Winter 2009 | V O L U M E 3 0 , N O

ploughsharesthe monitor winter 2009 | V O l u M E 3 0 , N O . 4

in this issue

Afgh anistan: The negotiation track B y Ernie Regehr

Afric a & the roots of Responsibility to Protect B y John Siebert

I n defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a space weapons ban B y Cesar Jaramillo

U S joins efforts toward a global Arms Trade Treaty: UN resolution promises negotiations to begin in 2010 B y Kenneth Epps

D evelopment and peacebuilding: The “ninth” Millennium Development Goal B y John Siebert a quarterly publication of project ploughshares www.ploughshares.ca Contents w i n t e r 2009

features 3 Afghanistan: The negotiation track B y Ernie Regehr building the case for negotiations among all interested parties in Afghanistan.

STAFF: 6 Selected Canadian military export contracts or deliveries reported Laura Ashfield, Intern Anne Marie Kraemer Grant Birks Ernie Regehr during 2008 Kenneth Epps Nancy Regehr a table of major overseas and US contracts. Maribel Gonzales John Siebert, Debbie Hughes Executive Director Cesar Jaramillo Wendy Stocker C anadian soldier 8 Africa & the roots of Responsibility to Protect in Afghanistan, by John Siebert The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterly journal November 5, 2009. of Project Ploughshares, the ecumenical peace IS2009-3062-03. africa’s contribution to international standards for human rights. centre of The Canadian Council of Churches. jpg. © Canadian Department of Ploughshares works with churches, nongov- National Defence. 11 In defence of the PPWT Treaty: ernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and T oward a space weapons ban actions that prevent war and armed violence by Cesar Jaramillo and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affili- prospects for the successful negotiation of a treaty against weapons in space ated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, or weapons used against space objects. University of Waterloo. Office address: Project Ploughshares 15 US joins efforts toward a global Arms Trade Treaty: 57 Erb Street West, Waterloo, UN resolution promises negotiations to begin in 2010 Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada 519-888-6541, fax: 519-888-0018 by Kenneth Epps [email protected] charting a path to the conference in 2012, with new leadership from the US. www.ploughshares.ca

SI DEbar: Civil society presses for a strong Arms Trade Treaty Project Ploughshares gratefully acknowledges the ongoing financial support of the many individuals, national churches and church 18 Development and Peacebuilding: agencies, local congregations, religious orders, T he “ninth” Millennium Development Goal and organizations across Canada who ensure that the work of Project Ploughshares continues. by John Siebert We are particularly grateful to a major report on armed violence in East Africa is launched by World Vision Canada The Simons Foundation in Vancouver and Project Ploughshares. for its generous support.

SI DEbar: Millennium Development Goals All donors of $50 or more receive a complimentary subscription to The Ploughshares Monitor. Annual subscription rates for libraries and institutions are: ite ms of interest $30 (Canada), US$30 (US), US$35 (international). Unless indicated otherwise, material may be 7 Peacekeeping school in Aid to readers reproduced freely, provided the author and 14 acronyms and Abbreviations source are indicated and one copy is sent Bamako, Mali to Project Ploughshares. Return postage is guaranteed. 10 Update on the Convention on Book and report notices Publications Mail Registration No. 40065122. Cluster Munitions 22 Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the Effectiveness of ISSN 1499-321X. 12 The World Council of Churches Arms Embargoes PAP Registration No. 11099 on nuclear disarmament 22 Peace and Conflict 2010 The Ploughshares Monitor is indexed in the Canadian Periodical Index. 23 Transforming Pakistan: Design: Graphics, University of Waterloo. 21 Paying UN dues Ways out of instability Photos of Ploughshares staff by 21 Faith leaders prepare for the 23 Conventional Arms Transfers to Karl Griffiths-Fulton. Developing Nations, 2001-2008 G8/G20 summit in Canada Printed at Waterloo Printing, Waterloo, Ontario. 23 Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Printed with vegetable inks on paper with 21 Prayer for a world without Decreasing the Operational Readiness recycled content. nuclear weapons of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals We acknowledge the financial support 23 DVD and report from WMD of the Government of Canada through the 24 New publication Publications Assistance Program toward our Commission available mailing costs.

2 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 Afghanistan: The negotiation track

B y Ernie Regehr

The current, and by now conventional, wisdom that the war in Afghanistan will not be won by military means alone is meant to highlight the importance of reconstruction, local peacebuilding, and an effective “hearts and minds” campaign. But as security conditions continue to slide,1 analysts and politicians are having to face what others have long been saying, that, even with these additions, the war will not be won.

E nding a war that won’t be won or lost less a reconciliation initiative than it is a military strategy designed to “neutralize the adversary” through cooption.

The new US Commander of the International Security But it is becoming increasingly clear that cooption on its own Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley will not be successful and that “national-level compromises McChrystal (2009), does not pull his punches when describ- involving power-sharing” will ultimately also be required ing the deteriorating security situation and the resulting loss (Suhrke et al. 2009, p. 3). Limited cooption initiatives, one of confidence in the Afghan Government: “The weakness of Western diplomat has noted, “make reconciliation sound like the state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, wide- surrender; where has that ever worked? What is required is spread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, structured engagement with all Afghan communities, includ- and ISAF’s own errors, have given Afghans little reason to ing the Pashtun and therefore representatives of the Taliban, support their government.” around a new political project” (Gall 2009). But not winning is not the same as losing. Former US Gen. McChrystal’s report (2009) briefly hints at just such a Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann (2009) new “political project,” raising the prospect of ending the war is among those who believe that foreign forces and their through reconciliation with insurgents: “Insurgencies of this Afghan partners, in their current numbers and roles, “can nature typically conclude through military operations and prevent Taliban takeover, but cannot bring victory.” In fact, political efforts driving some degree of host-nation reconcilia- late October reports out of Washington were suggesting that tion with elements of the insurgency. In the Afghan conflict, the Obama Administration was moving toward reinforcing a reconciliation may involve [Government of Afghanistan]-led, strategy of not losing. One approach being considered was high-level political settlements.” to defend the major cities and population centres against Taliban takeover, abandon or at least limit efforts to seek out and defeat insurgents in the rest of the country, accel- erate training of Afghan troops, expand economic development, and pursue “reconciliation with less radical members of the Taliban” (Shanker, Baker & Cooper 2009). Expanded attention to the last item would be new – how new depends on what is meant by reconciliation. Earlier efforts at reconciliation could more properly be called cooption efforts – essentially attempts to entice “moderate” Taliban to switch sides. A recent US intelligence analysis holds that some 90 per cent of insurgents are not religiously motivated Taliban or al-Qaeda but are tribal ethnic Pashtuns fighting in localized militias, in part for control of their own local territory and interests and in part to oust a foreign occupying power (Bender 2009). Winning over these non-ideological Taliban and other insurgents is

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 3 did not constitute a peace agreement. They needed to be supplemented by a strategic pursuit of reconciliation in order to bring all Afghan parties to the conflict into the peaceful political process.” That “strategic pursuit of reconciliation” has not happened. After the overthrow of the Taliban government, the Bonn process, confirmed through two Loya Jirgas, produced a new institutional and governance framework. Afghanistan’s constitution, approved in 2003 at the second Loya Jirga, has been described as “one of the most modern and democratic in the Muslim world” (Rashid 2008, p. 217), but, in spite of that, Afghanistan’s deteriorating security confirms that the post-Bonn political/legal order in Afghanistan has not become B uilding the case for negotiations inclusive and obviously has not earned the undivided loyalty of the Afghan population. Calls for a more robust, high-level, reconciliation or politi- In the face of the post-Bonn failure to build political stability, cal settlement effort have over recent months become much the strategy adopted by the international community has not more prominent. Last summer President Hamid Karzai been a determined political/diplomatic effort to rebuild a basic (IndiaExpress.com 2009) again argued that more foreign national consensus in Afghanistan; instead, the strategy has troops would not bring peace and that other approaches are been to militarily defeat those outside the consensus. But it required: “We must engage in negotiations, bring back those has been a resort to war, as Gen. McChrystal confirms with Taliban who are willing to return, who have been driven out considerable force, that has neither defeated the opposition by fear and coercion and the mistakes we’ve all made. They nor delivered a necessary, and expected, modicum of security. are part of this country and must be called back…. If Mullah Omar wants to come and talk, he’s welcome. It’s the desire we have and we should try for it. Without sincere peace Calls for a more robust, high-level, process on all sides, matters will only get worse.” reconciliation or political settlement Indeed, a New York Times report (Gall 2009) quotes Afghan effort have over recent months officials and Western diplomats as saying that “the peace process might have already made greater progress if the Afghan become more prominent. government and the United States had pushed it more forcefully.” The same sources also said that “negotiations should be expanded to a broad spectrum of Taliban leaders and that The failing military effort also translates into narrowing politi- a policy of talking only to moderates was doomed.” cal options and opportunities. In an open letter to President Obama, William R. Polk (2009) points out that when foreign The Obama Administration increasingly draws distinctions forces exit a counterinsurgency war, “almost always, those between al-Qaeda, which it sees as largely non-Afghan and who fought hardest against the foreigner take over when still harbouring ambitions to attack the United States, and he leaves.” In other words, the longer the effort to defeat an the Afghan Taliban, “which the administration has begun entrenched insurgency by sheer force, even when force is to define as an indigenous group that aspires to reclaim supplemented by enlightened hearts-and-minds counterin territory and rule the country but does not express ambi- surgency tactics, the more difficult it is to find a moderate tions of attacking the United States.” Al-Qaeda and Taliban middle ground. cooperation is thus pursued for tactical advantage, some in the Administration argue, and not because of shared strategic goals. The White House has therefore concluded that G enerating a political settlement the Taliban “could not be wholly removed from Afghanistan because they were too ingrained in the country” (Baker & Schmitt 2009). Negotiations in pursuit of that middle ground will take place, because that is how the vast majority of insurgencies end. The exclusion of the Taliban and other disaffected constituen- To date, however, efforts at high-level negotiation have not cies from the Bonn process in 2001 and 2002 meant that it enjoyed the committed political and material support of the was never the “high-level political settlement” it was meant international community. A key question now is how to get to be and that Gen. McChrystal says is, or at last may be, the international community behind the pursuit of such a needed. The war that has ensued since then is not a conse- settlement. quence of some parties to the Bonn agreement defecting from it; rather it is a consequence of the fact that key stakeholders As is frequently noted, there are multiple parties to the cur- were never a party to it. As Michael Semple (2009, p. 89) rent conflicts and the insurgency has multiple strands. In writes, “It is now widely understood that the Bonn Accords addition, there are influential traditional tribal leaders who

4 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 must also be engaged. In fact, during the 2009 election R eferences campaign, candidate Gul Agha Shirzai suggested that engage- Baker, Peter & Eric Schmitt. 2009. Afghan war debate now leans ment with Taliban elements could be done effectively through to focus on Al Qaeda. New York Times, October 7. http://www. tribal leaders: “We have capable people who are patriotic, nytimes.com/2009/10/08/world/asia/08prexy.html?_r=1. who can work on this and persuade the Taliban to come to Bender, Bryan. 2009. Taliban not main Afghan enemy. The Boston talk” (Gall 2009). Globe, October 9. http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/ articles/2009/10/09/most_insurgents_in_afghanistan_not_ Patrick Seale (2009) proposes “a dose of political shock religiously_motivated_military_reports_say. therapy…in a bold attempt at a political settlement,” and envisions the US establishing a regional contact group Gall, Carlotta. 2009. As US weighs Taliban negotiations, Afghans are already talking. New York Times, March 11. http://www. “tasked with summoning a loya jirga in which all sides of nytimes.com/2009/03/11/world/asia/11taliban.html. the Afghan conflict – President Hamid Karzai, his Taliban and other opponents, as well as regional and tribal dignitaries – IndianExpress.com. 2009. Karzai seeks negotiations with would be represented.” The Afghan Loya Jirga would pursue Taliban. July 19. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ Karzai-seeks-negotiations-with-Taliban/491338. an immediate ceasefire, followed by negotiations toward a decentralized form of government suited to Afghanistan’s McChrystal, Gen. Stanley. 2009. Commander’s Initial Assessment. regional and ethnic diversity. August 30, 2009. http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. In 2008 a group of Taliban leaders who had “reconciled” with Neumann, Ronald E. 2009. Afghanistan: Looking Forward. the Kabul government but maintained links with the Taliban Afghanistan Paper No. 1, July. Centre for International senior leadership put forward a seven-point process (Ruttig Governance Innovation and the Centre for International Policy 2009, p. 28) that they said had been tested with the top Studies. http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2009/6/ Taliban leadership. They envisioned a staged process, begin- afghanistan-looking-forward. ning with a recognition that the war cannot be won militarily, Polk, William R. 2009. An open letter to President Obama. and proceeding through confidence-building, including agree- The Nation, October 19. http://www.thenation.com/ ments to end attacks on civilian infrastructure and the release doc/20091019/polk. of some prisoners, to a jirga to work out key elements of a Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos. New York: Viking. peace plan. From there they set out plans for building international support, including within the Islamic Conference, Ruttig, Thomas. The Other Side. Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency: Causes, Actors and Approaches to ‘Talks’. Afghanistan and steps toward a ceasefire and a war-ending Loya Jirga. Analysts Network, July 2009. http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/ uploads/200907%20AAN%20Report%20Ruttig%20-%20 A key question now is how to get The%20Other%20Side.PDF. Seale, Patrick. 2009. Finding an exit from the Afghan trap. the international community behind Agence Global, October 23. http://www.agenceglobal.com/ high-level negotiations. article.asp?id=2168. Semple, Michael. 2009. Reconciliation in Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace Press. Shanker, Thom, Peter Baker & Helene Cooper. 2009. U.S. to Some observers call for the convening of a second Bonn protect populous Afghan areas, officials say. New York Times, conference that would involve the UN, key world powers, October 27. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/28/world/ front-line states, and all the key Afghan stakeholders. asia/28policy.html. Both the process and the conclusions of a negotiation Suhrke, Astri, Torunn Wimpelmann Chaudhary, Aziz Hakimi, track must obviously be led by and decided by Afghans. Kristian Berg Harpviken, Akbar Sarwari & Arne Strand. 2009. That doesn’t mean it will necessarily be led by the Afghan Conciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan: An Overview. CMI Report. International Peace Research Institute, Government, and it is not likely that a negotiation track Oslo, and the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen. http://www.cmi. will be persistently pursued without significant international no/publications/publication/?3266=conciliatory-approaches-to- encouragement and material support. Reconciliation is prop- the-insurgency-in. erly among Canada’s stated priorities in Afghanistan, but the promotion of a new peace process has not yet, but should, become an active priority.

Note 1.A mong many accounts of this growing insecurity is the most recent report of the UN Secretary-General, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” September 22, 2009, A/64/364-S/2009/475, E rnie Regehr, O.C., http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ is Senior Policy Advisor EGUA-7W8SKS?OpenDocument. with Project Ploughshares.

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 5 Selected Canadian military export contracts or deliveries reported during 2008

Overseas contracts during 2008 (non-US) Supplier Location Military product or service Contract value Recipient

Image generators for Do-228 flight trainersu Not reported India

P-3C aircraft training systemsu Not reported South Korea CAE Inc. Montreal, QC Helicopter simulators $33 million* Singapore

Upgrade Tornado and Eurofighter simulators Not reported Germany

CMC Electronics Inc. Montreal, QC Avionics computers for 35 trainer aircraftu Not reported Iraq

Helicopter handling systems for destroyersu Not reported Japan Curtiss-Wright Controls Inc. Mississauga, ON Helicopter handling systems for frigatesu “Multi-millions” Italy

$0.6 million Australia AIM-9X tactical missile assembliesu Elcan Optical Technologies Midland, ON $1 million South Korea

General Electric Canada Bromont, QC Work on F/A-18 fighter aircraft enginesu $1.3 million Australia

L-3 MAS (Canada) Mirabel, QC Replace centre barrels on F/A-18 aircraft $106 million Australia

L-3 Spar Aerospace Ltd. Edmonton, AB Replace outer wings on 3 C-130K aircraft $19.1 million UK

L-3 Wescam Flamborough, ON 5 King Air recon. aircraft camera systemsu Not reported Iraq

Luxell Technologies Inc. Mississauga, ON Maintenance display units for Eurofighteru Not reported Spain

ATR-42 maritime patrol aircraft enginesu $2 million* Libya

Super Tucano trainer aircraft enginesu $12 million* Chile

Y12IV transport aircraft enginesu $4 million* Uganda

AW139 multi-role helicopter enginesu $36 million* Qatar Pratt & Whitney Canada Longueuil, QC Super Tucano trainer aircraft enginesu $24 million* Ecuador

King Air surveillance aircraft enginesu $12 million* Iraq

AW139 multi-role helicopter engineu $6 million* Malaysia

AW139 multi-role helicopter enginesu $6 million* Cyprus

Presagis Montreal, QC Image generators for F-16 flight trainers Not reported Israel

Evolved Seasparrow missile worku Not reported UAE

Raytheon Canada Ltd. Waterloo, ON High-frequency surface wave radar Not reported Sri Lanka

High-frequency surface wave radaru $16 million Romania

Viking Air Limited Sidney, BC Overhaul of Twin Otter aircraft Not reported Argentina

6 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 US contracts for combat systems during 2008 Supplier Location Military product or service Contract value Recipient

Electronic counter measures systemsu $50.1 million DOD Allen-Vanguard Corp. Ottawa, ON Blast seats for Stryker armoured vehiclesu $15.3 million US Army

AIM-9X tactical missile assembliesu $2.3 million US Air Force Elcan Optical Technologies Midland, ON Tomahawk Block IV missile assembliesu $1.3 million US Navy

General Dynamics Canada Calgary, AB Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle design worku $0.4 million US Navy

Stryker armoured combat vehiclesu $300 million*

Mobile Gun System & other Stryker systemsu $38.4 million US Army Replacement of damaged Stryker vehiclesu $25.2 million General Dynamics Land London, ON Systems Canada Corp. RG-31 mine protected vehicles and spares $85.2 million

LAV-25 armoured vehicles and componentsu $25.3 million US Navy Mine resistant vehicles, support and upgrades $719.5 million

General Electric Canada Bromont, QC Work on F/A-18 fighter aircraft enginesu $5.5 million US Navy

Héroux Inc. Longueuil, QC B2 bomber and other aircraft landing gear $15.8 million US Air Force

Honeywell ASCA Inc. Mississauga, ON Control sensors for F-22 fighter aircraftu Not reported US Air Force

Orenda Aerospace Mississauga, ON Delivery of engine fan frames for JSF aircraftu Not reported US Air Force

Raytheon Canada Ltd. Waterloo, ON Work on Seasparrow missiles & containersu $21.1 million US Navy u Subcontract with corporate prime contractor * Estimated contract value Source: Canadian Military Industry Database, Project Ploughshares

Peacekeeping school in Bamako, Mali

In 1999 a military training centre, designed to strengthen For further information, see http://www.theglobeandmail. African peacekeeping capability, was opened in Côte d’Ivoire. com/news/world/canadians-teach-peacekeeping-to-african- Since 2007 it has been situated in Bamako. Originally troops/article1327464 and http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/ intended for West Africa’s regional partners, it now draws commun/ml-fe/article-eng.asp?id=3737. students from all over Africa, the only such facility on the continent to offer courses in both English and French. The Bamako Peacekeeping School is actively supported by France, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and Denmark. Canada has contributed more than $2-million for its construction and development since 2007 and has sent several Canadian military officers to help with training and management. The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada is one of the school’s main partners. C anadian Maj. Luc Racine in front The school has expanded rapidly, increasing its capacity of the Bamako Peacekeeping nearly fourfold since 2003. The school has trained a total of School’s crest. © Canadian 1,850 soldiers, police, and civilians from 41 African countries. Department of National Defence

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 7 Africa & the roots of Responsibility to Protect

B y John Siebert

It may surprise some Canadians that leading African spokespersons have embraced the responsibility to protect, or R2P, as a particularly African contribution to human rights standards. After all, Canada initiated the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that led to the foundational report for the concept in 2001 (ICISS 2001).

The Researchers’ Preface to the The 1990s also witnessed the accelerated passing from the ICISS background documentation scene of the political “grand old men” of Africa’s immediate indicates that R2P did not emerge post-colonial period. In the wake of their passing a newer ex nihilo. It rests on a foundation generation of African politicians, public servants, and military of past debate and practice. “The leaders surveyed the littered landscape of non-democratic task given to us by ICISS was to leadership with its fixation on regime survival rather than the lay out in straightforward and security and prosperity of Africans more generally. They were non-argumentative terms the main working for more responsive and accountable national and issues behind the debate about intergovernmental leadership. humanitarian intervention that has The striking difference introduced with the 2001 ICISS taken place over the last decade” Report on R2P, which distinguishes it from the previous (Weiss & Hubert 2001, p. X). “humanitarian assistance” stream, is characterized by commentators as: 1) a shift of focus from state sovereignty Africa’s evolving R2P security culture to state responsibility for the well being of its citizens; and 2) the obligation of the international community to intervene in the specific case of the four violations of international law Africa’s evolving peace and security architecture fits not only (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic within the broader international stream of “humanitarian cleansing) where a country is unwilling or unable to protect intervention” that preceded the ICISS, but is considered by its citizens (Evans 2006). Brunnee and Toope (2006, p. 8) some Africans as a specifically African tributary of that stream. conclude, “the responsibility to protect could well be of a different order. It could entail a fundamental conceptual shift, Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun (2009), a former top rooted in prior developments, but going much further….” UN official and one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, recently wrote that “unlike other regions, our [i.e., African] legal systems have long acknowledged that in addition to individuals, groups A large gap remains between a and leaders having rights, they also have reciprocal duties. So the responsibility to protect is in many ways an African continentwide African commitment contribution to human rights.” to R2P and an African capacity and In the 1990s African intergovernmental organizations were willingness to act. Moving from part of a developing security culture marked by a normative affirmation of the primacy of the needs of citizens. Musifiky aspiration to implementation of R2P Mwanasali (2006, pp. 90-91) identifies a number of factors isn’t a challenge unique to Africa. influencing this changing security culture: ■ Emphasis on the protection of civilians in international Sudanese diplomat and scholar, Francis Deng (1996), helped humanitarian law; to define this transformation with normative advances centered ■ The democracy movement promoting the rule of law, on transforming the principle of sovereignty as non-interference personal freedoms, and renewed political institutions; and to “sovereignty as responsibility.” ■ Citizen demands for participation and transparency in One result of this African affirmation that states bear governance. responsibility for the well-being of their own citizens, even

8 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 beyond individual state borders, was the embedding of the principles of R2P-like intervention in the African Union Constitutive Act (2002). Article 4(h) affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The African Union (AU) commitment explicitly to R2P was reiterated prior to the September 2005 World Summit in the March Ezulwini Consensus (2005). The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2007), to which all AU members subscribe, further reinforced in November 2007 the responsibility of states to safeguard their citizens with respect to the principle that gross and widespread violations of human rights give effect to consideration of an R2P intervention. It is widely recognized that these commitments mark a very different orientation for the AU from that of its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity from an ethos of non-interference to one of non-indifference. To give greater effect to its commitments and provide a means for “African solutions to African problems,” the AU is establishing a peace and security architecture, whose centrepiece is the African Standby Force (ASF). Targeted to be ready for deployment by 2010, the ASF is to cooperate with the UN and subregional African organizations in conducting peace operations. The ASF plan is to have five subregional brigades in the standby force, working with the Economic Community of West African States, the organization and its (sometimes unfair) reputation of Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Southern inefficiency.” African Development Community, the Economic Community Inclusive intergovernmental bodies such as the AU are not of Central African States, and the Arab Maghreb Union. In performance based but aspirational in nature. All the states addition to the ASF, other planned parts of the AU peace and in a region or subregion are by definition included. States join security architecture are an early warning system, as well as based on their stated commitment to adhere to the principles a Panel of the Wise to assist with preventing the outbreak or and goals of the organization, but do not have to demonstrate escalation of conflict (Puley 2005, pp. 10-11). the attainment of those goals or the implementation of The evolving AU security culture of non-indifference and R2P the principles prior to joining. Moving from aspiration to affirmations has its parallels in subregional African intergov- implementation of R2P isn’t a challenge unique to Africa. ernmental organizations, including the Economic Community This article is taken from “R2P and the IGAD Sub-Region: of West African States and the Southern African Development Lessons for the AU Security Architecture” from the Community, as well as the East Africa Community, and the forthcoming book Crafting an African Security Architecture: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (2009). Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century, African CSOs that have sponsored events and made public edited by Hany Besada, to be published by Ashgate in statements in support of their governments’ commitments Summer 2010. to R2P include the Eastern Africa Civil Society Organizations’ Forum (2009), the East Africa Law Society (2008), and the References Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace – AMANI Forum (2008). African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 2007. ACHPR/Res.117 (XXXXII) 07: Resolution on Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa. November. http://www. C ommitment and capacity responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/africa. African Union. 2002. Constitutive Act of the African Union. http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm. That there was and remains a large gap between a continentwide African commitment to R2P, and African ———. 2005. The Ezulwini Consensus. http://www.responsibility capacity and willingness to act, is also noted by Mwanasali toprotect.org/index.php/africa. (2004, p. 26): “The notion that the AU constitutes a regional Brunnee, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope. 2006. Norms, Institutions security community may strike some with incredulity, and UN Reform: The Responsibility to Protect. Behind the considering all the challenges facing the continental Headlines 63:3.

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 9 Deng, F. et al. 1996. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Update on the East Africa Law Society. 2008. http://www.responsibilitytoprotect. org/index.php/component/content/article/2231. Convention on Eastern Africa Civil Society Organizations’ Forum. 2009. Taken from ICRtoP participates in Eastern Africa Civil Society Forum Cluster Munitions (EACSOF), RtoP included in final communiqué.I nternational Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect. http://www. The Convention on Cluster Munitions was signed in Oslo, responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/ Norway in December 2008 and has since been opened for article/129-africa/2309-icrtop-participates-in-eastern-africa- signature and ratification at theU nited Nations headquarters civil-society-forum-eacsof-rtop-included-in-final-communique-. in New York. Evans, Gareth. 2006. The Responsibility to Protect: From an Idea According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster to an International Norm. Keynote Opening Address by Gareth munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to dis- Evans, President of International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of perse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs et al. Conference on The Responsibility to Protect: Engaging America, Chicago, November munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched 15, International Crisis Group. from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace – AMANI Forum. typically designed to pierce armour, kill personnel, or both. 2008. Global Consultative Roundtables on the Responsibility to Protect: Perspectives from East Africa and the Horn. Civil By signing the Convention, a state proclaims its consent Society Consultation Conference Report: Discussion Draft, to be bound by its provisions once it ratifies the treaty. In April 17-18, Metropole Hotel, Kampala, Uganda. http://www. addition, the state is obligated to not act against the “object responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/former-r2pcs-project/ and purpose” of the treaty until the treaty becomes law for reports-and-statements/1674-perspectives-from-east-africa- that state. Every country that has signed the Convention on and-the-horn-april-17-18-kampala-uganda. Cluster Munitions must still ratify it in order to become a International Commission on Intervention and State State Party bound by the Convention’s provisions. Sovereignty. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect. IDRC: Ottawa. As of mid-November 2009, 103 countries, including Canada, http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9436-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. had signed the convention. Of these, 24 had ratified: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. 2009. 1. norway (3 Dec 2008) http://www.icglr.org. 2. ireland (3 Dec 2008) Mwanasali, Musifiky. 2004. Emerging security architecture in 3. the Holy See (3 Dec 2008) Africa. Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, February. 4. sierra Leone (3 Dec 2008) 5. lao PDR (18 Mar 2009) ———. 2006. Africa’s Responsibility to Protect. Adekeye Adebajo 6. austria (2 Apr 2009) and Helen Scanlon, eds. A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa 7. Mexico (6 May 2009) and the United Nations. The Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa. 8. niger (2 June 2009) 9. albania (16 June 2009) Puley, Greg. 2005. The Responsibility to Protect: East, West, and 10. Spain (17 June 2009) Southern African Perspectives on Preventing and Responding to 11. Germany (8 Jul 2009) Humanitarian Crises. Project Ploughshares Working Paper 05-5. 12. Luxembourg (10 Jul 2009) Prepared for Africa Peace Forum, African Women’s Development 13. San Marino (10 Jul 2009) and Communication Network, Africa Institute of South Africa, and 14. Japan (14 Jul 2009) Project Ploughshares, September. http://www.ploughshares.ca/ 15. Zambia (12 Aug 2009) libraries/WorkingPapers/wp055.pdf. 16. Croatia (17 Aug 2009) Sahnoun, Mohamed. 2009. Africa: Uphold Continent’s 17. Slovenia (19 Aug 2009) Contribution to Human Rights, Urges Top Diplomat. allAfrica.com, 18. Uruguay (24 Sept 2009) July 21. 19. Malta (24 Sept 2009) Weiss, Thomas G. & Don Hubert. 2001.ICISS, The Responsibility 20. France (25 Sept 2009) to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. IDRC: Ottawa. 21. Burundi (25 Sept 2009) http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-9439-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. 22. Malawi (7 Oct 2009) 23. Macedonia (8 Oct 2009) 24. Nicaragua (6 Nov 2009) Thirty ratifications are needed for the Convention to enter into force and become binding international law. Only when the Convention enters into force will states be bound by all of the Convention’s terms and will the deadlines start counting J ohn Siebert down for clearance of contaminated land and destruction of is Executive Director remaining stockpiles. of Project Ploughshares. Updates on the status of the convention can be found by going to http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/treatystatus. 10 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 In defence of the PPWT Treaty: T oward a space weapons ban

B y Cesar Jaramillo

The draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) (CD 2008), jointly introduced to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) by Russia and China in 2008, constituted a welcome step toward the non- weaponization of space. It was – and continues to be – the most promising proposal to fill the normative void in the current space security treaty regime. However, almost two years after its introduction, the international community has failed to embrace this unique opportunity to lay down the foundation for a robust, unambiguous, and universal space security treaty that unequivocally prohibits the weaponization of space.

B ackground free outer space in international treaty law. It is true that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponi destruction in orbit and calls for the peaceful exploration of zation of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the place- Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies ment or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the are being developed seems to be widening the gap between use of earth-based weapons against space targets – activities military applications that may affect space assets and the which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition. precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate congested each year underscores the need for a comprehen- weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to sive space security treaty that builds on what little interna- those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this tional law exists in this realm and not only reflects current assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space convoluted domain. to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state, and considerable efforts are The PPWT – while not perfect and subject to revisions – rep- being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental resents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus circles to ensure that this delicate threshold is preserved. To far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons- be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of sat- ellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty. Not surprisingly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has been introduced at both the CD and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and has garnered near-unanimous Members of the Conference on Disarmament (highlighted in black)

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 11 support year after year – with the notable exception of the The World Council of United States and Israel.1 In this context, the PPWT draft treaty introduced at the CD in February 2008 has been touted Churches on nuclear as a practical way to “nip the problem of PAROS in the bud” (UNIDIR 2008, p. 147). If there is a ban on space weapons, disarmament the rationale goes, there will be no arms race to prevent.

We are writing to leaders of NATO and of the European Union T Phe P WT draft treaty in follow-up to our 30 March 2009 joint letter concerning NATO nuclear policy and its current strategic concept review. We are also writing to US President Barack Obama and Russian What, then, makes the PPWT proposal worthy of serious President Dimitry Medvedev as leaders of the states with consideration by the international community? In other more than 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. words, why is it an appealing alternative to the status quo? The PPWT is the first draft treaty on outer space ever pre- The new political dynamic for nuclear disarmament figures sented at the UN Conference on Disarmament, which is the in public statements recently issued by our councils, which quintessential international forum for addressing multilateral represent nearly 200 member churches in North America disarmament agreements. In fact, the PPWT builds upon and Europe. Referring to these statements by our governing elements contained in a 2002 Working Paper presented at bodies, we: the CD by a group of countries that also included Russia . Strongly affirm the joint statement byUS President Obama and China. Technically speaking, though, the PPWT Treaty and Russian President Medvedev on 1 April 2009 in London focuses not on disarmament but prevention, as outer space and the US President’s appeal for a world free of nuclear is currently considered to be weapons-free and, thus, there weapons on 5 April 2009 in Prague. is nothing to disarm. Still, the CD seems to be the obvious . Look to the US and Russia to take an important early step repository for such a proposal and most member states have toward that goal in the new START follow-on agreement. welcomed its introduction. . Call for NATO to respond in kind, with a clear endorsement of the new call for a nuclear-weapon-free world and by decid- The PPWT is innovative ing in NATO’s new Strategic Concept that nuclear sharing should be ended and US nuclear weapons based in NATO’s and groundbreaking. non-nuclear-weapon member states should be eliminated. . Call for the European Union to equally endorse the new Specifically, as implied in the name of the treaty, the PPWT call for a nuclear-weaponfree world in the EU Common seeks to ban two different yet interrelated conducts: Position for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, also reflect- 1. the placement of weapons in outer space and ing that the EU includes two nuclear-weapon states and four 2. the threat or use of force against outer space objects. member states with nuclear weapons on their soil. . Call for Russia to address its vast number of tactical nuclear The first initiative sensibly eliminates the fundamental weapons and resume the hopeful process of unilateral prerequisite for the actual utilization of space weapons: their reductions started in 1991 by both the US and the Soviet placement in space. The PPWT treaty defines weapon in outer Union/Russia. space in a thorough and comprehensive manner as: … Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical We acknowledge the steps NATO has taken to reduce its reli- principle, which has been specially produced or converted ance on nuclear weapons, as respondents to our earlier letter to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of to NATO leaders noted. We also welcome the commitment objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmo- sphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the of the new German government to have all nuclear weapons biosphere which are important to human existence or to withdrawn from its soil. inflict damage on them. (Article 1C) Now is the time to continue the trend. Every state has a part Clearly, if the Treaty enters into force, such a broad definition to play in breaking out of the self-fulfilling logic so often cited, would contribute decisively to the goals of PAROS and pre- that “we will need nuclear weapons as long as others have venting space from becoming an arena of military confronta- them”. We appeal to all nuclear-weapon states and states tion. Notably, it encompasses weapons placed in space that with nuclear weapons on their soil to contribute to progress can be used not only against other space objects, but also under the new political dynamic. against Earth-based objects. Thus, it seems apparent that It is our conviction that the present opportunity must be the framers of the PPWT strove to minimize the room for transformed into conclusive actions. ambiguity and interpretation with regard to the conditions under which a device in space can be considered a weapon. This text was taken from a letter by the WCC General Again, a weapon in space need not be used against an Secretariat, dated October 28, 2009. adversary for there to be a violation of the treaty, as its mere placement in space would be considered a breach of the treaty.

12 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 Similarly, the second focal point of this treaty, against the threat or use of force against outer space objects, provides a comprehensive ban on any aggressive action against objects in space, defined as: Any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters or the threat of such actions. (Article 1E) A positive characteristic of this definition is that there is no indication that hostile actions must originate in space. That is, according to the treaty, outer space objects should be free from hostile interference regardless of where it originates. The implication is that Earth-based weapons systems capable of C onference on Disarmament Plenary Meeting Participants. May 19, 2009. striking targets in space are included. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

the PPWT “does prohibit the use of such systems against C hallenges to the implementation of the PPWT space objects for hostile purposes” (CD 2009, p. 4). Certainly, there is an inconsistency to be observed in this case. That is, Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the adoption of the PPWT if ASATs are not to be used, their development and testing has been the staunch US opposition – to the draft treaty in would seem counterintuitive and contrary to the overall aims particular and to any legal measure designed to restrict its of the treaty. options in space. In 2007, the US Permanent Representative Likewise, it is not entirely clear if, under the treaty, an attack to the CD, Christina Rocca, said, “We continue to believe that by a state on its own satellite would be considered a hostile there is no arms race in space, and therefore no problem for act, not to mention the implications that this would have on arms control to solve” (US Mission to the UN in Geneva, the creation of space debris. If so, then some might argue that 2007). Such opposition by the Bush Administration was the PPWT lacks a provision for instances when there may hardly surprising, as the US has recently rejected any binding be a legitimate need to strike one’s own satellite. This could mechanisms that could restrict its ability to operate freely in be due to satellite malfunction, risk of reentry, sensitivity outer space. Moreover, this reluctance to abide by multilateral of information that could potentially be extracted from the legal regimes related to space security has been codified in satellite, etc. its National Space Policy (US Office of Science & Technology Policy 2006), which specifically states that: The United States will oppose the development of new It is imperative to act now in moving legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit toward a space weapons ban, before the or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the first hostile weapon is launched. rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space To be sure, there are other points where the PPWT lacks for U.S. national interests. precision, has potential loopholes, or is subject to interpretation. These shortcomings notwithstanding, the PPWT remains It is highly unlikely that the PPWT draft treaty will ever see the most highly structured state-originating proposal that the light of day as a binding multilateral legal instrument has been introduced in the CD with the aim of preventing the unless the recalcitrant US position is somehow moderated. weaponization of space. With the necessary revisions and That said, the US National Space Policy is currently under consultations, it could serve as a building block in a broader review by the Obama Administration, with an expected space security legal regime. completion date of early 2010. If the position taken by the Obama administration on issues such as nuclear disarmament is any indication, the review may warrant cautious optimism An urgent matter about a change in position on space security to one that embraces multilateralism. Time is of the essence for a weapons ban. General Xu Qiliang, Several observers have also pointed to areas of the treaty in chief of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which shortcomings and inconsistencies can be identified. For was recently quoted as saying, “as far as the revolution in instance, the treaty has been criticized because it does not military affairs is concerned, the competition between military specifically ban the development and testing of earth-based forces is moving towards outer space... this is a historical anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). The proponents of the PPWT, inevitability and a development that cannot be turned Russia and China, have argued that while such a ban was back” (Daily Telegraph 2009). Beyond the paradox of his omitted because such activities cannot be readily verified, nationality – China being one of the primary sponsors of the

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 13 PPWT – and the degree to which his statement reflects the –––––– . 2009. Principal Questions and Comments on the Draft official stance of the Chinese government, his words are a PPWT, and the Answers Thereto. August 18, CD/1872. http:// grim reminder of the risks associated with the weaponization disarmament.un.org/library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc of space. 70068fa14/4a10c7c900aa03c28525762500713d69/$FILE/ cd-1872.pdf. If space weapons are indeed placed in orbit, with the utilization The Daily Telegraph. 2009. Space arms race an inevitability. or threat of utilization by any state, the event will likely November 2. http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/breaking-news/ trigger an arms race, with potentially disastrous results. It is space-arms-race-an-inevitability/story-e6freuz9-1225793638201. imperative to act now in moving toward a space weapons United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2008. Security ban, before the first hostile weapon is launched. in Space: The Next Generation – Conference Report, 31 March – If the international community fails to act decisively, there 1 April 2008. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-978-92- will probably be a ratchet effect, whereby the process of 9045-192-1-en.pdf. space weaponization will not go backwards once it is set in United States Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, 2007. motion. The PPWT could stand in the way of that dangerous Statement to the Conference on Disarmament By Ambassador possibility and should be afforded the attention it deserves, so Christina Rocca, U.S. Permanent Representative. http:// that space can be preserved as a peaceful global commons. www.usmission.ch/Press2007/0213PAROS.html. United States Office ofS cience & Technology Policy. 2006. National Space Policy. http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf. Note 1.T he United States has voted against PAROS during three of the past four years, and abstained on the last vote in October 2009. Israel has always abstained.

R eferences C onference on Disarmament. 2008. Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects. CD/1839. http://disarmament. C esar Jaramillo un.org/Library.nsf/a61ff5819c4381ee85256bc70068fa14/ is a Program Associate b387f2a6bb147c5c852573e700701b27/$FILE/cd-1839.pdf. with Project Ploughshares.

Acronyms and Abbreviations asat anti-satellite weapon Asf african Standby Force Att arms Trade Treaty Attsc arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee Au african Union AV Armed violence Cafi control Arms Foundation of India CD Conference on Disarmament Cso civil society organization Fc un First Committee GD Geneva Declaration Iciss international Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty Isaf international Security Assistance Force MDG Millennium Development Goal Ngo nongovernmental organization Nisea non-Violence International South East Asia Oewg open Ended Working Group Paros prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space Pp project Ploughshares PPM Permanent Peace Movement Ppwt treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects R2P responsibility to Protect Salw small arms and light weapons WV World Vision WVC world Vision Canada

14 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 US joins efforts toward a global Arms Trade Treaty UN resolution promises negotiations to begin in 2010

B y Kenneth Epps

In a dramatic volte-face in October, the US government announced its support for the multilateral negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Treaty advocates welcomed the announcement by the world’s largest arms supplier. Many also expressed concern at the condition the US placed on its support.

I mpact of resolution vote in a four-week treaty conference in 2012. Beginning in July 2010 all scheduled ATT sessions at the United Nations will be devoted to constructing a legally binding convention. In late October the United States joined a large majority of states to vote in favour of a UN First Committee (FC) resolution to establish a timetable for negotiating a “strong and T he demand for consensus robust” arms trade treaty.1 The US vote was anticipated – in prior ATT sessions US delegates had signaled that a change to the US position was in the works – but it was no less sig- Enthusiasm among ATT nificant for that. The positive vote was a complete reversal of advocates for the result of the persistent and solitary “no” the Bush administration had the vote was tempered by instructed for earlier US votes on the ATT. It meant that for concern for a worrisome the first time the world’s largest arms exporter was backing condition the US placed on the UN process to produce an ATT with the “highest possible its support for the resolu- common international standards” to control transfers of tion. In discussions with the conventional weapons. co-authors (seven states led by the United Kingdom), the The FC resolution vote was heralded by states and civil United States insisted that society groups alike as a major step forward in the ATT the resolution include: “the process. In a press release, the NGO-led Control Arms cam- United Nations Conference paign (2009) “welcomed the historic breakthrough at the on the Arms Trade Treaty UN … and called on all States to negotiate a truly effective will be undertaken … on the Treaty.” Following routine secondary approval by the UN basis of consensus.” The US US Secretary of State Hillary General Assembly in December, the agreement will establish made clear that the consen- Rodham Clinton, September 23, negotiating sessions over the next three years, culminating sus requirement was non- 2009. State Department Image by negotiable and that if it were Michael Gross removed from the resolution text the US would withdraw its support for the ATT process. The position of the US delegation was hardened by a statement released by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in mid-October during the period the draft resolution was being circulated to other states by the coauthors. In the statement Clinton (2009) noted that “the United States is prepared to work hard for a strong international standard [to control conventional arms transfers] by seizing the opportunity presented by the Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty at the United Nations.” The statement went on: “As long as that Conference operates under the rule of consensus

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 15 Several states and many civil society observers expressed grave concern that the consensus requirement would lead to the opposite of US expectations. They argued that a conference operat- ing “on the basis of consensus” would provide all participating states with the power of veto, leading to deadlocked negotiations or a treaty reduced to the lowest common standards. They cited the experience of UN negotiations in other arms control and disarmament forums – most notably in the UN Conference on Disarmament – where consensus rules of procedure have allowed single states to hold up progress for years.

UN General Assembly, October 2009. UN photo/Paulo Filgueiras

decision-making needed to ensure that all countries can be P reparing for the 2012 conference held to standards that will actually improve the global situation by denying arms to those who would abuse them, the Despite the efforts of a few supportive states to amend the United States will actively support the negotiations.” consensus requirement, the First Committee resolution with The US argued that consensus was needed to ensure the the text the United States required was overwhelmingly widest support for the treaty and to avoid loopholes that approved on October 30 by 153 states. Nineteen states would weaken its effectiveness. The US would have the abstained on the vote, including major exporters Russia and power of veto to ensure that the treaty met high international China and major importers India and Saudi Arabia and other standards. However, the US view was not widely shared, Middle East states. (Zimbabwe was the sole state to vote no.) especially among some of the strongest ATT supporters. The task now for advocates of a strong Arms Trade Treaty is

Civil society presses for a strong Arms Trade Treaty

The participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Summer 2009, p. 6 or http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ has been, and will remain, a crucial factor in the development monitor/monj09asidebar.pdf), Project Ploughshares has of a global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Although the ATT must be worked with NGOs worldwide to implement national, regional, a convention of states, civil society has been instrumental and global action on the ATT. The activities have included: in promoting the urgency of the treaty and the key features ■ Lobbying during the July session of the Open Ended needed to make it comprehensive and effective. The Arms Working Group (OEWG) on the ATT at the UN in New York. Trade Treaty Steering Committee (ATTSC), of which Project With logistics arranged by Oxfam, members of the ATTSC Ploughshares is a member, has guided NGO advocacy of and Southern NGO activists spent the week meeting with treaty content – most notably by drafting and promoting the diplomats and state officials to advocate the “vital compo- “global principles” at the core of a strong convention. The nents” of an ATT. The NGO group also provided displays and Control Arms campaign has engaged hundreds of civil society handout materials for OEWG delegates and organized three groups worldwide in grassroots action, including the “Million side events to explore key treaty features in some detail. Faces” petition for an ATT that was delivered to the UN Secretary-General in 2006. ■ Regional workshops in Lebanon and Thailand. Hosted by the Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) in Beirut, partici- In recent months NGO activity on the ATT has focused on the pants from 10 Middle East and North African countries met move toward treaty negotiations, the next phase in the UN for two days in early July for briefings on the ATT process process. As the manager of program funding provided to the and to explore campaigning and advocacy with states in ATTSC by the UK government (see The Ploughshares Monitor, the region. A PPM spokesman presented the workshop

16 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 to ensure that the Preparatory Committee sessions established What is less clear is the extent to which the US view of high by the resolution for 2011 and 2012 are used effectively to treaty standards corresponds to the “global principles” based prepare the ground for the 2012 treaty conference. on international norms and responsibilities that are advocated by long-time ATT supporters. There are also widely ranging Enthusiasm among ATT advocates views on how the consensus requirement will shape the out- come of the treaty conference in 2012. US support, coupled for the result of the vote was tempered with the need for consensus, may prove a mixed blessing. by concern for the US requirement for consensus. Note 1. un document A/C.1/64/L.38/Rev.1 available at http://www. reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com09/res/L38Rev1.pdf. For its part, the US has committed to making good use of the PrepCom sessions. In a statement to the First Committee, R eferences US Ambassador Donald Mahley (2009) called “for all the C linton, Hillary Rodham. 2009. U.S. support for the Arms Trade participants in these discussions to recognize the enormous Treaty. US Department of State, October 14. http://www.state. responsibility of using the scarce available time to utmost gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130573.htm. effectiveness.… We must…use each day to put forward for Control Arms Campaign. 2009. World’s biggest arms traders serious consideration and review substantive proposals, not promise global arms treaty. News release, October 30. of what should be excluded from a legally-binding document, http://www.controlarms.org/en/media/index.htm. but of what should be included to establish the high stan- Mahley, Donald A. 2009. U.S. Statement by Ambassador Donald dards and effective implementation that will be required for a A. Mahley delivered to the Conventional Weapons Segment of successful product.” Mahley pledged that the US would bring Thematic Debate, First Committee of the 64th United Nations to the next meeting “a menu” of requirements for “successful General Assembly. United States Mission to the United Nations, deliberations on an ATT.” October 19. http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/ 130803.htm. There is no doubt that the two October decisions – the US announcement that it will join multilateral efforts toward an ATT and the First Committee resolution to launch treaty negotiations next year – have combined to boost the UN ATT process to a more dynamic, high-stakes level. It is also apparent that the US is prepared not only to participate but also to K enneth Epps provide leadership in the ATT process. is Senior Program Associate with Project Ploughshares.

Civil society presses for a strong Arms Trade Treaty

results to the OEWG meeting in New York and to an ATT- renowned Indian photographers such as Shri Raghu Rai. related regional meeting of states in Jordan. Similarly, par- Other popular campaigning activities in India include an on- ticipants from eight Asia-Pacific countries met in Bangkok line petition, work with celebrities, and the distribution of in late September at a workshop hosted by Non-Violence mobilization materials to campaign volunteers. International South East Asia (NISEA). In October, a NISEA ■ Lobbying at the UN First Committee in New York in spokesman made presentations to a regional meeting October. With logistics arranged by the International Action of states in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and to the UN First Network on Small Arms, more than 40 NGO representa- Committee sessions in New York. tives participated in a staggered lobbying effort throughout ■ Events, exhibitions, and outreach in India. The Control October to influence the drafting of, and support for, the Arms Foundation of India (CAFI) organized several events ATT resolution approved overwhelmingly on October 30. in New Delhi to bring more exposure to the ATT and press Although arguably more intense, the NGO activities followed India to support the treaty. CAFI-hosted activities included previous First Committee efforts. In addition to regular dis- an August briefing session for parliamentarians and two cussions with diplomats in the UN corridors and at ad hoc events in September – a two-day roundtable with govern- meetings, the NGOs distributed recent materials, hosted ment officials, military industry representatives, lawyers, five side events on ATT topics, and mounted a display and other experts; and an Inter-Faith Meeting of religious depicting breaches of the ATT global principles. leaders. During September CAFI also mounted a pho- tographic exhibition, “A Farewell to Arms,” featuring 14

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 17 Development and peacebuilding T he “ninth” Millennium Development Goal

B y John Siebert

The International Peace Institute,1 located across the street from United Nations headquarters in New York, hosted the November 12, 2009 launch of Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa: A Report on World Vision Peacebuilding, Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programmes.2 The event was sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, the International Peace Institute, and World Vision International. The report, co-authored by Ploughshares Executive Director John Siebert and Senior Program Associate Kenneth Epps, was the result of collaboration between Project Ploughshares (PP) and World Vision Canada (WVC), based on field research conducted in East Africa in September 2008. What follows is a version of the remarks made at the launch.

It is a matter of great urgency for all of us to consider that the P roject Ploughshares and disarmament poor, in addition to suffering from the deprivations inherent in poverty, also disproportionately suffer from violent conflict. Project Ploughshares is primarily a disarmament organization The 2007 Project Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report with a peacebuilding mandate that is inspired by the human indicated that 1.6 per cent of the countries ranked as High security framework. Ploughshares was the host in Canada Development states by the UN Human Development Index for the founding meeting of the International Action Network in 2006 experienced one or more armed conflicts during the on Small Arms in 1998 and we remain an active member of 10-year period 1997–2006. This figure rises to 30.1 per cent the coalition in its support of the UN Programme of Action of those ranked as Medium Human Development states. For on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Currently Low Human Development states, there is again a rise to 38.7 Ploughshares is managing a one-year program to advance per cent.3 the Arms Trade Treaty on behalf of the Arms Trade Treaty Steering Committee. It is also evident that armed violence stops and frequently reverses development processes and opportunities. Yet These international efforts to support the control of it remains a point of sensitivity for many development conventional arms, particularly SALW, are vital. But we judge practitioners that hard security and disarmament processes, that they aren’t enough. Within the Geneva Declaration while necessary, not be confused with the application of (GD) framework Ploughshares has been working with our official development assistance. colleagues in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to explore the demand For disarmament practitioners, a focus on hardware has side of SALW – why people feel they need these weapons – traditionally excluded the intricacies of social relations and in addition to the supply side – stopping the illegitimate or the economic conditions that can give rise to the demand for irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons. weapons. The dichotomy in the two positions is highlighted by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), set out by world leaders in 2000 with a deadline of 2015. Addressing the clear and persistent impact of armed violence on the poor was not included in the eight MDGs. In 2006, with the exemplary leadership of the Swiss Government and the United Nations Development Programme and the definitive contribution of our colleagues at the Small Arms Survey, the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development4 began to bridge this gap. In effect, addressing the impact of violence on the poor could be seen as an informal ninth MDG.

18 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 Development and Armed Violence Reduction: East Africa Experiences, Perspectives and Prospects, International Peace Institute Policy Forum, New York, November 12, 2009. (l to r): John Siebert, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares; Warren Hoge, Vice-President and Director of External Relations, International Peace Institute; Morten Wetland, Permanent Representative, Mission of Norway to the United Nations; Bill Lowrey, Director for Peace Building, World Vision International; Daniel Prins, Chief of Branch, Conventional Weapons, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs

Launching the report on armed violence in East Africa in New violence, as well as police and military personnel, local and York on November 12 is done to reinforce the tabling in the regional government officials, and NGO and CSO staff. UN General Assembly on November 16 of the UN Secretary- The questionnaire was organized around the four-point General’s report on the GD. armed violence (AV) lens of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and World Vision International and peacebuilding Development. At the centre of the AV lens are the people affected by violence, as well as consideration of the agents/ perpetrators, the instruments used, and the institutions As one of the largest development NGOs, World Vision affecting these communities. International has made a commitment to integrating The field research was a collection process rather than an peacebuilding with development and humanitarian evaluation process. The questionnaire was designed to programming to address the impact of armed violence at create a picture for each of the four elements of the AV lens. the grassroots. The joint report with Project Ploughshares Then we asked how WV development and peacebuilding provided a public opportunity for World Vision (WV) to programming had affected the level of violence in the past reinforce its support for the GD. three years. Founded in 1950, World Vision has worldwide experience implementing programs in emergency relief, community The poor, in addition to suffering development, and the promotion of justice in almost 100 countries. WV defines peacebuilding as “programmes and from the deprivations inherent in activities that address the causes of conflict and the griev- poverty, also disproportionately ances of the past, that promote long-term stability and justice, and that have peace-enhancing outcomes. Sustained pro- suffer from violent conflict. cesses of peacebuilding steadily rebuild or restore networks of interpersonal relationships, contribute toward just systems Both PP and WV were intricately involved in the design and continually work with the interaction of truth and mercy, and the execution of the research. WV capably handled justice and peace.” the complex logistics of the field research. In writing the The cooperation between Ploughshares and the WVC office report, however, there were some disagreements around exemplifies the “crossing of the divide” that is increasingly key questions: How heavily should the report rely on the taking place between disarmament and development quotations of those interviewed to convey their meaning? practitioners. How should quoted material be interpreted? Should recommendations be made? Who should be the primary target of the recommendations? R eport synopsis Compromises were found. Quotations are liberally included in the report but there is a narrative structured around the four The heart of the PP-WVC report reflects the responses to elements of the armed violence lens. Observations at the end questionnaires used in the field research conducted over three of each of the country chapters plus concluding observations weeks in communities in the North Rift Valley of Kenya, were written, but we saved explicit recommendations to the the Kitgum and Soroti Districts of Uganda, and Tonj East policy community for the Joint Statement at the start of the County in Warrap State, Southern Sudan. The people who report. were interviewed included both victims and perpetrators of

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 19 return. In that event these successful local peacebuilding and development efforts would be insufficient to meet the expected violence.

S udan

The pastoralists interviewed in Warrap State, Southern Sudan, provided more pointed lessons about the impact of one-sided disarmament exercises: they made conditions worse. These interviews also suggested that local peace agreements between competing communities were likely unsustainable without substantial development inputs, including infrastructure such as roads.

O bservations

The interviewees believed that WV peacebuilidng and development programs had made a constructive contribution to lowering the level of violence in each of the communities visited. People naturally wanted more of everything in these programs. The Sudanese spoke most forcefully about the need for greater peacebuilding and development efforts. K enya Clearly, in the three countries we visited, the level of assistance was lowest in Sudan, where WV programming was primarily humanitarian, with elements of longer-term In Kenya we visited three pastoralist communities: Turkana, development activity. Sadly, in the year since the research, Pokot, and Marakwet. Gun violence is embedded in a rich pastoralist violence in Southern Sudan has increased cultural web of long-held practices centred on cattle rustling, dramatically, with the UN documenting more than 2,000 now distorted by widespread civilian possession and use of deaths related to cattle raiding for the first eight months of automatic weapons, primarily variants of the AK-47. 2009 (Sudan Tribune 2009). This is a higher annualized While the Turkana and Pokot continue to be fierce opponents death toll than is currently experienced in Darfur. The PP-WV engaged in raids and counter-raids, with some abatement, report indicates why this could reasonably be expected. the Marakwet have developed a functional peace with the Pokot based on a recipe of factors. These include increased horticulture, peace-promoting national politicians, social control of guns within the community, and training of peace committees on both sides and then connecting them by cell phones. The most important ingredient, however, appears to Millennium be a decision by the Marakwet to significantly reduce the role of dowry in marriage, thus eliminating a primary incentive Development Goals for cattle raiding and greatly increasing inter-marriage and therefore family ties between the two. By 2015: ■ Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. ■ Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education. Uganda ■ Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women. ■ Goal 4: Reduce child mortality. In the de facto post-conflict situation in northern and eastern ■ Uganda, violence centred on domestic and sexual assault Goal 5: Improve maternal health. and land squabbles or “wrangles” as camps for internally ■ Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. displaced persons decongested. Conflict has been mitigated ■ Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. by training peace committees and offering relocation ■ Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development. assistance, particularly in finding livelihoods. Fears were Source: http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml still expressed in September 2008 that the Lord’s Resistance Army, effectively gone from the area since 2006, might

20 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009

R ecommendations Faith leaders prepare Recommendations to policymakers are separated from the main body of the report in a Joint Statement from PP and for the G8/G20 WVC to stimulate discussion and action by UN, government, and other policymakers. Further research on successful armed summit in Canada violence reduction programming is needed to guide future programming that combines peacebuilding with development. Project Ploughshares is part of the international 2010 Interfaith Partnership that aims to ensure that G8 political leaders gathering in Huntsville, Ontario in June 2010 C onclusion understand the pressing need to meet the challenges of poverty, environmental sustainability, and peace.

The research, but more importantly the Geneva Declaration In a statement released at an October 14, 2009 media event process itself, indirectly poses a very difficult question to in Toronto, members of the Partnership outlined their views on both development and disarmament practitioners: Can either how to shape a future focused on “the greater good for all.” development or disarmament be done successfully without This global call to action is a lead-up to the World Religions the other? If not, what are the implications for programming? Summit that will take place in Winnipeg, June 21-23, 2010. From the statement: Notes As people of faith and as concerned global citizens, we 1.F or more information about the International Peace Institute, urge our communities to do our part to reduce poverty, go to http://www.ipacademy.org. care for the Earth and invest in peace. We also monitor the 2. The report can be found on the Project Ploughshares website decisions our government leaders take, including decisions at www.ploughshares.ca. made at the 2010 political leaders’ summit in Canada. We 3. More information about the Human Development Index can be expect follow‐through on past promises. We expect bold found at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi. new actions based on the values and recommendations 4. Go to http://www.genevadeclaration.org. outlined here. Our prayers and wishes for wisdom and compassion are with our political leaders at this critical moment in our collective history. R eference Sudan Tribune. 2009. SPLM Pagan Amum says North Sudan For further information go to arming tribal militias. August 23. http://www.sudantribune.com/ http://www.faithchallengeg8.com. spip.php?article32219.

Prayer for a world without nuclear weapons

J ohn Siebert God of all times and seasons, is Executive Director of Project Ploughshares. You have presented us with a season of hope and a time of opportunity for a nuclear-weapon-free world. May we not squander this opportunity but find ways of working together to make a difference for the whole global family.

Fill us with the vision of your kingdom, where the lion lies down with the lamb, and weapons are turned into farming tools. Paying UN dues Empower us to declare that authentic security is found in enhancing our human interdependence in your one creation. As of October 21, 2009, 22 countries out of 192–11.4 percent–are paid-in-full members of the UN. They are Enable us to live this declaration in our relationships with Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Canada, Congo, Croatia, Finland, neighbors, near and far, and to you be all glory and praise, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New now and forever. Zealand, Niger, the Philippines, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and Tajikistan. © World Council of Churches 2009

The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 21 B ook Notices

Putting Teeth in the Tiger: Improving the war-fighting patterns, but [that they] very seldom have the Effectiveness of Arms Embargoes, edited desired political effects of ending wars or changing a target’s by Michael Brzoska and George A. Lopez, policies.” Still, they claim that the book illustrates Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2009, ISBN the following lessons: 978-1-8485-52029, hardback, 258 pages, . Arms embargoes are likelier to achieve the intended policy Volume 10 of Contributions to Conflict objectives when combined with other sanctions. Management, Peace, Economics and . Reducing the flow of arms is important. Development, £64.95. . Combining sanctions enhances the effectiveness of arms embargoes. From the introduction: . Arms embargoes against only one side of a conflict are The chapters in this study examine a number of ele- likelier to contribute to the achievement of the desired ments that are central to shaping the effectiveness of policy objectives. arms embargoes…. These include actual arms transfer While the authors acknowledge the scarcity of solid data, they relations…; cases for the implementation of the arms reveal that “what is well documented is that arms suppliers embargoes; type and nature of the sanctioned behavior; of various sorts are attracted by the opportunities to make decision-making within the targeted country or group; money through illicit deliveries provided by arms embargoes.” effects on targeted countries; identification of domestic Three groups of embargo-breakers stand out: governments actors in the target country that gain or lose from the sanc- allied to the target, private arms dealers and brokers, and tions; as well as the implementation of arms embargoes arms-producing states without proper export control. by embargoing states. The case studies describe patterns in arms transfers and embargo-busting, causes for arms The book indicates that “the implementation of arms embar- embargoes, and their effects in targeted countries and sup- goes has improved in the new century.” States that own or plier implementation. produce arms have improved their export controls. Private arms dealers are under better supervision and have access Contents: to fewer sources. The international community is more aware Chapter 1: a framework for the analysis of the effective- of sanction-busting. But there is still much room for improve- ness of arms embargoes ment. While necessary reforms are described in some detail, By Michael Brzoska the direction for future improvement can be summed up as Chapter 2: the unprecedented embargo: The UN arms “more commitment by states,” “more government oversight,” sanctions against Iraq, 1990-2004 and “more resources at the UN.” By Oldrich Bures and George A. Lopez Chapter 3: the challenge of measuring success: Contributors come from the Bonn International Center for Yugoslavia’s sanctions decade (1991-2001) Conversion, the Institute for Peace Research and Security By Wolf-Christian Paes Studies at the University of Hamburg, Metropolitan University Chapter 4: us measures against Pakistan’s nuclear poli- Prague, the Centre for European Security Studies at the cies, 1990-2001 University of Copenhagen, the Institute for Defence Studies By Sumita Kumar and Analyses in New Delhi, and the Kroc Institute for Chapter 5: tightening the screws in West African arms International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. embargoes By Maraike Wenzel and Sami Faltas Chapter 6: from failure to success: The impact of sanctions Peace and Conflict 2010, edited on Angola’s civil war by J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan By Wolf-Christian Paes Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, Chapter 7: un arms embargoes in the Great Lakes, 2009, ISBN 978-1-59451-715-0, 1994-2004 hardback, US$85.00; 2010, ISBN By Marc von Boemcken 978-1-59451-716-7, paperback, Chapter 8: arms embargoes against Eritrea and Ethiopia US$24.95. By Marc von Boemcken Chapter 9: a quantitative analysis of arms embargoes The Peace and Conflict series is the flagship publication By Michael Brzoska of the Center for International Development and Conflict Chapter 10: putting teeth in the tiger: Policy conclusions for Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. effective arms embargoes Peace and Conflict 2010 provides key data and documents By Michael Brzoska and George A. Lopez trends in national and international conflicts ranging from In the final chapter, the authors recognize that the main isolated acts of terrorism to internal civil strife to full-fledged effects of arms embargoes “are to change arms supplies and intercountry war.

22 The Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 Key features: R eport Notices . Peace & Conflict Instability Ledger, ranking the status and progress of 160 countries based on their fore- casted risk of future instability Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001- . Trends in Global Terrorism 2008 by Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional Research . Special topics: Women and post-conflict settings; truth Service, US Library of Congress, released September 4, 2009, commissions and tribunals 89 pages. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/ . Large format, full-colour graphs, tables, maps, and R40796.pdf. appendices This report is prepared annually. It provides official, unclas- Recommendations and observations: sified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to . Targeted international aid programs should be increased, developing nations by the US and foreign countries for the or at least sustained, for five to ten years after the end of preceding eight calendar years. war and should aim at promoting social programs as well as This year’s report notes that “developing nations continue to economic growth. be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons . UN peacekeeping missions have a positive effect in sustain- suppliers.” The report shows how the US and Russia have ing peace and development. dominated the arms trade to the developing world in recent . Explicit efforts to incorporate women in the peace process years. France is another significant player. The major purchas- in the stages after the termination of violence improve the ers of arms in 2008 were the United Arab Emirates, Saudi prospects for more durable peace agreements. Arabia, and Morocco. . In the right political context, truth commissions and international criminal tribunals help to reinforce peace and promote economic recovery. Reframing Nuclear De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals, by the J. Joseph Hewitt is Director for Government Relations at EastWest Institute, New York, in partnership with the Federal CIDCM, Jonathan Wilkenfeld is Director of CIDCM, and Ted Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland and the New Robert Gurr is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, published Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. October 12, 2009, 24 pages, available at http://www.ewi. info/reframing-nuclear-de-alert-decreasing-operational- readiness-us-and-russian-nuclear-arsenals. Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of instability by Hilary Synnott, International In June 2009, the EastWest Institute held a seminar on Institute for Strategic Studies / Routledge, “reframing nuclear de-alert” in Yverdon-les-Bains, Switzerland, 2009, ISBN 978-0-41556-260-7, paper- attended by technical experts, policymakers, military profes- back, 200 pages. To order, go to http:// sionals, and scholars from the US and Russia, as well as www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/ representatives from the non-nuclear-weapon states that how-to-order. sponsored the UN General Assembly Resolution “Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems” Hilary Synnott argues that any strategy (A/Res/63/41). The findings of the seminar are published in for addressing the country’s problems requires a nuanced this report. understanding of its turbulent history, the failings of succes- sive governments and the weaknesses of core institutions. He sheds light on the role of Pakistan’s army and its intelligence DVD and report from service and looks at how the army has used religion and the issue of Kashmir to maintain its own influence. WMD Commission available Synnott rigorously analyzes developments in Pakistan’s vola- The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission has prepared tile tribal regions and examines the role of past events, espe- a 45-minute film in which Dr. Hans Blix and several other cially since 11 September 2001, in generating the animosity members of the Commission reflect on nuclear disarmament. that many Pakistanis feel toward the West today. DVD copies of the film can be ordered from the production Of particular interest to Monitor readers will be analysis of company Svenska Filmbolaget Axess in Stockholm by contact- internal conflict, the wars with India, and ongoing unrest in ing [email protected]. All the material in Kashmir; the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan; the film can be used freely. and Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons. A 15-minute trailer of the film is available for viewing on the Sir Hilary Synnott, a Senior Consulting Fellow of the IISS, was WMDC website www.wmdcommission.org. the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Regional Coordinator for Additionally, copies of the WMD Commission’s final report Southern Iraq (July 2003–January 2004), the British High Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Commissioner in Pakistan (2000–2003), and Deputy High Chemical Arms are available from The Simons Foundation at Commissioner in India (1993–1996). no charge by contacting Elaine Hynes ([email protected]).

T he Ploughshares Monitor | Winter 2009 23 N ew Publication

Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa: A Report on World Vision Peacebuilding, Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programmes by John Siebert and Kenneth Epps, produced collaboratively by Project Ploughshares and World Vision Canada, published by World Vision Canada, 2009, spiral binding, 89 pages. In September 2008 Ploughshares Executive Director John Siebert and Senior Program Associate Kenneth Epps traveled to Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan to conduct comparative field research inW orld Vision peacebuilding and development projects (for more information, see Kenneth Epps, “Advancing development while reducing violence: Lessons from the field,” The Ploughshares Monitor, Winter 2008, http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/monitor/mond08a.pdf). The report, Addressing Armed Violence in East Africa, details the results of this research. As John and Ken traveled to different World Vision projects in East Africa, they conducted interviews and administered questionnaires that focused on gathering information in three main areas: ■ An assessment of the security situation in the communities visited; ■ The instruments used in armed violence; and ■ World Vision peace projects and their impact on armed violence. They were particularly interested in determining the roles of men, women, youth, and children – as both victims and perpetrators of violence. As John Siebert of Ploughshares and Chris Derksen-Hiebert of World Vision Canada note: “This study offers one ‘brick’ in what we trust will become a rising wall of field-based evidence to advance best practices in reducing armed violence.” More details about the contents of this report can be found in John Siebert’s article, “Development and peacebuilding: The ‘ninth’ Millennium Development Goal’” (see p. 18 of this issue). This report can be found on the Ploughshares website at www.ploughshares.ca. Hard copies of the report can be obtained by contacting Debbie Hughes at Project Ploughshares ([email protected]; 519-888-6541, ext. 702).

PUBLICATIONS MAIL AGREEMENT NO. 40065122 REGISTRATION NO. 11099 RETURN UNDELIVERABLE CANADIAN ADDRESSES TO PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES CONRAD GREBEL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE WATERLOO, ONTARIO, CANADA N2L 3G6