Achievement Index (UNDP); Digital Access Index (ITU); and ICT Development Indices
(UNCTAD).
The third issue is to survey the main arguments of the selected international organizations’ policy reports that mainly intend to create the indexes of the diffusion of
ICTs and the digital divide across countries. Above all, the four reports state that the technology gap between countries in terms of new ICTs exists today. According to
UNDP (2001), “the global map of technological achievement …… shows huge inequalities between countries—not just in terms of innovation and access, but also in the education and skills required to use technology effectively” (p.3). As well, ITU (2003) wrote that “although this is an impressive achievement, ICT penetration levels vary among and within countries, creating a digital divide between those with high and those with low access levels (p.4). Focusing on various socio-economic variables, OECD
(2001) found out that the digital divide “appears to depend primarily on two variables, income and education” and “other variables, such as household size and type, age, gender, racial and linguistic backgrounds and location also play an important role” (p.5).
(MAEs) – as physical installations created by third parties to facilitate traffic exchange between ISPs. Establishing an Internet exchange is an important policy decision in the allocation of resources for developing countries, keeping domestic Internet traffic within the country and saving international bandwidth for other uses” (UNCTAD, 2005, p.49). 24
UNCTAD (2005) also confirmed that “inequality in access to ICTs across countries remains high and significant, around twice the average level of income inequality generally observed” (p.10). Further it also found out that “trends in the digital divide show sharply contrasting trends according to the type of technology” (p.2).
With these findings, these reports suggested several propositions to overcome the newly emerging technology gap between countries. From a rather theoretical perspective in general, UNDP (2001) claimed that “technological innovation (……) first can directly enhance human capabilities. (...... ) Second, technological innovation is a means to human development because of its impact on economic growth through the productivity gains it generates” (p.28).
OECD (2001) highlighted “the importance of policy and regulatory reform” such as the liberalization of telecommunication markets and rigorous implementation of competition and “new investment and increased demand for communications access and services through falling prices and the offer of new innovative products” (p.6). More specifically, it suggested implementing several policy measures for improving ICT access and use as follows: 1) network infrastructure (infrastructure development and regulatory initiatives to enhance network competition); 2) diffusion to individuals and households
(access in schools and access in other public institutions); 3) education and training
(training in schools and vocational training); 4) diffusion to businesses (ICT support and training for small businesses, and assistance to regions and rural areas); 5) government projects (government services on line and governments as model users of ICT); and 6) multilateral co-operation (p.31). 10
10 . UNCTAD (2005) also proposed very similar policies to developing countries as those of the OECD 25
From slightly a different perspective from the previous ones, ITU (2003) emphasized the creation of an index for measuring access to new ICTs, to compare each country’s status, to set targets, and to measure progress. Then, ITU provided the Digital
Access Index (DAI) as a new measuring index of access to and use of ICTs. DAI consists of five factors as follows: 1) infrastructure (fixed telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants and mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants); 2) affordability (Internet access price (20 hours per month) as percent of per capita income); 3) knowledge (adult literacy and overall school enrollment); 4) quality (broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants and international Internet bandwidth per capita); and 5) usage of ICTs (Internet users per 100 inhabitants) (p.20).
In short, these major four policy reports released by international organizations have endeavored to introduce various index models of ICTs diffusion to measure each country’s current status or future readiness of ICTs development and to recommend relevant policy measures to enhance ICTs development.
2.2.3. Explaining the Determinant Factors of the Global Digital Divide
Recognizing the uneven diffusion of ICTs among countries, many academic researchers began to study the determining or causing factors to explain the global digital divide. However, as Guillén and Suárez (2005) pointed out, “in spite of the growing acceptance of the existence of a global digital divide, there is no agreement in the literature as to its causes” (p.682). Additionally, most of the empirical research on the
(2001) such as 1) General policy vision, and policies on the ICT environment; 2) Network infrastructure; 3) Technology development; 4) Technology diffusion; 5) Diffusion to businesses; 6) IT skills, education and training initiatives; 7) Globalization and international cooperation. Indeed, UNCTAD (2005) admittedly mentioned that these policy measures borrowed from the OECD Information Technology Outlook (2002). 26 determinants of the global digital divide has shown quite a wide range in terms of theoretical framework, methodological procedure, and the number of countries or regions examined. Therefore, this section first reviewed some noteworthy global digital divide research in terms of theoretical framework and variables chosen. Then, it summarized the main findings in the literature to review the determinants of the global digital divide.
Hargittai (1999) examined the impacts of economic indicators, human capital, institutional legal environment, and existing technological infrastructure on the differences in Internet connectivity measured by the number of Internet hosts per 10,000 inhabitants among 18 OECD countries. Four explanatory factors contained seven sub- variables: 1) economic indicators, consisting of economic wealth measured by GDP per capita and a country’s level of economic inequality measured by the Gini coefficient; 2) human capital, consisting of education measured by combined first-, second-, and third- level gross enrollment ratio and English language proficiency measured by Native speakers, high, and low English exposure from the information of percentage of students in general secondary education learning English as a foreign language; 3) legal institutional environment, comprising pricing measured by the average cost of a twenty hour monthly Internet access and telecommunications policy measured by a dichotomous variable distinguishing between countries that have monopolies in the telecommunications sector and those that have some level of competition; 4) existing telecommunications infrastructure, measured by telephone density of both telephone mainlines per 100 inhabitants and cellular phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants.
Norris’ study (2001) was one of the global digital divide studies that covered a large number of countries. It included 179 nation states worldwide amounting to 5.77 27 billion people in total. Drawing on the conceptual framework of the Internet Engagement
Model, Norris distinguished three hierarchical levels of analysis: 1) the macro-level, which “determines the availability and social distribution of Internet access within each country” such as socioeconomic development, technological diffusion, and democratization; 2) the meso-level, which is “the context of political institutions which provides the structure of opportunities mediating between citizens and the state including parties, parliaments, government departments, interest groups, new social movements and the news media; and 3) the micro-level, which is “individual resources and motivation affecting patterns of online civic engagement” (p.37).
U.S. and the European Union (EU), the series of American surveys by the Pew Center for the People and the Press data, the biannual series of Eurobarometer surveys, and the government website data by the CyPRG group database, Norris compared “the national context of Internet access in 179 countries, as well as the virtual political system within these nations, and then explores patterns of online civic engagement among individual citizens in Western Europe and the United States” (p.14).
Internet diffusion to explain inter-country differences in Internet Usage Rates (IURs) across 105 countries. They hypothesized that IURs, measured by the number of Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants, is a function of per capita income (GNPP), infrastructure, and non-economic factors. In this model, infrastructure was measured by the number of residential telephones per 1,000 people and the number of computers (PCs) per 1,000 people. For non-economic factors, Freedom House’s index of the level of civil liberties in 28 a country was employed, which is based on a 14-item Civil Liberties Checklist: covering freedom of expression and belief; freedom of association and organizational rights; rule of law and human rights; and personal autonomy and economic rights, etc.11
Bagchi’s study (2005) showed a somewhat interesting perspective in investigating the factors contributing to the problem of the digital divide in the global community.
Unlike most other digital divide research in which the outcome variable is usually calculated as some numbers of technological penetrations such as Internet hosts, Internet users, or mobile subscribers, Bagchi measured the digital divide as the difference in value of the IT Index between the U.S. as the base nation and another nation, named “the digital distance.” The IT Index is calculated from the usage of telephones, cell phones, personal computers, and the Internet per 1,000 people.
Then, Bagchi analyzed the impacts of four factors on the digital distance in 63 nations consisting of 30 OECD countries, and 33 countries in the Latin American and the
Caribbean region: 1) economic indicators measured by GDP per capita, Inflation Rate, and IT expenditure as a percentage of GDP; 2) social indicators measured by average
Gini index for income equality, average of secondary school enrollment for education, illiteracy rate, average trust index for interpersonal trust, and percentage of rural population for urbanization level; 3) ethno-linguistic indicator measured by ethnicity index ; and 4) infrastructure indicator measured by the number of television sets per
1,000 people for electrification level.
11 . Originally, the scores of Freedom Houses’ Index assigned to each nation range from 1 to 7, with the rating of 1 referring to ‘Free’ country and the rating of 7 denoting ‘Not Free’ country. However, Beilock and Dimitrova used two binary variables: FREEHIGH equaling 1 if the score equals 1 or 2 and zero otherwise, and FREELOW equaling 1 if the score equals 6 or 7 and zero otherwise (p.243). 29 economic, regulatory, and sociopolitical characteristics of countries and their evolution over time” (p.681), Guillén and Suárez (2005) investigated how Internet use could increase with the impact of a nation’s world-system status, policies in the telecommunications sector, democracy, and cosmopolitanism across 118 countries.
They measured a nation’s world-system status using information of imports, exports, arms trade, troop deployment, and diplomatic ties in each country, resulting in two dummy variables: ‘core’ (15 countries) and ‘semi-periphery’ (22 countries), and with all the other ‘semi-periphery’ countries as the omitted category. For the variable of policies in the telecommunications sector, they used two time-varying dummy variables:
1) whether the incumbent telephone company is fully privatized, majority privatized, minority privatized, or fully state-owned; 2) whether there is competition in local telephone service. Democracy was measured by three elements using the 10-point scale in the Policy IV database: 1) institutions to enable the people to express its political preference; 2) checks and balances on the executive’s power; and 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Lastly, the degree of cosmopolitanism was approximated by the expenditure on tourism abroad by residents of the country as a percentage of GDP (pp.690-691).
It is unique that Guillén and Suárez controlled for the effects of five variables, which have been commonly found to affect access to and use of new ICTs. The controlled variables are GDP per capita as a measure of economic development and purchasing power, the number of telephone lines in operation per 100 people as a measure of the development of the telecommunications infrastructure, the price in U.S. dollars of a three-minute local call during peak hour as a measure of the cost of Internet 30 access, percentage of the adult literacy population as a measure of education, and lastly a time trend (p.691). 12
As reviewed in the selected five studies above, various variables have been used to explain the problem of the global digital divide. Nevertheless, these explanatory variables can be categorized into three factors: 1) economic factor such as economic wealth, cost of access or use, and economic inequality; 2) telecommunications policy factor such as the level of competition, privatization, and liberalization; 3) non-economic factor such as socioeconomic stratification, education, nation’s status in world system, social openness, and value system. Based on these three factors, this dissertation reviewed some main findings from the previous research.
Much research has found that the different level of economic factors such as GDP per capita, GNP per capita, or Internet access cost was the most common factor among the determinants of ICTs diffusion at a country level (Bagchi, 2005; Beilock &
Dimitrova, 2003; Chinn & Fairlie, 2004; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Hargittai, 1999;
Hawkins & Hawkins, 2003; Norris, 2001). Hargittai (1999) found that “general economic strength [measured by GDP per capita ] does matter in predicting Internet connectivity”
(p.714) even among the richest countries in OECD. Bagchi (2005) also found that
“GDP’s influence is uniformly significant in both OECD and the Latin American and the
Caribbean nations” (p.61). In a broader perspective, Norris (2001) confirmed that “the root cause of unequal global diffusion of digital technologies is lack of economic
12 . There is no doubt that there have been far more different theoretical and methodological approaches in investigating the determinants of the global digital divide other than the five mentioned above. However, it is almost impossible to review all of them and it will be beyond the scope of this study because this dissertation does not aim to elaborate the previous theoretical frameworks and methodological procedures nor propose a better one, but to explore the current discourse of the global digital divide. Therefore, it will be sufficient to review the most common factors and variables examined in some empirical global digital divide research at this point. 31 development [measured by GDP per capita and R&D spending ], the same as the reasons for the uneven spread of old mass media like radio and television” (p.233).
Even though Beilock and Dimitrova (2003) acknowledged the relationship between Internet usage rates (IURs) measured by Internet users per capita and income variable measured by GNP per capita was non-linear, “with income differences having greater impacts on IUR at lower than higher levels” (p.237), they even estimated that “an additional person obtains Internet access for every $11 increase in GNP per capita”
(p.244). Additionally, Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that “Internet access cost as well as GDP per capita explain best the observed growth in computer hosts per capita” in a sample of the OECD countries.
“knowledge gap” (Tichenor, Donohue, & Olien, 1970), which posited those of a higher socioeconomic status use the mass media at a higher rate, and thus the gap between the higher and the lower increases over time. In this sense, Norris (2001) was concerned that
“access to digital technologies is likely to reinforce the economic growth and productivity of richer nations while leaving the poorest ones farther behind” (p.234).
The second factor frequently replicated in global digital divide research is the policy environment in the telecommunications sector within a country such as the regulatory mechanism, privatization, competition, and liberalization. Many empirical studies revealed that privatization and competition could lead to performance improvements in the telecommunications sector (Chinn & Fairlie 2004; Guillén &
Suárez, 2005; Hargittai, 1999; Hawkins & Hawkins, 2003; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002).
Hargittai (1999) found that the competitive environment in the 32 telecommunications sector is “not only related to directly making Internet services available to users through encouraging affordable pricing, but it also contributes to the development of the necessary telecommunications infrastructure of a country, which in turn facilitates connectivity” (p.712).
Focusing on 19 countries in Latin America, Hawkins and Hawkins (2003) also found that liberalization of the telecommunications market and the reduction of dial-up charges in tariffs were associated with an increase in Internet users. And they estimated that “liberalizing the market, or increasing competition, is associated with an expected annual change in Internet users by about 1.5 users per 1,000 people, and the changes in tariffs would be associated with increasing the change of Internet users by about 13 users per 1,000 people” (p.653). Guillén and Suárez (2005) also estimated that “full privatization (compared to full state ownership) increases [the Internet ] users by 11 percent, and competition in telephone services by 16 percent” (p.696).
Chinn and Fairlie (2004) even suggested that “nearly one-third of the Internet penetration rate gap would be closed if countries in the Middle East and North Africa had similar regulatory quality as the United States” (p.23). However, in contrast with the above findings, Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) argued that “competition in telecommunications markets does not seem to exert any independent influence on
Internet penetration.” Further they added that “the deregulation of the telecommunications sector improves Internet connectivity only if it lowers the access cost. There is in fact no intuitive reason to expect competition to matter irrespective of its impact through market prices” (p.309).
Some empirical economic research, even though these studies were originally 33 focusing on the performance of telecommunication industry rather than the global digital divide, emphasized that a more competitive, privatized, and liberalized policy environment in the telecommunication industry would be favorable to the diffusion of
ICTs and the reduction of price of all the telecommunications services (Bortolotti,
In a study of the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 African and Latin American countries from 1984 through 1997, Wallsten (2001) verified that “competition is associated with increased mainline penetration, payphones, connection capacity, and lower prices for local calls.
However, he also found that “privatization by itself is associated with few benefits.
Privatization combined with an independent regulator, however, is associated with increased payphone penetration, connection capacity and increased labor efficiency as measured by employees per mainline” (pp.12-13).
Nicoletti (2001) confirmed that “increasing product market competition, approximated by the share of new entrants or by the number of competitors, bring about productivity and quality improvements and reduced the price of all the telecommunications services, controlling for the influence of technological developments” (p.134). However, they also cautioned that “in some cases, privatization appeared to be associated with relatively low productivity” (p.134).
Similar findings can be seen in a study by Bortolotti et al (2002), which examined the performance of 31 national telecommunication companies in 25 countries between 34
1981 and 1998. Even though this study verified that “privatization is significantly related to higher profitability, output and efficiency, and with significant declines in leverage” but it also found that “competition significantly reduces profitability, employment and, surprisingly, efficiency after privatization while creation of an independent regulatory agency significantly increases output” (p.266).
The third common determinant factor in explaining the global digital divide is various non-economic variables such as socioeconomic stratification, education, nation’s status in world system, social openness, and value system. Norris (2001) stated that “the heart of the problem of the social divide in Internet access lies in broader patterns of socioeconomic stratification that influence the distribution of household consumer durables and participation in other common forms of information and communication technologies, as well as in the digital world” (p.234). For an example of socioeconomic stratification, Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that even though investment in education did not have explanatory power in the diffusion of the Internet in the OECD sample, for a larger sample of both industrial and developing countries, “investment in university education seems to matter more for Internet connectivity than the average years of schooling” (p.309).
“core and semi-periphery countries have significantly more Internet users than peripheral countries” (p.692) and “one percent increase in cosmopolitanism as measured by tourism expenditures abroad results in a .08 percent increase in Internet users” (p.696). From a society level, Wilson and Rodriguez (2000) have shown that “advances in ICTs like
Internet are most associated with a climate of democratic rights and civil liberties that is 35 conducive to innovation and adaptation of ICTs, respect for the rule of law and security of property rights, investment in human capital, and low levels of government distortions” (n.d.). As well, Beilock and Dimitrova (2003) found that “the openness of a society as measured by the breadth and qualities of civil liberties enjoyed by its people is an important determinant” and they also showed that “controlling for both income and infrastructure, there are significant differences in IUR across 16 European nations associated with religious affiliations” (p.247).
Using data of 47 countries from the World Values Survey, Volken (2002) found that both institutional trust in systems (trust in objective institutional factors such as freedom of the press, absence of corruption, political and civil right, rule of law, economic freedom and the historical experience of democracy and the absence of autocratic rule) and interpersonal generalized trust (trust in subjective perception of other’s ethos of cooperation, tolerance and freedom) substantially account for the differences in the diffusion of ICT not only between the transformation societies, but between developed societies as well.
In summary, many international organizations and individual researchers have examined the trends and various determinant factors of the uneven diffusion of ICTs across countries. A wide range of determinant factors have been found as the following:
1) a country’s economic wealth such as GDP per capita and GNP per capita; 2) institutional environments in the telecommunications sector such as the level of competition, privatization, and liberalization; 3) various non-economic factors such as socioeconomic stratification, education, nation’s status in the world system, social openness, and value system. 36
Following this multifaceted perspective, several policy recommendations have been proposed to encourage the development, diffusion and use of ICTs, and to address the global digital divide within and across countries. The “Plan of Action” declared by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 comprehensively included the future vision and target strategies to realize the potential of ICTs, and thus to attain the overall objectives of the information society as in the following table.
Eleven Action Lines in WSIS Plan of Action (2003) (pp.2-11) The role of governments and all stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development : Action 1 The effective participation of governments and all stakeholders is vital in developing the Information Society requiring cooperation and partnerships among all of them. Information and communication infrastructure: an essential foundation for the Information Society : Infrastructure is central in achieving the goal of digital inclusion, enabling Action 2 universal, sustainable, ubiquitous and affordable access to ICTs by all, taking into account relevant solutions already in place in developing countries and countries with economies in transition, to provide sustainable connectivity and access to remote and marginalized areas at national and regional levels. Access to information and knowledge : Action 3 ICTs allow people, anywhere in the world, to access information and knowledge almost instantaneously. Individuals, organizations and communities should benefit from access to knowledge and information. Capacity building : Everyone should have the necessary skills to benefit fully from the Information Society. Therefore capacity building and ICT literacy are essential. ICTs can Action 4 contribute to achieving universal education worldwide, through delivery of education and training of teachers, and offering improved conditions for lifelong learning, encompassing people that are outside the formal education process, and improving professional skills. Action 5 Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs: Confidence and security are among the main pillars of the Information Society. Enabling environment : Action 6 To maximize the social, economic and environmental benefits of the Information Society, governments need to create a trustworthy, transparent and non- discriminatory legal, regulatory and policy environment. ICT applications: benefits in all aspects of life : Action 7 ICT applications can support sustainable development, in the fields of public administration, business, education and training, health, employment, environment, agriculture and science within the framework of national e-strategies. 37
Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local conten t: Cultural and linguistic diversity, while stimulating respect for cultural identity, Action 8 traditions and religions, is essential to the development of an Information Society based on the dialogue among cultures and regional and international cooperation. It is an important factor for sustainable development. Media : The media—in their various forms and with a diversity of ownership—as an actor, Action 9 have an essential role in the development of the Information Society and are recognized as an important contributor to freedom of expression and plurality of information. Ethical dimensions of the Information Society : Action 10 The Information Society should be subject to universally held values and promote the common good and to prevent abusive uses of ICTs. International and regional cooperation : Action 11 International cooperation among all stakeholders is vital in implementation of this plan of action and needs to be strengthened with a view to promoting universal access and bridging the digital divide by provision of means of implementation.
2.3. Alternative Thoughts on the Global Digital Divide
Despite much evidence of positive relationship between ICTs capacities and development in many policy reports and empirical research, there have been widespread concerns that the explosive growth of ICTs can only exacerbate the existing inequalities between the developed and the less-developed countries as well as information rich and poor. Some critics argued that public policies that are supportive of ICTs development might reinforce, rather than alleviate, structural inequalities within and across national borders. Henceforth, poor regions or countries can become increasingly far more marginalized (McChesney, Wood, & Foster, 1998; Mattelart, 2003; Schiller, 1999).
From such a critical viewpoint, many theorists and researchers began to direct their attention to the discourse of the global digital divide itself, arguing that the discourse can do more harm than good by replicating the predominant discourse of the
Western-led technocratic development and by marginalizing the technology have-nots in its own (Burkett, 2000; Luyt, 2004; Selwyn, 2004; Thompson, 2004; Wilson 2003). 38
This attention to the discourse of the global digital divide is influenced from post- positivist perspective in the field of policy analysis. The post-positivist perspective views the policy making process as “argumentative” process, in which subjective argumentations construct a certain policy situation in particular ways, making certain definitions and conceptualizations of policy problems, policy means, and policy solutions acceptable and desirable. Therefore, the next section briefly reviews the theoretical assumption of the so-called “Argumentative Turn” in the policy analysis, as opposed to the positivist perspective of policy analysis.
2.3.1. Competing Paradigms of Policy Analysis
2.3.1.1. Positivist Policy Analysis as Technocratic Discourse
Traditionally, mainstream policy science has been influenced from the positivist perspective. According to the positivist perspective, scientific knowledge can be obtained only through the principle of empirical falsification verified by objective hypothesis testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations (Popper, 1959). This perspective also emphasizes the scientific research procedures such as “empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data gathering procedures, the measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive power” (Fischer, 1998, p.130). In the field of policy analysis, the positivist approach aims to identify policy problems, explain the cause of the problems, and to recommend effective policy solutions to the problems through a collection of empirical-analytic techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, multiple regression analysis, survey research, or input-output models.
Positivist policy science takes the shape of technocratic discourse. In a classical 39 political term, technocracy refers to “a system of governance in which technically trained experts rule by virtue of their specialized knowledge and position in dominant political and economic institutions” (Fischer, 1990, p.17). Logically, technocratic discourse can be defined as “discursive strategy by way of which technocrats transform their expert knowledge into discourse of social policy” (Lemke, 1995, p.58).
In fact, the technocratic vision in policy science was originated mostly by the writings of Harold Lasswell in the 1940s. He envisioned the creation of a multidisciplinary policy science, including a diverse range of scientific approaches from the social sciences such as economics, politics, and anthropology to the application of methods from the physical sciences, mathematics, and statistics (Fischer, 1995, p.4; 2003, pp.2-3). Lasswell’s notion of a multidisciplinary approach to policy science had the goal of creating an overarching policy science, “directed towards knowledge to improve the practice of democracy” (Lasswell, 1951, p.15). He believed that his project for the new policy science could identify societal problems objectively, provide relevant policy solutions, and fundamentally assist in facilitating the development of democratic government, with the help of trained policy experts capable of bringing the necessary knowledge to the decision-making table (Fischer, 2003, p.3).
The 1960s witnessed policy science as technocratic discourse steadily become a recognizable feature of public policy in the U.S. Confronted with emerging but serious domestic societal problems such as poverty, racial discrimination, health care, housing, education, and social welfare, the U.S. government was required to take corrective but quick political actions to alleviate those problems. In this situation, policy technocrats trained from diverse scientific backgrounds were expected to measure the extent of the 40 problems, to find the reasonable causes of the problems, to devise relevant policy solutions (Fischer, 2003, p.6).
Fischer (1995) summarized the characteristics of positivist policy analysis as technocratic discourse as the following: 1) identify the existence of a problem empirically; 2) formulate the goals and objective that leads to an optimal solution; 3) determine the relevant consequences and probabilities of alternative means to the solution; 4) assign a value, that is, a numerical cost or benefit, to each consequence; and
5) combine the information about consequences, probabilities, cost and benefits, and select the most effective and efficient alternative (pp.10-11).
2.3.1.2. Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis: Policy Discourse as Politics of Meaning
The 1980s saw the emergence of the post-positivist perspective in policy science.
The critique of the post-positivist perspective against the mainstream of policy science was not only about its methodological aspect but also about the fundamental positivist principle, which mandates a rigorous separation of facts and values, that is the principle of “the fact-value dichotomy” or “value-neutral orientation” (Fischer, 1998, p.131). This new perspective argued that the attempt to separate facts and values has facilitated a technocratic discourse in the policy sciences, which emphasized the efficiency and effectiveness of policy means to disguise politically established ends. Put another way, it claimed that mainstream policy science has ignored the fact that the policy process is value-laden and normative because of its objectivism (Throgmorton, 1993).
The post-positivist policy inquiry regarded the process of policy-making as
“policy discourse,” which is defined as “the communicative interactions among political actors that translate problems into policy issues” (Fischer, 2003, p.30). Therefore, several 41 post-positivist policy theorists have paid attention to the concepts of social values and meanings, discourse, interpretation, argumentation, or narrative to explicate the subjective nature of the policy-making process (Dunn, 2004; Fischer, 1995, 2003; Fisher
& Forester, 1993; Hawkesworth, 1988; Majone, 1989; Schon, 1979; Schon & Rein, 1994;
Stone, 1989, 2002; Throgmorton, 1993).
According to these scholars, the process of policy-making is aimed at subjectively constructing a certain policy situation in particular ways, making certain definitions and conceptualizations of policy problems, measures, and solutions acceptable and desirable.
This new insight, the so-called “argumentative turn” or “politics of meaning” in policy analysis, opposed the problem solving approach of the objective of mainstream policy science. Instead, it emphasized the role of discourse and argumentation in policy analysis.
In his introduction to Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process , Majone
(1989) emphasized the importance of discourse in policy analysis when he stated that:
As politicians know only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language. Whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process… Political parties, the electorate, the legislature, the executive, the courts, the media, interest groups, and independent experts all engage in a continuous process of debate and reciprocal persuasion. (p. 1)
Attention to the aspects of discourse and argumentation in the policy-making process enables us to view policy formation as the result of power struggles among stakeholders rather than as that of value-free or objective science. As Stone (2002) pointed out, “policy-making is a constant discursive struggle over the criteria of social classification, the boundaries of problem categories, and the definitions of ideas that 42 guide the ways people behave” (p.11). In this sense, policy analysis as technocratic discourse is “not neutral or value-free in nature, rather they embody the political and economic interests of a particular group involved” (Lemke, 1995, p.58).
Schon (1979) explained that policy problems are constructed “out of the vague and indeterminate reality and things are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation” (p. 264). The struggles over the definition of policy problems in the policy-making process are “symbolic contests over the social meaning of an issue domain in which meaning implies not only what is at issue but what is to be done” (Schon & Rein, 1994, p. 29).
In short, the argumentative turn in policy analysis is concerned with 1) the role of persuasion and argumentation in policy formation, 2) the value-laden definition of social and policy problem, 3) the recognition of participants and participation in policy-making process, and 4) the rationale and the conditions under which policy analysis is undertaken
(Richter, 1997, pp.6-8).
2.3.2. Attention to Discourse of New ICTs Development and the Global Digital Divide
Influenced from the post-positivist perspective, some critics began to investigate the policy discourse of new ICTs development or the global digital divide. These critiques focused on challenging the Western-oriented development model within the discourse of the new ICTs and the global digital divide.
In this line of thought, Burkett (2000) argued that there were five key erroneous assumptions within the discourse of inequality in the current globalizing informational economies: 1) “give the poor a computer and they will move from being information poor 43 to information rich”; 2) “information inequality is a North-South issue”; 3) “access to more information enriches people’s lives”; 4) “the information society will be more democratic and participatory”; and 5) “given enough information, we can solve the world’s problems can be solved” (p.680).
According to Burkett, these assumptions that prioritize access to ICTs and the quantity of information not only disregard “the prerequisites of access, including both infrastructure and socio-political structures which are necessary to support not only the initial connection to ICTs but the ongoing maintenance and improvement of such connections” (p.683), but also simply identifies “the information which is stored, distributed and retrieved through ICTs” with higher human knowledge and wisdom
(p.688). She also contended that the inequality of information should not be interpreted as the traditional “North-South divisions” (p.684), but should be recognized much more complex beyond this divide domestically and internationally. Finally, she concluded that
“the recent global inequality is a complex matter which cannot be addressed by deferring to the technocratic and simplistic platitudes often promoted in literature” (p.692).
Through a discourse analysis of 101 documents by seven major international organizations (Global Knowledge Partnership, International Development Research
Centre (IDRC), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), UNESCO, United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), USAID, and World Bank), Wilson (2003) sought to understand the assumptions underlying the international public ICT and development discourse and the implications of these assumptions for policy makers and development practitioners.
According to Wilson, the generally accepted model of ICT and development was 44 basically premised on “the dichotomy that is set up between the developed and underdeveloped, the information-haves and have-nots, and the modern and traditional”
(n.d.). She argued that this dichotomy categorized the developing countries as
“information poor” and fit them into a model of ICT development based on “catch-up, leapfrogging, and progress to the ideal represented by the developed countries” (n.d.).
She also maintained that the Western-oriented development model established on the dichotomy, reduced the issues of national development into a technological dimension, and thus allowed “the complex political [and economic ] factors influencing poverty and inequality at local, national, and international levels to be hidden, or at least to go unquestioned” (n.d.).
With an attention-grabbing title of Who benefits from the digital divide? , Luyt
(2004) argued that the promotion of the global digital divide as a policy issue would benefit the following four major groups: 1) “information capital”; 2) “governments and elites in the South”; 3) “international development agencies”; and 4) “global civil society.”
According to Luyt, each of these four groups had their own interests in the promotion of the digital divide issue. To begin with, information capital in the developed countries could acquire a new market for selling its new ICTs products and services, and for exporting its advanced technological system with high skills and knowledge into the developing and the less-developed countries. Secondly, the business elites in the South could have the opportunity for accumulating capital, actively involving in the global economic structure. The governments in the South also could secure their political hegemony over the population under the name of economic development. Thirdly, the 45 development agencies such as the World Bank, the UNDP, the UNSECO, or the ITU could find a new project through which these institutions believed they could provide their expertise. Lastly, global civil society, commonly known as non-government organizations, saw the new ICTs as a useful tool for organizing and communicating their messages to the world.
Thompson (2004) analyzed a speech delivered by the President of the World
Bank in 2000 at Cambridge University, entitled New Possibilities in Information
Technology and Knowledge for Development in a Global Economy , to show that the discourse of ICT development by the World Bank replicated its position of strength within the predominant technocratic discourse of development. According to Thompson, the following six discursive components were employed to highlight the World-Bank led
ICT development discourse: 1) technocratic expertise; 2) poverty as undisputable need for such expertise; 3) assumption of ICT as a neutral force in development; 4) display of expertise in the corporate terms; 5) technological optimism; and 6) pragmatic use of ICT, ensuring results. From the findings, he concluded that these components as a set of relations were served to normalize the Western-oriented conception of ICT development discourse.
Such thought-provoking arguments provide a very critical perspective to understanding the discourse of the global digital divide in two ways. First, it suggests a possibility that the discourse of the global digital divide might be constructed or controlled by some power groups who have political, economic, and discursive resources.
In other words, these groups can incorporate their preferred interests and values such as economic neo-liberalism in creating and executing of a certain public policy through 46 various discursive strategies. Second, in an international context, the discourse of new
ICTs and the global digital divide can be interpreted as a reproduction of the past discourse of technology and development such as the modernistic view of technological development.
Therefore, discourse analysis can be a useful lens through which to view the underlying forces in public policies just beyond stated policy goals and action plans, which are developed for public consumption. This is the rationale for this dissertation to choose discourse analysis to investigate the discourse of the global digital divide. The next chapter addresses the theoretical and analytical frameworks of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a form of discourse analysis. 47
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This dissertation utilizes the critical discourse analysis (CDA) methodology in its investigation of the discourse of the global digital divide. CDA is not only a theoretical framework that explores the relationship between language use as discourse and unequal power relations, but also is an analytical method that analyzes diverse linguistic features and discursive strategies by which a certain ideological bias is exercised in texts.
Therefore, this chapter first addresses the theoretical framework as well as the analytical procedures of CDA. Then, it explains the methods of both contextual and textual analysis to answer the two research questions: 1) what are the historical contexts that have shaped and promoted the discourse of the global digital divide?; and 2) how does the discourse of the global digital divide construct the discourse of technology and development? In addition, it overviews the selected text and explains the rationales for the choice of the text.
3.1. Theoretical Frameworks of Critical Discourse Analysis
3.1.1. Emergence of Critical Approach to Language Study
The late 1970s saw the emergence of a critical approach to the study of language developed by a group of linguists and literary theorists such as Gunther Kress, Robert
Hodge, Roger Fowler, and Tony Trew in Britain. This new critical perspective to language study reflected the growing critiques of the mainstream linguistics dominated 48 by the Chomskyan paradigm around the 1970s. The so-called critical linguistics (CL) maintained that the mainstream linguistic theory presupposed “two prevalent and related dualisms” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p.186).
Challenging the first dualism that “meaning can be separated from style or expression,” CL argued on the contrary that “lexical items, linguistic forms and linguistic processes carry specific meanings” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p.186). CL believed that selections of linguistic options were systematically and coherently exercised in a discourse in order to realize a certain meaning.
While the first dualism is more about the semantic relationship between linguistic features and realized meanings, the second dualism, “a fundamental distinction between the structures provided by the grammar of a language and the ways in which these are deployed in actual instances of linguistic communication” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p.187), is more related to the relationship between language and society. According to
CL, this second dualism posited that the grammar of a specific language as “a set of formal constructs or a system of rules for generating structures” exists without any reference to social needs. Therefore, the main issue of the mainstream linguistics was to analyze the formal, universal and context-free grammatical structure rather than to study social use or social meaning of language carried out in a certain social context or needs
(Fowler & Kress, 1979, p.187).
Opposing to the dualisms embedded in the Chomskyan linguistics, CL put more emphasis on the social aspect of a language, emphasizing that language must be the product of social structure. Therefore, it argued that the main concern of linguistics should be to investigate the social, economic, and political factors that influence the 49 selection, use, and meaning of language based on the belief that “the language that people have access to depends on their positions in the social system” (Fairclough, 1992, p.26).
In addition, CL also criticized sociolinguistics for merely establishing the correlations between language and society rather than looking for the deeper causal relations in which
“language serves to confirm and consolidate the organizations which shape it, being used to maintain the power of state agencies, corporations and other organizations” (Fowler &
Kress, 1979, p.190).
From such a critical perspective, CL aimed at “recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse by analyzing the linguistic structures in the light of their interactional and wider social contexts” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p.196). Further, critical linguistics discussed “how ideology and ideological processes are manifested as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes” (Trew, 1979, p.155).
Influenced from the theoretical foundation of critical linguistics, Fairclough’s first edition of Language and Power (1989) became the landmark publication for the start of
“critical discourse analysis” (CDA). Founded on the idea that there is unequal access to linguistic and social resources that are controlled institutionally, Fairclough described the objective of CDA as “a contribution to the general raising of consciousness of exploitative social relations, through focusing upon language” (1989, p. 4). Further, he argued that “language connects with the social through being the primary domain of ideology, and through being both a site of, and a stake in, struggles for power” (1989, p.15).
In terms of theoretical orientation, the CDA approach draws on diverse critical social theories ranged from Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, and Pierre Bourdieu in 50 order to examine ideologies and power relations involved in discourse. As well, in terms of analytic method, Fairclough (1995) noted that systemic functional linguistics is a congenial theory for CDA because it is multifunctional, well adapted for textual analysis and concerned with relating language to social context (pp.6-10). One of the real strengths of systemic functional linguistics in the context of CDA works is its ability to ground concerns with power and ideology systematically and consistently through the detailed analytic devices such as transitivity, agency, nominalization, mood, metaphor, and register etc. as they unfold clauses by clauses in the real contexts of language use
(Martin, 2000, p.275).
In this sense, the goal of CDA is to explore the relationship between power and language, and the link between language use and unequal relations of power, which projects one’s practices as universal and common sense exercised in discourse.
Consequently, “critical discourse analysts take an explicit socio-political stance” (Van
Dijk, 1993, p.252), which focuses on the role of discourse in the reproduction and challenge of dominance, and one of the aims of CDA is “to demystify discourses by deciphering ideologies” (Weiss & Wodak, 2003, p.14).
In short, CDA can be defined as an interdisciplinary approach to the study of language or texts, focusing on the discursive dimensions of the enactment of power and domination by societal institutions and elites (Fairclough, 1989; van Dijk, 1990, pp.150-
154). Rather than the narrow concept of textual analysis, however, CDA can generally be described as hyper-linguistic or supra-linguistic in that practitioners who use CDA consider the larger discourse context or the meaning that lies beyond the grammatical structure. Therefore, CDA is foremost interested in the social functions of language, or 51 language use in social relationship not just in language itself, and CDA “follows from a hermeneutic perspective whereby there is movement back and forth between the text and the power relations inherent in the linguist practices” (Levy, 2002, p.70).
3.1.2. Language as Discourse, Power, Ideology, and Hegemony
In CDA, language is considered to be “an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life” (Fairclough, 2003, p.2).
Therefore, CDA starts from the premise that language use as a form of social practice is socially determined (Fairclough, 1989, p.20; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p.258). The concept of language use as social practice in CDA is primarily influenced from
Foucault’s concept of discourse.
To begin with, in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Foucault referred to discourse as “the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (p.80). In his notion of discourse, the term “statement” has a quite different meaning from the way in which linguists and logicians usually use it. It is not the usual translation of French énoncés, which “imply only assertions as opposed to questions, orders, threats, and so forth” (Fairclough, 1992, p.40), nor is it “the same kind of unit as the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act” (Foucault, 1972, p.86).
For Foucault (1972), statement is “a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space” (pp.86-87) or “the modality of existence proper to that group of signs”
(p.107). That is, the modality allows statement “to be in relation with a domain of 52 objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality” (p.107). In other words, Foucault’s concept of discourse as a group of statements with the modality of existence underlined the aspect of “discursive formation” rather than a rhetorical or formal unity.
As “a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function” (p.117), the discursive formation becomes “the principle of dispersion and redistribution of statements” (p.107). Through the practice of discursive formation, a certain discourse redefined as “the group of statements that belong to a single system of formation” (p.108) attains not only a particular historical context but also a specific boundary of domain.
From Foucault’s earlier notion of discourse in The Archaeology of Knowledge,
CDA incorporated two major theoretical insights.
The first is a constitutive view of discourse, which involves seeing discourse as actively constituting or constructing society on various dimensions: discourse constitutes the objects of knowledge, social subjects and forms of self, social relationships, and conceptual frameworks. The second is an emphasis on the interdependency of the discourse practices of a society or institution: text always draw upon and transform other contemporary and historically prior texts, and any given type of discourse practice is generated out of combinations of others, and is defined by its relationship to others (Fairclough, 1992, pp.39-40).
As Fairclough (1992) pertinently pointed out, discourse analysis is “not to be equated with linguistic analysis, nor discourse with language” Rather, discourse analysis 53 is “concerned not with specifying what sentences are possible or ‘grammatical’, but with specifying socio-historically variable ‘discursive formulations’, which is systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but not others to occur at particular times, places, and institutional locations” (p.40). Further, the task of CDA is not just to analyze textual, linguistic, or discursive meanings within a text, but to critically investigate the historical context in which social inequality is expressed, constituted, legitimized by language use, or in discourse.
To get at this goal, however, the concept of discourse needs to be expanded into the notion of power through which a certain discourse becomes legitimate or disregarded.
This critical perspective of CDA is also inspired from the concept of power and discourse mostly by Foucault. Foucault understood discourses as “a conceptual terrain in which knowledge is formed and produced … and their effect is to make it virtually impossible to think outside them” (p.48). This short sentence from in The Orders of Discourse
(1981) well captured the gist of the relationship between power and discourse in very plain words.
As Davidson (1986) clearly pointed out this view of discourse underlined the mutual relations between systems of truth (or knowledge or discourse) and modalities of power (p.224). Foucault himself explained as well his shift of focus on discourse from truth (or discourse) as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements,” to truth (or discourse) as
“something linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it” (Rabinow, 1984, p.74).
This shift in concept of discourse from archaeology to genealogy added the nature of 54 power as necessary into the heart of discursive practices and processes, at the same time it maintained the function of discourse in constituting knowledge and regulating the rules of formation. 13
According to Foucault (1978), power comes from its omnipresence “not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one point to another, at every point” (p.93). Power is everywhere and exists implicitly at every level in all domains of social life. Continuing this line of discussion, Foucault advanced his five propositions of power: 1) “power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations”; 2)
"relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relationships such as economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual relations, but are immanent in the latter”; 3) “power comes from below, and there is no binary and all- encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations”; 4)
“power relations are both intentional and non-subjective, therefore its logic may be perfectly clear and decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them, and few who can be said to have formulated them”; and 5) “where there is power, there is resistance, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (1978, pp.94-95).
Foucault’s view of power enables us to understand that modern power is productive rather than prohibitive in the sense that power does not work negatively by forcefully dominating those who are subject to it, rather it incorporates them. As well, it
13 . Fairclough (1992) commented that this shift to the genealogical concept of discourse represents a somewhat decentering of discourse, or that discourse becomes secondary to systems of power. This modification in status of discourse in relation to power from Foucault’s genealogical thoughts might be the reason for a major contrast, as Fairclough asserted, between textually-oriented discourse analysis of CDA and Foucault’s more abstract approach (p.49). 55 demonstrates that modern power is developed from below in the sense that it operates at the lowest extremities of the social body in everyday social practices such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and the military (Fairclough, 1992, p.50; Fraser, 1989, p.18).
Overall, CDA agrees with this post-structuralist view that “all social practice is embedded in networks of power relations, through micro-techniques of power, or disciplinary power, or discursive practices, at the same time concurs with the view of modern power as invisible, self-regulating, and inevitably subjecting” (Chouliaraki &
Fairclough, 1999, pp.24). Foucault’s picture of modern power as politics of everyday life can be stated more positively in ruling out crude ideology critique, or top-down statism and economism. However, Foucault’s approach to power and knowledge regimes is likely to suspend the categories truth/falsity or truth/ideology, or to refrain from problematizing the normative validity of power and knowledge because Foucault is much more concerned with the processes, procedures, and apparatuses whereby truth, knowledge, beliefs are produced (Fraser, 1989, pp.19-26).
In regards to this issue, CDA maintains that the notion of networks of power relations needs to be complemented with a view of power as domination, which acknowledges the over-determination between internal and external practices, and establishes causal link between institutional social practices and the positions of subjects in the wider social field not to fall into structural determinism, or cultural relativism
(Fraser, 1989, pp.21-22; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p.24).
For the purpose of it, CDA pays its attention to the classical relation between power and ideology. Despite all the critiques about the Marxian idea of ideology as false consciousness or economic determinism, CDA sees ideology as the dominant ideas of 56 dominant powers and also as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations (Wodak, 2001, p.10). Then, CDA faithfully subscribes to what critical linguists initially believed, that “the systems of ideas which constitute ideologies are expressed through language” (Hodge, Kress, & Jones, 1979, p.81). Consequently, “the analysis of language is a necessary part of any attempt to study ideological processes: through language ideologies become observable” (p.81).
However, the perspective of ideology in CDA is much closer to the concept of hegemony, which is the centerpiece of Gramsci’s analysis of the Western capitalism rather than that of Althusser, which focuses on the implicit and unconscious materialization of ideologies in social practices. According to Chuliaraki and Fairclough
(1999), “hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than coercion, involving the naturalization of practices and their social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters of common sense-hence the concept of hegemony emphasizes the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination” (p.24).
Consequently, CDA takes a particular interest in the ways in which language mediates ideology in a variety of social institutions, taking into account the insights that discourse is historically produced and interpreted in specific time and space, and that dominance structures are legitimized by ideologies of powerful groups. According to this view, “dominant structures both stabilize and naturalize conventions, that is, the effects of power and ideology in the production of meaning are obscured and acquire stable and natural forms, they are taken as given” (Wodak, 2001, p.3). Through these venues of theoretical considerations, CDA can complete the chains of logic among language, 57 discourse, power, ideology, and hegemony.
3.1.3. Discourse and Social Context: Orders of Discourse
Language is not powerful or ideological in its own nature. The power of language as ideological or hegemonic practices comes from its constant relationship with social context. The way in which language as discourse interacts with social context can be delineated in two ways. First, language as discourse gains its social meaning and power as the representation of a specific historical context. That is, a specific discursive event is not simply an isolated textual occasion but a complex historical event that embodies a certain social context.
Fairclough (1992) explicated the relationship between discourse and social contexts, taking Thatcher’s political discourse as an example. He interpreted it as a re- articulation of the existing order of political discourse, “which has brought the traditional conservatism and neo-liberalism into a new mix, and has also constituted an unprecedented discourse of political power as a woman leader. According to Fairclough
(1992), this discursive re-articulation materialized “a hegemonic project for the constitution of a new political base and agenda, itself a facet of the wider political project of restructuring the hegemony of the bloc centered on the bourgeoisie in new economic and political conditions” (p.93).
From this line of thought, it is inferred that discourse analysis can be completed with the considerations of a specific historical and social context. In a similar vein, Gee
(1999) distinguished “discourse with little d” and “Discourse with big D,” adding that
“the former (language-in-use) is melded integrally with the latter (language plus other stuff) to enact specific identities and activities” (pp.7, 17). Consequently, for the purpose 58 of this study, which is the discourse of the global digital divide, it will be critically important to investigate the historical context upon which the discourse of the global digital divide is constructed and promoted.
However, this relationship between discourse and social context is somewhat one- way, from the latter directly to the former. Within this framework, a discursive event is no less than the reflection of a certain social context, losing its powerful concept of discursive practice. To solve this problem, CDA sees the relationship between discourse and social context in terms of orders of discourse, a term elaborated by Foucault. In his famous lecture delivered at the Collége de France on December 1970, he addressed that:
We know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of just anything. We have three types of prohibition, covering objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular subject; these prohibitions interrelate, reinforce and complement each other” (1971, p.8).
Influenced from Foucault’s concept of institutional and social constraints of discursive formation, CDA defines “orders of discourse” as “the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular social field” (Chouliaraki &
Fairclough, 1999, p.58). For instance, in the police interrogation discourse, where a police officer and a suspect are involved, each participant has a different degree of access to and control of the variable properties of the discourse, which is conventionally and legally required. It is right here that the second dialectical relationship between discourse and social contexts is situated. What is implied in the notion of orders of discourse is that
“people are enabled through being constrained: they are able to act or think on condition that they do within the constraints of types of discourse” (Fairclough, 1996, p.286; 2001, 59 p.23).
Discourse and social practice are constrained by interdependent networks, which are orders of discourse and social orders. The term social order refers to a structuring of a particular social practice into various types of social practice. In parallel, orders of discourse differ in both discourse types and the way they are structured. The relationship between a certain discourse type and an actual discursive event is quite conventional and thus predictable. Consequently, orders of discourse as the social conditions of discourse and the determination of discourse by social structures embody particular ideologies
(Fairclough, 1989, p.28). Particular ideologies represented through a certain discourse type are critically related to the notion of genre in discourse. Regarding the genre of discourse of this study, the policy discourse of the global digital divide, this study will address the functions and ideologies of technocratic discourse, which is the common genre in policy documents.
3.2. Analytical Framework of Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA uses the term discourse to refer to “the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part” (Fairclough, 1989, p.24). Therefore, CDA not only analyzes linguistic features and discursive meanings within a text, but also critically investigates social or historical context in which social inequality is expressed, constituted, legitimized by language use, or in discourse. For this dual purpose, Fairclough (1989,
1992) suggested a three-dimension analytical framework comprised of “description,”
“interpretation,” and “explanation.”
According to Fairclough (1995), the aim of the three dimensional framework is 60
“to map three separate forms of analysis onto one another: analysis of language texts, analysis of discourse practice, and analysis of discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice” (Fairclough, 1995, p.2). Therefore, this framework should not be confused with the objects of analysis in CDA, which are simply put “text” and “context.”
Instead, the framework should be understood as an analytical structure in which discourse as text and its interaction with the social or historical context is examined.
Description is concerned with linguistic analysis of text, that is, “the stage which is concerned with formal properties of text” (Fairclough, 1989, p.26). In this stage, analysis of discourse as text involves analyzing the meanings of individual words, the use of grammatical components, and some various discursive strategies through which a text represents manifest or latent values of the concerned in the discourse (Fowler, 1985, p.69).
Interpretation is concerned with the dialectical interplay between what is in the text and what the text generates in the interpreter understood through his or her background knowledge (Fairclough, 1989, p141). An interpreter’s background knowledge and ideological beliefs are involved in interpreting a text and a situational context. Otherwise stated, interpretation mediates the description of linguistic analysis with the explanation of social processes. Interpretation is an internal process of critical thinking within an interpreter rather than the object of analysis.
Explanation is an analysis of social processes. It deals basically with social processes in terms of historical context of a discourse, which establish the political, economic, and ideological basis of a discourse. Explanation seeks to unmask supposedly unbiased or impartial discursive strategies that promote the dominant ideas of power 61 groups. Without explanation, interpretation will be only an interpreter’s individual thought. Fairclough (1989) saw explanation as a process of unveiling and demystification of a discourse (p.141). Explanation makes CDA critical beyond simple textual analysis and linguistic criticism, which give little attention to context.
3.3. Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis of the Discourse of the Global Digital Divide
CDA is both textual analysis and contextual analysis. Two research questions in this dissertation, 1) “what are the historical contexts that have shaped and promoted the discourse of the global digital divide?” and 2) “how does the discourse of the global digital divide construct the discourse of technology and development?” are respectively concerned with critically investigating the historical context in which the discourse of the global digital divide is established and promoted, but also with analyzing linguistic features and discursive strategies through which the dominant theme of technology and development is expressed, constituted, legitimized within a text of the global digital divide. The subsequent sections address the detailed methods of both context and text, and introduce the selected text and the rationales for the choice of the text.
3.3.1. Contextual Analysis: Historical Approach
To begin with, this dissertation explored how the discourse of technology and development has been established from the post-World War period to the current age of globalization. This historical approach was employed in order to investigate the continuities in the dominant discourse in which old and new technologies have been capitalized on as an ideological tool as well as material forces for maintaining the 62 capitalist hegemonic power from the post-World War era to date.
Focusing on the history of the United States’ foreign policies on technology and economic development, this dissertation first looked into the political and economic circumstances after World War II upon which the principles of U.S. foreign policies toward the Third World such as the confinement of communism, the creation of overseas markets for U.S. capital and goods, and the integration of the Third World into the international trade system, had been established during the so-called Cold-War period. In such political and economic circumstances after World War II, how the Point-Four program as a technology transfer program and modernization theory as a socio-economic development model served for constructing the discourse of technology and development particularly toward the less-developed areas.
In so doing, this dissertation reveals that the Western-oriented modernistic discourse of technology and development incorporated the less-developed areas into the international trade system, and also marginalized them from the dominant political and economic interests during the post-World War period.
In a corresponding manner, this dissertation pays attention to the decline of U.S. hegemonic power politically and economically in international relations since the 1970s when U.S. foreign policies were shifted toward neo-liberalism. Then, this study explores the wave of neo-liberalism influenced the discourse of technology and development in the 1990s through the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) and the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications in the age of globalization. In so doing, this dissertation reveals the historical continuities of the capitalist strategies on technology and development to create new markets abroad and maintain the existing advantages of the 63 dominant economic power.
In short, this study maintains that the current discourse of the global digital divide is historically situated under the long-standing capitalist power relations as well as under the Western-oriented technological development paradigm.
3.3.2. Selection of Text
This dissertation selected a policy report to analyze the discourse of the global digital divide, From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities: Measuring Infostates for
Development, co-authored by ITU and ORBICOM in 2005. ITU and ORBICOM offered this report as a contribution to the second phase of the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) in 2005, responding to the recommendation of the WSIS in 2003, to
“develop and launch a composite ICT Development (Digital Opportunity) Index” (ITU &
ORBICOM, 2005, p.vii). This report monitors the current status of the global digital divide and implements relevant policy suggestions with the aims of eliminating the global digital divide and of creating digital opportunity, combining quantitative statistical analysis with qualitative regional analysis on the global digital divide.
This policy report consists of eight main chapters and some introductory statements such as executive summary, foreword, and preface. Chapter 1 introduces the conceptual and empirical framework of the Infostate model, which is the main theory and method in measuring and analyzing the global digital divide. Chapter 2 offers the overview of the current global trends of ICTs development, and Chapter 3 analyzes the magnitude of the global digital divide by measuring Infostates of individual economies and regional groupings. Chapter 4 provides an empirical analysis of the impact of 64
Infodensity on economic growth at a national level. Chapter 5 provides detailed regional analyses to explore the reasons for underdevelopment of ICTs, focusing on the areas of
Africa, Asia and Latin American and the Caribbean. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively deal with the issues of the gender digital divide and Free and Open source
Software (FOSS). And lastly, Chapter 8 explains the complete methodology and the technical specifications, together with explanatory notes.
There are four rationales for choosing this ITU-ORBICOM report in this dissertation to investigate the discourse of the global digital divide. First, this dissertation basically believes that policy reports are the most valuable resource to recognize the positions and arguments of certain stakeholders. Further, policy reports, in particular produced by international organizations, are the most important discursive resource to investigate the way in which the discourse of the global digital divide is being constructed, disseminated, and argued.
The second reason is the predominant role of ITU in the world telecommunications sector. The ITU was founded as the International Telegraph Union in
1865, and it is not only the world’s oldest international organization, but also it is the biggest international organization for dealing with global issues in the telecommunications sector as a special agency of the United Nations. It now includes almost all the world’s countries (190 member states) and over 650 private members from the telecommunication, broadcasting and information technology sectors.
As well, ORBICOM was jointly created in 1994 by the Network of UNESCO
Chairs in Communications and the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) from the mandate by UNESCO's New Communications Strategy unanimously adopted at the 1989 65
General Conference, which foresaw that new communications technologies would have a significant impact upon the complex processes shaping economies, the environment, social justice, democracy, and peace (UNESCO, 1989). Therefore, ORBICOM represents a variety of opinions from academics, high level corporate decision makers, policy consultants, and media specialists to figure out a multidisciplinary approach to the promotion of communications and international development.
Third, this report is closely related to the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, which is a series of United Nations-sponsored worldwide meetings about information and communication with a particular focus on its application to development and the global digital divide. This report project was initiated as the response to the recommendation of the WSIS in 2003 and was offered as a contribution to the second phase of the World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS) in 2005. Therefore, this report is assumed to embody the collected perspectives and discussions along with many other concerned stakeholders such as the IDRC,
UNESCO and UNCTAD, etc.
Last, the issue of text data selection in this dissertation was concerned with identifying a relevant text of the global digital divide, which contains a bounty of linguistic or discursive features worthwhile to be analyzed for exploring the dominant theme of technology and development in the discourse of the global digital divide. In case of qualitative studies in general, non-probability sampling such as judgement or convenience sampling are used because qualitative studies seek to generate problematic issues rather than to verify cause-and-effect relationships through hypothesis-testing.
Based on this criterion, this dissertation made a judgment that this ITU and ORBICOM 66 report is the most relevant text for this dissertation in terms of bountiful linguistic and discursive characteristics entrenched in the neo-liberal theme of technology and development among other policy reports on the global digital divide.
3.3.3. Textual Analysis: Linguistic Approach
The purpose of textual analysis in this dissertation is to show how the discourse of the global digital divide constructs the discourse of technology and development. For the purpose, this dissertation analyzed linguistic characters and discursive strategies employed in a policy report of the global digital divide, From the Digital Divide to
Digital Opportunities: Measuring Infostates for Development (ITU & ORBICOM, 2005).
First, this dissertation tried to find the main theme of this policy report to identify the main policy contents, which are policy context, policy problem, policy means, and policy goal. Then, this study analyzed the discursively constructed meanings of the global digital divide within the four policy contents: “information society” (policy context),
“Infostates” (policy means), “digital divide” (policy problem), “digital opportunities”
(policy goal), focusing on various linguistic characteristics and discursive strategies such as negative or positive words, metaphors, evaluative attributes, inclusive or exclusive pronouns, process types of verbs, nominalization, recourse to authority, and representations of othering or difference.
Secondly, this study analyzed the discursive strategies employed to legitimize the neo-liberal and modernistic view of technology and development. For this analysis, this dissertation focuses on the following discursive strategies: 1) “relative nature of digital divide” for designating the less-developed areas as problematic regions; 2) “narrative 67 structure” for promoting the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector; and 3)
“othering” for reproducing the Western-oriented modernistic view of technology and development. In doing so, this study attempts to reveal that the discourse of the global digital divide faithfully subscribes to the notion of the Western-oriented technological development in the new historical context of economic neo-liberalism. 68
CHAPTER 4
DISCOURSE OF TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM THE POST WORLD WAR II ERA TO THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
This chapter reviews the historical trajectories on which the discourse of technology and development has been established since the post-World War period to the current age of globalization to answer the first research question, “what are the historical contexts that have shaped and promoted the discourse of the global digital divide?” The focus of this chapter is to look into the ways in which the capitalist powers, mainly the
United States, have promoted the discourse of technology and development in different historical circumstances to maintain and reproduce their hegemonic powers over the less- developed areas. Therefore, this study attempts to find the continuities of the capitalist strategies over the Third World within the discourse of technology and development between the post-World War period and the age of globalization.
4.1. Establishment of the Discourse of Technology and National Development during the Post-World War II Era
4.1.1. U.S. Political and Economic Hegemony after World War II
The end of World War II marked a profound transformation in world affairs: the decline of European hegemony caused by the ravages of war and the loss of imperial colonies; the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant superpowers in international relations; and the proliferation of newly independent 69 countries from the old European and Japanese colonies in Asia and Africa (Browne &
Cottrell, 2003). Faced with this worldwide turmoil after World War II, the U.S. saw the expansion of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and other less-developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a real threat to efforts to take the leadership in the post-World War ground politically and economically.
Politically, the U.S. perceived the expansion of communism as the most threatening invasion to the principle of democratic freedom territorially and ideologically.
Economically, the encroachment of communism in the less-developed areas meant to the
U.S. the loss of markets overseas for American capital and goods that had been accumulated during the war period, and for procuring raw materials securely from those areas. The U.S. concern against the rising influence of communism was well shown when
President Truman (1949) announced publicly that “the actions resulting from the
Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of free nations to bring about world recovery and lasting peace” in his inaugural speech.
As Escobar (1995) precisely pointed out, the real challenging imperatives that the
U.S. encountered confronting the beginning of the so-called Cold War were “to avoid the spread of communism,” “to find ways to invest U.S. surplus capital that had accumulated during the war,” “to find markets overseas for American goods, given that the productive capacity of American industry had doubled during the war,” “to secure control over the sources of raw materials in order to meet world competition,” and “to establish a global network of unchallenged military power as a way to secure access to raw materials, markets, and consumers” (p.71).
Confronted with political, economic, and ideological challenges, President 70
Truman delivered four major courses of action that turned out to be the U.S. strategic plans for attaining and maintaining world hegemonic power during the Cold War Era.
First, we will continue to give unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies, and we will continue to search for ways to strengthen their authority and increase their effectiveness. We believe that the United Nations will be strengthened by the new nations which are being formed in lands now advancing toward self-government under democratic principles.
Second, we will continue our programs for world economic recovery. This means, first of all, that we must keep our full weight behind the European recovery program. (……) In addition, we must carry out our plans for reducing the barriers to world trade and increasing its volume. Economic recovery and peace itself depend on increased world trade.
Third, we will strengthen freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression. We are now working out with a number of countries a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area.
Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of less- developed areas. (From the Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman, January 20, 1949)
The four courses of action dealt with four different manifest goals and several specific institutions, agencies, or programs corresponding to each goal respectively: 1) to establish the cooperative self-government system based on democratic principles through the United Nations and related agencies; 2) to recover the European economy via the
Marshall Plan, and to increase the volume of world trade through the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank group, and the General Agreement on Tarrifs and
Trade (GATT) under the Bretton Woods system; 3) to secure freedom and peace in 71 democratic countries against the aggression of the Communist bloc through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and 4) to assist the less-developed countries economically and technologically through the Point-Four program.
In particular, among these four wide-reaching global schemes, the fourth action must be closely related to the establishment and impact of the discourse of technology and national development in the international context, which is the main issue of this chapter. Therefore, the subsequent two sections trace the historical routes in which the
Western-oriented discourse of technology and development was constructed and diffused during the Cold-War period, focusing on the Point Four Program and modernization theory.
4.1.2. The Point Four Program
While the Marshall Plan was a massive program of economic aid to Western
Europe after the end of World War II, the Point Four Program was a technology assistance program aiming at providing technical skills, knowledge, and equipment to the less-developed areas such as Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Compared with the total of
$19 billion spent to Europe during the period 1945-1950 through the Marshall Plan 14 , the
Point Four Program invested only approximately $390 million in total even though the beneficiaries had been extended into thirty-five countries by the time of the conclusion of the program in 1953 (Shenin, 2000, p.171).
14 . Bataille (1991) pointed out that “the mobilization of capital that accompanied the plan, which amounted to $19 billion during the period 1945-1950, was a clear reversal of the principles of classical economies” (p.175). 72
Nevertheless, the Point Four Program had far more significant implications for the future relationship between the developed and the less-developed countries beyond simple technical aid programs in poor regions. That is, the program marked an historic moment in which the United States as a world leader and the less-developed countries as a collective group encountered each other for the first time in the modern sense of international relations. Therefore, the Point Four Program became the key route through which the strategic principles of U.S. foreign policy toward the less-developed areas as a whole were formed and disseminated during the Cold War era. The U.S. strategies can be summarized in the following three ways: 1) to construct and propagate the discourse of technology and economic development; 2) to incorporate the less-developed countries into the world trade system, and 3) to employ the U.S. corporations and international organizations as a channel of access to the Third World.
Firstly, the Point Four Program was operated based on the belief that technical knowledge and capital investment were necessary to assist economic development in the less-developed countries. The following two excerpts, one from Truman’s inaugural speech and the other from an official document by the U.S. Department of State on the
Point Four Program, clearly articulated the role of technical knowledge and skills, and capital investment in accelerating economic development.
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development . (Truman’s Inaugural Speech, 1949) ( underlines added )
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There are two major methods by which international cooperative effort can aid and accelerate economic development . The methods envisaged by the present program are the sharing of technical knowledge and skills and the fostering of international investment in facilities and equipment. (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, p.3) (underlines added )
It is of course that technology has long been believed to be indispensable to human society in history as a marker of civilization with its massive impact on societal progress from the prehistoric Stone Age to date. Nevertheless, the concept of technology has varied from society to society at different stages of history. In this sense, Marx (1994) argued that “technology in today’s singular, inclusive sense did not gain truly wide currency until after World War I, and perhaps not until the Great Depression” (p.248).
What Marx meant by “technology in today’s singular, inclusive sense” was the American technological system, which had been constructed in the historical process of nation- building and industrialization within the U.S. territory. Between 1870 and 1920, the construction of railroad, telegraph, and telephone networks over a large geographical area was required to “replace the traditional organization of the family-owned and –operated firm with that of the large-scale, centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic corporation”
(Marx, 1994, p.245). As the synthesis of the nation’s technological, economic, and political systems, the American technological system embraced “the republican formula for generating progress by directing improved technical means to societal ends” and
“coincided with the increasing control of the American economy by the great corporations …… with a view to maximizing economic growth as measured by market share and profitability” (Marx, pp.246-251).
The American technological system as an integrated discourse consisting of political, economic, and technological ingredients found a new opportunity for expanding 74 its scope beyond the border in the face of the post-World War ground. The beginning of the so-called Cold War era substantially provided an economic and political foundation for the American notion of technology and development to diffuse over the globe.
Economically, to begin with, the following excerpt further explicated how the American notion of technology and economic development was formulated through the Point Four
Program in the context of the post-World War ground.
The first method of aiding economic development is a problem in know-how and “show- how”. Experience has indicated that the U.S. and other countries which have advanced technical and scientific resources can make them available to underdeveloped areas through channels of private enterprise and of government in a number of ways . These include helping to make basic studies and surveys or economic problem, needs and potential lines of development; furnishing expert advisers or missions to advise governments, private organizations, or business enterprises in development projects; joint financing and administration of foreign government operations in fields essential to economic development; helping to establish and operate research and experimental centers and laboratories; developing demonstration projects; providing on-the-job training; furnishing and instructing in the use of sample materials and equipment; consulting and advising with foreign visitors; translating and publishing specialized reports; assisting technical schools and universities; exchanging students and teachers in technical fields; bringing workers, supervisors, engineers and executives to the more advanced countries to observe or train in their industrial and other establishments; organizing international conferences on economic problems and providing technical data, publications and samples of materials for research and experimental purposes; and establishing and operating technical libraries and file services.
The second method of speeding economic progress is by fostering international investment , thus helping people put to productive use the skills which they develop. New techniques can advance economic development to only a limited extent unless capital investment is taking place at the same time. … Supplementary capital will be needed from abroad. Foreign investment played a significant part of in the rapid development of 75
the United States. It can play a decisive part in the accelerated development of other areas . It is important, therefore, that appropriate measures to encourage the international flow of investment capital be developed as part of the program . (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, pp.3-4) ( underlines added ).
The above excerpt not only demonstrated two essential methods, technical assistance and capital investment, for speeding up economic development in underdeveloped areas but also suggested the right path leading to economic development in certain ways. In terms of both technical assistance and capital investment, “advanced technical and scientific resources” and “foreign investment” that have already been experienced in the U.S. were emphasized. In other words, the program underlined the logic that the less-developed areas could attain economic development only through the help of technical resources, scientific knowledge, educational assistance, and foreign investment from advanced countries.
Politically, the Point Four program also had an ideological orientation, which was a means of containment of communism through economic development. That is, the program supposed that the economic growth stimulated by technical assistance “provide the development of democratic values, peace, and prosperity for the underdeveloped countries,” which was in turn “to turn [ the underdeveloped countries ] into anti-
Communist bulwarks” (Shenin, 2000, p.174). The following excerpt insinuated the relationship between the political and economic intention embedded in the Point Four
Program.
The United States and other free nations of the world have a common concern for the material progress of these people, both as a humanitarian and in itself and because such progress will further the advance of human freedom , the secure growth of democratic ways of life , the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce and the development of 76
international understanding and good will.” (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, p.2.) (underlines added )
In short, the discourse of technology and economic development, which had been developed in the American historical context and diffused into the world via the Point
Four Program, turned out to be an incontestable theory of development especially in the less-developed areas and played an ideological role against the expansion of communism.
Secondly, the Point Four Program showed the U.S intention to incorporate the less-developed countries into the world trade system as well beyond a simple technology aid program. Premised on the assumption that “increased production in the underdeveloped areas will not only benefit the inhabitants of those areas, but will have far-reaching effects on the world as a whole” (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, p.10), the program presented four general lines (trade, domestic production, capital goods, and raw materials) of economic development as follows:
Trade. - In the first place, there is a very close relationship between the development of an area and its volume of trade. It is a truism that the best markets are those in which there is the most purchasing power. …… At present, the low levels of production in many less-developed areas hamper the process of development internally because of limited domestic purchasing power for their own products . In the foreign field, the lack of capacity to produce commodities for export seriously limits their ability to buy imports which can be produced and sold by other countries . Except for foreign credits and grants, the less-developed areas can acquire the foreign exchange with which to increase their purchases abroad only by increasing their own productive capacity and their exports . Development of productive facilities in these areas will, therefore, contribute to a general expansion of trade in which we and other nations can participate to our mutual advantage. Many problems can be more easily solved if trade is expanding. Instead of having to 77 struggle with each other for a share of a limited market, the exporting countries will be able to participate in a constantly increasing flow of trade.
Domestic Production . - Secondly, many of the less-developed areas not only are lacking in capacity to produce commodities for export but, because of deficiencies in skills, equipment, proper seeds, fertilizer, etc ., have also been unable to produce for their own consumption goods and other items even though their natural resources could well be adapted to such production . They now find it necessary to import these commodities from abroad . By increasing their domestic production of these items, the foreign exchange now used in their purchase abroad could be devoted to the purchase of other types of goods which other countries are in a better position to produce and supply .
Capital Goods . - In the third place, the process of economic development means the existence of a long-term and expanded market for the sale of equipment and other manufactured products for capital installation. Growth in knowledge and skill in the installation and operation of machinery, equipment facilities will result in a greater need and demand for such equipment . Facilitating the flow of capital for sound project in less- developed areas also will result in purchases by them of capital equipment which they cannot themselves produce but which the United States and Western Europe can manufacture in large quantities .
Raw Materials . - Lastly, the economies of many of the more developed countries are becoming more dependent upon the import of many basic materials and raw materials . In many cases the sources of these commodities now being drawn upon are becoming exhausted. At the same time high levels of production are causing increasing demands. It is important that new sources be developed to the maximum extent. The possibilities of great expansion in the production of these important commodities exist in a number of the less-developed areas of the world . This can be a process of great mutual benefit by increasing the world supply of these commodities while expanding purchasing power in the countries of origin. (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, pp.10-11) ( underlines added )
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First, the program attributed the underdevelopment in many less-developed areas to “the low levels of production.” The low levels of production in most of less-developed areas limited “purchasing power for their own products” domestically and “their ability to buy imports which can be produced and sold by other countries” internationally.
Logically, the less-developed areas could escape from the vicious circle of underdevelopment “only by increasing their own productive capacity and their exports.”
Second, however, the less-developed areas “have also been unable to produce for their own consumption goods and other items even though their natural resources could well be adapted to such production” because they lacked “skills, equipment, proper seeds, fertilizer, etc.” Therefore, it is necessary “to import these commodities from abroad … which other countries are in a better position to produce and supply.”
Third, the program continued that “growth in knowledge and skill in the installation and operation of machinery, equipment facilities will result in a greater need and demand for such equipment … which they [less-developed areas] cannot themselves produce but which the United States and Western Europe can manufacture in large quantities.” Fourth, recognizing that the more developed countries “are becoming more dependent upon the import of many basic materials and raw materials,” the program asserted that “the possibilities of great expansion in the production of these important commodities exist in a number of the less-developed areas of the world.”
In other words, even though the logic of economic progress embedded in the program encouraged the less-developed countries to participate in the new world trade regime, it relegated those areas to the marginalized role of exporting raw materials to, and importing capital goods and technological equipments from more advanced counties. In 79 doing so, the program had been worked out as a channel of finding markets overseas for
American capital and goods, and of securing control over the sources of raw materials, both of which were among the imperatives that the U.S. confronted in the context of post-
World War ground (Olden & Phillips, 1952, p.246).
Lastly, the Point Four program clearly designated American private corporations and the United Nations with its specialized agencies as the responsible agencies committed to the program in particular, and the field of development in the less- developed areas in general.
Particular emphasis in the program is given, however, to the stimulation of a greatly expanded flow of private investment . The importance of American private investment lies not only in the fact that it is potentially the major source of foreign funds for development purposes but also in the fact that it contributes to the development process, enterprise, managerial experience and technical knowledge as well . (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, p.4) (underlines added )
It is proposed that this be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. …… It is contemplated that the U.S. will undertake bilateral arrangements for desirable projects whenever international organizations cannot or will not undertake them or such projects can be more effectively operated in this manner . (The U.S. Department of State, 1949, p.5) ( underlines added )
The first passage stressed the power of American private investment as the major source of foreign funds, managerial experiences, and technical knowledge to the development process in the less-developed areas. On the other hand, the second passage underlined that the Point Four program would be implemented basically through the
United Nations and its specialized agencies. However, it also clearly articulated that the 80
U.S. would intervene as an arbitrator when international organizations could not function properly. In short, the Point Four program became the first moment in which the direction of U.S. foreign policy against the Third World was established under the name of private investment and cooperation with international organizations.
As Lerner (1977) recognized, “the inspiration for the [Point Four] program and the objective it was intended to serve were bound up with: 1) decline of Europe as the world power center; 2) bipolarization and domination of the world by the two nuclear super powers; and 3) emergence of the Third World” (p.148). Within these historical contexts, the program was “the mechanism created either to introduce market forces into the excolonial world or strengthen them if they already were present” (Schiller, 1989, p.139). As well, the Point Four Program must be the very beginning of the U.S.
“economic-educational-scientific-military-industrial complex” in the 20 th century
(Goldwater, 1998, p.440). In a sense, Truman’s doctrine had a true claim when he avowed “the old imperialism has no place in our plans” in that a new imperialism was about to start off instead.
4.1.3. Modernization Theory: From Traditional Society to Modern Society
Modernization theory is a social and economic model of describing and explaining the processes of transformation from traditional or underdeveloped societies to modern or developed ones. The theory has been one of the major perspectives of national development and underdevelopment in the social sciences since the 1950s. Based on the definition of modernization as the “process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s 81 knowledge, permitting control over his environment” (Black, 1966, p.7), the theory has focused on ways in which pre-modern societies become modern through processes of economic growth and changes in social, political, and cultural structures.
To begin with, from the socio-psychological perspective, the theory attempted to understand why and how some societies became modern or developed faster than others.
In The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), Lerner identified “the mobile personality,” which is predominant in modern industrial society, as the key socio-psychological trait to the transition from traditional society to modern society. According to Lerner, “the mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment: he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience” (p.49). Then, he explicated the ways these mechanisms operate to enlarge a man’s identity as the following:
Projection facilitates identification by assigning to the object certain preferred attributes of the self -others are “incorporated” because they are like me… Introjection enlarges identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object -others are “incorporated” because I am like them or want to be them. (Lerner, 1958, p.49)
Using the word “empathy” for both mechanisms of projection and introjection,
Lerner hypothesized that there would be a significant positive relationship between empathy as “the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world” and modernization (pp.49-50). Further, he emphasized the role of the mass media in multiplying the empathic capacity and in removing traditional barriers and conservative worldviews in the less-developed countries. 82
In a similar vein, McClelland (1961) asserted that some societies became more advanced and modernized than others because a different capacity for development rested in the desires of the people. McClelland identified three human motivations for facilitating economic development: 1) the need for achievement, an intrinsic desire to perform well against a standard of excellence; 2) the need for affiliation, a concern in fantasy, and in action for warm, close relationship with other people; 3) the need for power, a desire for the means of influencing other people. According to him, the need for achievement was the most important factor among the three motivations in understanding the changes and evolutions in societies.
From a mixed view of macrostructure and microstructure, Inkeles (1969) found that while modernizing institutions as macrostructure forces such as education, factory experience, and urbanism had substantial impacts on the process of modernization, the following microstructure forces had greater power to facilitate the process of modernization: 1) openness to new experience, both with people and with new ways of doing things such as attempting to control births; 2) the assertion of increasing independence from the authority of traditional figures like parents and priests and a shift of allegiance to leaders of government, public affairs, trade unions, cooperatives and the like; 3) belief in the efficacy of science and medicine, and a general abandonment of passivity and fatalism in the face of life's difficulties; 4) ambition for oneself and one's children to achieve high occupational and educational goals; 5) liking people to be on time and showing an interest in carefully planning affairs in advance; 6) showing strong interest and taking an active part in civic and community affairs and local politics; and 7) striving energetically to keep up with the news, and within this effort preferring news of 83 national and international impact over items dealing with sports, religion, or purely local affairs (p.210).
On the other hand, from more a macroeconomic and social perspective, Rostow
(1960) emphasized that traditional societies have to modify their economies, values and social structures in order to reach development, based on his firm premise of five stages of economic growth that lead to development: 1) the traditional society; 2) the preconditions of take-off; 3) the take-off; 4) the drive to maturity; and 5) the age of high mass consumption.
Fully subscribing to the Western-oriented socio-psychology and evolutionary structural functionalism, modernization theory viewed the Western-oriented modernization process as the ideal model for the less-developed societies to follow.
Economic growth, the application of modern scientific and technological knowledge, and the Western-centric model of development were the intrinsic elements to the theory of modernization. As well, when the goal of economic growth was achieved, modernization theory assumed that ‘economic wealth would trickle down or spread across the different social strata in a system” and “economic growth would bring about compatible changes and improvements in other spheres” (Lee, 1980, p.18).
Logically, the important role of telecommunications infrastructure and services as well as mass media toward national development were extensively addressed and studied under the tutelage of in modernization theory. Modernization theory believed that the introduction and use of technologies would lead traditional society to modernize by removing traditional barriers and conservative worldviews through the process of promoting modern personality and structural differentiation (Lerner, 1958; Pye, 1963; 84
Pool, 1963; Schramm, 1964; Rogers, 1969; Schramm & Lerner, 1976). In other words, technologies were idealized as a momentum to bring economic, political and social improvements to the less-developed and developing regions.
There have been many empirical studies that attempted to find indices of telecommunications development that correlated with indicators of economic, political, and social development. Some studies found a high correlation between telephone density or usage and economic development (Jipp, 1963; the International Telegraph and
Telephone Consultative Committee, 1968; Bebee & Gilling, 1976; Hardy, 1980). Others found that the development of the mass media such as radio, television and newspaper is highly correlated with economic and political development (UNESCO, 1961; Schnore,
1961, Deutschmann, McNelly, & Ellinworth, 1961; Farrace, 1966; Cutwright, 1970).
4.1.4. Critiques about the Modernist View of Development
Modernization theory or the modernist view of developmnet has been subject to some criticism. Influenced from the intellectual origins from the critique of capitalism by
Marxism and Latin American Structuralism, dependency theory argued that the dependency of the less-developed countries on developed countries was the very reason for the underdevelopment in the less-developed countries (Cardoso, 1972; Frank, 1966;
Santos, 1970; Sunkel, 1969). Having defined dependency as “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another country to which the former is subjected” (Santos, 1970, p.231) or as “an explanation of the economic development of a state in terms of the external influences -political, economic, and cultural- on national development policies” (Sunkel, 1969, p.23), 85 dependency theorists criticized the notion of interdependent economic development or mutual benefit of trickle-down between the developed and the less-developed countries, which had been immersed in the dominant paradigm of development such as modernization theory.
Dependency theory argued that “contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries” (Frank, 1966, p.17). Furthermore, it contended that the unequal relation was the essential part of the capitalist system on a world scale as a whole. That is, the international division of labor in global capitalist system was responsible for the unequal economic structure in which the less-developed countries took the role of exporting raw materials, agricultural commodities, and cheap labor, and of importing surplus capital, manufactured goods, and technologies that are produced in developed countries.
Although Cardoso (1972) did not deny that economic growth could occur within a dependent state through new forms of joint venture enterprise among local state capital, private national capital, and monopoly international investment, he also contended that
“the relations between advanced capitalist countries and dependent nations lead rather to a ‘marginalization’ of the latter within the global system of economic development”
(p.93).
In short, despite all the assertions that modernization is the historically-inevitable and universally-acceptable road map to development, dependency theory maintains that modernization theory was also a historical product. The very historical contexts on which the Point-Four Program had been established such as the needs of the United States for 86 new markets abroad, the threats of communism, and the rise of the Third World were the same historical background for the birth of modernization theory: that is to say, modernization theory was the Western society’s response, particularly the United States, to these specific historical contexts with the view of preoccupying and maintaining the newly won hegemonic power. Some critics argued that sociology, political science, and development economics were employed to promote modernization theory as a grand theory in tandem with the national interests of the United States during the post-World
War period (Latham, 2000; Escobar, 1995).
While dependency theory focused on the imbalanced political and economic structure between the developed and the less-developed countries, post-colonialism attacked the modernist view of development from the perspective of discourse and power in the representation of the Third World as “the other.” Above all, Said’s seminal work,
Orientalism (1979), demystified the way in which the Western culture constructed “the
Orient” as the other. According to Said, Orientalism must be understood as “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it” (p.3). The representation of the Orient as the other was based on “the rigidly binomial opposition of
‘ours’ and ‘theirs,’ with the former always encroaching upon the latter” (p.227). This dichotomous representation of “othering” involved projecting a negative identity into the other and as a result the other was described as deviant such as “starving African” or
“backward Arabs” from the standard norms of the dominant group.
Since the publication of Orientalism , several post-colonial theorists investigated the representations of the Third World areas in various contexts. Mitchell (1988) 87 proposed the concept of “enframing” through which the Europeans discursively colonized Egypt as a problematic country in terms of natural disasters or overcrowded population “from a position that is invisible and set apart” (p.28). From a feminist perspective, Mohanty (1991) argued that the Third World women were represented as vulnerable, oppressed, and problematic but they had few choices and no freedom to act from within the ethnocentric view of Western scholars.
In short, dependency theory and post-colonialism criticized that at the core of modernization theory were several overlapping assumptions as follows: 1) “traditional” and “modern” societies are separated by a sharp dichotomy; 2) economic, political, and social changes are integrated and interdependent; 3) development tends to proceed toward the modern state along a common, linear path; and 4) the progress of developing societies can be dramatically accelerated through contact with developed ones. Put simply, the modernistic view of development served for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Third World by the Western powers.
In this sense, Eisenstadt’s definition of modernization well captured the imperialistic feature of modernization theory; “modernization is the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in
Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South American, Asian, and African continents” (1966, p.1).
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4.2. Emergence of Neo-liberalism and New Technologies in the Age of Globalization
4.2.1. Crisis of U.S. Hegemonic Power and Move to Neo-liberalism
The economic and political systems that had buttressed the U.S. hegemonic power in international relations since World War II began to decline in the early 1970s.
Economically, the power of U.S. dollar as the world’s leading reserve, international currency, and standard of value weakened noticeably, which had been one of the key elements of U.S. economic power under the Bretton Woods system. The so-called
Triffin’s dilemma, a fundamental contradiction between the power of the U.S. dollar as the only internationally reliable currency and the U.S. foreign trade deficit, was exacerbated in the early 1970s for various reasons such as increasing economic competition with some European countries and Japan that had succeeded in economic recovery from the damages of World War II, the massive escalation of U.S. military expenditures in the Vietnam War and against the communist block, and the quadrupling of oil prices in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Gilpin, 1987, pp.134-142). 15
As well, the world witnessed the decline of U.S. political hegemony that had been characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s. The defeat in the Vietnam War, the pro-communist revolutions of 1968 around the world 16 , and the rise of the Third World and the emergence of pro-communist governments across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin
America accelerated the weakening of U.S. political power over the world (Wallerstein,
2002, p.63, 2003, pp.46-68). In short, both economic and political situations in the early
15 . For example, the U.S. trade deficit took a quantum jump toward the end of the 1970s when it reached a rate of about $30 billion per year and it reached an annual rate of $75 billion in the final quarter of 1983 and is expected to exceed $100 billion in 1984 (Burns, 1984, p.1058). 16 . The revolutions of 1968 did not merely condemn U.S. hegemony. They also condemned Soviet collusion with the United States (Wallerstein, 2002, p.63). 89
1970s meant the overall descent in the U.S. hegemonic power in international relations
(Beaud, 2001, p.266).
Faced with the economic and political crisis in the 1970s, the 1980s saw the birth of economic liberalism and political conservatism in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Domestically, the Reagan and the Thatcher administrations, based on the belief that “government is the problem,” undertook a massive campaign of tax cuts, government cutbacks in social benefit programs, opposition to labor unions, and industrial deregulation to reduce or eliminate government intervention or regulation (Palley, 2005, p.25). The wave of economic liberalism was unfolded more aggressively in the context of the international economy. The slogan “There Is No Alternative,” declared by the former
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, succinctly encapsulated the central theme of economic liberalism, emphasizing opening up of international goods and capital markets, free trade, international division of labor, and financial capital mobility.
Commonly, the so-called neo-liberalism refers to “the application of the principles of neo-classical economics to economic development and other aspects of economic affairs” (Gilpin, 2001, p.306) both domestically and internationally. According to neo-classical theory of economic development, the principal source of underdevelopment in the less-developed countries is not from a peripheral, captial- dependent, technology-dependent, and trade-dependent economic structure, but from government policies that distort economic incentives, inhibit market forces, and actually work against economic development (Gilpin, 2001; Little, 1982). Therefore, the theory favors the fundamentals of market power and rejects government intervention.
Unlike the common understanding of the classical laissez-faire economic theory, 90 however, neo-liberalism as revived during the 1980s never meant smaller government.
As Campbell (2005) pointed out, “neo-liberalism is not about letting markets operate freely, or about removing government regulation of markets in general” (p.189). For example, the military expenditure during the Reagan administration hit a peak of $456.5 billion in 1987 in projected 2005 dollars, compared with $325.1 billion in 1980 and
$339.6 billion in 1981 (Washington Post, June 9, 2004). As well, most of the deregulatory policies in industry and the reduction of social benefits and tax rates were carried out under the direction of government. O’Neil (1997) succinctly argued:
the neo-liberalist vision of ‘less state’ is entirely illusory. Neo-liberalism is a self- contradicting theory of the state. The geographies of product, finance and labour markets that it seeks to construct require qualitatively different, not less, state action. Neo- liberalism is a political discourse which impels rather than reduces state action (p.292).
Concerning the topic of this chapter, which is technology and development in the age of globalization, this dissertation selected two historic events to explore the neo- liberal impact on the discourse of the global digital divide: 1) the Global Information
Infrastructure (GII); and 2) the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services in 1997. Therefore, the next sections look into the phase of technological development during the 1990s, particularly via the construction of the GII led by the United States.
Then, global reform in the telecommunications sector will be addressed later.
91
4.2.2. The Global Information Infrastructure (GII)
4.2.2.1. The National Information Infrastructure (NII) as Background for the GII
In July 1993, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the “National Information
Infrastructure Act of 1993,” which amended the “High-Performance Computing Act of
1991” (HPC Act of 1991). 17 The primary objective of the HPC Act of 1991 was “to accelerate research, development, and application of high-performance computing 18 in research, education, and industry” (p.1). The 1991 Act appreciated federal funding for the development of new supercomputers, advanced software, and a computer network such as a National Research and Education Network (NREN).
Recognizing the significance of the HPC Act of 1991, the National Information
Infrastructure Act of 1993 (NII Act of 1993) authorized that the scope of the HPC Act of
1991 should be widened to “establish an interagency program for development of applications of computing and networking technologies for education, libraries, health care, the provision of government information, and other appropriate fields” (NII Act of
1993, p.13). For the purpose, the 1993 Act authorized $1.1 billion for fiscal year 1994-
1998 (p.15).
Two months later, the Clinton Administration officially launched $2 billion-a- year National Information Infrastructure (NII) initiative on September 1993. According to Mattelart (2003), Robert Reich, the director of economic policy for the Clinton
17 . In 1990, then U.S. senator Al Gore introduced the National High Performance Computing Act of 1990 (S.1067) in order to create a national network of information superhighways, which would allow researchers, businesspeople, educators, and students around the country to communicate with each other and to access a broad range of research tools and information resources. However, this bill did not pass by the time the 101st Congress adjourned in October 1990. 18 . High performance computing represents “the leading edge of computing technology-the most sophisticated computer chips, the fastest computers with the largest memories, the fastest algorithms, and the fastest networks” (HCP Act, 1991, p.1). 92 transition team, laid the economic and political foundations for the NII initiative. In his book, The Work of Nations: preparing ourselves for 21st-century capitalism, Reich argued that “the only policy that will benefit all Americans is for government investment in two basic assets”: 1) human capital such as education and job training; 2) physical infrastructure ranging from roads and bridges to high-speed railroads and fiber-optic communications (Reich, 1991, p.111). Reich’s policy suggestion was based on his belief that there was no limit to the sale of “symbol manipulation services in a global economy and that the United States was in the best position to meet the challenge of information engineering by gaining the edge on its competitors” (Mattelart, 2003, p.119).
Therefore, although the NII initiative seemed to be driven by the recognition of the development of new ICTs and technological convergence among industries, it was “a sweeping interagency effort that encompassed regulatory reform, strategic investment, information policy, and reengineering government operations” (Kahin, 1997, p.152). The definition of the NII by the NII Advisory Council (NIIAC) well showed that the NII was just beyond a technology policy:
It is a series of components, including the collection of public and private high-speed, interactive, narrow and broadband networks that exist today and will emerge tomorrow. It is the satellite, terrestrial, and wireless technologies that deliver content to homes, businesses, and other public and private institutions. It is the information and content that flow over the infrastructure, whether in the form of databases, the written word, a film, a piece of music, a sound recording, a picture, or computer software. It is the computers, televisions, telephones, radios, and other products that people will employ to access the infrastructure. It is the people who will provide, manage, and generate new information, and those who will help others to do the same. And it is the individual Americans who will use and benefit from the Information Superhighway. The NII is a term that encompasses all these components and captures the vision of a nationwide, invisible, 93
seamless, dynamic web of transmission mechanisms, information, appliances, content, and people . (NIIAC, 1995, p.1) ( underline added )
Upon the very comprehensive definition of the NII, the NIIAC offered fundamental principles in five critical NII areas: 1) universal access and services; 2) privacy and security; 3) intellectual property; 4) education and lifelong learning; and 5) electronic commerce (pp.7-16). Among the five areas, the issue of universal access and services is relevant for the topic of this dissertation, the global digital divide. Therefore, it will be meaningful to look into the principle of universal access and services in the context of NII.
Based on the premise that “we must ensure that the enormous empowering capabilities these new information and communications services afford will be available to all Americans and that we not create a society of information ‘haves’ and ‘have nots”
(p.8). The foremost principle of universal access and services was “a national goal should be set to enable every individual to have access to the NII by the year 2005” (p.8). As well, the third principle stressed that “commercial and competitive initiatives should be the driving force behind the NII, and regulatory disincentives should be removed” (p.8). 19
From these principles of the NII in universal access and services, two significant objectives can be inferred, which are critically related to the issue of the digital divide: 1) the success of the NII depends on universal access to basic and new ICTs; and 2) commercial and competitive environments are prerequisite for achieving the goal of
19 . Although the role of all levels of governments in universal access and services was also mentioned in the third and seventh principles, the government’s role was relatively secondary; for example, “if commercial and competitive forces do not achieve the goal of universal access and services” or “to ensure fair access.” 94 universal access. These two themes became the most critical elements in discussing the digital divide domestically and internationally.
4.2.2.2. Visions of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII)
The NII initiative became a catalyst for a global strategy of the U.S. in 1990s. As declared in a policy report, Technology for America’s Economic Growth, A new
Direction to Build Economic Strength, Clinton and Gore envisioned the NII as a way to regain “world leadership in basic science, mathematics, and engineering” (1993, p.3). In
March 1994, then U.S. Vice President Al Gore introduced the vision for the Global
Information Infrastructure (GII) in a speech at the first World Telecommunication
Development Conference held in Argentina in 1994. With a very prophetic tone, Gore’s
(1994) address stressed that “the GII will promote the functioning of democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens in decision-making” and “GII will be the key to economic growth for national and international economies.”
More specifically, he addressed five basic principles as the foundation for the development of the GII: 1) encourage private investment; 2) promote competition; 3) create a flexible regulatory framework that can keep pace with rapid technological and market changes; 4) provide open access to the network for all information providers; and
5) ensure universal service. An official government document of the GII, The Global
Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Cooperation , promised that the GII would
“facilitate information infrastructure development in individual countries and the interconnection of networks on a global basis”, and also accelerated “development of useful applications, and increase sharing of information among people around the world” 95
(Brown, Irving, Prabhakar, & Katzen, 1995).
In response to Gore’s five principles of the GII, ITU members adopted “The
Buenos Aires Declaration on Global Telecommunication Development for the 21st
Century” in March 1994 for the development of the GII. The vision of the GII was further endorsed at a summit meeting of “Information Society Conference” of the G-7 in
February 1995. Fundamentally, both the ITU declaration and the G-7 meeting underlined the neo-liberal market-oriented approach to the development of the GII as in the following
. Major Principles of the Buenos Aires Declaration and the G-7 Meeting20 Buenos Aires Declaration (1994) G-7 meeting (1995)
1) provide for communications to be made 1) promote dynamic competition available to all individuals, groups and peoples. 2) encourage private investment
2) close the development gaps between 3) define an adaptable regulatory framework developing and developed countries and, in individual countries, between densely and 4) provide open access to networks sparsely populated areas. 5) ensure universal provision of and access to 3) recognize the varying levels of services development in developing countries, paying special attention to the requirements of the 6) promote equality of opportunity to the citizen least developed countries 7) promote diversity of content, including cultural 4) establish appropriate telecommunication and linguistic diversity policies and regulatory structures 8) recognize the necessity of worldwide 5) foster liberalization, private investment cooperation with particular attention to less and competition developed countries
20 . Among the eleven principles in the Buenos Aires Declaration, the other six principles dealt with somewhat minor issues such as “close cooperation with regional telecommunication organizations and international, regional and national development and financing agencies,” “the role of ITU in concert with other sectors in the transfer of knowledge and technology,” “ the role of sound and television broadcasting via terrestrial and satellite systems as one of the key factors in promoting social and cultural development,” “human resources development and management,” and “need to establish a program of cooperation among the members and a program of assistance to developing countries and the least developed countries.” 96
In short, the development of GII was deeply fueled by the neo-liberal theory of economic development, which has focused on private investment, competition, and liberalization, with promises of universal access and equality of opportunity for citizens.
Further, the neo-liberal approach to the GII was closely related to the two objectives of the U.S. NII: 1) universal access to basic and new ICTs; and 2) commercial and competitive environments. Such a consensus toward the GII among advanced countries turned out be a binding force worldwide through a multilateral agreement in 1997, the
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services. That is, the neo-liberal wave in the world telecommunications sector became the real force for every country in the world.
4.2.3. Establishment of Free and Open Global Markets: the GATS and the WTO
4.2.3.1. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
At the very apex of the world transformation toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s was the Uruguay Round. This worldwide trade negotiation was launched by the Ministers of GATT member-countries in 1986 and ended with the signing of the Final Act of the
Marrakesh Agreement in 1994. Of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the issue of trade in services on a par with the traditional commercial and manufacturing sectors was the hottest one. It reflected the neo-liberal push toward opening up protected markets worldwide. As the result of the Uruguay Agreements, the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) was reached and the World Trade Organization (WTO) was launched in
1995.
The GATS document consists of six Parts and eight Annexes, comprising several 97
Articles. It is beyond the scope of this study to look into all the Parts and Annexes.
Therefore, for the focus of this chapter, which is to map out the historical background that promote neo-liberalism and establish a global market, the following three issues are selected for further investigation: 1) expansion of the scope of trade in services; 2) multilateral binding rules of free and open trade; and 3) the emphasis on the progress of liberalization in specific national schedules.
First, Article I in Part I stipulated the scope and definition of trade in services.
The agreement defined trade in services as the supply of a service through the following four modes: 1) the supply of a service from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member (cross-border supply); 2) the supply of a service in the territory of one
Member to the service consumer of any other Member (consumption abroad); 3) the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member (commercial presence); and 4) the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member (presence of a natural person).
Article I had the effect of opening domestic service markets in member countries, which had been protected safely within national borders, to foreign providers. Almost every human activity was designated a service from transport and tourism to water, health, and education. As a result, foreign corporations were allowed to take over and invest in almost any private and public services in other countries.
Secondly, Part II and III specified “General Obligations and Disciplines,” which apply to all the members, and “Specific Commitments,” which complement the general commitments by individual members in terms of market access and national treatment. The 98 most important feature of “General Obligations” is the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN)
Treatment. It stated that “each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country” (Article II).
The core provisions of “Specific Commitments” are “Market Access” (Article
XVI) and “National Treatment” (Article XVII). Both Articles articulated that “each
Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment with respect to market access through the modes of supply” (Market Access) or “each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers” (National Treatment).
These three general and specific commitments of Most-Favoured-Nation
Treatment, Market Access, and National Treatment turned out to be the principal rules in a new free and open trade regime, the World Trade Organization (WTO). As a membership organization with legal and binding forces, the WTO became the primary responsible institution for facilitating international free and open trade on a multilateral basis (Gilpin,
2001, pp.222-223).
Thirdly, the focal point of establishing a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services in the GATS was to expand international trade “under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization” (GATS, 1994, p.285). Several
Articles in the GATS specify detailed requirements that all the members should abide by.
For example, “Transparency” (Article III) required that “each Member should publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the latest by the time of their 99 entry into force, all relevant measures of general application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement.” In particular, Article IV “Increasing Participation of
Developing Countries” specified the specific commitments of developing country members as follows: a) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia through access to technology on a commercial basis; b) the improvement of their access to distribution channels and information networks; and c) the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them (Article IV).
It was interesting that the GATS allowed member countries to defer the general
(MFN) and specific commitments (Market Access and National Treatment) for a certain period depending on the level of development of individual members in individual sectors. Article XX specified “Schedules of Specific Commitments,” stating that “each
Member shall set out in a schedule the specific commitments it undertakes under Part III
[Market Access and National Treatment] of this Agreement.” Further, the same Article
XX stipulated that the following provisions should be included in the national schedules:
1) terms, limitations and conditions on market access; 2) conditions and qualifications on national treatment; 3) undertakings relating to additional commitments; 4) where appropriate the time-frame for implementation of such commitments; and 5) the date of entry into force of such commitments.
However, the “Schedules of Specific Commitments” should not be understood as some exceptions to the all-embracing architecture of setting up free and open global markets based on neo-liberalism in the GATS. Rather, it must be understood as a temporary deferment considering different conditions of certain sectors among different 100 countries. Therefore, the national schedules must be positioned within the liberalizing contents of the GATS, which highlight openness, competition, and privatization across all sectors of industry in the end. In the basic telecommunications sector, the provision of specific national schedules led to the creation of “the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services” in 1997.
4.2.3.2. The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services
In 1997, sixty nine members of the WTO came to an agreement on basic telecommunications services to increase openness, privatization, competition, and deregulation in this sector. The WTO agreement was originated from the “Annex on
Telecommunications” of the GATS, which contained a special provision stipulating “each
Member shall ensure that service suppliers of any other Member have access to and use of any PTTNS on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions, for the supply of a service included in its Schedule.”
In practical terms, the Annex obliges suppliers of Public Telecommunications
Transport Networks and Services (PTTNS) to grant access to and use of PTTNS offered within or across borders, including private leased circuits, to service suppliers with market- access rights under the GATS. The provisions were drawn up in recognition of the fact that telecommunications services represented an important input into the supply of other services, and that adequate conditions of access to and use of PTTNS were essential to guarantee the rights of market-access commitments inscribed in the schedules. (Low &
Mattoo, 1998)
However, the liberalizing process of basic telecommunications services did not 101 show immediate progress as scheduled in the GATS agreement of specific national schedules because many countries had difficulties in following their individual schedules of market-opening in basic telecommunications services. Therefore, many countries sought to extend the schedule because they still believed in the strong impacts of basic telecommunications infrastructure on economic development and national security
(Marko, 1998, p.6).
After a two-year negotiation, at a WTO meeting in April 1996, participants adopted the Fourth Protocol. The Protocol affirmed the opportunity to negotiate further to try to secure improvements in national schedules on market-access and MFN treatment in the sector of basic telecommunications services, and established February 15, 1997 as the closing date. The Protocol and its annexed documents entered into force on 5 February
1998, when the schedules on basic telecommunication services of the signatories became an integral part of the GATS schedules of services commitments already in force since the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994.
Although only sixty nine members agreed to the WTO Agreement, the market scope in total accounted for more than 93% of the global telecommunications revenues in
1995 (Marko, 1998, p.11). As the result of telecommunications reform at a global scale, more than half of the countries in the world have fully or partially privatized their incumbent telecommunication operators by 2002. For example, countries with a privately-owned incumbent operator account for 85 percent of the world market by revenue and those with fully state-owned operators, in mobile as well as fixed-lines, account for just 2 percent (ITU, 2002, p.4).
The Agreement covered all the basic telecommunications services provided 102 through cross-border supply and through the establishment of foreign firms or commercial presence such as voice telephone services, packet-switched data transmission services, circuit-switched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph services, facsimile services, and private leased circuit services. It also covered value-added telecommunication services that suppliers use to add value to the customer's information by enhancing its form or content or by providing for its storage and retrieval such as on- line data processing, on-line data base storage and retrieval, electronic data interchange, email, and voice mail.21
The “WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications,” accepted by the sixty seven signatories in March 1998, well reflected the neo-liberal regulatory principle in the Agreement. The Reference Paper articulated that “appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive practices.” Additionally, the
Paper specified the anti-competitive practices as follows: 1) engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization; 2) using information obtained from competitors with anti- competitive results; and 3) not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are necessary for them to provide services (WTO, 1998, n.d.).
In short, the “WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services” can be understood in the progressive liberalization environments in general that had been built up in the 1980s led by advanced capitalist power countries. In particular, the WTO agreement reflected the transnational orientation of the telecommunications industry to
21 . The definitions and coverage of basic telecommunications services and value-added services are from the website of the WTO. (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_coverage_e.htm) 103 remove diverse barriers to trade in basic telecommunications services such as commercial arrangements with licensed operators and telecommunication price controls (Cross
Border Supply), restriction on callback service and limits on foreign currency
(Consumption Abroad), restrictions on foreign equity participation and nationality requirements for directors (commercial Presence), and immigration controls and restrictions on living conditions (Presence of Natural Persons). (Marko, 1998, p.4)
4.3. Interpretations of New Technologies and New Global Capitalism in the Age of Globalization
The term “globalization” has become the main representation for describing the current world situation in not only dominant theoretical discourse but also in every day language (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001;
Scholte, 2005; Waters, 2002). Even though a single or agreed definition cannot exist, most globalization studies at a basic level suggest that globalization is thought of as “the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (Held et al., 1999, p.2).
In terms of the growing magnitude of global interconnectedness, the process of globalization leads to “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990, p.64). Reconfiguring the spatial dimensions across societies, globalization spurs “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992, p.8), facilitating economic, political, and cultural interactions among different societies beyond the constraints of geography. 104
Such a discourse of globalization, as a set of processes of the expansion of global linkage and flows in economic transactions, political relations, and cultural interactions, has generated a sense that something new is happening to the world.22 Above all, globalization is viewed as the increasing economic integration into a single borderless global market in which transnational flows of goods, services, investment, production, finance, labor, and technology proliferate (Castells, 1996; Dicken, 2003; Friedman, 1999;
Ohmae, 1995).
According to Castells (1996), this emerging global economy is a historically new reality. In more detail, Castells explicated its fundamental distinctive features in two ways. One is informational in that “the productivity and competitiveness of units in the economy depend upon their capacity to generate, process, and apply efficiently knowledge-based information” Second is global in that “the core activities of production, consumption, and circulation are organized on a global scale, either directly or through a network of linkages between economic agents” (p.66). Friedman (1999) also believed that “the inexorable integration of markets, nation states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before--in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation states to reach around the world faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before" (p.7).
In particular, with the advent of space-shrinking ICTs and a more liberal international economic climate since the early 1980s, transnational corporations (TNCs) saw the increased salience of, and rapid growth in foreign direct investment (Dunning,
1993; Dicken, 2003). This change during the 1980s meant that the main strategies by
22 . This dissertation does not seek to review the general theories and debates of globalization (for good reviews see Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2005; Waters, 2002). Instead, it mainly deals with the relationship between globalization and the nation states. 105
TNCs in the international economy shifted “from international trade, which had been dominant in the period 1945-1973, to the internationalization of production” (Hirst &
Thompson, 1996, p. 66).
The growth of TNCs was made possible by the so-called “flexible accumulation” characterized by the emergence of entirely new sectors of production, new ways of providing financial services, new markets, and above all, greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation (Harvey, 1990). Along with the growth of TNCs, this new mode of production opened the door to the age of the global information economy.
One critical consequence of the emergence of global economy is that the nation states are now powerless to regulate the transnational flows and reduced to “little more than bit players” (Ohmae, 1995, p.12; Strange, 1996). 23 As Strange (1996) put it, “the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post-war period more by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong” (p.4). In a similar vein, Ohmae (1995) argued that economic power and political power were becoming effectively denationalized and diffused such that “the traditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible units in a global economy” (p.5).
In contrast, many critics have maintained that the discourse of globalization as the end or retreat of the nation states is greatly exaggerated and that the power of the nation
23 . Despite his emphasis on the emerging global economy as a historical novelty, Castells acknowledged that the role of the nation states as follows: “governments regulations and policies affect the international boundaries and structure of the global economy”; “furthermore, corporate nationality is not irrelevant to corporate behaviour” (1996, p.98). 106 states still remains in the process of economic globalization (Gilpin, 1987, 2001; Hirst,
1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Weiss, 1997).
Hirst and Thompson (1996) argued that the historical evidence confirmed only heightened levels of internationalization, that is, interactions between predominantly national economies. Consequently, they contended that the role of the nation states in
“the possibilities of national and international governance” in the international economy was still vital and thus “the processes of internationalization” strengthened the importance of the nation states (1996, p.17). That is, national governments are not the passive victims of internationalization but, on the contrary, its active players.
Considering multinational corporations as the products of their home economy, too, Gilpin (2001) asserted that the nation states were still the principal actor in international economic affairs and multinational corporations were simply national firms deeply embedded in their national societies and influenced strongly by home-country policies. Therefore, he maintained that “at the turn of the century, there are no truly stateless global corporations” (pp.297-299).
It is of course true that all the countries maintain the same power capacities in the emerging global economy. As Weiss (1997) pointed out, “because state capacities differ, the ability to exploit the opportunities of international economic change—rather than simply succumb to its pressures—will be much more marked in some countries than others” (p.26). In this sense, disregarding the popular belief that the recent world economy based on supranational markets and transnational companies, Hirst (1997) argued that “the world economy still remained dominated by the Triad of Europe, Japan, and North America” (p.410). All in all, these critics denied the popular myth that the 107 power of national governments or state sovereignty was being undermined by economic internationalization or global governance.
This dissertation agrees with the latter argument that the nation states are still powerful in the intensified global economy. Further, this study believed that the intensification of internationalization in the global economy was largely “a by-product of the US-initiated multilateral economic order which, in the aftermath of the Second World
War, created the impetus for the liberalization of national economies” (Held et al., 1999, p.6).
In a review of the U.S. role in the arena of global communications and culture during the last half of the twentieth century, Schiller (1998) observed two warrantable features: 1) the U.S. capitalist state still performs significant functions in the promotion of the cultural and communication industries, “representing the interests of the core capital”; 2) there has been “the effort to persuade the public that a new era has arrived”
(p.17). Then, Schiller concluded that “historical continuities in its quest for systemic power and control” (p.23) in global communications industries.
The close relationship between the U.S. government and private corporations is well shown in the process of establishment of the NII and GII. Although it has been generally recognized that the U.S. government initiated and designed the NII project, private industry also played an active role in this process (Malhotra, Al-Shehri, & Jones,
1995). In early January 1993, chief executive officers of 13 major U.S. computer companies proposed building a “National Information Infrastructure.” The companies were willing to contribute to funding most of it, hoping that the government’s existing high-performance computing and communications program (the National Research and 108
Education Network) would extend to offices and homes across the U.S. beyond the realm of government and university laboratories (Anthes, 1993).
Even in a more strict tone, some private telecommunication carriers and cable companies such as AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and the Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs) filed a statement which stressed their telecommunications networking expertise and belief that the U.S. government should not be involved in the information superhighway project at any level (Moeller, 1993). Such a desperate need of private industry reflected the increasing concerns of the U.S. government and industry in those times, “to enable this country to leapfrog the Japanese” (McChesney et al, 1998, p.88).
The choice of the word “new” in the above heading of this section does not mean a fundamental change in the capitalist strategy of technology and development. Rather, this study contends that the overarching goal of the GII and the WTO Agreement have created a new ground in which to reproduce and maintain the dominant capitalist power led mainly by the U.S. in response to the decline of its economic and political supremacy since the 1970s.
The neo-liberal reforms in the world telecommunications sector, which have been deeply embedded in the foundation of the GII and the WTO Agreement, can be understood as an effort to create new global markets for selling new ICTs products and services. Therefore, the neo-liberal strategy of technology and development, particularly toward less-developed countries, is quite similar to the modernistic scheme of technological development during the post-World War period in that both have endeavoured to incorporate the poor regions into the world capitalist system through the discourse of technology and development. 109
Mattelart (2003) asserted that it was no accident that U.S. Vice President Gore decided to make his announcement in Buenos Aires, the World Bank’s most brilliant pupil of structural adjustment policies based on neo-liberalism, before an audience of delegates to the plenary meeting of the International Telecommunication Union, in which the main topic was telecommunications and development (pp.118-119). It seemed that it was no coincidence that both the settlement of the Uruguay Round and the declaration of the GII occurred in the same year with just a month apart.
The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services was also deeply embedded in neo-liberal regulatory fundamentals. These include “low barriers to entry in the market for communications services, effective rebalancing of rates for services during the market transition, strong interconnection policies, and the creation of independent regulatory authorities with the resources and power necessary to foster competition and safeguard consumer welfare” (Cowhey & Klimenko, 2001, p.62).
The dominant capitalist powers have always emphasized that the private sector and international organizations such as the ITU would play an instrumental role in facilitating implementation of the GII and the WTO Agreement. Such a strategy is also similar to the emphasis of private corporations and the United Nations with its specialized agencies as the responsible agencies committed to the Point Four program.
For example, in his 1994 speech at the ITU conference in Buenos Aires, Gore spoke out to the world audience as follows:
The GII will be the key to economic growth for national and international economies. For us in the United States, the information infrastructure already is to the U.S. economy of the 1990s what transport infrastructure was to the economy of the mid-20th century. 110
… I assure you that the U.S. will be discussing in many fora, inside and outside the ITU, whether these principles might be usefully adopted by all countries” (Gore, 1994).
In conclusion, the dominant capitalist countries, mainly the United States, have taken advantage of the discourse of technology and development to maintain and reproduce their political and economic hegemony. In the age of globalization and neo- liberalism, the GII and the WTO Agreement became the double-headed apparatus in reorganizing the world economic order. 111
CHAPTER 5
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF A POLICY REPORT
ON THE GLOBAL DIGITAL DIVIDE
This chapter provides the results of a textual analysis of the policy report, From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities: Measuring Infostates for Development (ITU
& ORBICOM, 2005) to address the second research question, “how does the discourse of the global digital divide construct the discourse of technology and development?” The analytical approach can be divided into two parts. The first part focuses on describing the linguistic features and interpreting the discursively-constructed meanings, focusing on the four key policy contents employed in this report: “information society,” 24 “Infostates,” 25
“digital divide,” 26 “digital opportunities.” 27 The first part of the analysis aims to identify the ways in which these four key policy contents discursively construct the meaning of the global digital divide.
24 . This report uses the term “the Information Society” with “the” and uppercase letters. However, this study uses “information society” without “the” and lowercase letters in analyzing this report. 25 . Through this report, the four different terms “Infostates” (uppercase and plural), “Infostate” (uppercase and singular), “infostates” (lowercase and plural), “infostate” (lowercase and singular) were used. In most cases, singular form indicates the theoretical framework or model itself and plural form points to the actual numerical values calculated from the model. As well, with some exceptions the uppercased form is predominantly used. Despite some semantic differences, however, this study adopts the term “Infostates” (uppercase and plural) as policy means of this report based on that “Infostates” is the very object of measurement and comparison while “Infostate” provides the theoretical basis for it. In addition, this study uses “the Infostate” when the term is used together with the term “framework” or “model.” 26 . The term “digital divide” is used instead of “global digital divide” through this entire report. Nevertheless, this study regards “digital divide” in the meaning of “global digital divide” since this report focuses more on the digital divide between countries rather than within a country. In addition, while this report mostly uses “the Digital Divide” with “the” and uppercase letters with some exceptions, this study uses the term “digital divide” without “the” and lowercase letters in analyzing this report. 27 . This report uses the term “digital opportunities” without “the” and lowercase letters. Therefore, this study uses the term “digital opportunities” in analyzing this report. 112
The second part analyzes the discursive strategies employed to legitimize the neo- liberal and modernistic view of technology and development. For this analysis, this dissertation focuses on the following discursive strategies: 1) “relative nature of digital divide” for designating the less-developed areas as problematic regions; 2) “narrative structure” for promoting the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector; and 3)
“othering” for reproducing the Western-oriented modernistic view of technology and development. In doing so, this study attempts to reveal that the discourse of the global digital divide faithfully subscribes to the notion of the Western-oriented technological development in the new historical context of economic neo-liberalism.
5.1. Main Theme and Four Key Policy Contents
In this dissertation, policy (or public policy) is defined as “a political agreement on a course of action (or inaction) designed to resolve or mitigate problems on the political agenda-economic, social, environmental, and so on, which involves a specification of ends (or goals) to be pursued and the means (or instruments) for achieving them” (Fischer, 1995, p.2). This definition of policy articulates three important policy contents: 1) policy problem; 2) policy means; and 3) policy goal. Whereas diverse methods or steps have been developed for policy analysis or evaluation by several policy theorists (Bardach, 2005; Clemons & McBeth, 2001; Dunn, 2004; Fischer, 1995; Stone,
2002) 28 , almost of all the various policy contents or information are directly or indirectly
28 . Bardach (2005) developed the so-called eightfold path: 1) Define the problem; 2) Assemble some evidence; 3) Construct the alternatives; 4) Select the criteria; 5) Project the outcomes; 6) Confront the trade-offs; 7) Decide; and 8) Tell your story (p.XIV); Clemons and McBeth’s (2001) five-step method included: 1) Define the problem and determine its causes; 2) Establish criteria to evaluate alternative; 3) Generate policy alternative; 4) Evaluate and select policies; and 5) Evaluate adopted policy (pp.136-148); Dunn (2004) addressed five types of policy-relevant information: 1) Policy problem; 2) Expected policy 113 related to these three policy contents.
In addition, this dissertation includes policy context as the fourth policy content based on the belief that all the processes of policy-making are indispensably embedded in a specific time and space. Policy context, as the given social, political, and economic setting or environment, sets the boundary of specific allocations of resources and strategies for assessing policy problems, policy means, and policy goals (Grindle, 1980, pp.10-15). Therefore, it is necessary to consider policy context in policy analysis. The following Table 6 illustrates the definitions of the four key policy contents selected in this study.
Definitions of Four Policy Contents Policy Contents Definitions
policy problem societal problem that a policy is designed to redress
policy means political agreement on a course of action (or inaction)
policy goal pursued consequences that policy means to achieve
policy context given social, political, and economic setting or environment
This dissertation first analyzes the main title and executive summary to identify the report’s main theme, consisting of policy problem, policy means, policy goal, and policy context. In general, the main title of a policy report symbolically compresses the main idea or issue of the text, which implies or articulates policy problem, policy means,
outcomes; 3) Preferred policy; 4) Observed policy outcome; and 5) Policy performance (pp.3-5); Fischer (1995) expected a public policy to supply the following information: 1) Definition of the problem to be addressed; 2) Participants to be involved in the policy program and the ways the policy is to affect them; 3) Intended effects on the society as a whole; and 4) Declaration of the basic social and political values (pp.2- 3); Stone (2002) offered the three parts of policy making framework: 1) Goals; 2) Problems; and 3) Solutions (p.11). 114 policy goal, and policy context. On the other hand, executive summary in a policy report not only overviews the main policy contents discussed in the report but also provides the rationale connecting them in a concise way.
From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities : Measuring Infostates for Development. (Main Title)
The catalytic role of ICTs in creating digital opportunities conducive to development and the danger posed by the Digital Divide have been well documented in recent years. In this context, a reliable monitoring instrument is indispensable. This project builds on the enthusiastic reception of the ‘Monitoring the Digital Divide …and Beyond’ report, presented at the Geneva 2003 WSIS, and offers such an instrument to the international community . Based on the Infostate conceptual framework and model , it incorporates measurements of ICT capital and labour stocks, indicative of a country’s productive capacity, and ICT consumption flows, indispensable to function in an Information Society . (paragraph 1, Executive Summary)
The main title introduces the three main contents of this policy report, which are
“the Digital Divide ,” “digital opportunities ,” and “ Measuring Infostates ” as in 1>. The grammatical use of a pair of prepositions “ from ” and “ to ” in the main title implies that this report identifies digital divide as policy problem and digital opportunities as policy goal. is more clearly contrasting digital divide as policy problem and digital opportunities as policy goal by collocating some positive and negative words respectively as in “ creating [positive] digital opportunities conducive [positive] to development ” and “ danger [negative] posed by the Digital Divide. ” In addition, this report regards digital opportunities and development as equivalent as in “creating digital 115 opportunities conducive to development ” and “Measuring Infostates for Development.”
Therefore, this study considers both digital opportunities and development as the policy goal in this report.
On the other hand, “ Measuring Infostates ” in the main title can be understood as policy means performed in this report to address the problem of digital divide and to attain the goal of digital opportunities (or development). Further, the first two sentences in show how “Measuring Infostates ” intervenes between policy problem
(digital divide) and policy goal (digital opportunities). Premised on that “a reliable monitoring instrument is indispensable, ” “Measuring Infostates ” plays two significant roles in this report: First is “ Monitoring the Digital Divide” ; and second is “incorporates measurements of ICT capital and labour stocks, indicative of a country’s productive capacity, and ICT consumption flows, indispensable to function in an Information
Society.” In other words, “ Measuring Infostates ” as policy means enables us to identify and diagnose digital divide (policy problem), and to validate the impacts of ICTs on digital opportunities or development (policy goal).
Finally, the last sentence in provides the information of policy context as in “indispensable to function in an Information Society.” Put another way,
“Information Society ” is the very specific and historical context that this policy report perceived, in which digital divide, digital opportunities, and Infostates have a special contextual meaning.
In short, the main theme of the report is to eliminate the “digital divide” and to create “digital opportunities” in the “information society” by monitoring the digital divide and validating the impacts of ICTs through a measurement of a country’s 116
“Infostates.” From this finding, this study draws four key policy contents in this report: 1)
“information society” as policy context; 2) “Infostates” as policy means; 3) “digital divide” as policy problem; and 4) “digital opportunities” or “development” as policy goal. The subsequent sub-chapters will discuss the detailed description and interpretation of the four key terms in order to investigate how these terms discursively construct the meaning of the global digital divide.
5.2. Discursively-Constructed Meanings of the Four Key Policy Contents
According to Fairclough (2003), “textual analysis can identify the main parts of the world which are represented as the main themes, which in principle is open to a range of different perspective, different representations, or different discourses” (p.129). Also, he added that textual analysis can “identify the particular perspective or angle or point of view from which they are represented” (p.129). While the main theme refers to the principal subject in text or discourse, particular perspective refers to an intended or preferred representation to support or endorse a certain position. For instance, economic development in developing countries has been one of the main themes in international relations. However, there has been a range of different perspectives or discourses such as modernization theory and dependency theory.
The concept of particular perspective in CDA parallels with Fischer’s notion of
“ideological discourse of social choice.” According to Fischer (1995), “social choice seeks to establish and examine the selection of a critical basis for making rationally informed choices about societal systems and their respective ways of life” (p.22). He continued to contend that “in order to advance their own social and material gain, people, 117 to a greater or lesser extent, rationalize their beliefs” (p.161). However, in most cases of technocratic policy “no argument is made concerning the value of the outcome or any as to value choices regarding means… What is argued for is only the value of the evidence of basing action and policy on expert knowledge” (Lemke, 1995, p.71). In other words, ideological argumentation for a certain social choice is not so much obvious as the main theme in the genre of technocratic policy discourse.
In particular, the policy-making process around international relations is characterized as a complex collective system constructed by different actors such as nation states and “sovereignty-free actors” including multinational corporations, regional organizations, ethnic groups, bureaucratic agencies, political parties and a host of other types of collectivities (Rosenau, 1990, p 36). All these “different actors align themselves with different principles, … [which] propel a particular action in a certain direction, … to secure their own objectives and goals by successfully weighing one principle or set of principles over others” (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000, pp.18-19).
Therefore, it will be critically essential to legitimize and win support for a certain principle or position as universal value within such complex international circumstances, in which all the different principles and objectives are conflicting with each other.
Concerning the topic of this study, which is the discourse of the global digital divide, the issue here is to investigate the particular perspective or ideological position through which this policy report is discursively constructing the meaning of the global digital divide by critically analyzing the four key policy contents.
118
5.2.1. Key Policy Content 1: Information Society as Policy Context
As mentioned previously, information society is the very specific and historical context that this policy report perceived, in which digital divide, digital opportunities, and
Infostates have a special contextual meaning. 29 Therefore, it will be important to analyze the discursive formation by which information society is conceptualized and constructed.
As Fairclough (2003) stated, “discourses word or lexicalize the world in particular ways”
(p.129). Therefore, the analysis of lexicalization used in a text is critically important.
However, Fairclough also put more emphasis on that “rather than just focusing on the individual meanings of wording, it is more productive to focus on semantic relationship between words” (p.129). shows the ways in which information society as policy context is semantically constructed by lexicalization in this policy report.
We live in times of sweeping change, wide in scope and dizzying in speed . Beyond the geopolitics of our era, the major force behind this wholesale transformation is the new technological tsunam i that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution . Largely due to the explosive surge of ICTs and their applications , actual and impeding , we are witnessing fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies . Some are already well underway, some are expected over the longer term, and others are still unknowable. Yet some things, particularly those associated with old imbalances , move at a snail’s pace or even in the wrong direction . (p.1)
Above all, it is conspicuous that the current world, which is the information
29 . Through the publication the phrase “information society” appears 51 times in total in just the main text excluding chapter titles, table of contents, and reference sources. However, it is interesting enough that there is no one use of the word “globalization” in this whole main text 119 society, is described as being in the midst of phenomenal transformation as in “ this wholesale transformation, ” to such a degree of time and space as in “ sweeping change, wide in scope and dizzying in speed .” Portraying the current world as being drastically changing, which is the most usual tactic in policy documents, it is trying to convince readers that immediate actions are necessary and desperate.
At the heart of such a global transformation is technological force, ICTs take the position of driving force in this world transformation as in “ the major force behind this wholesale transformation is the new technological tsunami ” and “ largely due to the explosive surge of ICTs and their applications. More interestingly, this report uses two metaphors, “the new technological tsunami ” and “ the digital revolution,” to symbolically create the image of ICTs as driving force. Fairclough (1992) argued that the use of metaphors in texts “structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of knowledge and belief, in a pervasive and fundamental way” (p.194). The two metaphors,
“the new technological tsunami ” and “ the digital revolution,” emphasize the enormous power of ICTs in transforming information society on one hand. On the other hand, they strongly warn that there will be a disaster unless immediate actions are taken to prepare ourselves for the upcoming change, and thus ICTs are perceived as “actual and impeding.”
The combined logic between ICTs as driving force and global transformation as phenomenal consequence in information society is converging toward the aspect of economy as in “ fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies .” That is, the current global change triggered by ICTs signifies “fundamental shifts in economic arrangements ” and the economic shifts are 120 considered to be critically consequential in the future as in “with critical consequences for the future of our societies .” The equivalent meaning between the current global transformation in information society and economic consequences is also found in the following other cases: “Billions of people can now learn, know and share. This has a direct impact on the prospects for social and economic development .” (p.IX); “It represents the area of overlap between the economic and the social aspects of the
Information Society ” (p.1); “As the world moves towards a global information economy and information society ” (p.9); “In many parts of the world the arrival of the information economy and society ” (p.12); and “The economic and societal transformations of the
Information Society are far from being complete, though they have been occurring for some time now ” (p.135).
It is also true that this report literally mentions the social aspects of information society as in “social and economic development ” (p.IX), “social aspects of the
Information Society ” (p.1), and “societal transformations of the Information Society”
(p.135). However, various non-economic issues in the political, social, or cultural domains are not specifically discussed but only are mentioned as a somewhat blurred set collocated with the economic domain when the report is concerned with the impact of
ICTs toward development in information society. 30 Therefore, the constructed notion of information society is translated into information economy, and also it insinuates that the subsequent discussion will be highlighting economic development rather than political, social, and cultural development.
30 . Rather, these diverse issues are suggested in the chapters of regional analyses (Ch.5) and the gender digital divide (Ch.6) of this report as barriers to ICTs development in less-developed countries. The issue of diverse political, social, cultural barriers to ICTs development in less-developed areas will be discussed in the analysis of discursive strategies later in this study. 121
is also emphasizing not only the benefits of ICTs for social and economic development as an historic opportunity given to all human kinds, but also an emerging problematic concern that needs to be tackled in this fundamental transition by the different uses of “inclusive” and “exclusive” pronouns. To begin with, the use of inclusive pronouns such as “ we ” and “ our ” as in “we live in times of sweeping change”,
“beyond of the geopolitics of our era,” “the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet ,” and “we are witnessing fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies” denotes the current world situation that we now face as one global community. Thus, it can be interpreted as an historic opportunity given to all human kind as in “ ICTs represent an historic opportunity for our evolution ” (p.1).
On the other hand, the use of exclusive pronouns such as “ some ” and “ others ” as in “ Some are already well underway, some are expected over the longer term, and others are still unknowable. Yet some things, particularly those associated with old imbalances, move at a snail’s pace or even in the wrong direction ” clearly contrasts positive (first and second “some ”) with negative (“others ” and third “ some ”). In particular, with a decisive clue as in “ particularly those associated with old imbalances, move at a snail’s pace or even in the wrong direction ,” it can be reasonably inferred that the problematic issue here is something related to the status of technology and economic development in the less-developed areas.
In other words, the contrasting uses of inclusive and exclusive pronouns revives the classical logic of techno-centric development model targeting the less-developed or developing countries established since World War II in the context of new circumstances 122 in the information society. The next reemphasizes this logic.
As the world moves towards a global information economy and information society, economies are becoming increasingly aware of the central importance of extending Information and Communication Technology (ICT) access to their populations. With the growing recognition of ICTs as effective tools for economic growth and social development, there are ever-greater incentives for economies to foster higher access levels, improve their Infostates , and eventually overcome the digital divide, the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities. (p. 9)
The first ascertains the orthodox theory of the techno-centric development model once again as in “As the world moves towards a global information economy and information societ y, economies are becoming increasingly aware of the central importance of extending Information and Communication Technology (ICT) access to their populations.” Then, it also more clearly designates the target issues and the problem as in “ for economies to foster higher access levels , improve their Infostates , and eventually overcome the digital divide ” as well as the target areas as in “ those with and those without ICT-related opportunities .”
In short, one consequence is that this policy report establishes a discursive logic, consisting of information society as historical context, technology as a driving force, and economic domain as a consequence. Such a discursive work in this report faithfully succeeds to the classical logic of the techno-centric development paradigm targeting the less-developed or developing countries since World War II. As well, the logic of this report also insinuates that the very same development model that was established during the post World War period is still valid in the current context of the information society. 123
5.2.2. Key Policy Content 2: Infostates as Policy Means 31
As discussed in chapter 4 of this study, technology has been one of the major factors in developing national economies and in internationalizing capitalist production.
Many types of technologies in agriculture, military, electronics, management, finance, the mass media, and telecommunications have been transplanted from advanced countries to most less-developed countries under the name of technology-transfer or technology-aid since World War II. With the arrival of the so-called information society, new ICTs have become the innovative motor of national and capitalist development in the new age of global information or digital economy.
The very logic that has justified the roles and power of technology for development was technological determinism. It characterized technology as the driving force for social change, value-free neutrality, universal applicability, and thus an effective tool for leapfrogging by laggard countries. However, many critics argued that technology itself must have been the ideology as well as the product for maintaining the hegemonic power of capitalist society (Webster, 2002; Schiller, 1999; McChesney et al, 1998;
Mattelart, 2003). Therefore, this study tries to analyze the way in which technology, especially ICTs, is discursively constructed in this policy report. It will be a necessary step toward further investigating how digital divide and digital opportunities are conceptualized in the context of neo-liberalism.
As analyzed previously, “Infostates” as policy means plays an important role in intervening between policy problem (digital divide) and policy goal (digital
31 . Even though the analysis of digital divide as policy problem should be ahead of Infostates as policy means according to the logical process of policy analysis, this study notes that the concept of Infostates is essential to understand digital divide as policy problem. Therefore, for the sake of analytical clarity, this study analyzes Infostates as policy means in advance of digital divide. 124 opportunities) by monitoring digital divide and by validating the impacts of ICTs on digital opportunities or development. Therefore, it must be critically significant to look into how “Infostates” is discursively constructed. The following summarizes the theoretical framework of and essential components in the Infostate model.
[1] In that setting, the conceptual framework developed the notions of a country’s infodensity and info-use. Infodensity refers to the slice of a country’s overall capital and labour stocks, which are ICT capital and ICT labour stocks and indicative of productive capacity . Info-use refers to the consumption flows of ICTs . Technically, it is possible to aggregate the two and arrive at the degree of a country’s ‘ICT-ization’, or infostate . (p.3)
[2] Infodensity : (……) ICT capital comprises network infrastructure and ICT machinery and equipment. ICT labour is perceived not as a collection of individuals, but as the stock of the ICT skills of those in the labour force . In this formulation, produced output will be an increasing function of these ICT stocks, as it is for all other forms of capital and labour. (……) Info-use : The availability of ICT goods is indispensable for the consumption of ICT services that would satisfy ultimate needs, and building ‘consumptive capacity’ is a prerequisite to generating consumption flows. In that vein, a distinction is made between ICT uptake and ICT intensity of use . (Roughly speaking, uptake refers to ICT goods, while intensity of use to ICT services ). (p.3)
“Infostates” or “ICT-ization” is a theoretical and empirical model at the same time.
Theoretically, as text [1] in shows, it incorporates “a country’s overall …
ICT capital and ICT labor stocks and indicative of productive capacity ” (Infodensity) and
“the consumption flows of ICT ” (Info-use) in each country. This two-tier theoretical model of Infostates is based on the belief that “what really matters for development is the utilization of the productive stocks rather than their availability ” (p.4).
Text [2] in elaborates theoretical components of Infodensity and Info- 125 use. For Infodensity, “ ICT capital comprises network infrastructure and ICT machinery and equipment , and ICT labor is perceived as the stock of the ICT skills of those in the labor force.” For Info-use, “ a distinction is made between ICT uptake and ICT intensity of use . Roughly speaking, uptake refers to ICT goods , while intensity of use to ICT services ” (p.3). Empirically, on the other hand, the value of “Infostates” is calculated as
“aggregate the two and arrive at the degree of a country’s ICT-ization ” (text [1]). In more detail, the following
illustrates the lists of indicators chosen and their allocation in the Infostate model (p.6). Measurement Indicators in the Infostate Model Main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants Waiting lines/mainlines Digital lines/mainlines Cell phones per 100 inhabitants ICT Capital Cable TV subscriptions per 100 households Internet hosts per 1,000 inhabitants Info-density Secure servers/Internet hosts International bandwidth (Kbs per inhabitant) Adult literacy rates Gross enrollment ratios ICT Labor Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education TV equipped households per 100 households Residential phone lines per 100 households ICT Uptake PCs per 100 inhabitants Info-use Internet users per 100 inhabitants Broadband users/Internet users ICT Intensity International outgoing telephone traffic min/capita of Use International incoming telephone traffic min/capita
In short, “Infostates” as policy means in this report is not only a theoretical framework or a measuring instrument for identifying digital divide, but also a practical policy means for attaining digital opportunities. Infostates as a measuring instrument is 126 critically related to digital divide as policy problem. Therefore, the aspect of Infostates as a measurement and each of the components in Infostates will be analyzed later in the next section, “Key Policy Contents 3: Digital Divide as Policy Problem” in this study. The issue here is to analyze the constructed meanings of ICTs in general, which is the technological aspect of Infostates as policy means for creating digital opportunities for development.
First of all, ICTs are characterized in this report as an effective tool for development as in “ The catalytic role of ICTs in creating digital opportunities conducive to development ” (Executive Summary), “ the recognition that ICTs are an effective tool for social development and economic growth ” (p. VII; p. 9), “ Almost-instinctive early beliefs that ICTs represent a powerful new addition to the development arsenal ” (p.1),
“ICTs represent the newest addition to the kit of development tools ” (p.49), “ICTs recognized by the government as a development tool ” (p.70), and “As a cross-cutting tool , ICTs are expected to play a catalytic role as well ” (p.136). Also, ICTs are characterized as being value-free as in “ in the case of ICTs technology-neutral ” (p.5) and
“the desirable property of technological neutrality ,” (p.205) which has been also one of the core elements in technological determinism.
However, such a conception of ICTs as an effective, catalytic, and neutral tool toward development through the use of evident lexicalization is just one element in constructing the ideation of ICTs in this policy report. More fundamentally, ICTs are deemed to be all-affecting “ enabling technology ” (p.12). To further look into the powerful representation of ICTs, this study draws on the concept of “process type” and
“grammatical metaphor” in systemic functional linguistics. 127
Halliday (1994) stated that “language enables human beings to build a mental picture of human reality or experiences to make sure of what goes on around them and inside them. In systemic functional linguistics, the clause plays a central role that embodies a general principle for modeling human experiences, namely the principle that reality is made up of various types of processes” (p.106). A process consists of three components: 1) the process itself (verbal group), 2) participants in the process (nominal group), and 3) circumstances associated with the process (adverbial group or prepositional group). The concept of process, participant, and circumstances are semantic categories that explain in the most general way how phenomena of the real world are represented as linguistic structures (p.109). Halliday gave an example of a clause that includes all these components in one sentence.
Clause as Process, Participants, and Circumstances The lion chased the tourist lazily through the bush
participant process participant circumstance circumstance nominal group verbal group nominal group adverbial group adverbial group .
Halliday identifies three principal types of the process (or verbal groups). First,
“material process” is the process of Doing or Happening, which expresses the notion that some entity does happen or do something concrete, physical, or abstract. The referred entity is called “Actor” and it means the one that does the deed as in an example of “ The lion (Actor) sprang (Material Process).” Some material processes, but not all, have a second participant, which is called ‘Goal” as in the example of “ The lion (Actor) caught
(Material Process) the tourist (Goal),” in which the Doing (Material Process) by the 128
Actor is directed at the Goal (1994, pp.109-112). In the material process, “Actor” is presented as the initiator of the process, which denotes that “Actor” has “capacity for agentive action, for making things happen, for controlling others and so forth is accentuated” (Fairclough, 2003, p.150).
The second type of the process is “relational process.” It is the process of Being, which represent the notion that a relation is being set up between two separate entities to identify one entity (Identified) as another entity (Identifier) such as “A (Identifier) is the identity of X (Identified),” or assign attributes of one entity (Carrier) to another entity
(Attribute) such as “A (Attribute) is or has an attribute of X (Carrier)” (Halliday, 1994, pp.119-124). In technocratic discourse, the relational verb is frequently used to define something in the structure of “Token-Relational Process-Value.” In older grammatical terminology, the subject (Token) is equated with the complement (Value) through the use of the verb “to be” (Relational Process) (Halliday, 1994, pp.124-130; McKenna &
Graham, 2000, pp.233-234).
The third type of the process is “mental process,” the process of Sensing, which represents the notion that a human-like participant (Senser) endowed with consciousness feels, thinks, or perceives something (Phenomenon). While the material and the relational processes are the most common form of verbs in technocratic discourse (McKenna &
Graham, 2000, pp.236), the mental process is not very common. Rather, it is “more likely to occur in advocacy writing, for example, in texts about conversation” (McKenna &
Graham, 2000, p.236).
Additionally, there are three subsidiary process types, located at each of the boundaries of the three main types: 1) the behavioral process that refers to human typical 129 physiological and psychological behaviors, sharing characteristic of material and mental,
2) the verbal process, the process of Saying, which covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning, sharing characteristic of mental and relational, 3) the existential process, which represents that something exists or happens, sharing characteristics of relational and mental (Halliday, 1994, pp.138-144). These three sub-process types are rather a cluster of small subtypes blending two adjoining processes into a continuum.
On the other hand, the term “grammatical metaphor” is a grammatical unit that functions as a representation of process (verbs) semantically with the form of entities or things (nouns) (Fairclough, 2003, p.143). Systemic functional linguistics extended the concept of metaphor from its conventional application to the meanings of words to grammar. To illustrate the notion of grammatical metaphor, this study introduces an example from Halliday and Matthiessen (1999, p.231).
Example of Grammatical Metaphor Lung cancer death rates are clearly associated with increased smoking
(2) (3) (1) they die faster (1), SO (2) more people smoke more of them die (1), BECAUSE (2) people smoke more people die faster IF (1), THEN (2) more people smoke more more people die .
The sentence in bold above
illustrates an example of grammatical metaphor. The sentence can be rephrased as the followings: i) more people smoke (or people smoke more, or more people smoke more ), SO t hey die faster (or more of them die, or people die faster, or more people die ); ii) more people smoke (or people smoke more, or more people smoke more ), BECAUSE they die faster (or more of them die, or 130 people die faster, or more people die ); iii) IF more people smoke (or people smoke more, or more people smoke more ), THEN they die faster (or more of them die, or people die faster, or more people die ). Unlike the original sentence in bold, variants (i), (ii), and (iii) in italic are grammatically de-metaphorized sentences. In other words, variable clauses that functions as processes in (i), (ii), and (iii) are grammatically represented as two nominal groups: “Lung cancer death rates” and “increased smoking.” Halliday (2004) maintained that “grammatical metaphor provides speakers and writers with additional, powerful resources for enacting social roles and relations in the complex network of relations that make up the fabric of a community of any kind”
(p.636). Downing (1989) further argued that “grammatical metaphor is one of the more sophisticated operations involved in a writer’s exploitation of the meaning potential of a language” (p.88). Nominalization, which is “the conversion of a verb into a noun-like word, and semantically of a process into an entity” (Fairclough, 2003, p.143), is “the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor” (Halliday, 1994, p.352). Concerning the discursive power of nominalization, Fairclough (2003) stated as follows:
Nominalization characteristically involves the loss of certain semantic elements of clauses – both tense and modality. It also may involve the exclusion of Participants in clauses. …… There is no specification of who progresses, acts, destroys or creates. Nominalization is a resource for generalizing, for abstracting from particular events and series or sets of events, and in that sense it is an irreducible resource in scientific and technical discourse (Halliday and Martin, 1993) as well as in governmental discourse (Lemke, 1995). …… Such generalization and abstraction can erase or even suppress difference. It can also obfuscate agency, and therefore responsibility, and social division (pp.143-144). 131
The subsequent extracts contain a number of linguistic evidence that clearly
demonstrates the functions of different types of processes and grammatical metaphors to
draw attention to the technological-deterministic view of new ICTs.
[1] The astounding speed with which ICTs, and particularly the mobile phone and the Internet , are permeating every country , exemplifies the world’s path towards a global information society . ICTs are affecting lives everywhere around the world and historic developments are taking place across the technological board. (p.9)
[2] For many around the globe, ICTs touch all facets of daily life, whether economic, social, political, or cultural . Not only do ICTs facilitate information sharing and knowledge management – both key elements of the Information Society – but they also provide people, businesses and governments with the essential networks to overcome the challenges of distance and time. (p.135)
In texts [1] and [2] in , the verbs “ are permeating ,” “ are affecting ,”
“touch ,” “ facilitate ,” and “ provide ” function as the material process (doing) of ICTs (the
Actor). These material verbs first contribute to augmenting the notion of ICTs as an
Actor with an active and dynamic force. Also, these material verbs are reinforcing the impacts of ICTs by extending the affected Goals (object) in terms of geography, all aspects of societal areas, and diverse stakeholders as in “every country ,” “ lives everywhere around the world ,” “ all facets of daily life, whether economic, social, political, or cultural ,” “ information sharing and knowledge management ,” and “ people, business, and governments.
On the other hand, a verb “ exemplifies ” can be categorized as the verbal process, close to the structure of “Token-Relational Process-Value” in the relational process. In 132 other words, the function of the verb “ exemplifies ” not only serves as symbolic meaning as the verbal process, but also the same verb “exemplifies ” as the relational process identifies a Token-Value relationship between “ ICTs with astounding speed ” (Token) and
“the world’s path towards a global information society ” (Value). As a result, ICTs as a token is identified with “ the world’s path ” as a value.
While mainly depends upon the use of the material process and a simple unloaded Actor in developing the concept of ICTs, shows more delicate discursive strategies of ICTs with various types of processes and grammatical metaphors (nominalization).
[1] A technology that has been receiving a great amount of attention is broadband, a term used to describe technologies that offer a high-speed and permanent connection to the Internet. Its ability to deliver a variety of new applications promises wide-ranging social and economic benefits . (pp. 11)
[2] We live in times of sweeping change, wide in scope and dizzying in speed. Beyond the geopolitics of our era, the major force behind this wholesale transformation is the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution . Largely due to the explosive surge of ICTs and their applications, actual and impeding, we are witnessing fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies.” (p.1)
In text [1] of the verb “ promises ” functions as verbal processes, the symbolic meaning of which insinuates a higher degree of certification or possibility with its modal potential. The process also appears to function as the relational process in the structure of “Token-Relational Process-Value.” In this case, the verb “ promises ” 133
(process) relates two highly condensed and abstract nominal groups: “ Its ability to deliver a variety of new applications ” as Token and “ wide-ranging social and economic benefits ” as Value. Not only do the two nominal groups play the role of cause and effect through the logical connection made by “ promises ” but also the Value becomes more guaranteed by the meaning potential of “ promises .”
The nominal group as Token (or Subject), “ Its ability to deliver a variety of new applications ,” basically designates the efficiency of broadband technology when considered within the context of the paragraph. The very previous sentence in text [1] shows that broadband technologies are described in detail as ones “ that offer a high- speed and permanent connection to the Internet .” However, in reality there exist the limited qualities of broadband technologies in terms of speed and connection. Such a technological limitation is metaphorically re-constructed in this report as “ a variety of new applications ” through nominalization. Again, the other nominal group as Value (or
Object), “ wide-ranging social and economic benefits ” is just given here without any further explanation.
By shifting clauses to a lower rank order in the grammar, the resulting effect here is to make the argued semantic relation between new technologies and social and economic benefits less negotiable or contestable. Halliday and Martin (1993) succinctly pointed out such an effect of nominalization as “You can argue with a clause but you cannot argue with a nominal group” (p.39). More fundamentally, “technocratic nominalizations close off debate by eliminating, or at least presuming, causal and relational processes that would be evident in a clause” (McKenna & Graham, 2000, p.231). 134
Text [2] in also shows a similar strategy of process and nominalization to text [1]. In text [2], the verb in the first sentence is “ is ,” the relational process. The process connects two nominal groups, “the major force behind this wholesale transformation ” and “ the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution .” The relationship between the two nominal groups can be understood as “Identified-Identifying” relation. In technocratic discourse, the
“Identified-Identifying relation can often travel in both directions precisely because of the highly abstract nominal groups in the discourse” (McKenna & Graham, 2000, p.234).
Therefore, “ the major force behind this wholesale transformation ” (Identified or
Token) and “ the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution ” (Identifying or Value) can quite easily be reversed around the process.
In other words, a reversed new sentence “the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution is the major force behind this wholesale transformation” is also possible. Such a semantic relationship can corroborate “the very fact that these discourse elements can be related without seeming immediately nonsensical draws attention to the possibility that no logical relation exists between them at all” (McKenna & Graham, 2000, p.234).
The same semantic relation is directly transmitted to the next sentence. The nominal group of “ the explosive surge of ICTs and their applications, actual and impeding ,” is equivalent to “ the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution ,” and “ fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies ” semantically equals to “ this wholesale transformation,” with the relation created in the previous sentence being intact. 135
The constructed representations of ICTs are not all positive and beneficial. In fact, one crucial element in technological determinism is to accentuate the notion of technological imperative by suggesting some tragic endings unless they are implemented immediately. In so doing, technological imperative equates the potential of technology simply with the notion of inevitability.
[1] At a time when the new offers previously unimaginable opportunities , it also comes with the potential to seriously exacerbate existing sizeable and unwanted imbalances to the point that, if not properly addressed , they may look desirable down the road. In a nutshell, this is the story of the Digital Divide . (p.1)
[2] Therefore, the Internet has emerged not only as a revolutionary new technology but also as a major source of the Digital Divide . (p.21)
[3] It is crucial for countries to foster higher access levels , and improve their Infostates , so as to create digital opportunities (p.VII).
[4] there are ever-greater incentives for economies to foster higher access levels , improve their Infostates , and eventually overcome the digital divide , the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities. (p.9)
As shown in , ICTs not only offer “previously unimaginable opportunities ” (text 1) or are emerged “as a revolutionary new technology ” (text 2), but also come with “the potential to seriously exacerbate existing sizeable and unwanted imbalances ” (text 1), which is “the story of the Digital Divide ” (text 1) or “a major source of the Digital Divide ” (text 2). That is, this report emphasizes that ICTs as a new 136 opportunity for economic and social development may not be attained “if not properly addressed ” (text 1).
Then, concerning the way in which countries address the potential of ICTs properly, this report decisively highlights the importance of increasing Infostates as in “to foster higher access levels , and improve their Infostates , so as to create digital opportunities ” (text 3) and “to foster higher access levels , improve their Infostates , and eventually overcome the digital divide ” (text 4). That is, the higher access level of
Infostates in a country becomes the synonym for overcoming digital divide and creating digital opportunities. In so doing, Infostates turns out to be the only and crucial policy means in this report.
5.2.3. Key Policy Content 3: Digital Divide as Policy Problem
“Digital divide” is the policy problem that this policy report identifies and thus it is a target that needs to be eliminated or mitigated. As Dunn (2004) pointed out, “it is the problem orientation more than any other features that distinguishes policy analysis from disciplines that prize knowledge for its own sake” (p.2). In practice as well, decision- makers “first identify empirically the existence of a problem, then formulate the goals and objectives that would lead to an optimal solution” (Fischer, 2003, p.4). Consequently, the identification and construction of policy problem as such becomes the starting point in the process of policy analysis.
It has been increasingly noted that policy problems are not deduced from a set of objective and value-free observations, or policy problems “are not objective entities in their own right,” (Dery, 1984, p.64) either. From this perspective, policy problem can be 137 theoretically defined as “a gap between a normative standard and a perception of an existing or expected situation” (Fischer, 1995, p.71) or as “ unrealized needs, values, or opportunities for improvement that may be pursued through public action” (Dunn, 2004, p.72). These definitions emphasize the normative and subjective aspect of policy problem rather than the practical and objective aspect.
Otherwise stated, policy problems cannot be identified or evaluated without normative criteria, which are perceived as socially-agreed values. Fischer’s notion of
“social choice” fits well into the relationship between policy problem and normative values. Fischer (1995) explicated that “social choice involves the interpretive tasks of social and political critique,” which are “the concept of rational way of life and the good society” (p.22). According to the socially-chosen values, standards, or criteria, societal problem can be identified.
From the constructionist viewpoint, problem definition in policy discourse is understood as “a process of image-making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and responsibility” (Stone, 1989, p.282). Put differently,
“these socially constructed problems thus do not necessarily reflect any absolute, objective reality. Rather, based on symbols, language, assumptions, and value judgments, these constructions are inevitably arbitrary, subjective, and unstable” (Moon, 2002, p.145). This perspective noted that policy problem definition prioritizes some aspects of the issues, ignores other aspects, and directs the path to policy solutions in a certain way.
Therefore, in the field of policy analysis or evaluation, it is important to analyze the ways in which a policy problem is constructed within a text.
The issue here is to analyze how this report discursively defines and 138 conceptualizes “digital divide” as the policy problem in this report. The most salient feature in conceptualizing digital divide in this report is not far from the mainstream trend in most of the current global digital divide research, which have focused on the aspects of techno-centric access and usage levels. Some underlined phrases in describe the access-oriented definition of digital divide.
[1] Simply understood as the gaps between ICT ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ , the Digital Divide represents the newest addition to the enormous chasms in the stage of development and the standard of living among economies. (p.1)
[2] Our focus is on the Digital Divide , which is ICT-centric . (p.2)
[3] the digital divide , the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities . (p.9)
As shown in Text [1] in , digital divide is simply defined as “the gaps between ICT ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots ” and the focus is “ICT-centric ” (text 2). Even though the report claims that the Infostate model is not access-oriented as in “a cohesive conceptual framework, which goes beyond connectivity measures and logically incorporates skills, and offers rich analytical linkages ” (Executive Summary) and “ focus on ICTs, but be broader in scope than pure connectivity measure s” (p.2), the listed indicators in seem to be still skewed to access and usage dimensions. In particular, most of the indicators in Info-Use such as “TV equipped households per households,” “Resident phone lines per 100 households,” “PCs per 100 habitants,” 139 “Internet users per 100 inhabitants,” “Broadband users,” and “Internet users” are merely close to simple availability.
It is worth examining the definition of digital divide in Text [3], “ the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities, ” in more detail.
Semantically speaking, both the terms of “ haves ” and “ have-nots ” (Text 1) as such may not imply any judgement calls. Put differently, these terms require a further rationale to justify why “ haves ” is positive or advantageous and why “ have-nots ” is negative or harmful.
On the other hand, the definition of digital divide in Text 3 transposes the material dimension of technological access and usage into the symbolic dimension by using a highly loaded nominalization, “ICT-related opportunities .” The word, “ opportunities ,” has intrinsically positive connotations in itself, and thus the dichotomy between “ haves ” and “ have-nots ” is situated upon the logic of “good or desirable” and “bad or undesirable.” In so doing, the definition of digital divide, “the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities,” becomes a self-sufficient rationale for ascertaining digital divide as policy problem that should be resolved.
The “ICT-centric ” definition of digital divide, focusing on the levels of access to and usage of ICTs, is well exemplified in the conceptual framework of Infostates, which is the main theoretical and empirical model for monitoring digital divide in this policy report. Within the framework, digital divide is defined as “ the relative difference in
Infostates among economies ” (Text 1) or “ the difference between economies’ Infostates ”
(Text 2) as in .
140
[1] “The Digital Divide is then defined as the relative difference in infostates among economies . (p.3)
[2] “Considering that the Digital Divide is defined as the difference between economies’ Infostates , it is clearly affected by anything that affects Infostates.” (p.15)
As a measuring instrument, the Infostate model includes various types of indicators, consisting of ICT capital, ICT labor stocks, ICT uptake, and ICT intensity of use as illustrated in
32 The issue here is not to criticize the methodological exactness such as the credibility or robustness of the adopted statistical model. Instead, this study tries to investigate the function of the Infostate model both as a measuring instrument and as policy means. The theoretical framework of the Infostate model can raise a fundamental issue in that the problem of digital divide is measured and identified from the measurement of
ICT development. It is certain that the Infostate model may be a useful and reliable measuring tool for estimating and comparing the current status of ICT development across countries. However, it is one thing to know the development of ICT and quite another to understand the problem of digital divide. In order to making this issue clear, this study gives an example of logical problem related to the issue here.
32 . The complete methodology and the technical specifications, together with explanatory notes, are contained in detail in Chapter 8 of the report (pp.203-210). 141
Example of Logical Problem He is poor. (1) He does not have much money. (2) He spent a lot of money in gambling. (4) He needs to make a lot of money. (3) He needs to stop gambling. (5)
In
, we identified a problem issue in sentence (1). Sentences (2) and (3) follow the logical sequence employed in this policy report. Faced with a problematic issue, which is “He is poor (1),” the next step, according to the first logic, is how the concerned problem can be measured empirically. As a result, sentence (1) is empirically verified based on the objective evidence of sentence (2), which is “He does not have much money. Then, the solution to the problem is logically suggested in sentence (3),
“He needs to make a lot of money.” It seems to be very logical and scientifically flawless, but it falls into the fallacy of tautology.
On the other hand, sentences (4) and (5) show quite a different logical flow from the first one. Faced with the same problematic phenomenon, “He is poor (1),” the second logic asks why this problem occurs rather than measures it. The reason for sentence (1) this logic finds is “He spent a lot of money in gambling” (sentence 2). Now the logic can provide a solution, which is “He needs to stop gambling” (sentence 3). In fact, sentence
(2) might not be the proper reason for sentence (1). However, this problem-reason- solution judgment does not have any logical fallacies if only acceptable reasons can be obtained.
Correspondingly, this policy report apparently adheres to the logic employed in sentences (1)-(2)-(3) in
. Prior to probing the possible reasons for digital 142 divide, 33 this report measures each country’s Infostates to identify the existence of digital divide among countries. Then the report concludes that the increase in Infostates will result in overcoming digital divide and creating digital opportunities as in “It is crucial for countries to foster higher access levels , and improve their Infostates , so as to create digital opportunities ” (p. VII) or “ there are ever-greater incentives for economies to foster higher access levels , improve their Infostates , and eventually overcome the digital divide ” (p. 9). The real problem in this logic that the increase in Infostates as policy means toward policy goal (digital opportunities) is not deduced from the result of deliberations on various causes for digital divide, but is supposed beforehand within the very Infostate model as a device for measuring digital divide. Therefore, this tautological framework becomes a self-sufficient rationale for legitimizing the main theme of this report, which is the increase in Infostates is the only solution to solving the problem of digital divide. One critical consequence is that although the Infostate model can answer the following question, “which country’s Infostate improved, how much, when and from what ICTs ”
(p.57), it may not explain the real causes for digital divide nor offer reasonable solutions.
Even though the logic connecting policy problem (digital divide), policy means
(Infostates), and policy goal (digital opportunities) in this report seems reasonable, an issue of logical validity can be raised such as “Is measuring the level of a country’s
Infostates truly a valid method for monitoring digital divide?” or “Why does this project
33 . Indeed, this policy report prepares a separate chapter (chapter 5) to answer the why-question about the different status of ICT development among the countries. Nevertheless, this dissertation has an opinion that this why-question does not intercede in the main theme among policy problem, policy means and policy goal in the report. Instead, this why-question appears to be used as a discursive strategy to strengthen the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector, and to blame the less-developed countries for the lower level of Infostates. The discursive strategy will be analyzed later in this study. 143 measure Infostates to monitor digital divide?” In response to such possible inquiries, this policy report prepares two discursive strategies.
First, this report emphasizes the necessity of measurement in overcoming digital divide and in creating digital opportunities by the use of lexicalization with modal potential. Halliday (1994, p.355) recognized the evaluative attributes in propositions and proposals as one of the metaphors by which modality might be realized. In English, there are many attributes with evaluative meanings such as desirability, necessity, normativity, importance, or usefulness (Lemke, 1995, p.43; 1998, p.37; Graham, 2001, p.770).
Particularly in the genre of policy discourse, the evaluative dimension of language generates the imperatives for action (Graham, 2001, p.770).
shows the evidence of lexicalization with evaluative meanings as in
“a reliable monitoring instrument is indispensable” (Importance), “Ideally, the discussions that publications such as “From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities:
Measuring Infostates for Development” present will help inform the next steps we take in bringing access to ICTs and skills to people the world over ” (Normativity and
Usefulness), “the Digital Divide came to the fore with the need for measurement . The specific need for an instrument ” (Necessity), and “ work better , best practice, and critically link” (Desirability and Importance). In so doing, the Infostate model gains legitimacy as a measuring instrument.
[1] The catalytic role of ICTs in creating digital opportunities conducive to development and the danger posed by the Digital Divide have been well documented in recent years. In this context, a reliable monitoring instrument is indispensable . (Executive Summary) 144
[2] Ideally, the discussions that publications such as “From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities: Measuring Infostates for Development” present will help inform the next steps we take in bringing access to ICTs and skills to people the world over. (p. X)
[3] As an area of investigation, the Digital Divide is multifaceted and serves as a prime example of the need for multi-disciplinary approaches. From early on, much like every Information Society issue, the Digital Divide came to the fore with the need for measurement. The specific need for an instrument that would quantify the Digital Divide and systematically monitor its evolution became evident . This is where the present project is situated. While the issue is clearly applicable wherever masses of people live, including within economies, the focus of this work is on measurements across economies . (pp. 1-2)
[4] such policy work can confront different approaches and identify policies and strategies that work (or work better ), best practice, and critically link ICTs to overall development efforts. (p. 56).
The second discursive device for validating the necessity of measurement is the strategy of recourse to authority. The rationale comes from the recommendation of the
WSIS 2003 as in “a collaborative global endeavour in direct response to the Plan of
Action of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS, Geneva 2003), which called for the development and the launching of a Composite ICT Development Index ” (p.
V) and “the explicit recommendation of the WSIS Plan of Action, paragraph 28, to
…develop and launch a composite ICT Development (Digital Opportunity) Index” (p.
VII). The WSIS is one of the most prestigious global meetings concerning the issue of the global digital divide. As a result, the choice of Infostates as a measuring instrument for monitoring digital divide can be legitimized by the authority of global consensus.
Another noteworthy concept of digital divide in this policy report is to construct it 145 as a relative concept. The following exemplifies some cases in which the relative nature of digital divide is constructed. Digital divide is defined not as the absolute difference in Infostates but as “ relative difference in Infostates ” (Text 1) and “ its relative position toward other countries ” (Text 3). Text 2 explains why this policy project invites “relative” concept as in “ consistent with the need for policy relevance, as opposed to business usefulness … for businesses with an eye on market size. ”
[1] The Digital Divide is then defined as the relative difference in infostates among economies. (p.3)
[2] “Consistent with the need for policy relevance, as opposed to business usefulness , infostates are expressed in relative terms . Thus, a small country like Luxembourg can have a higher infostate than a much larger one, say, India. In absolute terms something like that is unlikely to happen – and this matters for businesses with an eye on market size . Considering the relative nature of the Digital Divide due to the constant evolution of infostates everywhere, the model calls for a reference country and a reference year.” (p.5)
[3] “The ICT Opportunity Index is an inclusive tool that measures economies’ ICT networks, skills, and use. The unique methodology of the index allows each economy to measure its Infostate over time, both in terms of its relative position towards other countries , but also against its own progress.” (p.7)
Such a relative concept of digital divide turns out to be a very powerful discursive strategy, which positions certain groups of countries as distinctive and, thus, problematic
“the other” within a system of differences, not outside representation (Hall, 1994, p.392;
Riggins, 1997, p.4). As previously discussed, “othering” is a way of defining one’s own 146 positive identity through the stigmatization of “the other."
. According to the very relative nature of digital divide, the report maintains that
“the 139 economies for which existing data makes it possible to estimate Infostates values were divided into five groups 34 ” (p.13). Then, the Infostate model emphasizes that “ the true objective the model is to measure the difference between this group with very high
Infostates and the others ” (p.14). As evidently articulated, “the high Infostates group” is identified with “ from Western Europe including all Scandinavian economies, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the U.K. and Germany, the U.S. and
Canada from North America, Hong Kong, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Japan from Asia, as well as Australia, New Zealand, and Israel ” (p.14). Then again, the other four groups are put together as “others” regardless of their individual diversity, reminding us of “ those associated with old imbalances ” (p.1).
After all, the scheme of the Infostate model faithfully subscribes to the traditional dichotomy of developed vs. undeveloped in the modernistic view of technology and development. Logically, this policy report has clear target areas as in “ focus for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin American and the Caribbean ” (p.V) and “ This detailed work was undertaken for several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the
Caribbean ” (p.57). The discursive strategy of othering functions as symbolic violence,
“as a tool for order, subjugation, and demise” (Bourdieu, 1999, p.3). As a result, such a discursive practice of othering becomes a material force to maintain and reproduce the existing power order.
In short, the reason why the digital divide becomes the problem in this report is
34 . The Infostate model labels these five groups as High, Elevated, Intermediate, Moderate, and Low Infostates groups. 147 given from the results of a relative comparison between the high Infostates group and the other ones. It reflects the long-lasting modernistic and colonial perspectives by way of which the level of development in the less-developed areas has been defined as underdeveloped.
5.2.4. Key Policy Content 4: Digital Opportunities (or Development) as Policy Goal
As obviously pronounced in the main title of this policy document, “ From the
Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities ,” digital opportunities are described as the desirable destination, contrasted with digital divide. Digital opportunities or development as policy goal can be reached through the aid of ICTs as in “ The catalytic role of ICTs in creating digital opportunities conducive to development ” (Executive Summary). The issue here is to investigate the way in which digital opportunities are discursively constructed as the final stage of development in this report.
Above all, as discussed previously in the section of “information society” as policy context, this report strongly underscores the economic aspect of development. For the purpose, the report first accentuates the economic nature of ICTs. As shown in
, the report basically assumes that “ the nature of ICTs is dual: they are both productive assets , as well as consumables.” This short sentence not only underlines the economic aspect of ICTs in itself, but also functions as the theoretical foundation of the
Infostate model, which combines Infodensity as “productive assets ” and “indicative of productive capacity ,” and Info-use as “consumables ” and “the consumption flow of
ICTs.” Consequently, Infostates defined as “aggregate the two [Infodensity and Info- use]” or “the degree of a country’s ‘ICT-ization” turns out to be an economic-oriented 148 measurement for digital opportunities or development.
The nature of ICTs is dual; they are both productive assets, as well as consumables ” In that setting, the conceptual framework developed the notions of a country’s infodensity and info-use. Infodensity refers to the slice of a country’s overall capital and labour stocks, which are ICT capital and ICT labour stocks and indicative of productive capacity . Info-use refers to the consumption flows of ICTs . Technically, it is possible to aggregate the two and arrive at the degree of a country’s ‘ICT-ization’, or infostate . (p.3)
The economic-focused concept of development in this report is more evident in the following . It seems that this report acknowledges the importance of other aspects as in “ it is situated all along within the broader socio-economic, geopolitical and cultural environment of a country ” (Text 1) and “The economic and social impacts of ICTs are equally important ” (p.10). However, the so-called “ the basics ” turn out to be that “ the economy plays the key role ” (Text 1) as shown in .
As a result, ICTs “ as an economic and social reality ” (Text 1) is confirmed again as in
“ICTs ceased to be a political issue and became an economic issue ” (Text 2).
[1] The conceptualization begins with the basics . The overriding issue of a society concerns the quality of life of its people. In that regard, the economy plays the key role, but it is situated all along within the broader socio-economic, geopolitical and cultural environment of a country . ICTs affect everything and they are treated as an economic and social reality . (p.2)
[2] When a new party came to power in 2003 on a platform of full liberalization, ICTs ceased to be a political issue and became an economic issue like other national 149
infrastructure. (p.69)
In a parallel with the way information society is described as “fundamental shifts in economic arrangements with critical consequences for the future of our societies ”
(Extract 3), the impact of ICTs on development also weighs the aspect of economic growth or development as in “ICTs are an effective tool for social development and economic growth ” (p.VII), “With the growing recognition of ICTs as effective tools for economic growth and social development ” (p.9), “This has a direct impact on the prospects for social and economic development ” (p.IX), “the linkages between the diffusion and use of ICTs and economic developmen t” (p.1), “Access to ICTs has been growing at high speeds, exceeding global economic growth ” (p.9), “Its ability to deliver a variety of new applications promises wide-ranging social and economic benefits ” (p.11), and “the economic impacts of ICTs on the firm, industry and macro levels ” (p.45).
Grounded in the economic-oriented nature of ICTs and economic growth as consequences of ICTs, this report analyzes the relationship between Infodensity and per capita GDP to measure “the impact of Infodensity on economies’ economic growth, including the marginal effects of an additional Infodensity point on per capita GDP ”
(p.45). It is interesting to see that this report uses Infodensity to measure the impacts of
ICTs on economic growth unlike it uses Infostates as the aggregate of Infodensity and
Info-use to measure digital divide.
As shown in , Infodensity as productive capacity is assumed to be more important to economic growth and development than Info-use as consumption as in
“while the current standard of living of the people depends largely on consumption, over time we must confront the problem of expanding the production capabilities of a country 150 in a sustainable way . This brings us to the whole issue of economic growth and, by extension, to economic development .” Otherwise stated, this report put more emphasis on the fact that economic growth can be attained through increasing the production side of
ICTs capacity, which is the level of Infodensity.
A distinction is made between consumptive and productive functions. Following economic theory, while the current standard of living of the people depends largely on consumption, over time we must confront the problem of expanding the production capabilities of a country in a sustainable way . This brings us to the whole issue of economic growth and, by extension, to economic development . (pp.2-3)
This statement can be understood in the context of the current neo-liberal reform in the telecommunications sector worldwide, which has underlined the necessity of market openness, competition, and privatization in the telecommunications industry. The stress on the production side of ICTs can facilitate foreign direct investment and technology transfer from “have-countries” to “have-not-countries.” Therefore, it can only benefit some advanced countries already equipped with ICTs infrastructure, equipment, and skills.
The summarizes the main result of the relationship between
Infodensity and economic growth as in “ Infodensity is found to be highly correlated with per capita GDP, with a correlation coefficient of 0.95 ” (Text 1), “ a 1 point increase in the Infodensity index would increase per capita GDP by $139-$193 dollars per year ”
(Text 2), and “ a 1% increase in the Infodensity index of a country would, on average, have resulted in a 0.3% increase in its per capita GDP ” (Text 3). 151
[1] Infodensity is found to be highly correlated with per capita GDP (expressed in $US and in PPP terms), with a correlation coefficient of 0.95 . (……) The results of the regression show that 80% of the variation in the rates of growth of per capita GDP is explained by the variation in the growth rate of Infodensity . This confirms the strong linkage between the level of ICT advancement of a country and its level of income . … This suggests that, on average, economic growth is more responsive to ICT changes today than it was a decade or so ago. (pp.45-46)
[2] Clearly, the results show that not only the sensitivity of per capita GDP to changes in Infodensity is large , but also that it has increased progressively over the period. The marginal effects indicate that, on average, a 1 point increase in the Infodensity index would increase per capita GDP by $139-$193 dollars per year . (p.50)
[3] the model was extended in order to control for other variables that have an impact on the growth rate of a country, (……) the model explains 73% of the variation in per capita GDP growth rates across time and economies . (……) The estimated elasticity coefficients exhibit the upward trend found there, increasing from 0.1 in 1996 to 0.3 by 2003 . That is, a 1% increase in the Infodensity index of a country would, on average, have resulted in a 0.3% increase in its per capita GDP in 2003. (pp.50-51)
It is not the aim of this dissertation to attest to the statistical result between the relationship between Infodensity and economic growth verified in this report. Rather, the issue here is to find the way in which a subjective argument of “ICTs are an effective tool for development ” is transformed into an objective fact, thus a truth.
To begin with, ICTs as an independent variable is measured as the level of
Infodensity according to the Infostate framework, and development as a dependent variable is measured as a country’s per capita GDP. Then, the application of statistical analysis empirically verifies a causal relationship between increase in Infodensity and per 152 capital GDP in some numerical formulae as in “1 point increase in the Infodensity index would increase per capita GDP by $139-$193 per year” or “a 1% increase in the
Infodensity index of a country would, on average, have resulted in a 0.3% increase in its per capita GDP.” The logical sequences can be illustrated as the following.
1 point increase in the ICTs are an Indensity Infodensity index would effective tool for and → → increase per capita GDP development Economic Growth by $139-$193 per year Subjective Theoretical Objective Proposition → Framework → Fact
↑ ↑ Measurement Statistics
Some post-positivist policy analysts argued that the use of numerical values in defining policy problems and recommending policy goals is one of the typical characteristics in technocratic policy discourse (Fischer, 1995, 2003; Lemke, 1995; Stone,
2002). The use of numbers in policy reports must be practically helpful in identifying policy problems objectively, comparing the extent of problems among groups concerned, and advising policy means and goals more clearly. Nevertheless, as Stone (2002) put it,
“numbers in politics are measures of human activities, made by human beings, and intended to influence human behavior” (p.177). That is, numbers as a means for human beings to understand the world objectively become a real and objective artifact, which imply a need for action (Fischer, 2003, pp.171-172).
Consequently, the whole deliberation concerning new ICTs and development in this report are simply transformed into a numerical formula as follows: “a country can 153 increase per capita GDP by $139-193 per year if it increases 1 point of Infodensity level.”
In short, the numerical formula as an objective reality becomes the sole practical goal toward digital opportunities or development. Such a petrified result can disregard rich discussions and deliberations on the development of more relevant policy means in the policy-making process.
5.3. Discursive Strategies of Justifying the Modernistic and the Neo-liberal Model of
Technology and Development
Hitherto, this dissertation analyzed the main theme and four policy contents in this report, focusing on their semantic connotations with the help of detailed linguistic analysis. Now it turns attention to some discursive strategies through which this policy report legitimizes the neo-liberal and modernistic view of technology and development.
This policy report conducts three types of regional analysis: 1) empirical analysis of magnitude and evolution of digital divide (chapter 3); 2) regional case analysis of reasons for digital divide (chapter 5); and 3) regional case analysis of reasons for the gender digital divide (chapter 6). This dissertation analyzes what specific discursive strategies are employed in these three regional analyses to promote the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector and to reproduce the modernistic view of technology and development.
5.3.1. Discursive Strategy for Designating the Less-Developed Areas as Problematic
The chapter of empirical analysis of the global digital divide answers the following two questions: 1) how big is digital divide? (magnitude); and 2) is digital 154 divide closing or widening over time? (evolution). Covering the period from 1995-2003, the report analyzed the magnitude and evolution of digital divide through the measurement of Infostates and the major components of Infodensity and Info-use.
The key results of the magnitude (Text 1) and evolution (Text 2, 3, and 4) of the global digital divide measured by Infostates are summarized in .
[1] The Infostate resul ts obtained from the model for 2003 are shown in Table 3.1. It becomes immediately evident that the gaps between the top and the bottom continue to be enormous . Infostate values range from a high of 254.9 to a low of 7.9. Literally, the have and the have-not economies are worlds apart, separated by many decades of development . (p.13)
[2] Infostates increase for every group and every year. The growth rates for all five groups are actually quite high: Infostate values in the low group more than quadrupled , and the moderate group was not far behind . The values of the elevated group more than tripled , (……) The rates of growth of economies with lower Infostates are greater than those with higher Infostates . (p.34)
[3] The divides are closing faster between the high group and the elevated (-41.6%), intermediate (-28.7%) and moderate (-21.7%) groups, than is the case between the high and the low groups (-13.2%) (p.35)
[4] The key messages can be summarized as follows: First, the Digital Divide is closing overall because the middle groups are making good progress against the top. Second, the low group is outpaced by middle groups and the only gains are against economies at the very top , with whom they are separated by huge gaps. Third, 2001 marks a leveling-off in both the closing of the divides between the high group and all others, and in the low group losing ground against all others. (p.35)
provides somewhat conflicting information on the magnitude and 155 evolution of digital divide. To begin with, the Infostate values for 2003 indicates that digital divide between the high Infostates group and the low Infostates group is big as in
“the gaps between the top and the bottom continue to be enormous ” and “the have and the have-not economies are worlds apart, separated by many decades of development ”
(Text 1). On the contrary, Text 2 shows that the growth rates of lower Infostates group are higher than those of higher Infostates group between 1995 and 2003 as in “Infostate values in the low group more than quadrupled, and the moderate group was not far behind. The values of the elevated group more than tripled ” and “the rates of growth of economies with lower Infostates are greater than those with higher Infostates ” (Text 2).
If these results are correct, it might be argued that digital divide is closing over time because economies with lower Infostates group are growing faster than economies with higher Infostates group during the period from 1995-2003 even though the gaps are still enormous in 2003. As previously discussed, however, this report defines digital divide as “the difference between this group with very high Infostates and the others ”
(p.14). According to this criterion of comparison with the high Infostates group, this report finds that “the divides are closing faster between the high group and the elevated
(-41.6%), intermediate (-28.7%) and moderate (-21.7%) groups, than is the case between the high and the low groups (-13.2%) ” (Text 3).
Therefore, the final result of empirical analysis of the evolution of digital divide in this report is that even though the gaps between the high group and all the other four groups (elevated, intermediate, moderate, and low) are closing during the period, the rate of closing gap in the low Infostates group against the high Infostates group is the lowest compared to those of the other three middle groups as in “the low group is outpaced by 156 middle groups ” (text 4). Further, this final result is deduced even though this report admits that the rate of closing gap between the low Infostates group and the high
Infostates group is actually narrowing as in “the only gains are against economies at the very top ” (Text 4).
In short, the relative concept of digital divide in this report serves as an important discursive strategy through which the low Infostates group is designated as problematic regions. The real function of the relative nature of digital divide is to compare the growth rates of Infostates in the four Infostates group (elevated, intermediate, moderate, and low) each other against that of the high Infostates group. As a result, the low Infostates group, which is heavy on Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, becomes the most problematic group even though the group improves the value of Infostates “more than quadrupled ” (Text 2) and narrows the gap against the high Infostates group as in “the only gains are against economies at the very top ” (Text 4).
After then, this report conducts a detailed regional analysis to identify specific factors that drive or impede the Infostates development targeting these low Infostates regions, which will be discussed in the next section.
5.3.2. Discursive Strategy for Promoting Neo-liberal Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector
As previously discussed in the section of analysis of digital divide as policy problem in this study, this report deduces the rationale of increasing Infostates as policy means from the very Infostate model as a device for measuring digital divide rather than considers various causes for digital divide. To compensate it, the consideration of various causes for digital divide or the low levels of Infostates is comprehensively examined in 157 the chapter of regional analysis in this report (chapter 5). Therefore, this dissertation here analyzes what ideological choices or values are constructed and promoted through the detailed regional analysis of the reasons for digital divide.
This policy report contains a chapter of detailed regional analysis with a focus for countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean to further investigate
“what government policies, business strategies, macro environments and other factors were driving the movement of the numbers ” (p.57). This chapter of regional analysis presents a complementary explanation to the empirical analysis of the magnitude and evolution of digital divide “by going behind the numbers to answer the all-important why questions ” (p.57).
This chapter of regional analysis overviews the evolution of Infostates for selected countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean “to identify specific causal influences, whether drivers or impediments, as well as link them to underlying policies, regulatory environments and business strategies ” (p.57). Also, the regional analysis goes hand in hand with “the discussion of country-specific and time- specific contexts, involving macro socio-economic, institutional, cultural and even geographical influences that impact on the diffusion and use of new technologies and services ” (p.57). Therefore, efforts are made “to enrich the analysis by sketching possible causes for the changes captured by the data, with the view of drawing useful policy lessons ” (p.57).
Through the detailed regional analysis, this report identifies five factors, which are perceived as favorable to increasing the values of Infostates as shown .
These five factors can be valued as practical action plans that this policy report concluded 158 to increase Infostates in each country and finally attain digital opportunities or development. Each of the five action plans can be respectively labeled as follows: 1) regulation and laws; 2) education and ICT training; 3) pricing and taxation; 4) domestic societal issues; and 5) competition.
- The importance of modern Telecommunications Acts and their implications come out loud and clear. - The emphasis on overall education and specific ICT training, as well as their many linkages with the Information Society, could not have been clearer. - The importance of pricing and affordability, taxation, information and awareness are all found to exert powerful influences on comparative performances. - Distinctions between urban centers and rural areas emphasize the need for broader developmental efforts and away from one-size-fits-all approaches. - Competition is a formidable force; the number of firms, the rules of engagement, and pricing plans all make a difference. (pp.57-58)
As discussed in the previous sections of four policy contents (information society,
Infostates, digital divide, and digital opportunities) in this dissertation, this report is quite immersed in the dominant development paradigm based on economic neo-liberalism.
Therefore, this study attempted to analyze how the neo-liberal development paradigm is discursively constructed within these five action plans. For the purpose, this study analyzed the two sections of “Regional Overview” of Africa, and Latin America and the
Caribbean areas, which summarize the detailed discussions of each country’s report. 35
The summarized overview sections were chosen because it is assumed that subjective
35 . This report does not provide “Regional Overview” of Asia. 159 judgment must intervene during the work of summarizing each country’s reports into these condensed overviews.
The most salient feature found in the regional overviews is an enormous emphasis on the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector. Indeed, among the five action plans, “regulation and laws,” “pricing and taxation,” and “competition” are to a great extent converging into promoting the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector.
To begin with, “regulation and laws” refers to issues related to governmental efforts to introduce new regulatory systems or laws in the telecommunications sector.
The changes in the regulatory system and the introduction of new telecommunications laws are acknowledged to create favorable environments that encourage the levels of
ICTs infrastructures, access, and usage in both industries and households. However, such laudable impacts of regulatory reforms can be guaranteed only on condition that they are equipped with neo-liberal principles, characterized as the elimination of political interference and the promotion of market forces. Surely, these have been the most prominent issues dealt with in the contexts of GII and the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services since the mid of 1990s.
Grounded on the theoretical and historical circumstances, this policy report emphasizes on the one hand that the successful neo-liberal economic reforms such as restructuring, competition, privatization, market-opening, or application of business models are being explained as the driving force for enhancing Infostate values. On the other hand, failed or poorly-handled privatization and competition as well as state interference or monopolistic restrictions in the telecommunications sector are described 160 as detrimental factors. As well, based on the belief that the lower cost of ICTs equipment is one of the critical factors to increasing the values of Infostates, this report also argues that the easiest way to cost reduction can be through the elimination of or reduction in taxation and tariffs, which is to be sure one of the main elements in the theory of neo- liberal economics. The underlined parts in the following shows the positive effects of the neo-liberal reforms, and the bold parts in the negative effects of the failed or partial reforms in the telecommunications sector.
[1] South Africa’s Infostate progress between 1996 and 1998 reflects the political commitment to affordable access for all citizens, following the first democratic election in 1994. By 1996 a legislative reform process was underway which, in 1997, resulted in the partial privatization of the fixed line incumbent Telkom and the introduction of the first independent regulator , the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, SATRA. (……) South Africa’s relatively high Infostate value in 1995 also reflects the introduction of mobile services . (……) The real growth in mobile, however, occurred between 1999 and 2001 when the threat of further competition from a third mobile network operator stimulated the introduction of pre-paid services. (South Africa, pp.59- 60)
[2] Kenya’s steady growth in cellular and to a lesser degree Internet services was primarily due to reforms that started in 1998, after a long period of monopoly restrictions characterized by huge waiting lists for fixed lines and high costs of cellular services. (……) Government and the operators were proactive in reducing the entry costs for subscribers: the government eliminated taxes on handsets , while the operators made them even cheaper by subsidizing them, reduced connection fees and introduced small- denomination airtime packages . (Kenya, pp.60-61)
[3] This advance resulted primarily from the reform of the telecommunications sector , starting with the split between national and international telephony within the 161 government-run system (as far back as 1981), followed by the privatization of the incumbent operator in 1997 and full liberalisation of the sector by 2004. (……) Finally, since 2000 a national development strategy (“e-Senegal”) has created a new telecommunications law , an independent regulatory body and an IT department , both linked to the Presidency, and firm steps to attract international capital investment in IT . (Senegal, p.61)
[4] Although there was a partial opening of the market to mobile operators, lack of political commitment to reform has created uncertainty, in a market that lacks a stable regulatory environment conducive to investment . The transition from full monopoly to partial competition was poorly handled and the three privatization attempts failed , worsening the situation and leaving the development of the sector to the two mobile operators . The ICT sector has become characterized by poor management, a weak and ineffectual regulatory authority, political interference, and the prevalence of hidden agendas . (Cameroon, p.61)
[5] Thus, rather slow progress was registered between 1996 and 1999. Political interference in the regulatory regime and an ineffectual regulatory authority also contributed to this. (Ghana, p.62)
[6] Ethiopia’s Infostate remained one of the lowest in the world. It has not undertaken the orthodox neo liberal reforms seen in the other countries. (……), very limited progress was made on the regulatory front due to the conflict of interest resulting from the government acting both as an operator and a regulator . (……) Ethiopia’s performance r einforces the scepticism about the effectiveness of public monopoly operators to provide communication services at affordable and efficient levels . (Ethiopia, p.62)
[7] it appears that after having shaped a consistent regulatory framework and a very good infrastructure propelled by private sector initiatives , a new stage has begun in the country, where exploitation and further utilization of the existing infrastructure is the relevant factor. (Chile, p.117)
[8] Uruguay’s evolution is based on the successful restructuring of the state 162
telecommunications firm (……) and by the opening up of the Internet market in 2002 to more private firms as Internet service providers . (Uruguay, p.117)
[9] The quality of Argentina’s education system, and the high level of investment that followed the privatization of telecommunications in the early nineties, were two factors that mitigated the effects of the economic, political and institutional crises. (Argentine, p.117)
[10] There is wide consensus that the lack of liberalization of the Internet and the mobile phones markets stands out among the reasons for these low penetration rates in Costa Rica. (Costa Rica, p.117)
[11] The number of Internet users in 2002 was six times the number in 2001, following a new telecommunications law in 2000 which led to an increase in the number of Internet service providers, more competition and reduced prices . (Jamaica, p.118)
The emphasis on the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector is strengthened by the form of narrative, or story-telling. Narrative can be defined as
“telling of a story, which presents information as a sequence of connected events with some kind of thematic or structural coherence” (Wiles, Rosenberg, & Kearns, 2005, p.90).
Based on the belief that “the narrative form of discourse has played a vital part in the epistemological challenge to the dominant empiricist orientation” (Fischer, 2003, p.161), many scholars have paid attention to the central role of narrative story-telling in policy making (Rein, 1976; Kaplan, 1993; Richter, 1997; Stone, 2002; Fischer, 2003).
Narrative is “an organized form of discourse with a plot in three parts: beginning, middle, and end” (Kaplan, 1993, p.171). In the context of policy making, the beginning of the story is about a problem to be solved by policy makers, the middle part introduces a policy means or intervention, and the end turns to the consequences of the policy means 163 or intervention. Structured sequentially with a beginning, middle, and end, the narrative tells us about “an original state of affairs, an action, or an event, and the consequent state of events” (Czarniawska, 1998, p.2). Through the construction and interpretation of such narrative sequences, policy makers seek to “translate a narrative into an argument, or to tease out the argument implicitly embedded in the story” (Fischer, 2003, p.181). Such a sequential narrative structure gives a “sense of ending” (Kermode, 1967), which “help criticize other stories and create a better one with a happier ending” (Kaplan, 1993, p.177). Therefore, the analysis of narrative or story-telling in policy reports is meaningful to investigate the way in which an argument is made persuasively.
In , the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector
(underlined parts) are positioned as policy means or intervention, which solve the underdevelopment of ICTs and thus lead to successful growth of Infostates. Likewise, the failed or partial reforms (bold parts) also show the narrative structure, but unsuccessful stories. Such a story-telling structure, in particular, is mediated by the use of words such as “resulted in ” “introduction ” (Text 1), “started ” (Text 2), “resulted primarily from ”
“followed by ” “has created ” (Text 3), “has created ” “failed ” (Text 4), “contributed ”
(Text 5), “has not undertaken ” (Text 6), “after having shaped ” “propelled by” “a new stage has begun ” (Text 7), “followed ” (Text 9), “following ” “led to increase ” (Text 11).
Consequently, the narrative structure underlines the causality of policy means, which is the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector in this policy report, and gives the feeling of ‘sense of happy ending.”
On the contrary, “domestic societal issues” does not have the narrative structure as shown in . Some domestic social issues such as income, race, or rural- 164 urban differences are just described as problematic without any policy interventions as in
“the distribution of income is racially skewed in favour of the white population, primarily in urban areas ,” “access to and use of ICTs by the black population, especially in rural areas ,” (Text 1), “The penetration of PCs and telephone services has been severely constrained by (……) low average household income, particularly in rural areas ” (Text
2). “around 90% of the rural population remains uncovered for even basic access ” (Text
3),
[1] However, the distribution of income is racially skewed in favour of the white population, primarily in urban areas . Thus, unlike the aggregate Infodensity and Info-use components, access to and use of ICTs by the black population, especially in rural areas , is very much in line with the rest of the continent. (South Africa, p.59)
[2] The penetration of PCs and telephone services has been severely constrained by the combination of high prices, a stagnant economy, and low average household income , particularly in rural areas (Zambia, p.60)
[3] First, around 90% of the rural population remains uncovered for even basic access . (Cameroon, p.61)
[4] Senegal’s education system is of a high-quality compared to most other African countries, with a regional telecommunications school created at the beginning of the ‘80 s. (Senegal, p.61)
[5] A regulator was also established in 1996 to control the behaviour of the monopoly operator, promote the expansion and maintenance of a good quality telecommunications service, license operators, and advance research and education in the telecommunication sector . (Ethiopia, p.62)
165
[6] The quality of Argentina’s education system , and the high level of investment that followed the privatization of telecommunications in the early nineties, were two factors that mitigated the effects of the economic, political and institutional crises . (Argentina, p.117)
[7] Joint actions by public and private actors (computerization and ICT training in schools , growth in ICT investment in post offices, etc.) also appear to have had a remarkable impact . (Jamaica, p.118)
Unlike “domestic societal issues,” “education and ICT training” has a sense of narrative in that the high-quality of education system and the introduction of telecommunications schools or ICT training are described as positive factors to mitigate social problems and to enhance ICT development as in Text 4, 6, and 7 in .
Nevertheless, this report also assumes that the impact of education and ICT training is mediated by neo-liberal reforms as in “A regulator was also established in 1996 to control the behaviour of the monopoly operator, promote the expansion and maintenance of a good quality telecommunications service, license operators, and advance research and education in the telecommunication sector” (Text 5) and “Joint actions by public and private actors (computerization and ICT training in schools, growth in ICT investment in post offices, etc.) also appear to have had a remarkable impact ” (Text 7).
Therefore, the positive impact of the neo-liberal reforms is maintained once again in
“education and ICT training.”
In addition, the discursive strategy of prioritizing the neo-liberal reforms in enhancing the Infostate development is legitimized by local authors. This policy report articulates that this regional analysis does not reflect any external pressures but the authentic voices from the regions themselves as in “ this work was carried out by 166 researchers in the South, for several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the
Caribbean ” (Executive Summary), “ The South assumed complete ownership of this part of the research . (……) Not only the country research was carried out exclusively by researchers in the region, but also the coordination of each region was undertaken by reputable regional organizations ” (p.VI), and “ This detailed work was undertaken for several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean” (p.57).
In short, the emphasis on local authors in the report plays the role of legitimizing the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism by eliciting consent from inside rather than from outside coercion. Consequently, it functions as a discursive strategy for creating and maintaining the hegemonic power of the dominant ideology.
5.3.3. Discursive Strategy for Reproducing the Modernistic View of Technological Development
The consideration of diverse reasons for digital divide is also explained in the chapter of the gender digital divide in this report. Unlike the discursive strategy of the previous regional analysis, which promotes the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector (see section 5.3.2), however, the reasons for the gender digital divide reproduces the modernistic view of development, which have attributed the underdevelopment of ICTs in the less-developed areas to the inner problems embedded in the traditional societies. Therefore, this dissertation analyzes the way in which the modernistic view of development is discursively reproduced through the detailed analysis of the reasons for the gender digital divide.
Above all, this policy report assumes that “ the gender digital divide will be situated in the context of the overall digital divide, as measured by Infostates. Gender 167 gaps must be viewed in conjunction with the overall situation of a country, and cannot be meaningfully analyzed independently ” (p.138). Therefore, quite similar to the analytic approaches used in the overall global digital divide, the first step in investigating the gender digital divide is carried out by a quantitative analysis of Infostates among countries by gender.
However, the results of the quantitative analysis of the gender digital divide are quite different from the overall patterns of Infostates in that they show only very conflicting results between the developed and the less-developed countries as in 20>.
[1] Data on access to and use of ICTs indicate that women’s participation in the Information Society, particularly in the poor countries of the world, lags behind that of men, a cause for serious concern. (p.138)
[2] Many studies have found that generally divides are larger among new ICTs with low penetration, decreasing gradually as penetration increases . (p.139)
[3] Even in countries where access is no longer much of an issue and penetration is high, inequalities in actual use can hamper women’s development opportunities on both the economic and social fronts. (p.138)
[4] The gender divide persists as we move to countries with more developed Infostates . (p.141)
[5] Recent results from a study of six countries are indicative of the progress women have made in some areas and countries, but also of the persistent nature of the gender divide even among developed nations . (p.142)
168
[6] Similar results of moderate, yet persistent, gender gaps have come out of other countries with very high Infostates . (p.142)
[7] While the gender gap has recently vanished in a few countries with high Internet penetration, such as Canada and the U.S., this is not the case among other countries well- known for their high Infostates , such as Norway, Luxembourg, the U.K, the Netherlands, Germany and France. (p.145)
[8] At the same time, we also see a number of countries with very low overall penetration that, within this context, do not seem to experience a gender divide . (p.145)
[9] The relationship between the gender divide and the overall digital divide is very tenuous and does not support the argument that the two move in tandem . (p.145)
[10] Clearly, there are factors at play other than those associated with overall Infostate development . (……) This can become more complex if additional variables are brought in, such as income, regional characteristics, cultural influences , etc. As was shown in Chapter 4, for example, while there is a relationship between Infostates and per capita GDP, that too is subject to important exceptions - with high income countries having relatively low Infostates and vice versa . (p.145)
While Texts 1 and 2 in state the gender digital divide is more typical in poor or lower Infostates countries, Texts 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 produce counterevidence that demonstrates that even in very high Infostates or developed countries the gender digital divide exists persistently. At the same time, Text 8 shows that a number of countries with very low penetration do not experience the gender digital divide. As a result, this document acknowledges that “ The relationship between the gender divide and the overall digital divide is very tenuous and does not support the argument that the two move in tandem ” (Text 9). Further, it even provides a somewhat contradictory remark against the main theoretical assumption of this report, which is the relationship between Infostates 169 and economic growth as in “ while there is a relationship between Infostates and per capita GDP, that too is subject to important exceptions - with high income countries having relatively low Infostates and vice versa ” (Text 10).
In the face of such a discursive crisis, however, this report resorts to various societal factors to explain the conflicting results on the gender digital divide as in “ there are factors at play other than those associated with overall Infostate development. (……)
This can become more complex if additional variables are brought in, such as income, regional characteristics, cultural influences, etc ” (Text 10). Therefore, the chapter of the gender digital divide takes a broader and multi-dimensional perspective. The 21> delineates that the principal perspective embedded in the gender digital divide is quite different from the main perspective of this report, which is access- and penetration- focused.
The size and the evolution of the gender divide refer largely to ICT access and penetration, which are the first and most basic requirements for their effective use. However, the issue of the gender divide is much broader . Even in countries where access is no longer much of an issue and penetration is high, inequalities in actual use can hamper women’s development opportunities on both the economic and social fronts. So, although initially we begin to identify where and how big the ICT access and penetration gaps are, we can say little about women’s equal and active participation in the Information Society just based on access . Access is a necessary but not sufficient condition to closing the gender digital divide. The issues of ICT literacy and skills are central to including and encouraging women to fully participate in, benefit from, and contribute to the Information Society . (p.138) Also, as shown in many sub-titles in the chapter of the gender digital divide such as “ location of use ,” “ patterns of use ,” “ ICT literacy, education and skills ,” “ men and 170 women digitally divided at the workplace ,” “ ICT employment ,” “ social and cultural barriers to ICT infrastructure and access ,” “ education and skills ,” “ employment and occupation ,” “ financial barriers and universal access ,” “ media and content ,” “ privacy and security ,” and “ ICT policy and governance ,” several topics beyond connectivity are being extensively discussed in the gender digital divide.
Literally speaking, it is categorically desirable to look into various contextual dimensions in each individual country so that we can comprehend the magnitude and evolution of the gender digital divide thoroughly, and thus suggest better policy means.
However, it seems that such an attention to country-specific societal contexts play a very significant role as a discursive strategy of “othering.” As previously discussed, the discursive strategy of othering has been historically abused to endorse the Westernized model of development by attributing certain problematic issues in the less-developed areas to the unique traditional characteristics inherent in non-Western areas, based on the clear-cut dichotomy between “Modern-Western-Good” and “Traditional-Non-Western-
Bad.”
The following contains many examples that show the case analysis of non-technological aspects in the less-developed areas is served to reproduce the discursive purpose of othering.
[1] Typically, the availability of access in locations other than the home have been perceived as equalizing forces for several aspects of the digital divide at large. While this is true in developed countries as well, in many developing countries alternative locations, especially public places, offer the main (if not the only) means of access . Generally, women have problems in access from such locations too . (p.147) 171
[2] Moreover, most Internet use in Yemen is either at the desks of professional and administrative employees in relatively large offices, where few women are found, or in cybercafés , where cultural constraints make it very difficult for women to frequent . (p.153)
[3] Men frequently felt threatened by women’s use of cell phones and the Internet; the new freedoms afforded to women were perceived as destabilizing to relationships. In many cases men monitored the cell phone and Internet use of their partners. (……) Very few people were aware of any connection between gender and ICTs, and the notion of gender equity in access to and use of ICTs was not commonly understood or accepted . (West Africa, p.155)
[4] The participation of men in the labour force exceeds that of women in every region of the world. The largest differentials are observed in the Middle East and North Africa, followed by South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean . (p.156)
[5] In addition to labour force participation in general, the sector of engagement matters. In Cambodia , for instance, where there is practically no difference between the participation rates of women and men in the labour force, a substantial proportion of men compared to women are either paid employees or self-employed, while the proportion of women in unpaid family employment is twice that of men. Women are always more likely than men to be family workers . (p.157)
[6] In South Africa , for example, although women make up just over half of the total population and 41% of the employed population, they occupy only 15% of executive manager positions and a fraction of director positions . (p.158)
[7] In much of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of the Caribbean, women make up the majority of the population in rural areas , as men migrate to the cities for work. (……) In Africa in particular, reliable Internet connectivity is frequently available only within capital and major secondary cities, while the majority of women live outside these regions . The urban bias in the diffusion of ICTs, coupled with the fact that most poor women in developing countries live in rural areas, make the placement of infrastructure a 172 gender issue . Thus, simply by being the majority of the population in rural areas, women have fewer opportunities than men to access new technologie s. Linked to location, but also to religious and socio-cultural attitudes, the mobility of women (both in the sense of access to transport and ability to leave the home) is also more limited than that of men . (pp.166-167)
[8] In a series of interviews with telecentre managers throughout Africa, all said that domestic responsibilities, socio-cultural constraints and economic hurdles were key impediments to women’s access . (p.167)
[9] women who do use telecentres throughout Africa are frequently uncomfortable receiving one-on-one technical assistance from a man . Having to interact closely with men may put off many women from visiting the telecentres. (p.167)
[10] Girls make up two thirds of children in the developing world without access to basic education . Particularly in India, the poorest often fear that ICTs and ICT centres are not for people like them for reasons of caste, illiteracy and gender power relations . They often assume that these centres are only for educated people. In Darjeeling, for instance, illiterate people frequently asked if the centres were only open to the literate. (p.169)
[11] The confluence of culture and computers can also constrain women from accessing and using ICTs when the traditional cultures view female use of computers negatively or if the use of computers by women is seen to be a burden to current (and potential) families . This is the situation for young Muslim women in Seelampur, India who were rejected as candidates for arranged marriages on the grounds that because they are computer-literate they will not adjust in the marital family . Instances have also come to light about greater dowry demands for computer literate daughters. (p.169)
[12] Among women users of the Internet at telecentres in Senegal , there were large variations in the use of applications between rural and urban women. In urban areas, women users preferred Internet navigation over e-mail and word processing, while in rural areas ‘surfing’ was not the preference of any of the women, probably due to the language and education variables (urban women users were likely to be better educated, younger and French speakin g). (p.170) 173
[13] Some reasons given by women and men in Nigeria for the low participation of women in ICT were that ICT and related careers were unsuitable for the female personality, too strenuous for women, and limited their chances for marriage . (p.174)
[14] In developing countries , women tend to lack access to other economic resources as well, such as land and labour force . Moreover, not only do women have less disposable income than men in general , they have more family responsibilities and are more likely than men to spend their earnings on food, clothes and other basic needs . (pp.182-183)
[15] A Commonwealth of Learning study in Zambia reported that “women are generally not engaged in their own economic activities and very few women have money . In many cases, their husbands bar them from making money. Since they need consent from their husbands to obtain a loan, they may have no access to lending institution s. (p.183)
A number of example texts in describe some social, economic, and cultural constraints as substantial barriers for women’s equal access to and use of ICTs in most developing and less-developed countries. Texts 1, 2, 9, and 10 explain that cultural constraints in many developing and less-developed countries make it difficult for women to get access to the ICTs equipment and education in especially public places such as large offices, cybercafés, and ICT telecentres other than home. For example, Text 9 describes the women who use telecentres in Africa “are frequently uncomfortable receiving one-on-one technical assistance from a man.” Text 10 also portrays that the poorest in India do not have the awareness of ICTs education due to caste, illiteracy, and the gender power relations as in “illiterate people frequently asked if the centres were only open to the literate.”
Texts 3, 7, 11, 13 and 15 explains that the patriarchic norm in these areas prevents women from getting benefits of new ICTs as in “Men frequently felt threatened by 174 women’s use of cell phones and the Internet; the new freedoms afforded to women were perceived as destabilizing to relationships ” (Text 3), “to religious and socio-cultural attitudes, the mobility of women (both in the sense of access to transport and ability to leave the home) is also more limited than that of men ” (Text 7), “constrain women from accessing and using ICTs when the traditional cultures view female use of computers negatively or if the use of computers by women is seen to be a burden to current (and potential) families ” (Text 11), “the low participation of women in ICT were that ICT and related careers were unsuitable for the female personality ” (Text 13), and “their husbands bar them from making money. Since they need consent from their husbands to obtain a loan, they may have no access to lending institutions ” (Text 15).
From the perspective of the labor force, Texts 2, 4, 5, 6, 14, and 15 explain that the male-oriented structure of employment in the less-developed countries, which segregates women to low-level positions or family workers, is also a negative factor for women to get access to ICTs resources as in “In Cambodia, (……) Women are always more likely than men to be family workers ” (Text 5), “they occupy only 15% of executive manager positions and a fraction of director positions ” (Text 6), “In developing countries, (……) not only do women have less disposable income than men in general, they have more family responsibilities and are more likely than men to spend their earnings on food, clothes and other basic needs ” (Text 14), “women are generally not engaged in their own economic activities and very few women have money ” (Text 15).
In particular, Text 4 emphasizes that the unequal participation of women in the labor force is more noticeable in the less-developed areas even though it acknowledges this pattern is worldwide as in “ The participation of men in the labour force exceeds that 175 of women in every region of the world. The largest differentials are observed in the
Middle East and North Africa, followed by South Asia and Latin America and the
Caribbean ” (Text 4).
Lastly, Texts 7 and 12 indicates that the asymmetric development of ICTs infrastructure between urban cities and rural areas in the less-developed countries exacerbates the Internet connectivity by women in rural areas, in which women make up the majority of the population as in “In Africa in particular, reliable Internet connectivity is frequently available only within capital and major secondary cities, while the majority of women live outside these regions ” (Text 7), “The urban bias in the diffusion of ICTs, coupled with the fact that most poor women in developing countries live in rural areas, make the placement of infrastructure a gender issue” (Text 7), “in Senegal, (……) while in rural areas ‘surfing’ was not the preference of any of the women, probably due to the language and education variables (urban women users were likely to be better educated, younger and French speaking) ” (Text 12).
It is of course that this report also acknowledges that the similar patterns of the gender bias in the labor force are observed even in developed countries as in “ Further evidence of the difficulties encountered by women stems from their employment in industries of the ICT sector, both in developed and developing countries ” (p.158), “ the tendency (……) to direct women into non-technical professions (……) is also the case in so-called developed countries ” (p.170), “ Among developed countries , the percentage of women in ODL programming also varies, (……) Female participation is lower in
Europe ” (p.177), “ women tend to be younger than their male colleagues, since women’s entry into science, engineering and technology fields is a relatively recent phenomenon. 176
This is true in developed as well as developing countries ” (p.181), “although women tend to be overrepresented in lower-paid, lower-skilled and lower-level positions (in both developed and developing countries )” (p.181), “ Some concerns are relevant to both developed and developing countries, such as difficulty balancing home and work environments, and the use of home workers as a way for businesses to avoid labour laws, paying benefits or social insurance ” (p.181), “ In developed and developing countries alike , much of women’s work is unpaid ” (p.182).
However, the approach to the developed countries is rather different from that of the developing or less-developed regions. Dealing with even similar problematic issues such as under-representation of women in labour forces or unpaid work in the developed countries, this policy report does not associate them with some socio-cultural traditional origins but only addresses the issues without any further explanations.
Such a stigmatizing discourse in the gender digital divide faithfully follows the long-lasting modernistic bias against the non-Western areas by way of which the causes or origins of underdevelopment were attributed to the inner problems of the traditional societies themselves. Consequently, this report insinuates that possible solutions can be obtained not from inside but from outside as in “ In developed countries some general strategies have proven to be effective in encouraging the continued participation of girls and women in education, such as scholarships based on merit, culturally appropriate facilities, female teachers, alternative schools with flexible schedules, and vocational training ” (p.175).
In short, the focus on various socio-cultural aspects in the discussion of the gender digital divide functions as a blaming device with the help of discursive strategy of 177 othering, which attributes the underdevelopment of ICTs infrastructure and the low level of Infostates to the inner problems of the less-developed countries. 178
CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigated the discourse of the global digital divide historically and discursively, using critical discourse analysis (CDA), with a view to identifying that the discourse of the global digital divide is not only an emerging discourse in the current age of globalization and neo-liberalism, but also is the succession of the modernistic discourse of technology and development constructed by the dominant power countries since World War II.
The mainstream studies of the global digital divide, based on positivist policy analysis, have focused on measuring the magnitude of the digital divide and ICTs development across countries, and explaining the determinant factors of the global digital divide empirically. On the other hand, some critics have paid attention to the discourse of the global digital divide itself, arguing that the discourse of the global digital divide could reproduce the existing inequalities between the developed and the less-developed countries by promoting the dominant paradigm of the Western-led technocratic development.
The methodology of CDA offers a useful theoretical and analytical perspective in exploring the discourse of the global digital divide since CDA is concerned with exposing power relations that are backgrounded or connotated rather than denoted within a text. With the help of CDA, which views a text not only as a representation of social events but also as causal power in the construction of the social world, this dissertation 179 first explored how the discourse of technology and development has been historically established since World War II in order to answer the first research question, which is
“what are the historical contexts that have shaped and promoted the discourse of the global digital divide?” Then, it also conducted a critical textual analysis of a major policy report on the global digital divide, From the Digital Divide to Digital Opportunities:
Measuring Infostates for Development co-authored by ITU and ORBICOM (2005) to address the second research question, which is “how does the discourse of the global digital divide construct the discourse of technology and development?”
This chapter concludes the current study by summarizing research findings in relation to research questions and discussing them with a suggestion of multi-disciplinary approach to deliberate the issue of the global digital divide.
6.1. Research Summary
6.1.1. Historical Continuities of the Dominant Capitalist Strategies in the Discourse of Technology and Development from the Cold-War Era to the Age of Globalization
From a historical perspective, this dissertation tracked down the establishment of discourse of technology and development since the post-World War II period to the current age of globalization to answer the first research question: “what are the historical contexts that have shaped and promoted the discourse of the global digital divide?”
The challenges that the U.S. faced after World War II can be summarized into the following two: 1) to defend the democratic regime against the communism; and 2) to create U.S. economy hegemonic power over the world in the post-World War II era.
Technology was an ideological tool as well as a material force to serve these two challenges. The beginning of the Cold War era considerably provided economic and 180 political foundation for the American notion of technology and progress to diffuse over the globe, particularly targeting the Third World.
The Point Four program, just beyond a simple technical aid program, marked a historic moment in which the United States as a world leader and the less-developed countries as a collective group encountered each other for the first time in the modern sense of international relations. The Point Four Program became the key route through which the strategic principles of U.S. foreign policy toward the less-developed areas as a whole were formed and disseminated during the Cold War era.
The U.S. strategies can be summarized in the following three ways: 1) to construct and propagate the discourse of technology and economic development; 2) to incorporate the less-developed countries into the world trade system, and 3) to employ
U.S. corporations and international organizations as a channel of access to the Third
World. The Point Four Program must be the very beginning of the U.S. economic- educational-scientific-military-industrial complex in the 20 th century, and can be understood as the start of U.S. global capitalist strategy during the Cold-War era.
Modernization theory, as a social and economic model of describing and explaining the processes of transformation from traditional or underdeveloped societies to modern or developed ones, provided the theoretical foundation for the U.S. foreign policy of technology and development to spread into the Third World. From the socio- psychological perspective to the macroeconomic and social perspective, modernization theory disseminated the Western-oriented model of development as the ideal model for the less-developed societies to follow. The modernistic view of development, characterized as the sharp dichotomy between “Traditional-Bad-Others” and “Modern- 181
Good-Us”, and the emphasis on the impact of modern scientific and technological knowledge on economic development, served for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Third World.
The U.S. political and economic power began to decline in the early 1970s. The weakness of the dollar, increasing economic competition with some European countries and Japan, the massive escalation of U.S. military expenditures, the quadrupling of oil prices, the defeat in the Vietnam War, the pro-communist revolutions of 1968 around the world, the rising power of the Third World, and the emergence of pro-communist governments across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America accelerated the weakening of U.S. political and economic power over the world.
In the 1980s, it was economic neo-liberalism and political conservatism that the
United States chose in response to the economic and political crises in the 1970s. At the very core of the world transformation toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s were the establishment of GATS and WTO. As a result, the world saw the creation of a single global market, which was characterized as the expansion of the scope of trade in services and multilateral binding rules of free and open trade.
Technology once again became the main topic of development in this neo-liberal world transformation. The so-called “information revolution” or “digital revolution” offered a new ground in which the dominant capitalist powers could regain their economic hegemony through the brand-new information and communications technologies. The establishment of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) and the
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services were the result of neo-liberal global market and new ICTs. 182
The GII and the WTO Agreement were deeply immersed in the long-lasting efforts of the dominant capitalist powers to create new markets overseas for selling their goods and services. Therefore, the neo-liberal strategy of technology and development, particularly toward less-developed countries, is quite similar to the modernistic scheme of technological development during the post-World War period in that both have endeavoured to incorporate the poor regions into the world capitalist system through the discourse of technology and development. The overarching visions of the GII and the
WTO Agreement have created a new ground in which to reproduce and maintain the dominant capitalist power led mainly by the U.S. in response to the decline of its economic and political supremacy since the 1970s.
In conclusion, the dominant capitalist powers, mainly the United States, have taken advantage of the discourse of technology and development in order to maintain and reproduce their political and economic hegemony from the post-World War II era to the post-Cold War era.
6.1.2. Deconstruction of the Discourse of the Global Digital Divide
The first part of textual analysis in this dissertation aimed to analyze the linguistic features and the discursively-constructed meanings in the selected policy report on the global digital divide, focusing on the four key policy contents employed in this report:
“information society” as policy context, “Infostates” as policy means, “digital divide” as policy problem, and “digital opportunities” as policy goal.
This study found that the notion of “information society” as the current world circumstance was discursively constructed as, to such a degree of time and space, the age 183 of phenomenal transformation. Portraying the current world as being drastically changing, the report tried to convince readers that immediate actions are necessary and desperate. In this policy report, the driving force of this global transformation was placed on new ICTs, and the consequence of ICTs as driving force and global transformation in information society was converging toward economic development particularly in less- developed countries.
In short, one consequence is that this policy report established a discursive logic, consisting of information society as historical context, technology as a driving force, and economic domain as a consequence. Such a discursive work in this report faithfully succeeded to the classical logic of the techno-centric development paradigm targeting the less-developed or developing countries since World War II.
“Infostates” in this report is not only a theoretical framework or a measuring instrument for identifying digital divide, but also a practical policy means for attaining digital opportunities. This report mobilized the following three linguistic devices to emphasize the role of ICTs as an effective tool for development. First, this report repeated some lexicalizations such as “catalytic role of ICTs in creating digital opportunities conducive to development,” “ ICTs are an effective tool for social development and economic growth,” “ ICTs represent a powerful new addition to the development arsenal,” “ ICTs represent the newest addition to the kit of development tools,” “ICTs recognized by the government as a development tool,” and “As a cross- cutting tool, ICTs are expected to play a catalytic role as well.”
Second, this report used some linguistic devices such as process type and grammatical metaphor to construct the image of powerful ICTs. Many material process 184 verbs such as “ are permeating ,” “ are affecting ,” “ touch ,” “ facilitate ,” and “ provide ” contributed to augment the notion of ICTs as an enabling actor with an active and dynamic force. The verbal and relational processes verbs such as “exemplifies,”
“promises,” and “is ” identified “ICTs with astounding speed ” and “Its ability to deliver a variety of new applications ” as Tokens with “the world’s path towards a global information society,” “wide-ranging social and economic benefits,” and “ the new technological tsunami that envelops our planet, epitomized by the digital revolution ” as
Values. The resulting effect of process types and nominalization was to make the argued semantic relation between new technologies and social and economic benefits less negotiable or contestable.
Last linguistic device for “Infostates” was to accentuate the notion of technological imperative by suggesting some tragic endings unless they are implemented immediately. For this purpose, this report warned the possibility of “the potential to seriously exacerbate existing sizeable and unwanted imbalances,” “the story of the
Digital Divide,” “a major source of the Digital Divide,” and “if not properly addressed.”
In short, in this report “foster higher access levels ” or “improve their Infostates ” becomes the synonym for “create digital opportunities ” and “eventually overcome the digital divide.”
The most salient feature of “digital divide” as policy problem in this report was the dichotomous conceptualization as in “the gaps between ICT ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots ” or “the gap that separates those with and those without ICT-related opportunities.” The dichotomous concept of digital divide not only highlighted the access- and usage-oriented 185 perspective of technological development but also insinuated the notion of traditional divide between North and South.
However, the real problem connotated in the concept of digital divide in this report was in the measurement of digital divide itself as in “the difference between economies’ Infostates.” Otherwise stated, the increase in Infostates as policy means toward policy goal (digital opportunities) was not deduced from the result of deliberations on various causes for digital divide, but was supposed beforehand within the very Infostate model as a device for measuring the digital divide. This tautological framework became a self-sufficient rationale for legitimizing the main theme of this report, which is the increase in Infostates is the only solution to solve the problem of digital divide.
Therefore, the issue of measurement became the most critical concern in this report because the measurement itself is the very logic for identifying digital divide and validating the Infostate model. As a result, this report emphasized the necessity of measurement by the use of lexicalization with evaluative meanings such as Importance,
Normativity, Usefulness, Necessity, and Desirability. Also, this report turned to the global consensus such as the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) for further confirmation of the importance of measurement issue.
The relative concept of digital divide as policy problem, “relative difference in
Infostates ” and “ its relative position toward other countries,” was another distinctive feature. Such a relative concept of digital divide functioned as a very powerful discursive strategy of othering. According to the very relative nature of digital divide, the four groups (elevated, moderate, intermediate, and low) were assessed in terms of relative 186 status of ICTs development, compared with the high Infostate group. Therefore, the four groups were put together as “others” regardless of their individual growth and respective diversity, reminding us of “ those associated with old imbalances.”
In short, the scheme of digital divide as policy problems based on the Infostate model faithfully subscribed to the traditional dichotomy of developed vs. undeveloped in the modernistic view of technology and development. As a result, such discursive strategies in digital divide became a material force to maintain and reproduce the existing power order.
This report basically supposed that digital opportunities or development as policy goal could be reached only through the increase of Infostates. However, the concept of digital opportunities as the desirable destination was skewed toward the economic aspect of development. For the purpose, the report first accentuated the economic nature of ICTs as in “the nature of ICTs is dual: they are both productive assets, as well as consumables ” and explained Infodensity as “productive assets ” and “indicative of productive capacity ,” and Info-use as “consumables ” and “the consumption flow of
ICTs. ” Throughout the report, the economic domain became “ the basics ” and “the key role ” in the issue of digital opportunities. Finally, the main result of this report was formulated as “1 point increase in the Infodensity index would increase per capita GDP by $139-$193 dollars per year ” and “ 1% increase in the Infodensity index of a country would, on average, have resulted in a 0.3% increase in its per capita GDP.” Such numerical formulae as an objective reality and force disregarded the whole deliberations concerning ICTs and development.
187
The second part of textual analysis in this dissertation aimed to analyze three discursive strategies of justifying the neo-liberal and modernistic paradigm of technology and development in this report. This study first found that the empirical analysis of digital divide on the magnitude and evolution of the global digital divide served as a discursive strategy through which the low Infostates group was designated as problematic regions.
The real function of the relative nature of digital divide is to compare the growth rates of
Infostates in the four Infostates group (elevated, intermediate, moderate, and low) each other against that of the high Infostates group. As a result, the low Infostates group, which is heavy on Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, became the most problematic group despite the group improved Infostates values “more than quadrupled ” and narrowed the gap against the high Infostates group as in “the only gains are against economies at the very top.”
Next, this report gave prominence to neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector in a detailed regional case analysis with a focus for countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Among the five action plans,
“regulation and laws,” “pricing and taxation,” and “competition” were to a great extent converging into promoting neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector.
Deeply grounded on the neo-liberal visions of GII and the WTO Agreement, this report foremost drew attention to the neo-liberal regulatory reforms, characterized as the elimination of political interference and the promotion of market forces. Further, this policy report emphasized on the one hand that the successful neo-liberal economic reforms such as restructuring, competition, privatization, market-opening, application of business models, and the elimination of or reduction in taxation and tariffs were being 188 explained as the driving force for enhancing Infostate values. On the other hand, failed or poorly-handled privatization and competition as well as state interference or monopolistic restrictions in the telecommunications sector were described as detrimental factors.
The emphasis on neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector was strengthened by the form of narrative, or story-telling. In this report, the structure of narrative played the role of giving prominence to the neo-liberal propositions in the telecommunications sector through the narrative plot, consisting of beginning (policy problem), middle (policy means) and end (policy outcome). The neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector as policy means or intervention were positively constructed to solve the underdevelopment of ICTs and thus lead to successful growth of
Infostates. On the contrary, the failed or partial neo-liberal reforms were portrayed as unsuccessful stories. Consequently, the narrative structure underlined the causality of policy means, which is the neo-liberal reforms in the telecommunications sector in this policy report, and gave the feeling of sense of happy ending.
In addition, the discursive strategy of prioritizing the neo-liberal reforms in enhancing the Infostate development was legitimized by local authors in the South. The emphasis on local authors as in “this work was carried out by researchers in the South, for several countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean ” played the role of legitimizing the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism by eliciting consent from inside rather than from outside coercion. Consequently, it functioned as a discursive strategy for creating and maintaining the hegemonic power of the dominant ideology.
Lastly, this report reproduced the modernistic view of technology and development within a detailed analysis of diverse reasons for the gender digital divide. 189
Unlike the previous chapters, which focused mainly on the aspects of technology and economy, the analysis of the gender digital divide took a broader and multi-dimensional perspective as in “ there are factors at play other than those associated with overall
Infostate development. (……) This can become more complex if additional variables are brought in, such as income, regional characteristics, cultural influences, etc.”
Even though it might be desirable to look into various contextual dimensions in each individual country for suggesting better policy means, such an attention to country- specific societal contexts in this report played a very significant role in attributing the underdevelopment of ICTs in less-developed areas to the inner problems embedded in the traditional societies through a discursive strategy of “othering.” Othering has been historically abused to endorse the Westernized model of development based on the clear- cut dichotomy between “Modern-Western-Good” and “Traditional-Non-Western-Bad.”
Cultural constraints such as patriarchic tradition in many developing and less- developed countries were described as a substantial barrier for women to get access to the
ICTs equipment and education in especially public places such as large offices, cybercafés, and ICT telecentres other than home. The male-oriented structure of employment in the less-developed countries, which have segregated women as the low- levels of positions or family workers, was also perceived as a negative factor for women to get access to ICTs resources. Also, the asymmetric development of ICTs infrastructure between urban cities and rural areas in less-developed countries was recognized as another factor to exacerbating the Internet connectivity by women in rural areas, in which women made up the majority of the population.
Such a stigmatizing discourse in the gender digital divide faithfully follows the 190 long-lasting modernistic bias against the non-Western areas by way of which the causes or origins of underdevelopment were attributed to the inner problems of the traditional societies themselves.
6.2. Conclusion
Technological innovations have been essential for human progress throughout history. In particular, modern technologies such as automobiles, telephones, radios, and televisions have always held promise as “an engine of economic growth” for transforming less-developed and developing countries since World War II (Norris, 2001).
Today, the growing importance of new ICTs in human development is undoubtedly one of the significant features of our current world. ICTs have become the great enabler and the pre-requisite for economic and social development and an essential condition to closing the gaps between the North and the South.
The problem of a technology gap between developed and less-developed countries gained prominence through the ITU special report, The Missing Link , the so- called Maitland Report (1984). Addressing the deficiency of telecommunications infrastructure and equipment in these regions, the report spurred various teledensity research and established the ultimate objective, which was by the early part of the twentieth century virtually the whole of mankind should be brought within easy reach of a telephone.
With the advent of new ICTs and the arrival of the globalization era, the importance of knowledge and the establishment of effective technological systems in less-developed countries became the prime topic. Given the prominence of the issue in 191 current debates on the role of ICTs and development, it is not surprising that numerous attempts have been made to monitor and assess the so-called global digital divide.
Due to concerns and expectations triggered by the emergence of new ICTs such as personal computers, the Internet, or cellular phones, etc., almost of all the countries, the international and regional organizations concerned, business corporations, and scores of individual researchers and policy makers began to recognize the digital divide as one of the most critical issues that should be tackled within and across national borders since the mid 1990s. All these stakeholders have been pouring out annual or special issues of policy reports, organizing a number of international meetings and conventions ranging from local conferences to world summits, and carrying out scores of academic research projects on the topic of the digital divide nationally and globally.
With usually minor methodological differences, these attempts invariably have concluded that the access and usage of ICTs in poor countries indeed lag far behind what have occurred in the industrialized countries. Consequently, most policy reports and academic research on the global digital divide have strongly suggested that these regions ought to enhance the levels of access and usage of ICTs equipment.
However, the following three somewhat extreme cases raise a considerable question about the current research trend of the global digital divide. Firstly, the Basel
Action Network, an environmental organization group based in Seattle, recently released a special report titled, The Digital Dump: Exporting Reuse and Abuse to Africa (2005).
The report accused that unusable computer equipment is being donated or sold to developing countries by recycling businesses in the United States as a way to dodge the expense of having to recycle it properly. While this report focused on Nigeria in western 192
Africa, it also said the situation was quite similar throughout much of the developing world (Flynn, October 24, 2005).
Second, there is an interesting research of the digital divide in India (James,
2004). According to his findings, there are various ways in which poor and illiterate people in developing countries benefit from the Internet without any use of computers and Internet connectivity. He exemplified some successful ICTs initiatives to bring high technologies to people in rural and poor regions in India, using the existing intermediaries such as public payphones and postal network. The so-called Kisan Call Centers (2004) was designed to provide information on specific problems raised by individual farmers.
Farmers are able to call a toll-free number using public payphones in order to pose a question to the nearest call-centre and the question is answered directly by a graduate student of agriculture in the local language or in some case the question is transferred via the computer system to a known expert at a university or government research centre for further answers.
The second ICTs initiative, the so-called “e-post,” began in 2001 by the
Department of Posts and it was scaled up to the national level in early 2004. This project is operated in the following two stages: 1) a sender hands in to a postal worker his/her message with an ordinary mail address; 2) the message is typed and e-mailed to the post office nearest the recipient, where it is printed out, placed in an envelope and delivered in the ordinary way. Without having access to computers or the Internet, e-mail can be sent and received.
These two examples in India were possible because of the fact that India is one of the few developing countries with the widest public payphones and the quickest postal 193 network in the vast majority of rural areas. Observing India’s successful cases, James
(2004) concluded that “such indirect benefits make up at least an extra 30 percent of the direct benefits derived from Internet usage in India” (p.176).
Last example is “Information Age Town” in Ireland (Warsachuer, 2003). In 1997, a small town, Ennis, was selected and funded to help overcome the technological deficiency and limited use among Ireland's small villages. As a winner, Ennis town installed an Internet-ready personal computers, ISDN line, and smart cards to every family and business. However, a visit to Ennis three years later found that the town had little to show for its money. Warschauer (2003) portrayed the town as follows:
Advanced technology had been thrust into people's hands with little preparation. Training programs had been run, but they were not sufficiently accompanied by awareness programs as to why people should use the new technology in the first place. And in some instances, well-functioning social systems were disrupted in order to make way for the showcase technology. For example, as is the case in the rest of Ireland, the unemployed of Ennis had been reporting to the social welfare office three times a week to sign in and receive payments. Following their visits, the people usually stayed around the office to chat with other unemployed workers. The sign-in system thus facilitated an important social function to overcome the isolation of the unemployed. As part of the "Information Age Town" plan, though, the unemployed received computers and Internet connections at home. They were instructed to sign in and receive electronic payments via the Internet rather than come to the office to sign in. But many of the unemployed couldn't figure out how to operate the equipment, and most others saw no reason to do so when it deprived them of an important opportunity for socializing. A good number of those computers were reportedly sold on the black market, and the unemployed simply returned of their own accord to coming to the social welfare office to sign in (pp.3-4).
Warschauer (2003) commented that the failure of Ennis in Ireland could again and 194 again in any technological initiatives and projects around the world, “which too often focus on providing hardware and software and pay insufficient attention to the human and social systems that must also change for technology to make a difference” (p.6). The above three cases in Nigeria, India, and Ireland are the very evident examples that demonstrate that today’s dichotomous notion of the digital divide, “haves and have-nots,” only obtain a partial or superficial understanding of the global digital divide.
For the most part, the current new ICTs policy discussions have focused on access and usage in the micro level as well as market liberalization in the macro level. Such a perspective of technological development, as discussed in this dissertation, has served as an ideological tool for maintaining and reproducing the Western-oriented technocratic development model through which less-developed and developing countries have long been marginalized and stigmatized as forever beneficiaries or laggards. In contrast, the implications of new ICTs ought to be understood “whether the deployment of ICTs is consistent with ensuring that the majority of citizens acquire the necessary capabilities for interpreting and acting upon a social world that is intensively mediated by new ICTs”
(Mansell, 2002, p.409).
Sen’s capability approach might be relevant for expanding our horizons concerning the issue of ICTs and human development. Criticizing the traditional welfare or utility approach, which have focused on income growth, commodity command, happiness, or desire, Sen (1993) explicated his concept of development as combinations of “functioning” and “capability” based on the notion of quality of life as follows:
Functionings represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the 195
alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which he or she can choose one collection. The approach is based on a view of living as a combination of various ‘doings and beings’, with quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings. (1993, p.31)
That is, Sen saw capability as a kind of freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations and concluded that “development can be seen … as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” such as social and economic facilities for education and health care as well as political and civil rights to participate in public discussion
(1999, p.3). In a similar vein, Seers (1979) saw development as “inevitably a normative concept, almost a synonym for improvement” (p.10). According to Seers, economic growth is a necessary condition for a poor country from a long-term perspective but it is not a sufficient condition. Therefore, he emphasized the role of national policy to realize the development potential of a high rate of economic growth and to reduce poverty, inequality and unemployment (p.13).
From a perspective of human development as social inclusion, Warschauer (2003) maintained that access to and usage of new ICTs “is not an end itself” but “part of a broader effort to better understand the process of technology use and the role of ICTs in human and social development” (p.216). Selwyn (2004) also addressed that “the crucial issues of the digital divide are not just technological but they are social, economic, cultural and political” (p.357).
Toward helping people participate fully in the information economy and network society, it is of utmost importance that politicians, policy-makers, academics, and business practitioners take a more context-based view of the global digital divide. The context-based perspective is concerned with not only physical access to ICTs but also 196 access to skills, knowledge, contents, literacy, education, and community and social support to realize the benefits provided from access to new technologies.
Concerning the task of writing policy reports, this study suggests foremost that analyses of the global digital divide as policy problem should start with examining the uniqueness of social structures, social problems, and social relations in individual societies rather than with counting the number of owners and users in ICTs equipment, products, and services. Technologies do not exist apart from social contexts. However, the current framework of the global digital divide has been conceptually entrenched in technological determinism and neutralism.
Overlapping with each other, both determinism and neutralism assume that technologies as a value-free and neutral tool exert an independent force on society. On the contrary, technologies do not simply appear on the scene being fully developed and ready to be implemented. Technological development is socially constructed through the multidirectional alternation of variation and selection by the relevant social groups (Pinch
& Bijker, 1993). Larger technological system including physical artifacts, social organizations, labelled scientific, legislative system, and human operators closely interact with one another to solve problems or fulfil goals related to the technological development (Hughes, 1993).
Consequently, the consideration of social structures, problems, and relations that are unique in a certain societies should be placed as the first priority in implementing better policy intervention toward ICT development. In this sense, this dissertation proposed that the starting point for a progressive consideration of ICT in any levels of institutions should not be to overcome the digital divide simply by increasing the levels 197 of access to and usage of ICTs. Rather, the focus should be shifted into how ICTs might be used to make people more capable, equitable, and socially inclusive within the broader social structures. For this purpose, it is needless to say that we need interdisciplinary knowledge from different academic backgrounds such as sociology, anthropology, audience studies, political science, economics, education, history, and demography etc. 198
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JOONHO HWANG
Education
2006 Ph.D. Mass Communications, The Pennsylvania State University 1999 M.A. Communication, Seoul National University 1995 B.A. Communication, Seoul National University
Work
2005-2006 Research Assistant, Social Sciences Library, The Pennsylvania State University 2002-2005 Graduate Teaching Assistant, College of Communications, The Pennsylvania State University 2000-2001 Research Fellow, Korea Information Society Development Institute 1999 Research Assistant, Korean Broadcasting Institute
Conference Presentation
Hwang, J. (Feb. 2006). Deconstructing the Discourse of Global Digital Divide: A Critical Discourse Analysis of a Global Digital Divide Initiative. 2006 AEJMC Midwinter Conference, Bowling Green State University, Toledo, OH. Hwang, J. (Feb. 2003). Cultural Values in Korean Cellular Phone Commercials. The 20 th annual meeting of the Intercultural Communication Conference (ICC), University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL. Proffitt, J., Yang, H. & Hwang, J. (Nov. 2002). What is the Message?: News Perceptions of Sensationalism and Medium. The National Communication Association (NCA), New Orleans, LA. Top Student Paper Hwang, J. (Sep. 2002). What is the Meaning of Media Deprivation in Cross-Cultural Adaptation? The International Conference on Globalization & Cultural Diversity, Virginia Tech University, Roanoke, VA. Hwang, J. (Feb. 2002). The Olympic Games Defined and Shaped by Media: Who Can Be on the Top of the Five Rings? The 19 th annual meeting of the Intercultural Communication Conference (ICC), University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL.
Fields of Study
Telecommunications Policy International Communication
