted by Stephan Brown that this has been far from easy. As CIDA originates from the then Department for External Action, the cooperation between the two has been experienced as an appropriation of development funds by the latter. (Brown 2008) A problem we will return to below.
With regard to the previously mentioned mission in Afghanistan the Independent panel on Canada‟s Future Role in Afghanistan published a report, commonly known as the Manley report. The report states that “To ensure systematic and sustained political oversight and more effective implementation, a better integrated and more consistent Canadian policy approach should be led by the Prime Minister, supported by a special cabinet committee and a single full-time task force involving all key departments and agencies.” (Manley report 2008:38)
However, the coordination by the various departments and CIDA has not been unproblematic. As was just mentioned, Brown noted that: “CIDA‟s closer collaboration with the government‟s other international policy actors, mainly DFAIT and the Department of National Defense (DND), carries the strong risk that development objectives will be subordinated to security and commercial interests, rather than the other way around”. (Brown 2008)
This brings us to the final section of this chapter: the possible criticism and potential problems stemming from the security-development nexus as a conceptual framework. This in relation to the empirical evidence for the nexus as well as the concerns with regard to a negative impact of the operationalization of the nexus in actual policy. After this last section we will summarize our findings and draw conclusions which we will translate in the theoretic template trough which we will analyze the institutional changes in the European Union.
1.4. Criticism
Notwithstanding the popularization of the security-development nexus since the end of the Cold War, the paradigm has not remained undisputed. In this final section we will discuss some of the main problems identified. The scope between these criticisms differs quite substantially. Ranging from the empirical basis of the possible existence of the nexus, to potential difficulties in operationalizing the nexus in actual external action.
Indeed, the most fundamental problem of the security-development nexus has been the weak empirical evidence of a causal link between the two concepts. Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie note that “The existence of a general correlation between poverty, instability and violent conflict is undisputed. Nevertheless, the real causality of the linage is yet to be fully analysed.” Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming:6) Needles to say, when formulating policy and potentially operationalizing the nexus, it should be taken into account that the
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 24 causality between the two concepts remains elusive. This of course does not mean that no correlation exists.
Furthermore, criticism has been expressed to the security-development project in the sense that it is unclear what the goal of the project is. Tschirgi explains that in “advocating for effective and integrated security and development policies, it is necessary to ask: Whose security is at stake? Whose development is affected? Whose agenda has precedence?” (Tschirgi 2006:44) Waddell supports this statement by claiming that “[l]inking security and development is liable to result in a securitization of development and not the developmentalisation of security”. (Waddell 2006:538)
Most explicitly championing this proposition is Mark Duffield who during the beginning of the millennium has strongly challenged the use of development for refurbishing relations of power between the metropolis and the borderlands. Duffield notes that “Achieving security in the border-lands, and hence international stability, is now seen as lying in activities designed to reduce poverty, satisfy basic needs, strengthen economic self- sufficiency, create representative civil institutions, encourage thrift, promote human rights, gender awareness, and so on: the name of this new security framework is development. “ (Duffield 2002:1064)
Apart from this normative questionability of the concept a different strand of criticisms follows a more practical path. Crucially, it has been noted that the security-development nexus works better on paper than in practice. Different authors thus identify what has been labelled a „gap‟ between theory and practice. It is easy to claim the link between security and development and how these are expected to interact, so far it has proven to be a totally different matter to bridge the gap between theory and practice and between rhetoric and reality in the field. (Tschirgi 2006:57-59)
This has led to the question what should be integrated with what? Waddell notes that “linking security and development can be a recipe for confusion and incoherence”. (Waddell 2006:538) One interviewee in Waddell 2006 claims that the supposed link is difficult to operationalize, exclaiming that “it seems (…) as if security is the new development and development is the new security.” (Waddell 2006:532) With the clear danger of security interests trumping development incentives. (Waddell 2006:538)
Indeed, Klingebiel and Roehder, writing in 2005, note that albeit not all “development- military interfaces are fundamentally problematic in nature” it is possible to distinguish “four sensitive areas”, especially from the development policy perspective to which attention should be paid. The four Klingebiel and Roehder introduce are:
1. Subordination of development policy to a military logic. 2. Implementation by the military of measures with a development character. 3. Development policy as a source of funding for military missions.
25 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk
4. Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military. 5 (Klingebiel and Roehder 2005:22-23)
Finally, the closer conceptual integration would potentially present another problem. With many different actors involved, it becomes unclear who will actually be responsible for the potential results. Bueger and Vennesson write about David Chandler that “For Chandler the mere idea of coordinating the security-development nexus is one by which the different agencies want to escape their responsibility in a field where a high uncertainty exists of what can or should be done.” (Bueger and Vennesson 2009:32)
1.5. Conclusion
Thus we come to the conclusion of our first chapter on the security-development nexus. We set out with a review and analysis of the concept against its historical background. We were able to distinguish three specific periods during which the nexus has been conceptualized. Subsequently we took a closer look at the different possible ways the proposed linkages between security and development can be formulated in theory, based on the Human Security-, Global war on Terror- and Peacebuilding-framework. Subsequently we considered how the concept has been taken up the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada.
We established that the nexus has a long history, going back to the end of the Second World War, but that the actual popularization took place only after the Cold War, during the nineties alongside increasingly complex and comprehensive United Nations peacekeeping. Finally, we observed that most of the actual operationalization took place post 9/11 in wake of the increased attention paid to underdevelopment due to the Global War on Terror.
When we discussed three different frameworks stemming from the nexus, we found that different operationalization can be put into a matrix with two axes. On the one axis would be the primacy given to either development or security. On the other would be presented whether the focus is on integration or cooperation between the different policy fields. Based on these findings we adopt the framework proposed by Bueger and Vennossen in a slightly adapted manner. This provides us with the matrix presented on the next page, which we will use for the analysis of the European Union in the following chapters.
Looking to three countries that have been working with the concept we found that these countries indeed followed different paths. The United Kingdom has set up special supra ministerial groups working on the subject. The Netherlands has opted for a more coordinated option, setting up different coordinating committees with overall responsibility allocated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the Netherlands has followed a strategy to widen and broaden the ODA definition to include what traditionally were considered security issues. Finally, Canada has created special funds to allow closer
5 A table giving an overview of the chances and risks of development – military co-operation as presented by Kliengenbiel and Roehder is included in the appendix. G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 26 cooperation between the different departments and in the case of Afghanistan has suggested a centralized, leading position for the Prime Minister.
From this analysis of the different countries we derive the following three categories within which the operationalization of the security-development nexus has been aimed for so far. These are: funds (such as the Dutch Stabilisation Fund), institutions (such as the UK‟s Global Conflict Prevention Pool), and positions. (such as the position of the Prime Minister aimed for by Canada.) Integrating these findings with the previously mentioned model created by Bueger and Vennesson we can formulate the following table which we will use to analyse the manner and position the European Union has given to the operationalization of the security-development nexus:
Type Specific6 Manner7 Primacy8 Funds Institutions Positions
In order to help organize our findings in the coming chapters and especially in order to be able to assess the aggregated weight that has been put into the various combinations we finally introduce the model included below. As already mention, based on Bueger and Vennossen, the matrix has four fields which represent the different possible fields a specific fund, institution, or position can have according to the above presented table. For example, if an institution proposes an integrative manner of interaction between security and development but gives primacy to development, it would be placed in the top right corner of the matrix.
Integration
- -
Security
Development - -
Coordination
6 „specific‟ stands for the specific fund, institution or position which is assessed. 7 „manner‟ represents the way the specific fund, institution or position attempts to organize the interaction between security and development. Categories are taken from Bueger and Vennossen: „coordination‟ or „integration‟ 8 „primacy‟ stands for the overall priority the specific fund, institution or position identifies. Categories are taken from Bueger and Vennossen: „security‟ or „development‟ 27 Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus | G.W. van Dijk
Furthermore, to sum up our findings several things can be noticed. First of all with regard to the motivation for coming to a policy that includes both policy fields. One stems from the realisation of the complexity of the subject matter. Furthermore, stemming from this realisation is the aim to come to a more efficient policy, thus increasing the cost-result ratio of foreign action. Next to these motivational strands is the ambition to achieving greater policy effectiveness, thus increasing the goals-results coefficient of external action.
Secondly, it should be noted that the linkages between security and development can be found on different operational levels. Firstly there is the conceptual level where we found a strong link between the level of a country‟s development and its conflict proneness. In the field, military and civilian actors work together which has been labelled CIMIC (Civil- Military Cooperation). As humanitarian/development workers need protection by the military and the military can increase its legitimacy by providing humanitarian assistance. (commonly known as a „hearts and minds‟ strategy.)
To conclude then, the security-development nexus is a conceptualisation of the proposed linkages between security and development, created after the Second World War, which holds in essence that there can be no security without development and vice versa. Thus, it advocates a closer coordination or integration of external action, which can take many different shapes on many different levels, ranging from policy design to actual operation in the field.
However, the concept has not been without its fair share of criticism. Problems that have been identified in relation to the concept relate to the fundamental causality between the different concepts, which remains elusive. Furthermore, a gap between rhetoric and practice exists, as well as confusion over what should be integrated with what exactly. Furthermore it remains questionable whose security should be the focus of an integrated approach, and finally, the possibility for the different actors involved to pass the buck has been identified as a potential problem.
In the next chapter we will look at how the European Union has taken up the security- development nexus in its rhetoric in the form of official policy statements and we will investigate how the Union has subsequently organized its development and security policy in the period before the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. This will eventually form the basis on which we will discuss the institutional reforms following „Lisbon‟ in relation to the manner in which the Union organises its security and development policies. In the final part of the thesis we will subsequently assess to what extent and in what ways the European Union has dealt with the difficulties identified above.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 1: The Security-Development Nexus 28
Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty
2.1. Introduction
Having established the background of the security-development nexus and having established a framework for the analysis of the manner of adherence to the theory, it becomes time to look at the specific case under investigation here: the external policy of the European Union. From what we have found in the previous chapter it is clear that due to the complex interaction of security and development various options exist for operationalizing external policy that would allow the European Union to work on the nexus.
The European Union currently is the biggest international development donor in the world. The combined annual development budget of the Union and its individual member states is second to none. Furthermore, the Union has been actively pursuing an independent security policy since the creation of the West European Union in 1948. These developments have been characterized by a steady pace as is shown by the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy under the treaty of Maastricht which included setting up the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).
Traditionally the security related efforts of the Union have been characterized by an inter- governmental statute. Other policy fields, such as the common market, were early on in the European Union‟s history elevated to a supra-governmental level. This difference is explicitly shown in the Maastricht Treaty by the Commission (first pillar, supra- governmental) – Council (second pillar, inter-governmental) divide. However, the ESDP was a clear step in the direction of more external orientated action on behalf of the European Union. After the signing of the Saint Malo (1998) declaration by France and the United Kingdom the European partners have been able to set up several ESDP missions abroad.
More recently, with the signing of the Lisbon treaty, the European Union has been fundamentally restructured. For the first time in its history, the Union has left the traditional pillar construction and has opened the way for more coordinated approaches to its external policy, possibly integrating its security and development policy with its diplomatic service: the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS). These developments that followed the signing of the Lisbon treaty will be addressed in the third chapter of this thesis.
Having already sketched the dilemma‟s that stem from the security-development nexus, the central question of this chapter is: to what extend has the European Union adopted the security- development nexus in its foreign policy prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty?
In order to answer this question we have divided this chapter in to three parts. First we will discuss the adoption of the security-development nexus in the Union‟s discourse, looking into several key policy documents concerned with the subject such as the European Security Strategy. Furthermore we will look into the 2008 and 2010 Headline Goals, as well as separate statements by Javier Solana, as High Representative for Common Foreign and 29 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Security Policy. Thus the main question of this first part will be: To what extend has the European Union adopted the security-development nexus in its policy documents prior to the Lisbon Treaty?
In the second part of this chapter we will discuss the background of both the Union‟s development as well as its security policy. As already hinted at above, the two policy fields have followed rather different paths. By sketching the background of these two policy fields, the problems that arise in reaction to the coordination between them can be better understood. Especially the location of the two policy fields into different „pillars‟ is crucial to understand the problematic cooperation. Thus the guiding question for this second part is: How have the European Union‟s security policy and development assistance evolved prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty?
In the third part we then investigates the way in which the security-development nexus has been operationalized and institutionalized by the European Union prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. This is done in order to create a frame of reference to the current standing of this operationalization. In particular, we will discuss the general effort of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) as well as the specific institutions working in this field, including the Political and Security Committee, Civil-Military Cell within the EU Military Staff and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). The question that will guide us subsequently is: How has the security-development nexus been operationalized/institutionalized by the European Union prior to the Lisbon Treaty?
With answering these sub questions we expect to be sufficiently ready to return to the main question of this chapter and be able to analyse the development of the security-development nexus in the European Union‟s external action prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. This will form an excellent background for analysing the changing position the nexus has ascertained post-Lisbon, and thus the direction the Union is heading in with regard to the coordination of its external policy. Furthermore it will help assess the opportunities and difficulties lying ahead.
2.2. Discourse: Talking the Talk
With regard to policy statements there would seem to be no shortage of examples in which the European Union has emphasised the security-development nexus. From this perspective the Union seems committed to adhering the nexus‟ logic. In this first part of this second chapter we will discuss some of the key statements made by the Union in this regard. Special attention will be placed on the European Security Strategy (ESS), the European Report on Development (ERD), and the various trade agreements made with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
As a starting point we note that according to Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie, “the merger of security and development policies can easily be found in the EU‟s policy declarations and it can be considered one of the guiding motives behind the institutional reforms over the past decade.” (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming 8) G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 30
The organization of this first part is as follows: First we disseminate the discourse expressed in key development policy documents which relate to the coordination of security and development efforts. Subsequently, we will do the same for key security documents.
2.2.1. Development
It has been noted that the first concrete EU document on the security-development nexus was the 2001 Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming) In the document stemming from the program‟s convention the Commission observed that “development policy and other co-operation programmes provide, without doubt, the most powerful instruments at the Community‟s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict”. (European Commission 2001:9)
Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie furthermore identify four significant documents and one important initiative with regard to the adoption of the security-development nexus from the perspective development assistance. First they note how the European Consensus on Development of 2005 recites the classic security-development nexus core, stating: “Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur”. (ECD 2005 art 40)
The second set of documents Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie refer to are the Cotonou Partnership Agreements. Originally signed in 2000, the agreements have been revised in both 2005 and 2010. The agreements concern the relations and economic partnership between the ACP countries and the European Union. However, as only the 2010 version includes references to the security-development nexus we shall discuss these documents in the third chapter.
Thirdly, both the 2005 and the 2009 Policy Coherence for Development (PDC) included the security-development mantra. The 2005 version states that “there can be no development without peace and security; and no peace and security without development.” (PDC 2005) The 2009 version even identifies „security and development‟ as one of the five priorities. (PDC 2009)
The final document referred to by Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie is the 2007 Joint Africa- Europe Strategy, which again recites that “peace and security lie at the foundation of progress and sustainable development”. (JAES 2007:32) Interestingly however, Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie note that the “reverse relationship is less pronounced.” (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming 9) Thus hinting at the possibility of security trumping, or at least preceding, development.
Indeed, in accordance with the identified documents and claims within them, as represented above, the 2009 European Union Report on Policy Coherence for Development notes that “No one questions anymore the importance of security for development and the role that development plays for preventing conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and for 31 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk accompanying crisis management through protective, confidence-building and crisis- alleviating measures. The security development nexus has been firmly established in the EU‟s political priorities”. (EU RPCD 2009, emphasis added)
2.2.2. Security
The European Security Strategy was published in December 2003 by the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and subsequently adopted by the Council, the same year the Union had been shown to be significantly divided on the subject of how to respond to the Iraq-crisis. Especially Germany and France where not convinced with regard to intervention; whereas the United Kingdom contributed a significant number of troops to the invasion. At the same time the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), about which more below, had become operational. Against this background the European Union needed to develop its own Security Strategy.
The Strategy emphasises that due to the size of the Union, both economically as well as in relation to the number of member states and the size of its population, the European Union was inevitably going to be a “global player.”(ESS 2003:1) Key threats that where identified to European security included, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure, and organized crime. In order to meet these threats the Union needed to be „more active‟, „more capable‟, and „more coherent‟. (ESS 2003:11-13)
With regard to this need for more coherence it was noted in the Security Strategy that: “The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.”(ESS 2003:13) However, by 2008, in a review of the 2003 strategy it was found that the EU‟s “ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through to the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced.” (ESS 2008:9)
In 2004, the year following the original ESS publication, the commission set the 2008 Civilian Headline Goal. It emphasised that the ESDP needed to expand its civilian capabilities as it was noted that: “Developing the civilian dimension is part of the EU's overall approach in using civilian and military means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilisation.” (CHG 2008, 2004:2)
The 2010 Civilian Headline Goal, published in 2007, restated the previous ambition, noting that “As ESDP ventures further afield and diversifies in its tasks and missions, there is a continuous need to develop a body of crisis management capabilities, and to ensure that the EU uses all available means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks, including in a substitution scenario.” (CHG 2010, 2007:1) G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 32
From the above we can conclude that the European Union has in fact extensively adopted the security-development rhetoric in its policy documents. It remains to be seen however, to what extend the Union has been able to institutionalize this identified need to work on security and development issues in tandem. Tschirgi already emphasised that “research at the nexus of security and development consistently draws attention to failures of policy implementation.” (Tschirgi 2006:59) In the next section of this chapter we will discuss how the European Union has institutionalized the interaction between security and development prior to the Lisbon Treaty.
2.3. Walking the Walk? Organisational Background
Having established the rhetoric adoption by the European Union of the security development nexus, it becomes time to assess in what ways this rhetoric has actually been operationalized. In order to do so, we will trace key institutional developments in this regard up to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, in this section we will briefly address the background of the European development and security policy before we move on to the third section in which we will fully address the coordination and cooperation between the policy fields.
The significance of this exercise becomes clear when we later on refer to the changes that have taken place after the coming into effect of the Lisbon treaty. This treaty ended the European Union‟s pillar structure, which as will be discovered here, in the past had caused considerable difficulty in operationalizing the security-development nexus in European external action. A striking example of turf war between the first and second pillar in this regard stemmed from the Council‟s (second pillar) decision to fund an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) project aimed at reducing the spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW).
The Commission was of the opinion that the Council had overstepped its mandate, as it interpreted this project as a developmental programme instead of a security project and thus falling under the mandate of the Commission instead of the council. The case was eventually brought to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which indeed was of the opinion that the projects fell under the jurisdiction of the first (developmental) pillar‟s mandate. Drent and Zandee note that “The EJC case shows how formal division of authority does not take into account the blurred dividing lines between peace, security, economic and social development, giving rise to artificial institutional turf wars.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:15)
2.3.1. European Security
As we are specifically writing on the European Union, significant other organizations which have been crucial for the development of a common European defence and security policy are not included here. This means that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West European Union (WEU) will not be dealt with here, even though these organizations have been crucial for developments within the European Union. For example
33 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk through the Berlin plus agreements which allows the EU to use NATO infrastructure for its ESDP missions.
In the history of the European Union, several attempts had been made in setting up a coordinated defence strategy parallel to the economic integration under the common market and the European Communities. An attempt was the European Defence Community (EDC) the proposal of which, ironically, did not make it through the French parliament. The irony being that it had been the French prime minister (Président du Conseil) René Pleven who had proposed setting up the EDC. An even earlier attempt was the setting up of the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) and Western European Union (WEU), which was overshadowed and integrated into NATO.
In 1992, with the signing of the treaty of Maastricht, the newly created European Union encapsulated the previously existing European Communities (which became one of its three pillars). Also, the treaty included the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the „second‟ pillar of the European Union. However, it was not until after 1998 that the CFSP was expanded to include a defence arm. This was only possible after a bilateral meeting between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French president Jacques Chirac in the French city of St-Malo.
The common statement stemming from this meeting, although brief (only about a page and a half long) stated that the European Union should be strengthened with the “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” (JD British-French summit St-Malo, also in Drent 2010:16) This statement and the underlying agreement between the French and the British led to the extension of the CFSP with the European Security and Defence Policy under the treaty of Amsterdam.
Following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, in a subsequent Council meeting in Helsinki, it was stated that the Union should, by 2003, have the ability to deploy and sustain for the duration of at least one year, within 60 days of an initial request, a military force of up to 60.000 persons, capable of fulfilling the full range of the earlier agreed upon „Petersburg tasks.‟9 This ambition however, was never achieved, and by 2003 it was changed into the potential to deploying so called „Battlegroups.‟10
With regard to the operationalization of the ESDP it suffices to say that before the ratification of the treaty of Lisbon there had already been 23 crisis management missions, covering over 13 countries on 3 continents, proving the capability and willingness of the European partners
9 Petersberg Tasks = “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (TEU) 10 “A Battlegroup is based on combined arms, battalion sized force (1500 troops) and reinforced with combat support elements. It could be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. Each Battlegroup will be associated with a Force Headquarters and, notably, pre- identified transport and logistics elements.” (Council of the European Union 2005:1) G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 34 to be active players in the field. For an overview of the various missions that have taken place, or are currently taking place under the ESDP umbrella, see the Appendix.
Against the background of the inter-governmental set up of the security and defense policy, the highest authority with regard to the ESDP is the European Council. (Made up of heads of government and the president of the commission). Most decisions however are made on the level of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) made up of the member states‟ ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development, depending on the specific subject that is to be discussed. The GAERC is supported by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which is the daily representation of the member states at the ambassador level, as well as the General Secretariat of the Council Secretary General of the Council/High Representative for CFSP)11.
As will be discussed below, the ESDP had a strong emphasis on integrating civil activities within its missions. Drent notes that of the 23 ESDP missions, only 6 where strictly military, the remaining 17 being either „hybrid‟ or civil missions. This in fact created the problem of civil-civil coordination, as it has been noted that: “New missions (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) were introduced in the second pillar, but the European Commission already had responsibilities for external „civilian‟ activities, such as the delivery of emergency humanitarian aid, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:25-26) It is to these responsibilities we now turn.
2.3.2. European Development
European Union‟s history as an international donor goes back further than its history as a cooperating military power, and is substantially more complex. Within the first European Commission, overseeing the European Economic Community after the ratification of the Rome Treaties in 1957, there already was a commissioner on „development‟ (Robert Lemaignen). Furthermore, the treaty foresaw the creation of the European Development Fund (EFD).
At the time of the signing of the Rome treaties large parts of the world where still colonies of the EEC member states. Thus special attention was focussed on this group of countries. For the first four decades, the development assistance stemming from the European Economic Community was mainly inspired by a market-logic, providing preferential positions to the former colonies under the consecutively Yaoundé, Lome, and Cotonou accords, supplemented by the European Development Fund.
During this time most of Europe‟s relations with third world countries where managed by the European Commission‟s Directorate General on External Relations (RELEX) even though during all this time there has always been a commissioner tasked with the development of, initially, the overseas territories, and after these had become independent states, with general development assistance. As an example of these changing positions an overview is included
11 An organogram of this setup is included below in part 3 35 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk in the appendix which shows the different commissions as well as the relevant commissioners and the name of their portfolios.
Under the 1992 treaty of Maastricht, which in effect created the European Union as such, there was special attention for development cooperation, under TITLE XVII Article 130u. It stated that the European efforts should be “complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States” (TEU art 130u), with a particular focus on the integration of developing countries into the world economy and poverty reduction in the poorest of countries.
The same year saw the creation of the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). ECHO‟s stated mandate under the European Union “is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. The aid is intended to go directly to those in distress, irrespective of race, religion or political convictions.” (ECHO website) In the meantime, ECHO has been renamed the Directorate General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, but has retained the ECHO abbreviation.
In accordance with the increased importance attached to European development assistance, next to the already market stimulating policies, 1999 saw the creation of the Directorate General Development (DGDEV) which was to specifically focus on the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries, which had historical ties to the Union, whereas RELEX maintained relations with Latin American and Asian countries. DGDEV‟s responsibilities where thus:
“(a) initiating and formulating the Community's development co-operation policy for all developing countries, and
(b) co-ordinating the development policy for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) region and the overseas countries and territories (OCTs).” (http://www.developmentportal.eu)
In order to be able to fulfill these dual tasks, the DGDEV was given authority over the EDF. Thus it was stated that the DGDEV “decides the multi-annual programming of the European Development Fund and the funds allocated to the Development Co-operation Instrument (DCI), another of the Union‟s financial instruments for development. (www.developmentportal.eu)
To complicate things further, by 2000 the Commission was confronted with questions about the “relevance and quality” of the Community‟s development programs. (Annual report 2001 ECDP) Especially the coordination of the various actors involved in development assistance within the Union was problematic. By this time not two, but four Directorate Generals were involved. (RELEX, DGDEV, DG Trade, and the DG Enlargement.)
In reaction to this, the Commission created the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO or EuropeAid) which led to the following work division: “the geographic Directorates-General (External Relations and Development) took charge of programming and strategy, while the
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 36 new EuropeAid Cooperation Office (EuropeAid) took on responsibility for the remainder of the project cycle12 (from identification of projects to ex-post evaluation).” (Annual report 2001 ECDP) By 2002, AIDCO was set up as a DG, headed by Director-General Giorgio Bronacci.
In order to present the very complicated situation up to the treaty of Lisbon, the following schema from Mikaela Gavas and Simon Maxwell is included below:
(Source: Gavas and Maxwell 2009:3)
Having sufficiently described the background to the operationalization of the security, as well as the development policy field up to the coming into effect of the Lisbon treaty, we now turn to the attempts the Union had made in institutionalizing the connections between these two, in accordance with the previously identified rhetoric concerning the security- development nexus prior to the signing of the Lisbon Treaty.
12 The 5 steps identified in the project cycle are: identification, formulation, implementation, evaluation/audit and programming. 37 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
2.4. Pre Lisbon: integration, coordination, subjugation?
2.4.1. CMCO
After discussing the adoption of the security-development nexus in the discourse of the Union in part one, we subsequently analyzed the background of both the security as well as the development policy of the Union. In the third part of this chapter we are interested in the ways in which the Union has attempted to conceptualize, and more importantly, institutionalize the nexus between its security and development policy.
The Union has conceptualized the security-development nexus in two ways. The first conceptualization is known as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC relates to the coordination of civil and military activities „in the field‟. The second conceptualization is Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) which is a specific approach developed by the European Union which aims at coordinating civil and military aspects of intervention at the policy and strategic level.
The aim of CIMIC has been identified as “to ensure the coordination and cooperation between EU military missions and civil actors (external to the EU), including the local population and authorities, as well as international and non-governmental organizations and agencies.” (Ioannides 2010:29) However, CIMIC stems from a military logic. Ioannides notes about CIMIC that: “it is primarily concerned with force protection and cooperation with non- military actors is subordinated to that aim.” (Ioannides 2010:34)
In 2007 the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council) acknowledged that “The EU is addressing insecurity, and conflicts and their root causes, through a wide range of instruments. Inter-linkages between security and development should be seen as an integral part of the ongoing EU efforts, including those to enhance Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) in order to address complex crises in a coherent manner.” (Council of the European Union 2007:4)
CMCO thus has a much broader aim. Albeit still a work in progress, in 2003 the Council already noted in a document with the title „Civil Military Coordination‟ the “need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU‟s response to crisis”. (Council of European Union 2003) Thus, it can be stated that CIMIC is related to European Union‟s interaction with external third parties in the field during operations, whereas CMCO is concerned with relations between the various European agencies, committees etcetera, with regard to the planning of operations.
An excellent overview between the fields of CIMIC and CMCO is provided by Carmen Gebhard. This overview has been included below.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 38
(Source: Gebhard 2008:7)
39 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
2.4.2. Institutionalization
Having found that the European Union has formulated two strategic concepts that should coordinate civil-military relations both internally, between the various committees and groups (CMCO) as well as civil-military relations in the field (CIMIC). We will here further elaborate on the manner of institutionalization which these conceptualizations have undergone within the European Union. This will require some basic understanding of the European Union in general.
As will be recalled, prior to the Lisbon treaty, the European Union was characterized by the pillar structure, which consisted of the supranational European Community headed by the European Commission, and intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar headed by the Council.13 With regard to the security-development nexus, the pillars where quite an obstacle, as development, due to the previously mentioned background of the field, was a supranational policy field. Security however, was organized in an inter-governmental manner, due to the more sensitive nature of the policy field.
If we are then, to look for an operationalization of the security-development nexus in the light of CMCO prior to the signing of the Lisbon treaty, the institutions that held mixed Commission-Council representatives are significant. Indeed, one of the institutions with such a mixed staffing was the Political and Security Commission (PSC) as there always was a representative of the Commission part of it. (Eva Gross 2008:22)
The PSC, also known as COPS due to the French acronym (Comité Politique et de Sécurité) was created as a result of the treaty of Amsterdam as a temporary body but under the treaty of Nice became a permanent institution. The purpose of the PSC was to “monitor the international situation, to present opinions on the ESDP to the Council and to monitor the implementation of specific policies.” (Gross 2008:22)
In order to help the PSC in this task, it is supported by two Committees. Firstly, for the military part of ESDP operations by the Military Committee of the European Union (EUMC), made up out of the Chiefs of Defense (CHOD), represented by their military representatives (Milreps). Secondly, for the non-military part, the PSC is supported by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which is made up of representatives of all the member states, the Council, and the Commission. Within CIVCOM the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) was established in 2007 “in order to provide the planning structure for CIVCOM” (Gross 2008:22).
Part of the Commission‟s secretariat is made up by the European Union‟s Military Staff (EUMS) which in turn is supported for the cross disciplinary work by the Civ-Mil Cell. The Cell became operational in 2006. With regard to the Civ-Mil cell it has been noted that it “is
13 The third and final pillar, not discussed in this thesis was the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 40 the first standing EU body that fully integrates military and civilian expertise, including from the European Commission, thus contributing to CMCO.” (Ioannides 2010:41)
Another key position that was created pre-Lisbon with regard to external relations was the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the same time the HR was the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, thus heading the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. 14 In first instance this position was occupied by former Spanish minister of foreign affairs Javier Solana, who shortly before assuming his position of HR/SG left his job as secretary general of the NATO.
Although the HR/SG was not in itself a position that crossed pillars, as there was no official integration into the Commission and purely supra-national affairs, the HR/SG was a supra governmental position in the sense that the HR/SG was expected to embody the interests of all member states. Next to this, the HR/SG was supported by the Policy Unit which was made up from representatives of member states as well as Commission and Council officials and was placed within the Council Secretariat.
Furthermore, since 1996 the Council has appointed Special Envoys to areas of particular interest to Europe. The position of Special Envoy was recognized in the 1997 treaty of Amsterdam and was developed further under the subsequent treaties. Technically, the Special Envoys or more recently Special Representatives are considered CFSP Special Advisors. Even though the EUSRs are appointed by the Council their supporting team is supposed to be assembled “in consultation with the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative, and in full association with the Commission.” (Council of the European Union doc. 7089/00)
Thus, is has been noted that the Special Representatives stand in the middle of EU foreign policy “at the crossroads between the institutional dynamics of Brussels headquarters, the often heterogeneous priorities of Member States, and the requirements for action in the field.”(Grevi 2007:6) Giovanni Grevi notes for instance with regard to the EUSR of Afghanistan that coordination between different actors was successful: “Awareness of the need for a fully integrated approach in devising and conducting the EU‟s intervention has been steadily growing, and plans have been drawn up to ensure structured coordination between different actors and instruments.” (Grevi2007:78)
Grevi continues to explain that “the Commission has been extensively reporting to the PSC and CIVCOM, so as to maximize mutual consultation and ensure unity of purpose. The practice of monthly meetings involving all relevant actors in Brussels has been established, bringing together the Commissions, the Council Secretariat and the EUSR liaison office. Relevant officials are thus in permanent contact both in Brussels and in the field, and cooperation works rather well. Looking ahead, the importance of coordination at EU level among Member States cannot be overstated.” (Grevi 2007:78)
14 This practice of combining the Commission and Council position has been labeled „double hatting‟. 41 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Thus, to summarize, the single most important Committee that has been involved in organizing cross pillar intervention was the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The PSC is supported by both civil as well as military advising bodies, of which CIVCOM itself was made up from member states, Council and Commission representatives, and the EUMS included a Civ-Mil Cell, again composed of actors across the pillars.
Finally we identified the dual position of High Representative and Secretary General as key to the organization of European external action. More about this position in the next chapter. It suffices to say here that the supporting actors of the HR/SG, the Policy Unit and the EUSR, firmly established the cross-pillar potential of the HR/SG. Below an organogram of the ESDP is included that includes all the actors discussed here.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 42
(Eva Gross DIIS Report 2008:21)
43 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
3.5. The money
Next to the organizational part of the institutionalization of the security-development nexus it is interesting to „follow the money‟ and highlight two funds in particular that have been set up in order to facilitate the closer connection between the field of security and development. The first in this regard is the previously mentioned EDF. Already established with the creation of the European Community in 1957, the fund has been identified as “the main instrument for providing Community aid for development cooperation in the ACP States and OCT.” (Europa.eu)
Notwithstanding its background as focused on traditional development cooperation of the former colonies, more recently the fund has been used to pay for activities which are not considered traditional development activities, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) projects and Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programs. An example of this allocation is the funding that was provided by the EDF for an ECOWAS SSR program in Guinea Bissau, about which more below.
Furthermore, Grevi notes that “the EU created, out of the EDF, the African Peace Facility (APF), endowed with 250 Million. While the APF is managed by the Commission, its disbursement requires the approval of the PSC, based on the assessment of the political appropriateness of envisaged operations. This procedure establishes an innovative bridge between the Commission and key CFSP decision-making bodies.” (Grevi 2007:103)
A second fund that can be considered as on the nexus between security and development is the Instrument for Stability (ifS) which in 2007 replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. (RRM) The purpose of the „instrument‟ is to react to sudden instability and crisis and in this light prepare conditions for long term development by providing funds for the protection of:
“democratic, pluralist state institutions, and an independent judiciary, good governance and law and order” as well as support “international criminal tribunals and ad hoc national tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, the promotion of independent and pluralist media, aid for the victims of the illicit use of firearms, support to relieve the impact on the civilian population of anti-personnel landmines, unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war, etc.” (Europa.eu)
The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is another of the main development funds of the European Union. The Instrument was established in 2007 and has a budget of about €16,9 billion. It is divided into several key thematic programs among which is the "assistance in post-crisis situations and fragile States." (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid) The fund covers Asia, Latin America, Central Asia, the Middle East and South Africa.
A problem with the money flow of European development aid has been the fact that aid has appeared to be obviously politically motivated. For example, it has been noted that since 1995, the top recipients of European aid have been situated primarily in the European direct
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 44 neighborhood, including the Balkans. (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming 20) After the events of 9/11 and the intervention into Afghanistan, the country became a large recipient of European aid. The final point in case is the fact that Turkey has topped the list of countries receiving Official Development Assistance from the EU in both 2004-2005 as well as 2007-2008. (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming 20)
3.6. The missions
Finally we briefly look at two specific missions: one in Somalia and the other in Guinea Bissau. This is done in order to give an example of how the funding goes in practice. The missions were chosen as they both present an interesting illustration how the European Union has used its funds in this regard.
Somalia
When we look at the funding in practice, it becomes clear that the various EU funds have been used alongside one another. For example, when we look at the European Commission‟s Assistance to Somalia it becomes apparent that Somalia received both humanitarian as well as development aid. Since 2005 €87 million has been provided in humanitarian assistance, providing primary healthcare, food aid and access to water. The Commission estimates that over 3 million Somali‟s have benefited from the humanitarian aid. (EC 2009)
At the same time, the commission has provided large sums of development assistance: €278 million since 2003. Projects focused on three sectors: governance and security, social sectors, and agriculture. Additional development funding was provided through the EDF, African Peace Facility (APF), as well as the isF in support for the African Union Peacekeeping Mission (AMISOM).
Since 2010, so after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union through the PSC has set up an ESDP mission in Kenya, called the European Union Training Mission Somalia. The mission is overseen by the EUMC and funded by the participating member states. The mission‟s goal is to “contribute to and support the development of a functioning security infrastructure in Somali by strengthening the Somali Security Forces.” (www.africa-eu- partnership.org)
Guinea-Bissau
Notwithstanding the fact that the European Union has a long history of development aid with regard to the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau, we are particularly interested in the recent EDF aid allocation to this east African country. Under the 10th EDF, covering the period 2008-2013, the three primary objects of assistance where: conflict prevention in fragile states, water and energy, and general budget support. Thus it was claimed that “EU support in Guinea-Bissau will contribute to strengthening its state structures, to improve governance, to conflict prevention and to encouraging national reconciliation.” Total EDF aid amounted to 102.8 million. ( http://ec.europa.eu) 45 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
A part of this EDF allocation was the EU SSR Guinea Bissau program, created in 2008. The EU SSR GB was in fact set up under a Council mandate as an ESDP operation. In accordance with general ESDP guidelines, the EU SSR GB was to be put under “political control and strategic direction” of the PSC. (http://ec.europa.eu) Thus the Council created an ESDP program funded by the Commission‟s EDF allocation during the 2008-2013 plan. The ESDP mission was cancelled however, due to allegations of unwillingness on the part of Guinea Bissau‟s government to cooperate with the program.
Again, both these programs should be seen separately from the Commissions humanitarian aid allocation under the ECHO. For example, in 2009 the Commission approved for another 2 million in humanitarian aid for the greater West African area. (including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Vert, Chad, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Mali and Togo) (ec.europa.eu)
3.7. Conclusion
To conclude then, in this chapter we set out to investigate the European Union‟s rhetorical commitment to the operationalization of the security development nexus in its external policy. We found that the Union in various documents and statements has indeed expressed support for a holistic approach concerning its security and development policy. Key documents we discussed included the European Security Strategy and The Development Consensus.
Subsequently, we briefly discussed the background of both the development as well as the security policy of the European Union. It became clear that the Union has a much older commitment towards development, creating the European Development Fund in 1957, than it has to a coordinated security policy. Only after the Treaty of Amsterdam the much more sensitive security policy field was organized into the CSFP under the ESDP which in effect became the second (intergovernmental/Council) pillar. Development policy grew out of the former colonial ties as well as trade preference that was given, and became part of the (supra-governmental/Commission) first pillar.
However, the organization of a coordinated development assistance policy was problematic due to its fragmentation over various institutions. We found that by 2008 development assistance was spread over DG Enlargement, DG External Relations, DG EuropeAid, DG Development and DG ECHO. Furthermore, we found there where over seven financial instruments with regard to development, including the European Development Fund and the Instrument for Stability.
Finally we looked at the actual coordination of security and development policy, which was organized by the Union under the heading of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIVCOM) in relation to cooperation in the field between EU and non-EU actors, and Civil Military
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 46
Coordination (CMCO) in relation to inter-European Union institution. Thus it would indeed seem fair to state that the Union has recognized the importance of coordinating its development and security policies.
One of the key difficulties we found in this regard was the traditional pillar division. Due to this division of competence it seemed quite difficult to bridge the gap between security and development. However, we found that the Union has committed itself to inter pillar cooperation and coordination through a vast set of committees and groups that include members representing both the Commission as well as the Council. These include the CIVCOM, Civ-Mil cell, Policy Unit.
When we „followed the money‟, it became clear that the Union has applied the „Dutch method‟ of trying to widen the scope of development, specifically with regard to the use of the European Development Fund. For the 2008-2013 period the Fund was used to finance a ESDP SSR project in Guinea Bissau. Although according to the OECD criteria SSR programs are indeed eligible for ODA spending the danger of reallocating development funds towards the security policy field without making additional funds available for development was noted by Klingebiel in the previous chapter.
Furthermore, also in accordance of what was identified by Klingebiel, it would seem that the Union has invested heavily in organizing the cooperation between civil and military elements of the ESDP. However, these efforts have only had limited effects across security and development fields. The Union was more devoted towards CIMIC then it was to CMCO. Indeed, Drent and Zandee noted in this regard that:
“the first decade of ESDP has learned that within the second Pillar civilian and military crisis management activities and capabilities are still separated, despite all coordination efforts undertaken already.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:2)
If we place our findings in the framework we created in the previous chapter, we arrive at the table included below. This table includes the various budgets of different items mentioned in the table. A complete justification with relevant sources is included in Appendix five.
The analysis whether a specific fund, institution or position should be considered as organizing the interaction in an integrative or coordinative manner is based on the description included in this chapter. The same applies to the analysis with regard to whether primacy is given to development or security. A glossy of this analysis is included in Appendix seven.
47 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Type Specific Manner Primacy Budget Funds EDF Integration Development 2.087.500.000 ifS Integration Security 100.000.000 DCI Integration Development 2.413.857.142 CSDP Coordination Security 159.200.000 Institutions PSC Coordination Security - RELEX Coordination Security 379.654.859 DG DEV Coordination Development 132.097.865 ECHO Coordination Development 741.014.000 EuropeAid Coordination Development 132.097.865 CIVCOM Integration Security 3.198.193,55 EUMC Coordination Security 6.396.387,01 EUMS Coordination Security 20.136.774,19 Civ-Mil Cell Integration Security 3.553.548,39 CPCC Integration Security 7.107.096,77 Positions HR/SG Integration Security 254.174,70 EUSR Integration Security 14.000.000
If we translate these findings to the matrix presented in the end of the previous chapter we come to the following visual representation of the information found above:
Integration
6 2
Security
Development 5 3
Coordination
However, if we aggregate the budgets of the various items in matrix based on the information included in the table above we can find the relative financial importance given to the different quadrants. In this calculation we included the financial means available to the different funds to the organization which determine its distribution.15
15 This means that both the EDF as well as the DCI are included in the DGDEV and AIDCO their budget, whereas the Instrument for Stability is included into the RELEX budget. This explains why, even though both the EDF and the DCI were identified as „Integration-Development‟ items, 0% of the budget in the calculation above was spend in this quadrant. G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty 48
Integration
0,46% 0%
Security
Development 10,73% 88,81%
Coordination
On the basis of this table it seems clear that the Union despite its rhetoric commitment has found it rather difficult to truly integrate its security and development policy. Most initiatives seem to have originated from a military logic of force protection and force acceptance. This assessment is furthermore supported by the fact that development funds have increasingly been used in order to pay for non-traditional development projects, as well as the specific allocation of aid to security-strategic neighboring countries.
As is shown by the model presented above, looking back at what was introduced in the previous chapter by Bueger and Vennesson it would thus seem that the European Union, prior to the reorganization following the Lisbon Treaty had more funds, institutions and positions with a predisposition towards security. However, if we take the financial weight the different items carry it becomes clear that a lot more European money was spend on development compared to security.
With regard to the question whether the Union has mainly followed a coordinating or integrative approach, the second divide introduced by Bueger and Vennesson, it is clear that both with regard to the number of funds, institutions and positions, as well as with regard to the financial means associated with the different items, coordination has been preferred over integration. With this established it is time to turn to our final chapter and assess what changes the Lisbon treaty brought.
49 Chapter 2: Europe before the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty
3.1. Introduction
So far we have discussed the organization of the European Union‟s development and security policy up to the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty, originally drafted as the first ever European constitution, is a clear demarcation point as the document initiated a far-reaching reorganization of the Union in general and its external action in particular. By discussing this reorganization we will be able to analyze the direction the Union has taken in regard to the operationalization of the security-development nexus.
The central question we will be answering in this final chapter is: to what extend has the European Union adopted the security-development nexus in its foreign policy after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty? Having answered this final question will put us in a perfect position to answer the general question we set out to answer at the beginning of this research which we will subsequently do in the general conclusion, directly following this third and last chapter.
In order to be able to come to the above mentioned analysis this final chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is concerned with two things. Firstly, as the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was anything but straightforward the context in which the treaty was signed will be discussed in order to sketch the background against which the changes in organization have taken place. Secondly, we will briefly reflect upon the rhetoric affirmation of the Union‟s aim at working along the security-development lines in both post-Lisbon policy documents as well as in interviews.
Having analyzed the background of the Lisbon Treaty we turn to examine the institutional changes that have taken place as en effect of the treaty. We will particularly reflect on the changes that have occurred with regard to the operationalization of the security- development nexus. In this section we will reflect on three changes in organization in particular. The first being the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Secondly, we will discuss the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). And thirdly, we will deliberate on the fusion of the DGDEV and AIDCO into the new Directorate General for Development and EuropeAid.
Finally, in the third and last section of this chapter we look forward to what challenges and opportunities remain for the Union after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. Special attention will be put on the future position of ECHO and the Directorate General for Development and EuropeAid, as well as the use of the previously mentioned development funds.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 50
Answering these three sub-guiding questions will bring us back to the main question of this chapter, to which we will reply on the basis of the evidence found in the different sections of this third and final chapter.
3.2. Background of the Lisbon Treaty
The Lisbon Treaty came into effect on the 1st of December 2009. However, the road leading up to the eventual coming into effect was less then straightforward. In order to understand the content of the Lisbon Treaty, it is necessary to sketch the background of the treaty. Important in this regard is the fact that the treaty was drafted in the wake of the rejection of the European Constitution. Indeed, after negative referenda in both the Netherland and France the constitution was rejected. To prevent all that hard work and negotiations which had led to the constitutional draft would be in vein, the member states convened a way in which most of constitution could be salvaged.
The constitution was intended to finalize the reforms of the Union that has started under the Amsterdam treaty in 1998 and which subsequently had been continued under the Nice treaty in 2002. The institutional changes were needed in particular in light of the foreseen expansion of the Union, which eventually took place with the joining of 10 new member states in 2004. This raised the number of members from 15 to 25, seriously complicating the decision making ability of the EU institutions. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union as well, raising the number of member states to 27.
As the Nice treaty was not able to solve any of the real organizational difficulties the Convention on the Future of Europe was established in 2001, with the aim of drafting a constitution for the Union. The Convention, led by former French President Valéry Giscard D‟Estaing, presented the draft constitution in July 2003. When presented in 2004 to the Council all the (by then) 25 members of the Union signed the Constitution after which the necessary ratification process could begin. As unanimity was required the French and Dutch „no‟ definitely rejected the constitution.
Subsequently, after a time of reflection, in 2007 during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaty under German presidency the Berlin Declaration was issued which reaffirmed the European commitment to coming to a reorganization of the Union before the next scheduled European Parliamentary Election of 2009. This renewed effort in effect led to the formulation of the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, or, more simply put: the Reform treaty, which was signed by representatives of all 27 member states in Lisbon during October 2007.
Again, ratification turned out to be an obstacle. Due to the nature of the Reform Treaty the only country that issued a public consultation was Ireland. Ireland‟s previous referendum over the constitution was cancelled after the Dutch and French rejection. In first instance the Irish rejected the treaty, but in a second referendum they decided to support the Treaty. In order to help the Irish to vote in favor of the new amending Treaty, one of the changes 51 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk envisioned in the treaty, the reduction of the Commission‟s size16 was omitted. When finally the Czech Republic ratified the treaty in November 2009, and came into operation the first day of the next month: 1 December 2009.
3.2.1. The nexus in rhetoric post Lisbon?
Having introduced the history of the Lisbon Treaty, in this section we are concerned with the extent to which the Union has rhetorically committed itself to working on the security- development nexus before we look at the changes the Lisbon Treaty itself entails. We will first analyze the extent the Lisbon Treaty itself implies the security-development nexus and subsequently we will briefly reflect on related EU publications that have been published in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty and finally analyze interviews and press releases by key EU personnel.
In the amendments made by the Lisbon treaty to the original treaties the nexus is not explicitly mention. The adjusted TEU states that the European Union commits itself to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security” as well as “foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty” subsequently, in the same article it reads that “The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies.” (Art 21:3) Thus, albeit not explicitly mentioned, the connection and the necessary cooperation between the different fields is implied.
Furthermore, in post-Lisbon publications the connection between security and development has resurfaced. In the previous chapter we already referred to the Cotonou Partnership Agreements of 2010. (A revisions of the original 2000 Cotonou Partnership Agreement) The 2010 revision states that “The parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development.” (Cotonou art 11) Furthermore stating that “the interdependence between security and development shall inform the activities in the field of peace building, conflict prevention and resolution; which shall combine short and long-term approaches”. (Cotonou art 11)
Other examples include the European Commission (2010) Policy Coherence for Development Work Programme 2010- 2013. In it, it is explained that “Since many security issues contain a short-term security dimension and a long-term development purpose, they can be addressed both by Common Security and Defense Policy tools as well as by development and cooperation instruments, depending on the main objective of each project. In this context, it is of utmost importance to ensure coherence between all available EU instruments, as well as to foster possible synergies leading to the overall reduction of violence and the establishment
16 The reduction of the commission‟s size was proposed to enable it to work more efficiently. Up to then, al the member states nationalities where represented in the Commission, even though commissioners are officially supposed to stand above the national divides. However, Ireland and a number of other „small‟ member states feared that the reduction in Commission size would curtail their influence. For further information see (Rood 2009). G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 52 of the right conditions for development.” (EC(2010:40) SEC(2010)421) Albeit not such a high- profile publication compared to the previously discussed documents, it does reaffirm the Unions commitment.
In the European Commission‟s Green Paper on Development, published in November 2010, the importance of working on security and development is again stressed on several occasions. For example, under heading 2.4 on fragility and security it is immediately noted that: “Without peace and security, the rule of law, adequate and predictable legislation or sound public finances, aid will never succeed in giving people a long term future.” Furthermore the Green Paper states the importance of establishing “consistent and comprehensive political strategies linking early warning and preventive diplomacy to short term, crisis response measures (humanitarian, diplomatic, civilian and military crisis management) and to longer term instruments and policies (on development cooperation, trade, environment and adaptation to climate change to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters, migration, etc.).” (Greenpaper 2010:8-9)
In addition to this written confirmation, the Director General of the newly created DG DEVCO, about which more below, stated in a recent interview about the European External Action Service that: “We have a collective responsibility to do everything in our power to make it [the EEAS] succeed, not least because of the contribution which it can make to development. Indeed, one of the things the external service will have to do is to better deliver on the security aspects in volatile countries. Without a better security environment, you cannot have development. […] We will have to work with the external service on the nexus between security and development. One cannot work without the other. So, this is not about politicizing development, but, rather, how to better deliver on security in order to better deliver on development.”(Fokion Fotiadis, 21 February)
Indeed, on its website, DGDEVCO explains that: “Addressing causes of conflicts (poverty, disease, lack of governance and rule of law) is an essential first step for the EU to help promote peace and development. EU development work uses non-military means to support the peaceful resolution/prevention of armed conflict through negotiations, demobilization, demilitarization, etc.” (http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid)
Thus it would seem save to say that after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union is committed to working on the nexus between security and development. Indeed, as was shown above, the treaty can be perceived as creating the possibility for greater coherence between the different policy fields. We now turn to the actual institutional changes that have occurred as a consequence of the Lisbon treaty in order to discover to what extend the renewed (rhetoric) adoption of the nexus has been operationalized.
53 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
3.3. Changes under Lisbon
Having discussed the background to the Lisbon Treaty and having established that the Union has explicitly confirmed its commitment to the security-development nexus, it becomes time to have a close look at the actual institutional changes that occurred after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the first of December 2009.
As was previously stated, we are particularly interested in three modifications of the institutional set-up of the Union post-Lisbon: the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the creation of the European External Action Service, and the fusion of the DG Development with the DG EuropeAid. However, it is important to note here that these where not the only changes that were made to the Union in the Lisbon Treaty.
One of the most significant overall changes in the structure of the European Union was the fact that the former Pillar construction of the Union was rebuked in favor of a more coherent organization. Along this line, the Union became a single legal person including al the previous institutions. As such, the European Council became the Council of the European Union.
Subsequently, the Council was to be headed by the newly created President of the European Council: not to be confused with the non-existing post of President of Europe. Previously, the Council had been presidented by the head of state or government of the country that held the semiannually rotating precedency of the Council. The last head of government in this capacity was Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt after who the first President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy took over due to the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty.
Further changes related to the powers of the European Parliament. Contrary to before, post Lisbon the European Parliament and the European Council stand on equal footing on many policy fields. However, this does not apply to the policy fields under review in this thesis: development assistance and defense. (Seters and Wolff 2010:15-16) Also, the earlier mentioned General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), was split up into the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the General Affairs Council (GAC) with development cooperation falling under the FAC mandate with COREPER assuring “overall coherence”. (Seters and Wolff 2010:20)
With regard to the FAC its coordinating and coherence managing position needs to be further stressed. It has been noted that “At its sessions on Foreign Affairs, the Council deals with the whole of the Union's external action, including common foreign and security policy, foreign trade and development cooperation. A priority in recent years for the Council, in cooperation with the Commission, has been to ensure coherence in the EU's external action across the range of instruments at the Union's disposal.” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu)
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 54
Having thus discussed some of the general changes stemming from the Lisbon treaty, and having identified the far reaching nature of these reforms, it becomes time to turn to the three specific institutional changes that where introduced above.
3.3.1. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
The first of the three major institutional changes discussed here is the creation of the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Although similar in name to the already existing Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, a position fulfilled by Javier Solana, the new position has an even broader mandate. Next to the already briefly discussed President of the European Union the position of High Representative is the most significant centralization of the external action of the European Union. The position is similar to that of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which was envisaged under the European Constitution.
The creation of the position of the new High Representative stems from article 18 of the amended version of the Treaty of the European Union, following the changes included as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty. The article states that the HR shall be appointed by the European Council, in agreement with the President of the Commission and that the Council holds the power to “end his term of office by the same procedure.” The HR job description then follows, stating that:
“2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defense policy.
3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.
4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action.” (TEU art 18)
Further related to the central object of this study, the HR, according to the amended version of the TEU after Lisbon, has the authority to propose a CSDP mission to the Council. In order for such a proposal to be successful, the Council still has to unanimously agree on it. With regard to funding these missions, article 42:4 notes that, probably due to the dual-hatting of the HR/VC, she can “propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.” (TEU 42:4) This would include for example the EDF.
Thus the HR has a central position when it comes to formulating European External Relations, both within the Common Foreign and Security Policy in general as well as the
55 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Common Foreign and Defense Policy in particular. Furthermore, by presiding over the earlier discussed FAC the HR is at the center of where the foreign policy of the Union is made. Thus, in light of the position and associated tasks attributed to the position of High Representative post-Lisbon, it has been noted that the newly created post of HR “may to a certain extent be seen as a merger of two previous posts: the High Representative (the previous incumbent being Javier Solana) and the Commissioner for External Relations (Benita Ferrero-Waldner).” (Seters and Wolff 2010:21)
However, these are not the only two positions the HR will be fulfilling. The HR simultaneously acts as vice-president to the European Commission which puts her close to where it is decided where the development funds are allocated. So, next to the security position we already established as following from her position as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy the HR/VC has a strong development mandate as well. Indeed it has been noted that the HR/VC is tasked with coordinating “the Union‟s external relations, and to support and facilitate the cooperation between the Council and Commission in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of external action.” (Council of EU 2010:2)
From what we have discussed it is clear that with the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and „double heading‟ it the Vice President of the European Commission, the Union has taken clear steps at better coordinating policy across the former pillars. Due to her position as head of the FAC, High Representative, and Vice President of the Commission she is at the center of where the European Union‟s Diplomatic-, Defense- and Development policy meet. In order to support her with the wide set of tasks, the Lisbon Treaty included a call for the creation of the European External Action Service, an organization to which we will now turn our attention.
3.3.2. The European External Action Service
The second major institutional change that occurred under the Lisbon Treaty was the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, the Lisbon Treaty does not gave an outline of what the EEAS should look like. It stated that:
“In fulfilling his (sic) mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.” (TEU, post Lisbon amendments, Article 27:3)
It thus becomes apparent that the function of the newly to be created EEAS was open for debate, and thus for extensive lobbying. To a large extent the newly appointed HR/VC Catherine Ashton was free to select her own personnel. However, in order to make the EEAS G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 56 a success she had to be very careful and balance between the wishes of the three big European states, England, Germany, and France, as they all had their own ideas about the EEAS. Furthermore she had to acknowledge the wishes of the smaller member states. Next to these, due to the nature of the EEAS, she had to pay close attention to the wishes of both the Commission and the Council and, increasingly under Lisbon, to those of the European parliament.
Even though the European Parliament formally only needed to be consulted on the creation of the EEAS, which in fact it was, as the Parliament is the keeper of the EU budget it could prevent the necessary reorganization of the Commission and Council employees and funds required for the creation of the EEAS. In fact, the parliament was not comfortable over the manner in which the EEAS was organized and especially not with the limited accountability of the EEAS as it was neither a Council nor a Commission organization. Furthermore, Parliament feared that the EEAS Secretary-General, as a civil servant, would have too much power and finally, Parliament was worried about the coherence of development policy as a consequence of the EEAS. (Furness 2010:8)
Eventually a compromise was found with the creation of the post of administrative Directorate-General within the EEAS. The administrative Directorate General would report to the HR in her capacity as Vice President of the Commission, which effectively puts the EEAS in under the “same discharge procedure as that of the Commission, meaning that the Parliament will have annual right of approval.”(Furness 2010:9) This gives the European Parliament the „nuclear option‟, of rejecting the administrative DG which would subsequently freeze the entire working of the EEAS.
Although the organization was basically created from scratch it incorporated several already existing building blocks. These include the Geographical, or country Bureaus from the DG Development as well as the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the previously discussed EUMS with its Civ/Mil Cell. The actual transfer of staff took place on the first of January 2011. Below a table is included which shows the number of personnel transferred from the different European institutions into the EEAS. The total number of staff included from the other Institutions accumulated to a total number of 1643. As already mentioned, the 93 DG Development personnel included below represent the former country offices of the Directorate General.
Transfer of posts: Transfer of posts: Transfer of posts: Transfer of New posts Commission Brussels Commission Commission Delegations posts: Total 2010/2011 RELEX Brussels DEV RELEX Council 585 93 436 411 118 1643 (Source: EEAS, http://europa.eu)
There are several tasks envisioned for the EEAS. The first relates to the core of the Service: supporting the High Representative in her task as representing the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Secondly, as an external action service, the EEAS will incorporate the various
57 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Commission delegations abroad into what informally are known as the EU embassies. This places the Service in the „field‟ and thus in an excellent position of accumulating information for the HR/VC to support her in formulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As to date, responsibility of over 54 of the former Commission delegation has been taken over by the EEAS.
In reaction to the creation of the EEAS the Commission created the Foreign Policy Instruments Service (FPIS), later renamed the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) which works on foreign affairs within the mandate of the Commission. The FPI for example maintains the delegations that have not yet been incorporated into the EEAS. Furthermore, it not only shares responsibility over the instrument for stability with the EEAS, but also has its headquarters in the same building as the EEAS: the newly build Triangle building in Brussels. Due to the small size of the FPI the future of this Commission department remains uncertain.
Returning to the EEAS, another key task of the organization strongly relates to the core of this research. In the Proposal submitted to the Council in relation to the setting up of the EEAS, Catherine Ashton suggested that the Service should have primacy in the initial steps in the ODA policy cycle. The proposal states:
„The EEAS shall in particular have responsibility for preparing the Commission decisions on the strategic, multi-annual steps within the programming cycle. Given their portfolio responsibilities in the Commission, the proposals and programming documents pertaining to the European Development Fund, the Development Cooperation Instrument and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, shall be prepared by the relevant services in the EEAS and the Commission under the direct supervision and guidance of the Commissioners for Development and Neighbourhood respectively, and then jointly submitted with the High Representative for decision by the Commission.” (Council of EU 2010:8)
As this suggestion was adopted by the Council, the Service has a core tasks in the development policy of the Union, initiating programs. Programs seem to be based on the strategic interest of the Union on the one hand and the information gathered via the EU Delegations abroad on the other. However, opinions on the role development policy will take within the EEAS are miscellaneous. Some fear that the development policy will be subjugated to strategic and political agenda. Mikaela Gavas, a researcher connected to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) noted that within the EEAS:
“Development cooperation is conspicuously absent!”, further stating that “One can only assume that the development responsibilities will be taken care of by the different geographic departments in the EEAS. However, where will the development expertise and oversight come from? Where will the development leadership come from within the EEAS? The short answer is: it won‟t.” (Gaves 2010)
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 58
Others however, including the previously cited Furness, are more optimistic about the future functioning of the EEAS. Indeed, he states that: “With regard to specific regional and country programs, development cooperation cannot be isolated from foreign policy issues such as democratization, human security, good governance and regional stability. EU policy in these areas will be in the EEAS‟ mandate, and this will provide ample opportunities to focus more on the „security-development nexus,‟ especially policies and programs in fragile states.” (Furness 2010:17)
Whatever stand one takes, the EEAS will have a major say in future European development policy due to three main changes that where incorporated into the TEU as a result of the Lisbon amendments. Firstly through the role the EEAS will obtain in the Official Development Assistance cycle: being responsible for most organizing and planning as well as overseeing the Development funds: the EDF as well as the DCI. Secondly through the different country desks that have been incorporated by the EEAS, and finally through the former Commission delegations, which after Lisbon became EU delegations, run by EEAS personnel. However, the execution of development policy remains in the hands of the former DG Development and EuropeAid, which were fused after Lisbon. It is this fusion to which we will now turn our attention.
3.3.3. DG DEVCO
The last major reform we will discuss in light of the security-development nexus here is the reorganization of the European development assistance after the Treaty of Lisbon. As will be recalled, in light of the lacking performance of the development cooperation stemming from the European Union, EuropeAid (or DG AIDCO) was created in 2001 and was tasked with the execution of the EU‟s development programs stemming from the different EU funds, after these where designed by the DG Development.
However, with the shift of the planning stages of development cooperation to the newly created EEAS it remained unclear what tasks remained for the DG Development. Especially as all the country desks where moved into the EEAS. It was thus foreseen that the DG Development and EuropeAid might be joined into a new Directorate General. Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie noted that: “the Commission‟s core tasks may be reduced to the implementation stages of EU development policies – establishing annual action programs and implementation through EuropeAid. From this perspective, a merger between DG DEV and EuropeAid may well be envisaged.” (Del Biondo, Oltsch and Orbie forthcoming 12)
Indeed, on the 27th of October 2010 the Commission announced, together with other organizational changes, the official merger of what remained from the DG Development with EuropeAid into the newly created DG Development Cooperation – EuropeAid. The motive which was mentioned was to increase the efficiency of European development assistance by putting planners and operators closer together. Newly appointed director general Fokion Fotiadis stated that:
59 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
“The merger of DG Development and DG AIDCO is a unique opportunity to bring together policy design and policy delivery. It is very important for people who develop policy to have a reality check of the policies by getting the views of those who are going to implement them. On the other hand, those who have to implement policies need to understand what political objectives we pursue with the funds. Joining them together is a great opportunity to do things better, both in terms of policy design and in terms of implementation.” (Fokion Fotiadis 2011)
This leads to a somewhat strange institutional set up with regard to development policy because as will be recalled the Development Commissioner remains responsible for the overall development policy of the Union but drafting of development programs and needs assessment seem to have become a joined task of the EEAS and DG DEVCO. As was mentioned before, according to the Council decision regarding the creation of the EEAS, the development commissioner remains included on decision making in this regard, but as the Commission and thus his „own‟ Directorate general has „lost‟ all of the offices in the field, as well as the specific country desks, the needs assessment seems to have moved away from the DG DEVCO. Thus it remains to be seen how influential the development commissioner‟s impute will be.
In this regard it was recently noted that “The EEAS has declared competencies on the whole cycle of definition, preparation, planning, development, implementation and evaluation phases. Experts are reporting that according to a "workable compromise", the EEAS would be involved in 3 of the 5 steps of the planning cycle for Development, while the commission would be in charge of 2. This responsibility of DG DEV[CO] would concern the deployment, implementation and evaluation phases.” (http://www.diplomacystrategy.org)
Below an organogram is included which shows the current conundrum between DEVCO and the EEAS. The original was created by Furnall in 2010. Below adaptations have been introduced to incorporate the fusion of DG Development with AIDCO, which at the time of Furnall‟s writing had not yet been announced.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 60
(original adopted from Furnall 2010, altered by author)
3.4. ECHO
Having substantially discussed the reorganization of the European Union‟s foreign policy instruments after the amendments of the Lisbon treaty, in the final part of this chapter we will reflect on the next possible step in integrating the various instruments. After having discussed the position of the development funds in relation to European security, questions have been raised with regard to the position humanitarian aid should have. In this regard we now turn our attention towards the European Union‟s humanitarian office: ECHO.
Writing in February 2010, Drent and Zandee wonder in relation to the newly to be created EEAS “whether the areas of the Directorate General for Development, Europe Aid and ECHO should be included as well.” (Drent and Zandee 2010:16) As we already discussed above, DGDEV was indeed split up between EuropeAid and the EEAS and thus partially
61 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk integrated into the EEAS, while thus far the Unions Humanitarian Office has remained autonomously responsible for humanitarian assistance.
This has not been self-evident. Indeed there have been calls for the integration of ECHO into the EEAS in order to have the various foreign policy fields centralized. Current Commissioner of International Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, Kristalina Georgieva, stated in this regard that “We are developing the external action service, and there have been some voices saying 'let‟s pile up our instruments designed to reach out to others: development cooperation, humanitarian aid, trade, security funding, and then put it under the one big umbrella‟” (http://euobserver.com/9/31831)
However, in line with what could have been expected from the Commissioner she explained in an interview that: “We have made in Europe a conscious choice to protect the impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian aid by keeping our humanitarian service outside of our foreign affairs entity, the External Action Service. I am convinced, and so is Catherine Ashton, that this is the right choice.” (Rosenkranz 2011) In the interview she then continued to explain the importance of unbiased, neutral humanitarian aid, from several perspectives. Firstly she referred to the moral duty to help anyone in need. Secondly she stated keeping the services separate would be a good example to upcoming world powers. And thirdly she underlined the access one gains by not taking sides. (Rosenkranz 2011)
After reaffirming the independent status of ECHO, Georgieva stated that “of course, we don‟t live on two separate planets with Catherine Ashton, and there is a high degree of collaboration. It is strongest in the field, when you are in a zone of conflict, say, right now, Cote d‟Ivoire. Of course it‟s very important that the ECHO team and the External Action Service see eye to eye, we exchange information, we work together.” However, her conclusion was that we should: “Be confident that we will respect this division of labor, but we would also nurture that collaboration when it makes sense.” (Rosenkranz 2011)
However, on the 10th of February 2011 the issue of integrating ECHO was again raised by the EUobserver, when the online newspaper learned that “Discussions are under way for a potential merger between the EU's humanitarian aid and crisis management budgets after 2013, raising concerns among a number of NGOs and MEPs that EU aid could become increasingly politicized.” (euobserver.com/9/31786) A commission official working in the humanitarian aid sector who wanted to remain anonymous, was quoted saying that: “There is an idea on the table [to merge the two budgets] which is being considered by some people [ …] It's not a formal proposal at the moment and it's not something we would support.” (euobserver.com/9/31786)
Dutch Socialist Member of the European Parliament, Thijs Berman, noted with regard to the possible proposal of merging the various financial instruments that: “If it ends up in the June proposals17 I will fight it. Humanitarian aid needs to be impartial in order to ensure that all
17 The June proposal was the commission‟s budget proposal for the 2013-2020 period.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 62 parties in a recipient country accept it as not favouring one side or the other. This is also crucial for the safety of humanitarian aid workers distributing support on the ground” (Leonzon 2011)
Indeed, some of the fears relating to the potential integration of the various budgets stems from what was noted by Rizza Leonzon when she wrote that “the merger of the EU‟s humanitarian aid and crisis management budgets will prompt EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton to call the shots in humanitarian aid spending.” (Leonzon 2011b) However, no change in the humanitarian assistance instruments was reported in relation to the eventual proposal of the 29th of June, suggesting that resistance against merger was convincing enough. (Seters 2011)
Thus for now it would seem that the impartiality of humanitarian assistance has trumped foreign policy consideration, which means that ECHO will continue to exist as an independent Office within the European Union. Thanks to the reforms under the Lisbon Treaty an increasingly holistic approach with the other external orientated EU institutions, in particular DGDEVCO and the EEAS can be anticipated. However, further integration may be envisioned in the future as well.
The claimed independence of ECHO would surely be an asset when it comes to its subsequent access to crisis area. The extent to which ECHO is in fact perceived as an independent, neutral actor remains to be seen. On the one hand it would seem that because humanitarian assistance remains need-driven the influence of foreign policy should indeed be limited. However, on the other hand, the expertise aimed for within the EEAS, as well as the knowledge of current local affairs through the EU embassies makes close cooperation between the two organizations very important.
3.5. Conclusion
Having extensively discussed the background to the Lisbon Treaty and the difficult path the treaty followed before coming into effect on the 1st of December 2009 we briefly reflected on the rhetoric commitment of the Union to the security-development nexus. We found that both in policy documents as well as in interviews „post-Lisbon‟, the Union repeatedly expressed the necessity to work on the conundrum of security and development. Subsequently we discussed some of the changes that were included in the Treaty, such as the creation of the position of President of the European Council, the splitting of the former GEARC into the FAC and GAC, and the extension of the European Parliament‟s powers.
At the heart of this chapter we zoomed in on the three most substantial transformations that where included in the Reform Treaty. Most prominently was the creation of the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy which as we discovered, combined three former positions: that of the High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, Director General of RELEX, and Vice President of the European Commission. Furthermore we looked into the creation of the European External Action Service which we
63 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk found claimed a very central role for itself in the foreign affairs area of the Union, including development assistance.
The third institutional reorganization we discussed was the fusion of what was left of the DG Development after the country desks where moved to the EEAS with EuropeAid creating the DG DEVCO. We established a complicated and still unsolidified relation with the EEAS, especially over the initial stages of development projects. Indeed referring to this divide as „the awkward split concerning development policy‟ Mahony recently noted that „The EuropeAid Development and Cooperation DG looks after the development policy and establishes thematic programs. The service, on the other hand, is supposed to allocate money and look at regional strategies.” (Mahony 2011) This according to her has brought obvious turf wars with it.
However, this does not only apply to the DEVCO – EEAS relation. In this chapter we discussed the future position of ECHO and the pressure the Office has been under to merge either itself or its budget with the EEAS. In this regard commissioner Georgieva was quoted expressing the necessity for ECHO to remain an independent organization but she subsequently stressed the necessity to coordinate closely with DEVCO and the EEAS.
Recently however, it has been noted that competition between the three organizations is still strong and the relationships still need to congeal. An example of this was recently given by Mahony, who quoted „an insider‟ as saying: “They are creating new political desks in DEVCO. I don‟t think they will ever be officially called that, but there are people doing just briefings for the commissioner. It should be the EAS doing that. The same is true of ECHO [the humanitarian aid and civil protection unit]. They have their own reports. ECHO informs ECHO.” (Mahony 2011)
To conclude then, it would seem save to say that the European Union has continued to commit itself to the security-development nexus. The Lisbon Treaty indeed created the opportunity for the European Union to work along this nexus in a more coherent manner. The rhetoric has been accompanied by actual reorganization of the Union‟s foreign policy instruments. By moving large parts of DGDEV into the EEAS and with the created of the new HR/VC former „pillar boundaries‟ seem to have been overcome. If we then fill in the framework created in the first chapter based we come to the following table18:
18 For items with an –, no specific budget was included G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 64
Type Specific Manner Primacy Budget Funds EDF Integration Development 3.780.333.333 ifS Integration Security 357.444.700 DCI Integration Development 2.413.857.142 CFSP Coordination Security 326.624.000 Institutions FAC Coordination Security - PSC Coordination Security - FPI Integration Security 20.505.568 CIVCOM Integration Security 2.845.609,97 CPCC Integration Security 6.323.577 EUMC Cooperation Security 5.691.219,94 EEAS Integration Security 464.104.592 EUMS Coordination Security 17.916.803,51 Civ-Mil Cell Integration Security 3.161.788,90 DG DEVCO Coordination Development 306.661.077 ECHO Coordination Development 878.195.432 Positions HR/VG Integration Security 286.572 EUSR Integration Security 19.948.000
As was done in the previous chapter, the information above can be presented in a matrix which presents the number of items which fall in the specific quadrants:
Integration
8 2
Security
Development 5 2
Coordination
When we calculate the financial weight of the various quadrants in line with the method used in the previous chapter we arrive at the following matrix:
65 Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty | G.W. van Dijk
Integration
46,16% 0%
Security
Development 4,07% 49,77%
Coordination
Thus, after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, the number of funds, institutions and positions giving primacy to security have been most numerous. With regard to the integration – coordination divide it becomes apparent that the emphasis has been on integration. That this process has not been straightforward and that serious challenges remain is obvious. Key difficulties that need to be resolved include clarity about the mandates concerning the project circle of development projects and mandates over development funds. In this regard, the cooptation of DEVCO into the EEAS might be envisioned, whereas ECHO will probably remain autonomous.
G.W. van Dijk | Chapter 3: Europe after the Lisbon Treaty 66
General Conclusion
To recuperate, on the basis of the previous three chapters it is time to close of this thesis and answer our guiding question as we have stated it at the beginning of this research. We started this thesis with the realization that the European Union is becoming an increasingly significant actor in international relations with growing influence across its ever expanding borders. We noted that the Union had become the largest international donor of development assistance and was increasingly working on developing its own crisis management capacity.
With the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty we noted that it was time for a close analysis of the manner in which the Union has organized the interaction between its security and its development policy. The Lisbon Treaty provided an excellent point of reference as it entailed the most far reaching institutional reform of the Union to date.
In order to analyze the interaction between security and development policy within the European Union we created a theoretical framework based on a literature review focused on the security development nexus. In turn, this framework became our „searchlight theory‟ in analyzing the organization of the interaction between the different policy fields of the European Union. Our guiding question subsequently was: To what extent has the European Union adopted the security-development nexus and what direction has the operationalization of the nexus in the Union‟s foreign policy taken?
In the first chapter, we identified the deep historical roots of the nexus between security and development as a policy framework, going back to the events following the Second World War. Furthermore we observed that notwithstanding the popularization of the nexus after the Cold War, most of the actual operationalization took place post 9/11 in wake of the increased attention paid to the interaction between security and development due to the Global War on Terror.
Based on the writings of Bueger and Vennesson we identified that operationalization of the nexus can be put into a two axes matrix. On the one axis would be the primacy given to either development or security. On the other the way in which the different policy fields where made to interact: integration or cooperation. Furthermore we discussed the difference between the interaction between security and development in policy formulation and operationalization in the field. Finally we identified the potential theoretic weaknesses of „the nexus‟, including the unproven fundamental causality between security and development and a huge chasm between rhetoric and practice.
In the second chapter we were able to identify the rhetoric commitment of the European Union to working along the lines of the security-development nexus. The Union has adopted the logic of the nexus and has again and again stressed that both issues are inseparable and have to be worked on simultaneously. However, looking at the historical development of the two policy fields, we found that development cooperation has a much longer history within
67 General Conclusion | G.W. van Dijk
European foreign policy, already stemming from the Treaty of Rome, whereas the security and foreign policy arm of European policy only came into being after the Maastricht treaty.
In light of these different evolutions we analysed the manner in which the Union had actually organized the interaction between its development and security policy prior to the Lisbon Treaty. We found that the focus had been put on the coordination of the two fields trough Civil Military Coordination CMCO in policy and Civil Military Cooperation CIMIC in the field. Analysing these concepts we noted that they stemmed from a military logic, thus hinting at the precedence of security over development in European external relations.
However, when we „followed the money‟, it became apparent that the EU has tried to widen the definition of Official Development Cooperation (ODA) to include non-traditional ODA projects, such as Security Sector Reform. However, the allocation of the biggest development funds (the EDF and the DCI) fell under the mandate of institutions we identified as giving primacy to development over security. Thus, „pre-Lisbon‟, notwithstanding the large amount of so-called inter-policy organisations working on both security and development, we can state that on the basis of the financial analysis, development trumped security.
After the ratification and coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty, both the development sector as well as the security sector of the European Union where fundamentally reorganized. This was the main theme for the third chapter of this thesis. We sketched the background of the Lisbon Treaty and the continued rhetoric commitment of the Union to keep on working on security and development in a concurring manner. More fundamentally, we discussed the changes the Lisbon Treaty brought, such as the official dismantling of the „pillar‟ structure of the European Union, with the European Council becoming an EU institution.
Key elements of the treaty that were highlighted included the creation of the new position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, which combined three positions: that of High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, Director General of RELEX, and Vice President of the European Commission. Subsequently we talked about the newly created European External Action Service and the fact that it took over the European Commission‟s delegations and integrated both the EUMS as well as part of the DG Development. The rest of which was combined with EuropeAid into DEVCO. Finally we discussed the future of ECHO as an independent EU organ, as calls where increasingly heard to integrate ECHO into the EEAS or DEVCO, which however, at the time of writing has not occurred.
Undeniably, the Lisbon Treaty, with the ending of the traditional pillar structure, paved the way for a more holistic approach between the development and security policy fields. Especially the creation of the High Representative as well as the EEAS are clearly institutional reforms that place security policy and development assistance close to each other.
G.W. van Dijk | General Conclusion 68
When we looked at the post-Lisbon institutionalization of the interaction between security and development it became apparent that security has attained a much more important place in the organization of the European Union relative to what it had been. This mainly stems from the enormous influence the EEAS has claimed for itself in relation to development assistance. So far 3 of the 5 stages of development project cycles seem to be in the hands of the Service whereas DEVCO remains responsible for the execution of the projects.
In order to be able to come to our final conclusion with regard to the direction the European Union‟s effort of coming to a holistic approach between its security and development policy has taken, we recall the figures we found in the different chapters. For the period before the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty we found the figures presented below. The left matrix presents the number of funds, institutions and positions working in the different quadrants. The figure on the right presents the financial weight the different items carried.
Integration Integration
6 2 0,46% 0%
Security
Security
Development Development 5 3 10,73% 88,81%
Coordination Coordination
For the period after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, following the same method presented above, we found the following figures:
69 General Conclusion | G.W. van Dijk
Integration Integration
8 2 46,16 % 0%
Security
Security
Development Development 5 2 4,07% 49,77%
Coordination Coordination
To conclude then, the direction the European Union has given to the interaction between its development and security policy can be „calculated‟ by comparing the differences between the matrices for the period before the coming into effect of the Lisbon treaty as well as those presenting the situation after the coming into effect of the Lisbon treaty. In the graphs included below we deducted the figures found in the different quadrants for the period after, with the corresponding quadrants for the period before the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty. This leads to the following matrices:
Integration Integration
+2 - +45,70% 0%
Security
Security
Development Development - -1 -6,66% -39,04%
Coordination Coordination
From these graphs a clear direction of the manner in which the Union has given shape to the interaction between its security and development policy becomes apparent. Compared to the situation prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the Union has given more attention (and funds) to an increasingly integrated manner of interaction. Furthermore, security has become more important to the Union compared to development but has not trumped it yet. G.W. van Dijk | General Conclusion 70
Having established this „direction‟ to more integration and a primacy of security we can look forward to what lies ahead for the European Union. Interesting is the future position of DG DEVCO. In line with the direction identified in this thesis it would not seem unimaginable that DEVCO could be integrated into the EEAS. Especially as it would seem that the same arguments apply to the integration of DEVCO into the EEAS, as where raised in relation to integrating DG DEV and AIDCO. Namely that those who make the plans and those executing the plans should work closely together. Such an integration would result to a situation similar to the current situation in the Netherlands.
Having answered our main guiding question we can precede towards making some recommendations with regard to the future course which the European Union might envision for itself, in relation to the interaction between its security and development policy. There are two recommendation is particular which relate to the future of the European Union we want to raise here.
The first relates to the position of ECHO. Notwithstanding the temptations that accompany the idea of being able from a CIMIC point of view to integrate humanitarian assistance into military missions, this goes against the reason d‟être of humanitarian assistance, which, as the word ought to imply, should remain solemnly based on humanitarian grounds. ECHO should continue to work on a „need‟-basis and should not become a political instrument. Recently the organization was possible to work in areas such as Yemen which might not have been possible if it was not strictly politically neutral.
Secondly, DEVCO should be fully integrated into the EEAS. Albeit this does raise the danger of completely subjugating development assistance to political ambitions, development per definition holds a view of what a society should look like, and implies political changes. The current situation of the EEAS being responsible for the first three stages of the project cycle and DEVCO for the latter two makes for an inefficient development program. Furthermore, integrating DEVCO into the EEAS will prevent duplications and bring development cooperation closer to the European embassies. Furthermore it would create a stronger development bloc within the EEAS, thus affirming the European Union‟s commitment to poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals in its foreign policy.
71 General Conclusion | G.W. van Dijk
Bibliography
Books
Anderson, M.B. (1999) Do no harm: how aid can support peace–or war (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder)
Baarda D.B., M.P.M. de Goede and J. Teunissen (2005) Basisbook kwalitatief onderzoek, handleiding voor het opzetten en uitvoeren van kwalitatfief onderzoek (Wolters-Noordhof, Groningen)
Chant, S. and C. McIlwaine (2009) Geographies of development in the 21st century: An introduction to the global south (Edward Elgar Publishing, London)
Dijkzeul, D. and J. Herman, Eds. (2010) Humanitaire ruimte: tussen onpartijdigheid en politiek (Academia Press, Gent)
Lasswell, H. D. (1950) National security and individual freedom (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York)
Tschirgi, N., M.S. Lund, and F. Mancini, Eds. (2010) Security and development: Searching for critical connections (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder)
Vos, H. ed. (2010) De impact van de Europese Unie, Beleidsterreinen, strijdpunten en uitdagingen (ACCO, Leuven)
Articles and online sources
Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) (2009) “Crisis management operations in fragile states, the need for a coherent approach” Advisory Repost No. 64
Beijnum, M. van, and L. van de Goor (2006) “The Netherlands and its whole of government approach on Fragile States, case study Sudan.” OECD DAC fragile states group, Clingendael http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cru_paper_sudan.pdf
Bell, L. (2003) “The Global Conflict Prevention Pool, a joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict” Foreign and Commonwealth Office Publication
Brown, S. (2008) “CIDA under the gun” in Daudelin, J. and D. Schwanen eds. (2008) Canada Among Nations 2007: What Room for Manoeuvre? (McGill-Queen‟s University Press, Montreal)
Bueger, C. and P. Vennesson (2009) “Security, development and the EU‟s development policy” European University Institute – Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
G.W. van Dijk | Bibliography 72
Council of the European Union (2010) “Draft Council decision establishing the 73uropa73ize7373 and functioning of the European External Action Service” Document # 8029/10
Council of the European Union (2007) “Security and development, Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the member states meeting within the Council” Document # 14919/07
Council of the European Union (2005) “The EU Battlegroups and the EU Civilian and Military Cell” Factsheet Retrieved from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf
Council of the European Union (2003) “Civil military coordination” Document # 14457/03
Council of the European Union (2000) “EU Special Representatives: Guidelines for appointing procedures and administrative arrangements” Document # 7089/00
Drent, M. (2010) “Tien jaar Europees Veiligheids- en Defensiebeleid: problemen en potentie” Internationale Spectator 64:1 16-20
Drent, M. and Zandee (2010) “Breaking Pillars, Towards a civil-military security approach for the European Union” Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague.
Duffield, M. (2002) “Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: Aid as a relation of global liberal governance” Development and Change 33:5 1049-1071
Duffield, M. (2005) “Getting savages to fight barbarians: development, security and the colonial present” Conflict, Security and Development 5:2 141-157
Engberg-Pedersen, L., L. Anderson and F. Stepputat (2008) “Fragile situations: Current debates and central dilemmas” Danish Institute for International Studies Report
Einsiedel, S. von (2005) “Policy responses to state failure” in Chesterman, S., Ignatieff, M. and R. Thakur eds. (2005) Making states work: State failure and the crisis of governance (United Nations University Press, Tokyo)
European Think Tanks Group (DIE, ODI, FRIDE and ECDPM) policy Brief (2010) “Development-proofing the European External Action Service” retrieved from: www.europesworld.org/Portals/0/.../development-proofing-the-eeas-.pdf
European Commission (2009) “Somalia: Factsheet” retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/assistance_UE_somalia_2009_EN.pdf
European Commission (2001) Annual report 2001 on the EC development policy and the implementation of the external assistance retrieved from: ec.europa.eu/.../annual- reports/europeaid_annual_report_2001_en.pdf
European Report on Development (2010) Social Protection for Inclusive Development
73 Bibliography | G.W. van Dijk http://erd.eui.eu/
Fitz-Gerald, A.M. (2006) “Addressing the security-development nexus: implications for joined-up government” in Klingebiel, S. ed. (2006) New Interfaces between security and development: changing concepts and approaches, German Development Institute.
Gaves, M. (2010) “A u-turn on the European External Action Service? Where is development?” http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2010/10/14/development_european_externa l_action_service.aspx?utm_source=ODI_Blog&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Google+ Reader
Gavas, M., S. Maxwell (2009) “Options for architectural reform in European Union development cooperation” Overseas Development Institute Background Note www.odi.org.uk
Germond, B. and M.E. Smith (2009) “Re-thinking European security interest and the ESDP: Explaining the EU‟s Anti-Piracy Operation” Contemporary Security Policy 30:3 573-593
Gebhard, C. (2008) “ Civil-military coordination and cooperation in the context of the EU‟s crisis management CMCO versus CIMIC” National Defence Academy
Glasius, M. (2008) “Human Security from paradigm shift to operationalization: Job description for a human security worker” Security Dialogue 39 31-54
Greco, E., N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri Eds (2010) EU crisis management: institutions and capabilities in the making Istituto Affari Internazionali http://www.iai.it/pdf/quaderni/quaderni_e_19.pdf
Grevi, G., D. Helly, and D Keohane Eds (2009) European Security and Defense Policy, the first 10 years (1999-2009) European Union Institute for Security Studies (Corlet Imprimeur, Condé- sur-Noireau)
Grevi, G. (2007) “Pioneering foreign policy: the EU Special Representatives” Chaillot Paper # 106
Gross, E. (2008) “EU and the comprehensive approach” Danish Institute for International Studies Report 2008:13
Homan, C. (2010) “Valt veiligheid ook onder ontwikkelingssamenwerking?” www.clingendeal.nl/publications/20/20101129_CSCP_artikel.homan.pdf visited on 05/02/2011
Howell, J. (2006) “The global war on terror, development and civil society” Journal of International Development 18 121-135
G.W. van Dijk | Bibliography 74
Hurwitz, A. and G. Peake, reporters (2004) “Strengthening the security-development nexus: Assessing International Policy and Practive Since the 1990s” International Peace Academy Conference Report
Hynek, N. (2010) “Consolidating the EU‟s crisis management structures: civil-military coordination and the future of the EU OHQ” DG EXPO Standard Briefing http://tepsa.be/Hynek%20Consolidating%20the%20EU%20Crisis%20Management%20Stru ctures.pdf
Ignatieff, M. (2002) “Intervention and state failure” Dissent 49:1 114-123
Ioannides, I. (2010) “EU civilian capabilities and 75uropa75ize75 with the military sector” in Greco, E., N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri Eds (2010) EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making Istituto Affari Internazionali
Joint declaration issued at the British –French summit, Saint-Malo (1998) retrieved from: http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2002/02/joint-declaration-on-eu-new01795
Klingebiel, S. and K. Roehder (2005) “Subordination or cooperation? New interfaces between development and security policy” Peace, Conflict and Development 6
Leonzon, R. (2011) “Planned merger of EU humanitarian, crisis budgets draws flak” http://www.devex.com/en/articles/planned-merger-of-eu-humanitarian-crisis-budgets- draws-flak?source=ArticleHomepage_Center_2
Ling, T. (2002) “Delivering joined–up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems” Public Administration 80:4 615-642
Macrae, J. and N. Leader (2000) “The politics of coherence: The UK government‟s approach to linking political and humanitarian responses to complex political emergencies” Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group Research Brief
Manley, J. (2008) “ Report of the Independent Panel on Canada‟s Future Role in Afghanistan” dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf
Mahony, H. (2011) “Diplomatic service blues” Blogs.euobserver.com/mahony/)
Menkhaus, K. (2004) “Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia” Conflict, Security and Development 4:2 149-165
Menocal, A.R. (2008) “International workshop on human rights and state-building – A new paradigm for development assistance in fragile states?” Workshop Report, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark and the Overseas Development Institute. Copenhagen 21 April 2008
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2002) Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002
75 Bibliography | G.W. van Dijk
Paris, R. (1997) “Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism” International Security 22:2 54-89)
Pasquini, E.L. (2011) “EU‟s new development aid architecture: A conversation with Fokion Fotiadis” http://www.devex.com/en/articles/eu-s-new-development-aid-architecture-a- conversation-with-fokion-fotiadis-part-1
Performance and Information Unit (PIU) (2000) Wiring it up. Whitehall‟s management of cross cutting policies and services. Retrieved from: ctpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Wiring- it-Up-2000.pdf
Phillips, L. (2009) “Somalia wins over $200m in Brussels donor‟s conference” Euobserver 24/04/2009 http://euobserver.com/?aid=28001 visited on 15/07/2011
Pirozzi, N. and S. Sandawi (2009) “Military and Civilian ESDP Missions: Ever Growing and Effective?” Documenti 29:09, Instituto Affari Internazionali
Pop, V. (2010) “Somalia security forces to get EU training” Euobserver 25/01/2010 http://euobserver.com/?aid=29333 visited on 25/03/2011
Pop, V. (2009) “EU could send police mission to Somalia” Euobserver 18/05/2009 http://euobserver.com/?aid=28143 visited on 25/03/2011
Pronk, J. (1993) “Een wereld in geschil” Nota aan de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal der Nederlanden
Robinson, C. (2006) “Integration and integrity in EU politics for security and development” in Klingebiel, S. ed. (2006) New Interfaces between security and development: changing concepts and approaches, German Development Institute.
Rosenkranz, R (2011) “The state of EU humanitarian relief, a conversation with ECHO chief Kristalina Georgieva“ http://www.devex.com/en/articles/the-state-of-eu-humanitarian- relief-a-conversation-with-echo-chief-kristalina-georgieva
Rood, J.Q. Th. (2009) “De EU na het Verdrag van Lissabon: Naar een nieuw politiek en institutioneel evenwicht?” in R.H. van Ooik en R.A. Wessel red. (2009) De Europese Unie na het Verdrag van Lissabon (Kluwer, Deventer)
Seters, J. van, and S. Wolff (2101) “European Development Cooperation: Brokering environmental knowledge beyond Lisbon” ECDPM discussion paper 102
Seters, J. van (2011) “The EU financial framework 2014 – 2020: what‟s in it for development cooperation?” http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/mff2011-whats-in-for-development- cooperation/
Stewart, F. (2004) “Development and security” Conflict, Security and Development 4:3 261-288
G.W. van Dijk | Bibliography 76
Tschirgi, N. (2006) “Security and development policies: untangling the relationship” in Klingebiel, S. ed. (2006) New Interfaces between security and development: changing concepts and approaches, German Development Institute.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1994) Human development report
Waddell, N. (2006) “Ties that bind: DfiD and the emerging security and development agenda” Conflict, Security and Development 6:4 531-554
Willis, A. (2011) “EU aid chief: merger with foreign policy „over my dead body‟” Euobserver http://euobserver.com/9/31831
Youngs, R. (2008) “Fusing security and development: Just another Europlatitude?” Journal of European Integration 30:3, 419-437
Websites
http://ec.europa.eu/echo http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid http://europa.eu www.africa-eu-partnership.org www.consilium.europa.eu www.developmentportal.eu www.diplomacystrategy.org www.diplomatie.gouv.fr www.international.gc.ca www.isis-europe.org
77 Bibliography | G.W. van Dijk
Appendix
Appendix 1: Chances and risks of development – military co-operation from the perspective
Table 1: Chances and risks of development – military co-operation from the perspective of the different actors involved Actor Chances Risks - Risk that development policy may find itself subordinated to a military strategy as well as to short- term political considerations - Security risk in that development policy may - Security and stability as find itself in the position of the sine qua non for the a target of attacks development of the country - The possibility that affected involvement of - Security as a condition development policy may required for the serve to 78uropa78ize and engagement of support military development policy interventions - Constructive influence on - Risk of public criticism Development Policy security strategies along the lines: - Influence on approaches “Development policy adopted by military actors providing military in areas relevant to assistance” development policy - Resources may be - Coherence of overall diverted from the “core policy, including business” of development consideration of aspects policy (i.e. long-term tasks) relevant to development - Resources used for policy noncivil tasks are not eligible for recognition as ODA - Regional reorientation of development policy - Possible inability to adhere to principles of development policy - Greater acceptance on the - Possibility of mission part of the local population creep when the military due to better planning of takes on a growing number Military civil activities of civil tasks on the ground - Access to additional - Demands for more (development policy) transparency/disclosure of resources (financial, military strategy vis-à-vis G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 78
advisory, implementation) third parties - Parallel command structures and, possibly, restriction of powers of discretion on the military side - Complementary and effective approach in acute - Loss of impartiality and crises based on purely neutrality subsidiary aid provided by - Security risk (NGOs as a the military NGOs soft target) - Depending on the - Diversion of funds to concrete case, a more secure countries in which military setting for the missions are underway. implementation of projects and programs. (source: Kliengenbiel and Roehder 2005:11-13)
Appendix 2: Institutional organization of the CFSP/ESDP
(Source : http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr)
79 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
Appendix 3 : The European Commission and development assistance
Commission Commissioner Position Hallenstein 1 Robert Lemaignen Overseas Development Hallenstein 2 Henri Rochereau Overseas Development Rey Henri Rochereau Development Assistance Jean-François Deniau Foreign Trade, Enlargement and Assistance to Developing Countries” Malfatti Jean-François Deniau External Relations & Development Aid Mansholt Jean-François Deniau Foreign Affairs & Development Aid Ortoli Jean-François Deniau Development cooperation Claude Cheysson Development Jenkins Claude Cheysson Development Thorn Claude Cheysson, Edgard Development Pisani Delors 1 Lorenzo Natali Cooperation, development affairs and enlargement Claude Cheysson Mediterranean policy and North-South relations Delors 2 Manuel Marin Cooperation, development and fisheries Henning Christophersen Economic & financial affairs and coordination of structural funds Delors 3 Manuel Marin Cooperation, development and humanitarian aid Santer João de Deus Pinheiro Relations with African, Caribbean, Pacific Countries, South Africa and the Lomé Convention Prodi Poul Nielson Development & Humanitarian Aid After 2004 expansion Joe Borg Development & Humanitarian Aid Barosso 1 Louis Michel, Karel De Development and Gucht Humanitarian Aid Barosso 2 Andris Piebalgs Development Kristalina Georgieva International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response
G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 80
Appendix 4: Overview of ESDP missions between 2003 – 2009
Source: (Pirozzi and Sandawi 2009)
Appendix 5: Chart of ESDP mission between 2003 – 2009
http://www.isis-europe.org/ 81 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
Appendix 5: Justification for budget of the European Union before the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty
Type Specific Budget Explanation and source Funds EDF 2.087.500.000 Budget 9th EDF 2000-2007= EUR16.700.000.000 /8 = 2.087.500.000 per year ifS 100.000.000 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2007_VOL4/EN/n mc-titleN188CA/nmc-chapterN60591451817- 26/articles/index.html#N60591451914-28 DCI 2.413.857.142 Budget 2007-2013 = EUR 16.897.000.000/7 = 2.413.857.142 a year
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/develo pment/general_development_framework/l14173 _en.htm CSDP 159.200.000 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:1535:1537:EN:PDF
CFSP military operations are not covered by the European Union but are funded separately from the EU budget by the member states. Institutions PSC - No specific budget could be found: not a standing institution but a council. RELEX 379.654.859 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:1535:1537:EN:PDF DG DEV 132.097.865 Total administrative expenditure on development was 264.195.730. Cost is split between the DG DEV and EuropeAid.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:1656:1662:EN:PDF ECHO 741.014.000 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publicati ons/annual_report/annual_report_2010.pdf page 155 Europe- 132.097.865 Total administrative expenditure on development Aid was 264.195.730. Cost is split between the DG DEV and EuropeAid.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:1656:1662:EN:PDF CIVCOM 3.198.193,55 Total budget CIVCOM, EUMS, EUMC, and Civ- Mil Cell was: 40.392.000
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 82
:L:2007:077:0281:0293:EN:PDF
Total employees in this field was approximately 341.
Actual size of CIVCOM was not found. By approximation, based on total EU member states at the time = 27.
Thus, 27/341 of 40.392.000 = 3.198.193,55 EUMC 6.396.387,01 Total budget CIVCOM, EUMS, EUMC, and Civ- Mil Cell was: 40.392.000
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:0281:0293:EN:PDF
Total employees in this field was approximately 341.
Actual size of EUMC was not found. By approximation, based on total EU member states at the time = 54.
Thus, 54/341 of 40.392.000 = 6.396.387,01 EUMS 20.136.774,19 Total budget CIVCOM, EUMS, EUMC, and Civ- Mil Cell was: 40.392.000
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:0281:0293:EN:PDF
Total employees in this field was approximately 341.
Precise size of EUMS was not found. Around 200 personnel:
http ://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESD P_10-web.pdf page 42,
Minus Civ-Mil Cell = 30 Thus, 170/341 of 40.392.000 = 20.136.774,19 Civ-Mil 3.553.548,39 Total budget CIVCOM, EUMS, EUMC, and Civ- Cell Mil Cell was: 40.392.000
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:0281:0293:EN:PDF
Total employees in this field was approximately 83 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
341.
Precise size of EUMS was not found. Around 30 personel:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsU pload/070227BriefingCCMBrausstoEP.pdf
Thus, 30/341 of 40.392.000 = 20.136.774,19 CPCC 7.107.096,77 Total budget CIVCOM, EUMS, EUMC, and Civ- Mil Cell was: 40.392.000
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ :L:2007:077:0281:0293:EN:PDF
Total employees in this field was approximately 341.
Precise size of CPCC was not found. Around 60 personnel:
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload /pages24-25-CEU8003ESDP6final_vers.pdf
Thus, 60/341 of 40.392.000 = 7.107.096,77 Positions HR/SG 254.174,70 In 2006, 16th level 3rd step was: 16.944.98 a month, makes 203.339,76 a year.
HR/SG earned 125% A1 final step. See:
Council Decision laying down the conditions of employment of the Secretary-General, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, of the Council of the European Union Retrieved from http://www.ena.lu/
100% = 203339,76, thus 125%= 254.174,70
http://ec.europa.eu/reform/pdf/salaries_study_ en.pdf EUSR 14.000.000 http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai 106.pdf page 21
G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 84
Appendix 6: Justification for budget of the European Union after the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty
Type Specific Budget Explanation + Source Funds EDF 3.780.333.333 Budget 10th 2008 to 2013 = EUR 22.682.000.000 /6 = 3.780.333.333 a year
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/develo pment/overseas_countries_territories/r12102_en. htm ifS 357.444.700 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do ?uri=O J :L :2011 :068 :FULL :EN :PDF page II787 DCI 2.413.857.142 Budget 2007-2013 = EUR 16.897.000.000/7 = 2.413.857.142 a year
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/develo pment/general_development_framework/l14173 _en.htm CFSP 326.624.000 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/LBL2011/EN/SEC0 3.pdf
CFSP military operations are not covered by the European Union but are funded separately from the EU budget by the member states. Institutions FAC - No specific budget could be found: not a standing institution but a council. PSC - No specific budget could be found: not a standing institution but a council. FPI 20.505.568 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/LBL2011/EN/SEC0 3.pdf CIVCOM 2.845.609,97 Budget 2011 was not available.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2011/EN/SEC02.p df
figure used was based on same calculation as used in 2007, making use of the 2010 budget.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL3/EN/n mc-titleN51171761465-1/index.html CPCC 6.323.577 Budget 2011 was not available.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2011/EN/SEC02.p df 85 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
figure used was based on same calculation as used in 2007, making use of the 2010 budget.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL3/EN/n mc-titleN51171761465-1/index.html EUMC 5.691.219,94 Budget 2011 was not available.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2011/EN/SEC02.p df
figure used was based on same calculation as used in 2007, making use of the 2010 budget.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL3/EN/n mc-titleN51171761465-1/index.html EEAS 464.104.592 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O J:L:2011:068:FULL:NL:PDF EUMS 17.916.803,51 Budget 2011 was not available.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2011/EN/SEC02.p df
figure used was based on same calculation as used in 2007, making use of the 2010 budget.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL3/EN/n mc-titleN51171761465-1/index.html Civ-Mil 3.161.788,90 Budget 2011 was not available. Cell http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2011/EN/SEC02.p df
figure used was based on same calculation as used in 2007, making use of the 2010 budget.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL3/EN/n mc-titleN51171761465-1/index.html DG 306.661.077 http://eur- DEVCO lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL4/EN/n mc-titleN19A00/nmc- chapterN19A39/index.html#N19A39
G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 86
ECHO 878.195.432 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O J:L:2011:068:FULL:EN:PDF II913 Positions HR/VG 286.572 130% salary grade 16 3rd step. This excludes benefits.
http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O J:L:2009:322:0036:01:EN:HTML 16, 3rd step being 18.370,84 (23.881 a month) times 12 = 286.572
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/salary_o fficials_en.pdf EUSR 19.948.000 http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=O J:L:2011:068:FULL:NL:PDF page776
Appendix 7 : Explanation of placing funds, institutions and positions.
Type Specific Manner Primacy Funds CSDP Coordination Security
Common Security Clear focus on security European Union‟s and Defense Policy and defense policy: little security and defense attention paid to military policy. affairs. DCI Integration Development
Development Focus on essential needs Very large European Cooperation as well as post-crisis Union development aid Instrument situations. instrument. EDF Integration Development
European Focus on development Largest European Development Fund aid, but known to support Union development aid security projects in order fund. to come to a holistic approach. ifS Integration Security
Instrument for Short term crisis reaction, The purpose is to react Stability long term development to sudden instability goals. and crisis and only then prepare for long)term development Institutions PSC Coordination Security
Political Security Clear focus on Monitor the
87 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
Committee international security: international situation, little attention paid to to present opinions on development aid. the ESDP to the Council and to monitor the implementation of specific policies. CIVCOM Integration Security
Committee for Set up in order to ensure a Focus in on ensuring Civilian Aspects of higher degree of inter- improvements in the Crisis Management pillar coherence in the crisis response EU's civilian crisis capabilities of the management. European Union. Civ-Mil Cell Integration Security
Civilian- Military Cell Specifically created to Set up within the fully integrate military EUMS, aim was to and civilian expertise. enhance a holistic approach in crisis- response. CPCC Integration Security
Civilian Planning and Created in order to Part of CSFP, mandate Conduct Capability provide planning focuses on civil (non- structure for CIVCOM. developmental) planning in relation to crisis response. DG DEV Coordination Development
Directorate General Clear focus on Former European for Development development aid: little Union‟s development attention paid to military directorate general. affairs. DG DEVCO Coordination Development
Directorate General Clear focus on European Union‟s EuropeAid development aid: little integrated Development and attention paid to military development aid Cooperation affairs. directorate general. ECHO Coordination Development
Humanitarian Aid Clear focus on European Union‟s department of the humanitarian aid: little humanitarian Office. European attention paid to military Commission affairs. EEAS Integration Security
European External Works on both security as Primary mandate Action Service well as development focused on external affairs. and security policy in support of HR/VC G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 88
EUMC Coordination Security
European Union Clear focus on military Solemnly Consists of Military Committee affairs: little attention paid military staff. to development aid. Supposed to advice PSC on military affairs. EUMS Coordination Security
European Union Clear focus on military Solemnly Consists of Military Staff affairs: little attention paid military staff. to development aid Supposed to advice PSC on military affairs. EuropeAid Coordination Development
Directorate General Clear focus on European Union‟s for Aid Coordination development aid: little development attention paid to military coordinating affairs. directorate general. FAC Coordination Security
Foreign Affairs Brings together ministers Headed by HR/VC Council of foreign affairs, defense, who‟s mandate focuses trade and development on security. Usual assistance composition of council are only foreign affairs ministers. FPI Integration Security
Foreign Policy As Commission Main task is to manage Instruments department integrates a crisis response security and development facility. policy. RELEX Coordination Security
Directorate General Worked in cooperation Mandate focused on for External Relations with DGDEV, EuropeAid, external representation ECHO, in light of the of the European Union CFSP: supported the and crisis response. HR/SG Positions HR/SG Integration Security
High Representative Stands above traditional Mandate focuses on for Common Foreign policy field divide and foreign and security and Security Policy. have thus been able to affairs /Secretary-General of integrate both the Council of the European Union HR/VG Integration Security
High Representative Stand above traditional Mandate focuses on of the Union for policy field divide and foreign and security 89 Appendix | G.W. van Dijk
Foreign Affairs and have thus been able to affairs Security Policy/Vice integrate both president of the European Commission EUSR Integration Security
European Union Stand above traditional So far have been send Special policy field divide and to region of security Representative have thus been able to concern integrate both
G.W. van Dijk | Appendix 90