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DIRECTORATE OF - INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top—Sfl§F€t Lge 3'5(°) 1 March 1968
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Information as of l600r l March 1968 s.5(¢)
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L HIGHLIGHTS
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—- An enemy ground assault on the Khe _ Sanh base has been repulsed. The Communists have suffered a —_L serious reverse in their largest effort at sea infiltration to date.
'I. The Military Situation_in South Vietnam: Comunist troops launched a ground attack against the allied outpost at Khe Sanh early on'l March (Paras. l-3). Scattered enemy actions were re- ported throughout the remainder of the country (Paras. 4-6). There are indications that the Com- munists are planning large—scale activity in the
3:NhX2)' western_highlands on-3 March (Paras. 7-9).
3.3(h)(2)
—-- Three enemy trawlers were sunk off the coast of South Vietnam (Paras. l2-18). Both allied and _._._. enemy casualties continue to rise sharply (Paras.
19-2l)."‘ -
_-_h_..._. II. rPolitical Developments in South Vietnam;_ 'The Communists may have snared a prominent Buddhist
.-_-i. to support their new front (Paras. l-2). A Commu- nist mass atrocity has been unearthed in Hue ' (Paras.-3-4). The merger of the Thieu—endorsed -_-._.-..-_. Popular Front for National.Reconstruction with Senator-Tran“Van~Don\s People's Committee to Save the Nation appears in the offing (Paras. 547)._ The Lqwer House on,l March overwhelmingly rejected la:-in Thieu's request for sweeping powers in the economic' area (Paras. 8-9). I III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
-.-.-.._..._. There is nothing of significance to report. =
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' ' 1 I-=' '"*- * r"%>%"e=.@:'='“. - "*=¥'%ss? c-9» .- . if’,~-I,-5'#5!!§E§» -1 Ml \ — Fa» J ~“-_ V ii‘ Ln ' ‘ -.1;,4»~= ° '~" -13 ;' 1r’ ‘~ ' '=~'-.-; ‘~-- ~" '"",¢'sc¢ . - -- '“:_,_..§‘o._..$.i5.‘§5.*#'T‘ . 1~.- :s.’.!.!$a._ "?2‘-;~;;,¢_r '_,~__ ._-;‘:2r!; ,_ ¢ ~, "* '?'- - ‘I ‘. ‘ ,' i”-35?" . "_. *1; .1! . ;*.- *‘“. ,-.~'* _.. .- 14%; _.-. *7 _ __ .".;,__:.~€ ,5, "§\‘*i5"n7fi|.:s_Z‘_{,§';;J,‘,‘ §"-'+‘<9§~'="-*‘¢»» - ‘ ' - =3 1*-**:¢~;;*iF1:.~ .- " ~ g-1.~. --_“ ' , - ~ ' < _ .,_,_. ~1'" ~ ~‘.- __~ . .~ r . . aw . """°"1" '>‘-‘ . r‘ ‘E4’ 1-'" w~<=‘€i§ 1.5 -7- _.~. _’,~5§i-’§~-*5 wt?$- -, - I ~ -r--- S , > l 697e2 3-as CIA I MARCH I _Appr0ved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123; ' 3-5<°> I. "THE MILITARY SITUATION 'IN.'¢'SOU'I|l‘I_-I VIETNAM 1. Communist military activities were at a. near-normal, pre-Tet .level throughout-most of the country on 29 February - 1_March. Aside from a- ground attach at_Khe Sanh, enemy efforts were limited to small—scale skirmishes and some shellings. 2. At the Khe Sanh Base, North Vietnamese regu- lars launched a ground probe early on~l March. Com- munist.infantrymen, led by sappers, who placed ex- p__los_ive_ charges. under the barrier wire, hit the east- ern perimeter which is defended by the South Vietnam- ese 37th Ranger Battalion. Enemy troops also made small probes against the northeast and southern sec: tions of the base. H 3. Si3ty—seven North Vietnamese were killed be- t I fore they withdrew*from battle in.the face of heavy allied firing. =Allied casualties were reported as_ light.- As the Communists, aided by extensive tunnel- .ing, edge close to the allied base, similar probes to test the camp's defenses can be expected.- 4;J_In the_central part of the country, Commu- nist forces continue to maintain pressure on.the high- land provinces.of Kontum,=Darlac,_and_Pleiku..'Pleiku city and a nearby air base were hit by mortars on 1 March and enemy-units staged several light probes north- and northeast of Kontum city on 29 February. " 5. SevehJenemy+initiated military actions were reported on 29-February — l March,in South-Vietnam1s III Corps. The majority of these.incidents occurred in Hau flghia Province; -One was a large~scale mortar-- barrage against a US Army base camp some l5 miles west ' of Saigon.-.- = -I 6.~ In the delta provinces, scattered skirmishes and shellings of outposts and district towns by the Viet Cong took place on 29 February. Most of_the-in- cidents were concentrated in Vinh Long and Dinh Tuong provinces. , l March 1968 1-1- s.5(¢ ” X Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 '; ( l ' ' ' 104 \..\|t'1 5 ~ x"6a' no NORTH \ VIETNAM \. . 6 X" " r’ 0,,-hire"-}im4 zana 7 >' . , . ._, . " KQUANG "rm \_‘ ‘ ‘ ' Ee n O . I 95': ‘ =' Hue \ _ .0 '--'-THUA THIE - __ , - \ ;”7e:4'a,-W .. . . k=.\__A ha , >16 aN’en'g ‘i "6 16 y ’ ‘ ('.—‘:u1;;~1 . ID NAM : ‘ THAILAND‘ ‘ .1 QUANGTIN . Q, .. ~ - A 3 . QUANG _ _ 4} Q: ~NG~ p 1_ ' " '- - Trdwleidesfroyed V _ ‘ - - ' '. KONTUM"- <. \ . Q 3 I -/""’1--V»--~--~""”"*=\ A--1*“ 5-~"e' f‘“°'““"'. -"" '\,..)"r ~ _- A Trawler tours 9 '\__/._‘~' '-\_ (' .. preiiersed _ DIN : BIN" ' ‘~‘ “ . '14 \/ ' - Plelku , _ ,_ _ $1 PLEI-KU ' ‘ ' , -\_ _ PHU 9 j " @6011 . sou p >7 Tunle S an V ' DARLAC - KHANH . _ Q‘ H” V J .>+ A . -. F I .-/ Qt!/ANG nuc ' ‘F’ "Ti'§w|9l' .d°$|'|'°Y9d “ ' _/~--/ TUYEN 2 - _]2 _ R ' ‘ ~" ‘Y ‘ - x. M RANH , '1 °"6E|'E . -- ; NINH . PHUOC - . , ._ _ f\__\ ,_ V -~ - @ I _.\," am“ LONG THUN . A-l_ LAM DONG V Z2 Io 3 -G » ‘ LONG \ \ TAY e mm-4 \ I \ " H "' C--/' ~53- @~ . “EN \ _) KIEN .-._ /‘emu W PHONG -ruom; _.- noc_ ‘ I‘ W“ h \§\\ Q T,“ ll CORPS \..v DID mu puoc Cupntnl Specie! Zone \ mus \_ C j 4-. GULF OF, ea xi; Y EN W -. " - SIAM V ' ° BAC LIEU av CORPS/'~ ~5°U\TH VTETNA-M 1M/men ‘ A’ A 2 ' >~ A'§"e.'-1‘-f ‘ - » E T V 9ur|o{|At " ‘ ‘ "'" - 3' -‘ C45 u . so 75 1oom==" '- »T'<1.W|¢.' »- ~ d==."9Y!=d.~‘_ 1 ' .‘- '. 1 lee" -V ~ "no 1 &'9‘.. pp; \ 1=.w.- 1. . 69783 3-6B CIA Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 K ' 3-5<<=> \ y I Communist_Sea.Infiltration Thwarted 12. A large-scale Communist sea infiltration effort ended in apparent failure when three 100-foot steel-hull trawlers-were destroyed by explosions dur- ing the night of 29 February — l March on South Viet- nam's coast.- A fourth trawler headed toward Binh Dinh Province sensed-trouble and reversed course. Accord- ing to late reports, the vessel was in international waters and under allied surveillance. 13. The trawlers apparently attempted.to land su p— plies in.coastal areas of Quang Ngai, Khanh Hoa, and An Xuyen provinces, all of which have long been sus- pected entry points for maritime infiltration. Follow ing procedures observed in previous Communist water- borne supply operations, one of the vessels was blown up after it had been fired upon by allied forces. "The other two trawlers were apparently destroyed by al-- lied mortar and naval gunfire. 14. One of these trawlers can transport up to 10 ‘.’i tons of munitions to South Vietnam in a matter"of days l The risk of detection and loss of cargo is high, how—. ever. In contrast, it would take weeks to move simila I‘ amounts to coastal South Vietnam-through the overland infiltration corridors. Accordingly, the magnitude of the sea infiltration effort, the largest yet detected in Vietnam and the first seen in eight months, and the clear willingness of the Communists to accept the risks of such a venture suggest enemy forces in these coastal areas have an urgent need for supplies, pos—- sibly to support another series of attacks. ' _ l5. Four enemy 40-foot junks also were sighted on l March at the mouth of the Cua Viet in northeast- ern Quang Tri Province. One junk containing arms and ammunition was captured. Late reports indicate three others were located less than a mile off the river‘ mouth and-are under surveillance. l March 1968 I53. s.5(¢ ‘ ‘ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 4 s.5(¢) 1 16. These junks may have attempted to supply major elements of North Vietnamls 324B Division now in this general area. The use of junks in this instance decreases the risk of cargo loss to the. l Communists and suggests enemy supply-requirements this area are less \ in urgent than farther south. n - 17. Recent unusual activity by Chinese naval \ forces_in the northern Gulf of Tonkin suggests the Chinese may be assisting_in enemy trawler_operations; “ Since 9 January,four Chinese minesweepers have been operating north of Hainan Island.-\ 3.3(h)(2) ._ 18. Chinese vessels have assisted North Viet- -——- namese sea infiltration missions through the Hainan Straits in the past and may have done so in the case -.-——— of four trawlers detected on 29 February --1 March. -4.-._ Allied and Enemy_Casualties Rise Sharply ———-_-— 19, Both allied and enemy battle deaths con—v tinue_to rise sharply. During the first two months — of 1968 nearly 3,000 American troops have been killed. — The-weekly average_of US combat;deaths this year is" about 350;.nearly double the figure for 1967 when an average of some 180 US troops were killed each week.‘ In 1966 the weekly average of US deaths was 96; in.l965, 26. - - 20. South Vietnamese and other allied casual- ties have also been high this year, continuing the upward trend since 1965. The South Vietnamese have lost approximately 510 killed per week so far this year,-compared with 206 per week last year and 182 in 1966. Third country allies have lost 28-men’ . killed per week so far this year compared with 21 killed per week in 1967 and ll per week in 1966. 21. Reports of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army casualties have reached unprecedented_highs~ . _l March 1968 ; I-4. _ s.5(¢) \ \ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 ,1 1 ~ -1¥9P~SEK3R1fF a5( 1 35 O0 /\ ? '1 this year,* Nearly-50,000 enemy reportedly have been killed.“ This is more than_ha1f-the number df enemy reported killed in A11 of 1967-485,710; 1 1 Combat.Deaths. Th1rd- 4- QE- Acountrx VC/NVA 4.15:’. 1953*“ 2,987 4,400 ' 240 49,442 Per Week 350 510 28 1967 9,353 10,739 1,105 86,710 Per Week 180 206 21 1,688 1966 5,008 9,469 ~ 566 55,524 ,Per Week 96 182 E 11 1,065 1965 " 1,369 11,243 31 35,436 Per Week 26 216 680 Cumulative ’ 19,009 56,386 1,943 296,676 From Jan 1961 *As of 29 February. **Data on South Vietnamese casualties this year are subject to repision because reporting from irregular f0rces.in rural areas is incomplete. L I: v1-_—- 1 March 1968 _1__|_ I-5 _ w .; ;;£fi § \/O Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 ~ ( 3-5(0) II. POLIIIQAL~DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1. Liberation Radio on 28 February carried the first known endorsement by a prominent Vietnamese of Communist political objectives in South Vietnam. The statement of support was allegedly signed by Thich Don Hau, doyen of the Buddhist hierarchy in Hue and in the entire I Corps region. It appealed to all Buddhists to join the new Communist—inspired National Alliance Front for Democracy and Peace of Hue city, surfaced during the Tet offensive. Citing purported repressions under past and present Saigon regimes, HauPs statement declared that association with the new front was the "correct_path" for settling the war and achieving Buddhist aspirations. 2. There have been.indications that at least some Buddhist militants in Hue cooperated with the Communist attack, but the activities and-whereabouts of Hau have not been established. It is possible that his statement was not voluntary. Regardless of the circumstances, however, the use of his name should bring the Communists advantages by influencing Buddhist fence-sitters and by fostering increased friction between the Buddhist militants and the Thieu government. h Communist Atrocity in Hue l 3. According to the Thua Thien province chief, Colonel Pham Van Khoa, 77 bodies were recovered from a mass grave in Hue on 28 February. The victims were found shot in the back and their hands tied. Khoa told a US Embassy officer that the bodies were mostly civilians but included a large number of police and civil servants- .Khoa also speculated that a num- ber of the dead were South Vietnamese who had worked for Americans. 4. The victims apparently had been dead about ten days and may have been executed after trials b aC0m munist "citizens court" which was reported[:::::2%] 3.3(h)(2) [:::::::::::]to have been operating in the vicinity of the mass grave site. M l March 1968 II-l s.5(¢) \ \ J:.e1>secKE"F 1 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 J I¥}P—SE€H§EH? 3503 o ‘ Front Merger in the Offing ' 5.\ \the Thie 11- 3.3(h)(2) endorsed anti—Communist alliance, the Popular Front for National Reconstruction, may be merged with Sena tor Tran Van Don's People's Committee to Save the Nation. Tran Van An, who heads the former organiza- tion, reportedly has already discussed the possible merger.withi Don' and' Thieu's brother Nguyen Van Khieu, as well as other members of his organization. Anoth er meeting is scheduled with Don for l March when An will indicate his agreement-for,a merger of the two groups. 6. An does not intend, however, to submerge his group totally in the new alliance or to los e COI1 trol of his following. \ 3.3(h)(2) he proposes to take the line'that Don should continu 8 as president of the combined front, but there s hould be a joint controlling committee composed of representa tives of both groups. An will, at least initially, take steps to ensure the organiza t iona 1 in t egri ty of his group while indicating publicly that it is an integral part of the combined front. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) K:::::::::]Don is amenable to An's conditions, even though An would remain in a position to pull his followers out of the united front._ An reportedly feels that his precautions will dispel President Thieu's fears concerning the creation of a large political front over which he has no control. 7. The prognosis for the new joint front stil l does not appear good.d An's efforts to pressure his organizations‘ integrity will probably sap the new front of any genuine strength.- It is also poss ible that the whole effort by An to merge with Don's front may be a ploy inspired by President Thieu t0 cripple a potential source of political competi tion on the national level. Since Thieu is known to feel that the Don organization is a vehicle for Vice President Ky?s political ambitions, he may feel that the crippling merger will serve a dual purpose. l March 1968 II—2 35Ufl \ \ 110-P/S'EC'K'E"T‘ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: '201 9/04/1 7 C06787123 __ If 3-5<°> \ \ Lower House Refuses President Thieu Economic Powers ' 8. lThe Lower House today, in a move that was not unexpected, rejected President Thieu‘s request for emergency decree powers in economic and financial spheres. The only surprises were the lopsided size of the vote, 85 to 10, and the fact that it was taken on an alternative proposal of the Lower House joint economic and finance committee which would-have scaled down ThieuTs emergency power from a requested l2 months to 90 days. _ 9. The motives behind the Lower HouseFs rejec- tion appear to be threefold: l) reluctance to re- linquish any of its prerogatives; 2) unwillingness to give the appearance that the assembly cannot deal with emergency situations; and 3) concern that the granting lof decree powers to the President is unconstitutional. It puts the House under the gun since it must now live up to its promise to give priority consideration to economic measures proposed by the government. l March 1968 I I‘- 3 s.5(¢ \ \ 1 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 _. . (. \ I SURVEILLANCE RADAR STATIONS IN NRTH VIHNAM | pt _ ' 166 iés 164 :7 _ __ I ‘ Mengtz .\ > _ _ I > ‘ “ NJA KUNM|NG A 6! "iv _|cANTON'_-.A|R DISTRICT -_-,-~~ C1H"1.N'A" - ~ R» _, “K011; V 1 ,: ‘_. ‘I A A J" ’ 2' °"* -. \~,° __. /' _ \. _ A \ . \I ‘ \(..Y-. \ _ 7, V \- '-' 5\\_ ‘:1 . . ing '- ming ' '\ ‘*2 _ .' LaiChau \ 22 , \_\ \ Lang -"A 5 \\ ’ I ‘\\ Y en L. JL " ‘ I Nguyen "ea /‘Dian ien 3;? > ‘ - Ph 04%‘, ‘A L‘ r l I c ,:- _ 1., \ , '9 HANOI ' .\ v \_. =.,\ ' . -\..-\_.\w__/" ~40 . ,_ \._\ v. in H - - P a- 5 -- M ' §,_sUng I LAOS Samneuau P ‘ r'v—_. l/ . uang Prabang " W nh ljloa ‘\ \ I .\ K..3 ._\\ $ l \ ° GULF "\-. we,0 (‘Q , S-\ . OF u~-. - a 4’_0u,,, . \“ , . ‘ TONKIN - 'g‘- 3 . 1° .-_/ ' /v.,,,,]_ - . \ 4,," ._ \< I 4% '5 ‘O J - ' 9 . \ 18 ]8VlENTl_ . Q ' t\._ . ,Tl-IAILA N D - \'- \ _\ QD _. 3,,’ I ' \ se°°§ . DEMARCATION uus \.._ I A ‘So1.'pone' ~ - .NORTH VIETNAM \ \> - A ,;:-SQQTH . ' ' I _ .-, .- u . _ , . ' ‘_\¥ - . 'Sector Possible AA ~ontr9|_|er _ t heudqpurters _l:] _ _O V ' -A ~ station All‘ wurnin'g'_|i_n_k Rddur _ - Q -- A '"' "" P'*°n . \ Q A Urglocuted station Possible link - ":16 O 25 50 75 Miles O ' " 25 50 ' - t_ »_ ,». ,,; SECRET ; ,; s.5(¢) , Q ...=...... ~- 102‘ mane»-| Y 194 _. ._ 196-...-...... ,...4(, _,:@_1o_s| 09784 3-as cm Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 _, __ _ - __._.fi _= _..-- _.l_._ __ _ _ —-~-__€_qé.%- _ Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 . < 8-5 I \ IV. OTHER COMMUNIST. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS _ l. Recent analysis has identified two Chinese Communist air surveillance radar stations in north- eastern North Vietnam. Both transmit tracking data on US aircraft approaching North Vietnam from the Gulf of Tonkin between Haiphong and the China border. - 2. These stations may have been in North Viet- nam for some time since they are located at the same place as two Chinese antiaircraft artillery stations active since November 1966 and August 1967. The radar stations are_probably subordinate to the airy defense sector headquarters at Ning-ming in the Canton Air District. .' 3. They are also in direct contact with a pos- sible antiaircraft observation post controller in the Lang Son area of North Vietnam and probably pro- vide tracking data for immediate use by Chinese anti- aircraft units. Their broadcasts are probably moni- tored by the Ning-ming sector headquarters for local early warning purposes. ~ 4. Since December 1966 three Chinese Communist air surveillance radar stations have been identified in northwestern North Vietnam. They are controlled by a Kunming Air District sector located in the Mengtzu area, and are probably used primarily to pro- vide early warning of US aircraft approaching from Thailand. Although they have not been directly associated with Chinese antiaircraft operations in North Vietnam, the station in the Yen Bai area prob- ably coordinates also with local Chinese antiaircraft units. 1 March 1968 IV—l \ \ s.5(¢ rep-s~EcRTE’"f Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 .~ < P 3 T‘ \ ll I P‘ _-I _._. _...___. -__ v ? : \ \ {hi __l_g__1 1 11¢ : I I\.gL.>- -- ‘Ia-A-r-*r—4— Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787123 \