• 0

CATHOLICISM AND CRISIS: L *ECOLE SOCIALE POPULAIRE AND THE

DEPRESSION IN QUEBEC,

by

F. J. Frigon

B.A., University of British Columbia, 1967.

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of

the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

HISTORY

We accept this thesis as conforming to the

required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

October, 1972. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study.

I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of

The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada

Date November 3, 1972. -i-

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to determine how a group of socially-concerned French-speaking Catholics grouped around

l'Ecole Sociale Populaire or E.S.P. of Montreal reacted to the depression. Their importance lay in the fact that they were charged with the task of adapting the Church's organization and teachings to Quebec's changing socio-economic structure. As a result, they had developed by 1930 a network of interlocking organizations and relationships in Quebec and in Europe. The

fund of ideas and experiences which the E.S.P. accumulated thereby was disseminated amongst French Canadian elite groups largely through the medium of monthly pamphlets. Thus, when the depression struck and made Montreal, of Canada's urban regions, one of its chief victims, the members of the E.S.P. were put to the test.

The misery and insecurity engendered by the collapse of the economic system stimulated a demand for viable solutions and for action.

An examination of the pamphlets published by the E.S.P. between 1930 to 1940 indicates that its members were slow in perceiving the causes and effects of the depression. Yet the

E.S.P. was quick to mount a campaign to stop the growth, especially

in Quebec, of Communism and, for a time, of the Cooperative

Commonwealth Federation. Nevertheless, the E.S.P.'s pamphlets reveal that as time went on an increasingly serious split developed amongst its members primarily over the attitude Catholics should -ii- adopt towards the existing socio-economic system.

The E.S.P.'s programme for dealing with the depression manifested an ambiguous attitude towards the state. On one hand, there seemed to be a fear of too much state intervention and, on the other, there was an acknowledgement that only the state could deal quickly and effectively with the problems created by the depression. Equally important, many members of the E.S.P. favoured long-term structural reforms such as a return to self- sufficient agriculture through a programme of colonization rather than immediate ones. Later, the E.S.P. was to embrace but not with equal fervour the Catholic concept of corporatism as the long- range solution. Another factor which shaped the E.S.P.'s response to the depression was the tendency of its members to consider all proposals and activities primarily in terms of combatting Commun• ism and Socialism.

In evaluating their accomplishments, some members of the

E.S.P. came to realize that they had enjoyed less than complete success. They appeared to have been most disappointed with the colonization programme and most satisfied with the anti-Communist campaign. A personal assessment of the E.S.P.'s efforts finds its commitment to social justice and to pluralism within the

Church to have been its most attractive features. The most unattractive aspect of the E.S.P.'s publications was the tendency on the part of its authors to subordinate all values to the main• tenance and expansion of the Church's influence and organization.

This tendency helps to explain why the E.S.P.'s proposals and activities did not give due consideration to the mass misery created by the depression and to the power wielded by the economic -iii- elite. In turn, this conclusion helps to explain why the E.S.P. did not have a greater impact at this time. Nevertheless the depression seems to have given birth to new conceptions of the role of the Church and of its members. With time these new ideas were to bring about a drastic alteration in the form and substance of the Church. -iv-

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

I. The Church in French Canada... 1

II. The rise of Social Catholicism 12

III. The depression in Quebec 32

IV. The E.S.P. and Capitalism 41

V. The E.S.P. and Communism 52

VI. The roots of the Catholic programme ... 81

VII. The role of the state in the Christian society 91

VIII. The Catholic alternatives to monopoly capitalism 105

IX. The role of the E.S.P. and of Catholics in

realizing the ideal 126

X. The success and the failure of Social Catholicism.... 136

XI. Bibliography 148

XII. Appendices A. Key Nationalist and Social Catholic organizations and personalities 158

B. The aims of the E.S.P 172

C. The political programmes of the E.S.P 174

XIII. Footnotes 186 -1-

Chapter I

The Church in French Canada

The purpose of this investigation is to determine how a

group of socially-concerned Catholics in the province of Quebec

reacted to the depression. Through their eyes it should be possible to come to some understanding of the Roman Catholic

Church's reaction to this socio-economic crisis. Two questions, however, immediately come to mind. Can the historian treat the

Church as he would any other institution? Can he understand the

spirit as well as the letter of the writings of this group if he

does not consider the supernatural dimension? It would appear

that the only rational procedure he can adopt is to see what the

clergy considered to be .their position in society.

What was the position of the Church within French-Canada?

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Catholic clergy had become the unchallenged leaders of French Canadian society."'"

The hierarchy, in a collective letter issued on September 22, 1875,

asserted that,

"La fin de l'Eglise est le bonheur eternel des antes, fin supreme et derniere de l'homme; la society civile a pour fin le bonheur temporel des peuples. Par la nature meme des choses, la socigtg civile se trouve indirectement, (sic) mais v§ritablement surbordonnSe; car, non seulement elle doit s'abstenir de tout ce qui peut mettre obstacle a la fin derniere et supreme de l'homme, mais encore, elle doit aider l'Eglise dans sa mission divine, et au besoin la proteger et la d§fendre."^

Thus, the Church, as the chief instrument of God on earth,

demanded that it be accorded a pre-eminent position in a Catholic -2- society. It followed from this assertion that the hierarchy's position was one of leadership. In the words of Msgr. Paquet, a leading Thomist theologian,

"...pour conserver et consolider cette unite morale (sic) dont 1'absence sterilerait tous nos efforts, rien n'est plus essentiel qu1une soumission filiale aux enseignements de l'Eglise et une docilite parfaite envers les chefs autorisis qui representent parmi nous son pouvoir."3

From statements such as these and from its activities, many of which will be discussed in this study, the Church made it quite clear that it was concerned with power over men's minds and actions. As such, it must be studied and evaluated as a man- made organization.

The secret of the Church's success in asserting its dominance over French-Canada lay in the flexibility of its organization. A sociologist, H. Guindon, has described it in these terms:

"It had a centralized bureaucratic structure organized on a regional basis into dioceses with the best communications system of all institutions and a dis• cipline and staff approximating the effectiveness of the military."4 The basic unit was the parish. In a rural setting, the parish fulfilled not only spiritual but also social, cultural, political 5 and, even, economic functions. With increasing urbanization, the parish demonstrated its adaptability by retaining this central position in the lives of the French Canadians in spite of the pressures of city life.

The Church's most reliable ally in carrying out its work was the patriarchical, extended family system. It provided the necessary element for growth - children - and transmitted the teachings of the Church to them. Within the parish, a -3-

family's status could and did vary according to the degree of religious conviction it demonstrated in its conduct. At the summit of this social pyramid stood the priest - the father of all - supervising, guiding and instructing his parishioners.

Furthermore, the Church controlled the educational system.

While most of the farmers1 sons and daughters never acquired more than an elementary education, the elite attended the

"colleges classiques". Developed primarily to provide a

Christian humanist foundation to candidates for the priesthood, these secondary institutions, in effect, controlled the avenues

7 of social mobility and intellectual development. The clerics often picked the candidates, often financed them, socialized them through the type of education provided and, when the

students proved to be unsuited for the priesthood, often provided

the training required for the other two most prestigious professions - law and medicine. Consequently, the elite of

French Canada was in many ways literally the creation of the clergy.

Another factor which maintained the power of the clergy in

French-Canada was the prestige it enjoyed. No other French-

speaking group could aspire to a comparable status because of

the dominance of English-speaking elites in the economic and political spheres in Quebec and in Canada. Only through the ranks of the clergy could a French-speaking Canadian reach a position where he could exercise power on an equal footing with the English-speaking elite while remaining totally within his g

own culture. Such prestige must have acted as a magnet for

the best talents that French Canada could produce. -4-

With such spiritual, material, and intellectual resources, it was only natural that the clergy should take the lead in elaborating and articulating the deepest values of French g

Canadian life. One of its leading theorists was abbe Louis-

Francois Lafleche, who later became bishop of Trois Rividres.

His ideas had a great influence on succeeding generations - especially on the clergy. A nationality, for him, was: "...un peuple qui parle la meme langue, qui a la meme foi, et dont les moeurs, les coutumes, les usages et les lois sont uniformes."

A patriot was someone who loved,"...sa patrie terrestre, parce qu'elle est pour lui un avant gout de la patrie cileste..."

It was unthinkable that patriotism and religion should ever be separated for, as he exclaimed: "que serait, en effet, un

]&atriotisme sans religion, sinon une fureur aveugle, un non-sens, une absurdity?" He asserted that the mission of the French-

Canadian nation was, "...essentiellement religieuse." It consisted of, "...la conversion et la civilisation des sauvages de ce pays, (sic) et le but que leur a assigne la Providence n'est rien moins que 1'gtablissement (sic) d'un peuple profond^ment catholique (sic) dans cette terre qu'elle leur a donnee en heritage, (sic)"

Given their position, it was inevitable that Lafleche and other clerics should blend religion and patriotism in this way.

This fusion of religion and nationalism reflected in part the policy of the French-speaking clergy since the British conquest of Canada.1"^ As they never tired of reminding their country• men, the clerics had never wavered in their defense of French

Canadian rights nor tired in their efforts to fulfill what they -5- believed to be the needs and aspirations of the group. In part, this alliance of culture and religion reflected the personal 12 link binding the Church to every French Canadian family. More important than these, however, was the fact that such an alliance bound French Canadians to the Church. Behind the aphorism, "la langue, gardienne de la foi", behind slogans such as "provincial autonomy" and behind the successive battles for French Canadian rights stood the Church, forever the guardian of "la survivance" - of French Canadian culture yes, but, more important - of the faith in Anglo-Protestant North America.

To preserve the language and the faith, the clergy supervised and regulated the group's social mores. Controlling a wide variety of official and unofficial sanctions and rewards, the clerics could regulate to a high degree the conduct of individual members as well as the type of influences allowed to penetrate 13 their consciousness. Even the political process at all levels was subject more or less, depending on the issue and the individ• ual , to their controls. While the clergy was forced to become more discreet in asserting and exercising their power, the fact was, as Andre Siegfried noted, that the Church "...lives outside the jurisdiction of the civil power; above (sic) it, the ecclesiastics sometime maintain and always feel. The law not merely places no obstacles in their way, but on the contrary, it supports them."14

As a result, Siefgried wrote, "Liberty appears in the laws, but does not yet exist in the customs of the people."

Whatever the effect on the average French Canadian, the total result of this situation was highly beneficial to the Church. -6-

Interacting upon one another, these factors generalized and intensified the level of faith and submissiveness to the clergy 15 to make French Canada one of the most Catholic of nations. In concrete terms, this meant a steady increase in the rate of religious vocations until it stabilized at a level matched by 16 few other nations. This development, in turn, served to reinforce the dominance of the Church by providing it with the personnel required to maintain and extend its influence.

But the very success of the Church in molding French Canada in its own image created a problem of increasing seriousness.

The Church encouraged the formation of large families. The 17 result was one of the highest birth rates in the world. There was little, however, that the Church could do about the lack of suitable lands to support such families. Wherever such lands were to be found, whether in the Eastern Townships, the Lac-St.

Jean region, the isolated valleys of the Laurentians and the

Gasp§ peninsula or, later, the region of Abitibi, the clergy devot• ed a great deal of energy and resources in encouraging young couples 18 to settle them. But there were always more couples than there was land. Even when the land was available, the "habitant" might not have the cash to buy a farm for his son. To obtain the necessary cash, the "habitants", in increasing numbers, were compelled to switch to commercial agriculture. As a result, they became vulnerable to the material and non-material influences of the cities. The growth of "le luxe effren§" in the countryside, a process constantly denounced from the pulpit, led to an increas• ing dissatisfaction with rural society. The end result of both developments was migration. -7-

There was a migration to the lumber camps every winter.

There was a migration to Ontario and to Western Canada. There was an increasing migration to the urban centers of the province.

But the main stream, until World War I, flowed towards the labour- intensive textile mills of New England. Each family, as they

left, vowed to return when a stake had been made but most never did.

While this flow served to strengthen the Church to some extent by purging Quebec of its discontented elements, the very

size of the migration was a threat to the survival and expansion 19 of French Canada. Apart from the loss of manpower, this migration made Quebec more open to the non-French-Catholic

influences. As the clergy could not reverse its teaching on birth-control, another solution had to be found.

To stop this migration of French Canadians to the United

States, the clergy relied upon the Anglo-Protestant economic

elite to provide employment. Based in the city of Montreal, this

elite took advantage of Montreal's strategic position in respect to Canada and of the National Policy to increase its economic 20

power. Having access to excellent sea and land transportation

facilities, this group developed consumer-oriented industries

to supply the growing population of Canada. The chief con•

tribution of French Canada was an ever-increasing pool of un•

skilled "habitants" to work in these low-wage, labour-intensive

industries. This economy, however, could not absorb the bulk

of the landless "habitants".

It was only when American capital began to penetrate deep

inside French Canada in order to exploit the mineral, forest and -8- water resources of the Precambrian Shield that the migration 21 to the United States was halted. Company towns sprang up throughout the province. At the same time, Montreal, as the headquarters of national and international corporations, increased its domination of Quebec's economy. Industrialization, urbanization and English-speaking economic domination, with their attendant benefits and dangers, grew at an ever-increasing pace after World War I.

Because these capitalists provided landless French Canadians with employment within Quebec, most of the clergy looked upon them as benefactors and did much to ensure that a favourable 22 socio-economic climate prevailed. Fearing statism, which was equated with secularism, the majority of clerics were staunch supporters of "laissez-faire" policies in economic and social matters. The Church could not maintain its position if the state began to compete for the allegiance of the people. Thus, the ideal was the self-reliant family system. Such a conception of the state fitted in perfectly with the political elite's inclination to view office holding more as a means of personal 23 enrichment than of public service. This concept of the state, of course, more than met the requirements of the capitalists

for it provided them with a docile labour force and a complaisant government.

Of the many threats which industrialization posed for the

Church, the main one came from a small but steadily increasing number of workers. To deal with the problems of low wages and poor working conditions, these workers turned especially to -9- 24 International unions for assistance and leadership. The coming of international unions was a mixed blessing for French

Canadian workers. For one thing, they restricted themselves largely to craft unionism and, hence, could not take in more than a small percentage of the working force. For another, they were often insensitive to the distinctive features and special problems of their French-speaking members. Nevertheless, they did increase the influence of the workers in socio-economic matters through their greater willingness to resort to strikes.

On May 7, 1883 Cardinal Taschereau of Quebec city condemned

"...toute society dont les reglements renferment le principe des greves" on the grounds that strikes were violent manifes- 25 tations of class warfare. Although Rome, at first, supported him, pressure from the American and British hierarchies forced it to suspend this condemnation in 1887. The French-Canadian clergy continued to denounce the use of strikes and to preach the need for order and submission to God's will.

Another weapon which the international unions attempted to use to improve the position of the workers was the "Parti 2 6

Ouvrier de Montreal". Created in 1904, the party drew its inspiration from the British Labour Party. Its programme called for a wide range of reforms, notably the secularization of education and greater government intervention in socio• economic matters. Such demands were, of course, a direct challenge to the clergy. The resulting hostility, added to . its internal conflicts and poor organization,prevented the party from enjoying more than isolated successes and, in time, brought -10-

about its disappearance. But, the very fact that it had come

into being and had advanced such demands in the fortress of

Catholicism shook the more alert clerics out of their complacency.

These clerics began to study the social effects of indust• rialization. They were not slow to grasp that its most dangerous by-product was class conflict with its demands for radical reforms and its ideologies seeking to win the people away from the Church.

To appreciate the devastating effect of class conflict upon the 27

Church, they had only to look at secularized France. The carriers of this infection in Quebec, they agreed, were the

"neutral" unions and, in particular, the militant international unions. Many of the union leaders were known Freemasons, anti- clericals or socialists, and the unions themselves were the 2 8 main support of the "Parti Ouvrier". On the basis of their

studies, the clerics concluded that these union leaders were exploiting the legitimate desire of French Canadian workers for organization and leadership in order to loosen the bonds linking

them to the Church by encouraging an indifferent or "neutral"

attitude to religion. Once these bonds were cut, they would be

free to win the workers to their revolutionary ends. While it was true that not all unions had this orientation and that

some were opposed to international affiliation, the fact remained

that, even in the more nationalistic unions, the material and

religious interests of the workers were put in opposition to each other. Msgr. P.E. Roy of Quebec City, recreating the situation

for an audience, was expressing the feelings of these socially-

concerned clerics when he exclaimed: -11-

"En plein chez-nous, des mains etrangeres avaient Stabli cette barri^re de mensonge entre l'ouvrier et l'Eglise. Sournoisement, habilement, patiemment, elles avaient accompli cette separation nifaste; puis, ce but atteint, elles avaient pousse la foule dans des sentiers mauvais ou l'on n1entre d'ordinaire que gour courir a une ruine certaine, loin de l'Eglise et loin de Dieu."

To socially-conscious clerics, like Msgr. Roy, the issue was clear':

"...notre vie sociale va-t-elle rester marquee de l'empreinte du christianisme qu'elle S toujours eue? Ou bien va-t-elle biffer cette marque de noble origine, pour laisser apposer sur elle les scell^es diffamantes du socialisme etranger ou cosmopolite?"

How to deal with such a threat? -12-

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF SOCIAL CATHOLICISM

Nothing in the experience of the French-speaking clergy

had prepared them to deal with the threat which the growth of

trade unions, particularly from the United States, posed to

their dominant position. As outright condemnation was too blunt

an instrument to use in dealing with it, other means had to be

found. Increasing numbers of clerics turned to Rome for guid•

ance and, more specifically, to the encyclical Rerum novarum

which Pope Leo XIII had issued on May 15, 1891.

As Pope Leo attempted to define in Rerum novarum the

Catholic conception of the industrial society, its principal

elements should be examined. He declared that to preserve the

autonomy of the individual and of the family, "our first and most

fundamental principle...must be the inviolability of private

property."''" Furthermore, he asserted that the socialist goal of

an egalitarian society was a dream, for "...unequal fortune is a 2

necessary result of inequality in condition."

Turning to the state, Pope Leo maintained that its proper

role was, firstly, to enable the faithful to practice the Church's

teachings on social questions and, secondly, to protect and

advance the interests, as defined by the Church, of its citizens 3 and, especially, of the poor. As its first duty was to protect private property, the state had to act to remove, "...the causes

which lead to conflicts between masters and those whom they employ." The state, in particular, had to ensure the observance of holy -13- day s of rest. It had to regulate the hours of work, the labour of females and of children, and the sanitary conditions in factories. Above all, it had to make sure that "...the re• muneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reason-

5 able and frugal comfort." To guarantee the effectiveness of these reforms, Pope Leo asked that the laws "... induce as many people as possible to become owners."

These reforms could best be carried out by the employers and employees through their associations. Such associations, according to the encyclical, were more than ever necessary for 7 the orderly development of society. Hence, the state should not interfere with their activities unless absolutely necessary.

As many of the existing associations were incompatible in aim with those of the Church, Leo XIII urged that Catholics form their own associations which would promote, firstly, "piety and morality", secondly, "unanimity and goodwill", thirdly, careful consideration of the rights and duties of the employers as well as those of the employees and, finally, the resolution of grievances, the regular supply of labour and insurance against g sickness, old age and misfortune. The result of these activities, he believed, would be not only the advancement of the spiritual and material interest of those involved but also the conversion of the de-Christianized proletariat to the Church.

Considering the fact that his predecessor, Pope Pius IX, had come close to condemning all developments since the French

Revolution when he issued the Syllabus of Errors, in 1864, -14-

Leo XIII's encyclical represented a fundamental change in the 9

Church's outlook. Because the stakes were high, nothing less

than the re-Christianization of the proletariat, the Pope took a great risk. For many years, the Church had been divided into

two groups: those who believed that the Church should adapt to contemporary developments, particularly to the liberal-democratic

state, and those who believed that the Church could not make any concessions and still retain its divine nature.'''0 Nowhere was

this division deeper than in France - the spiritual home of

Lacordaire and of De Maistre. ^

The call of Leo XIII for Catholic social action, coupled with his policy of encouraging Catholics to use the instruments

of the liberal-democratic state, stimulated the growth of the 12

Christian Democratic movement. Its aim was to exploit to the

full the democratic liberties - which Catholic kings had never

granted the Church - and the techniques necessary to make these

freedoms effective in order to win the masses to the Catholic

alternative to liberalism and socialism. Although forbidden

from engaging in direct political action, the Christian Democrats developed a multitude of associations, newspapers and Catholic 13

schools. The main problem they faced was how to use these

forces in the most effective manner. What was needed was an

agency which would stimulate research into the workings of modern

society and would adapt Catholic teaching to its needs. It would

also propagate these findings and coordinate any action under•

taken. To fill this gap, a group of Jesuits and laymen created 14 1'Action Populaire in 1903 at Rheims, France. So well did this -15- agency carry out its functions that it soon assumed the leader• ship of the movement throughout the world.

France also provided the leadership for the opposition to

Leo XIII*s policies. An atheist, Charles Maurras, and his group,

"l*Action Frangaise" provided the ideological leadership to the 15

Catholic Integristes as the traditionalists were called. They believed that the liberal state and industrialization had des• troyed the organic relationships which had made France great.

Only the collapse of modern society - a process they hoped to hasten by the use of any means, including violence - could restore the traditional virtues of France. In the meantime, the two institutions which had more or less retained these tradit• ional values, the Army and the Church, must be preserved from contamination. Specifically, the Integristes opposed any weaken• ing of the Church's hierarchical organization, favoured a greater emphasis on spiritual matters and wished to restore Catholicism 16 as the official religion. Their position within the Church was strengthened when a sympathizer, Pius X, succeeded Leo XIII 17 in 1903. While he could not repudiate Leo XIII's teachings and Christian Democracy, Pius X gradually restricted the activities of the movement and emphasized the spiritual development of the

faithful.

In France, the dispute became increasingly bitter as the

Integristes, supported by the bulk of the clergy and the middle class, attempted to discredit Social Catholicism, that conception 18 of the Church which Christian Democrats were trying to develop...

The climax came in the dispute over the nature of the associations -16- recommended in Rerum novarum. Leo XIII's guidelines, designed

for a world-wide audience, were of necessity very general, and therefore, open to differing interpretations. Many questions had to be answered. Should these associations include employers as well as employees? Should they be independent of the hierarchy? Should they depend on the good will of the employer?

Should non-Catholics be admitted? Under what conditions?

Generally speaking, the Action Populaire, faced with the compet•

ition of socialist and syndicalist unions, tended to favour associations which would be concerned mainly with the workers1 19 professional interests. It exposed itself in the process, to the Int§gristee* charges that it was fostering a materialistic 20 - outlook. The Int^gristes, at best, favoured corporatism, that

is the organic union of employers and employees in a given

industrial sector in order to resolve problems and disputes harmoniously, and, at worst, they favoured associations which 21 would do little more than promote piety. As this dispute

reached new heights, the Action Populaire in the winter of 1914 came very close to being condemned. It was only with the death of Pius X in August, 1914, that Social Catholicism could begin

to feel secure within the Church.

The first impulses toward Social Catholicism in Quebec were felt not in the more cosmopolitan and industrialized city

of Montreal but in the less sophisticated and perhaps, for this

reason, more religious city of Quebec. In 1900 Alphonse

Desjardins put into operation the first credit union in -17- 22 North America at Levis. With the help of the church, he was

to see his conception of these Peoples' Banks spread throughout

the western hemisphere. At the same time, Msgr. Bggin,

Archbishop of Quebec City, as a result of a strike, was begin-

ing the process of arbitration which would lead to the restruct- 23 uring of the union involved according to Catholic principles.

These developments, however, lacked coordination and planning.

It was only in 1907 that 1'Action Sociale Catholique was created

and placed under the direction of the abbe, later Msgr. P. E. Roy

in order to deal with socio-economic matters on a full-time basis

Even then, this group was concerned mainly with publishing a

daily newspaper, 1'Action Sociale later to become 1'Action

Catholique.

The first concrete manifestation of Social Catholicism in

the archdiocese.of Montreal was the formation of 1'Association

Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne-frangaise or the "A.C.J.C." 25

in 1904 under the auspices of the Jesuits. Composed of

students attending the classical colleges and Catholic univer•

sities the A.C.J.C. ranked its interests in this order of

importance: the religious question, the national question and

the social question with emphasis on education, agriculture, 26

colonization and labour unions. By promoting discussions and

activities related to these problems, the A.C.J.C. formed a

group of dedicated laymen who were to second the clerics in

establishing Social Catholicism in Quebec. However?fit was

only in 1908 that some of these clerics and laymen began to give

their full attention to socio-economic problems. -18-

Concluding Rerum novarum, Leo XIII had urged the clergy to 27 provide the leadership required to implement his programme.

Moreover, every Catholic was obliged to follow the teachings of the Pope. Even though, as Siegfried observed, "the Catholic

Church in Canada is in truth in a condition of deep submission to the Holy See", it cannot be denied that Social Catholicism was introduced into French Canada slowly and in a piece-meal 28 fashion. So exasperating was this for some, that a Jesuit priest denounced the Montreal episcopacy to the Papal delegate 29 for ignoring Rerum hovarum. Why the delay? It can probably be explained, in part, by the division, the bitterness, the confusion and the insecurity associated with Social Catholicism.

In fact, there is evidence to suggest that pressure was put on

Msgr. BruchSsi, the Archbishop of Montreal, not to allow the creation of an agency such as 1'Action Populaire in his 30 jurisdiction. Given the autonomy the bishops enjoyed, a more important reason probably was the unprecedented : nature of the problems which increasing industrialization created for the

French Canadian hierarchy. It is quite probable in view of their traditionalist outlook that the clerics simply were at a loss as 31 to how to deal with these problems. It was to study the condition of labour in the province that an interdiocesan reunion of priests, representing Quebec's 32 hierarchy, was held in Montreal in 1908. One result of this meeting, it seems, was the creation by L^onidas Hudon, s.j., and

Arthur Saint-Pierre, a member of the A.C.J.C., of a Federation des Ligues du Sacre Coeur to coordinate the fight against blasphemy -19- 33 and intemperance among the working class. Another result of

the meeting was an address to the hierarchy warning of the

constant progress of socialist and Masonic influences inside the

"neutral" labour unions. On the basis of this warning, the first plenary council of Canadian bishops, meeting in Quebec City from

September 19 to November 1, 1909, condemned the principle of 34

"neutrality" in labour organizations. The English-speaking members of the hierarchy never applied it in their dioceses, probably because Catholics were in a minority everywhere outside of Quebec. For Quebec, however, this condemnation was the prelud

to the introduction of Catholic unions.

Realizing that the "federation" was inadequate for the task of organizing Catholic unions, Father Hudon set on foot a "Cercl 35

sacerdotal d'Etudes sociales". He hoped, in this way, to form cadres of priests well-versed in the Church's social doctrine and in the techniques required to apply it. Approximately thirty priests began to meet every fortnight to study the various aspects of the question. After a time, they came to see that to

succeed, the Montreal Social Catholic movement required a perm• anent research and propaganda agency along the lines of 1'Action

Populaire of Rheims. A series of annual congresses of the

Federation des Ligues du Sacre^Coeur proceed to follow a parallel course. The most important of these congresses was

the one held on January 25 to 26, 1911 to study the labour organ•

izations in Quebec. Out of its deliberations came four

resolutions that mark the turning point of the movement. The first of these resolutions asserted that, "il est -20- nicessaire et possible d'unir nos ouvriers dans les syndicats 37 professionnels nettement catholique." From this assertion, the second resolution followed: "IS oG la place est libre, et le terrain bien prepare, on peut des maintenant fonder ces syndicats." The third resolution declared that, "il faut avant tout faire 1'Education sociale du clerge et des autres classes de la soci^te." Combined together, these resolutions gave birth to the fourth which charged the executive of the federation,

"...de preparer un projet d'organisation." From this resolution was born in May, 1911, l'Ecole Sociale Populaire or, as it will be referred to hereafter, the E.S.P.

Its programme made it clear that the E.S.P. was to be 38 concerned with more than the organization of Catholic unions.

This task, however, was its immediate concern and, in fact, the

E.S.P. was expected to coordinate the organizational activities 39 being undertaken throughout the provinces. In practice, the

E.S.P. was forced, probably for administrative reasons, to confine itself to the archdiocese of Montreal. Here, it set about making the necessary preparations for the formation of Catholic unions.

These preparations included a propaganda campaign to familarize the interested public with the aims and techniques of Catholic unions. To do this, the E.S.P. called upon 1'Action

Populaire for help. In addition to materials, it sent, among others, Father Plantier, one of its founders, who for seven months toured Quebec and lectured on the work of his organization.

From Belgium came Father Rutten, organizer and Secretary-General of the Confederation of Christian Trade-Unions. The E.S.P's -21- secretary, A. Saint-Pierre, following the example of the

European Social Catholics, set up study circles as a preliminary to the creation of full-fledged unions. Membership reached a peak of over 2,000 male and female workers.

So successful did the work of the E.S.P. appear to be that a convocation of priests in January, 1914 approved Father Hudon's motion that the archbishop appoint a full-time director of 41

Catholic unions. Msgr. Bruchesi consequently set up a committee composed of his auxiliary bishop, Msgr. Gauthier and an abbe"

Maurice to supervise the organizational work. A conflict soon erupted. The issue was whether or not these embryonic unions were ready to embark upon professional activities. Abbe" Maurice argued that they were ready while Saint-Pierre felt that more preparation was needed. Apparently this controversy reached such proportions that Msgr. Bruchisi had to strip the E.S.P. of its organizational function in 1915. While there is no evidence linking the two events, in that year the original group of clerics and laymen who had founded the E.S.P. was dissolved and the

Jesuit order requested to assume sole responsibility for it.

On top of these blows, the E.S.P. saw its organizational efforts wasted as most of its union-study circles collapsed under the pressures of the First World War.

It would be wrong to conclude from this account that the

E.S.P.'s efforts had been in vain. For there was, at least, one man who was prepared to learn from its mistakes and who was eager to re-establish Catholic syndicalism on a more solid^ basis.

His name was Joseph-Papin Archambault. A son of the traditional 43 elite, he had entered the Jesuit order in 1897. He was -22- educated and later taught at the College Sainte^Marie. While there, Archambault became involved in the A.C.J.C. movement.

It was for this group that he introduced in Canada in 1909 the

Jesuit order's system of closed retreats. He was a participant in the initial steps leading to the foundation of the E.S.P. and was the first to write a pamphlet for it. Ordained in 1912,

Archambault was sent to Europe to study, at first hand, the

Social Catholic movement. In the process, he established personal contacts with its outstanding personalities. He returned in

1914 prepared to take a leading role in the Montreal branch.

Upon his return, Archambault was given charge of his order's retreat house, Villa Saint-Martin, in Montreal, a position he was to retain until 1921. From this base, he proceeded to become the 44

"Eminence noir" of Social Catholicism. An able organizer,

Archambault was quick to adopt the European movement's technique of using closed retreats to form "corps d'elites". This tech• nique consisted of encouraging members of the same profession or occupation to hold group retreats. The priest in charge would

then demonstrate the relevance of the social doctrine of the

Church to their situation and exhort them to apply it to their

everyday activities. Out of the experience of the retreats were

to come a multitude of Social Catholic organizations, campaigns

or initiatives, many of which had their source in Father

Archambault. Moreover, he was in a position, through his daily

contacts with all segments of society, to coordinate the efforts

of Social Catholics. His influence, however, upon the development

of the movement was greater than this. -23-

The pre-war organizational work of the E.S.P. had collapsed so easily primarily because it had failed to prepare the workers adequately. Alfred Charpentier, "converted" by Archambault to the concept of Catholic unions and, later, to become one of its leaders, described the E.S.P's initial efforts as,

"...la folle brusquerie des organisateurs de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire d1avoir voulu arracher les ouvriers aux unions neutres sans se douter qu'ils y etaient attaches par un sentiment de conservation.1,45 46 Archambault agreed with this analysis, if only implicitly. He insisted upon a methodical programme of education, technical 47 and spiritual, before the actual organizing work could proceed.

In a systematic fashion, Archambault, like the French Social

Catholics, planned to utilize the study circles to create a reservoir of competent union leaders and the closed retreats to ensure their reliability. His immediate target were those workers who already were convinced unionists and, preferably, union leaders. Archambault, like the Quebec City Social Catholics, considered the leaders of the "neutral" national unions to be particularly vulnerable to "conversion". Having become convinced

Catholic unionists, they would be expected to win over the membership of their unions to this principle. Thus, Archambault's strategy combined a period of careful preparation with the organization of Catholic unions on an existing base.

In the winter of 1918, Archambault proposed that an inter- diocesan reunion of priests and workers be held. Such a reunion, which was to be, "...le berceau du syndicalisme catholique dans la province...", was held on April 28, 1918 48 at the Villa Saint-Martin. Two resolutions were adopted. -24- The first proposed that Catholic syndicalism be introduced throughout Quebec. The second, inspired by Archambault, recommended that each bishop appoint a priest to take charge of union organization within his diocese. On June 2, 1918, another reunion was held. The assembled group defined the requirements each Catholic union would have to meet. There were four of them, namely, "1° Approbation des statuts par 1'eVeque. 2° Presence d'un aumonier nomine" par l'autorite" religieuse. 3 Groupement exclusif de catholiques a titre de membres actifs. 4° Admission provisoire des non-catholiques a titre de membres-adjoints." 49

At the same time, the meeting adopted Archambault's strategy with the result that, on June 13, 1918, the first study circle, 50

Cercle Leon XIII, was formed. From this group were to come the first permanent Catholic unions in Montreal. The attempt to organize Catholic unions in the main centers of Quebec also proved to be more or less of a success. A series of annual conventions bringing together the representatives of these unions was crowned in 1921 with the birth of the greatest single achieve• ment of Social Catholicism in French Canada, La Confederation des

Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada.

The Church's influence on the C.T.C.C., as this central body of Catholic unions came to be known, could be seen in the every• day activities of its branches. Much of the funds which were needed initially to launch and maintain them came from the 51 hierarchy. Priests as well as lay organizers attempted to win employers and employees to the idea. The chaplain of the union often carried out many of its administrative functions. Many of -25-

the arguments used to convince Catholic workers that they should 52

join were also provided by the Church. To those who opposed unions on principle, the organizer could point to the repeated

Papal demands that the faithful should form such associations.

If some doubted the value of unions based on religious beliefs,

they were confronted with Pius X*s injunction that such unions be formed where a majority of the population were Catholics in order to protect their spiritual as well as their material

interests. When the charge of "divisiveness" was made against

them, Catholic unionists replied that nothing prevented them

from cooperating as a group with other unions on matters of

common interest. Furthermore, they could argue that, unlike the other types, Catholic unions promoted class harmony and economic

stability not only in their everyday activities but by reason of

their very existence which forced "neutral" unions to moderate

their demands and activities or lose their Catholic members. Of

course, these organizers also stressed the advantages of such

unions from a nationalistic point of view. Nevertheless, the

patriotism of the"neutral" national unions had never convinced

the bulk of the members of international unions to change their

allegiance. The C.T.C.C., by combining nationalism and religion,

set out to provide a mass base for the Social Catholic movement.

The E.S.P., as has been noted, was after 1915 no longer

involved in the organization of Catholic unions. It was, however,

very much concerned with preparing the public and, especially,

the elite to accept and support them. An educational programme was important for two reasons. In the first place, as a former -26- chaplain recollected: "La classe dirigeante et meme le clerg£ a quelques exceptions prds, voyaient rouge d§s qu'il §tait 53 question d1union ouvriere, meme catholique." A second and a more important consideration was, as a close associate of Msgr.

Roy stressed, the fact that, "Les pretres en effet ne seront volontiers admis par les ouvriers dans leur syndicats que le jour ou ils pourront prouver que rien de ce qui intiresse la classe ouvriere, meme au point de vue materiel ne leur est Stranger."54

For these reasons, the E.S.P., up to the depression, dedicated the largest number of its pamphlets to Catholic unionism.

In addition to its educational efforts, the E.S.P., through its research and with access to leading theologians,provided to the Catholic unions the doctrinal guidance needed to contend with 55 those problems which all unions face. Like the Action Populaire, the E.S.P. had to answer questions such as the following in the light of Catholic doctrines. What is a fair wage? Are strikes permitted ? Is a closed shop desirable? What reforms should the

C.T.C.C. support? The E.S.P. could not apply these doctrines without, taking into account local conditions such as the presence of competing "neutral" unions. By 1930, the C.T.C.C. with the help of the E.S.P. had moved from a position where it emphasized the open shop and employers' rights to one where it demanded the national and religious institutions grant preference to companies whose workers belonged to Catholic unions, that the closed shop be adopted, that Sunday observance laws be tightened, and that the provincial rather than the federal government 5 6 implement family allowances and unemployment insurance. In this manner, the C.T.C.C. attempted to promote the spiritual, -27- the national and the material interests of its members.

The E.S.P.'s research and propaganda functions were not restricted to Catholic unions for it had been created to educate Catholics as to their social responsibilities. To achieve this aim, it had to combat in the words of its former secretary, A. Saint-Pierre,

"...11 indifference et, par suite, le manque presque absolu de connaissances de notre classe instruite et de notre classe patronale a l'egard du plus formidable des problemes actuels: le probleme social".57

Over the years the E.S.P.'s monthly pamphlets scrutinized most socio-economic problems and Institutions in Quebec. As a result, it stimulated the study of economics and sociology. Edouard

Montpetit, one of the first French Canadians to study economics, 5 8 was for a time a researcher at the E.S.P.. Later, he helped to form the Department "of Social Sciences at the Universite de Montreal. The E.S.P. generally relied on clerics and laymen with some training in the field to examine a particular problem or institution. Social problems such as housing, infant mortality and juvenile delinquency, institutions such as the educational system, economic activities such as pulp and paper and tourism, and economic issues such as the degree of French Canadian participation in industry and the desirability of colonization were analyzed carefully and possible solutions to the problems involved were weighed. Thus, the E.S.P., like its French counter• part, made room for diverging interests and opinions on "les 59 questions libres." -28-

Having defined the socio-economic problems faced by-

industrialized societies such as Canada, the E.S.P. devoted many of its pamphlets to publicizing the teachings and activi•

ties of Social Catholics at home and abroad. Its pamphlets

ranged from those concerned with the technical problems involved

in setting up Social Catholic organizations to those attempting

to explain the general principles of the movement. The E.S.P.

constantly emphasized in these pamphlets the unity of thought

and action, the necessity of practising one's beliefs in every•

day life. By confronting its readers with the complexity of

these problems and the variety of ways Catholics could contribute

to their solution,the E.S.P. undoubtedly increased the social

consciousness of the elite.

While they reflected the complexity of an increasingly-

industrialized society, the E.S.P's pamphlets retained a

coherence which increased their impact upon the readers. Guided

by the Church's teachings, by the experience of Social Catholics

everywhere, and by its own programme, the E.S.P. was concerned with the projection of these doctrines on contemporary develop• ments. Specifically, in the words of Father Archambault, its

aims included,

"soutenir les justes revendications des diverses classes sociales...indiquer d'utiles remedes a leurs maux, susciter de saines institutions..., encourage l'exercice raisonnable de 11 association sous ses formes diverses..., proteger et favoriser . la famille..., dgfendre l'ordre et la paix sociale."6

In this way, the E.S.P. was to provide tangible proof that, "..,1'Eglise catholique et ses enfants ne sont Strangers il rien de ce qui int§resse dans l'humaine civilisation l1accession des corps au legitime bien-etre terrestre et celle des ames a'la vertu et au ciel."

Thus, the E.S.P's contributors, in many ways, were members of a school of thought. Archambault defined the E.S.P. as, "... une societe de propagandistes sociaux (sic), liis entre eux par la meme pensee apostolique et par l1adhesion §. un meme 61 Programme bien defini...!' As a result of its work, the E.S.P., together with its affiliated organizations, became the intellect- 6 2 ual fount of Social Catholicism in Quebec.

It is probable that the influence of the E.S.P. was surpassed only by one other Montreal group, l1Action Frangaise.

Led by abbe" Lionel Groulx, this group published 1 'Action

Francaise in order to deal with cultural and political issues.

Far from being rivals, the doctrines and membership of these 6 3 movements overlapped. In any case, the Papal condemnation of

Maurras' Action Francaise in 1926 shattered the remnants of the Catholic Integristes and led to the disappearance of its 64 French Canadian counterpart as well. Similarly, most of the National and Social Catholic organizations interlocked with the 6 5

E.S.P. in doctrine and membership. Some of the main French- language daily newspapers, Le Devoir of Montreal, L'Action

Catholique of Quebec City and Le Droit were also linked to this network of formal and informal ties. So closely tied were these groups that an initiative by one component would generally attract the support of the others or an attack on one part would bring the others to its defense. P. E. Trudeau has argued that this -30-

close relationship of ideas and institutions created a monolithic

social-nationalist ideology which dominated the intellectual

life of Quebec for many years.

Beyond this network of clerics and laymen was the Company

of Jesus. This quasi-military religious order was dedicated

to harnessing worldly developments to the ultimate benefit of 6 6

the Church. Their dominant position in educational institu•

tions assured Social Catholicism a steady flow of young recruits

and a coherence of doctrine.

Of the Jesuits none did more to bring about a coordination

of ideas and of activites than J. P. Archambault. As "Pierre

Homier", he organized in 1913 La ligue des droits du francais which in due time gave birth to Groulx's Action Francaise, a 67 movement in which he continued to play a prominent role. More

important for Social Catholicism, Archambault launched in 1920

Les Semaines Sociales du Canada. For one week each year, the

elite of French Canada would gather at a given location in

Quebec and would listen to papers read by their peers on a given

theme. Because of the wide publicity accorded to these gatherings,

especially by the E.S.P., and the influence of the people involved,

the Semaines Sociales were a powerful tool in developing, in

Archambault's words, "...une homog€neite de pens^e et d'expression 6 8

infiniment pr^cieuse." Devoted to the principles of Social

Catholicism, Archambault did not shrink from manipulating men nor

did he hesitate to put pressure on those whom he felt were not 69 carrying out their duty - even bishops. Nor was he one to -31- ignore an opportunity to increase the influence of the move• ment; thus, he instituted the Catholic hour programme on the radio. It was only natural, therefore, that he should be asked in 1929 to become director of the E.S.P. and in 1932 to take on the additional task of coordinating the activities of all organ• izations coming under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of

70

Montreal. As one of the three Canadian delegates to the

Union internationale dlEtudes sociales which met each year at Malines, Belgium, he also had a hand in coordinating the international Social Catholic movement. Thus, Archambault1s activities did much to knit the various segments of the move• ment into a coherent group.

By 1930, Social Catholicism was firmly entrenched in the province of Quebec. The zeal and the enthusiasm it called forth made it clear that the Church was not in a state of decay - far from it. It was more than ready to meet the dangers and to exploit the opportunities which the depression brought in its train. -32-

Chapter III

The Nature of the Depression in Quebec

The agony experienced by countless individuals in Quebec as a result of the collapse of the economic system in the 1930's cannot be considered here. All that can be done is to provide a general outline of the disaster which befell Quebec, and of the extent to which its experience resembled that of the rest of Canada. For this was to be the context within which the

E.S.P. was to develop.

Since 102,112 of the 188,907 Quebec workers employed in manufacturing in 1935 lived in Greater Montreal, it would appear, given the already depressed condition of agriculture, that

Montreal was most affected by the depression.1" Dependent as it was on entrepot trade for its prosperity, Montreal was most vulnerable to the general collapse of international trade which occurred. While Quebec as a whole appears to have experienced the depression less than provinces such as Saskatchewan, there is evidence to suggest that, of the urbanized areas, Montreal suffered the most.

In investigating the causes of price spreads early in the depression, the Stevens committee found the most shocking 2 examples of the exploitation of labour in the Montreal region.

It found that some employers used females to replace male labourers in order to pay lower wages and to gain a more docile 3 labour force. The Stevens committee discovered that because there was a minimum wage law for female labour, "in three -33- factories, many 'boys', aged 14 to 20 years, were employed at

2 1/2 cents to 6 cents per hour. In fact, there was a notice• able tendency for male workers to be paid less than female and 4 perhaps to displace them." Government agencies, it reported, tended not only to ignore the situation by failing to enforce the provisions of the labour legislation but actually were the accomplices of the employers. As an example of this, the

Stevens report noted that, "By permission of the Minimum Wage

Board of Quebec, dated August 11, 1933, this company (the company referred to was Butterfly Hosiery Co. Ltd.) was enabled to classify most of its female employees as inexperienced and pay them with two exceptions, the princely sum of $3 and $4 per 5 week." Of one factory, the committee wrote: "It may have been a decent respect for the opinion of mankind on the part of these employers that made them compel their workers to sign their wage receipts in blank." The Stevens report indicated that for many of those Montrealers who were "lucky" enough to remain employed the depression meant progressive pauperization and dehumanization.

So bad were conditions in the clothing industry that this committee, dominated by conservative politicians, declared:

"They should not be tolerated in any state that claims to call 7 itself civilized."

These workers, at least, had a regular source of income.

Their agony was eclipsed by that of the unemployed. The Rowell-

Sirois Commission at the end of the depression concluded that the imposition of barriers to immigration by the United States, the collapse of one-company towns in various parts of Quebec, -34- and the continuing influx of surplus rural population had produced a huge pool of unemployed and mainly unskilled labour g in Montreal. As a result, the commission wrote:

"It early became evident that unless progress along the traditional lines of Canadian expansion was rapidly resumed Montreal unemployment would become chronic and the hard core of the Canadian problem. ... Unemployment in Montreal and the satellite industrial towns of the area became one of the outstanding economic and human problems of the time..."

What were the dimensions of this human problem? Accord• ing to one study, 191,778 people or 19.5% of Montreal's population 9 in 1934 were on direct relief. In certain parts of the city such as the town of St. Michel the percentage was much higher.

As a family of five was allowed to earn $12 per month in addition to the $39.48 it received in direct relief, this meant that a large segment of Montreal1s population was condemned to live at a bare subsistence level until such time as the economy recovered.

Hand in hand with poverty came isolation and apathy. To obtain some idea of what the unemployed must have experienced at this time, some observations of a few commentators are suggest• ive. A French Canadian economist, Esdras Minville, reported that there was "...an excess of houses in a city where, on the other hand, there exists an acute housing shortage.1,11 A

"Quebecer" described in these terms the situation of the un• employed in Montreal: "...living in misery, too poor to pay for the light and gas which are laid on to their crowded homes, having to cook with coal-oil bought at a price pegged by the oil interests, burning candles for light, and being sent to gaol in batches by Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company because some of them have enough initiative to jump the meter by tapping the wires and the mains..."12 Nowhere else in Canada, according to the Rowell-Sirois

Commission, were the extremes in the distribution of wealth 13

greater than in Quebec. The Stevens report underlined the

fact that, even as it was lowering the wages of its employees,

the Macdonald Tobacco Company paid its chief executive 14

$260,000 per year. Another study by the League for Social

Reconstruction showed how the family of Senator Webster of

Montreal was able through their monopoly over the importation

of Welsh coal to realize profits in excess of $1,300,000 in the 15 years 1930 to 1933. The collapse of the facade of prosperity

revealed the true nature of the economic system for those who

had eyes to see.

Solutions for these problems were not forthcoming from a

provincial government described by the Rowell-Sirois Commission

as tending "...to follow the let-well-enough-alone school of 16

social economic policies.11 Any inclination toward action which the Liberal regime of Premier Taschereau may have had was weakened by the difficulty it had in coming to an agreement with the Conservative administration at Ottawa and the Conservative 17 mayor of Montreal, Camillien Houde. The pressures for action,

however, could not be entirely ignored. To provide some aid to

the victims of the depression in the Montreal area, the provin•

cial government's programme consisted chiefly of direct relief,

of sporadic public works projects and of a campaign to encourage 18

a return to the land and self-sufficiency. According to the

Rowell-Sirois report, "The aggregate cost of these efforts proved staggering, yet they did little more than tide the situation over, and made only a limited impression on the basic problems." As a result, it noted that, "The financial position of Quebec, long considered the fiscal Gibraltar of the Canadian 19 provinces deteriorated alarmingly during the depression..."

It went on to argue that the failure of the provincial government to establish progressive taxation to bridge the great gap in the distribution of wealth, and the exemption of Church property from taxes, had forced some hard-pressed municipalities such as

Montreal to expand into the income and sales tax fields, thereby hampering any effort to reform the tax system.

In practice, the day to day responsibility for dealing with the consequences of the depression fell on the municipalities.

The effectiveness of their actions depended upon the financial resources and the leadership available. In financial terms, this meant, in the words of Minville, that, "...Montreal's contribution to the total unemployment relief varies between

48 and 50 per cent, while Toronto's share does not go beyond 20

35 to 39.5 per cent." It was on this basis that, according to him, Montreal had to provide for the 280,096 people on direct relief in April 1933. Although the criteria under which relief was allocated were far from generous, Minville complained that the system of public assistance, "...drew to the metropolis a multitude of people who barely earned their living where they were...It has been stated that certain municipalities found it profitable to pay the fare of the destitute who were leaving 21 town." Montreal was obviously in no position to provide leadership in eliminating the causes of the depression. This search for leadership to end the depression led to a 22 proliferation of ideologies and movements in Quebec. If the bulk of the population had fallen into a position of greater dependency, they were not all resigned to their fate. Some of

these movements adopted a conservative orientation, while others were more liberal in tone.

For English-speaking Canadians the most frightening of these groups were those movements which adopted Nazlism or Fascism as models. While they attracted much publicity, it would appear

that they were never able to attract much French-speaking support

More important was the revival of the nationalist movement with 24 the creation of periodical, 1'Action Nationale in 1933. For the nationalists, the depression was, "...1'expression de notre 25

faillite, faillite morale, gconomique et intellectuelle."

Together with various organizations such as La Ligue d1Achats chez-nous, l'Ordre Jacques Cartier, and Les Jeunes-Canada, the Action Nationale carried on a campaign to reconquer for

French Canadians their rightful position in the economic and political spheres. While not linked with the Fascist or Nazi movements, the nationalists tended towards anti-semitism.

Another revival which was to lead to more direct action was that of the provincial Conservative party under the dynamic leader- 26

ship of Camillien Houde. Although forced to make way for

Maurice Duplessis in 1933, he undoubtedly gave the Conservative party a more reformist orientation than it had possessed previously. These movements were more or less of the right. -38-

On the left could be found a similar proliferation of groups and ideologies. The most threatening of these groups for the French Canadian elites were the C.C.F. which was to remain a mainly English-speaking organization, and the

Communist party which, as will be seen, obtained most of its 27 support from the immigrant population of Montreal. Much more significant on the long-run was the influence of French liberal Catholics such as Jacques Maritain who, in reaction to the Integristes, developed a personalist philosophy in an attempt to reconcile the claims of the individual with those of 28 society. His influence was felt particularly in Quebec by a group which published La Releve and by Andre Laurendeau, who was to replace his father in 1937 as director of L'Action

Nationale. These men tried to give nationalism a more humanist and liberal outlook. Of more immediate significance, as will be seen, was the revolt of a group of young Liberals who, inspired am part by the American New Deal, attempted to "re- 29 liberalize" the Liberal party.

In this manner, the feeling of discontent which increased as year after dreary year of depression passed by manifested itself. Politically it was to lead to the overwhelming defeat of the Liberal regime by a coalition which called itself the

Union Nationale. But, in each case, it is apparent that these movements were led by articulate members of the middle class.

What could the inarticulate members of the working class do - except follow? -39-

They could organize themselves in unions and strike for a

better deal and, after 1935, in growing numbers they did.

Spontaneously or with the help of a more militant leadership,

unions sprang up in Quebec. With the coming of the C.I.O.,

even the C.T.C.C. had to broaden its outlook, and change its 30

tactics in order to retain and expand its membership. In

the process it came into conflict with the government which

it had helped to elect in 1936. The new Union Nationale

government soon disappointed the hopes which it had aroused.

It not only refused to take stern measures against monopolistic

abuses but set out to weaken the position of the unions. The

Duplessis government in 1937 passed measures, which in effect made collective bargaining unnecessary and condemned the 31

principle of the union shop. When 10,000 members of the C.T.C.C. went on strike against the Dominion Textile Co. in 1937 to obtain

a collective agreement, Duplessis supported the company. Only

the intervention of Cardinal Villeneuve ended the strike.

When another affiliate of the C.T.C.C. attempted to establish

a union shop in the shipyards of Sorel, the intransigence of

the owners, the Simard brothers, supported by the provincial

government and, indirectly, by the federal Liberal government

led to violence. Thus the C.T.C.C. was forced to adopt a much more militant stance in order to survive the hostility of the

government and the competition of American-inspired unions.

These were some of the main issues and movements to which

the depression gave birth in Quebec. What course would the

E.S.P. follow? To what extent could it provide some of that leadership which an increasingly restless population demanded?

What orientation would it adopt? To what extent would the

E.S.P. merely react to events? These were some of the challenges and opportunities which the depression provided the E.S.P. „ Chapter IV

The E.S.P. and Capitalism

The depression years, 1929 to 1940, were the years when the E.S.P. probably reached the peak of its influence. It was well prepared, as has been noted, to meet this challenge.

Archambault, therefore, could write in the midst of this period

"Malgre ses insuffisances, cette troisieme p^riode rejoint done celle des debuts, si active, ... et replace l1E.S.P. parmi nos principaux organismes de base, sur lesquels peut s'appuyer

1*Action catholique au Canada."!

There was much that the Social Catholics had to do. They had to answer such questions as the following in the light of the

Church's teachings. What were the causes of the crisis? Were the arguments of Socialists and Communists acceptable? If not, what should be the attitude of Catholics towards them? What should be the attitude of Catholics towards the existing social system? What kind of society should Catholics strive for?

What reforms should the state implement? What reforms should

Catholics - as individuals or groups - help bring about? What should be done about the condition of agriculture? What should be the role of the E.S.P. in bringing these changes about? Not only had these questions and a thousand related ones to be answered but also the methods of implementing these ideas had to be developed. Thus, the depression was to tax the material and spiritual resources of Social Catholics to the limit.

An early concern of the E.S.P. was to explain why the economic system had collapsed. It was the French-speaking hierarchy who, in a collective letter, attempted to discuss -42- 2 Le Malaise economique des temps presents. They felt that the depression was due to two main causes. The first cause was the excessive concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few.

In this, they made it clear they were only agreeing with Pope

Pius XI's encyclical Quadragesimo anno published on May 15,

1931 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Rerum novarum.

They fully supported the Pope's contention that the wealthy had social responsibilities. The other main cause of the depression, according to the hierarchy, was, "...le luxe effr^ne qui, en meme temps, s'est developpe dans toutes les classes, meme les

3 moins fortunees." The depression had only exacerbated this problem through the generalization of direct relief. They asked themselves: "Ne serait-ce pas donner pratiquement dans le socialisme, favoriser chez plusieurs 1'insouciance, l'ggoisme, la paresse, et aggraver encore le malaise qui gtreint la 4 society?" It was clear to them that the depression was God's way of punishing men for their evil ways in order to force them to return to a more virtuous way of life. Unless people turned away from their preoccupation with the material world, it was likely that His wrath would manifest itself in a more terrible manner.

While the hierarchy had agreed with Pius XI's analysis of capitalism, they had not discussed it in any detail. A prominent Social Catholic, Abbe Philippe Perrier undertook to discuss not only this aspect of the Pope's thought but everything contained in L'Encyclique "Quadragesimo anno". According to -43-

Perrier, the Pope discussed in his encyclical the developments in the capitalist system since Rerum no var urf> which had caused the depression. Since 1891 the distribution of wealth had become even more unequal. The consequence of this was to concentrate the economic power in the hands of a few, particularly those in control of financial institutions. These men had acquired this power through unbridled competition which favoured the strong and the unscrupulous. Having acquired it, they could then make the state serve their economic interests at home and abroad. As the Pope put it, "l'appgtit du gain fait place S une ambition effr£n£e de dominer.11 Perrier emphasized that this analysis also applied to Quebec. For, he stated, "depuis pres d'un si§cle nous pratiquons 'la libre concurrence' mise en honneur 7 par 1'Angleterre." He pointed out that Henri Bourassa had concluded after a study of Quebec's financial institutions that:

"...la ploutocratie regne-t-elle en maitresse dans la province.de Quebec plus que dans le reste du pays, au Canada, comme aux Etats-Unis, plus qu'en Angleterre et en France."^

Because this economic elite had used its power irresponsibly, the depression had occurred.

The first extensive analysis of capitalism which the E.S.P. produced was written by Esdras Minville as an introduction to g the E.S.P.'s programme of social reform. Minville made it clear that he agreed with Pius XI that capitalism was not intrinsically bad. On the contrary, provided it was organized on the basis of justice, this system was the best means of ensuring economic growth, "...support de la vie intellectuelle et morale et de la vie sociale."^0 It had been distorted, however, by its abuses. -44-

Specifically, the root of the problem was the tendency of capital to dominate all aspects of economic life. This tendency existed because the capitalist system "...s'est infeode au liberalisme economique... I1^ The satisfaction of personal interests had become the dominant motive of economic activity.

While Miriville agreed that investors should have a return on their investments and that they should run the industries for,

"...advenant insucces, le capital serait perdu, cependant que le travailleur conserverait sa force de travail", the problem was that capitalists had become concerned solely with profit 12 making. They treated labour as another commodity to be paid for at the lowest possible price. The result was to drive the workers into a profound state of misery with the consequent rise of class conflict.

Another abuse of the capitalist system, according to

Minville, was the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of a decreasing number of people. With their wealth and through monopolistic practices and interlocking directorships, these men had gained control over the economic life of Quebec.

By various means, they were also able to dominate its political life. Some of these methods included, "...11 Election des chefs politiques aux conseils d'administration des grandes entreprises... les souscriptions aux caisses eiectorales... 1'asservissement de la presse..."13

As a result, these capitalists exercised a direct andiindirect control over political developments. Proof of this was the existence of high tariffs on imports which forced the consumers -45-

to pay high prices for products such as cotton goods, and the

prevalence of economic and political imperialism as in the case 14

of the American penetration of Central and South America.

Secure in the knowledge that they controlled politics and public

opinion, these men were free to exploit their captive markets

to the full. Thus, they enjoyed excessive profits from their

numerous enterprises, profits which they were careful to hide

from the consumers through financial techniques such as the

overcapitalization of industries and the watering of stocks.

These abuses, Minville believed, had brought about two main results. The first was an unlimited increase in production

as in the case of the pulp and paper industry in order to

increase or maintain the profit margin as well as the competi•

tive position. The result? "On le connait, c'est l'icrasement

du marche, la crise de surabondance, plus douloureuse que les 15

famines d'antan." Secondly, these abuses had generalized and

intensified speculative practices among the general public in

the hope of quick returns but their control over various segments

of the economy made it easy for the financiers to manipulate

these hopes to their own advantage.

In this manner Minville attempted to show how these

"economic dictators" had increased their wealth and power. He

repeated that it was the abuses of capitalism which had created

this situation.

While Minville more or less followed what he thought was

Pius XI's critique of capitalism, other contributors to the

E.S.P. attempted to probe the intricate mechanism of the economic -46- system in order to better appreciate the Pope's teachings. A

Jesuit priest had attempted before Minville's study was pub• lished to examine the operation of stock exchange in the light of Christian morality."^ According to this contributor, the

Pope had not dealt directly with this question in his encyclical but he had stated that those who used their wealth to develop industries, to create employment and to produce useful products 17 were practising "...la vertu de magnificence." In so far as the stock exchange helped to bring the investors and the indus• trialists together, it served a social purpose. Abuses occurred, however, in the carrying out of these transactions. To ascertain the morality of these transactions, each had to be examined closely and the rights and responsibilities of those concerned weighed in the light of Christian justice and charity.

Having discussed the main abuses that could occur in a stock exchange, the author concluded that in the light of the individual aspect of property, speculation in stocks was acceptable provided that the speculator did not gamble sums needed to discharge his responsibilities, that he used his own money and, most important, "que l'on n'emploie pas des moyens injustes pour gagner, c'est-S-dire pour faire pencher la balance 18 du hasard en sa faveur." In the light of the social aspect of property, however, the author declared that, "cette richesse 19 qui s'acquiert sans travail est le scandale de la society."

He asked: "Qu'est-ce done au fond que cette speculation? Une maladie, une grosse fievre, fievre du lucre et de la richesse, qui engendre la fievre des plaisirs, du vrai jeu, des d^penses folles...."

Once begun, there was no limit to it. He felt that if the stock exchange could curb this tendency to speculate, it would be a socially useful institution.

Another contributor to the E.S.P. carried out an intensive study of the financial abuses of capitalism which he listed as

"...mouillage du capital, surproduction, speculation effrenee, 20 gonflement du credit... Of these he felt that the practice of watering stocks was the most dangerous. His purpose in carry• ing out this study was three-fold: to ensure that Christian principles kept "...contact avec le reel, eclairer un point determine des affaires, et travailler a le mettre en accord avec les exigences de la morale chretienne."21

Hence, he attempted to unite an objective study of an economic phenomenon with a careful consideration of the relevance of

Christian principles to the situation. While refusing to name individuals, he set out to expose the unscrupulous practices of financiers in order that they would become more responsible. He 22 felt that, "la finance du monde entier s'est paganisee."

Methods which in the past had been used exclusively by Jewish financiers had now been adopted by everyone including Catholic and French-Canadian businessmen to obtain, "...un pouvoir discretionnaire que leur auraient envie les despotes de l'antiquite." He tried to demonstrate that in Quebec the

Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated and the pulp and -48- paper industry had led the others in exploiting consumers and 23 investors by watering stocks. Most public figures from

W. L. Mackenzie King to H. H. Stevens to Henri Bourassa had denounced this practice. 24

What were the consequences of these abuses? He argued that the practice of watering stocks was a main cause of the depression. This practice had created a debt structure of administrative costs and interest payments which many industries could not carry when sales were depressed and the competition keener. It accelerated the growth of monopolies with a consequent concentration of economic and political power. By fostering higher tariffs and greater productive capacity, this practice led to an excess of goods. At the same time, it forced prices of manufactured goods to rise more rapidly than the revenues of small businessmen and farmers. Through ads and easy credit, consumers had been encouraged to buy thereby pushing prices upwards. Speculation, overproduction and inflation, he concluded, had led to the collapse of the economy.

Because the United States and Canada had tolerated these practices more than other countries, he felt they suffered more from the consequences. Workers were unemployed, small businesses were bankrupt. The purchasing power of consumers had dropped.

There was now a large number of unemployed who were dependent on public assistance. Class divisions had worsened. In fact, generations would suffer because of the irresponsible actions of a handful of men. With the same intensity but with a different starting point, a Belgian contributor, A. Muller, s.j., set out to demonstrate by a rigorous analysis of the ideological foundations of the existing economic system why the depression had come aboul^

The economic system, according to this author, rested upon three pillars: materialism, individualism and liberalism.

Because of the first of these, spiritual values were /.-relegated to a narrow sphere of human activity. Economic considerations had become the main determinants of action and, consequently, people were seen either as means or as outlets of production.

Profits had become the goal of economic activities. Many economists tried to justify this development by arguing that once enough wealth had been created men would be able to develop their potential to the full and hence attain a higher degree of civil• ization. While admitting that there was some truth to this argument, the author noted that, in their unbridled search for profits, capitalists had created an excessive^productive capacity, thereby amassing a huge surplus of unsold products. Thus, the so-called "science des richesses" had led to widespread poverty.

For this reason, Muller believed that people would no longer accept seeing "...les forces spirituelles impitoyablernent assujetties §. la loi de l'int^ret, la science stipendiee, les arts commercialises, les influences politiques mises a l'encan, 26 les consciences memes devenues 1'objet d'un ignoble trafic".

The second pillar of the economic system, according to this contributor, was individualism. This particular conception -50- of the individual had begun as a natural reaction to a fossil• ized social organization but, in the process, had gone too far

in emphasizing the autonomy of individuals. In the economic sphere, it assumed that .transactions were carried on between individuals,

"...pourvus de droits identiques, d^gagis de tout lien de solidarite sociale et reglant en toute liberty leurs actes sur les conseils de leur interet particulier."27

Profit and efficiency were the only criteria used. The social value and the social effects of business transactions were not considered. Ruthless competition rather than cooperation was encouraged. Given; the increasing inter-dependence between people, such attitudes had brought about general poverty. The extent of the depression had revealed the belief in the autonomy of the

individual to be an illusion.

As for the third pillar of the capitalist system, liberal•

ism, the logical consequence of individualism Pius XI stated in

Quadragesimo anno,

"La concurrence...s'est d^truite elle-meme; a la liberti du marche a succede" une dictature economique. L'app^tit du gain a fait place S une ambition effr6n§e de dominer.

By bringing on the depression, the author concluded that the

ideology of capitalism had discredited itself.

Although few in number, it is clear from these summaries that the Social Catholics gradually came to understand the

subtle ways in which monopoly capitalism posed a threat not only to the well-being of society but also of the Church. The increasing sophistication of these analyses is proof of this development. What is more important, however, is the fact

that all of these studies took as a point of departure the encyclical Quadragesimp anno. It would appear that the chief

impulse for the E.S.P*s re-examination of the capitalist system came - not from a concern with the mass suffering resulting

from its collapse - but from the urgings of the Pope. Never•

theless, many members of the E.S.P. group, it appears, had

gained by 1936 a greater awareness of how the socio-economic

system worked. -52- Chapter V The E.S.P. and Communism

Even before it began its study of the causes of the depression, the E.S.P. was concerned with a phenomenon which seemed to thrive on the suffering which the economic crisis engendered. This phenomenon was Communism. Its doctrines were dissected. The Russian experiment was carefully analyzed and Communist activities in a great number of countries includ• ing Canada were followed closely. Why did the E.S.P become so fascinated with this phenomenon? The answer to this question, as will be seen, is not a simple one. From the very beginning of the depression, it was clear to Social Catholics that, "le reve communiste est seduisant. Il promet une revanche contre les abus du capitalisme prive. Aux victimes de la crise actuelle il fait entrevoir un myst^rieux royaume d'igalit§."^ To ensure that Catholics understood what Communism had to offer and how it proposed to implement its programme, the E.S.P.'s contributors during this period consecrated the largest number of pamphlets and tracts to it. The conclusions they reached will be the theme of this chapter.

The two main concerns of the E.S.P. during the first half of the period under study were to examine the ideology of

Communism and its application in Russia in the light of Catholic doctrine. For this task, the E.S.P., in addition to its French-

Canadian contributors, relied heavily upon French, Belgian and

Swiss organizations, particularly one group called 1'Entente 2 Internationale contre la Hie Internationale based at Geneva.

Many of these -studies tended to approach their topic in a -53- scholarly manner by quoting Communist sources extensively, by using footnotes and by providing a bibliography. This fact suggests that the main target of these pamphlets were not the unemployed but the intellectuals.

Early in the depression, the E.S.P's contributors dissected 3 the Communist doctrine and subjected it to their criticism.

They noted that there were many forms of collectivism. Each form, however, condemned the exisiting economic system for the same reasons. The Social Catholics admitted that much of what these collectivists had to say about capitalism was true but as

Pius XI stated in Quadragesimo anno: "Leurs reclamations, dans ce qu*elles ont de juste, trouvent un appui bien plus fort dans les principes de la foi chretienne. . .'.

Where these collectivist groups diverged was on their attitudes to the right of owning private property and on the methods to be used in achieving their aims. The most extreme of these groups, the Communists, wished to abolish private property completely, set up a dictatorship that would benefit the work• ing class and achieve their goals by the use of all means, including violence.

The Social Catholics argued that, in seeking to abolish the right to own private property, Communism revealed its unjust nature. It would deny the individual the moral power to dispose of his possessions, thereby preventing him from develop•

ing his talents in his own particular way for his own particular ends. Instead Communism would make him a dependent of the state

for his present and future needs. There were some who pointed -54- to the early Christians or to the monasteries as examples of

Communism. The Social Catholics replied that in these cases collectivism had been practised on a voluntary basis and with the aid of Divine Providence. There were others who objected that the right to own property led to its abuse, particularly to an unequal distribution of wealth. The Catholic answer was that it was only just that the diligent, the thrifty, the skilled and the talented be rewarded. Not only did human law recognize this but,

"...ces inegalit^s inevitables (sic) sont justifies par .. la Providence (sic) divine, qui a bien le droit de favoriser les uns plus que les autres et preside a la distribution des biens de la terre, en vue de la fin supreme qui est le sqlut des hommes."5

As for the abuses of capitalism, it was always possible to check these. In any case, Social Catholics felt that Communism would lead to greater abuses than had capitalism.

The E.S.P's contributors saw Communism as being destructive not only of the individual but also of society. It posed a threat to the basic unit of society, the family. By abolishing private property, these authors felt that Communism would under• mine the authority of the father. He would no longer be the sole provider and would lose his ability to guide the develop• ment of his family. While it was true that many were now unemployed, these Social Catholics believed that the hope of acquiring some wealth in the future still kept the family together.

This hope the Communists would deny them. Moreover, Communist doctrine favoured the attainment of the equality of the sexes by legalizing birth control and divorce. It would also usurp -55- parental responsibilities in the upbringing of children. Hence, the E.S.P.*s contributors concluded that Communism attacked the hierarchical family system directly as well as indirectly.

As far as the state was concerned, the Social Catholics argued that, even though Communism would lead to a vast increase in its bureaucracy, in the long run the state would be under• mined. Economically, the absence of a stimulus to production and craftsmanship would bring about a drastic decline in the nation's wealth and the growth of the bureaucracy would encourage a greater degree of uniformity and resistance to innovations.

These factors, added to the increase in financial responsibilities which Communism entailed while destroying all incentives to save, would inevitably lead to the impoverishment of the nation.

Socially, the abolition of property would intensify individual and group jealousies and conflicts as to how material goods should be apportioned. Corruption would increase while citizen participation in community affairs would decline. In the face of this deteriorating situation, the Communists would have to choose between pursuing their goals and risk rebellion or abandon• ing their goals and maintaining power. Fundamental liberties such as the right to choose an occupation and where to practise it, liberty of conscience and of expression, as well as parental rights, would soon be suppressed. Certain classes or groups would find themselves with even fewer rights. As the regime became more tyrannical, it would attempt to perpetuate itself by any means. -56-

According to the E.S.P's pamphlets, the end result of

Communist doctrine would be the disappearance of the hard-won achievements of generations: progress, culture, public order and internal peace. And for what? To replace a Capitalist oligarchy with a Communist one? To create a gigantic state apparatus in the hope that there would be more wealth available for all? To proclaim social equality by pretending that the physical and spiritual needs of human beings would disappear?

To create a New Man - described by a Communist as:

"...Le jeune barbare plein de force que n'a pas corrompu la civilisation capitaliste, qui n'est pas perverti par le confort et le bien-etre..., qui ne s'est pas encore laisse" plier au joug de la legality et de l'ordre bourgeois?"6

The authors of these pamphlets doubted whether the Communist dream was worth the risk.

The other aspect of Communist doctrine which Catholics should consider, the E.S.P. felt, was the way it hoped to gain power. Unlike previous revolutions, the Communist revolution was a product of scientific planning. For Communists, one author stated, "...la revolution devient un moyen reconnu legitime, etudie" & froid et perfectionne comme une machine de 7 guerre." By exploiting the suffering of the impoverished masses, the Communist party attempted to convince individuals to accept its programme. Once these individuals had become members, the party would indoctrinate them in order to ensure Q

"...une ob^issance passive et complete...." It demanded complete obedience not only to the letter but also to the spirit of its orders. In this way, it had forged a revolutionary elite -57- grouped in cells. Discipline and zeal was maintained by periodic purges of the membership and by the incessant struggle to bring about the Communist revolution.

In pursuing their revolutionary ends, these "bataillons d'acier du proletariat", according to the Social Catholics, followed a grand strategy. Through constant propaganda, the

Communists attempted to win over or to neutralize various groups. At the same time, they agitated against the existing socio-economic system in order to exploit social divisions and to create chaos. When conditions were ripe, the Communists would unleash a violent revolution to win and to maintain power.

The stronger the opposition the more ruthless they would be in order to eliminate all obstacles to the implementation of their programme. While the Communists might be forced to compromise, it could only be a temporary expedient for their goal, accord• ing to one author, was total control - not only over temporal affairs - "...mais surtout une juridiction sans limite sur 9 les ames elles-memes...."

Catholics, the E.S.P. argued, did not have to content themselves with vague statements as to the effects of Communist doctrines. There already existed a model of the Communist state: the Soviet Union. As Communist propagandists always referred to Russia as the embodiment of their programme, the E.S.P. set out to show what this Workers' state had achieved."*"^ For this reason, it devoted the largest number of its anti-Communist pamphlets to the Soviet Union. -58-

Reflecting upon the historical development of Russian

Communism, an E.S.P. contributor felt that there were lessons to be learned from it. Two characteristics which the Communists had displayed were, "...une adresse consommee et un devouement fanatique...They seemed to achieve their greatest successes by appealing to,

"...des mecontents, des rat^s, des flaneurs ... toujours prets ..aux aventures pirilleuses, aiguillones par le mirage d'une fortune promptement acquise."12

It appeared to one author that the greatest ally of the

Bosheviks was, "...cette caricature de liberte qui accorde la tolerance meme aux intol^rants" - a mistake, he stressed, which 13

Lenin dxd not make. As a result of these and other factors, a small group of men had become a threat to human civilization.

Turning to the Communist achievements, the Social Catholics examined the impact of the massive socio-economic changes which had been carried out. While not ignoring the past, they were particularly concerned with the first Five Year Plan in the process of being implemented. From their studies of its workings, they concluded that it was a massive failure due to gross miscalculations and to the lack of competent personnel. It had brought about a drastic decrease in the production of foodstuffs and consumer goods. Millions of peasants had been uprooted and their property absorbed by the collective farms, while in the cities the workers had been reduced to the status of serfs in order to maintain production. To finance this gigantic effort, the standard of living had been reduced and working conditions depressed. Famine and misery were the lot of many. It was clear -59- to Social Catholics, like Minville, that the continuation of 14

Lenin's N.E.P. would have achieved better results. All that had been achieved was "...1 *ggalite dans la misere."

Communism's attempt to create the new Soviet Man had also turned, according to the E.S.P., into a nightmare. The

Communists had succeeded in destroying the Russian family unit in order, so they claimed, to accord the young a privileged position in society. The reality was otherwise. After studying the methods used, one author warned that if the Communists had their way, "...ils empois^sonneront l'ame enfantine de vices, de propagande haineuse contre les parents 'arri£rgs'; ils enseigneront aux enfants la haine de la religion, le m§pris du bien, ils pousseront des volontes faibles et inexperimenties a 1'accomplissement d'infamies...."15

The result of such practices was the growth of juvenile delinquency. All the vices were on the increase among the young.

The Five Year Plan had aggravated the problem to the point where there was a large-scale child abandonment. Vicious and depraved bands of young people were roaming the country. Many were dying of famine and other causes due to neglect. To stem the tide, the Communists would have to admit their responsibility and this they could not do. Such was the new Adam in their godless

"paradis terreste".

If Communism was such a failure, how, some people asked, did it maintain its power? To the Social Catholics, the answer was obvious: through sheer force. Because of its total control over the material and human resources of the country, the -60-

Soviet regime could weather massive socio-economic failures.

Any sign of opposition was quickly eliminated by the refined system of terror which had been developed. In addition to the secret police, the regime relied upon geography, severe legal penalties, and the Red Army. All activities including intellectual and cultural had to serve Communism or be repressed.

It appeared to Minville that the aim was to transform the individual into "une bete de somme dont on dispose et qu'on rationne S volonti.

Nowhere, the E.S.P. felt, was the inhuman nature of the

Communist regime so clearly revealed as in its campaign to eradicate all signs of religion. To overcome the strong resist• ance of the people, it had developed a systematic programme to attract individuals to militant atheism. Specialized schools were turning out zealous propagandists. Every form of commun• ication including the school curriculum was being made to serve this end. Anti-religious campaigns were reinforced by the government's resources and activities. As a result, anti- religious manifestations especially by young people were rewarded while religious ones were punished severely. By 1935, clergymen of all faiths had been deprived of their civic rights and were subject to persecution and, in many cases, murder. One author estimated that fifty percent of all clerics had been liquidated 17 between 1917 and 1934. These findings seemed to give added strength to Pius XI's denunciation of Communism as a system, -61-

"...qui ne recule devant rien, ne respecte rien, et qui, partout oft il. arrive au pouvoir, agit avec une dureti, une inhumanite incroyable et indescriptible."18

It made more urgent his appeal in 1930 to all Catholics to pray 19

for the conversion of Russia. Events since that time, one

author lamented, seemed to indicate that prayers only goaded

the Communists to commit greater crimes against religion.

In spite of Communist atrocities, the Social Catholics

observed that many countries were seeking closer relations with

the Soviet Union in order to alleviate the effects of the depression. They set out to prove, therefore, that establish•

ing any type of relationship with Russia would only aggravate

the socio-economic problems of non-Communist countries. They

stressed that the Communists admitted that, "L'U.R.S.S. n'est pas un Etat comme les Etats capitalistes...II est la force et

les infinies ressources d'un grand Etat au service de la 20

revolution mondiale..."(sic). They attempted to demonstrate

to those who persisted in believing that the Soviet government

and the Komintern were independent of each other that both were but the instruments of the Politburo of the Communist party.

Thus, while the Soviet government attempted to create the

impression that it stood for peace and stability by signing non-aggression pacts and by joining the League of Nations, its

complementary arm, the Komintern exploited these openings by

subversive activities. In the E.S.P.*s view, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union could only increase the power

and prestige of the Communists internally and externally; it could not advance the cause of peace and prosperity. The most powerful weapon, according to the Social Catholics, possessed by the Soviet regime to open hostile countries to

Communist influence was the promise of increased trade with its concomitant, increased employment. They tried to show that in fact the reverse was the case. As the regime bought only what was absolutely necessary to make Russia self-sufficient, its real purpose in developing trade was to foster revolution.

Because it had absolute control over the country1s natural and human resources, the E.S.P.1 s contributors argued that it could and did dump vast quantities of primary products on the 21 world markets. This practice only aggravated the unemploy• ment situation inside the importing country. With greater discontent and with greater financial resources, the Soviet regime could then intensify the subversive activities of its agents inside that country. Hence, these authors concluded that trade with the Soviet Union only led to a worsening of the socio-economic crisis.

Wherever a trading nation had swallowed the Soviet lure, it had suffered, according to the E.S.P., from serious internal difficulties. Agents of the Komintern were able to organize subversive movements and to infiltrate unions. To increase the militancy of the workers and to create greater socio• economic instability, the Communists encouraged strikes. Another tactic which came to the attention of the E.S.P. after 1935 was 22 the creation of Leagues against War and Fascism. By posing as the champions of peace and demoncracy, the Communists hoped to win the support of the intellectuals and of the young. They had met with some success, according to the E.S.P.'s sources, especially in France where outstanding personalities such as

Andre Gide, Henri Barbusse and Romain Rolland had put them• selves at the service of this world movement. While the nominal leadership was in the hands of such persons, the actual control remained with the Communists. In mobilizing support from a greater variety of groups, the Communists hoped to weaken the strength of the great powers - particularly the morale of their armed forces - and to bolster the prestige of the Soviet Union, thereby making the host country, in the minds of Social Catholics, susceptible to Communist revolution.

As was the case inside Russia, the Communists elsewhere, in the opinion of the E.S.P., paid particular attention to their 23 anti-religious campaign. Since 1930, the Communists had gained control over the left wing association of atheists, Internationale

Proletarienne, from the Socialists and had transformed it into a formidable threat to religion. As in Russia, they looked to youth and to anti-religious groups such as the Free Masons for recruits. They also exploited the existing divisions between the Churches. The Leagues against War and Fascism seemed, to the Social Catholics, to be having considerable success in 24 attracting Protestants. Once in contact with these elements, it was easy for the Communists to exploit their hostility to the Catholic Church by linking it to poverty and imperialism.

The Communists, a contributor reported at the end of this period, were even exploiting the divisions within the Catholic Church by appealing to those Catholics who did not fully understand that nature of Communism or who had misguided social consciences 25 or who were dissatisfied with some Church leaders or doctrines. In 1936, Pius XI denounced this Communist tactic, "...cherchent a crier quelques possibilitis de rapprochement et de collaboration de la part des catholiques, en distinguant entre idiologie et pratique, entre idie et action, entre ordre iconomique et ordre moral." The following year, in his encyclical, Divini Redemptoris, the Pope declared: "Le communisme est intrinsiquement pervers, et l'on ne peut admettre sur aucun terrain la collaboration avec lui de la part de quiconque veut sauver la civilisation chretienne."27

The coming to power of the Popular Front in Spain and the ensuing civil war was for the Social Catholics horrible proof of the threat which Communism posed to the Church. Spain was for them, "..le grand soir de la dgbauche antichretienne, la 28 grande orgie sacrilege." As the atrocity stories poured in - tales of massacres of priests and nuns, of wholesale confiscation and destruction of Church property including priceless works of art - the Social Catholics came to the conclusion that the

Church was the chief target of the revolutionaries. With a mounting sense of horror and indignation, Pius XI declared: "On dirait...qu'une satanique preparation a allume, et plus vive encore, dans l'Espagne cette flamme de haine et de persecution plus feroce, reservee, de l'aveu meme de ses ennemis, a l'Eglise et 5 la religion catholique..."29

"How had this happened?" Social Catholics asked themselves.

How could Catholic Spain which, by the sword and by the word, had stood as the vanguard of the Church now be at the mercy of its worst enemies? A report from the Vatican provided an -65- explanation. The chief cause of this catastrophe lay not in the Church as some would have it, but in the progressive 30 secularization of the country. While not denying that

Catholics could have done more to adapt to the increasing indust• rialization of Spain in order to maintain the Church's influence, it was the growth of Masonic influences in all spheres of activity which had opened the way for the Communists. Another contributor tried to show that the Communists had exploited the 31

Popular Front tactic to gam a foothold in the government.

Through constant agitation the Communists had attempted to improve their position at the expense of their partners by broad• ening their popular support. In this way, the author argued, they were preparing the way for a Kerensky-type of government to be followed soon after with a Soviet-type. Spain made it quite clear to the E.S.P.'s contributors that even the most Catholic of nations was not immune to Communism.

Although, as has been noted, the E.S.P. was preoccupied with Communism throughout the depression, it was not until 1935 that the E.S.P. began to ask itself whether or not Canada was threatened. While brief discussions had been published, no systematic study was made until Archambault wrote La Menace 32 communiste au Canada. The title of this pamphlet clearly indicated his belief that it was a threat and he set out to prove it. He traced the development of the Canadian Communist party from its creation in 1922. In 1931, it had been forced by the application of Section 98 of the Criminal Code to transform itself into the Canadian Labour Defense League. According to -66-

Archambault, it received most of its support from immigrants.

Membership in 1932-33 had increased from 13,000 to 17,000 and

the number of affiliated members had reached 120,000. One of

these affiliated groups, the Workers' Unity League, was con•

cerned with the organization of industrial unions and with the

development of a more militant attitude amongst the workers.

Another achievement was the existence of numerous small

newspapers, many of which appealed to a particular ethnic group.

The fact that they were able to survive with little or no visible means of support was proof to the author that they were

supported by the Komintern. From this time onwards, the E.S.P. kept a close watch on the Canadian Communists. In 1936, as

Archambault pointed out, even though the Communist leadership had been imprisoned in 1931 for their propaganda work, upon . . . 33

release they had continued their subversive activities.

During the federal election of 1935, Archambault noted that six

Communists had contested ridings and had received 30,000 votes.

At the other levels of government, there was one Communist

M.L.A. in Manitoba and many municipal councillors throughout

Canada.

Other Catholic groups or agencies joined in the watch.

Le Devoir, for example, published an article, which the E.S.P.

reprinted, describing the success of Communist propaganda

throughout the world and, of particular interest, the success of

the Left Book Club in reaching intellectuals throughout the 34 British Empire. Even the Vatican's daily newspaper, 1'Osservatore Romano contributed a most interesting analysis of -67- . . . 35 Communist activites in Canada. It reported that when the

House of Commons was debating the defense budget, the Canadian

Youth Congress had organized a campaign against war and had appealed to the young not to volunteer and to resist conscription if war came. Regarding the Spanish Civil War it wrote that committees to aid the Loyalists were in existence throughout the country. As a result of their activities the Vatican source claimed that over 2,000 Canadians had gone to Spain. Such reports led Social Catholics to believe that the Communists were very active in Canada.

At the same time, the E.S.P. was concerned with the twists and turns of the party line as to the correct tactics to follow.

During this period, contributors to the E.S.P. saw the party shift its emphasis from organizing the unemployed and the immigrants to infiltrating the international unions attempting to organize Canadian workers into industrial unions. Youth work,

Archambault wrote, was also being stressed in order to establish a continuous programme for the recruitment of new members. The

Social Catholics heard Tim Buck * s appeal for a common front against poverty, fascism and war and reported success by the

Communists in winning over such organizations as the Civil

Liberties Union, the League for Peace and Democracy, the League of Nations Society of Canada and the Canadian Youth Congress to 36 mention only a few. More threatening was the exploitation by the Communists of growing Canadian nationalism. For sometime, they had attempted to place themselves in the tradition of

Mackenzie-Papineau rebellions but, by 1938, according to 1'Osservatore Romano, they were exploiting the sentiment for a strong central government in order to remove provincial barriers to the implementation of their programme should they come to power. The proof of this, according to this article, was that wherever the Rowell Commission sat, "...tous les

Boards of Trade ou les Unions du Travail, influences par les communistes, ont reclame un gouvernement central fort et une legislation unique du travail." The Communists had not ignored the antipathy of Protestants for Catholicism either. Their success in this regard, according to the report from the Vatican, explained the intense agitation against the Padlock law outside of Quebec. In fact, the previous autumn had seen many Protestant ministers replace the regular Sunday service with a discussion of the unconstitutionality of this law. It appeared to the

Social Catholics that Communism was indeed a growing threat within the country.

The E.S.P.'s collaborators also asked themselves whether or not Quebec was threatened by Communism to some extent. When it came to their home ground the Social Catholics led by

Msgr. G. Gauthier , sounded the alarm at an early date and main- 37 tained a tireless watch throughout the depression. Msgr.

Gauthier was particularly alarmed by the propaganda activities of the Communists. Nevertheless, it was Archambault's study in

1935 which dealt most thoroughly with this aspect of the problem.

In 1933, there were, according to his sources, 1,200 active and 38

10,000 affiliated members in the Montreal area. At that time, the Canadian Labour Defense League claimed 200 French-speaking members. To attract more French Canadians, it had resolved at its convention to de-emphasize its anti-religious propaganda, to promote bilingualism particularly within some of its affiliates such as the union trying to organize with

some success the loggers of the Rouyn-Noranda area, and to make more use of French in its propaganda activities. From the

documents which Archambault placed innappendix to his study,

it appeared that a Communist youth organization was competing -

albeit unsuccessfully - with a Catholic one for the allegiance

of young French-speaking workers and that attempts were being made to exploit anti-war sentiment in French Canada. The

following year Archambault noted that the Communists had

contested three Montreal ridings and had circulated a French 39

language version of their programme. These facts, Archambault

concluded, did not justify a complacent attitude.

Social Catholics could not afford to be complacent in

their struggle against Communism. For, it was clear to them,

as Msgr. Gauthier put it, that: "La religion est une puissance d'ordre...elle cultive des espgrances surnaturelles qui ne sont pas inutiles pour faire accepter les miseres et parfois les duretes de la vie... Supprimez Dieu .. et le premier probleme qui se pose devant 1'esprit, c'est le ,redoutable probleme de l'inigalite" des conditions humaines....' Hence, the Communists could never achieve their revolutionary

goals until they had destroyed the Church. Archambault and

other Social Catholics were alert to any anti-religious mani- 41

testations. It appears, however, that it was during the

Spanish Civil War and the anti-Padlock Law agitation that the Social Catholics felt most threatened. There were, as will be seen, huge demonstrations against the presence of Loyalist propagandists in Montreal. Msgr. Gauthier publicly warned the

English-speaking middle class against letting its anti-Catholic attitudes lead it into an alliance with the Communists. The

Social Catholics, in calmer moments, agreed with Archambault that the devotion of French-Canadians to the Church was still strong. Nevertheless, they also feared that the activities of the Communists were having some effect upon the average

French-speaking Catholic. Archambault declared that there were some who claimed to be,

"...a la fois communistes et catholiques. On a meme entendu un ouvrier faire cet aveu naif: 'Je prie tous les soirs pour que le communisme arrive!'"43

It was easy to foresee the day, Archambault warned, when forced to choose between the Church and Communism,

"„ Mai conseilles par la misere, par les abus scandaleux d'un capitalisme oppresseur, par leur ignorance de la doctrine sociale de l'Eglise, par une propagande de plus en plus habile et tenace, ces travailleurs abandonnent leur religion pour 1'eVangile soviitique."

If it was true, as was generally admitted, that the French- speaking population remained loyal to the Church, what forces in Quebec sustained Communism? Msgr. Gauthier suggested that the writings of such left-wing French authors as Gide, Barbusse,

Rolland and Malraux had had an impact upon some French Canadian intellectuals - a fact which Archambault described as surprising 44 and most dangerous. some workers, as has been noted, were felt to be sympathetic. But the most fertile soil for Communism, according to Archambault, was the immigrant groups, an increas- 45 ingly more important segment of Montreal's population.

Poverty-stricken before coming to Canada, they had been rendered even more miserable by the depression. As they had little under• standing of the traditions and institutions of the country,they were fully exposed to the depression. The Catholics amongst them were for the most part scattered throughout the city. It was very difficult, therefore, for the Church to provide for them effectively. French-speaking Catholics, by and large, seemed to be indifferent to their suffering. The Communists, on the other hand, had established newspapers, some schools and social clubs designed to appeal to such groups. It appeared to

Archambault that they were increasingly successful in winning

Catholic immigrants to their cause. As for the non-Catholic immigrants, the largest group among them by far was Jewish. This group, Archambault stated, "...dans tous les pays 1'armee reVolutionnaire peut compter, surtout si elle s'attaque §. des institutions chretiennes, sur les sympathies et meme l'aide effective de ce groupe naturel* lement enclin. par ses atavismes, aux id£es subversives.

He added it had already provided the Communists with many active members. The Communists appeared, to the E.S.P., to have a strong base from which to expand.

Whenever the Social Catholics paused, therefore, in the midst of this anti-Communist campaign to ask each other, as

Cardinal Villeneuve did of Archambault in 1935, whether or not, "Vos avertissements n'ont-ils et§ que pour allumer des incendies que vous auriez le plaisir d'iteindre ensuite aussi -72- aisement", they could only answer, as the Cardinal answered his own question, that "le feu en est allum€ parmi nous, il est urgent de le circonscrire, puisqu'on ne peut esp^rer d'ici 47 longtemps l'eteindre."

Only a fool could ignore the figures: in 1934, there were forty Communist centers in Montreal, admittedly none of them French-speaking, while in 1936, the chief of police 48 reported that the Communists had held 802 meetings. Only a fool could ignore the experience of other countries. The evidence was there for anyone to see. At another level, it seemed illogical that there should be no Communist activities in Quebec. Msgr. Gauthier had come to the conclusion earlier that until the world became completely christianized, there would always be, "...une opposition irreductible entre deux croyances, deux fois qui exigent l'une et l'autre le don total 49 de l'homme". For his part, Archambault agreed that the Church faced a formidable challenge. He believed that what was at stake was "...peut-etre, l'avenir meme du catholicisme sur tout ce continent."

It was in this psychological atmosphere that the Co-operative

Commonwealth Federation thrust itself upon the consciousness of the Social Catholics. As in the case of Communism, Pope Pius XI had already set the tone. He declared in Quadragesimo anno that much of what the Socialists said was true and that they had become very moderate in aim and method. Yet, there was no basis for cooperation between Socialism and Catholicism for the former "...repose sur une thiorie de la societe qui lui est propre et qui est inconciliable avec le christianisme authentique. Socialisme religieux, socialisme chritien sont des contradictions: personne ne peut etre en meme temps bon catholique et vrai socialiste."

When, therefore, a Canadian political party, the C.C.F., pro•

claiming socialist principles, began to emerge in 1932-1933, the

E.S.P. called upon a promising young Dominican priest, Georges .... 51 Levesque to examine it critically.

Father Levesque began his study of the C.C.F. by asking: 52

"mgrite-t-il notre attention?" Its leaders, he declared,

"...sont des hommes trds intelligents, tr§s actifs et bien decides, qui priparent leur campagne depuis des annies." The

C.C.F. already had committees in most parts of the country trying

to recruit members and establish an organization. It had obtained

the support of fourteen M.P.'s and of agrarian and labour groups

from B. C. to Montreal. Among all segments of society, it had

the support of "...certains groupes qu'on pourrait appeler les

groupes de mecontents." Levesque noted that in December, 1932,

an assembly of United Church ministers had adopted a programme

similar to that of the C.C.F. At the same time, the League for

Social Reconstruction was not only providing the C.C.F. with

theoretical guidance but also strengthening its appeal to

intellectuals. LeVesque concluded that the C.C.F. had a great

potential for growth. The conditions appeared to be ripe, for

according to the author, -74- " Il presente a une foule qui souffre depuis longtemps les plus dures privations, qui commence 1 s1impatienter et a d£sesp£rer des vieux partis jusqu'ici impuissants S la soulager, un programme qui a tout l'attrait de la nouveautg, qui se resume en quelques formules simplistes et claires, qui promet a breve £cheance remede S tous les maux et qui du reste contient beaucoup de bonnes choses."

It was important, therefore, to decide what attitude Catholics

should adopt towards it. In making such a decision, LeVesque stated that the Catholics had to consider whether or not the

CCF. was more akin to the British Labour Party, tolerated by the Church, or to the European Socialist parties, condemned by the Church. Does the CCF. , LeVesque asked, possess the three main characteristics of a true Socialist party?

As to the first characteristic, the reliance upon violent class conflict, Levesque admitted that the CCF. did not advocate violent class conflict to achieve its ends. He feared, however,

that this was not an absolute article of faith. The party might

resort to it, he claimed, if it ever became the sole method of achieving its goals. To support this claim, he alleged that

J. S. Woodsworth, its leader, had stated that violence might come if the CCF. was ever prevented from achieving its aims through constitutional means. Such a statement, to LeVesque, was

like an ultimatum, " c'est comme s'il disait: Nous vous apportons un remede, il faut absolument que vous 1 *acceptiez... Je sais bien que pour tenter d'eviter 1'accusation d'etre reVolutionnaire, M. Woodsworth a fait remarquer ensuite que la violence inevitable sur laquelle portait sa menace ne serait pas le fait de lui-meme ni de son groupe, mais l'oeuvre de forces reVolutionnaires ^trangeres a eux. Echappatoire, nous semble-t-il; comment soutenir serieusement qu'en dehors de la CCF., le peuple canadien soit si mur pour la revolution?"53 -75- Drawing extensively upon statements made by Conservative members of Parliament, Livesque pointed to the support Woodsworth alleg• edly gave to the revolutionary O.B.U. in 1919 and to the apparent 54 Marxism of Angus Maclnnis to expose the true nature of the C.C.F.. Furthermore, he argued, even if this party was not violent, its denunciation of capitalism and its constant demand for socio• economic change might bring about a situation which it could not control. This, to him, was all the more likely as the C.C.F. lacked a firm foundation of spiritual and moral principles. Secondly, the attitude of the C.C.F. towards private property was, to LeVesque, unclear. The party was split between all-out socializers like Maclnnis and the majority which did not go so far. But he believed that the C.C.F. would so modify the right to own private property as to practically eliminate it.

Rerum novarum clearly stated that the expropriation of private property was legitimate only to the extent that the common good required it and where it was the only way to serve it. It appeared to him that the C.C.F. was not prepared to accept such limitations. Hence, he concluded that the C.C.F. opposed the right to private property.

Finally, LeVesque felt that if the C.C.F. did not have a materialistic conception of society in principle, it had one in fact. He argued that while the C.C.F. hoped to bring about a "nouvel ordre social", it had not presented a programme designed to promote the common good, that is to promote "...la vie vert- 55 ueuse des citoyens et la prosperity publique." All that it offered was "...riformes de choses et non de personnes." He could only conclude from this that the C.C.F. assumed, "...que la coramunaute humaine n'a ete" constitute qu'en vue du seul -76- bien-etre" - a characteristic, according to Pius XI, of true 56

Socialism. To objections that the C.C.F. was concerned only with socio-economic reform, he answered that these changes could not be carried out without altering the moral foundation of society. Hence, the C.C.F. had a duty to clarify its programme on this point. As the depression was caused, accord• ing to the Pope, by the decline of morality, the C.C.F. had to pay some attention to moral reform. Otherwise, its silence on these two points was further proof to LeVesque of its material• ism.

On the basis of this critique, Levesque was able to conclude that the C.C.F.: "...entre dans cette categorie de socialisme 'attenue" et moins intransigeant' , dont parle Quadragesimo anno, mais qui reste encore assez vrai socialisme pour ne pas miriter' 1'adhesion des catholiques."57

He added that if the C.C.F. abandoned this position or, if it clearly demonstrated that this was not its true position, there would be no reason to restrain Catholics from participat• ing in it. There was much in the C.C.F. programme, he felt, that Catholics would find attractive. The first of these was,

"le primat de l'homme dans l'economie, c'est- S-dire la subordination effective et complete des biens, de leur production et de leur distri• bution aux besoins humains. Ici les Co-ops sont loin d'etre materialistes, ils le sont moins que nos capitalistes devergondes."58

Other aspects included the C.C.F.'s insistence on a planned economy, its emphasis on the common good over particular interests and its desire to broaden the scope of social legislation. -77-

While Levesque insisted on the tentativeness of his conclusions, Msgr. Gauthier felt justified the following year in taking a stronger position on this issue. Drawing heavily on Levesque's critique without acknowledging it and, at the same time, taking into account developments since it had been written, Msgr. Gauthier undertook to "direct" his flock as to how they should view the C.C.F. in a sermon which the E.S.P. 59 published. Although Msgr. Gauthier in delivering his sermon painted vivid word pictures of the threat which Communism posed, he declared that, "...ce n'est pas sous sa forme absolue et brutale que le communisme est et craindre en ce pays ... le socialisme - ce communisme a longue tcheance - est au contraire a redouter...."60

His purpose, he explained, was to apply the joint declaration of the Canadian hierarchy to the specific needs of his diocese.

The declaration, according to him, had condemned Communism and Socialism in general. Because the declaration had not named a specific group in order to make sure that all forms were included, there was oneorganization, he said, which used this as a sign of approval. He repeatedly stressed that it was not his purpose to intervene in political matters but simply to carry out his duty as Archbishop and as citizen. He rejected the C.C.F. complaint that it was only the Quebec hierarchy which opposed it by pointing to the criticism which the Catholic news• paper, The Prairie Messenger, had directed against the Saskatchewan 61 branch of the party. From this point of departure, Gauthier went on to reiterate the points which LeVesque had made but in

stronger terms. -78-

Gauthier did elaborate, however, on certain aspects

of the C.C.F. which LeVesque had ignored or which had become manifest after his study had been published. In particular,

Gauthier criticized the C.C.F.'s stand on individual rights.

On one hand, he felt that the Regina Manifesto's declaration

on the right to own property among other things went against

the fact that, "...les pays qui resistent le mieux a la propagande communiste sont ceux 5u la petite propriete est le 6 2 plus repandue." On the other hand, he accused the C.C.F. of being too tolerant. Specifically, he questioned: "...les sympathies trop bruyantes de la C.C.F. pour 1'experience des Soviets? Les commentaires des Co-Ops autour de 1'article 98 ne sont pas moins suggestifs. Et pourquoi ces protecteurs de 1'ordre national interviennent-ils en faveur des communistes? Et pourquoi 1'article 12 du programme de Regina rgclame-t-il la liberty de parole et d'assemblee pour tous, sans exceptions evidemment pour les communistes revolutionnaires?"

Another aspect on which Gauthier diverged from Levesque was the question of the C.C.F.'s attitude towards the rights of

the Church and of French Canadians. He was especially concerned with its attitude to education. Like LeVesque, he felt that

the C.C.F.'s programme was too vague. Article 9, he pointed out,

simply stated "the amendment of the Constitution without

infringing upon racial or minority rights". To Gauthier, this

article smacked of the infamous Erfurt programme of the German

Socialist Party which had declared, "religion, affaire privee".

Whereas the other political parties, he admitted, might not be

overly concerned with morality, they at least, -79- "...s1adaptent aux institutions etablies, et par leurs chefs, maintes fois, a notre connaissance, ils ont fait du moins profession de spiritualisme et de christianisme".63

He feared that the CCF. would abolish the Senate, the

legislative councils and provincial rights without making clear what the alternatives were. French Canada would then be "...

sans defense dans le grand tout canadien..." and might soon discover that these reformers "... font bon marche" de nos 64

institutions, de nos droits et de la Constitution fgdirale."

Msgr. Gauthier, unlike Father Levesque, did not shrink

from reaching firm conclusions as to the nature of the C.C.F.. He

expressed his belief that, "le socialisme ne sera toujours que

le precurseur de communisme" and warned Catholics to beware of

the notion that they could alter it by becoming members. It was more likely, he said, that they would be its victims. To under•

line this assertion, he pointed to the fate of the Russian bourgeoisie which in attempting to bring about political change had opened the way for the Bolsheviks.

If the attitude of Social Catholics towards Communism and

Socialism is compared to their attitude towards capitalism,

some similarities are noticeable. In both cases, the Pope out•

lined the directions to be followed. There existed in both cases differences in emphasis but there the similarities ended. There

is no doubt that, in considering the threat of Communism and

Socialism, the E.S.P. drew upon a greater variety of sources.

Consequently its pamphlets recorded a greater variety of re•

actions to this threat than to capitalism. These reactions

ranged from the calculated attempt to discredit the CCF. to -80- th e near-hysteria of the Spanish civil war period. Another noticeable difference was the scope of the anti-Communist campaign. It had to take into account international and national as well as provincial developments. There appears also to have been a greater degree of agreement on this issue. As a Jesuit priest wrote:

"la restauration de l'ordre social serait impossible si on laissait pen^trer dans les classes populaires le venin de la doctrine boleheviste."65

Thus, it did not matter if the contributors were conservatives trying to maintain the status quo or reformers hoping to see the triumph of the Social Catholic programme; they agreed that these collectivist doctrines were the greatest enemies of the Church.

As a result, they tended to ignore the differences existing within and between the Communist and Socialist movements.

Even as they adopted a scholarly approach, the Social Catholics never questioned the reliability of their sources. Fear and hope made them blind. -81-

Chapter VI

The Roots of the Catholic Programme

If most Social Catholics appeared to agree that collectivism in its various forms was the main threat, what was to be their attitude towards the existing socio-economic system? This question focusses attention on the motives of the Social Catholics as, guided by the Church's social doctrines, they attempted to develop Catholic solutions to the problems created by the depression. Because they were usually too preoccupied with this task to discuss their basic assumptions at any length, their fundamental views can only be accumulated in bits and pieces. But the task is nevertheless necessary for it was these assumptions that gave the E.S.P.'s thought its orientation and ultimately, controlled the effectiveness of its actions.

The first problem that confronted most of the Social

Catholics was how they should deal with the obvious fact that the existing socio-economic system had brought about the depression. Some of the early pamphlets tried to dismiss the problem or to diminish its importance. One author, for instance, attributed the depression to many causes, especially to World

War I."*" He felt that the capitalist system was the victim of Bolshevik propaganda. North America contained too much evidence of the beneficial effects of capitalism for these lies to convince him. If there were abuses, they were more noticeable in Europe than in North America. These abuses, in any case, would -82-

not be cured by Communism. In fact, he claimed that it was

the failure of the Soviet Union to repay huge loans to German

and British banks which caused a general economic collapse.

While few were so explicit about it, some Social Catholics

linked anti-capitalism to pro-communism.

Other commentators adopted a variation of this theme.

Perrier summarized this position best in discussing L'Encyclique 2

"Quadragesimo anno". While admitting that the capitalist

system had "...une grande responsabilite dans la triste situation

presente....", he stated that it was unjust to see it as the

sole cause, as many were wont to do. Leo XIII's dictum that

"le travail ne peut pas plus se passer du capital, que le

capital peut se passer du travail", in his opinion, held true

in this situation. He contended that "une lutte etroite et

aveugle" against capitalism would produce greater misery and

unemployment.

A few wanted to restrain anti-capitalistic emotions for moral reasons. Quebec's bishops, in analyzing the causes of

the depression, judged it to be "pirilleux et injuste" to

attack indiscriminately all who had accumulated some wealth while ignoring the many services these people performed for

society.

Another attitude, which some of the E.S.P. group adopted, was a refusal to reach any hard conclusions, as to what the

individual or the group should do. Minville, for example, after

demonstrating in a most logical manner the responsibility of

capitalism for the depression concluded with this statement: -83-

"Le capitalisme n1 a rien en soi qui contredi.se la morale...Le capitaliste a mieux §. faire que d'entasser des richesses. II a un role social S jouer. Si un jour, il le comprend, la . prosperiti et la paix rggneront dans le monde."

With a different emphasis but with the same result, a European contributor claimed that the economic crisis was a liberating influence because "la crise revile au monde la voie qui y mene All groups, whether liberals, socialists or communists, were seeking to alter the dominant value system in order to subordinate personal interests to the common good.

As the only system which integrated the best which these philosophies had to offer, Catholic social doctrine, he was sure, would attract increasingly all those who were seeking changes in the present situation.

Much less complacent was another group of contributors

5 to the E.S.P. . One member of this group, after analyzing the financial abuses which had led to the collapse of the economy, concluded that the best allies of the Communists were the financiers. Another felt that one effect of monopoly capitalism upon people was to make them more susceptible to Communist propaganda. The best expression of this feeling came from

LeVesque who argued that all measures from propaganda to legal repression would be useless against Communism unless the root causes of mass suffering were eliminated. Did these causes, he asked, exist in Quebec? And answered: -84-

"Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit d1avoir lu les revelations honteuses que nous ont apportees certains rapports de 1'enq.ue.te Stevens; d1 avoir visits, autour de nos grands magasins regorgeant de marchandises, certains taudis ou tant de nos bonnes families souffrent les plus dures privations; d1avoir vu, aux portes de nos usines..., ces longues files de chomeurs...; d'avoir rencontrt, sur des terres pourtant vastes et riches, des cultivateurs qui, malgri leur travail et leur bonne volonte, ne pouvaient parvenir S y subsister."

These men became increasingly bitter in their denunciation of capitalism for providing the breeding ground of Communism.

Where did Archambault stand on this issue? He wrote in

1933 that until the appearance of Quadragesimo anno the attitude of Catholics towards the existing order "...sans etre louable 7 pouvait i. la rigueur s'explique". The causes of the disaster were obscure and the solutions were not obvious. There was fear that an anti-capitalist attitude would worsen the situation.

Since Pius XI had spoken there could no longer be any hesitation on the part of Catholics. It was the Pope himself, Archambault emphasized, who had written: "II y a violation de 1'ordre...quand le capital n'engage les ouvriers...qu'en vue d'exploiter H son gre et 5 profit personnel l'industrie et le regime economique tout entier,...."

Still, Pius XI had not condemned the system itself, Archambault stressed, but its great abuses. Other Social Catholics agreed with him on the need to combat these abuses which bred social injustice without destroying the beneficial aspects of capitalism.

The strongest anti-capitalist sentiment came from those

Social Catholics who judged its operation on moral grounds.

Abbe" G. C6te, chief spiritual advisor of the C.T.C.C, made the -85- o most extensive of these assessments in 1937. Not only did he attempt to analyze the morality of contemporary capitalism but also the reasoning of those Catholics who defended it.

Cote" set out to demonstrate, first of all, the falseness of the three basic arguments of Catholic conservatives. The 9 first of these was the necessity to observe contracts. Cote admitted that valid contracts which promoted social harmony should be respected. These contracts, he insisted, to be valid must be equitable for all concerned. In many cases, he felt that the state, for example, had signed contracts which were invalid and illicit such as those connected with the exploit• ation of Quebec's natural resources. He asked: "Que dire de ces marches effectue, par abus de pouvoir...pour alimenter la caisse §lectorale;... que dire de ces marches dont les'obligations' furent constamment violies, et dont la pleine execution avait pour effets le pillage d'un patrimoine, une entrave i. la colonisation... 1'exploitation de la main-d'oeuvre, du consommateur et des epargnants...."

A second defense of capitalism, which to him, was not wholly true, was the call for resignation in the face of mass misery. Thos who argued this way relied upon Pius X's advice given several decades previously to a group of visiting Catholics.

The Pope, C6t€ argued, was referring "...aux inegalit^s irreductibles et utiles: celles de la nature,..." and not to

"...des in£galit£s injustes qu'il faut supprimer et des inigalit^s inutiles qu'il faut restreindre.Pius X had insisted upon the obligations which employers owed to their employees. Similarly Leo XIII had demanded that a just relation• ship be established between the two groups. False interpretations -86- of Papal thought, Cote admitted, would be a mere semantic exercise if the present situation was not so grave and, if so many were not inclined "...S considerer les encycliques pontificales, non comme des documents a realiser, mais comme des plans de discours a paraphraser.

Thirdly, Cote decried the failure of many Catholics to distinguish between capitalism per se and the existing economic system which he called "le neo ou 1'hypercapitalisme". The former was not condemned by the Pope nor could it be condemned, as it was but a form of the right to own property. The same restrictions did not apply to the latter which he defined with the help of Pius XI as, "...le mal-etre, la surabondance encadrant la misdre, 'une poignte de riches et une multitude d'indigents' 12

...'.' If looked at in the light of this definition, Cote" felt that neo-capitalism would be seen not only as immoral but as amoral and, hence, had to be brought under control.

To support this contention, Cote pointed to the fact that the dominant economic doctrines were atheistic. They stimulated the worship of wealth and would recognize no limit to its acquisition and use. Neo-capitalism had, in the words of

Leo XIII, imposed a "...joug presque servile (sic) S l'infinie 13 multitude des prol§taires." In denouncing this situation, it was clear to Cote" that both Leo XIII and Pius XI had condemned the existing economic system. The type of economic system which would meet the Church's requirements was still but an abstraction.

Another reason for condemning monopoly capitalism, the author declared, was the fact that it was actively anti-religious. In their everyday transactions, capitalists attacked the

Christian concept that the individual person is the end of all human activities. Instead they had transformed labour, accord•

ing to Pius XI, into "...une instrument de depravation; la matigre inerte sort ennoblie de l1atelier, tandis que les 14 hommes s'y corrompent et s'y degradent."

A third reason for condemning the existing economic system,

C6te argued, was its materialistic outlook. Capitalists had for

a long time claimed that, "...les exigences de la morale sont incompatibles avec 11 idee du progres et la seVerite d'un bilan; que la question du prix de revient ne ressortit a aucune £thique, et que ceux qui s'entetent § vouloir mettre un peu de justice dans la pagaie economique sont des idSalistes, des gens' pas pratiques', qui ne connaissent pas la 'joie' d'etre employeurs."15

This attitude was as responsible as Communist agitation for convinc•

ing the workers that force was the only means of improving their

lot.

On the basis of these facts, C6te could not accept the

arguments of those who counselled caution in exposing the nature

of monopoly capitalism. Had not Pius XI denounced the progressive

de-Christianization of the masses as a scandal? Was not

capitalism destroying the family unit "...en jetant les enfants

a la rue, la femme a l'usine et l'homme au foyer...?"16 Was

it not this system which was stimulating the growth of statism,

"...puisque 1'Assistance publique passe son temps a ramasser

les ruines cyniquement accumul^es par lui, au nom du profit

illimit£.... " as well as the other evils which he had enumerated?

Such a system had to be loudly condemned. Failure to do so -88- risked creating the dangerous impression that "...l'Eglise a partie liee avec le capitalisme moderne...." The consequence of proclaiming the rights of property to those who had no hope of acquiring any would be to alienate these people from the

Church as had happened in Europe. To avoid repeating this error,

Coti believed that it was necessary to make it unmistakeably clear to everyone that the Church was not bound to any economic system. In support of this position, Cardinal Villeneuve, a year later, expressed his belief that those who wished the

Church to remain silent wanted either to protect the status quo 17 or to promote their own ends.

Most members of the E.S.P. group supported the Pope's call for change in the existing socio-economic order. His guide• lines were of necessity very general. They did not answer such questions as: what long-term goals should be established?

What strategy should be adopted? How fast should these changes be implemented? What needs should be met immediately? It was up to the E.S.P. to mobilize the resources available in order to carry out this task.

A fundamental concern of the Social Catholics was the type of society which should replace the existing one. Perrier, in discussing this complex question, wrote that social reform did not mean levelling of class differences but rather the 18 encouragement of more widespread ownership of property. To another commentator, it seemed that capital must be subordinated to the needs of the workers and, in turn, "...le travail de

1'esprit doit primer le travail materiel, qu'il doit le diriger, -89- l'orienter, le conduire dans la voie du progres...." Along the same line, a contributor cited with approval a resolution of

French Social Catholics who proposed to strive for,

"...une sorte d'autorite" paternelle, (sic) qui d'une part reconnaitrait aux travailleurs tous les droits qu'exige leur collaboration et de 1*autre creerait aiitour du groupement professionnel une atmosphere vraiment familiale...."

For this group, change tended to mean the restoration of a stable, well-ordered society.

Other contributors to the E.S.P. had a different view as to where social change should lead. Levesque was the first to articulate this vision when he declared that all reforms must aim to, "...human!ser (sic) notre Sconomie...la mettre au service de la personne (sic) humaine, mais de toute la (sic) 19 personne humaine et de toutes les (sic) personnes humames."

To him this meant that all economic activities should be guided by the principle of social utility rather than profit-making, that corrupt practices such as Sunday work should be eliminated and that a grossly unbalanced distribution of wealth should be replaced by a more egalitarian one. In particular, the new social system would seek to improve the lot of "...les pauvres, les malades, les m§res necessiteuses, les vieillards, leSjeunes chomeurs...." Another Social Catholic described the ideal society as one in which the actions of the individual person, "...la disposition qu'il fait de ses biens, les contrats qu:'il passe, les profits qu'il realise, sont justiciables d'un double critere; celui de l'utilite ihdividuelle et celui de l'intiret general. Et c'est toujours selon ce dernier que se doit prononcer 1'arret decisif."2° -90-

Cote, for his part, called for a society that would enable the workers to obtain, "...avec le pain, la securite du lendemain et la joie de vivre...." Cardinal Villeneuve summed it up best when he asserted that the Church wanted "une justice organised". This meant, he explained, that society had to be organized in such a way that those persons "...qui essaient de s'ajuster a leur devoir et selon les regies de leur conscience ne soient pas du meme fait ecrases....." For this group, social reform had to facilitate the growth of the individual.

Regardless of their aims, those who commented on the

Social Catholic programme felt a sense of urgency in realizing it. Some Social Catholics were set in motion by the Pope's warning that, if this was not done without delay, "...on n'arrivera pas 3. defendre efficacement l'ordre public ... contre 21 l'assaut des forces revolutionnaires." For others, the motivat• ing force was the challenge to build a society which contained in Levesque's words, "ni capitalisme viciS ni marxisme vicieux", a society based on Christian humanist principles. Some^like

Archambault, were moved by both of these impulses at the same time.

Oscillating between the fear of Communism and an increas• ing hatred of capitalism, the E.S.P. group embarked upon a quest for the Christian society. In formulating its outline, they wavered between the requirements of social order and of personal development. At the extremes, they came into conflict. It was on these shaky foundations that they proceeded to erect a

Catholic programme adapted to Quebec's needs and resources. -91-

Chapter VII

The Role of the State in the Christian Society

Given the urgency of the problem and the magnitude of the task, the Social Catholics had to turn to the state for help.

In doing so, they asked themselves questions such as: to what extent should the state be trusted to carry out changes? What types of reforms should it be required to execute? Before they could answer these questions adequately, however, they had to decide what the role of the state would be in their reconstructed society.

A man who was to become a leading French Canadian theo• logian, L. Chagnon, s.j., was the first to discuss the proper role of the state.''' From Quadragesimo anno, Chagnon deduced several principles to guide thinking on this subject. The state, he argued, had a double task: on one hand, it had to protect the rights of individuals and of associations as well as aid them in their activities and on the other hand, it had to take charge when and where private groups were unable to cope with the situation. In addition, it had a special responsibility to care for the weak and the poor. Its role, ideally, was, as much as possible, to encourage autonomous associations to carry out these functions by granting them the necessary authority and funds. The state would then be free, in Pius XI's words, to

"...diriger, surveiller, stimuler, contenir, selon le comportent les circonstances ou l'exige la necessite...."

The crux of the problem,was, as Chagnon asked himself, "Pour eviter le socialisme, faut-il condamner toute national- 2 isatxon? Dans quelle mesure peut-on 11admettre?" The Pope had stated that in certain cases it was reasonable that the state should take responsibility for the functioning of an enterprise because of the danger for the common good if left in private hands. For more specific directions on this matter, Chagnon turned to the "Code Sociale de Malines" which had been drawn up in 1928. While recognizing the legitimacy of nationalization, the code set limits to its use. The most important of these were that just compensation be paid, that it be used only in specific cases and that the form adopted vary according to the situation. This brief discussion was not taken up again until 3

1938 when another theologian gave it a more extensive treatment.

Yet, he had little to add to what Chagnon had already written except his marked preferrence for joint ventures by the state and private capital and for autonomous regulatory agencies to free the state from the role of "...docile instrument de toutes les passions et de toutes les ambitions de l'interet", into which, 4 according to the Pope, it had fallen. As these were the only discussions to be found, there seemed to be a reluctance among other writers to consider this aspect of the problem.

Whatever misgivings they may have had about the role of the state, the fact remains that Chagnon and a group of theologians drew up in 1933 a set of guidelines for those wishing to reform the socio-economic order in Canada.~* As this programme was restricted to general principles, a group of laymen developed a 6 second programme in greater detail. Added to several other -93- pamphlets on specific topics, these proposals made up the

Catholic programme to be carried out by the state. This programme can be divided into approximately five main areas of concern: financial and corporate, political and legal,wages and social legislation, agriculture and colonization, and, finally, Communism and civil liberties. By examining their comments on each aspect, it should be possible to gain some understanding of the E.S.P.'s priorities and, more important, its concept of the role of the state.

The leading exponent of financial and corporate reform in 7

Quebec was Dr. P. Hamel. Drawing upon his extensive research on the practices of monopoly capitalism, he advocated a series of reforms which would break the power of the "trusts", particularly that of electricity. To do this he preferred that the state enter into direct competition rather than simply g regulate them. This approach he claimed would avoid the danger of one dominating the other. Where this was inadequate, he proposed that the state nationalize those monopolies most flagrant in violating the public interest such as the Beauharnois

Corporation and the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Corporation.

He favoured enabling legislation that would permit municipalities to take these enterprises over but he admitted that where this had been attempted the local governments had had to resist the heavy pressure of the financial interests.

As far as those "trusts" which were not to be nationalized were concerned, Hamel intended to rationalize their internal structure so as to make financiers directly responsible to the -94- small investors and to curb the growing power of holding companies. Through these reforms, he hoped to make private enterprise work for the benefit of the consumers and small investors. Wealth, as a result, would be acquired in a more honest and responsible manner and, consequently, the rising discontent would be eliminated. For Hamel, only the state was strong enough to achieve these goals and most Social Catholics seemed to agree with him except for one who felt that he had 9 not gone far enough. To make economic institutions more responsive, he urged that the board of directors include representatives from all groups concerned, including the workers.

He supported government action to save investors from a total loss of their savings because "une bourgeoisie ruinSe devient plus facilement anarchique que le proletariat...." Yet, he also demanded that those investors who had not suffered such losses share proportionately in the drop of income which other groups had experienced. In this manner, some Social Catholics hoped to use the state to break the economic power of the financiers and to render economic activities more responsive to human needs.

Closely related to economic reform was political reform.

The commentator on this part of the programme claimed that this was its most controversial aspect yet it was also the most narrow in scope.^ These proposals were designed to break the domination of the economic elite over the political process and to render politics more honest and responsible and its admin• istration more competent. To do this, they called for the end of the practice of appointing leading politicians to boards of directors. They also proposed, among other things, that newspapers declare who their owners were, that electors be

asked to present identity cards and that the father of a family be accorded more votes than a single man. An economic council was to be created to ensure the competence of the administration and to provide the research facilities needed in making decisions

These political reforms were as far as any contributor of the

E.S.P. went during the depression in this respect.

More important, considering the prevalence of unemployment and of wage-cutting, were the proposals in regard to wages and other social measures. Here, the stumbling block was deciding exactly what is a just wage. Recognized as a key issue, this question was discussed extensively by many E.S.P. contributors during this period. All looked to the Pope for guidance.

Pius XI, in his writings, had simply stated that everyting possible should be done so that the workers would obtain "... une suffisante abondance" in order that they might be able to support a family more easily.11 Consequently, they had to look elsewhere for more precise guidelines.

Msgr. Gauthier explored this problem early in the depression

He stated that the Code de Malines defined "le salaire vital" as including the subsistance of a man and his family and in• surance against accidents, sickness, old-age and unemployment.

As the worker could not be treated as a commodity he was entitled to this wage. Having obtained a just wage, the Church demanded that all parties respect their obligations and carry out their dutires diligently. In his discussion of this problem, Changnon -96-

argued that, "le salaire doit permettre au travailleur de

riparer ses forces et de vivre une vie pleinement humaine, c'est- 13

1-dire familiale.... To those who scoffed at this concept of

"le salaire familiale", he pointed out that it did not mean that

the principle of "I travail tlgal, salaire egal" would be

eliminated for it was assumed that the young worker would save

any surplus for the time when he would have a family of his own.

It was also assumed that the family would help the father to

some extent in earning enough to meet their needs. He warned

that, in addition to these factors, the state of the particular

industry and of the economy had to be considered. All Social

Catholics who wrote on this question agreed that the wage level must be enough to foster a happy family life. In particular, they were concerned that it be enough to encourage the mother to 14 stay at home. Failure to pay such a wage, in Cote's eyes, 15

constituted robbery.

To supplement this wage, most Social Catholics agreed

other measures were needed. Foremost among these was a system

of family allowances. Such a system would serve as "...la

retribution du service sociale rendu par les families nombreuses."

The Pope had also encouraged attempts to develop a comprehensive

scheme of social insurance as well as worker participation in

the control and benefits of industry but it was only in his last

encyclical, Divini Redemptoris, that he recommended a system of 17

insurance against old age, sickness and unemployment.

Altogether these principles comprised the theoretical basis for

the Catholic proposals in this area. The actual programme of the Social Catholics, commented upon by A. Charpentier, President of the Montreal Council of the 18

C.T.C.C, tended to follow these guidelines. The methods to be used in realizing these goals were a list of social measures combined with, as will be seen, extensive structural reform.

Noteworthy amongst the latter was the proposal that the govern• ment extend collective agreements to achieve minimum standards in a given sector. In sum, the C.T.C.C, Charpentier declared in a later discussion of these proposals, supported, "...une legislation familiale..., qui permette a l'ouvrier de salaire moyen ... de faire, en eievant sa famille, quelques economies et de s'edifier lentement une maisonnette; car ^ l'ouvrier proprietaire est un pilier de 1'ordre social." In discussing the reasons for the proposals advanced by his group, Charpentier warned:

" II faut eviter de favoriser les seuls ouvriers, ce qui accentuerait l'exode rural vers les centres „n urbains et serait injuste pour les agriculteurs."

The main concern behind their agricultural reforms, as the

President of the Catholic Farmers' Union, l'U.C.C, wrote, was that, "La terre doit etre remise a la premiere place dans les preoccupations des dirigeants. Toute renovation sociale doit 21 commencer par 1'agriculture, base economique d'une nation."

Apart from providing research and educational facilities, the role of the state in bringing this about consisted, for the most part, of aiding the farmers' efforts. The Social Catholics believed that, by associating with each other, the farmers could solve most of their problems. When it came to colonization however, their attitude changed somewhat. -98- What exactly should the state do to promote colonization?

Those authors who discussed this question agreed with Minville 22 that the state had a major role to play. It had to create a situation whereby the colonist would no longer appear, "... selon 1'angle sous lequel on se place, ou comme un paria ou comme un heros..." and, in this way, make it as attractive a way of life as that of the urban worker. At the same time, it had to avoid fostering "...le culte de l'Etate Providence...."

Any aid that it provided should never be in the form of a direct grant, "instrument au surplus de favoritisme et meme de corruption...." but as a reward for effort, even if this effort benefitted the colonist himself. It should create, therefore, a system of grants which would encourage the settler to develop his land and to maintain it no matter how difficult the economic situation became. The state should also ensure that the settlers always had a market at a fair price for pulpwood. As for the other types of aid, they should be granted in a form that would benefit the community such as the construction of roads, schools, churches, etc.. If the colonist needed special help, Minville insisted that it be provided through colonization societies. At the summit, he hoped that the government would set up a commission to research and to develop a colonization plan, thereby elimin• ating political influence as a factor. Because, in his opinion, colonization was its most urgent and important task, Minville demanded that the government, above all, assign it a higher priority when drawing up the provincial budget. Directly or indirectly, the state, in the minds of the Social Catholics, was vital to the success of colonization. -99-

The fifth aspect of the Catholic social programme which the

E.S.P.'s collaborators developed differed from the other four in its negative character. It was the part most commented on and it changed in emphasis with new developments. This aspect of the programme was concerned with the Communist threat.

What, the E.S.P. group asked, should the state do to elimin• ate the Communist menace? Turning to Quadragesimo anno, they read the passage deploring,

"...11 insouciance de ceux qui, ntgligeant le peril qui nous menace de ce c6t§...la ligereti qui... laisse subsister un etat de choses qui fournit le terrain favorable au mtcontentement legitime, et qui pepare ainsi les voies § une revolution mondiale."23

In the early part of the depression, most of the Social Catholics who wrote on this problem tended to concentrate on the need to break off all relations - and especially trade - with the Soviet 24 Union. But they came to see with Perrier that the roots of Communism would not be eradicated by,

"...de vaines denonciations des crimes perpetris H Moscou, ...en interdisant 1'entree au Canada du charbon russe (au profit des capitalistes qui monopolisent la production et 1'importation des charbons gallois et amgricains), quitte §. fraterniser avec les 'meurtriers' de Leningrad pour rigulariser le cours du ble."

Gradually the emphasis of the anti-Communist campaign shifted in line with the Pope's thinking to the elimination of those factors on which Communism thrived.

If social reform was a powerful weapon against Communism, repressive measures, to the Social Catholics, were not to be ignored. Pius XI had denounced those who "...laissent se propager de toutes parts des doctrines qui, par la violence et le meurtre, -100- 25 vont a la destruction de la Society tout enti^re." Archambault took the lead in demanding stronger measures against anti- religious propaganda and stricter enforcement of existing laws, 26 particularly of Section 98 of the Criminal code. Repeatedly,

E.S.P. contributors ranging from laymen to Cardinal Villeneuve demanded tougher measures against Communist activities. The climax of this campaign appears to have been reached in the years

1936-1937. At demonstrations organized to protest the presence in Quebec of supporters of the Spanish Republican forces, resolutions were passed calling for immediate action on the part of the government in respect to Communist activities and to 27 social reform. Equally significant was the presence of the recently-elected Premier, Maurice Duplessis, at the Quebec 28 demonstration. There, in an impromptu speech, he asked the federal government to halt the use of the mails for propaganda purposes and congratulated the students of the Universite de

Montreal who had disrupted a pro-Loyalist gathering. Turning to

Cardinal Villeneuve, he offered him, "...la plus sincSre collaboration de mon gouvernement dans toutes les initiatives que vous voulez bien prendre." In May, 1937, "la loi protegeant la province contre la propagande communiste", better known as the Padlock law, was adopted.

The controversy over the nature of civil liberties which the Padlock law aroused led the E.S.P. to publish a tract 29 entitled Doit-on tolirer la propagande communiste? This tract condensed the thinking of Social Catholics on this matter. -101-

The author based his defense of the Padlock law on three main propositions. The first concerned the nature of liberty.

All that was necessary to possess liberty, according to him, 3 0 was that a man "...peut 5 son gre agir ou ne pas agir." He did not need the ability to choose between good and evil.

Cardinal Villeneuve had made this distinction quite clear when he spoke against those claiming "liberty tgale accordee a

1*enfant comme §. l'adulte, a l'homme sain et au ditraque, au citoyen digne et au bagnard, H celui qui defend l'Etat et a 31

1'autre qui le trahit...." Each individual, in the Cardinal's opinion, had to be accorded liberty in proportion to his state; physical and mental, to be exercised within the limits of the common good as defined by natural law, by divine law and by wise human laws.

The second point the author made concerned freedom of expression. Was it absolute? To say yes meant that good and evil were put on an equal footing. Leo XIII had condemned such liberty. The author contended that, "...le droit (sic) est une faculty morale de faire ou d'exiger quelque chose. Et comme l'on ne peut faire que le bien et non le mai, il ne peut y avoir aucun droit a faire le mai."32

He added that, given the natural tendency of man towards evil and given the inability of most men to undertake the research necessary to refute false reasoning, it was more than likely that such freedom would corrupt most people. As the state's first duty was to protect the rights of its members amongst which were,

"...celui de connaitre la verite, et d'eviter que ne soient mis -102- en peril les principes premiers qui sont a la base de l'ordre social...", it could not tolerate absolute freedom of expression 33 without destroying itself. Leo XIII, while making it quite clear that the Church could not accept that the freedom of thought, of expression, and of conscience were natural rights, had stated that, it could accept under certain circumstances that they be tolerated "...pourvu qu'un juste temperament les 34 empeche de d§ggn§rer jusqu1 a la licence et au d€sordre." In any case, the common good must set the limits. It followed, there• fore, that revolutionary, atheistic ideologies which attacked the roots of social order should never be allowed to develop.

On the basis of these principles, it was clear to the author why Communism could never be tolerated and why the Pope had repeatedly denounced it as the greatest threat to civilization.

Because of its destructive nature, the author declared that, to prevent Communism from winning, "...l'on pourra, si les autres conditions n^cessaires S cette fin sont r^unies, aller jusqu' 35 au recours aux armes inclusivement." The government, there• fore, was fully justified in taking those measures which would prevent Communism from becoming a threat. Critics who claimed that such measures were incompatible with, "...les libertes si

§tendues dont se vantent les grandes dSmocraties'", ignored the fact that many democratic regimes had been replaced by non- democratic ones, "...parce que l'on n'a trouve que dans un regime fortement concentre le remede adequat a la menace tr§s 36 r€elle." Many democratic countries such as the Scandinavian ones had not made this error. He concluded by lauding the -103- federal cabinet which, "malgrt la pression formidable exercee sur eux par nos grands pourfendeurs des Etats totalitaires et du fascisme...ont eu le courage et le merite de refuser de dtsavouer la loi du cadenas...."

In this manner, the Social Catholics in varying degrees hoped to erect a Christian society with the assistance of the state. There developed, however, two major obstacles to the effectiveness of the state1 s role. One of these, as a close associate of Dr. Hamel noted in a speech delivered to the anti-

Communist assembly at which Duplessis was to speak, was that,

"Les gouvernants, meme ceux-IS qu1une formule democratique semble mettre particulierement au service du peuple souffrant, sont beaucoup trop ^7 lents a imposer la politique sociale chretienne...."

The other obstacle which was to grow in importance with time, was the question of jurisdiction. Most of these reforms required close federal-provincial cooperation. If, as one Social Catholic was later to remark, the federal government assumed control over social legilslation,

"Elle deviendrait necessairement d'inspiration anglaise et protestante, car on voit difficilement, meme avec beaucoup d* imagination, le gouvernement federal mettre en pratique et rgaliser au pays 2 les recommendations que le Pape donne aux catholiques...."

Having no obvious means of overcoming these obstacles and, in many ways, actually contributing to their growth, the E.S.P. group was to see its reform programme lose its initial force as many proposals were discarded or modified. The presence of such obstacles could not strengthen what was for many an already weak faith in the efficacy of the state as an instrument for reform and must have reinforced the bias of many Social Catholics -104- for structural reforms. It is this important aspect of their programme which must now be examined. -105-

Chapter VIII

The Catholic Alternatives to Monopoly Capitalism

Many members of the E.S.P. group looked upon political

reforms as relatively short term measures. What was needed, in

the long run, were structural changes which would ensure that the depression would never recur and that the Christian conception of

social relations would triumph. During the period under study,

the French Canadian Social Catholics tended to envisage the means of accomplishing these goals in two ways. The first was

the rehabilitation of agriculture with its concomitant, colon•

ization, and the second was the transformation of the existing

system of economic relations by the creation of corporations.

The E.S.P.'s contributors tended to concentrate on the former

at the beginning and the latter at the end of this period but both were constantly on their minds. What they hoped to accomp-

lish through these reforms and how they hoped to do it will be

the concern of this chapter.

At a conference on colonization held in 1932, Archambault

observed that the depression had exacerbated French Canada's

population problem.1 Yet, it had also renewed interest in

colonizing unsettled areas of the province. He proposed, there•

fore, that the group exploit this opportunity to make colonization

the most important task of French Canadians, more important,

"...que le developpement de l'industrie, la confection de ponts, de canaux, et de routes M 1'usage des touristes, et meme le progres des arts et des lettres." -106-

J. E. Laforce, who was to become the Minister of Agriculture under Duplessis, remarked, at the same conference, that if

Canada had 1500 more agricultural parishes, such a market would be created for industry as to eliminate the depression.

He also believed that many who had left the farm now realized that it provided an occupation, "...ci la longue plus assures que ceux procures par le travail § des usines souvent im- productives ou le pelletage de la neige pour les corporations 2 municipales." A few months later, the hierarchy declared that,

"Le retour a la terre et le souci de chaque foyer de produire par lui-meme ce qui lui est ntcessaire, constitue, avec la pratique de l'economie, la plus profonde solution humaine du probleme actuel...."3

The most compelling argument in favour of colonization at this time, as one author put it, was that "la classe agricole, tout en ressentant les rudes coups de la depression, n'a pas manqu§s 4 de pain." The nature of agriculture, he felt, forced even the most foolish to exercise some foresight for he was, at once, the employer and the employee. No matter how low the prices dropped, the farmer would always be able to subsist.

The depression, in effect, called into question for many

Social Catholics the trend towards the greater industrialization and urbanization of Quebec. To one author, the depression was an indication that French Canadians could not hope to gain control 5 of industrialization. Their "aspirations religieuse et nationale" were used as excuses to ostracize them. Proof of this was, -107-

"...les raison futiles invoqu^es pour nous marchander ou nous, refuser ce qui nous revient de 11 admin'stration de la chose publique et de la distribution des emplois dans les compagnies de chemins de fer et d1utility publique...."

The influence French Canadians did have came from their control over agriculture. If they were to escape becoming a nation

"de serviteurs et de salaries" they had to cling to the soil.

Chagnon, in his discussion of the Catholic programme, condemned

"11 agriculture speculative" for stimulating the "desertion" of the land and over-production of foodstuffs. For another commentator, industrialization was acceptable only if it comple- 7 mented agriculture. The hierarchy, in 1937, condemned the belief fostered by urbanization that, "...la condition de cultivateur en est une a laquelle on ne doit se rSsoudre que de g mauvais gre...." It was clear to many of the E.S.P.'s contri• butors that the urban way of life had failed and, therefore, a return to a more satisfying mode was needed.

A return to agriculture would satisfy, according to them, not only the individual1s economic and social needs but also his cultural and religious aspirations. Minville, for one, set out to demonstrate the beneficial effects a colonization programme 9 would have for French Canadians. He contended that French

Canada was caught in a paradoxical situation. As an economically and politically weak society, it depended on a high birth rate to survive. Yet, as the cities filled with the unemployed testified, it could not meet the needs of its members. Obviously, what French Canada needed was a socio-economic system that would -108- give these people a chance to develop their talents. But, to

Minville, industrialization was not the answer because French

Canadians lacked the capital, the skills, the spirit and, above all, the numbers. Furthermore, past experience had made it plain that such a policy, even if implemented by French Canadians, would render them vulnerable to other economic crises, to the continued uprooting of their farmers and to a falling birth rate.

The only solid economic base was the land. Hence, a colonization programme was required. It would redress the economic ills of which the depression was a symptom; it would provide openings young people needed, "...tant que dans les limites de la province de Quebec d'abord, de la Confederation cai^dienne ensuite, il restera une acre de terre cultivable^" and it would assure "...

1'accroissement normal en nombre et en qualite..." of the population.10 Haste was essential as enforced idleness and public relief were destroying French Canada's human resources.

If his plan was carried out, he was confident that,

"Cent ans ... d'un effort methodique, et toutes les terres cultivables de l'est du Canada, sauf peut-etre la pininsule ontarienne, appartiendront aux gens de notre sang. Les crises alors pourront venir, aussi dures qu'on puisse les imaginer. La France d'Amerique...sera assuree de son avenir."il

As various E.S.P. commentators stressed repeatedly, colonization would also safeguard French Canada's religious values. It would take children away, in Laforoe's words, from

"...des tavernes, des sales Schoppes ou la juiverie vend a temperament, de la deformation que la ville donne trop souvent 12 aux deracines qu'elle finit par tuer lentement." The benefits -109- of agriculture, in the opinion of another Social Catholic,were even greater than this for, "...la religion n'a jamais eu chez nous de meilleure sauvengarde naturelle que 1'action colonisatrice et la vie des champs...Les relations y sont plus cordiales, les joies plus pures, la natality pluseievee, parce que la morale conjugale et familiale y est plus honor^e. De 1§. des moeurs d'un christianisme sans defaillance ou se preparent les grands Chretiens, oil germent les nombreuses vocations sacerdotales et religieuses qui dibordent sur toutes les plages de l'univers, au benefice des missions etrangeres."13

If this was to continue, he was convinced that French Canadians had to remain an agricultural people. In this appeal, he was joined in 1937 by the hierarchy who admitted, "...que toute la tradition eccl^siastique montre une estime singuli^re pour

1'agriculture....

Archambault claimed that as far back as Msgr. Bourget's first letter on the subject in 1848, the clergy had led the colonization movement in French Canada. Others claimed that it was Msgr. Laval who had first committed the Church to colonization.

In any case, a group of priests dedicated to the promotion of colonization, "les missionnaires colonisateurs", had long been in existence. Now as in the past, their task and their motives remained the same: the maintenace of the alliance between the land, the language and the faith.

Although there was little that the Social Catholics of

Quebec could find in Papal pronouncements to support their claims on behalf of agriculture, the fact was that for many, especially during the first half of the depression, it was the most attractive alternative to the dominant system. Impercept• ibly, however, the emphasis changed as the Pope's writings came -110- to be better understood. From agriculture, the attention of the E.S.P. shifted to corporatism. Aided by European Social

Catholics, the Quebec branch proceeded to study and to develop the most elaborate aspect of their programme. No other aspect, except Communism, was to receive so much attention and support.

No other aspect was to be so misunderstood.

To what purpose did these men support corporatism?

Quadragesimo anno suggested to Cardinal Villeneuve that "...la society est mai batie."1^ Society had to be reorganized by substituting, according to Pius XI,

"...des organes bien constituts, des ordres ou des professions qui groupent les hommes, non d'apres la position qu'ils occupent sur le marche du travail, mais d'apres les diffirentes branches de l'activite sociale auxquelles ils se rattachent."l^

This would eliminate, Cardinal Villeneuve believed, situations where gains on behalf of the workers would be made at the expense of the farmers or where wage increases led to the collapse of an industry or to a weakening of its competitive position. It would also halt the trend towards greater state intervention in socio-economic matters. Such a reorganization of the economy would foster, in Perrier's words, "...d'une part, 17 cette juste soumission a l'empechera d'etre excessive

Through this reform the Social Catholics hoped to redress the imbalances which they detected in the existing society.

More important, on the long run, such a re-organization of the economy would lead to a change in personal values. By uniting science, capital and labour within one legal framework, corporatism would bring about a better appreciation of the -Ill- worth of labour, of the needs of a particular industry and of the 18

requirements of the common good. It would remind all concerned,

E. Duthoit, President of the French Semaines Sociales wrote,

that "Tous ont...11 obligation morale - sans parIer de 1'intSret

bien compris - de cooperer au bien commun de leur milieu 19

professionnel." Corporatism would compel them to act in this

manner, Muller claimed, without violating their individual

freedom. In the process, it would fulfill man's need to live and

develop through close and constant contact with his peers and

would increase his awareness of the bonds which linked him to

the community.

What, the Social Catholics asked themselves, do these

goals require? By uniting those most concerned in a given enter•

prise, corporatism would enable them to study and to resolve 20

their common problems. They would negotiate, according to

Muller, the collective agreements applicable to their sector

of the economy and establish the rules and penalties to ensure

its operation. Each group within the corporation, however,

would retain its autonomy and by advancing its particular inter•

ests counter-balance the power of the others. As one comment•

ator ptit it, "Le bien commun ne forme pas une masse compacte et homogene dont la representation puisse etre avantageusement confiee a un organisme unique; (sic)il y a des palirs et des etages dans le bien commun (sic) et a chaque palier et, a chaque etage, il convient qu'il ait sa representation propre...."21 The Social Catholics hoped, in this manner, to structure the relationships within the economic system so as to promote a -112- reconciliation of diverging interests.

Duthoit felt that there was another and, considering the chaotic economic situation, more important dimension to corp- 22 oratism. It would create "l'iconomie ordonner", thereby avoid• ing the evils of laisser faire and of statism. Unlike the former, it would stablize production and unlike the latter, it would preserve individual initiative. Most writers on this topic, however, emphasized its role in promoting social harmony.

The most difficult and most controversial question which corporatism raised concerned its relationship to the state. Pius

XI called upon the state to leave to these intermediate bodies, "...le soin des affaires de moindre importance ou se disperserait a l'exces son effort; elle pourra des lors assurer plus librement, plus puissamment, plus efficacement les fonctions qui n'appartiennent qu'a elle parce qu'elle seule peut les remplir...."23

For Duthoit as for most Social Catholics, this meant that the corporation would relieve the state"...de tout ce qui peut etre regit avantageusement su sein meme de la profession.The state's role would be limited to sanctionning the decisions of the corporations.

Muller tried to allay the misgivings which had arisen on this question. To those who argued that it could not come into being without the force and discipline of a dictatorial regime behind it, he replied that, on the contrary, true corporatism "...ne peut s'ipanouir et prosptrer que sous un regime de large liberty, compatible nianmoins avec un pouvoir fort et respect^, strictement cantonne dans l'exercice de ses fonctions naturelles."25 -113-

Totalitarian regimes, such as those found in Italy and Germany, by their very nature could not respect the autonomy of any group.

Furthermore, to succeed corporations had to develop "...en tenant compte du temperament national, de ses traditions, de sa situation economique." Hence there were many types of corporatism. To those who complained that it would severely weaken the power of the state, Muller answered that, while incompatible with a dictatorship, corporatism did require a strong government to establish the pre-conditions for its successful implementation. Others claimed that once established corporatism 2 6 would strengthen the state in many ways. By decentralizing responsibilities, it would enable the state to concern itself with the main issues; by organizing economic activities in a hierarchical structure, it would make economic and social develop• ment more orderly and by mobilizing the expertise to be found in each sector, it would enable the government to make wiser decisions in socio-economic matters. Some trade-unionists believed that, by democratizing the decision-making process within industry, corporatism would also reinforce political democracy.

Equally difficult to resolve was the problem of how corporatism should be implemented if the state was to have a restricted role. Muller had to admit that, "...nulle part encore on n*a decouvert la formule definitive, dresse" le plan 27 standard sur quoi reorganiser uniformement toute vie sociale."

This was not really a problem for, as Muller noted, "chaque branche de l'activite economique reclame une discipline adaptee -114- a sa structure et §. ses besoins." Each sector, therefore, had to develop its corporation on the basis of experience rather than a priori. A more formidable problem, to him, was that the groups who were being asked to create this unifying organism lacked the spirit of cooperation. And this spirit could not be created by decree. In addition, corporatism required skilled leadership if it was to succeed. These qualities could only be developed through patient and gradual educational work. Consequently those who considered this technique to be too slow to end the depression were turning to more radical solutions. Muller questioned their assumption that this work would be a slow process. They only had to look around them to see,

"...le nombre imposant d'institutions pricorporatives dija existantes - syndicats...ententes, accords, contrats collectifs, etc. - qui :constituent pour l'oeuvre a edifier de precieuses amorces dont 1'experience a dija revile la puissante efficaciti."28

What else had to be done? These elements had to be coordinated and developed with the collaboration of men of goodwill until the corporations had the organization, the skill and the authority to take over from the state.

The chief obstacle to its implementation, Muller felt, was the distrust of trade-unionists who saw corporatism only as an 29 attempt to divide them. It was true that some supporters of the concept had also seen it in this light and had interpreted

Pius XI's demand that "...§. ces classes opposies on substitue (sic) des organes bien constitues..." accordingly. Muller argued that in this case the Pope was referring to the social order and not -115-

to unions. Where unions had been infected by revolutionary

ideologies, they undoubtedly could not be integrated in the new

structure until these elements had been purged. Otherwise the

formula to be followed was "le syndicat libre dans la profession

organisee." The alternative was to force Christians to join

unions "...dont les principes et les programmes seraient en

contradiction avec les legitimes exigences de leurs consciences.11

Within the corporation, the union would have the right to be

consulted and to share in its control. This right was to be

exercised only at that level and not at the plant level, for

a rational division of power based on competence had to be main•

tained. With each group organized and interacting within the

corporative framework, Muller was convinced that this would soon

lead them to resolve their disputes on the basis of equity rather

than of strength. Christian unions had much to do to develop within their members that sense of social responsibility and

that spirit of cooperation necessary to make corporatism a

reality.

Finally, Muller had to consider the ways in which the state

could facilitate this process. What were they? He attempted to

answer this question by examining the various attempts that had

been made to introduce corporatism. The Dutch experiment, he

suggested, had failed because of internal and external economic

competition and because of the reluctance of the government to

grant these corporations more than consultative powers. This

raised the question of when the government should intervene to

make the corporations viable. He concluded that much depended -116- on the government for,

"s'il sait liberalement partager avec eux ses responsabilites en matiere sociale et yconomique, leur assigner un pouvoir r§glementaire et executif Stendu, les Conseils professionnels ne tarderont pas 3. prendre profonderaent racine dans la vie gconomigue...."31

Looking at the Fascist version, he could not help approving the radical change in attitude which Mussolini had brought about.

According to Muller, "...le denouement a la chose publique a etS remis en honneur dans tous les milieux...." While he could excuse the way corporatism had been imposed, he could not accept the fact that the state retained a great deal of control over its operation. He had to agree with the Pope that the Fascist corp• orations had "...un caract^re exagereinent bureaucratique et politique...." This was true not only of the Fascist corporations but of the unions as well. The same could be said of the Nazi version.

Two other experiments, however, met the requirements laid down in Quadragesimo anno. One was in the county of Fribourg,

Switzerland and had not been in operation long enough to show if 32 it would be a success and the other was Portugal. The most laudable aspect of the Portuguese experiment was that it granted the right within certain limits to those concerned to develop the type of corporation that would best meet their needs. The strong• est criticism that could be made of it was that the state had created the employers* association and had decreed which union each group was to join. This decree, of course, appeared to violate a fundamental principle of Catholic corporatism. But, -117- asked Muller, is this freedom of choice absolute? Wherever unions were too weak or the workers unable to organize themselves or were all Catholics, the state was justified, in the writer's opinion, in creating single unions for each economic sector pro• vided they were not animated with a spirit contrary to the Church's teachings. Thus Muller cleared the way for Social Catholics to cite Portugal as proof that their concept of corporatism was viable.

Corporatism as a solution for Quebec's ills received a great deal of support from the E.S.P.*s contributors during this period. Yet only two of them produced a detailed plan for its application. As these two programmes differed significantly in aim and method, they should to be examined in some detail. 33

The earliest of these was written by Minville. His aim was to correct the weaknesses that had led to the depression.

He proposed to do this by using corporatism to reconstruct French

Canadian society, "...sur une base nouvelle, adaptie desormais a notre temperament et aux exigences de notre situation...." Many wanted to break the power of monopolies first but he reminded them that this problem was merely a symptom of an older problem: the absence of a national purpose. An anti-trust campaign might improve the standard of living of the working class but, Minville wondered, for how long. He asked: "...depuis quand le progres d'un peuple s1 apprecie-t-il b\ la qualite du menu quotidien de ses masses ouvrieres ou autres? Probleme de culture avant tout, qui concerne done le coeur et 1'esprit au moins autant que l'appareil digestif...."34 -118-

The mass exodus from the farms, the proletarianization of small property owners and the idleness of the young were jeopardizing the survival of French Canada. Corporatism, in his judgment, was the only way to remedy these ills.

Minville's main concern was overcoming the obstacles to the implementation of corporatism. Because of the problems raised by geography and law, he concluded that it should only be applied in Quebec. There, the most formidable obstacle was the heterogenrous nature of the population. Not only was this so but the economic power was also held by the English-speaking minority.

How could they be expected to adopt corporatism when "...leur richesse et leur puissance, ils les doivent, du moins croient les devoir...! la formule d'organisation sociale que nous voulons 35 changer." Any scheme that they could not accept "...est aussit6t taxi de radicalisme, voire de communisme, et discredits mithodiquement par eux." The only way this barrier could be surmounted was, he believed, by the application of corporatism only to sectors controlled by French Canadians.

There was much to recommend this approach to Minville. For one thing, French Canadians were a very homogeneous group - culturally and spiritually. For another, as the provinces had the jurisdiction over this area, there would be no constitutional problem. In addition, there existed between the two major cul• tural groups, "...une difference d'aptitude, de ginie ethnique qui voue 1'un et 1'autre groupe a une carridre iconomique, sinon essentiellement, du moins sensiblement diffirente."36 -119- Th is fact was manifested in the tendency of French Canadians to succeed in small and medium-scale enterprises while the English-

Canadians controlled the huge corporations. For these reasons,

Minville recommended that French Canadians proceed to reorganize the economic sectors under their control according to corporative doctrines and, thereby improve their economic position. He did not dwell on the technical aspects of carrying out this policy.

He felt confident, however, that, once corporatism was in operation, the question would soon arise as to the role of the English-speaking minority of Quebec. When this happened, he hoped that each group would have formed professional associations on the basis of religion. Once these groups were brought together in a corpor• ation, the process of majority rule would eliminate the power of the "economic dictators".

Quite different was the attitude of the man who was to become the leading theoretician of corporatism in Quebec, 37

Maximilien Caron, professor of law at the Universite de Montreal.

He cited A French Social Catholic who had warned his colleagues to remember that the purpose of corpoatism was not to absorb "...la personne humaine dans un vaste organisme, mais a l'encadrer dans un ordre humain 5u chacun, se sente a la fois plus responsable de sa destinee et plus capable de faire le choix nicessaire qui doit le mener un jour a la vision de Dieu."

Caron saw in this conception of corporatism the means of eliminat• ing that often fatal weakness of democracy, the fact that, "... tous se riclamaient de la democratie, mais ne la vivaient pas. 38 >

Aucun souci de l'utilite commune ne les animait." By providing individuals with a framework within which they could effectively protect their rights and could clearly understand their obligations, -120-

Caron hoped that corporatism would develop a sense of community.

Following the guidelines constructed by the European Social

Catholics, Caron discussed the practical aspects of the implement• ation of corporatism in great detail. There is no need to analyze his programme except in a general way. To attain an orderly and just economy, he, like most corporatists, divided the power and the responsibilities between local, regional and provincial corporations. These bodies, if they were to overcome the obstacles in their path, had to be erected step by step and had to adapt themselves to the particular needs of the area and of the economic sector served. By clearly demonstrating its beneficial influence in this way, he was convinced, corporatism would win support. At the same time, he urged that a campaign should be undertaken to prepare the way by mobilizing public opinion and by furthering economic decentralization through cooperatives. As a result of these and other actions, Caron envisaged the emergence of a more humane society.

It was within this context of increasing interest in corporatism as a long-term solution to the depression that the

E.S.P.'s contributors turned their attention in the latter part of this period to the role of Catholic unions. What they con• ceived that role to be merits some study.

Archambault was quick to see in Catholic unions, "...une des digues les plus puissantes que notre pays puisse dresser 39 contre le communxsme...." He enumerated their beneficial effects as follows: -121-

"Non seulement on y combat directement les theories bolchevistes, on y enseigne au travailleur la doctrine chritienne, on fortifie son attachement a l'Eglise et a l'ordre social, mais, en outre, par leurs oeuvres iconomiques...ils rendent son existence moins dures, plus humaine, et contribuent par 15 H faire disparaitre ce ferment d'anarchie...."

Cardinal Villeneuve, while echoing this praise, took particular satisfaction in the fact that, "leurs rdglements et 1'action de leurs aumoniers constituent une digue...contre toute idee 40 subversive essaierait de les envahir." A related task which the President of the C.T.C.C. was pleased to describe at an anti-

Communist demonstration was to rid Quebec of the humiliating fact that, "...depuis pr§s d'un demi-si§cle, une grande partie du travail organise" s'est developpie sous le souffle materialisant de 1'esprit amiricain avec la connivence de chefs canadiens mai iclairis.

Thus, the Catholic unions were performing, as they had in the past, an important ideological function.

Similarly, as Archambault had noted, the C.T.C.C. continued to present the Catholic alternative to the workers. One leader of the C.T.C.C. asserted that two basic principles guided

Catholic unions. The first was that all men"...ne doivent pas 42 etre considiris comme des outils et comme des instruments...."

The second was that, "...tous les hommes ... sont foncierement igaux (je dis foncierement et non pas absolument)." It was because of these principles that the C.T.C.C. attempted to shorten the work week so that the worker would have the leisure to belong

"...a' une Eglise et pour pratiquer sa religion....", to shorten -122- the working day so that the worker could develop "... son in• telligence, jouir de son foyer et pourvoir H l'education de ses enfants..." and to claim a reasonable wage so that he would not have to live like "...une bete sans raison et sans intelligence."

For these reasons, he also supported the closed shop. Another

leader of the C.T.C.C. stressed the desire of Catholic unions to establish, "...des relations cordiales et harmonieuses entre 43 patrons et ouvriers...." He emphasized the need to consider the employers1 point of view and the need to respect their mutual obligations. As conflicts, unfortunately, could not be avoided, he stated that strikes should only be the last resort and, then, undertaken only if certain restrictions were observed. In discussing the reforms which the C.T.C.C. advocated, Charpentier also gave first priority to the maintenance of harmonious relations.

Both of these tasks - combating ideological enemies and promoting the Catholic programme - were merely a continuation of the original role of the C.T.C.C.^ What was new, or at least given more emphasis at this time, was the concept embodied in the

Social Catholic proposal which became in 1934 "la loi relative 3. 44

1'extension des conventions collectives de travail." This law gave the provincial cabinet the power to extend the terms of a collective agreement negotiated between one company and one union

to all others in the same trade or industrial sector. To carry out and enforce its provisions this law authorized the creation of a "comity conjoint" composed of representatives of all groups directly concerned. Why did the C.T.C.C. support this step?

Charpentier believed that this law would, -123-

"...mettre fin a 11entre-tuerie patronale et aux salaires de famines; loi qui stimule, renforcit et itend 11 organisation professionnelle dans les milieux od elle etait inconnue, qui ilargit son horizon social et l'oriente dans _ le sens de ses responsabil^tis nationales.... "

In making this last point, he was expressing the hope, in which he was to be disappointed, that only incorporated unions, that is Catholic ones, would be granted the right to have their contracts extended, thereby giving them a great advantage over the non-Catholic unions. Other immediate benefits to be derived from it, according to him, included the closed shop, tighter control over apprenticeships, and the elimination of "wildcat" strikes. Its greatest merit, however, for many Social Catholics including Charpentier was that "...ce ne sera encore qu'un palier vers une autre rgforme plus complete, plus comprehensive: 1* 46 organisation corporative de la profession." In the minds of many contributors to the E.S.P. the same 47 principles applied to a certain extent to the farmers. By associating in various ways, they claimed that the farmers would improve their economic situation. Similarly, to ensure the success of colonization, most Social Catholics called for the creation of parochial or diocesan societies to promote it. Yet another form of association, which gained in importance at the end of this 48 period, was cooperation in its various forms. Because it bred a sense of social responsiblity and decentralized economic power, cooperation was considered by many as preparing the way for corporatism and even as comprising an element within the corporatist system. -124-

Colonization and corporatism were the two main proposals advanced by the E.S.P. to replace the existing socio-economic system. It was chiefly to bring these changes into being that cooperatives and unions were encouraged. When the Duplessis government came into office, it was colonization that was given 49

a higher priority. When this government attempted}as has been noted, to weaken the bargaining position of the unions in 1937, it was largely because they saw Catholic unions as a prerequisite of corporatism that Cardinal Villeneuve publicly criticized the government and Msgr. Desranleau, auxiliary Bishop of Sherbrooke, 50 denounced "...cette blague de la liberty de travail."

Desranleau was to support the C.T.C.C. in its attempt that year to establish a union shop in the Simard shipyards of Sorel.

In colonization and corporatism could best be discerned the conflict of loyalties from which many French Canadian Social

Catholics suffered. Simply stated, they were torn between rejecting completely the industrial order and returning to the traditional way of life and accepting the Pope's challenge to transform the existing society according to Catholic conceptions.

It is interesting to note that the:only E.S.P. contributors to discuss agriculture and colonization were French Canadians, while

Europeans provided most of the theoretical framework of corporatism.

Within this context the same divergences in attitudes, interpretations and approaches noticeable in other parts of the

Catholic programme were also present. Few other Catholic pro• posals however, demonstrated the contrast in aims and approaches -125- found in the corporatism of Minville, Caron and Muller. On no other topic did an author perform the intellectual acrobatics which Minville exhibited. In writing a pamphlet on corporatism three years after promoting colonization as the solution to the depression, Minville appeared to have reversed his stand and embraced the industrialization of Quebec. The most curious aspect of his writings was his belief that the English-speaking "economic dictators" could be integrated gradually and peacefully into the

French-speaking corporations even though he had demonstrated a few years previously the tenacity and the ruthlessness with which the capitalists maintained and exercised their power.

In spite of this wishful thinking, the shift from colon• ization to corporatism during this period indicated that the

Social Catholics realized,with the Pope's assistance, the need to face the fact that Quebec was no longer a rural society. The impression remains, however, that while their minds turned to corporatism, their hearts remained with agriculture. Was Pierre

Trudeau right, therefore, in writing: "...n'etant guere disposes

3 comprendre, le phinomdne industriel et la prolitarisation des masses... nos theoriciens ne d^gagerent de 1'enseignement social des papes que les formules qui pouvaient ennoblir d'un prestige 51 d'emprunt nos prijuges de groupe?" To answer this question adequately, it is necessary to first examine the E.S.P.'s con• ception of its role and assessment of its efforts. -126-

Chapter IX

The Role of the E.S.P. and of Individual Catholics

As they formulated their programme to deal with the questions raised by the depression, the members of the E.S.P. had to consider what their role was as Catholics, both collectively and individ• ually, in its implementation. It is necessary to study this aspect in order to grasp in its entirety their vision of the world and of themselves.

One of the earliest undertakings connected with the E.S.P., was the convocation of a -conference on colonization in February,

1932.1 Delegates from every part of Canada, representing over

300,000 people, attended this two-day conference presided over by

Archambault. Turning to another field, one of its campaigns tried to focus attention on Catholic unionism when a "Semaine Syndicale" 2 was staged in November, 1937. More long lasting were the E.S.P.'s efforts on behalf of corporatism. Using the resources of the

E.S.P., Archambault launched in 1936, a bi-monthly review, L'Ordre

Nouveau to diffuse the latest developments in Catholic and, 3 especially corporatist thought. Apart from the pamphlets dedic• ated to these topics from time to time, no other important initiatives were reported.

Much more elaborate was the E.S.P.'s incursion into the political sphere. On March 9, 1933, the E.S.P. invited a group of 4 theologians to meet in Montreal. Archambault described its purpose thus: -127-

"Chacun reconnut 1*importance d'offrir aux citoyens de ce pays, desireux de s*employer S une restauration basie sur l'encyclique Quadragesimo anno, en particulier aux hommes publics, un programme ferme et precis."

After further consultations, the programme was submitted for the approval of "... de hautes personnalitis ecclesiastiques et laiques."

Archambault claimed that it had received a warm reception from all sectors of public opinion in Quebec. As the group had been concerned only with general principles, this first attempt lacked the concreteness which a political programme required. By

September 30, 1933, a group of laymen had carried out this further task. While disclaiming responsibility for it, Archambault admitted that the second programme accorded very well with the first. Look• ing at other Catholic countries, he noted, that "L'inergique chancelier d'Autriche, Dollfuss, disait derni§rement quril voulait reconstruire son pays sur les bases de l'encyclique 5

Quadragesimo anno." He urged French Canadians as devoted Catholics to try to do the same. It was possible if they followed Pius XI1s guidelines and if "...devant le bien commun les intirets de parti s*effacent...." That this was no idle fancy was demonstrated in the summer of 1934 when a group dedicated to "re-liberalizing" the governing Liberal party emerged.6 Paul Gouin, son of a former Premier and leader of the Action Libirale Nationale, acknowledged that they had taken, "...comme base d'etude et de discussion, pour preparer notre mahifeste, le programme de Restauration sociale publie sous les _ auspices de l'Ecole sociale populaire." The ties between the two were much stronger than this statement -128- suggests for there is evidence to indicate that many of those who drafted the second programme were also instrumental in writing the g

A.L.N, manifesto. Other parties, including the ruling Liberal party, adopted parts of the second programme. It was on the basis of the A.L.N, manifesto that an alliance was forged between Gouin 9 and Duplessis, the leader of the Conservative party. In the 1935 provincial elections, the A.L.N., running on this platform, won twice as many seats as its partner. While many other factors shaped the Union Nationale, there is no doubt that the E.S.P. contributed to it.

The forces that thrust the E.S.P. into the political sphere were not entirely positive in nature. Describing the context within which the E.S.P. had acted, Archambault wrote: "A cette ipoque surtout 5u le groupe Woodsworth se montrait tre" actif tant au Parlement que dans les assemblies publiques, la saine opinion s'inquiitait et demandait une directive ...II s'accompagnait presque toujours d'une remarque: Si le programme de ce nouveau parti va trop loin, ne pourrait-on pas-puisque des riformes s1imposent-en itablir un qui conviendrait aux catholiques, qui leur indiquerait jusqu'oil ils peuvent aller dans leurs revendications sociales?"l°

The meeting that resulted led, as has been noted, not only to the

formation of a political group, the A.L.N., but also to Msgr.

Gauthier's "warning" about the C.C.F.. In turn, this was endorsed by Cardinal Villeneuve and by the bishops of Saskatchewan where

the C.C.F. was most active.H

The importance of fear in determining the E.S.P.'s role manifested itself most clearly in the anti-Communist campaign which took place in Quebec. One of the chief tasks the E.S.P.

assigned itself in this regard was to "eclairer les intelligences." -129-

For, Archambault argued,

"C'est en camouflant sa vraie nature, ses visees anti-religieuses, ses resultats economiques, que le communisme peut faire des conquetes dans notre classe ouvridre, encore croyante et attachie S nos institutions."!2

It was of great importance, therefore, that the E.S.P. expose the nature of Communism and its results. It was equally important to make the workers understand the Church's social doc tr i ne, namely,

"...1'inegaliti des conditions, la necessity de la souffranee, le r6le veritable de la richesse, la dignite" de l'homme, sa haute destinie, son droit a une salaire familiale; puis tout ce que l'Eglise a fait pour le travailleur..."13

Special attention had to be paid to the Catholic immigrants in

Quebec. The Church, Archambault admitted, had already lost the majority of them and was in danger of losing the rest if some• thing was not done. The cause of this deplorable situation,

Archambault stated, was the attitude of French-speaking Catholics.

He asked,

".. . songe-t-on a" prier aussi pour la conversion des quarante-huit mille juifs qui etendent sur Montreal leur emprise grandissante? ...quelle aide pecuniaire leur apportons nous? ...ces missions qui n'attendent que des ouvriers pour donner des beaux fruits, combien des n6tres y consacrent leur zele?"

French Canadians would have to become more knowledgeable and more committed if the Communist threat was to be eliminated.

To accomplish this task, the E.S.P. utilized, apart from those already discussed, every medium of communication. Noteworthy among these were anti-Communist plays composed by Jesuits and made available to Catholic groups. Regular dispatches on Communist -130-

activities were sent to French language newspapers; special days,

weeks or other events were staged to focus attention on this

question. A travelling exhibition of Communist documents attempted

to bring home the reality of the threat and, periodically, a

campaign was undertaken to accomplish a specific goal such as the 14

one against trading with the Soviet Union. In doing so, the

E.S.P. always attempted to achieve the maximum impact often by

calling upon influential persons to support its position. In

this respect the climax appears to have been reached in October,

1936 when more than a hundred thousand people gathered simultan•

eously in Montreal and Quebec City to applaud a glittering array

of personalities and to hear Msgr. Gauthier's declaration that, in

the face of Communist attempts to destroy the Church in Quebec and 15

in Spain, "...votre premier devoir est de la difendre...."

Meanwhile, in Quebec City, Cardinal Villeneuve proclaimed in

front of Premier Duplessis that, "...notre province est devenue

l'objet des convoitises enflammees des revolutionnaires et des

sans-Dieu..." and denounced the presence in Montreal of "...

delegations mensongdres, flanquees de pretres apostats ou de

religieux difroques...." The E.S.P., in the words of one of its members, appears to have adopted the strategy of combatting 16

communism "...par les memes armes dont celui-ci se servait."

Most of these proposals and activities required a collective

effort on the part of Catholics. Another aspect which the E.S.P.

had to consider was the role that the faithful could fulfill

individually. -131-

Chief among these individual responsibilities was charity.

Starting with the Pope who insisted that Catholics demonstrate to the Socialists,

"...que leurs reclamations, dans ce qu'elles ont de juste, trouvent...une force de realisation bien plus efficace dans la charite chretienne...", many Social Catholics saw charity as a remedy for the maldistri- 17 bution of wealth which existed. Some felt as Quebec's hierarchy did that charitable works would safeguard, "...avec 1'ordre social le respect de la propriete...." Others, while granting that charity was desirable, agreed with the outspoken Msgr.

Desranleau that, "...la charite, pour etre vraie et efficace, doit tenir compte de la justice. Que l'aumone, les dons ou les gratifications de fin d'annee ne reparent pas les injustices et les vols commis par celui qui ne paie pas le juste salaire familial ou retient guelque chose sur le prix du travail ouvrier.n™

In an attempt to reconcile these tendencies, Cardinal Villeneuve stated that charity would work best where Christian virtues were not thoroughly accepted. It would help ease the lot of those, "...qui souffrent dija d'ecrasement et de ruine."

An equally important function of charity for many Social

Catholics was its ability to improve the relationship between groups. Workers, one member wrote, should exercise this virtue particularly in their relations with employers for, "ses reven- dications y gagneront surement en procedes loyaux et pacifiques...

The most urgent task for a Christian, according to Msgr. Gauthier, was, -132-

"...de jeter dans tous les milieux qu'il frequent© de l'optimisme et de la bonne humeur, de la resignation et de la joie chritienne. Par l'exemple et par la parole, il doit ouvrir I ceux que la gene rend maussades et exigeants les perspectives consolantes de l'Evangile."

Looking at this question at the end of the depression, Cardinal

Villeneuve concluded that without a sufficient degree of justice,

"les individus auront beau consoler les peines et pardonner les injures...les classes d'en bas seront icrasies...et

...celles d'en haut seront aussi ?0 entrainees dans le meme icroulement."

How could Social Catholics ensure that each one of the faithful understood his responsibilities and acted accordingly?

That many did not comprehend the Church's social doctrine was obvious. Pius XI deplored the fact that many Catholics were exploiting their employees and even worse,

"...il en est qui abusent de la religion elle- meme, cherchant a couvrir de son nom leurs injuste exactions, pour ^carter les reclamations pleinement justifiies de leurs ouvriers."21 Or, in the more caustic language of Msgr. Desranleau:

"En entendant parler patrons et ouvriers, en lisant journaux et revues; en ecoutant les discours et les programmes politiques, en examinant les reglements municipaux dont l'affiche paienne: 'Defense de mendier', dishonore 1'entree de nos villages canadiens en itudiant les lois des gouvernements, les publications de grandes firms economiques, nous sommes bien forces d'avouer que ces hommes, qui ont mission de penser et d'iclairer le peuple, n'ont pas lu, ou n'ont pas compris, ou n'ont pas voulu accepter les conseils et les ordres

It was clear to many Social Catholics that unless all men were guided by justice and charity instead of by greed and egoism no -133- programme of reform could succeed. What was needed was an elite, who, by word and by example, would act as the vanguard in realiz• ing this ideal. How to create such an elite? In Quadragesimo anno, Pius XI suggested that the Church seek this elite amongst those groups who had abandoned religion. By doing so, the Church would gain men,

"...qui comprennent leur mentality, leurs aspirations, qui sachent parler a leurs coeurs dans un esprit de fraternelle charite...les apotres immediats des ouvriers seront des ouvriers, les apotres du monde industriel et commergant seront des industriels et des commergants."22

Archambault was quick to adopt this technique but, it appears, that his principal objective in doing so was to counter 23

Communist inroads among the working class. In 1933, he in• spired the creation of a training school where for several weeks each summer, a carefully selected group of men - mostly union leaders - underwent a period of intense study and of spiritual ex^ercises. Their task was to counter Communist propaganda and activities through speeches, discussion groups and social clubs.

It was only in the latter part of the depression that the E.S.P.'s contributors broadened their interpretation of the Pope's thought.

Actually some efforts had been made earlier, under the direction of Archambault, to sow the seeds of what was to become

1'Action Catholique movement. But these efforts had found a weak echo in the E.S.P.'s pamphlets. After 1937, however, l'Action

Catholique became a major theme and it grew to become a most 24 complex organization. Mobilizing Catholics on the basis of age, sex and occupation, it superseded or swallowed up old Social -134-

Catholic organizations such as the A.C.J.C.. Ancillary services were established such as training facilities and university courses. Coordinating bodies emerged. A new type of specialist appeared in the ranks of the clerics.

To what ends was this zeal channelled? One of its goals was to transform the milieu in such a way that,

"...le christianisme n'affecte pas seulement notre mani^re d'etre ouvrier, itudiant, ... mais etre ouvrier, etre etudiant...deviennent autant de manieres d'etre chr£tien...."25

Another of its goals was to encourage lay participation in the

Church's divine mission so that all would remember, "...que l'Eglise ce n'est pas seulement la hiirarchie mais et les clercs et les laiques." At the parish level, Archambault envisaged the formation of a committee of laymen to coordinate activities and to promote Catholic virtues by combatting or cultivating, among others,

"...les foyers d'immoraliti; ...1'intemperance; ...surveiller spicialement les buvettes, les plages, les cinemas; travailler...1 la diffusion de la bonne presse; ...la famille...."26

This committee, he stressed, could only act in an advisory capacity.

The only time it should act on its own was when its activities,

"...pourraient indisposer contre l'autoriti, la preservant ainsi, en cas d'echec, contre toute diminution de prestige." While the organization and tasks of the Action Catholique were more exten• sive than has been indicated so far, it is obvious from what has been said that it was much more than an anti-Communist campaign.

It was an attempt to demonstrate that the Church was concerned not only with legal, political, social or economic reform but also with -135- the whole man. His needs, his concerns and his manner of communicating became the center of the Church's attention. The context within which he lived became the preoccupation of clerics 27 such as Levesque. In the process, the Church bypassed those elite groups who in the past had acted as mediators. By group• ing Catholics on the basis of occupation, age and sex, the

Action Catholique weakened those organizations which had always attempted to unite religion and nationalism. Thus, Groulx condemned, "cette formule idiote d'action catholique...elle les 2 8 forgait §. choisir entre leur foi et leur nationality." The

E.S.P. nevertheless continued to promote it. The Action Catholique, according to one of its French Canadian theoreticians, was testimony to the fact that the faith was, "...'totalitaire', en ce sens qu'elle exige le tout de l'homme et ne veut rien laisser 29 hors de ses attemtes. "

To construct this Catholic universe, physical and spiritual, and to eliminate or block competing ideals, the E.S.P., it seems, multiplied its activities and influence during the depression.

Operating in a favourable environment, for the most part, directed by an indefatigable man and supported by a multitude of dedicated laymen, the E.S.P. was in a good position to shape, directly or indirectly, the Social Catholic reaction to developments in Quebec.

The degree of success it obtained and the worth of its programme and efforts are questions that must be considered separately. -136-

Chapter X

The Success and the Failure of Social Catholicism

How successful did the members of the E.S.P. think they had been? Commemorating the tenth anniversary of Quadragesimo anno in 1941, Cardinal Villeneuve discussed the accomplishments of the French Canadian Social Catholics during the previous decade.1 Successive provincial and federal governments, he found, had implemented many of their proposals in socio-economic matters. The most important of these included the Collective

Agreements Extension Act, minimum wage legislation, aid to needy

mothers and unemployment insurance. In general, he felt, that as a result,

"L'ouvrier est maintenant plus considire. II est geniralement mieux traite. L'Etat le laisse au moins s'organiser. Les patrons consentent §. nigocier avec ses representants."

On the same occasion, he joined other members of the hierarchy of Quebec in issuing a collective letter. They agreed that much had been accomplished but that it was not enough. If, they wrote, federal and provincial legislation was examined and if the reports from recent enquiries into working conditions were true, it had to be admitted that, "le capitalisme dans notre pays exploite l'ouvrier, que protege insuffisamment notre legislation."

What the Social Catholics considered to be the results of their efforts to improve the status of agriculture while not as clear is nevertheless suggestive. In their collective letter on agriculture in 1938, the hierarchy deplored that fact that, -137-

"...il advient trop souvent que le courant industriel et les exigences des patrons ou des ouvriers l'emportent de beaucoup, dans les preoccupations des hommes d'Etat et des chefs sociaux, comme dans le remous de l1opinion publique, sur les intirets de la classe agricole...."3 It appeared to them that,

"les grandes firmes industrielles semblent payees par les speculateurs pour arracher a leurs terres et rassembler en des milieux industriels de plus nombreux travailleurs. II y a des lois qui reduisent les heures et la semaine de travail et haussent les salaires des employes; il n'en est presque pas qui favorisent 1'agriculteur."

The programme of colonization also seems to have fallen short of expectation. Elsewhere, Cardinal Villeneuve is quoted as writing in 1946, in connection with colonization, that, "on a voulu faire oeuvre utile mais en de trop nombreux cas les realisations ont 4 dimenti les esperances." The evidence appears to confirm this interpretation.

A similar fate apparently befell corporatism. In spite of the intensification of the E.S.P.'s efforts during and after

World War II, its prospects appeared by 1955 to have become dimmer.'^ A reason for this development, according to one E.S.P. contributor, was that, on one hand, unions, even those affiliated with the C.T.C.C., "Plutot que de nuire 3 leur cause, ils prefdrent sacrifier la convention avec extension et gagner du terrain dans 1'organisation syndicale, 3 la faveur des contrats particuliers 3 dresser."

On the other hand, the employers, while not opposed to the establishment of channels of communication with their employees, -138-

"...craignent une collaboration a" l'usine qui s'itablirait entre eux et l'organisme syndicale comme tel; ils ont peur des dictats iconomiques que leur imposeraient les syndicats par leur influence sur la main - d'oeuvre."

Thus, it seems that whatever gains had been made had been wiped out.

The aspect of their programme which ostensibly was the greatest source of satisfaction for Social Catholics was their campaign against collectivist doctrines. As early as 1936, the E.S.P. was congratulated on the fact that "..les idies de

M. Woodsworth n'ont pas eu chez nous le succes qu'il espirait."

Reviewing the anti-Communist activities of the E.S.P. in 1938,

Archambault declared:

"Si le communisme a peu entami notre classe ouvriere, s'il n'a pu surtout y trouver des dirigeants, - car ce sont des hommes Strangers ci notre nationality...qui dirigent le Parti communiste dans la province de Quebec, - nous le devons en grande partie aux chefs du syndicalisme catholique, formes dans les cercles d1etudes ou a l'gcole de Vaudreuil...."

It can be inferred from these statements that, if the E.S.P. had not succeeded in eliminating the threat, It had isolated it with the help of the Padlock law. A brief analysis of its post- depression pamphlets indicates that anti-Communism became a minor theme, perhaps, for this reason.

On the basis of these fragments and other sources, it would appear that the E.S.P. enjoyed less than complete success in implementing its programme. This conclusion does not diminish an appreciation of the energy and devotion that went into it. Nor does it make any less necessary a personal assessment of the worth -139- of its programme. To be valid, such an appraisal must focus

on the values which permeated the E.S.P.'s thought and actions.

One of the values to be found in most of the E.S.P.'s work was the desire for social justice. It was partly due to this

impulse that the Social Catholics constructed a programme of

reform which within its social and political context could be 7 considered very liberal. In the process, the E.S.P. ran the g

risk of being criticized for intervening in partisan politics.

Neither did the Social Catholics hesitate in supporting the principle of collective bargaining in the face of the hostility of employers and even of the government which they had helped elect, nor did they shrink from supporting the "anti-trust" campaign at

a time when its advocates were being branded as Socialists.

Their thirst for social justice undoubtedly helped to make many

Social Catholics such as LeVesque, Coti and Desranleau more open

to new concepts, more outspoken in their denunciation of the evils of capitalism, more uncompromising in their ideals and yet, more willing to learn from the workers themselves or through the medium of the social sciences of the problems which they had to confront.

This openness to reality led some of them to conclude with Cote

that the greatest problem which had to be solved was the fact that

the workers, "...sont victimes du disordre d'un travail mai paye, d'une production livrie 5 1'individualisme, d'un

that only a militant labour movement could solve this problem.

And through the medium of the E.S.P. they tried to make others

conscious of this fact. -140-

Another dominant value in the E.S.P.'s work was a commitment to pluralism. With a greater understanding of Papal thought and of the socio-economic reality, there developed an increasing divergence amongst its contributors as to aims and methods,sometimes to the point of conflict. The E.S.P. neverthe• less made its facilities available to these contending schools of thought. To a certain extent it also was open to the latest developments in European Social Catholic thought.1^ The result of this commitment could only have been to legitimize dissent within the Church and to stimulate in some of its readers a re• examination of the meaning of religion.

Does this conclusion mean, therefore, that Pierre Trudeau was wrong, at least as far as the E.S.P. was concerned, in des• cribing French Canada's social thought as "monolithic"?1''" To the extent that this description ignores the increasingly pluralistic nature of Social Catholicism, it is inaccurate. To the extent that the term indicates the underlying unity of doctrine, it is accurate. It must be remembered that the E.S.P.'s tolerance did not extend beyond "les questions libres". There was, it is true, a degree of self-criticism on such questions as the attitude to take towards capitalism and the reason for the loss of Catholic immigrants but this never amounted to questionning the Church's privileged position in Quebec. Furthermore, the degree of depend• ence upon Papal directives manifested by all contributors to the

E.S.P. restricted their field of enquiry. Even when they appeared to digress from Papal thought on such matters as colonization and the Action Catholique, they still tried to justify it in terms -141- of the Church's interests. It could be argued that the real purpose of the E.S.P. was not to foster the construction of many paths to Catholicism but to ensure that the various factions within the Church remained connected in thought and action to the main route. This tendency could lead some Social Catholics, as in their discussion of capitalism, to gloss over the issues raised by the Pope's writings. Or it could manifest itself in the fact that most of the E.S.P.'s proposals such as those con• cerning colonization were justified in terms of the benefits they would bring to various groups within the Church such as the farmers, clergy, unions, etc.. The E.S.P., therefore, did not really stray from its founding ideals. It was merely demonstrat• ing the Church's ability to adapt to new situations without destroying its essential unity. For this reason, Trudeau was 12 wrong in accusing the E.S.P. of distorting Papal thought.

It is on the question of who ultimately benefitted from the

E.S.P.'s efforts that Trudeau was most inaccurate. His main theme was that "le nationalisme a §t€...l'axe principale autour duquel a gravite presque toute la pensee sociale des Canadiens 13 frangais." In so far as the E.S.P. is concerned - and:it has been noted that the E.S.P. was a leading, if not the main source of Social Catholic thought - this claim is untenable. This study has tried to show - with some success - that the motivation behind such disparate proposals and activities as the shorter work week, corporatism, or the anti-Communist campaign was not so much to protect French Canadian culture, although, as Minville's writings testify, this was an important goal, as to advance the interests -142- of the Church. The axis around which the E.S.P. revolved was not, as Trudeau claimed, nationalism but Catholicism. In fact, when nationalism no longer served the interests of the Church as in the case of 1'Action frangaise and the Action Catholique, the clergy did not hesitate to abandon it. Equally incorrect are those who dismiss colonization as the fancy of some isolated 14 academic or litterateur. Such people may very well have advocated colonization but its importance came from the fact, as has been shown, that it served and had always served the interests of the Church. If further proof is needed as to the orthodoxy of the E.S.P.'s thought, a simple glance at the list of its collaborators will reveal that they were the dominant elements of the Church.

Another misconception of Social Catholic thought prevalent during the depression was the tendency to see it as the harbinger 15 of Fascism in Quebec. The fear of Communism, the insistence on corporatism, the utterances of leading clerics and the desire to create a Christian society, on the surface, ran counter to many of the assumptions of the liberal-democratic state and resembled developments in Italy, Spain and Portugal. The Social Catholics were well aware of these fears and, in various ways, attempted to 16 allay them. If at times Social Catholic thought skirted the edges of Fascism, it is well to remember that it tended to stay far away from statism. Experience in Germany and Italy tended to confirm the assertion of one author that, "toute pretention totalitaire en dehors de celle de la religion de l'Evangile se 17 heurte done pour un Chretien 3 une impossibilite...." The E.S.P. -143- made it quite clear that the only reason it supported the provincial government's Padlock law was because it supplemented the Social Catholic programme.

The purpose of the E.S.P., in accordance with the Pope's teaching, was not to create a nationalist or fascist society but to foster a "totally" Catholic environment. As the Pope's guide•

lines had to be adapted to Quebec's socio-economic conditions in order to be effective, the E.S.P. had to decide which of those guidelines should be emphasized and which should be modified or applied at a later date. This role required men who were either trained in the Social Sciences or were attuned to basic needs of the day. Most of the members to the E.S.P. failed to display such qualities until the end of the depression. Even then, it can be argued that they did so only after the Pope had repeatedly stressed the need to develop such qualities. This tendency to ignore reality, which manifested itself in many of the pamphlets of the

E.S.P., helps to explain why the Social Catholic programme did not meet with greater success in Quebec. To be fair, it should be noted that the Pope's guidelines were open in most cases to conflicting interpretations. Most factions within the Church could

find in Pius XI's pronoucements a great deal of justification for their position. Thus, those who felt long term considerations should have priority over immediate needs, those who believed that Communism was a greater problem than mass unemployment and those who argued that industrial peace was more important than higher wages could all cite some passage or other from the Pope's writings. Conversely many of those Social Catholics such as

Archambault, Villeneuve, Gauthier and Minville who expressed -144-

concern for the deteriorating socio-economic situation did so mainly because of the Pope's appeals. Another factor which blunted the message of the E.S.P. was the fact that most of its

French Canadian contributors still considered the traditional

rural society as a viable alternative to the increasing urban-

i zation of Quebec. Combined together, these factors helped to

produce a detachment from the mass misery of the depression that

rendered much of the Social Catholic programme ineffective. Where

a great deal of success was achieved as in the case of the election

of the Union Nationale or the isolation of Communism, it was

largely due to the ability of the E.S.P. to obtain general agree•

ment by exploiting the fears and hopes of each faction.

A more fundamental criticism of the E.S.P. is that, in spite

of its professed aim of building a more humane society, its real

purpose was to maintain the dominance of the Church. This motive

goes a long way in explaining the apparent inconsistencies in the writings of many of its members and between their thought and

their actions. Examples of these abound: for instance, they

admitted the need for the state to implement socio-economic

reforms, yet many, often the same writers, expressed misgivings

about statism or about the wisdom of depending upon the federal

government. Many Social Catholics like Archambault and Villeneuve

agreed that repressive measures were inadequate to combat

Communism but they also insisted that the government, either

federal or provincial, implement them. Most members of the

E.S.P. supported the Pope's contention that the capitalists were

ruthless and domineering yet, like the Pope they feared the state -145-

or militant unions more. They placed their faith in the willing•

ness of these capitalists to voluntarily surrender their privileges

in order to bring corporatism into being. Similarly, many Social

Catholics saw the need for urgent action to remedy the situation

but they refused to seek the assistance of non-Catholic groups

such as the C.C.F. or the Protestant Churches. The truth was that,

for most Social Catholics from the Pope down to Charpentier, the

chief consideration was whether or not a certain idea or a given

act would promote the interests of the Church as an institution.

The main route of Social Catholic thought, ultimately, led to

a shrunken universe of discourse. In this world, the individual

Catholic was urged by Msgr. Gauthier "...de se defier des

nouveautes, de ne pas croire qu'elles vont faire disparaitre 18

d'un coup les abus et les injustices." He was placed in an

organization - whether the family unit or the Action Catholique, told what to think and what to do and how to do it. And all of

this was supposedly to cultivate the growth of his intellectual

and moral faculties. Could this fact explain the xenophobic

streak which runs through many of the E.S.P.'s pamphlets? Even

those who were genuinely committed to a more humane society such

as Livesque or Coti could see only the seeds of Communism in the

C.C.F. or justify a strong anti-capitalist stand in terms of the

Church's interests. The real failure of Social Catholicism during

this period was this inability or unwillingness to make the needs

and concerns of the individual person, rather than of the

institutionalized Church, the beginning and the end of its thought

and actions. -146-

It would be wrong to dismiss Social Catholicism completely

for, as has been shown, new strains of thought appeared within

it which contained the promise of a very different Church. With time, many clerics, led by Levesque, recognized that the insist• ence on a "totally" Catholic environment was not only breeding resentment on the part of those who felt themselves to be "... dans leur propre domaine.. .encercle's, en tutuelle, conduits comme des mineurs," but was also blocking Catholic participation in organizations "...du avec leurs concitoyens non-Catholiques, ils pourraient concourir au bien commun de la soci€t€.....11 and 19 broke openly with the E.S.P. . The hierarchy had earlier come to the conclusion that it ran a great risk in preventing Catholics from supporting the CCF. and, in 1944, in spite of the opposition 20 of the E.S.P., lifted Msgr. Gauthier's condemnation. Their commitment to social justice increased during the 1940's to the point where Msgr. Charbonneau, successor to Msgr. Gauthier, risked his position by supporting the C.T.C.C against the government 21 during the Asbestos strike. Eventually some clerics came to see that Communism was a myth used by shrewd politicians such as Duplessis to manipulate Catholics and publicly condemned the 22 immoral tactics of the Union Nationale government. Each of these events were steps away from the traditional conception of the Church as the guardian of stability. But these changes were slow in coming and dependent upon personalities and events. It was only in 1950 that the hierarchy finally committed itself wholeheartedly to the transformation of the existing socio-economic 23 system and abandoned colonization. And the motivation for these -147-

changes remained the same: the survival of the Church. Only

with Pope John XIII and Vatican II did the individual conscience

gain precedence for Catholics over the organization of the Church.

By that time the E.S.P. had lost the influence it had once

exercised in Quebec and had been transformed into a purely 24

research agency. To the extent that the E.S.P. contributed to

the decline of that concept of Catholicism it had represented,

it was a success.

These conclusions are based on the principal themes to be

found in the E.S.P.'s pamphlets written between 1930 to 1940.

As some of these themes reached their peak of development before

or after that period, much more research needs to be done. Other aspects which need more study include the relationship between

increasing specialization within the clergy and diverging inter•

pretations of Papal thought, the sources of the humanistic currents

within Social Catholicism, and the impact of specific proposals

upon other elite groups. Many of the assertions made in this

study undoubtedly need more support or confirmation. This

investigation, therefore, is a beginning rather than an end in

understanding French Canada's reaction to industrialization. -148-

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Desjardins, A. La Caisse populaire. 3 ieme ed., #7, 1944, (191TT

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Reid, P. "Action Liberale Nationale. 1934-1939." M. A. thesis, Queen's University, 1966.

Tetu, M. "Les Premiers syndicats catholique canadien. (1900-1921)". These de doctorat, University Laval, 1961. APPENDIX A

KEY NATIONALIST AND SOCIAL CATHOLIC

ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONALITIES -158-

Comite de 1'Association Catholique de la Jeunesse canadienne- francaise. 1905 (founded 1904)

Antonio Perrault, president

Adelard Leduc, vice-president

Jos. Versailles, vice-president, (President in 1904)

Eugene Angers, secretaire

Edmond Hurtubise, tresorier

L. Renaud Lavergne, secre.-correspondant

Armand Dugas, seer.-correspondant

R. P. Charles Chaput, s.j., aumonier-directeur.

Le Semeur, bulletin de I'A.C.J.C., Montreal, 1905. -159-

Officiers de l'E.S.P.

(May, 1911)

President d'Honneur: S. G. Mgr. P. Bruchesi.

Vice-President d'Honneur: Chanoine G. Gauthier.

Bureau de

President abbe P. Perrier.

Premier Vice-President E. Montpetit.

Deuxi^me Vice-President R. P. L. Hudon, s.j.

Troisi^me Vice-President A. Fauteux.

Secretaire A. Saint-Pierre.

Secretaires-Adjoints abbes A. Deschenes et J. C.

Lacroix.

Tresorier H. Godin.

Rapporteurs R. P. Valentin-Breton, o.f.m.,

abbe H. Gauthier, p.s.s.,

E. Hurtubise,

abbe C. J. Beaudin.

L'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #la, (1911) pp. 19-20 , -160-

Comites Permanent de 1'E.S.P.

Comite D'Etudes et des Publications

President R. P. Guillot, c.s.s.r.,

Secretaire F. Bourbonniere,

Secretaire-adjoint abbe E. Hubert.

Comite de Propagande

President J. B. Saint-Pierre,

Secretaire A. Langevin.

Comite des Finances

President E. Gohier,

Secretaire E. Lavergne.

Comite D'Action Ouvri^re

President R. P. Tourangeau, o.m.i.,

Secretaire C. Tessier.

L'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #la, (1911) p. 20. -161- s

Fondateurs de La Ligue des droits du francais

(March 11, 1913)

(It became "La Ligue d'Action Francaise" in 1921)

Pierre Homier, (J. P. Archambault, s.j., founder) Dr. Joseph Gauvreau, Omer Heroux, Leon Lorrain, Anatole Vanier, A. G. Casault, Henri Auger.

(later)

R. P. G. Charlebois, o.m.i. (provincial of the Oblates and leader of the Franco-Ontarian resistance to Regulation 17) Abb§ Philippe Perrier, Abb§ Lionel Groulx, (director of "1'Action Francaise) Louis Hurtubise, Napoleon Lafortune, Antonio Perrault, R. P. Rodrigue Villeneuve, o.m.i., (nationalist and future Cardinal) R. P. Louis Lalande, s.j.

Antonio Perrault, et. al, Consignes de demain,, Doctrine et origines de 1'Action francaise, Montreal, Librairie d'Action Canadienne-frangaise Ltee, n.d., p. 2- -162-

Reunion - Villa Saint - Martin

(April 28, 1918.)

J. P. Archambault, s.j. (initiator)

Mgr. G. Gauthier, (auxiliary archbishop of Montreal, presiding) abbe Bois (secretary) abbe Maxime Fortin {initiator of Catholic syndicalism

in the Quebec archdiocese) abbi Lacroix Montreal abbi J. Tremblay Chicoutimi abbe P. Desranleau Saint-Hyacinthe

Mgr. Ross Rimouski chanoine Massicotte Trois-Rividres

abbe J. Cote Levis

R. P. Stanislas Levis abbe Petitgrew Thetford-Mines abbe 0. Archambault Joliette

R. ,P. Bernier Hull

A. Charpentier (worker)

A. Latreille

A. Therien

A. Daoust

M. Gilinas (industrialist)

L1Organisation ouvriere catholique au Canada, #105, (1921) p. 16. -163-

Second Reunion - Villa - Saint - Martin

(June 2, 1918)

R. P. J. Archambault s.j.

R. P. Bourassa

abbS Fortin

abbe Hebert

F. Roberge

A. Latreille

A. Charpentier (future President of C.T.C.C.)

E. Thirien

P. BeaulE (lrst President of C.T.C.C.)

H. Doucet

D. Pilon

H. T. Lachapelle

A. Th€rien

L*Organisation ouvridre catholique au Canada, #105, (1921) p. -164-

Commission generale des Semaines Sociales du Canada.

(1920)

President (founder) R. P. Joseph Papin Archambault, s.j. secretaire Guy Vanier,

Abbe Leonidas Adam, R. P. A. F. Auclair, o.m.i., Pierre Beaule, Senateur Belcourt, Noel Bernier, Alfred Charpentier, Abbe" Ph. S. Desranleau, Juge C. E. Dorion, Dr. Jules Dorion, J. E. A. Dubuc, Abbe" Cyrille Gagnon, Abbe" Maxime Fortin, L€on-Mercier Gouin, Oscar Hamel, Abbe" Edmour Hubert, Omer Heroux, Mgr. Eugene Lapointe, Abbe Olivier Maurault, p.s.s., Edouard Montpetit, Mgr. L. A. Paquet, Antonio Perrault, Abbe" Philippe Perrier, Dr. Fred A. Richard, Mgr. F. X. Ross, R. P. Rodrigue Villeneuve, o.m.i..

Compte rendu de la Semaine Sociale canadienne, vol I, 1920, -165-

La fondation du Conseil central des Syndicats catholiques et

nationaux a [ontreal.

(February 1920)

President A. Charpentier vice-president E. Provost

2e vice-prisident M. Levasseur secretaire-archiviste A. Chabot assistant-secretaire J. B. Huot secretaire-correspondant J. P. Malo secretaire-financier A. Bilodeau assistant-secretaire J. A. Coderre tresorier L. G. Therien commissaire-ordonnateur E. Pigeon sergent d'armes A. Tremblay aumonier-gen€ral abbe E. Hebert assistants les abbes Gaudry et Primeau

L'Organisation ouvriere catholique au Canada, #105, (1921) pp. 21 & 31. -166-

Comite central de la Ligue du Dimanche

(formed April 8, 1923)

President M. le juge E. Fabre - Surveyer (Montreal)

Vice-president M. le juge T. Tremblay (Quebec)

Secretaire-tresorier R. Germain (Montreal)

Aumonier R. P. J. P. Archambault, s.j. (Montreal)

Directeurs M. le juge R. Millar (Hull); M. le juge T.A. Fontaine (Sainte- Hyacinthe); J. A. Rochefort (Chicoutimi); J. Cartier, C. R. (St. Jean); M. le notaire E. Forest (Joliette); Ch.-A Gascon (Montreal); A. Vanier, C. R. (Montreal); E. Laurin (Trois-Rivieres)

J. P. Archambault, s.j.' Pour un dimanche Chretien, Tract #349, pp. 5 & 15. -167-

Directeurs de la Ligue d'Action Nationale.

(January, 1933)

(Publishers of "1'Action Nationale", successor to "1'Action

Frangaise")

MM. Esdras Minville, president,

Hermas Bastien, secretaire,

Pierre Homier, (J. P. Archambault, s.j.)

l'abbe Lionel Groulx,

Eugdne L'Heureux,

Olivier Maurault, p.s.s.,

Anatole Vanier,

l'abbe Albert Tessier,

Harry Bernard, (director)

Arthur Laurendeau,

Rene" Chaloult,

Wilfrid Gu^rin,

Leopold Richer,

Albert Rioux,

Dr. Philippe Hamel.

L'Action Nationale, Montreal, Ligue d'Action Nationale, 1933, vol II. -168-

Le 9 mars 1933 se riunissaient done,31'Immaculee-

Conception de Montreal, sous la pre idence du

directeur de l'Ecole Sociale R. P. Archambault, s.j., Populaire, ceux dont les noms suivent:

Archeveque coadjuteur de Saint- S. Exc. Mgr. Yelle, Boniface, alors directeur du grand seminaire de Montreal,

vicaire g6n€ral honoraire de M^gJT Eug§ne Lapointe, Chicoutimi,

Mgr. Charbonneau, vicaire general d1Ottawa,

Mgr. Desranleau, cure de Sorel,

Mgr. Lebon, du College de Sainte-Anne-de- la-Pocatiere, professeur 3 L'Universite Laval, le R. P. Forest, o.p., Doyen de la Faculty de Philosophie de L'University de Montreal, l'abbe Philippe Perrier, Professeur au scolasticat de Joliette le R. P. Leon Lebel, s.j., aum6nier general de 1'Union Catholique des Cultivateurs du Canada,

1'abbi Jean Bertrand, aumonier des syndicats catholiques de Montreal, le R. P. G.-H. Levesque, o.p., professeur au scolasticat d' Ottawa, les RR.PP. Chagnon, s.j., et professeurs au scolasticat de Lery, s.j., de 1'Immaculie-Conception.

Les vingt-cinqi ans de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire, 1911-1936, #269-70, (1936) p. 23, -169-

Les signataires du deuxieme programme de restauration sociale.

(Sept. 30, 1933)

Esdras Minville professeur a l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, president de 1'Action Nationale,

Dr. Philippe Hamel professeur a 1'Universite Laval, president de 1'Association dentaire du Canada, (leading anti-truster),

V.-E. Beaupre ingenieur civil, professeur a l'Ecole Polytechnique, ancien president general de 1'A.C.J.C. et de la Society Saint-Jean- Baptiste,

Albert Rioux president del'Union catholique des Cultivateurs du Canada,

Dr. J.-B. Prince chirurgien en chef de 1'Hopitai de Lachine, president du Comite des Amis du "Devoir",

Anatole Vanier avocat, ancien president de 1*Union regionale de 1'A.C.J.C,

Le Programme de restauration sociale, #239-40, (1934) p.80.

In the introduction, Archambault states: "Pour des raisons personelles, deux ou trois des collaborateurs crurent preferable de ne pas prendre rang parmi les signataires du programme." According to R. Rumilly's Histoire de la Province de Quibec, vol. XXIII, p. 212, Paul Gouin and Eugene L'Heureux, editor of 1' Action Catholique were the collaborators who did not sign. -170-

Les signataires contd.

Arthur Laurendeau maitre de chapelle a la cathedrale de Montreal, (Later editor of 1'Action Nationale until succeeded by son Andre.)

Alfred Charpentier president du Counseil central des Syndicats ouvriers catholiques de Montreal, (from 1936-46 President of the C.T.C.C.)

Wilfred GuErin N.P. secretaire de 1'Union regionale des Caisses Populaires de Montreal, directeur de la Ligue d1Action nationale,

Rene" Chaloult avocat, ancien president de la Societe* des Etudes juridiques de Quebec. (Prominent nationalist- anti-truster.) -171-

Comite des Oeuvres Catholiques du diocese de Montreal

directeur: J. P. Archambault, s.j.

Le Comite des Oeuvres catholiques de Montreal group actuellement (Avril, 1942) les societes suivantes:

Societe Saint-Jean Baptiste, Societe Saint-Vincent-de-Paul,

Fid£ration des Ligues du Sacr§-Coeur, Association catholique professionnelle des Voyageurs de Commerce, Conseil central des Syndicats nationaux catholiques, Syndicat catholique du

Tramway, Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne,

Chevaliers de Colomb, Union catholique des Cultivateurs,

Ligue des Retraitants, Amicales des anciens eleves des Freres des Ecoles chretienne, Societe de Colonisation, Ligue du

Dimanche, Cheminots catholiques, Ecole Sociale Populaire,

Tiers-Ordre de Saint-Frangois, Chevaliers de Carillon,

Alliance catholique des Professeurs, Amis du Devoir.

J. P. Archambault, s.j., Le Couvre - Feu, Tract #274, (1942) p. 13. Most of these organizations were in existence before 1930. APPENDIX B

THE AIMS OF THE E.S.P. -172-

Le progamme de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire.

(May, 1911)

L'Ecole Sociale Populaire, dans un esprit de parfaite

soumission a l'autorite religieuse, declare:

Que la question sociale, etant avant tout une question morale et religieuse, c'est 1 l'Eglise qu'il en faut d'abord demander la solution;

Que 1'organisation professionnelle, § personnalite civile et a base confessionnelle, est le meilleur moyen de conserver et de ritablir la paix sociale et d'ameliorer le sort des

travailleurs dans les villes, d'augmenter le bien^etre de nos populations dans les campagnes et d'arreter l'exode rural;

Qu'elle se propose de favoriser de toutes ses forces la

fondation des oeuvres sociales en general et tout particul-

ierement des suivantes: les Caisses Populaires, les patronages et les cercles d'itudes;

Qu'elle est en faveur d'une saine legislation sociale, notamment sur les points suivants: la riglementation du

travail des femmes et des enfants; la limitation des heures de travail; 1 * interdiction du travail de nuit; le repos dominical; l'hygiene des usines, fabriques, etc ... et des habitations ouvri^res; la cooperation sous toutes ses formes;

la protection des ouvriers canadiens contre la main-d'oeuvre etrangere; la reconnaissance legale dans les campagnes d'un bien de famille insaisissable; la speculation et les trusts.

L'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #1A, (1911), p. 17-18. -173-

L'Ecole, naturellement, est opposee au socialisme: elle proteste energiquement, en particulier, contre toute mesure et tout projet de loi tendant 3 restreindre, au benefice de l'Etat, l'autorite des peres de famille ou de l'Eglise en matiere d'education. /

APPENDIX C

THE POLITICAL PROGRAMMES OF THE E.S.P. -174-

Le premier programme de restauration sociale.

(March 9, 1933)

1. Le regime capitaliste n'est pas mauvais en soi, mais il a €te vicii par des abus tres graves. Des reformes s'im- posent en vue de mettre fin a la dictature iconomique et d'assurer, par une meilleure repartition des richesses, le relevement des classes populaires.

2. A l'§goisme dominateur et cupide il faut opposer, en tout premier lieu et dans toutes les classes de la societe, le veritable esprit chritien, inspirateur de justice, de cha• rite" et de moderation, le respect des droits de Dieu (obser• vation du dimanche, etc.) et des droits du prochain

(fidelity aux contrats, etc.)

3. C'est de la nature et done du Criateur que les hommes ont regu le droit de propriety privee. Ce droit comporte des obligations sociales qui en temperent 1'usage et le subordonnent aux exigences du bien commun.

4. L'Etat doit au plus tot par des reformes legislatives soumettre a une ryglementation severe et plus efficace les institutions financieres et les compagnies 3 fonds social, afin de supprimer la surcapitalisation, le mouillage des valeurs, les abus du credit et de la speculation.

5. Certaines categories de biens conf^rent parfois une puissance yconomique trop considerable pour qu'elle soit laissee entre les mains de personnes privyes. Des conside-

Pour le Restauration sociale au Canada, #232-3, (1933), pp. 62-4- -175- rations d'interet general peuvent imposer ou conseiller, dans des cas particuliers, la gestion publique, nationale, provinciale ou municipale.

6. II appartient a l'Etat d'imprimer une direction d1 ensemble a l'Economie nationale et, a cet effect, d'instituer un Conseil Economique national, expression de 1'organisation corporative, qui permettra aus pouvoirs puhlics d'agir en liaison Etroite avec les reprEsentants qualifies et compEtents de toutes les branches de la production.

7. II faut tendre a 11amEnagement d'un ordre corporatif par 1'organisation complete et lEgale des diffErentes professions

(ainsi dans le monde du travail: syndicats ouvriers, associations patronales, commissions mixtes).

8. Une legislation sociale s1impose qui assure a) aux ouvriers: une protection efficace contre les risques d'acci• dent, de maladie, de vieillesse et de chomage; b) aux agriculteurs: un credit agricole effectif, une adaptation

Equitable du droit de faillite ou de saisie, une protection suffisante contre les accidents (incendie, maladies du be- tail, mauvaise recolte).

9. L'ouvrier a droit a une salaire familial. Si les conditions presentes de la vie industrielle ne le rendent pas toujours possible, la justice sociale commande que l'on proc^de sans delai a des rEformes qui garantiront a 1'ouvrier adulte une rEtribution proportionnEe aux charges normales du mEnage. II est dEsirable que les employes puissent etre appelEs a participer en quelque maniere S la propriEtE de -176-

1'entreprise, et sa gestion ou aux profits qu'elle apporte.

On devrait aussi venir en aide aux families nombreuses par des

nte'sures spiciales comme les allocations familiales, une diminution ou exemption d'impots, etc.

10. Le chomage actuel reclame une intervention speciale des pouvoirs publics. II faut tout mettre en oeuvre pour fournir du travail, et, en attendant, pourvoir iquitablement a la subsistance de ceux qui sont dans le besoin.

11. Des mesures s'imposent pour rendre moins onireux aux families peu fortunies les services medicaux et les frais d'hospitalisation.

12. En vue de r€tablir l'equilibre de la population, on doit favoriser 1'agriculture familiale et restreindre la culture industrialisee, promouvoir 1'enseignement rural et les methodes cooperatives, inspirer l'estime de la profession agricole, aider a 1 *§tablissement des fils de cultivateur, developper method- iquementlla colonisation.

13. Fidele a la constitution qui nous regit, l'Etat doit respecter les droits des provinces et le principe d'igalite des deux races qui est I la base de la Confederation canadienne.

II s'appliquera aussi a une politique de collaboration economique

internationale et s'emploiera a l'avenement de la paix. -177-

Le deuxieme programme de Restauration Sociale.

(September 30, 1933)

La crise que nous traversons exige de toutes les bonnes volontes un effort Energique de redressement. L'Ecole Sociale

Populaire a publie en mai dernier un programme doctrinal de haute inspiration. Nous y adhErons pleinement.

Nous croyons, nous aussi, que les causes principales de la crise sont d'ordre moral et que nous la guirirons surtout par le retour ci l1esprit Chretien: esprit de justice, de charite, de moderation, respect des droits de Dieu et des droits du prochain.

Nous croyons que l'Etat, dont le role est de protiger les droits et les libertis legitimes, ceux surtout des faibles et des indigents, et de promouvoir le bien commun, doit intervenir par des mesures legislatives pour mettre fin a la dictature economique et assurer une meilleure repartition des richesses.

Contrairement au socialisme, intrinsequement mauvais, le regime capitaliste n'est pas condamnable en soi. Ce sont les abus qui l'ont vicii. Ce sont eux qu'il faut faire disparaitre.

Nous croyons que les corpos professionnels devraient s'organiser solidement afin de jouer dans la soci€ti le role important auquel ils sont destines. Il faut tendre §. l'ame- nagement d'un ordre corporatif qui dechargerait l'Etat d'un bon nombre de taches secondaires dont on l'accable.

Nous croyons enfin que le Canada est d'abord pour les

Canadiens et que toute immigration en ces temps de ch6mage serait

Le Programme de restauration Sociale, #239-40, (1934) -178-

contraire aux intirets du pays. Mais a la base de cette politique canadienne, nous mettons le respect des droits des provinces et le principe d1egalite des deux races, tels que .

les reconnait le pacte de la Confederation.

Elabore par des moralistes, le programme de l1E.S.P. s'en

tenait aux grandes lignes. Il ne descendait pas dans les details. Ces precisions cependant sont necessaires. II faut

les presenter au public qui exige des reformes concretes et pratiques. Elles reinvent, pour la plupart, de techniciens.

C'est avec leur aide que nous avons prepare les articles

suivants. Nous avons du, afin de condenser en quelques lignes une matiere abondante, adopter des formules breves. Quelques

points toutefois demanderaient des explications. Nous comptons

les fournier dans une brochure qui paraitra sous peu.

Nous invitons nos compatriotes a etudier serieusement ce programme et, s'ils le trouvent raisonnable, a s'en faire les

promoteurs aupres des hommes publics pour en obtenir une

application graduelle.

Restauration Rurale

1. Restauration de 1'agriculture existants: Retour a

1'agriculture familiale. —Association professionnelle des

cultivateurs. —Generalisation de 1'instruction agricole. —

Expansion du mouvement cooperatif. —Credit agricole par

1'intermediaire des caisses populaires. —Diversification de la

production par 1 * introduction de nouvelles specialites

culturales convenant a notre sol et a notre climat et ripondant -179- aux besoins des marches locaux. A cette fin, inventaire: a) de la consommation sur les marches urbains pour savoir exact- ement ce qui s'y vend; b) de la production agricole, afin de se rendre compte de ce qui y manque; c) du territoire cultive au point de vue climat et sol afin de determiner les cultures a introduire.

2. Colonisation: a) Part de.l'Etat: Proceder d1apres un plan determine d'avance. —Faciliter l'acces des terres colonisables partout ou elles se trouvent, qu'elles appartien- nent S la couronne, ou qu'elles soient concedees en seigneuries ou en reserves forestieres. A cette fin, delimiter les reserves de colonisation et reintegrer au domaine agricole celles qui sont concedees en reserves forestieres ou en seigneuries. —Exiger des compagnies qu1elles achdtent le bois des colons avant de faire la coupe sur leurs propres limites.

—Conserver le regime des primes avec paiement regulier, a condition qu'il y ait residence. —Etablir un budget de colon•

isation mieux proportionne aux besoins pressants de l'heure. —

Favoriser la creation de societes de colonisation et cooperer avec ces societes;. —Aider les colons par 1' intermediaire des

societes diocesaines et par des travaux (routes, etc.) ou par des subventions collectives (construction d'ecoles, d'eglises) plut6t que par des gratifications individuelles. —Appliquer plus largement le plan Gordon pour le retour §. la terre des chomeurs urbains.

b) Part du public: Societes paroissiales et diocesaines de colonisation pour le recrutement des colons et 1'organisation -180- des paroisses nouvelles.

3. Arts domestiques et industries locales: Promouvoir le diveloppement des arts domestiques afin d'accroitre les revenus de la famille agricole. —Proceder & une enquete: a) sur ce qui se fait, b) sur ce qui pourrait se faire. — Favoriser la decentralisation economique; & cette fin, aider au diveloppe- ment de la petite et fnoyenne industrie locale et regionale qui complitera 11 agriculture en lui offrant un debouchi a) pour ses produits, b) pour son surcroit de main-d'oeuvre.

La Question ouvriere

Uniformisation dans tout le pays de certaines lois ouvri§res qui ont une portie nationale ou internationale, comme la reglementation des heures de travail. —Organisation progre• ssive des assurances sociales 3 base contributoire. — Application immediate, comme mesure«:transitoire, de la loi fedirale des pensions de vieillesse. —Allocations aux meres neeessiteuses.

—Salaire vital proportionne a la famille moyenne. —Experimen• tation prudente des allocations familiales, en tenant compte du probleme rural. —Primat du salaire sur les dividendes. —

Salaire minimum aux (journaliers). —Apprentissage obligatoire.

—Conseil supirieur du travail et code du travail. —Extension juridique du contrat collectif. —Organisation corporative de la profession. — Retour de la m§re au foyer. —Stricte observance du dimanche. —Initiatives publiques et privies qui faciliteront I 1*ouvrier l1accession a la propriety. — Dispar- ition des taudis. —Surveillance plus efficace de 1'observation -181-

des lois ouvridres. —Revision de la loi des accidents du

travail quant au choix du medecin et au delai donnant droit

a 11indemnite. —Rgglementation de la vente a temperament.

Lutte contre les trusts

Combattre les cartels du charbon, de la gazoline; surveiller

le commerce du lait et du pain. —Lutter tout specialement

contre le trust de 1'electridte. —Organiser la concurrence

par la creation d'une commission provinciale hydra-glectrique

qui amenagerait, au fur et § mesure des besoins les chutes

non concedees. —Reprise par l'Etat des chutes d'eau concedees mais non exploiters. — Faire enquete sur la Beauharnois Power

Corporation, la Beauharnois Company et la Montreal L. H. & P.

Consolidated, et, sur preuve d'abus suffisants, etatiser les usines hydro-eiectriques de la Beauharnois, en garantissant les obligations et en ne versant aux actionnaires qu'une remuneration correspondant a leur mise de fonds rielle. —Imposer au trust un controle a la generation et a la distribution afin d'assurer a tous des taux moderns. —Protection du gouvernement aux municipalites qui, apres un referendum, desirent municipaliser

leur serv ice d'eiectricite. —Une politique d1electrification rurale progressive, selon un plan determine. — Enquete complete sur la structure et les methodes financieres des compagnies d'utilites publiques, et assainissement de leur capitalisation.

—Obligation pour les compagnies eiectriques de creer entre les mains de l'#Etat, par le versement annuel d'une redevance prise -182- sur les revenus, mais calculie d1apres un certain pourcentage de la capitalisation, une reserve avec laquelle le gouvernement pourra, au cas d'abus prouves, racheter les entreprises d'apr^s la valeur materielle de l'actif.

Reformes financieres

Uniformisation de la loi des societes S fonds social dans tout le Canada. —Defense d'avoir recours a des prete-noms pour l'obtention de lettres-patentes. —Supression des actions sans nominal et simplification de la structure financi^re des societes, ne laissant subsister que des obligations, c'est- a-dire des titres de criance gages par une premiere hypotheque sur des immeubles, des actions privilegiees et des actions ordinaires d'un nominal determine. —Simplification de la structure financiere des societes. —Participation des obligataires a 1'Election des Conseils d'administration. —

Obligation pour les administrateurs d'une compagnie de possider, d'apres la capitalisation, une valeur determined d'obligations, plus la moitie de cette valeur en actions ordinaires. —D§pot obligatoire de ces titres dans une compagnie de fiducie comme garantie d'honnete administration. —Obligation pour les soci6t£s de publier annuellement une liste complete de leurs actionnaires et obligataires. —Limitation, d&apres les benefices, des appointements, commissions, jetons de presence versus aux fonctionnaires supirieurs et aux administrateurs, avec obligation pour la compagnie d'en publier chaque ann£e le montant. —

Interdiction aux administrateurs de profiter de leur situation -183- pour encaisser des profits ou eviter des pertes personnelles

au detriment des actionnaires et des obligataires. —

Interdiction des bonis et dividendes pay§s en actions ainsi que des fractionnements d'actions et des emissions de titres amoindrissant le gage du capital dejS souscrit. —Uniformisation des bilans. —Fixation des pourcentages pour depreciation, amortissements, etc., principalement par les societes qui font

le commerce d'articles de premiere necessity: lait, farine, pain, charbon, Electricity, etc. —Responsabilite conjointe des administrateurs avec les verificateurs qui signent les etats financiers des societes. —Responsabilite conjointe des administrateurs et des courtiers qui vendent les titres d'une compagnie quant S la veracite du prospectus. —Reglementation severe et, au besoin, abolition des "Investment Trusts" et

"Holding Companies". —Interdiction aux banques de preter:

1. a leurs administrateurs, soit directement soit indirecte- ment; 2. I des entreprises oil lesdits administrateurs sont interesses. —Interdiction aux banques d1avancer aux courtiers plus de cinquante pour cent de la valeur nominale du titre cote ou cinquante pour cent de la cote si le titre se traite en dessous du pair. —Interdiction rigoureuse des "pools" et de la vente a decouvert. —Imposition d'une taxe provinciale au vendeur, sur toute mutation effectuee moins d'un an aprds

1'achat d'action cotee en bourse. -184-

Riformes politiques

Dans la mesure du possible, execution des travaux publics en regie pour mettre fin au regime des grands entrepreneurs.

—Interdiction aux ministres d'etre administrateurs d'une entre- prise industrielle, commerciale ou financiere; comme compensation, relevement de leurs appointements et assurance d'une pension convenable, apres une piriode de service diterminee. —

Obligation pour les societis iditrices de journaux de publier la liste assermentie de leurs administrateurs, actionnaires, creanciers hypothicaires et ridacteurs riguliers. —Imprimerie d'Etat pour le gouvernement provincial et obligation pour les autres corps publics de n'accorder de contrats d'impression qu*apres demande de soumissions. —Interdiction S l'homme public de faire par un prete-nom ce que la loi lui interdit de faire personnellement et renvoi aux tribunaux plutot qu'aux assemblies dilibirantes de tout cas de concussion et de piculat.

—Elections a date fixe et declaration obligatoire par les partis des montants souscrits a leur caisse electorale ainsi que des sommes affecties a 1'organisation ginerale et dans chaque circonscription. —Application rigoureuse de la loi contre les suppositions de personne (tiligraphes). —Creation d'un conseil economique provincial compose" d'un comite directeur et d'autant de sous-comites qu'il y a de branches importantes de la vie iconomique et sociale. A ce conseil siigeront des ; specialistes nommis par l'Etat, mais disignes par les divers groupements professionnels et sociaux. Le -185- conseil aura pour mission d'elaborer une politique economique et sociale et d'apporter aux gouvernants le concours de ses itudes et de sa competence. En outre, le conseil collaborerait a la nomination des sous-ministres et des fonctionnaires superieurs de l'Etat.

Tous les articles de ce programme ne sont pas de rea• lisation facile ni immediate. Nous nous en rendons parfaite- ment compte. Mais les reformes qu"ils preconisent nous paraissent justes et necessaires, et aucune ne saurait rencontrer d1obstacle reellement insurmontable.

Mus uniquement par 1'amour de notre pays, desireux d'y faire regner un ordre plus conforme a la justice sociale et de le preserver ainsi des bouleversements auxquels nous expose la situation actuelle, nous voulons travailler au triomphe de ce programme. Tous ceux qui pensent comme nous, individus ou societes, sont invites a nous adresser leur adhesion. Nous accepterons aussi volontiers les observations qu'on voudrait bien nous faire. FOOTNOTES -186-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. See J. C. Falardeau, "Evolution des structures sociales et des elites au Canada Frangais", in G. Sylvestre ed., Structures Sociales du Canada Frangais, Etude de la Sociite Royale du Canada, 1966, pp. 9-13 and his-',1R©le et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", Esprit, Paris, (Aug-Sept. 1952 issue) pp. 217-29. Also H. Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", in M. Rioux and Y. Martin eds., French-Canadian Society, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1964, vol. I, pp. 137-53. (Carleton library, no. 18).

2. Mandements, Lettres pastorales, circulaires et autre documents publics dans' le Diocese de Montreal, Montreal, J. H. Plincjuet, 1887, 7ieme tome, pp. 204-6.

3. Part of a speech given in 1902 by Msgr. L.-A. Paquet and reproduced in the BreViaire du Patriote Canadien-Frangais, Montreal Bibliotheque de l1Action Frangaise, 1925, p. 58.

4. Guindon, op_. cit., p. 153.

5. See Guindon, Ibid., p. 153-8; Falardeau, "Role et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", pp. 217-29. For a priest's view, see theppamphlet by A. Dugre, s.j., La parolsse au Canada frangais, Montreal, Ecole Sociale Populaire, hereafter cited as E.S.P., #183-184, (1929).

6. E. C. Hughes, French-Canada in Transition, University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. 9-10; H. Miner, St. Denis A French- Canadian Parish, University of Chicago Press, (1939) pp. 94-104 & 251, and M. Tremblay, "Orientations de la pensee sociale", in Falardeau ed., Essais sur le Quebec Contemporain, Quebec, Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953, pp. 200-1.

7. Tremblay, Ibid., pp. 202-3; Guindon, op. cit., p. 152; Falardeau, "Les Canadiens Frangais et leur ideologie", in M. Wade ed., Canadian Dualism, University of Toronto Press, 1960, pp. 26-9; R. Boily, "Les hommes politiques du Quibec. 1867-1967", in Revue d'Histoire de l'Amgrique Frangaise, vol. XXI 3a, (centennial issue) 1967, pp. 609 & 621, and L. E. Hamelin, "Une etude des variations rigionales du nombre des vocations sacerdotales", in his Recueil de travaux de Sciences Humaines, Quebec, Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1962, p. 26.

8. Boily, 0£. cit. , p. 621; Tremblay, op_. cit. , pp. 200-1, and J. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, University of Toronto Press, 1965, pp. 511-19. -187-

9. For background, see Tremblay, Ibid., pp. 203-8; Falardeau "RSle et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", pp. 222-3, as well as his "Les Canadiens Frangais et leur ideologie". Another source is M. Brunet, "Trois dominantes de la pensie Canadienne-Frangaise", in his La presence Anglaise et les Canadiens, Montreal, Beauchemin, 1964, pp. 112-66.

10. The following are taken from his Quelques Considerations sur les Rapports de la Societe civile avec la Religion et la Famille^ Montreal, Eusebe Senecal, 1866, pp. 24, 29, 38-50. This book was condensed into a pamphlet by the E.S.P. in 1924 under the title Le Patriotisme, #124.

11. See Falardeau, "Role et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", pp. 217-29 and his "Evolution des structures sociales et des elites au Canada Frangais", pp. 9-13.

12. Falardeau, "Role et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", p. 227.

13. Falardeau, Ibid., pp. 228-9; Andre Siegfried, The Race Question in Canada, E. Nash, trans., Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1966, (originally published in Paris in 1906) pp. 35-47 and Miner, op. cit., pp. 94-99 for this and the following.

14. These are taken from Siegfried, Ibid., pp. 22-3 & 42.

15. Siegfried, Ibid., p. 25 and Falardeau, "Les Canadiens Frangais et leur ideologie", p. 30.

16. See Hamelin, "Evolution Numerique seculaire du clerge Catholique dans le Quebec", in his Recuell, particularly pp. 225 & 233-5; F. Dumont, "Reflexions sur 1'histoire religieuse du Canada Frangais" in V. Harvey et. al, L'Eglise et le Quebec, Montreal, Les Editions du Jour, 1961, pp. 54-5; Falardeau's "Role et importance de l'Eglise au Canada Frangais", p. 224, and P. E. Trudeau, "La Province de Quebec au moment de la greve" in La Greye de l'Amiante, Montreal, Les editions Cite-Libre, 1956, p. 58. On the basis of Falardeau's figures, Trudeau calculated that there was one vocation for every forty Catholics in Quebec during the 1940's. This excluded the many French Canadian missionaries stationed outside of Quebec. As Hamelin shows the rate has remained fairly steady since the end of the nineteenth century.

17. J. Henripin, "From acceptance to control: the demography of the French Canadians since the seventeenth century", in Martin and Rioux, French Canadian Society, vol. I, pp. 209-15. -188-

18. Ibid., pp. 209-10; Hughes, op_. cit. , pp. 2 & 7; Tremblay, op_. cit., pp. 192-202. See especially, Miner, op_. cit., pp. 63-75 & 239-41 as well as R. Redfield's introduction. Another useful source is W. F. Ryan, s.j., The Clergy and Economic Growth in Quebec. 1896-1914, Les Presses de 1"Universite" Laval, 1966, pp. 250-56. For a discussion of the significance of colonization, see pp 105-109 of this thesis.

19. See Hughes, Ibid., pp. 216 and Miner, Ibid., pp. 68 & 71-2.

20. For a discussion of the economic evolution of Quebec, see R. Blanchard, Le Canada Frangais, Librairie Artheme Fayart (Canada) Ltee., (1960) pp. 180-98 & 277, and A. Faucher, and My. Lamontagne, "History of Industrial Development", in Martin and Rioux, French Canadian Society, pp. 257-71.

21. See Faucher and Lamontagne, Ibid., p. 264-65 as well as Lamontagne, "The American Economic Impact on Quebec", H. Aitken, et al., The American Economic Impact on Canada^ Duke University Press, 1959, p. 92, and Faucher and G. Paquet, "L1 experience economique du Quebec et la Confederation", Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, (Nov. 1966), pp. 24-25.

22. For a discussion of French Canadian reactiontto industrialization, see Faucher and Paquet, Ibid., p. 25, and Blanchard, op_. cit. , p. 198. Ryan, op_. cit. , pp. 23-25, 80 & 92, 254-61, 265-71, discusses this question extensively.

23. In addition to those sources listed in note#22, see Boily, op_. cit. , p.63I-2; P. E. Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec", in Canadian Dualism, pp. 246-55; Guindon, op. cit., p. 156 and J. C~ Bonenfant, "La vie politique du Quebec de 1910 a 1935," in Sociite Royale du Canada, Aux sources du present, University of Toronto Press, 1960, pp. 31-33 for discussions of the various factors involved.

24. See G. Pelletier, "Le syndicalism*Canadien-frangais," in Canadian Dualism, pp. 280-83, 286-87 and a pamphlet by A. Charpentier, De 1'Internationalisme au Nationalisme, Montreal, E.S.P. #88-89, (1919) pp. 18-20.

25. P. Savard, Jules-Paul Tardivel, la France et les Etats- Unis. 1851-1905. Les Presses de 1'Universite Laval, 1967, (Les Cahiers de L'Institut d'Histoire #8/} p. 212; Trudeau, op_. cit. , pp. 62-3, and Cardinal Taschereau's "mandement" in Mandements, lettres pastorales et Circulaires des Eveques de Quebec, Quebec, Imprimerie Ginerale, 1890, vol. II, pp. 554-7. -189-

26. In addition to Pelletier, op_. cit. , pp. 283-87, see A. Charpentier, "Le mouvement politique ouvrier de Montreal. 1883-1929", Relations Industrie-Lies, vol. 10, no. 2., (Mar. 1955) pp. 74-93 and a pamphlet, A. Saint-Pierre, L'organisation ouvriere dans la Province de Quebec, Montreal, E.S.P. #2, (1913) pp. 23-31. For the reactions of French Canadian social reformers to the proposals of this short-lived Labour movement, see J. Levitt, Henri Bourassa and the Golden Calf, Les Editions de 1'Universite d'Ottawa, 1969, pp. 110-112 especially.

27 Ryan, QJJ. oit., pp. 263-64 and Sr. M. A. Welton, Mgr. Paul-Eug§ne Roy, Quebec, Les Editions de l1Action Catholique, 1941, p. 55.

28. Saint Pierre, op_. cit., passim.

29. This speech was given in 1918 and was cited by another leading Social Catholic, Msgr. Lapointe of Chicoutimi, Semaine Sociale du Canada, 2ieme session, (1921) p. 386, and by Welton, op. cit., p. 165.

30. Welton, Ibid., pp. 66-7. -190-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Five Great Encyclicals, New York, the Paulist Press, 1955, (1939) p. 7.

2. Ibid., p. 8

3. Ibid., pp. 9-15 and 15-23 for the following.

4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. Ibid., p. 22.

6. Ibid., p. 22.

7. See Ibid., pp. 23-29.

8. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

9. L. Sturzo, Church and State, University of Notre Dame Press, vol. 2, 1962, pp. 423 & 432-3. Sturzo led the Italian Popular Party, after World War I, an attempt to adapt the teachings of Catholicism to politics. See pp. 478-80 of the same book.

10. For studies of this conflict see, in addition to Sturzo, Ibid., A. R. Vidler, A Century of Social Catholicism. 1820-1920, London, S.P.C.K., 1964, pp. 54-93 and P. Droulers, Politlque" Social et Christianisme; Le Pere Desbuguois et "1'Action Populaire" dSbutisy syndicalisme, et lntegristes. 190 3-1918, Paris, Les Editions Ouvriers, 1969.

11. Sturzo, op_. cit., pp. 458-61.

12. Ibid. , p. 439; Vidler, op_. cit. , pp. 129-30 and Droulers op. cit., pp. 306-11.

13. Sturzo, Ibid., pp. 464-5.

14. Droulers, op. cit., pp. 40 & 146-51 and H. Fontanille, L'Oeuvre Sociale d'Albert de Mun, Paris, Editions Spes, 1926, p. 259.

15. Sturzo, op. cit., pp. 459-62; Droulers, Ibid., pp. 255 & 92, and E. Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, trans. L. Vennewitz, New York, The New American Library, (1963) pp. 101-2 & 137.

16. Nolte, Ibid. , pp. 185-6; Sturzo, op_. cit. p. 462 and Doulers, Ibid., p. 359.

17. Nolte, Ibid. , p. 103, n. 50; Sturzo op_. cit. , pp. 462-5, and Droulers, Ibid., pp. 360 & 84. -191-

18. Droulers/Ibid., especially has a full account of the conflict. See his Chapt. V, pp. 229-392. The bitterness of the dispute can be gauged by the accounts of leading clerics denouncing Leo XIII in private and of the determination of the A.P. to resist the IntSgristes and, if necessary, the Pope. See p. 41 also.

19. Droulers, Ibid. , pp. 239-41 and Fontanille, op_. cit. , p. 248.

20. Droulers, Ibid., p. 232.

21. Ibid. , pp. 32-41 & 354 and Vidler, op_. cit., p. 126. For the following, see Droulers, pp. 346-50 & 390-91.

22. See his pamphlet, La Caisse populaire, 3ieme ed., Montreal, E.S.P. #7 & 12, 1944 (1912), pp. 41-47.

23. See pamphlet, L'Organisation ouvriere catholique au Canada, Montreal, E.S.P. #105, (1921) pp. 5-7 and J. Hulliger, E'Enseignement social des eVeques Canadiens de 1891 a 1950, Montreal, Fides, (1957) pp. 115-16. I will hereafter cite the E.S.P. pamphlets by their number when referred to at infrequent intervals in a chapter.

24. Sr. M. A. Welton, Mgr. Paul-Eug§ne Roy, Quebec, Les Editions de 1'Action catholique, 1941, pp. 66 & 96 and J. P. Archambault, s.j., L'Action Catholique au Canada, Montreal, E.S.P. #287, (1937) p. 9.

25. See G. Lemieux, "Notes sur le mouvement social Catholique" Chronique Sociale de France, (Sept. 15, 1957) p. 461; J. P. Archambault, s.j., Le Clerge et les Oeuvres sociales, Montreal, #59, (1916) pp. 4-6 and Appendix A, p., 158.

26. Lemieux, p. 463 and Sr. M.A. of Rome Gaudrea^ The Social Thought of French Canada as Reflected in the Semaines Sociales, Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1946, p. 2 .

27. Five Great Encyclicals, pp. 29-30 and Les Encycliques Sociales, Montr§al, E.S.P. #424, (1949) pp. 7-8.

28.Siegfried, The Race Question in Canada, E. Nash, trans., Toronto, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1966 (originally published in Paris in 1906), p. 24.

29. P. Savard, Jules-Paul Tardivel, la France et les Etats- Unis. 1851-1905, Les Presses de 1'University Laval, 1967, p. 262, n. 36. -192-

30. Droulers, op_. cit., pp. 382-3, n. 467. He reports that Cardinal Billot, a close advisor to the Pope, feared that the Jesuits would gain control over such an organization.

31. W. F. Ryan, s.j., argues this way in his The Clergy and Economic Growth in Quebec. 1896-1914, Les Presses de 1'University Laval, 1966, p. 206.

32. As there are contradictory accounts, I have relied on Ibid., p. 206; #105, pp. 3-4 & 10, and #287, p. 4.

•33. Again the picture is confused. I have relied on M. Tetu, "Les Premiers syndicats catholique canadien. (1900-1921)", University Laval, these de doctorat, 1961, pp. 239 & 277. L. Hudon, s.j., was editor and, later, director of the Messager Canadien du Sacre Coeur, organ of the Ligues du Sacre Coeur. His was to be the force behind the E.S.P., at least, until 1915.) ; A. Saint-Pierre, "Le fondateur", Les vingt-cinq ans de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire, E.S.P. #269-70, (1936) pp. 3-5). A. Saint-Pierre was one of the first lay Social Catholics. Later he became a professor of sociology at the University de Montreal. (Gaudreau, op. cit., pp. 49-50.) See Appendix A, p. 159.

34. It was this statement, discussed in Chapter 1, which pointed out the dangers which international unions created for Catholics. See the pamphlet, L'Esprit chrytien dans la famille et dans Ta society, (extrait de la lettre des Peres du premier Concile Plenier de Quebec) Montreal, E.S.P. #60, (1916) pp. 29-31.

35. Tetu, 0£. Cit., pp. 277 & 81 and #105, pp. 10-1 for this and the following.

36. For the actual papers presented to this congress see the E.S.P. pamphlets, J. P. Archambault, s.j., L'Organisation ouvriere catholique en Hollande, #1 and A. Saint-Pierre, L'Organisation" ouvriere dans la province de Quybec, #2. As all of the following pamphlets and tracts were published by the E.S.P., I will omit the place and publisher.

37. This and the following from Tetu, ojo. cit., Appendix B, pp. 539-42. For the structure of the E.S.P., see my Appendix A, pp. 159-60.

38. See my Appendix B, pp. 172-3.

39. Tetu, 0£. cit., pp. 281-2 and #2, pp. 33-35 for the following.

40. See Tetu, op_. cit., pp. 286-9, #2, pp. 33-5 and #105 p. 15 and Droulers, op_. cit. , pp. 333 & 336-7. Droulers notes that while Plantier was in Montreal, the Intigristes, through a sympathizer, abby D'Amours, director of Quebec City's 1'Action Catholique, attempted to discredit the A.P.. Saint-Pierre1s -193- defense in Le Devoir only provided them with more ammuniption. For the A.P.1s influence, see #16, 20-21, 31, 32, 34*35, 39, and 48-49 as examples.

41. Tetu, ££. cit., pp. 290-1 and #105, pp. 14-15.

42. Archambault, "Les trois phases de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire", Les vingt-cinq ans de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #26'9jr70, (1936) p. 43. It is to be wondered if this change was in any way connected with the death of Pius X.

43. This biographical sketch has been pieced together from the following: J. Cousineau, s.j., "Notes biographiques", Relations, (Nov. 1966) vols. 25-6, no. 310, p. 296; Gaudreau, op. cit., pp. 31-2; R. Rumilly, Histoire de la Province de Qu§bec, Montreal, Editions Fides, vols. XX, p. 173, and-XXIII, pp. 151-2, and Archambault, Le Clergg et les Etudes sociales, #24, (1913), pp. 14-19.

44. For this title, see P. Gouin, Servir, Montreal, Les Editions du Zodiaque, (1938) vol. I, p. 225. Other sources are: Cousineau, Ibid., p. 298; G. Jean, s.j., L'Oeuyre de 1a Vii1a

Saint-Martin. 1914-1924T Oeuvre des Tracts #57, (1924), pp. 3-12, and Fontanille, op. cit., p. 226.

45. Ma Conversion au syndicalisme catholique, Montreal, Fides, 1946, p. 86 as well as pp. 29-30, 38 & 47. See Appendix A, p. 165.

46. Especially in his series of pamphlets on La Question sociale et nos devoirs de catholiques, #65-8, (1916-17) .

47. Charpentier, op_. cit., pp. 80-88 & 121; Tetu, OJD. cit. , pp. 303 & 314-15 and Archambault, Le Syndicalisme catholique au Canada, #267, (1936) pp. 13-14 for this and the following.

48. Charpentier, "L'Ecole Sociale Populaire et le syndical• isme catholique", #269-70, p. 20 and Tetu, Ibid., p. 302 and Appendix A, p.162.

49. Charpentier, Ma conversion au syndicalisme catholique, p. 188. See also Tetu, Ibid., p. 303 and Appendix A, p.163.

50. #105, pp. 17-27 for this account.

51. #105, pp. 22-26. As this pamphlet is an extract from the official history presented by the C.T.C.C.'s first secretary- general, G. Tremblay, its value is great. Also Tetu, op_. cit., p. 466. -194-

52. #105, p. 27. See Charpentier1s discussion of his "conversion" in his De 1'International!sme au National!sme, #88-89, (1920), pp. 35-8.

53. Abbe E. Delisle, cited by Welton, op. cit., p. 143.

54. Abbe Lortie, cited by Tetu, op_. cit., p. 541.

55. The following pamphlets deal with topics related to the C.T.C.C: #92-3, 100, 120-21, 125, 144, 151, 159-60, 161, 165, 172-3, 175, 187, 199. One remarkable fact about these is the prominence of clerics in defining union problems. #100 dealing with the question of fair wages, #92-3 dealing with the morality of strikes and #199 - Msgr. Gauthier's plea that preference be accorded to Catholic unions - are examples of this tendency.

56. Semaines Sociales du Canada, 1 iere session, Montreal, E.S.P., (1920) p. 135 and R. P. Bonhomme, o.m.i., Les Oeuvres dans la Cite, #189, (1929) pp. 30-33 for the resolutions adopted by the C.T.C.C in 1929. For a critique of the C.T.C.C, see P. E. Trudeau, La Greve de 1'Amiante, Montreal, Les editions Cite-Libre, 1956, pp. 80-87.

57. Cited by Lemieux, op_. cit. , p. 149. He apparently stated this in 1920.

58. #105, p. 12 and Trudeau, op_. cit., pp. 15 & 55 for a critical view. Note in regard to the following that the E.S.P. provided a cumulative bibliography of its pamphlets in each issue.

59. Droulers, op_. cit., pp. 85-86. On the inside cover of its pamphlets, the E.S.P. generally disavowed any responsibility for the opinions of its contrbutors.

60. #269-70, pp. 60-61 for this and the following quotes.

61. L'Ecole sociale Populaire, #la, (1911), p. 12. This was its introductory pamphlet.

62. See Trudeau, op_, cit., pp. 19-38 & 41-44 for a critique of the E.S.P. and its contributors.

63. See M. K. Oliver, "The Social and Political Ideas of French Canadian Nationalists. 1920-1945.", McGill University, Phd. dissertation, 1956, pp. 109-134; A. Perrault, et. al., Consignes de demain. Doctrine et origines d e 1'Action Frangaise, Montreal, Librairie d'Action Canadienne Frangaise Ltee, n.d., pp. 5-10; L' Action Nationale (successor to 1'Action Frangaise) vol. 52, no. 7-8, (Mar.-April, 1963) p. 657 and vol. 57, no. 10, (June, 1968) and R. Ar§s, s.j., "Catholicisme et nationalisme en une synthase vivante", pp. 936-47. See Appendix A, pp. 158-61 & 167. -195-

64. Oliver, pp. 158-60; Nolte, op. cit., pp. 101-111 and E.S.P.1s Oeuvre des Tracts #92, Pie XI, Actes pontificaux concernant 1' "Action francaise", (1927?7"I

65. See my Appendix A, pp. 158-71 for a sampling of the member• ship of leading National and Catholic organizations. Also Bonhomme, #189, attempts to list some of the Social Catholic agencies to be found in various cities in Quebec. Trudeau has also discussed this problem extensively; op_. cit., pp. 38-76. See his p. 60 for the following.

66. See Rene Fulop-Miller, The Power and Secret of the Jesuits, F. S. Flint and D. F. Tait, trans., London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, D-930) p. 404 and various pamphlets and tracts, especially one tract entitled Jesuites, #266, (1941) pp. 5-6. For their role in various organizations, see Appendix A., pp. 158-71.

67. L'Action Nationale, vol. 52, no. 7-8, pp. 644-65.

68. #260-70, p. 50. For differing views, see Trudeau, 0£. cit., pp. 43-44 and Gaudreau, op. cit., pp. 10-21. See also Appendix A, p. 164 as well as E.S.P.Ts Le vingt-cinquieme anniversaife des Semaines Sociales du CanadaT #381, (1945) pp. 9-11, 15-16, 25 & 27.

69. As in the case of the long struggle of La ligue de Dimanche (see Appendix A, p. 166) to force the religious and political elite to condemn violators and to enforce the laws relating to Sunday observance. Of the various pamphlets and tracts on this subject, see his Pour un dimanche chrgtien. Vingt-cinq ans de bon combat, Oeuvre des Tracts #349, (T948) p. 3. As to his ability to manipulate men, all accounts agree. Gaudreau, Ibid.,p. 32 quotes Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, describing Archambault as a benevolent dictator. Another acquaintance described him in these terms:

"Tous se sont avoues heureuses victimes de cet entraineur incomparable qui vous ensorcelle de facon imperceptible et vous reduit 5 1'impuissance de resister sans que vous sachiez trop comment."

L-P. Roy in #381, p. 30.

70. Cousineau, op_. cit. , p. 299. Archambault's Le Comite paroissiale, organe de 1'Action catholique, #301-2 (1939), p. 46, discusses how these organizations coordinated their work. For a list, see Appendix A, p. 171. An Appendix to A. Muller, s.j., La Crise liberatrice, #266, (1936) p. 22, points out that Archambault's fellow delegates at Malines were a Senator and a federal civil servant, thereby, suggesting that this group was considered by the federal government to be an important one. On pp. 22-9, Archambault describes a programme of social reform he helped to develop with American and Mexican Social Catholics. -196-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. E. C. Hughes, French-Canada in Transition, University of Chicago Press, 1965, (1943) p. 25. For a more extensive discussion of the effects of the depression in Quebec, see The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939, Book I, pp. 124-150.

2. House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on price spreads and mass buying, Ottawa,King's Printer, 1934, pp. 110-115 especially.

3. Ibid., P. 115.

4. Ibid., P- 112.

5. Ibid., P- 119.

6, Ibid., P. 113.

7. Ibid., P- 111.

8. The Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations, op. cit., p. 191 for this and the following.

9. The League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada, Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., (1935) p. 13.

10. Ibid., p. 14.

11. Labour Legislation and Social Services in the Province of Quebec. A study prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion- Provincial Relations, 1939, p. 94. For a biographical sketch of Minville, see p. 19 8 of this thesis.

12. "French Canadian Nationalism", Canadian Forum, vols, 15-16, (May, 1936) part 2, p. 12.

13. p. 227

14. p. 115.

15. Combines and the Consumer, L.S.R. pamphlet #2, pp. 15-16.

16. p. 193.

17. J. Castell-Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review, Toronto, The Canadian Review Co., 1935-6, p. 280. -197-

18. The Rowell-Sirois report, op. cit., pp. 191-2 & 193 for the following.

19. Ibid., pp. 227-9 for this and the following discussion.

20. Minville, op_. cit. , p. 83 and p. 79 for the following.

21. Ibid., p. 82.

22. Hughes, op_. cit., p. 216.

23. M. Oliver, "The Social and Political ideas of French Canadian Nationalists. 1920-1945.", Phd dissertation, McGill University, 1956, pp. 207, 215 & 221.

24. See Appendix A, p 167.

25. V. Barbeau, Mesure de notre Taille, Montreal, Devoir, 1936, p. 2 & 28. For the following see Oliver, op_. cit. , pp. 145-54.

26. H. La Roque, Camillien Houde, Montreal, Les Editions de l'Homme, (1961) pp. 24-83.

27. Two articles, in particular, which appeared in the Canadian Forum discuss the influence of these parties in Quebec. E. Forsey's "Politics in Quebec", vol. 13, (June 1933), pp. 326-7 and J. E. Keith's "The Fascist Province", vol. 14,(April 1934), pp. 251-2.

28. See Oliver, op_. cit. , pp. 158, 171 & 186 for a very good discussion of this development.

29. See H. F. Quinn, The Union Nationale, University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 48.

30. Ibid., pp. 86-7 and the collection En Greve, Montreal, Les Editions du Jour, (1963) pp. 61-62.

31. J. R. Cardin, L'influence du syndicalisme national catholique sur les droit syndical Quebecois, L'Institut Social Populaire, (formerly the E.S.P.) 1957, no. 1 pp. 40, 89 & 95.

32. See the accounts of these strikes written by J. P. Lefebvre and J. Francoeur in En Greve, pp. 23-57 and 61-95. -198-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. Archambault, "Les trois phases de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire," Les vingt-cinq ans de 1'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #269-70 (1936), p.45.

2. E.S.P.'s L'Oeuvre des Tracts #159 (1932). As Archambault explained when discussing "Les trois phases de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire", this series of tracts had been started in 1919 in order to make room for a greater variety of subjects. The regular E.S.P. pamphlets were reserved for social problems. See p. 46.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid., p.4-5.

5. #241, (1934) pp. 17-21. For Perrier's role in the Social Catholic movement, see my Appendix A, pp. 159-161 &'i64 and tract #335 Monseigneur Philippe Perrier.

6. Ibid., p. 20.

7. Ibid., p. 21.

8. Loc. cit..

9. "Le Capitalisine et ses abus", Pour la restauration sociale, #232-33, (1933) pp. 5-17. As Minville was an important contributor to the E.S.P., a few words should be said about him. Born in 1896, he was educated at the College St. Laurent and received his training in commerce at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, an affiliate of l'Universite de Montreal. He spent a brief period working for various financial institutions before being appointed professor at the E.H.E.C., There he helped to create l'Actualite Economique which is still being published. At various times, he was to carry out studies for the provincial government and for the Rowell-Sirois Commission. He eventually became the director of the E.H.E.C. and later dean of the Social Sciences department of the University de Montreal. As a member of the Social Catholic movement, he participated in the work of the E.S.P. and its affiliates as well as in the nationalist movements. See my Appendix A, p.167 & 169 ; Sister Gaudreau's The Social Thought of French Canada as Reflected in the Semaines Sociales, Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America^ Press, 1946, pp. 53-4, and H. E. Durant, The National Reference Book on Canadian men and women, 6th ed., Canadian Newspaper Service Ltd., 1940, p. 500. -199-

10. Ibid., p. 5.

11. Ibid., p. 6.

12. Loc. cit..

13. Ibid., p. 10.

14. Ibid., p. 11.

15. Ibid., p. 15.

16. R. P. Bournival, s.j., Les Operations de Bourse et leur moralitS, #226 (1932).

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid., p. 17.

19. Ibid., p. 22 for this and the following.

20. A. Gratton, Le Mouillage du capital, #243-45, (1934) p

21. Ibid., p. 8.

22. Ibid., p. 12 for this and the following.

23. Much of his documentation came from Dr. Philippe Hamel probably the most prominent Social Catholic of that time because of his campaign against monopolistic practices. See R. Chaloult Le Docteur Philippe Hamel, tract #407, (1954) pp. 2-5.

24. Ibid., pp. 70-75.

25. La Crise libgratrice., #266, (1936). Muller was a professor at l'Institut, superieur de commerce Saint-Ignace d'Anvers.

26. Ibid., p. 7.

27. Ibid., p. 9.

28. Ibid., p. 14. -200-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. E.S.P., Cahier anticommuniste, #217-18, (1932) p. 1. This manual was put together £>y a group of French Canadian Jesuits.

2. For examples of the work of this group, see pamphlets #223-24, 262 & 265 and tracts #143, 148 & 162.

3. The E.S.P. compiled these critiques in two pamphlets, #217-18 and Manuel anti-bolchevique, #207-8, (1931). See also T. M. Lamarche, o.p.j Le Reve communiste, #220, (1932) .

4. #217-18, p. 4.

5. Ibid, p. 16.

6. #207-8, p. 13.

7. #220, p. 25.

8. #207-8, 0£. cit., p. 5.

9. #217-18, p. 32.

10. In addition to the sources listed in n. 3, see the following pamphlets, En Russie sovietique, #206, (1931), Journies anticommunistes, #251-52, (1934), Cilaac, Les Enfants abandonnes, #246;: (1934), and tracts 1'Entente Internationale, La Russie en 1930, #143 (1931), Les Sans^Dieu, #188 (1935).

11. #217-18, p. 36.

12. #220, p. 23.

13. #217-18, 0£. cit. , p. 40.

14. "L'experience marxiste en Russie", #251-52, p. 28. For the following quote, see #217-18, p. 54.

15. #246, p. 30.

16. #251-52, p. 28.

17. Ibid., p. 31.

18. Abbi P. Perrier, L'Encyclique "Quadragesimo anno", #241, (1934), p. 24. -201-

19. #206, p. 16. At this time he also established a research center to monitor Communist activities throughout the world. A member of this group was also a contributor to the E.S.P., J. Ledit, s.j.. As such and later as director of the "Lettres de Rome", he kept Catholic agencies such as the E.S.P. informed of Communist activities. See his pamphlets, L'Espagne au sortir de la guerre, #309, (1939), Radicalisme moderne, #318, (1940) as well as articles inserted in various other pamphlets and tracts. For the following, see tract #188^. 13.

20. L1Entente Internationale, Vers la guerre, tract #162, (1932) p. 1 and its pamphlet Le Komintern.le Gouvernement Sovigtique et le Parti Communiste de L1 U.R.S.S. , #262 (1935) for the following.

21. L'Ouvrier en Russie, tract #141, (1931) pp. 15-16.

22. Lettres de Rome, Pacifisme reVolutionnaire, tract #197 (1935) pp. 8 & 15 especially.

23. See L'Action internationale des sans-Dieu, tract #166,

(1933) .

24. #197, 0£. cit., p. 9 and tract #188, p. 4 for the following.

25. See Ledit, #318, pp. 10-14. 26. As quoted by Cardinal Villeneuve, Pour le Christ-Roi et contre le communisme, #274-75, (1936) p. 37.

27. As quoted by Archambault in a speech given in 1938, Le Plus grand pgril, #352, (1943) p. 17.

28. #274-75, op_. cit. , p. 26 and Le Vendredi saint de 1'Eglise d'Espagne, #283, (1937) p. 25". This pamphlet is an excerpt from a Vatican report. Its title is significant.

29. #274-75, p. 37 quoted by Cardinal Villeneuve.

30. #283, pp. 2-3,

31. Quand le Front Populaire est roi, tract #205, (1936) p. 14.

32. #254-55, (1935).

33. Published in 1943, #352, pp. 1-14.

34. Ibid., pp. 20-24.

35. Found on pp. 27-32 of Msgr. j:. T. McNicholas' Mentalitg communiste, #298, (1938). -202-

36. #254-55, p. 11 and #298, p. 30-31 for this and the following discussion.

37. J. Hulliger in his L'Enselgnement social des eveques Canadiens de 1891 a 1950, Montr§al, Fides, (1957) pp. 211-18 lists the many instances when Msgr. Gauthier warned his flock about the Communist threat. See his circular to the clergy, Le Communisme au Canada, tract #140, (1931).

38. #254-5, pp. 13-15.

39. #352, p. 8.

40. tract #140, p. 3.

41. In addition to #254-5 and tract #140, see #251-52, p. 35.

42. #274-75 contains the speeches given by Msgr. Gauthier and Cardinal Villeneuve at anti-Communist demonstrations. The tone of these speeches suggest that the Catholics felt themselves to be very much on the defensive.

43. #254-55, p. 16 for this and the following.

44. tract #140 p. 3 and #251-52, p. 7.

45. See Sous la menace rouge, tract #201, (1936).

46. Ibid., p. 4.

47. #254-55, p. 1.

48. #251-52, p. 7.

49. See his pastoral letter published as La Doctrine sociale de L'Eglise et la Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, #242, (1934) p. 5 and #254-55, p. 17 for the following quote.

50. Pour la restauration sociale au Canada, #232-33, (1933) p. 40.

51. "La 'Cooperative Commonwealth Federation'", Ibid., pp. 18-37. For Levesque's position in the Social Catholic movement at that time, see Appendix A, p- 168. He eventually became head of the department of the Social Sciences at Laval University and was largely responsible for making it one of the best in Canada. He also became a leading theoretician of the Cooperative movement and helped to make it a powerful force in Quebec.

52. Ibid., p. 19 for this and the following.

53. Ibid., pp. 23-24. -203-

54. Ibid., pp. 24-25. Not only does an examination of Hansard for Feb. 1-2, 1933 reveal that LeVesque accepted the arguments of the Conservative M.P.s without attributing these statements to them but it also indicates that he systematically ignored Woodsworth's objections.

55. Ibid., p. 33.

56. Ibid.,p. 34.

57. Ibid., p. 36.

58. Ibid., p. 37.

59. #242.

60. Ibid., p. 7.

61. What Gauthier did not mention was the fact that until his recent appointment to the archbishopric of Quebec city, Cardinal Villeneuve had been bishop of the diocese of Gravelbourg, Sask.,

62. #242, 0£. cit.,p. 13 and p. 15 for the following.

63. Ibid., p. 21.

64. Ibid., p. 23.

65. #217-18, p. 1. -204-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI

1. T. M. Lamarche, p.p., Le Reve communiste, #220, (1932) pp. 5 & 29.

2. #241, (1934) especially pp. 19-20.

3. Le Malaise iconomique des temps presents, tract #159, (1932) p. 3.

4. "Le Capitalisme et ses abus", Pour la restauration sociale au Canada, #232-33, (1933) p. 17 and Muller, La Crise liberatrice, #266, (1936) pp. 18 & 21 for the following.

5. Gratton, Le Mouillage du capital, #243-45, (1934) p. 77 and Journees anticommunistes, #251-52, (1934) p. 9 -

6. La Menace communiste au Canada, #254-55, (1935) pp. 19 & 20 for this quotation by Archambault.

7. #232-33 p. 1 & p. 43 for this and the following.

9. Ibid. , pp. 7-9 for the following.

10. Ibid. , pp. 10-11.

11. Ibid. , pp. 12-13.

12. Ibid. , p. 14.

13. Ibid. , p. 16.

14. Ibid. , p. 18.

15. Loc. cit. .

16. Ibid., p. 20 for this and the following.

17. "Pour restituer a l'idifice social son Squilibre", Pour un ordre nouveau, #297, (1938) p. 14.

18. L'Encyclique "Quadragesimo anno", #241, (1934) pp. 2, 11 & 19. For the following see #220, p. 12 and #232-33, p. 46.

19. #251-52 p. 43. See pp. 44-47 for the following.

20. #266, p. 13. For the following, see #286, p. 6 and #297, pp. 16-17. -205-

21. As quoted by Archambault, #232-3, p. 3. See #251-52, pp. 42-43 & 47 for the following. -206-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VII

1. "Directives sociales catholiques", Pour la restauration sociale au Canada, #232-33, (1933) pp. 38-64. See p. 55 for the following. For his role in the Social Catholic movement, see Appendix A, p. 168 and for the guidelines which he developed, see Appendix C, pp.174-6.

2. Ibid., p. 41 and pp. 42-43 for the following. The "Code" was a product of the group to which Archambault was one of Canada's representatives.

3. Msgr. W. Lebon, La Nationalisation des entreprises, #300. As this pamphlet is out of print, it was found in Semaines Sociales du Canada XVI session, (1938), pp. 285-99 where it was first delivered.

4. Ibid., pp. 290 & 295.

5. #232-33, pp. 38-64. See Appendix A, p. 168 for the individ• uals involved and Appendix C, pp. 174-6 for the programme.

6. Le Programme de restauration sociale, #239-40. See Appendix A, pp. 169-70 for the individuals involved and Appendix C, pp. 177-85 for the programme itself.

7. Ibid., pp. 40-71 and Appendix C, pp. 181-4. See p. 199, no. 23 and Appendix A, pp. 167 & 169 for more information on Hamel.

8. Ibid., pp. 41 & 43.

9. Gratton, Le Mouillage du capital, #243-45, (1934) pp. 78, 80-81 for the following.

10. #239-40, pp. 73-78 and Appendix C, pp 184-5. See especially p. 74.

11. As quoted by Chagnon, #232-3, p. 39.

12. Le Communisme au Canada, tract #140, (1931) p. 6.

13. #232-3, op. cit., p. 49 for this and the following discussion.

14. See #239-40, p. 34 as an example.

15. La Malfaisance du capitalisme actuel,#286, (1937) p. 4.

16. According to Chagnon, #232-33, p. 50.

17. See #239-40, p. 31 and Cardinal Villeneuve's commentary on Divini Redemptoris in Pour un ordre nouveau, #297, (1938) p. 18. -207-

18. #239-40, pp. 19-39. Appendix C, pp.180-1 and Appendix A, p. 170.

19. Journees anticommunistes, #253, (1934) p. 24.

20. #230-40, op. cit., p. 23.

21. Ibid. , pp. 7-18 and Appendix C, pp. 178-80. See pp. 8-9 especially.

22. L'Oeuvre de la colonisation, #238, (1933). For the following,,see p. 21. For a discussion of the importance of colonization in Quebec, see pp.104-9.

23. L'Encyclique "Quadragesimo anno," #241, (1934) p. 24.

24. For examples, see Manuel antibolch§vigue, #207-8 (1931) and Le Commerce avec les Soviets, #231^ (1933). For the following, see #241, Ibid., p. 22.

25. L'Action international des sans-Dieu, tract #166, (1933) p. 16.

26. La Menace communiste au Canada, #254-55, (1935) p. 18.

27. Pour le Christ-Roi et contre le communisme, #274-75, (1936) pp. 28-29 & 59.

28. Ibid., pp. 56-58 for the following.

29. Abb§ C. Poisson, #231, (1938),

30. Ibid. 2.

31. Ibid. , P. 4.

32. Ibid. , V' 5.

33. Ibid. , P. 7

34. Ibid. / P. 8.

35. Ibid. / P- 14.

36. Ibid. 15 and ' P* 37. #274-75, p. 47.

38. J. Filion, Jeunesse et politique, #292, (1938) pp. 7-8. -208-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VIII

1. Pour la colonisation, #219, (1932) p. 6, for this and the following. This pamphlet consists of extracts from speeches delivered at the conference.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

3. Le Malaise economique des temps presents, tract #159, (1932) p. 7.

4. Abb§ G. Bilodeau, La Profession agricole, #225, (1932) p. 5.

5. #219, p. 25 for this and the following.

6. Pour la restauration sociale, #232-33, (1933) p. 52.

7. Abbe" E. Beaudoin, L'Agriculture base Economique d'une nation, #237, (1933) p. 27.

8. Les Probleme rural au regard de la doctrine sociale de 1'Eglise"; #288, (1938) p. 5.

9. L'Oeuvre de la colonisation, #238, (1933).

10. Ibid., p. 9.

11. Ibid., p. 32.

12. #219, p. 13-14.

13. Ibid., p. 24.

14. #288, p. 3 and #219, Ibid., pp 9-10 for the following.

15. Pour un ordre nouveau, #297, (1938) p. 29.

16. Perrier, L'Encyclique "Quadragesimo anno", #241, (1934) p. 28. See #297, pp. 29-30 for the following.

17. Perrier, Ibid., p. 26.

18. Ibid., p. 14.

19. L'Organisation corporative, #256, (1935) p. 4 and A. Muller, si.j., Essais d'organisation corporative, #247-49, (1934) p. 3 for the following. -209-

20. Gratton, Le Mouillage du capital, #243-5, (1934) p. 90 and #247-49, p. 5 for the following.

21. Cited in Cateehisme de I'organisation corporative, 2ieme ed., #289-90, 1946 (1938) p. 50, n.l.

22. #256, pp. 6, 10 & 19 for this discussion.

23. #241, p. 27.

24. #256, p. 18 and #243-5, p. 90 for the following.

25. #247-49, p. 96 and pp. 98-99 for the following discussion.

26. #243-45, p. 91. See Duthoit, "Etat et Corporation", L'Ordre corporatif, #268, (1936) p. 23 and Archambault, Le Syndicalisme catholique au Canada, #267, (1936) p. 25 for the following.

27. #247-49, p. 94 and his "L'Ordre corporatif et les syndicats", #268, p. 10-13 for the following.

28. #268, p. 13.

29. Ibid., pp. 14, 16 & 18 and #247-49, p. 7 for the following.

30. Ibid., p. 17.

31. #247-49, p. 21 and pp. 34 & 36 for the following.

32. Ibid., pp. 51 -54, 97 & 101 and #268, p. 21 for the following discussion.

33. Comment Etablir 1'organisation corporative au Canada, #272, (1936). See pp. 10-11 for the following.

34. Ibid., p. 16.

35. Ibid., p. 8 for this and the following.

36. Ibid., p. 14.

37. La Corporation professionnelle, #306, (1939). See p. 25 for the following.

38. Ibid., p. 29.

39. La Menace communiste au Canada, #254-55, (1935) p. 29. See p. 30 for the following.

40. Cited in Petit catEchisme d1Education syndicale, 2i§me ed., #295, (1938) p. 30. -210-

41. J ournee s anti commun is te s, #253, (1934) pp. 17-18.

42. Ibid., p. 10-11 for this and the following. See also his discussion in #267, p. 27.

43. Ibid., p. 14 and 15-16 for the following.

44. For a description of its operation, see #256, pp. 28-31.

45. See #253, p. 25, and his discussion of it in Le Programme de restauration sociale, #239-40, (1934) pp. 24-25.

46. #239-40,Ibid., pp. 25-26.

47. Among others see #237, p. 31; #238, p. 26; #239-40, p. 10 and #288, p. 7, 23-24.

48. See La Coopgration economique, #284, (1937) pp. 10 & 14.

49. J. Castell-Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review, Toronto, The Canadian Review Co., 1935-6, p. 217.

50. #297, pp. 20 & 26. For Desranleau's role in the Social Catholic movement, see Appendix A, pp ,162,'164 & 168 and for his role in the Sorel strike, En Greve, Montreal, Les Editions du Jour, (1963) p. 61.

51. La Greve de l'Amiante, Montreal, Les iditions Citg-Libre, 1956, p. 20. -211-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IX

1. See Pour la colonisation, #219, (1932) pp. 30-32.

2. See Le Syndicalisme national catholique, #285, (1937) p. 2.

3. J. Cousineau, s.j., "Notes biographiques", Relations, (Nov. 1966) vols. 25-6, no. 310, p. 296. In 1940, L'Ordre Nouveau was replaced by Relations.

4. For accounts of this meeting, see Pour la restauration sociale au Canada, #232-33, (1933) pp. 1-4 and Le Programme de restauration sociale, #239-40, (1934) pp. 1-4. For the authors of these programmes, see Appendix A., pp. 168-70. The source of the following quote is #232-33, pp. 3-4.

5. #239-40, Ibid., p. 4 for this and the following.

6. For accounts of this development, see H. F. Quinn, The Union Nationale, University of Toronto Press, 1963, p. 48 and P. Reid, "Action Libirale Nationale.1934-39.", M. A. thesis, Queen's University, 1966, pp. 45-49.

7. For the text of his speech, see Quinn, Ibid.,Appendix

Bf p. 217.

8. According to Reid, op_. cit. , p. 67, n. 8. Msgr. Lebon, "La journte des treize," Les vingt-cinq ans de 1'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #269-70, (1936) pp. 28-29 for the following.

9. Quinn, op_. cit. , pp. 58, 73-4 for an account of subsequent developments.

10. #239-40, pp. 1-2.

11. See #269-70, p. 29 and S. M. Lipset',-. Agrarian Socialism, Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1968 (1950) p. 171.

12. La Menace communiste au Canada, #254-55, (1935) pp. 23-24 and Journ§es anti-communistes, #251-52, (1934) p. 8.

•13. #254-55, Ibid., p. 25 and Sous la menace rouge, tract #201, (1936) p. 11 for the following.

14. See #254-5, Ibid., pp. 27-28 and #269-70, pp. 31-32. An example of the following can be found #251-2, p. 1.

15. Pour le Christ-Roi et contre le communisme, #274-75, (1936) , p~ 7 and p. 35 for the following. -212-

16. #269-70, p. 31.

17. Quoted by Msgr. Gauthier, La Doctrine sociale de l'Eglise et la Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, #242, (1934) p. 24. "

18. Pour un Ordre nouveau, #297, (1938) pp. 8-9. The Cardinal' views on charity can be found in the same pamphlet, p. 16.

19. Le Reve communiste, #220, (1932) p. 28. #242, p. 25 for Msgr. Gauthier.

20. #297, ojp_ cit., p. 16.

21. #254-55, p. 35. #297, op. cit., p. 9 for the following.

22. Cited in L'Action catholique specialisge, #279, (1937) p. 3.

23. See #254-55 op_. cit. , p. 27 and J. B. Desrosiers, p.s.s., "L'Ecole normale de VaudreuTl", #269-70, pp. 35-41.

24. See #279, op_. cit. , and Archambault, L'Action catholique au Canada, #287, (1937).

25. #279, Ibid., p. 5 and p. 18 for the following.

26. #287, OJD cit. , p. 18 and 16 for the following.

27. See his "L'Action catholique, agent de restauration sociale", Semaines Sociales du Canada, 16ieme session, (1938), pp. 403-12.

28. J. P. Gaboury, Le Nationalisme de Lionel Groulx, Editions de 1*University d'Ottawa, 1970, p. 25.

29. #279, Q£. cit., p. 9. -213-

FOOTNOTES

Chapter X

1. Causerles sur les encycliques "Rerum novarum" et "Quadragesimo anno", #330, (1941) p. 23 and p. 30 for the following quotation.

2. La Restauration sociale, 2ieme ed., #328, (1943), p. 19. "

3. Le Prob1erne rural au regard de la doctrine sociale de 1'EglTse^ #288, (1938) p. 6 for this and the following.

4. Hulliger, L'Enseignement social des eVeques Canadiens de 1891 a 1950, Montreal, Fides, (1957) p. 86. See Blanchard, Le Canada Frangais, Librairie Artheme Fayart (Canada) Ltie., (1960) p~i 103 for a discussion of colonization.

5. Examples of this campaign which tended to focus on the Portuguese experiment are pamphlets reproducing Salazar's speeches and writings, L'Organisation corporative portugaise, #355, (1943) and Mon temoignage et mes positions, #435, (1950). For the following, see E. Bouvier, s.j., L'Organisation corporative est-elle realisable au Quebec? #478, (1955) pp. 1 & 28.

6. Les vingt-cinq ans de l'Ecole Sociale Populaire, #269-70, (1936) p. 29. For the following, see his speech reproduced in Le Plus grand peril, #352, (1943) p. 19.

7. In fact, an observer wrote that the leadership of the provincial Conservative party considered the adoption of some of its planks as "...too radical and the result of hasty action." H. C. Goldenberg, "Politics in Quebec", Canadian Forum, vol. XIV, (Oct. 1934) p. 8.

8. Le Programme de restauration sociale, #239-40, (1934) p. 3.

9. La Malfaisance du capitalisme actuel, #286, (1937) pp. 6 & 7 for this and the following as well as Pour un ordre nouveau, #297, (1938) pp. 26 & 27.

10. For a more extensive discussion of the impact of European Social Catholic thought upon the French Canadian intelligentsia, see Oliver, "The Social and Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists, 1920-1945." Phd dissertation, McGill University, 1956.

11. La GreVe de l'Amiante, Montreal, Les editions Cite-Libre, 1956, p. 35. -214-

12. Ibid., p. 41 and p. 125 of this thesis.

•13. Ibid., p. 11. Even the staunchest of French Canadian Nationalists grouped around 1'Action Nationale tended to follow the Church's lead. See G. Fortin, "An analysis of the Ideology of a French Canadian Nationalist Magazine. 1917-1954.", Phdcdissertation, Cornell University, 1956, pp. 48, 59 & 131. For Pius XI's attitude towards nationalism, see Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, L. Vennewitz, trans., New York, the New American Library, 1969, (1965) pp. 103-111.

14. In particular W. Ryan, s.j., The Clergy and Economic Growth in Quebec. 1896-1914, Les Presses de 1*University Laval, 1966, pp. 248-56.

15. Of the many articles written in the Canadian Forum in support of this thesis, see E. Forsey, "Clerical Fascism in Quebec", June, 1937, pp. 90-92.

16. See Cardinal Villeneuve's speech reprinted in #297, pp. 14-23 and several tracts and pamphlets on the Padlock law, on Corporatism, etc., such as the reprint of H. F. Quinn's article The Bogey of Fascism in Quebec, tract #234, (1938).

17. A. Malo, o.fvm., L'Action catholique specialised, #279, (1937) p. 9. Pius XI condemned Mussolini's attempt to gain control over Catholic organizations in 1931 and in 1937 he formally condemned Naziism. A. Freemantle, ed., The Papal Encyclicals in their historical context, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, (1956) pp. 243 & 250.

18. La Doctrine sociale de l'Eglise et la Cooperative Commonwealth Federation^ #242, (1934) p. 23.

19. P. M. Gaudrault, o.p., Neutrality, non-confessionnalitg et l'Ecole Sociale Populaire, Les Editions du Levrier, 1946, p

20. M. G. Ballantyne, "The Catholic Church and the C.C.F.", The Canadian Catholic Historical Association Report, 1963, pp. 33-47.

21. See the account in Trudeau, op_. cit. .

22. Abbes G. Dion and L. O'Neill, "A Sordid Boon", C. Nish, Quebec in the Duplessis era, 1935-1959; Dictatorship or Democracy? Toronto, The Copp Clark Publishing Co., (1970) pp. 142-45. (The article is a reprint found in this volume of 'Issues in Canadian history series') and H. Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered", in M. Rioux and Y. Martin eds French-Canadian Society, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1964, vol I, pp. 137-53 for an analysis of the factors which drove the Church to oppose Duplessis. -215-

23. J. Cousineau, s.j., L'Evolution de la mentalite sociale au Quebec depuis 1931, #487, (1956) pp. 11-13.

24. See the introduction to J. R. Cardin's L'Influence du syndicalisme national catholique sur le droit syndic a 1 Qu§bec"ois, L*Institut Social Populaire, (June, 1957), #1.