CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Belgium as a Crucial Test asaCrucial Consociationalism: Belgium of Department of International Relations and European Studies The 2007-2011 Political Crisis Central European University European Central Supervisor: Erin K. Jenne K. Erin Supervisor: Word Count: 13,820 Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Submitted Zsofia Pales 2011 By CEU eTD Collection parties tohavemore extreme demands and pursuearoad secession.towards past political conflicts in Belgium, becauseinstitutions themeansprovide and incentives for ethnic and other current the for areresponsible themselves institutions consociational the that argues thesis theory.the against This betested will consociationalism for case serve as ideal an to which used Belgium, between conflictethnic differentthe groups. integration and promotes reduces ethnic opposite effectwhatas founders to of theory the suggest. Insteadof providing stability, political it achieve infact Itattempts the institutions consociational todemonstrate that deeply states. divided This thesis aims to challenge consociationalism as a method for reducing ethnic conflict in conflict ethnic reducing for method a as consociationalism challenge to aims thesis This Abstract i CEU eTD Collection sending mesending from avery book useful the library.Amsterdam public his cooperation and help. insightfulvery would likeadvices. I also my to thankJohn Harbord, Academic Writing professo I wouldlike my tothank Erin and forprofessor her supervisor Jenne andencouragement enthusiasm, Finally, Iwould like to thank friend my Roland for Coenen photocopying and Acknowledgements ii r for CEU eTD Collection Chapter 2— Methodology and Research Design DebateChapter 1— The Introduction Table of Contents Acknowledgements Abstract Bibliography Conclusion Chapter 3— The CaseofBelgium 1.2 1.1 3.3 Belgium asaFederalState 3.2 Growing Ethnic Tensions andSteps towards Federalism 3.1 The roots ofethnic antagonism 2.2 Methodology 2.1 CaseSelection: Consociationalismin Belgium 3.3.4 The PoliticalDeadlock of 2010-2011 3.3.3 The Political 31 Deadlock of 2007-2008...... 3.3.2 The PoliticalDeadlock of 1987-88 3.3.1 The First Political Deadlock of 1978-79 ...... i The Argument Consociationalism andits Criticism ...... 39 ...... 1 ...... 42 ...... iii ...... 15 ...... ii ...... 9 ...... 4 ...... 22 ...... 18 ...... Table of Contents ...... 18 ...... 4 ...... 27 ...... iii ...... 35 ...... 13 ...... 23 ...... 13 ...... 20 ...... CEU eTD Collection Studies, University 1-13.California,of 1981. (ed.) ArendLijphart, 1 that can that ensure ininterim. runningof the country the However,the long-term the absence of a a government be assignedto could"caretaker" temporary offederal responsibilities the government the of some each, governments separate with German) and Dutch (French, communities since Belgium has regions autonomous three (Flanders, Wallonia andBrussels)linguistic and three unity Party (Wallonia), Socialist which make forming acoalition However problematic. particularly Flemishliberal ambitionsNew Alliancefuture and of pro-independence pro- the (Flanders) and democracy.case forconsociational theeffectiveness of is caseof test acrucial the Belgium consociationalism cannothold up in Belgium,it is notlikely holdto up anywhereif else. In this sense, a consociation, for type ideal an it make would believe proponents that conditions the of most meets Belgium that Given in Belgium. deadlock political current in the role system's consociational coalition This deservesgovernment. andthetesting investigation unusual event the of form neededinhas ever any a 300 days, to breaking record time the country government last the has recentlyitmight lead to the strong fragmentation of the state and toa political deadlock. This ishappened exactly what consociationalism powersharing encourages and equal representation differentthe of ethnic groups, in Belgium.it "is the most perfect, most convincing, andmost impressive example of a consociation." Belgium is most1981 thata consociational "Belgiumexample of the thorough that democracy" claimed and as a federalin consociation. a successful observed Lijphart of Arend Belgium as the paradigm fact regard in statepolitical maintainsystem for to divided societies stability. political of system consociational the Supporters appropriate most the as scholars has some by recommended been has notConsociationalism been able to form a Lijphart, Arend. "The Belgian Example of Cultural Coexistence in Comparative Perspective." in. Perspective." in Comparative Coexistence Lijphart, of Cultural Example Arend. Belgian "The The political crisis that started instarted The be is crisis political explained2007 to that bythediverging and party politics Conflict andCoexistenceConflict inBelgium. Introduction 1 Berkeley: Institute International of Berkeley: Institute 1 While CEU eTD Collection Cornell University 2005.p. Press, 66. G. andRothchild, Donald (eds.). 3 Societies. Divided Ethnically Arguments." In: S. Noel. ed. 256. as cited in O'Leary, Brendan. "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 2 societies." divided in severely conflict mitigate to "inapt is system the Horowitz, Donald Belgium is a perfect example. However, according to the major opponents of consociationalism like "unhealthy." 300 days of anddeadlock finally form a government. The currentsituation is thus undoubtedly The "Shame" demonstrations peopleby feel in illustrates, and solidarity. of Brussels dissatisfied absence the cooperation political have urged the politiciansdifferentregions communities. and As place took thedemonstration onthe24thJanuary that 2011 to come to an agreementfederalpermanentis bemajor if tothe even devolved governmentcan a problem,extensive power after more than above grouprights and other institutional concentrateweapons innot did ethnic foci," Roeder claims that "Belgian power sharing was most stable as long as ethnicity was not elevated support, it has never threatened the complete dissolution of Belgium. The consociational democratic Theconsociational of Belgium. dissolution complete the threatened never has it support, nationalism has gone through several phases the lastduring decades,at times havingless more or deadlock. political the its Although contributingto extreme Flemish claims;thus problematic dueto party,separatist very NewFlemish the and cooperation bargainingAlliance, makeselite Flemish the However, separatism. towards claim growing Flemings' in the role major a play Wallonia of impoverishment relative the with hand in hand growth economic Flemish continuing the regions dueto Walloonsthe two towards between the cleavage economic growing the and side Flemish from the The historical grievances ethnic of antagonism. longby history preceded a andlinguistic division between the Flemings the and Walloonsbe could not more pronounced, Theregional, cultural ethnicity, bemore of exacerbated. assertive have their to tensions institutions thetheir means through own ethnic groups since system provided that theconsociational Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." in Roeder, Philip Horowitz, Donald. The consociational system is usually recommended for deeply of states, divided which Ethnic Groups inConflict Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005.p.4. From Power Sharing toDemocracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in SustainablePeace: Power andDemocracy afterCivil Wars. . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. p. 2 2 Similarly, 3 asserting Ithaca: CEU eTD Collection of of this model as a method ofmanaging conflict in deeply societies.divided onthe viability castdoubt Belgium’s conclusions asacrucialBelgium. Given testcase,these status politicalin current deadlock the them and ultimately produced actually exacerbated ethnic tensions, This analysis demonstrates that the internal features of consociationalism, rather than mitigating actually promoting conflict. The limits of consociationalism will be tested with the case of Belgium. it forbeenhave as against of leveled that well assome ethnic criticisms the astate, tensions within of features consociational the in thusbe system regardingtheirdiscussed will advantages resolving generated unresolvableframework of problems within system. the consociational the Themain causesfor including Belgium, (nationalism do economicsomeand/or that of root upheaval) the that could have led to the political deadlock and investigate what the consociational pattern failed to causes research exacerbation ledidentify will underlying the conflict? to reduction The present of its andinsteadof course system simply run with? consociational notcope Orhasthe system could consociational the crisis that current haveinducedthe could factors what for aconsociation, type ideal be before. Belgiumpoliticalin wasconsidered most the If deadlock now and thepast notto of the central government. It is also an interestingto its fullest, has notbeen able to prevent ethnic tensions from producingquestion total functionalin Belgium breakdown elaborated been had it why though even Belgium system, consociational the has Apparently comegovernment. a to face such a in consociational a peaceful situated of democracy region Europe. isIt indeed whyit puzzling forwas possible suchapolitical emerge crisis to ina consolidated in state. one living ethnic communities between different conflicts resolve ethnic to is meant system Arguably Belgium cannot be the ideal model for a consociation since it is currently lacking is currently it since a consociation for model ideal be the cannot Belgium Arguably 3 CEU eTD Collection consociationalism happenwhichlikely forms is majority. if clear group to a one Heargues solution the that of can only work if people are neatly divided into two or more distinct regions; and (2) their vital interests) threaten that legislations prevent can (minorities veto Minority (4) Parliament); the and institutions is cultural ethnicgroup inkeypublic proportionally concern); (each (3) Proportionality represented thatareof inmatters autonomy of enjoysespecially certain amount government(each group a (2) self- power); Autonomy or of shareexecutive the part major of groups power-sharing the (each Executive (1) democracies: characterize consociational that principles organizational four key second book Accommodation: PluralismNetherlands andDemocracyinthe in his work byLijphart advocated first was of consociationalism concept model. The strongly based on the of governance, this way and betweenreducing tensions thedifferentantagonism assumptionethnic Itis groups. of elite system in ofsociety a common all segments incorporate is to function its core since of cooperation,governance, and in thisemergence majortarianthe ethnic Itwasoriginally to inopposition type ofovert conflict. developed way is a top-down elite-based communities can be efficiently consociational through governed thisprinciples, way reducing the linguistically, differentcomprise ethnically orregions) that or religiously (states territories divided 1.1 Consociationalism anditsCriticism 4 6 University Press, 1977. 5 Berkeley: University Californiaof Press, 1968. Lijphart, Arend.Lijphart, Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." "Consociational Arend. Lijphart, Arend.Lijphart, Lijphart also acknowledges other solutions to ethnicLijphartalso acknowledges namely solutions to other conflict, (1) Lijphart firstLijphart developed his theory of consociationalism in late1960's.the key Its idea is that Democracy inPluralSocieties:AComparative Exploration is the best way to stabilize democracy in plural societies. Lijphart also specifies a The Politicsof Accommodation: Pluralismin theNetherlands. andDemocracy Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 6 . Chapter 1— The Debate The 1— Chapter World Politics 4 21 (2).1969. p.207-25. 4 which helater developed in his 5 . In it, Lijphart identified Lijphart it, In . NewHaven: Yale partition, The Politics of assimilation which CEU eTD Collection certain party's political interests instead of the group's they represent since elites are allowed to allowed are elites since represent they group's the of instead interests political party's certain a further will consociationalism arguesthat Rinus vanSchendelen etc.). cultural, economic, (social, power sharing system leads strong to polarization and reinforces the already existing cleavages the since states divided in all governance of form justified be a not may consociationalism critics, remains why institutionsthese failed tocontain growing ethnictensions in Belgium. question latter,the the address. If failedto ultimately institutions these factors that structural by or larger by as themselves, expected institutions Horowitz, were drivenby consociational inBelgium tensions The it. increased remains question whether Belgium than rather exacerbate in conflict ameliorate would consociationalism that wouldhave predicted Lijphart Therefore, unfavorable. are conditions initial if even societies, plural most for consociationalism proposes thus Lijphart unfavorable. are conditions though even work might still it cases in other whereas 7 economic differences among groups" large and ethnic of include:"the absence of the important of a majority absence socio- group which number of favorable conditions that could make consociationalism more likely to work, the most 8 Societies Peacemaking inMultiethnic decisive not are factors these that claims Lijphart however efficiently, more work democracy consociational between groups different ofcompromise the traditions better prior autonomy; (7) territorial federalism can aremorepromote concentrated, ethnic groups loyalties; (6)if ethnic than beloyalties(5) shouldof stronger particularistic state; the overarching unity internal the promote dangers external (4) small; relatively be shall country the of population shouldnotbe too many groups (3 to 5) so that negotiation is still possible among them; (3) the total shouldgroups be samethe balance roughly sizesothat exists of power amongthem; (2) there Lijphart, Arend. “The Power-Sharing Approach,” in Joseph Montville (ed.) Lijphart, Arend. “The Power-Sharing Power-Sharing Approach,” “The Arend.Lijphart, Lijphart's theory has received considerable criticism from various scholars. According to the to According scholars. various from criticism considerable received has theory Lijphart's , only , helpful. Even if a state encompasses all these factors, success is not guaranteed, is not success factors, all these encompasses ifEven a state . Lexington, MA: LexingtonBooks, 1990.p.491-509. 7 . He specifies seven additional favorable factors: (1) ethnic 5 op. cit ., p.498. 8 . These conditions could make could . Theseconditions Conflict and CEU eTD Collection means to press for further concessions, eventually resulting in resulting secession. eventually press concessions, forfurther means to events thatlead tocollapse, since through their institutions own willpolitical ethnic groups have the of chain irreversible inplace an secession andonce triggers towards isstep firstautonomy the Perspective,” 13 Harvard University,p. 32. 1972. population than the second largest ethnic group (certainly true forpopulation (certainly Flemish in the the secondlargestthan Belgium), ethnictrue the group encompass a so called "core ethnic region" that system. federal the of andcollapse the extreme polarization incorporates mighteventually differentto lead ethnic achievegroups, between intends to apeaceful coexistence at least it though even 20% consociationalism, Therefore demands. for secessionist more of incentive an creates more of the of differentethnic groups, whole alter recommendation." the not does status of if isquestionable conditions the score [of the favorablethe versusunfavorable conditions] a consociational [power-sharing] system; if conditions are unfavorable, he proposes the same. The conditions are not at all present. "If conditions are favorable, Lijphart's theory leads him to propose desirable the cases where different most for the it recommends and of consociationalism concept solution of a problem, therefore implying a paradox. solutiontherefore of aproblem, democracy builds on a divided society and elite cooperation itincorporates both the origins and the consociational Since 'devices'. consociational the and stability elite accommodation, dissensus, isnotareal segmentation, theory, together joining consociationalism a mere but tautology 12 Collected Criticisms." 1984. pp.34. Politica 19, Acta World Politics 31. 1979. pp. 107; Schendelen, Rinus van. "The Views of Arend Lijphartand p. 265.Lustick, Ian. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control." 10 Criticisms." 1984. Acta Politica 19, 9 bargain on behalf withof group the very little constituentoversight. 11 Political Science. Schendelen, Rinus van. "Consociational Democracy: The Views of Arend Lijphartand Collected Cornell, Svante. 2002. “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Nordlinger, E. A. Barry, Brian. "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy." Laitin, David. "South Africa: Violence, Myth andDemocratic Reform." Many scholars in fact claim that consociationalism instead of accommodation the insteadpromoting of consociationalism claim that infact Many scholars World Politics Oct 1975, 5 (4). p. 480. Conflict Regulation Regulation Conflict in Divided Societies exacerbates ethnicconflict , Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 254. 11 6 . Nordlinger claims thatsegmental autonomy 10 Laitin claims that Lijphart overuses the overuses Lijphart that claims Laitin . Cambridge, MA: Cent.Int. Aff. 12 Similarly Cornell asserts that asserts Cornell Similarly 9 13 Brian Barry claimed that World Politics Hale argues that if Hale arguesthat states British Journal of 39.1987. CEU eTD Collection since ethnic groups themselves arenot cohesive, makes this less cooperation plausible. across group lines," latitudebut tocooperate more leaders leaders, indeedhave would set of then by wererepresented a single "If each group between groups. ethnic of instead rival a competition the viability intra-ethnic questions sincetheycanleadtostronger competition, grand coalitions of country is to be run but whether it should be a country at all," 19 Consociational NormativeandPolitics: Explanatory Arguments." p.4. make leaders of make leadersof differentthe subculturesvulnerable, more while divide consolidating the ethnic are "inapt tomitigate conflict in severely divided societies." of struggleslikely "theproducts relativelyof moderatecleavages,"claims or thatthey resolved and ethnicescalate means conflict. to andthe motives the both them provides system power-sharing The parties. different the between concession mutual sharinginstitutions empowerethnic press groups to for further demands instead of promoting a an national overarching identity more problematic. AccordingRoeder and to Rothchild, power- apart from groups and canmake loyalties moretheir theseethnic pronounced creation the elites, of itsConsociationalism, top-downapproach dueto andinteraction between byreducing ethnic the more difficultto overcome duetotheir 'primordial' thanideological/religiousqualities identities. division. This integrating,way instead consociational the of system strengthens and enforcesonly ethnic itself. system by consociational its institutionalization the more dueto pronounced becomes divide his laterasa work favorableithas condition, been byscholarsstrongly since criticized ethnic the 15 Collapse,” 14 sovereignty. pursue to likely is majority 18 CivilWars.Democracy after Democracy.” in Roeder, Philip G. and Rothchild, Donald (eds.). 17 16 Lijphart, Arend. Lijphart, Hale, Henry. 2004. “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Horowitz, Donald. Rothchild, Donald. Roeder, Philip G. “PowerSharing asanImpediment and toPeace Barry, Brian. "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy." Ibid. , p. 574. p. , Horowitz, also argues that consociationalism can in fact strengthen ethnic divides and divides ethnic strengthen fact in can consociationalism that also argues Horowitz, 15 According to Barry, if "the basis of division is ethnic the question may not be how the World Politics Power-sharing inSouthAfrica. op.cit., Ethnic Groups inConflict. , Vol. 2,p. 56,No. 173. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. p. 36. 14 Even though Lijphart lists geographical concentration in concentration geographical lists Lijphart though Even p. 256. as cited in O'Leary, Brendan. "Debating 7 17 Horowitz claims that consociations are more are claimsconsociations that Horowitz p. 119-128. 18 16 SustainablePeace: Power and He claims that ethnic identities are identities ethnic that claims He op. cit ., p. 503. 19 It can It CEU eTD Collection 25 24 Issue 1, p.17. 23 Sep 2010,45; 3; 346-369. democracy,multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde." Acta Politica, 22 Hamilton College, Clinton, NY, April 9, 1994. The Case of Serbia." presented at the workshop "The Balkans: Nationalism and Ethnicity," in conflict with spiral Gagnon, ethnic groups" other toward V.P. asDemobilizer: "Ethnic Conflict political actors to try appear the most supportive ofethnic claims, which causes an inevitablealmost 21 the cohesion of the system; maintenance and to the commitmenthave astrong (3) in cleavages; totranscend subcultures order (4) realizerival the of elites the with effort common thea in join (2) dangerssubcultures; the of interests diverging the of political fragmentation.(1) accommodate be ableto 'elite should cartel' as an which government the cooperation, defining elite bargaining long-term reinforce that stability difficulties mightariserun, in they short the can beresolved overthelong run processes through of Lijphart that (aconcern deadlock aserious canimpose vetoes minority plus agencies, of multiplication views as the lead to also could a autonomy Segmental appointments. merit-based with interfere itcan services, problem ofachieving elite in consensus coalitions.grand Second,if proportionality is applied in public the inefficiency). of difficulty the to due decision-making the down slow seriously can systems such that noted However, hedifferences of opinion." claims that conflict in of regulation membershipwith groups asociety shifting thataredividedby temporary while some of these 20 which is not only conducive but essential for consociationalism to work, is a critical foundation for majortarianism. of illusion of the creation the to which contributes they represent, group the to only accountable instead ofbridging it. Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." "Consociational Lijphart, Arend. Lijphart, Arend. Lijphart, Andeweg, Rudy. "Consociational Democracy." Sinardet, Dave. "From consociational consciousness to majortarian myth: Consociational Gagnon defines ethnic outbidding a"competition as attractto popular [that] leads support Ibid. , p575. In his 1969 paper "Consociational Democracy" Lijphart emphasizes the importance of importance of elite the emphasizes Lijphart Democracy" In his"Consociational 1969paper He systems. consociational to inhere that dangers the of some recognized himself Lijphart 22 address theproblemof According not Andeweg, to does "consociationalism Democracy inPlural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 20 23 ethnicSinardetpromotes itAccordingalso to outbidding, 24 op. cit 8 Annual Review Annual Review Political of Science ., p. 216. . 25 op. cit., Elite cooperation, , 2000, Vol. 3 21 as elites are aselites p.50-51. CEU eTD Collection 27 26 andmeans thestakes of both escalate the conflict.“ ethnicleadersto for incentives create Roeder,to one of mainthe of opponents power-sharingthe “power-sharing system, arrangements secession. autonomy andAccording eventually mobilize greater for demands around inspiration to conflict. ethnic promoting for responsible primarily are mechanisms consociational system have been explained above, however, in this section I intend to specify which in Some it. the inherent paradoxes of promote reduce conflict, the designed to they were originally system, though a The mechanisms even political consociational the paradox. suggests of deadlock, forcoalition government last the andhas 300days, a political history been hasoften that markedby by Lijphart as the ideal type that the accommodate differentliving ethnic groups state. inone Even Belgium though has been defined closely fits his model, the autonomy group andminority defined isby Lijphart, decrease veto) meantethnic to conflictfact and that it has been unable to form a 1.2 The Argument in matter. interests a particular stronger than is their system defending not the of maintenance the and cooperation on intent elites' if the adeadlock create (Andeweg) could issue aparticular in about in Strong differences caseof the opinion Belgium. very pertinent areall separation basedonethnicity (Horowitz) electoral intra-ethnic and strict due to competition aboveby articulated ethnic Barry, and eliteas divide cooperation deepening of the divides the and both on drawing in consociationalism, inherent Therefore on. paradox later the bewill explained its functioning. lack Indeed,the of elite cooperationplays a crucial in role crisisthe in Belgium, as behalf of their ethnic groups and toinflict greater losses on the leaders of the common-state.” on makelikely demands more extreme more to are leaders “under ethnic claims that power-sharing Ibid. Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." , p. 56. The power-sharinginstitutions provide ethnicgroups leverage,the tools the andthe The consociational system its fourthrough key features (grand coalition, proportionality, 9 op. cit ., 56. 26 He also 27 This CEU eTD Collection little potential to be long-lasting. He claims that while previous class or religious cleavages tended cleavages religious or class previous while that claims He long-lasting. be to potential little has system the divides, ethnic on but differences religious/class on based primarily not is system institutional in not concentrate didfoci."weapons ethnic and rights group other above elevated not was ethnicity as long as stable most was sharing role in the ethnic dividedeepening through system'sthe reification ethnicity.of power- "Belgian reach thegovernment.” likely to are cross-cutting than rather cumulative are that divisions policy only cleavages; cross-cutting of elimination the so ethnicity is seldom irrelevant to any policy question....this ethnification of issues, in turn, leads to make incentive an to havegreater issue, politicians ethnic allissues dividedsocieties ethnically and foregroundinto thereby making the allissues ethnicissues.“Under in power-sharing institutions group to act." cohesion and cohesion institutionalizing and promoting identity separate the of increasesa titular group's group that secessionist claims. "Theinstitution of autonomous is regions secessionismconducive to because if that are givenethnic groups autonomy, pursue political institutions the willempowerthem to claims Cornell Similarly group. ethnic the of secession in the result eventually can which motion, Perspective,” 29 28 because beingleft behind leave off.” themworse will demands greater or make to others inspires similar government expenseofthecommon-state at the rights for greater an group ethnic demandof Each of defection. effecta dominocascading through power-sharing institutions than they would in a majortarian system.“Power-sharing may unravel by the morelot empowered a become minorities factthat the to due parties different the between establishbecomes moreto acompromise andit difficult way bargainingthe becomes reduced range 30 31 Cornell, Svante. 2002. “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." Ibid. , p. 66. p. , The consociational system in The system ethnicity positions ethnically consociational societies applied divided when 29 op. cit., willingness p.252. to act, and institutions act, political increasesthe establishing to 10 30 Roeder emphasizes the consociational system's consociational the emphasizes Roeder 28 This way an irreversible process is put into is put process irreversible an way This 31 Roeder claims that if the power-sharing if the that claims Roeder op. cit op. cit., capacity ., p.57. p. 56. of that of CEU eTD Collection Democracy." 33 34 generation problem.” socalled“second- the mightdue to especially abate, commitment is in place, sharing system power-sharing, thepower- to once commitments might besincerein their ethnic leaders although that They claim conflict. also ethnic instead of reduce generate to empower leaders ethnic that conflict. ethnic increases andclaims therefore secessionist empowers Flemish state, of the irreversible. According to Roeder the consociational model thus leads to the stronger fragmentation seems that a route has on Belgium embarked each group, toethnic moremoredevolve power and differences through 1962languagethe laws and continuousthe reforms since the 1970sthat 32 further side grants other the until inforcedecision-making adeadlock governmental to “mutual begin can be addition,vetoes brinkmanship inwhich used to threatens of each side a game In cleavages. ideological already existing the besides based onethnicity become duplicated more since parties islikely ethnic power-sharing during also party fragmentationsystem of the government. ethnic which groups canlead multiplication tothe of partiesinpolitical legislaturethe both and the major all represent to intends legislature and government the since run long in the inefficiency” arrangementnecessary. They also claim power-sharing that institutions lead to“governmental followingbeen had generation not duringmadepresent the conditions that a power-sharing more in hands." institutional concentrate weapons their particularly since adoption have the Regional 1994Constitution,the of the to Councils come Belgium less therights stable... of haveethnic groups come to trump rights the of groupsand,other has made intoarrangement an power-sharing 1970s the ethnic of democracy multiple-majority Belgium's of transformation "The impossible. integration made which fix border a drew laws 1962language bythe ethnic cleavage reinforced the integrative, more be therefore to cross-cutting Rothchild, Donald. Roeder, Philip G. “Power Sharing asanImpediment and toPeace Ibid. Ibid., , p.39. Rothchild and Roeder list a number of mechanisms inherent in the consociational system consociational in the inherent mechanisms of a number list Roeder and Rothchild p. 66-67. 34 op. cit., This can makingslowlikelypolicy a down andismore produce deadlock. to The p. 38. 33 Incentives tend toshiftas the contract becomes a reality, especially since the 11 32 Since the emphasis on the ethnic the on emphasis the Since CEU eTD Collection where conditions arefarlesswhere favorable. conditions cases in other so do to likely less even is it then in Belgium, compromise ethnic promote not did system if the that argue can one conditions, initial favorable most the has which and implemented most completely were institutions as a consociational case where by Lijphart beenidentified has maintainflawsto itself. the due inherent system of consociational the its position Since Belgiumto managed not has it consociation, a for model ideal an been once had it if even that suggests which consociationalism, towards route the itembarked on since times happenedthree it already has fact in deadlock, political facesasevere Belgium time that isit first the not clearthat become will also pursue a roadtowardsseparation. by means ethnic groups the to It the these for groups providing between increase tension the to served conflict ethnic reducing of instead system consociational the that clear become thus will It instability. political with reforms consociational of interconnectedness the demonstrating way in this system, consociational the of evolution the to relation in the evolution of the consociational system in Belgium step-by-step and describe each political crisis fragmentation of the state, triggering the resurgence of separatist claims. In this thesis, Iwillthe to presentled that itself system consociational is the it that but tackle, not could system consociational to push for further claims andless compromise,willing to resultingin a political gridlock. mutual variouson challenge toreach issues.a empowers veto agreement Thegroups mutual ethnic formation fragmentationmoredue toparty government problematicbecomes alot areal and in case of the very since Belgium, mechanisms are apparent mentioned demands. The further above 35 concessions.” Ibid. , p. 37. p. , I argue that the political crisis in Belgium is notdue to some external factors or problems the 35 The mutual instead mutual veto for The mutual of fears, ethnic groups can empower reducing 12 CEU eTD Collection grand coalition consisting of 4-6 parties (4.6 on grand coalition (4.6on average of 4-6parties consisting 1968),comprising since Flemishand both had a hadalways Belgium in the1970s, reform state first its Since system. of consociational the embodiment perfect the it made certainly they institutions, consociational eight the all have to used territorial and non-territorial "federalism" and decentralization; (8) minority veto. minority (8) decentralization; and "federalism" non-territorial and territorial multidimensional system; of character (5) party the representation; system; (6)proportional (7) separation of powers; (3) balancedbicameralism and minority multiparty representation; (4) semi- and relations executive-legislative (1) balanced (2) coalitions; grand power-sharing: consociationalism: executive successful to central were believed he that institutions eight all but elements, four initial the just not implemented Belgium that fact in the lies model Belgian the of success the Lijphart, to According candidates. potential other all above success stable and long-lasting consociationalism mostfor divided butinadvocates states, casethe of heBelgium envisioned its "the most perfect, most"the convincing, most perfect, andmost exampleof impressive a consociation" of the Belgian communities under a consociationalcrucial test of consociationalism. 1981 Lijphart predicted In along-lasting andpeaceful coexistence democratic structure and a stand to candidate as serve best shouldthe it consociationalism, for describedas theideal case by Lijphart Belgium as such puzzling has taken identified how Sinceplace. a political been could Belgium deadlock have indeeditis Bosnia). Therefore elsewhere(eg. of systems democracy settingup consociational 2.1 Case Selection: Consociationalism in Belgium 37 cit., 36 Lijphart, Arend. "The Belgian Example of Cultural Coexistence in Comparative Perspective." Ibid. p.8. , p. 7. p. , Consociationalism is closely associated with Belgium, which served as a role model for model role a as served which Belgium, with associated closely is Consociationalism Chapter 2— Methodology and Research Design Research and Methodology 2— Chapter 13 37 As Belgium As 36 Lijphart op. CEU eTD Collection imposed by the state. Even by imposed had it state. the been fromthough aunitary it 1830 onwards,state not been had forcefully not was and consent leaders' the on based was system ethnofederal an towards evolution group autonomy. facilitatein is isalsoconcentrationpredominant Belgium,which ethnic supposed to groups the of The Lijphart. geographic according to groups, ethnic numberof small the due to more efficient community comprises less than 1% of the total population. Negotiation between the elites should be majorThere aretwo ethnic and Flemings the groups, Walloons, the since the German-speaking 10,7 million, make which should the decision-making less process complex according Lijphart. to approximately small, relatively is population The 4). page (see consociationalism for favorable as democracy,making it acrucial test case, it alsomeets some of the conditions that Lijphart identified strongly upon relies consociationalthe logic of consensus among the principal ethnic groups. introduce an institutional aninstitutional introduce reform motion." introducing bell alarm the 'ring' can they communities, the between relations the damage severely a bill"could judges that languagegroup of a quarters three If bell procedure.' 'alarm the through majority Flemish the and minority Francophone the both of rights the protects veto Theminority isguaranteed. minorities of all therepresentation sector, public inthe functions in in seats the andboth terms of division the proportional legislature Through the representation of guarantees powerissharedwith the federal the autonomygovernment. that ethnicgroups the of Flanders, Brussels)andnon-territorial Dutch-,(communities: German-speaking) French-, and among French Dutch the and speakers(7-7each) inthecabinet. The territorial Wallonia,(regions: 1968, making ita multi-party strongly system. 41 democracy,multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde." 40 39 Delegation." West European Politics 38 Walloon parties. Lijphart, Arend. Lijphart, Sinardet, Dave. "From consociational consciousness to majortarian myth: Consociational De Winter, Lieven; Dumont,Patrick Ibid ., p. 958. p. ., Besides the fact that Belgium implemented nearly all of the elements of consociational of elements the of all nearly implemented Belgium that fact the Besides 38 41 The of has alsoParliamentapproximately 6-8 partiesaverage since on consisted Belgium has had atradition compromiseof during the last40 years in which the Democracy inPlural Societies: A Comparative Exploration double majority double , Nov2006, Vol., Nov2006, Issue 5,p.958. 29 ."Do Belgian Parties."Do Belgian UnderminetheDemocratic Chainof 14 is needed from 39 divided The ministerial areequally positions both language groups,which again . op. cit op. cit., ., p.497. 40 Inorder to p.354. CEU eTD Collection 119. Handbook ofPolitical Science Vol. 7:Strategies ofInquiry. 42 level inresulting deadlock political inthe Itiscentral government. very unlikely violentthat state at the conflict is ethnic in my research variable dependent The of consociationalism. route embarked on the Belgium since conflicts implicated inprevious are also but recentcrisis, just the to not haveled that these defects in show model deadlock; I also a political consociational resulting arelessideal. where theconditions cases inother fail to likely is very it Belgium in fails if consociationalism that argue to plausible validity."in the theory's According Eckstein, to "crucial []mustcase-studies closely fit a theory if is haveto one confidence theory of consociationalism, ofLijphart’s metall has conditions the it Because conditions. favorable havefewer that and/or it qualifiesless completely isimplemented consociationalism in cases, where itbetter will other that perform believe cannot we as otherwise, here; a conflict "crucialreduce to shown be must consociationalism favorable, case" for testing according system initialwas implemented book andthe to wherethe weremost conditions the validity of the theory. its various institutions, Iwill use thefollowing method. through ethnic conflict hasexacerbated exactly how consociationalism about understanding a better isethnicmeans groups byno dueto guaranteed consociational the inherentflaws.system's Togain the peaceamong favorable conditions, ifmost of the qualifies nomatter astate that become clear consociationalism to perform its promised function of reducing ethnic tensions. However it will strongly promotes human rights, making it ademocratic ethnofederation. marked by civil wars or any ethnic violence. In addition, the state is based on the rule of law and Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science",in. F. Greenstein, N.Polsby (eds.). I intend to shed light on the underlying problems leading to the current defect of currentthe defectleadingthe of intend to underlyingshed lighton the problems I to the where consociationalism, for case test a crucial as identified been has Belgium Since 2.2 Methodology forcandidate Belgium qualifyperfect asthe suggestthat should All thesefactors 42 Since Belgium is a 'crucial case' for the testing of consociationalism, it is it consociationalism, of testing the for case' 'crucial a is Belgium Since 15 Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley,p. 1975. CEU eTD Collection initial case conditions are translated into caseoutcomes," aretranslated conditions initial case University Press, 1997.p.64. 43 conflicts. these for responsible isdirectly consociationalism hypothesized, as criseshaveled different This determinethe me to origins. their analyze will and whether, to allow of system. With use the consociational the to inrelation crises the escalated that causes the investigate longitudinal analysis will investigate four timeintend periodshaveshown that disturbances,therefore I political use to deadlocks. in longer longereach a political resulting took Reaching problematic. concession always time consociational/federal institutions, whichmade cooperation among the ethnic all groups morethe new of implementation the with grown simultaneously has groups ethnic of power The for further and topress more ethnicclaims. also the radical and empowered veto groups minority formbetween severalvery became to parties a grandcoalition difficult. Autonomous institutions aconcessions reaching and of divisions), ethnicity was aresult electoral of reinforcement the of party system (which the fragmentation to Due the invery problematic. Belgium made negotiation them longin institutions run. the Consociational suchas veto andminority have coalition grand exacerbated only have tensions resolveaimed ethnic to reforms that state consociational/federal produced these crises willbe examinedin intend analysis. following the I demonstrate to new that system itself (since it has certain inherent flaws explained above) or other structural factors consociational the level. Whether federal at the government central the within handle—conflicts isbest incould consociationalism that type equippedconflict to happen Belgium and of the that conflict of type beon the focus will the therefore, Belgium; in current place take would conflict VanStephen. Evera, process-tracing, In the following chapter Iwill In thefollowing overview evolution adetailed the provide chapter about the of Political conflict will serve asa starting pointfor determining which time periods select.to I which "explores the chain of events of the decision-making process by which to gain an in-depth picture of each time period that is of importance and importance is of that period time each of picture in-depth an gain to Guide toMethods Studentsfor ofPoliticalScience 16 43 Iwill beable deduce causesthat the to . Ithaca :Cornell CEU eTD Collection mobilization and separatist claims. and separatist mobilization consociational Iwill period. systemshow howthe actually themeansprovided for ethnic 3.3 will primarily focus on fourthe major political in deadlocks Belgian recent history during its as political 3.3 well inChapter crises.be Chapter subsequent the as theirconnection with discussed an from 1960son institutionalthe will mostimportant ethnofederation.to unitary reforms state The a from shift to Belgium led eventually that War World II after tensions growing the and explained be will sentiments nationalist Walloon and Flemish the of roots historical the 3.2 and 3.1 chapter Belgian consociational/federal system hand inhand with emergingthe political deadlocks. In 17 CEU eTD Collection 1830 and later Prime Minister of Belgium: of Minister Prime later and 1830 of Belgium, exemplified throughaquoteby as Charles Rogier, leader of Belgian the in Revolution officiallanguage up until 1889. French frenchificationThe Bourgeoise intenton was whole of the backdated to1830, foundationthe fromof Belgianstate, the which timeFrench became theonly comprising French-speakers. 58%Flemish-speakers and41% Theof ethnicdivide roots the canbe 3.1 Theroots of ethnic antagonism 45 44 Political andSocial Science Belgian politics. The offrenchificationprocess set off by French-speakingthe elites graduallyled to of characteristic for accommodation, elite becomefoundation was the to common enemy the fight decades. nexttwo the for undisputed leadershipwas joint whose Catholics, the and Liberals the between cooperation butnecessary unwilling the previous wasmade by to the independence Dutch domination. The possible from Netherlands the identity inNetherlands, the emphasis establishingof wasputon the opposition Belgian a common from the masses. independence among the After the predominant was illiteracy and common people the by only in use was Flemish French. only spoke elite political and financial economic, the since state unitary a become should Belgium that question beyond was It language. official its as French Heisler, Martin O. "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium." Rogier, toJean-Joseph1832. Charles."Letter Raikem." Belgium became a unitary state after its independence from in afterits from independence 1830 with Netherlands the state became Belgium a unitary in Europe, states most divided deeply of the as one been characterized has Belgium French, and we will hence destroy bitby bit the Germanic element in Belgium.” learn to be constrained will of offices, these of advantages the deprived temporarily Flemish, the way, this Luxemburgers; and Walloons to entrusted are functions military and all iscivil it that necessary achieve this result, to In order French. one language, anditis only the evidentlanguage Belgians of the that should be “The first principles of a good administration are based upon the exclusive use of Chapter 3— The Case ofBelgium Case The 3— Chapter , Vol.433, Ethnicin Conflict Worldthe Today.1977 Sep.p.36. 18 45 This political cooperation among the elites to Annals of the AmericanAnnals of Academy of 44 CEU eTD Collection in followingthe chapter. federalization. The changes that resulted in the first steps towards a federal system will be discussed economic, and political demographic changesof a 1960's the needgrowing for produced upsurge. Controversial issues in 1950'swhich the further ethnically thepopulation,divided the and involving punishments. severe After World Warmovementenjoyed Flemish arenewed IIthe collaboration with associated became itsince diminished its popularity war the after however During SecondWorld the War, by promoted the useof Reich, Dutch was especially the Third forDutch-speakers. upspace andopened inpublicservices Francophone elites domination the of inonly 1932did Dutchbecome the languagesole official Flanders, of which finally ended the 1893 universalsuffrage which further empowered wasintroduced Flemish majority.the However, in became 1898Dutch recognizedasthe officialother language Frenchand inFlandersbesides in movement, Flemish the of advancement the to Due base. agricultural strong a with poor, relatively stayed region Flemish Northern the as Belgians, all benefit not did wealth industrial the However, embraced industrialization, contributing totheflourishing of Walloonthe steel industry.and coal State Structure." 47 46 cleavages, which further enhanced the stability of the state's segmental structure. administration and policy making. These class and religious cleavages cut across ethnic or educational, andregional networks they social, etc. all occupied asignificantposition in public prevented any kind of conflict cleavages thesocietal between separation clear The Socialist). Liberal, (Catholic, cleavages betweenideological/religious on based the segmented extremely differentbecame population the century, the of end the groups since all the gainedsegments political power only in the 20th century. With the emergence of new a Socialisthad elite towards their own emergencethe of a Flemish movement,opposition which initiallywas manifested in literature and D'Haveloose, Erik. "Milestones in the Belgian Political History and the Foundation of the Belgian Ibid ., p. 38. p. ., During the 19thcentury becameBelgium one fewthe of countriesin quickly that Europe RoSa-factsheets No. 5. No. 2000 October.2. p. 19 46 47 CEU eTD Collection of Ethnic Conflict." 50 the expendituresforincreased and schools, bothstate religious both thereby parties. satisfying 49 even three demonstrators got killed. The king finally abdicated in favor of his son, Baudouin I. opposed to 42% in Wallonia and 48%in Brussels. After the return of the king, strikes broke outand 48 to the North. Foreign investors preferred the Northern region and the building of new industries in new of industries building the and region preferred theNorthern investors Foreign North. to the becameindustriesmost relocated of while inwar light the the 1950's, after the a significantdecline boom with development. Wallonia'scoupled economic heavyand industries steel coal experienced gain moreinfluence inboth politics and public services. The Flemish population enjoyed amajor cleavage. ideological divide between Socialist Wallonia andmore Flandersbecame Catholic prominent alot the dueto though linguisticthe struggle wasnot themainfocus of these the conflicts, regional linguisticand demanded for financing the of secondary schools,might asit state-rundisadvantage schools. similarbrought objected results. The Liberals andSocialists tothe amountof aid Catholics the a 1950referendum. support for the return of the king, the socialist stronghold Wallonia voted against the king's return in outalongconflictlines, had broke party Flanders since been predominantly Catholica strong with the though Even proponents. Catholic the and opponents Socialist/Liberal the between opposition inby much andconfined prisoner andcreated Germans His attracted the criticism actions Austria. stayed buthis inoccupation surrenderingafter Belgium army. warendedAfter the hewastakenas to Leopold III throne.the The kingfollownot did government the exileinto during German the King of return the concerned Question, which Royal Onewasthe them of apparent. cleavage more thatideologically controversies made population the divided and and the linguistic regional However, hadbeen other there moderate. more became movement Flemish the repercussions Dunn, James A. "The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Insitutionalization in on The Catholics School andthe Pact finally agreed Socialists/Liberals the 1958 which In the consultative referendum in March, 72% voted for the return of the king in Flanders as The economic changesinthe1960'sequipped anddemographic Flemishthe population to After World War3.2 Growing Ethnic Tensions and Steps towards FederalismII, due to the Flemish collaboration during the war and the following 48 The Western Political Quarterly. The controversy 'School inthe1954and the around Question' 1958elections 50 20 Vol.No.1, 1974March, 27, p.147. 49 Even CEU eTD Collection split of the University of Louvain/Leuven into French and Flemish sections had been another been had sections Flemish and French into Louvain/Leuven of University the of split group increasegroup to its demands onthe political system." each andstimulated ethnic two communities the between relations the polarized sixties of laws the stayed bilingual. French-speaking and wasdeclared Brussels Dunn,linguistic According "the to drawinglinguistic of border in strictthe made Flanders exclusively1962 Dutch-speaking, Wallonia secure long-awaited to thecultural whereas their Flemingswanted linguistic autonomy. and The federalization, promote to motif main Walloons' the been had government central in the dominance national dominated" government. economic problemscapital. could TheFrench-speakers. Francophonetheir Thepredominantly of also composition resented the Flemings Walloonsbe easierFlemish countryside, thereby expanding the territory of Brussels which was mostly inhabited by alsodealtthe to Bruxellois promoted French-speaking of movement with the was border language fix the to side Flemish by a federalization,regionalurged the thatinterests. protect factor theirAnother to in order system political the restructure government both necessity to the side felt more pronounced, became As theregional/ethnic differences because than theyby a "Flemishfelt that Wallonia's growing 54 of Ethnic Conflict." 53 51 52 Flemish majority wanted to see reflected in the political scene as well. Wallonia. the demographic boom was also amore promising workforce than the aging population of instead North the of refurbishing old mines in the South. The younger population of Flanders due to Dunn, James A. "The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Insitutionalization Heisler, Martin O. "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium." Ibid., Ibid. , p. 40. p. , The linguistic laws of the 1960's thus only led to further and tensions The linguistic demands. onlyledto 1968 thus The lawsof 1960's the p.149. 51 In terms of social and economic conditions there was thus a sudden reversal, which the which reversal, sudden a thus was there conditions economic and social of terms In dominance." inflictedfrancophone during longthe periodcultural, of political and economic with buildinginstitutional safeguards Flemish against for real revenge imaginedor wrongs concerned became Walloons] [The means. evolutionary through system Belgian able to"Given larger,their more dynamic andeconomy,population be Flemings][the would achieve both economic and political goals within the framework of the op. cit., op. 52 p. 148. 53 Protecting Wallonia's economic interests against the Flemish the against interests economic Wallonia's Protecting 21 54 op. cit., p.39. CEU eTD Collection problems tended to be viewed through beproblemsof tendedviewed through prism ethnic to the the problem." linguisticin political,Belgium's social "manyof the economic, lines1970s.Therefore andother dominantother nationalin split and two up along the the 1968,the also Liberals parties, Socialists Chrétien) Social (Parti PSC Walloon the and Volkspartij) (Christelijke CVP Flemish the into party of Ethnic Conflict." 57 55 rights of other groups and,arrangementhas of rights have madeBelgiumlessstable... the ethnic groups trump come the to particularly since the transformation Belgium's multiple-majority of democracy 1970sintothe an of ethnic power-sharingadoption of the 1994 Constitution, "the asserts, federation. multi-ethnic As of Roeder the theevolution with simultaneously the Regional evolved. In doing so, I will exclusive antagonism between the two ethnic groups. shed lightRassemblementWallon (RW)in Wallonia effectively mobilized support voter based on mutuallythe on the cleavage. The emphasized ethno-linguistic Volksunie the formed that Flanders andthe in (VU) causesbeen had parties nationalistic lines, new ethnic across formerly cut that parties threetraditional the of political deadlocks that unfolded lines. along ethnic/linguistic traditional three parties the up of split with the correlate is Louvain to of thetransfer. theUniversity opposed of divide The redrawn in 1962)-itsthe "expulsion,"it as was called by French-speakingthe Bruxellois who were borders French-speakingits the theand area(since linguistic French section to transferring Louvain of sectionUniversity of Catholic the French the resulted expanding from over dispute the state. led of issue introduction an ethnofederal conflictual uptothe that 56 p. 134. Coexistence inBelgium. Dunn, James A. "The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Insitutionalization Gérard-Libois, Jules. "Belgian Electoral Politics." in Lijphart, Arend (ed.) Ibid. , p.135. The rest of this chapter will analyze in detail how the Belgian consociational/federal system consociational/federal Belgian the how in detail analyze will chapter this of rest The 3.3 Belgium asaFederal State op. cit Berkeley: of Institute International Studies, University California,of 1981. ., p.150. 22 56 After the division of the Social Christian Social the of division the After 57 55 Besides the division of Conflict and The "Louvain affair" "Louvain The CEU eTD Collection 58 which reforms, state 1970 the from originating issues unresolved with filled was climate political the Flemish Christiantime. first leader in1979Wilfried elections for the of the political deadlock Martens, After winning Democrats, was assigned the task1978-79 of Deadlock Political First The 3.3.1 of forming a coalition government. The have surpassed300days andstill havemanaged not toform a coalition government. 2007, it 210days took parties for the toform a government. Finally,in crisis, currentthe parties the neededof formation for days government to 148days.rose During in deadlock the third political when occurred it106 daysform took parties for the a coalition to In 1987, thenumbergovernment. major tointroduce in consociational started first In1977-78,the politicalreforms crisis 1970s. the tensions,in the long run they had the opposite effect, namely exacerbated ethnic conflict. separatism. even institutional I conclude that, reforms temporarily suppressed ethnic though the by supported institutional means majority andequippedtheFlemishto pursue their claims on process setoff irreversible an arrangements consociational the how Iwillshow argument, Roeder's morehands." institutional in their weapons concentrate have to Councils come Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." Since the implementation of the new state reforms in 1970, Belgium came to face a serious Belgium since place took that deadlocks four political the depicts chart The following 23 op. cit., 58 Tosupport p. 66-67. CEU eTD Collection necessary necessary from both language groups. the so called 'alarm bell' sothe wascalledintroduced. also procedure 'alarm bell' of The aimedto procedure the of Representatives, federalthe government. Two were linguistic groups established in both Senatethe and Chamber the executive and proportional representation thewithin in legislature wasintroduced both Brussels and Flemish minority in the Brussels executive college. executive Brussels inthe minority Flemish minorization"inagainst federal the for in government grantingto the return representation equal "guarantees demanded French The level. federal and aregional both on minorities of protection 60 59 Walloon demands. the satisfying given autonomy, regions,the thereby to were somecompetencies economic whereas cultural Flemish for claim the satisfying thereby communities, the to weregiven of education (Flanders, Walloniaand Brussels). cultural three communities (German-, French- andFlemish-speaking) and three regions the cultural/linguistic concern. The reforms introduced a new state structure based on the division of the of more were which Flemings, the of claims the and 1950's, the in region the of crisis economic the due socio-economic primarily were which Walloons, the of claims diverging the satisfy aimed to reforms The 1970constitutional coexistence. a peaceful into communities the between 1970'sstarted that off Belgium consociationalthe on path. forming a coalition took 106 days, weneed tohave a closer look at the constitutional reforms of the in difficult. tounderstand why extremely aconcession Therefore order made reaching parties bodies for further for decentralization. bodies regions based on the linguistic divide, laws that would set up new cultural councils or economic 63 andgroup take intheir language oath the of chosen the group. whereasgroup, members from bilingualthe of region Brussels declare their of choice parliamentary 62 of Ethnic Conflict." 61 Heisler, Martin O. "Managing Ethnic Conflict in Belgium." The German-speaking community, however, received only equal competencies in 1983. Laws that make a special majority necessary include laws aim modify of borders that include makethe to Laws the necessary that aspecial majority Members of unilingual (Walloniaregions andFlanders) become members of theirlanguage Dunn, James A. "The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the Insitutionalization Since the 1970's Belgium has adopted more Since andmoremeasureshas adopted 1970'sBelgium the conflict in toturn the order 60 62 In addition, a few other measures were introduced that aimed to guarantee the guarantee aimed that to introduced were measures few other a Inaddition, op. cit., op. and for the acceptance of a new constitutional reform, a dual majority was p. 153. 59 Competencies in language and cultural issues Competencies inlanguage parts andsome and cultural 63 Besides the special majority law in the federal parliament, 24 61 linguisticTherefore parity the within op. cit., p.42. CEU eTD Collection division between the regional and national authorities and the issue of haveissue divided ethnic of Brussels authorities andthe and between national division regional the regionalization forand autonomy Brusselsboth and Wallonia. over Disputes exact the power- its in Belgium political, social and cultural Flemish-majority arrangements. Furthermore, essentially an the Walloonsmirror would demanded that further economiccapital a wanted Bruxellois the other way around, however Flemishthe wanted no expansion of Brussels' territory. The Flemish Flanders. territory the language laws TheFrancophones insistedand to not should adjust thus that territory into the of expands it areasince in suburban Brussels' French-speakers of rights the voting the limiting also expansion, and dynamism natural its in city the limited borders the fixed regarding itinhabitedgovernment, was language90% In byFrench-speakers. the addition, laws that Brussels the in minority Dutch the of representation equal the appreciate not did They Bruxellois. Francophone the of rights the disregarded which Flemings, the and Walloons the between deal elite State Structure." 65 time. reject bill. the however, Thebill,be vetoed for thesecondagain by cannot group samelinguistic the modifications, amendments to the bill. Then the Parliament has to vote again to either accept or 64 ethnic groups. speaking minority in the this Brussels arrangementfurther only ledexecutive, demands to byboth Dutch- the of equal representation tothe in response was guaranteed in thecabinet minority French-speaking the of presence equal the though Even unsettled. levels regional and national a solution for problematicthe status of Brussels andleft some of power-divisionthe between the however, yetfearsprovide ethnicgroups, the not appeased. of Thereforms not completely did were major towards federation. afirstSomemulti-ethnic of becomingstep andindicated Belgium the a bill put them a significantcan at disadvantage, the parliamentary isprocedure suspended. vetoing anybillthatcould harm interests. If their quarters three of judgesa linguistic group thata of infederal byproviding rightthe them Brusselsandparliament) theprotect the minorities(both D'Haveloose, Erik. "Milestones in the Belgian Political History and the Foundation of the Belgian make to days thirty has which cabinet the to sent is bill the rung, is bell' 'alarm the After This first setof inreforms 1970 thus introduced several institutionsconsociational in 65 The of Francophone inhabitants Brussels regardedthis as moreagreementan of op. cit. , p. 3. 25 64 CEU eTD Collection 67 Constitution." 66 agreement. acommon reaching of difficulties the dueto months three place next forthe nottake formation did this government reason For French-speakers. and of number Dutch- equal from an beformed shall cabinet thatthe mandates system consociational the on based constitution Belgian The Brussels-issue. the and regionalization regarding minister. Theit Francophonewould that join sideasserted if only coalition the was found a solution andWilfriedleader CVP wereheld the of elected asprime yearnew elections Martens, was minister theresignationand led to LeoTindemans eventually primethe of in1978. followingThe implemented never was Pact Egmont the protests, the and issue the on divisions intraparty CVP's the Dueto during bargaining side the the Flemish process. weakening thereby regionalization, Volksunie andpromoted however,more(VU), Francophones waswith cooperative the the party, nationalist Flemish The regionalization. of necessity the on position unified relatively regionalists. On the other invotes Flandersbeen during had the1977elections, internally intodivided unitarists and hand, the major FrancophoneFlemish party,parties theon these Socialist issues.was ThePartynever Flemish Pact (PS)implemented Egmont the Christian Unfortunately, reflected Flanders. of region the into expanded now Democrats suburbs the due a territorially to immediate (CVP) whosince gainedBrussels, of region publicthe within vote to be able to most area suburban Flemish in Brussels' of Francophones the for protests and the dividedgovernments for all threethe communities andwould regions. It have granted inscriptionthe right attitude of the formation ThePactwouldgovernmenthaveautonomous on24May 1977. process established andgroups political leadersunitarist into and regionalist camps. that were that intoto come effect in 1980. amendments constitutional new of way by decentralization economic and regionalization further Covell, Maureen. "Agreeing to Disagree: Elite Bargaining and the Revision of the Belgian Ibid., In 1977theEgmontPact aimedput an end to these and disputes to signed was aspartof a The political conflict of 1978 exemplifies very well the consociational system's flaw in flaw system's consociational the well very exemplifies 1978 of conflict political The p. 464. p. Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science. 26 Vol.No. 15, 31982Sep., p.455. 66 67 Finally, the Flemings agreed to CEU eTD Collection State Structure." 69 Flanders. This unification of community and regional bodies strengthened Flemish autonomy as autonomy Flemish strengthened bodies regional and community of unification This Flanders. parliamentand both assisted government community Dutch-speaking the and the region of well. InFlanders the regional and the community institutions became fused by together which one as their andgovernments parliaments own satisfied.thus finallygot andcommunities Theregions demand cultural for autonomy and the Walloon further economicfordemand were regionalization regional country environmenteconomic development, andplanning, employment. personal affairs, and thewelfare and health care, encompass to extended became of cultural communities the powers regions were assigned The implemented. was never Pact of the Tindemans government Egmont more since the regionalization specific powers this time as well, involving ethnic/linguistic communities. that this, show will I amendments. constitutional last inthe roots its search to need again we level, too,central was rootedunderstandnew Inorder coalition government. to could gridlock what have causedthis atthe in the consociational system andfollowing chapter. the strictand their correlation with upcomingthe political deadlock in1987will be explainedin the regional divisionlong runfurtherempowers more minoritiesonly extreme and produces demands. The 1980 reforms of demandsthe of the minorities the elites, political the between made difficult extremely bargaining that fragmentation intraparty had to be satisfied if parties wanted to reach a concession. This in the 68 less plausible". makescooperation cohesive, not this themselvesare groups ethnic lines," leadersacross of leaders, tocooperate havemorelatitude then group would butsince indeed set bysingle a wererepresented "if each bargaining. group termselite of out, pointed As Horowitz D'Haveloose, Erik. "Milestones in the Belgian Political History and the Foundation of the Belgian Horowitz, Donald. The constitutionalnext reforms in 1980 intended tofurther clarify issues around 1988May148daysFrom it forDecember victors form the took 1987 to of a to elections the 1987-88 of Deadlock Political The 3.3.2 op. cit., Ethnic Groups inConflict p. 3. p. . op. cit 27 ., p.574. 69 The Flemish The 68 Besides CEU eTD Collection op. cit., 70 similar and other ethnic the federal Thisissueshiftedgovernment. cases in within groups to focus both the between tensions increased Happart-issue the around The controversy from his position. elected mayor of Voeren refused tosit for aDutch-language test. Therefore he was deemed to resign for becoming elected. requirement be theknowledge a language for cannot or a particularas acandidate apublicposition, of run to one prevent cannot language native one's constitution, 1970 the on based hand other the On peopleoffices inpublic/governmental hadtospeakthe language was that territorially determined. as mayor.was elected of 1970, constitution Happart the called Jose According to French-speaker this The issue arrangement. of Voeren intheyearof again receivedspecial 1987 whena attention forwith special generating French-speakers,by the Walloonsresentment regulations the towards Flemish-speaking be to determined officially was it since controversy, linguistic of topic a became in number of the French- and42%respectively). Dutch-speakers (51% and Thetown of Voeren however areversal census 1947displayed of from a later Flemish Limburg Numbers the province. which populationthe consisted of 18% French-speakers and 81%of Dutch-speakers, part became of border wasfixedinlinguistic linguistic 1962.The basedon 1930according censusfrom town, a to the town timewhen the the Voeren/Fouron about backto dates Thecontroversy pastgrievances. on and communities the providedmeans newfor ethnic the two groups to pressfor new demands based regions tothe offurther powers Thedevolution ethnofederation. becomean for to Belgium way the regions. other resolved, Brusselsaround nor wasit withlike institutions was notits own the autonomous provided financing of regionsthe and the communities happened still federalthe plusthrough state, theissue yetThe possible. not levelwere federal on the elections yet, since direct state federal a really not though differentthe regions andcommunities receivedmore autonomy,Belgium atthis point was opposed to the different bodies of the Walloon region and the French-speaking community. Even Craeybeckx J., Meynen A., en Witte, E. The consociational institutions of territorial and non-territorial autonomy have further paved further have autonomy non-territorial and territorial of institutions consociational The p. 442. 70 The was,however, problem Happart only newly that the Politieke van1830totHeden. Geschiedenis vanBelgië 28 CEU eTD Collection 72 71 in furtherregionalization. resulted of course which reach aconcession, becomecapital region. anautonomous to Finally, extensiveafter bargaining parties the managed to French-dominated the want not did Flemings the whereas independence, economic gaining thereby become region). wanted Brusselstoafully-fledged region, and TheFrancophones Brussels-capital haveshould autonomous (Wallonia only regions two (Wallonia, three Flanders), and or Flanders, in Belgium differencewas whether Themajor opinion favoringfurther decentralization. towards both federalization, the further but Flemish andWalloon advocated shifted traditional parties in 1979),asnotonly thenationalist (eg.theparties Volksunie ortheRessamblament Wallon) regionaliststhe (like difficulty unitarists viewsthe and opposing of inbargainingnotdue tothe was culminated in 148 days. constitution was less easy and prolonged therefore formation, government which eventually the amend to necessary was which sides both on majority thirds two the achieve to however, concern, of thatwere pressing settle issues of the some opportunity to the provided parties the formation reform.government of Theperiod state new the bethrough settledhad to that foreground Happart-controversy,the abortion) (eg. cameissues the to educational, social other economic, cases like find solution need to an urgent have Besides the to accepted. to group anewlegislation considering thatwithin the consociational system a doublemajority is neededby each language reach easy to not reform were state ofthe amendments new onthe Concessions communities. appease of refinement consociational system between theexisting the the to ethnic tensions in municipalitiesthe Brusselsaround eventually resulted in fallthe governmentthe of in 1987. languages Theandundergovernment. controversies Flemish regional the theuseof aroundHappart worked still but Flemish, any speak not did in municipalities servants civil where area Brussels the to become an autonomous region with a legislative and executive body of its own. In return the Ibid., Ibid., Each ethnic group put forward its demands in terms of the new state reform.new the Thisits state time demands of forward interms the put Each group ethnic The upcoming elections in 1987 Decemberbrought with it need the for thefurther p. 445. p. p. 442. 29 72 Brussels was determined was Brussels 71 CEU eTD Collection 73 the of proportion fixed the that felt now Flemish the parliament, national dominated Flemish the measures of the protectagainst their economy to tried and better-off region Flemish economically far 1990's. the Walloonsdominated Whereasso tothat the losingthey out were that felt havefurther issues regions, the economic over polarization financial to of fixed amount assistance provided them have institutionsthe to demands. further Even though 1988reformsthe assigned a states, As Roeder government. whole the down bringing of effect the had eventually that Happart-controversy) the (eg. problems minor for further demands. The ethnification of certain issuesincentives had also created contributed only demands to the amplificationinstitutional acquired of newly far, so visible been has it as however of the national tax for their financing, which further satisfied their economic claims. communities. In addition, the communities and regions from this time on could rely on a fixed part had the regions, been given to whilehad fully education the language been to transferred etc. scientific environment, in work, and of Competencies communities. research, the public areas regions the both of powers the extended significantly and further decentralization to agreed parties Brusselsbecame government fixed.Toconstitutionally avoid matters, social disputes on and other the in minority Dutch the of representation the addition, In Dutch. speak not he did if office from be on now serving any Flemish the could his removed under servant civil regional government since from resolvecontroversies, the Happart-type to arrangementaimed 1970 constitution. This Flemings insisted linguistic that the bordercannot bemodified, but stay fixed based shall on the Roeder, Philip G., "Power Dividing as an Alternative toEthnic Power Sharing." The consociational institutions byandmore assigning more autonomy to regionsthe The temporarilythus appeasedagain demandsoftheethnicgroups, reforms of 1988 the rather than cross-cutting are likely to reach thegovernment.” likely reach to are cross-cutting than rather cumulative are that divisions policy only cleavages; cross-cutting of elimination irrelevant toany policy question....this ethnification issues,inof leads turn, tothe seldom is ethnicity so and issue, ethnic an issues all make to incentive greater “under power-sharing in institutions ethnically divided societies, havepoliticians 30 73 op. cit., p.56. CEU eTD Collection State Structure." 77 76 75 Graham. (ed.) Graham. 74 nationalists." Flemish for point rallying a of something become has programme benefits national thatWalloons share of disproportionate security social the received under The Flemish felt that national fiscal policies put Flanders in a position of subsidising Wallonia. "The national tax wasprovidedthat financing for the of regionsthe putthe Walloons atanadvantage. in such a way due to the instancesnecessarily whichwould policies not North the against theSouthbecameput interpreted consociational ethnicfunding divide ofof schoolsthe country. problems, policiesfor the became ethnification example, imbalancesother of in prevalent, the or scientific research, or the routing of the high speed train, etc. In all these Flemish newspaper regular, variousprotests became over legislations andas by a opinion conducted public poll the the parties could not agree for the next 196 days to form notnewagree for partiesthe next196daysto form the in setting time a record coulda government, federal elections leftit were unresolved. evoked 2007 After the that causes the crisis since current precedentto the important be termsThe crisisof ofstalemates. 2007could considered an political ThePolitical 3.3.3 Deadlock of2007-2008 possible. become had also federal of the states elections Direct of constitution. the framework the within organize independently institutions their to federal states the to autonomy constitutive provided and reforms previous the of discrepancies based onlanguage divides (French,and Dutch German). The of1993further reforms refined the Wallonia, (Flanders, communities three regions and defined Brussels) territorially three with the independence in 1992. D'Haveloose, Erik. "Milestones in the Belgian Political History and the Foundation of the Belgian Murphy, Alexander."Belgium's Divergence: Regional Along Road to Federation."in: the Smith. Ibid. Ibid., , p. 94. p. , The year 2007 marked 20years political The year after 2007 in deadlock another of relative peacefulness p. 93. p. Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge. Federalism: TheMultiethnic op. cit., op. Standaard 76 p. 4. p. Ethnic tensions led in Belgium formally1993 to become afederal state indicates, 31% of indicates,31%of Flemishthe wouldhavefavored outright 77 31 Longman Group Limited, 1995. p. 92. 75 public Asconsequence, a 74 Besides the fiscal CEU eTD Collection more difficult.By introducing Verhofstadtnew 5%threshold, a intendedreduce thenumber of to government, this number hadsix risen to party due to fragmentation, whichmade bargaining all the majority was no longer an governmenteasy matter. Whereas in The electoral the by wasintroduced change Guy Verhofstadtincoalitions in 2003 order to make the forming of past four parties parties. Flemish only for voters Flemish while parties, Walloon for were vote only can voters Walloon sufficient easier. to form a Therefore district). oftheDue Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde theexception (with regions of the borders to the highnot the transgress do districts and electoral parties, organized nonationally are there reforms, fragmentation of parties, difficult. extremely agreement reaching acommon to achieve coalition and Socialists families (the making an unprecedented Liberals)and thereby the producing party 'traditional' two other the of parties with ally to had a Democrats workingChristian the Belang, Vlaams with coalition federal a forming avoid to order In elections. regional Flemish inthe Democrats Christian the after place second the to occupy got theparty Interest), (Flemish Belang Vlaams right-wing extreme of the increased popularity ledtothe which differences economic growing The tensions. significant thatproduced other factors been had there changes, electoral the Besides have with been congruent provinces,the butwhich would haveinvolved thesplit-up BHV.the of levelfederal by introducingalso new a5%threshold. introduced It electoral woulddistricts that the on easier formation government make and fragmentation party counteract to intended reforms Vilvoorde, which wascame due again to the to stillthe foreground level political on the conflict generated Walloons that reason Theother more pronounced. became unresolved the and Flemings the duebetween differences andeconomic as to autonomy) fiscal of terms the in controversial(predominantly electoral reformscase regions tothe devolution thefurther power concern pressingof about Flemings' due tothe of ofthe Verhofstadt. electoral districtmostly abate. led were deadlock 2007political the not The factors that ethnic to demands did 1993, The of Brussels-Halle- in state become federal formation. Even afully-fledged Belgium did though terms of government Since the parties in Belgium are electorally split up on a linguistic basis since the 1970 the since basis linguistic a on up split electorally are in Belgium parties the Since 32 CEU eTD Collection 357. democracy,multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde." 79 their Aftermath." 78 flowinto less the federal state Wallonia.well-off of Flanders is regions wealthier Europe the of one the to pay they a lot taxes of the factthat the Flemings resent most since independence, economic votes. their on count and minority a as periphery and learn population the of speakers tointegrate consider while French-speakingthe Dutch, parties been constant on the have tensions region, linguistic the and district theelectoral mattermismatch of the to Due competences. since economic and the social various demanded 1970in return Flemings the Flanders, region the of state size reforms. The Flemings way the that reducing Brussels, bilingualextend of the region to frenchification. In order of threat would want the linguistic territorial defendedby principle French- Flemishthe whoconsider theexpansion Brusselsof asa the against go Flanders,would this of territory is the on However, periphery since the candidates. for core,vote French-speaking the people can asits bilingualBrussels BHV with district electoral since many people left the is periphery On of Flanders. French-speakinghas an that hand,itpart other the 80% population, urban cityscape of Brussels Brussels. The of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district anda region thebilingualBrussels comprises willing to move to thehave countryside.implied the split-up ofIn thethe BHV each electoral province. This to adjust would electoral the districts to intended which 2003 electoral reform district since it expanded over the capital-region of way around. theother from coalition, or left aregional out beingfederal coalition while partof the parties were more certain since problematic, them somewhat between level. regional madethe cooperation This unforeseenelectionsother namelyincongruency ledfederal problems,in to the andof parties the federal regional the and However,the the timeshiftbetween legislature. federal inthe parties Sinardet, Dave. "From consociational consciousness to majortarian myth: Consociational Sinardet,Dave. "Belgium Federalism Put to the Test: The 2007 Belgian Federal Elections and The furtherdemand for devolution by of powers Flemingsthe has been furthera demand for duethe new attention gained districthas also BHV the issueof electoral The controversial 78 West European Politics , Sep 2008,, Sep Vol. 5,p. 31Issue 1018. 79 33 op. cit., p.356- CEU eTD Collection August 2007.http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=DMF24082007_083; August 83 82 Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 81 forced to cooperate and to try to reach concessions,Christian whichDemocrat), led to serious however difficulties. incorporatedin both 2007of the regional The branchesfor of growingthe traditional the party familiesfirst (Liberal, Socialist, time partiesexclude opposition the government the always or families' VlaamsBelang.Before inorderto from different party familiesand 50%Dutch-speaking be members) was to formed from belongingparties todifferent 'party were French- first of comprising coalition 50% for grand(usually formation timethe the aswell.In 2007 growing popularity the newof challengesin federal Vlaams Belangraised the government would have voted for independence, whereas 54% opposed the idea of Flemish separatism. ideathe of opposed independence, for54% whereas voted would have timeindicates Flemish atthe shocking questioned 45% of 1300 thatthe also It produced results. by Flemish conducted Televisionthe by has and Company Standaardthe in2007 published (VTM) itsa differentin xenophobia,whichresulted party'schanging the to name. A opinionpublic poll, before called the Vlaams Blok, was alsolabeled a criminal party by the other regional parties due to democracy does not exist because a multi-national people does not exist." not does people exist amulti-national because not does democracy people exists. European in becauseA or noBelgian making the European superstate multi-national regions. As Franck Vanhecke, theparty of claims "We president the Belgium andoppose the two the between inequalities huge the to Flanders due of theseparation advocates that Interest) increasing to the popularity nationalist/separatistof the party (12%) Vlaams (Flemish Belang 80 Flanders. faces to compared region the 10% higher unemployment the mention WorldWar,to not Second the since decline constant facing been have mines iron and with high-value (egdiamond exports in industry Antwerp), while Wallonia's industry based coal on euros. Wallonia Flanders to is (by estimated Belgian the Federation beEmployers)of to app.2 billion “Kleine Helft wil Vlamingen Volgens Onafhankelijk Enquete Vlaanderen.” Jan Vanhecke cited: De Winter, Lieven. "Belgium Towards the Breakdown of a Nation-State in the Heart of Europe?" "Belgium." 81 The growing economic cleavage between the two ethnic groups has significantly contributed significantly has groups ethnic two the between cleavage economic growing The Political Risk Yearbook:Political The FlemishRepublic, . Jul2009, Vol.Issue 3/4.p. 15 15. Belgium 2006. Country 34 Report, 2008. Report, 80 The yearly transfer from transfer The yearly 82 De Standaard The Vlaams Belang, , 24 83 The CEU eTD Collection European record) that negotiations between electoral victors have brought no results. Therefore results. no havebrought victors electoral between negotiations that record) European coalition with the Socialist Party of Wallonia. It has been more than 300 days (Belgium breaking the autonomy, from backits for greater demands down form isto necessary a cross-ethnic which tensions. avoid of not indicator has ethnic factBelgium clearthe does that route taken the butgenerates twothe bringing ethnic groups, them closer tothe possible splitof country.the it Thereforeis a polarized further has crisis The run. long in the surface to come to seem rather they temporary, only as these obstacles predicted Lijphart Even though them.increases it ethnic tensions, of reducing Instead effect. completely opposite the produces fears. This ethnic generates way consociationalism (where only Flemish couldpoliticians standfor would vote) endanger their vital andinterests Halle-Vilvoordea Dutch-speaking Brusselsand constituency into BHVthe abilingual district becomes reduced zero.to In addition, the Francophone parties feel that the Flemish proposal to split 'healthy'impossible extremely multiparty difficult coalitions grand by or elite cooperation which creation parties makesthe of nationalist extreme the irreversible. growingof The popularity pressfor ethnic furtherfiscal, autonomy, social,etc. groups by becomes which process the off better socio-economically makes the but conflicts resolveethnic not does system consociational in eventually resulted a political deadlock. and difficultextremely became negotiations ideologies, very of of parties bedifferent composed had to coalition Belang. the As the Vlaams leave out to be able to and government acoalition form elections. The Christian Democrats had incorporateto parties from other party familiesbe to able to led the popularity the 2007 increased Vlaamsof VB tooccupy secondplace atthe the Belang, motives which fed economic between secessionist Flemish ethnic cleavage the groups and thereby Since June 13, 2010 elections the separatist New Flemish New Sinceelections separatist the June 13,2010 beenhasAlliance unwilling to 2010-2011 of Deadlock Political The 3.3.4 the that indicates clearly crises, previous to similarly crisis, political 2007 The 35 CEU eTD Collection make further negotiations even less possible. "If you know this country you see that we have you we an seethat you this country know "If less possible. furthernegotiations even make isthreatening the growing popularity in parties separatist of Flanders, as mapthe shows,whichwill unresolvedissues the previous government did not manage to cope with. Whatis on the other hand continuation is current 2007crisisasthe the would-beof government struggling with the en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Belgian_federal_election_2010_map_en.png (accessed April 2011).31, 84 Alliance (N-VA)in is region Dutch-speaking quitehomogenous. the with refusal by Francophonethe parties. etc. regions), taxation to the finance law(whichwould transfer All invain,was met hisproposal the BHV district; a issue of the settling regions; new the to competencies further of transfer the namely: be settled), issues to state reform (elections a most critical the package (comprising proposed further He negotiations. by to king appointed the every 5 years, bothhis regional post and after federal);FrancophoneSince equivalent. did Ruponot manage tofurther negotiationsthe and resigned from manya new failed N-VA andthe part of Parliament the biggest the family party comprises Socialist the has no attempts,since minister prime next be the to appointed was Party Socialist the of head Rupo, Elio efficiency. Vande Lanotteand which the parties Ecolo, would mirror in thethis regional governments, way resulting ingreater (headFlemish Party (CD&V), the Flemish Socialist Party (SPA), the Humanist Democraticof Centre (CDH) the FlemishFlemish Socialist Alliancefurther reinforced nationalist The grand sentiments. coalition toconsist was supposed of New the Party)(N-VA), of CD&Vby farsurpassedthe to that be which previousthe itself attributed crisis could which was the Socialist its informed of popularity a part with CD&V the coalition the has the previous only government, Alliance Flemish New the While problematic. quite Party acoalition of forming the making significant, of Wallonia (PS), thecontinue. Christian andnegotiations protests while inof caretaker the role acts the former government the currently Democratic and For map the see, Wikipedia. "BelgianFederal Election 2010." Winkipedia.http:// 2010. As the map on the following page indicates, the overarching popularity of following As indicates,Flemish overarchingpopularity mapon the the the page New of the become has regions of votes their the winning majority parties two the The gapbetween 36 84 The current crisis isaclear The current CEU eTD Collection 2006, Vol.5.29, Issue5.p. 87 http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/europe/3760352/Beginning-of-the-end-for-Belgium 86 mechanisms achieve quite the opposite effect as were meant to achieve. meantto effect aswere opposite the quite achieve mechanisms structural the toreconcilethem.use Therefore functions sharedthe not differences anddoes the sharpens which components two into country the of division complete in the lies problem isbigger than ever.in tensions faces reconciling theThe challenge Belgium Peters, According to responsibilities" up taking by development economic strong had has that is Slovakia It independence? from most the weaker region of Czechoslovakia. Slovakia was against independence," he said. "Who has benefited wasthe "Slovakia Walloonsthe break-upCzechoslovakia. of with the made acomparison he level, inis view which our isn'tBelgium,but Europe." Whensolidarity about questioned towards one evening -in an evolution towards our owndemocracy iswhich Flanders andasupra-national He further"We saidthat wantstep-by-step,to go not by revolution want- wedonotsplit to in up 85 democracies" fully fledged two into nation Belgian the of up asplitting of years 100 than more for on going been that's evolution Peters, B. Guy. "Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate." "Beginning of Endthe for Belgium?" "Beginning of Endthe for Belgium?" 86 85 told De Wever (head of N-VA) to the Flemish magazine Reuters. Reuters Reuters in in 37 Stuff World. Stuff World. June 1,2010. June 1,2010. West European Politics 87 The ethnic, linguistic and , Nov CEU eTD Collection op. cit., 88 status-quo. the defend who Francophones Flemish partiesnot the masses. In addition, since there is a considerable outbidding on the Flemish side between the in terms and elites the among only place takes cooperation divide, theethnic across integrated not are parties of their sidessuccess, since for reducesthe further two between potential inbreakdown the communication radical demands,left distribute have to been itreduced, less will likely be anincentive for compromise. The thisto create win-win situations by subsidiesgranting tocamps in butconflict, since financial resources cannotused it since problems the solve to be sufficient not might leadconsociationalism crisis, financial recent to an agreementDe differences. Winter, integrating the According of instead to cleavages, tothe enforces due these with culturalthe tensions are aimed to be resolved through the extreme degree of institutionalization that De Winter, Lieven. "Belgium Towards the Breakdown of a Nation-State in the Heart of Europe?" p.19. 88 38 CEU eTD Collection unitarist and regionalist by camps, 1980's the unitarism hadbeen eliminated as a viable alternative, Belgium the consociational has Whereashad inthe dividedpath. into parties taken been 1970's it ethnic is ineptconflict. tomitigate situation, quo. Apparently,further thepower-sharing system since satisfy with parties a win-win cannot make status- the reinforce them andthat subsidies fiscal national allowances various benefited from have Francophones the years twenty last the Throughout demands. Flemish extreme avert to tried of 'frenchification' Brussels,around whereas Francophones,the by theirminorityusing veto, have Flemish demands for complete fiscal autonomy and the split of the BHV district to stop the back then shorter in than recentcases.the process Thepolitical crises 2007 and 2010haveof hadstrong why bargaining very to ethnic lasted mightserve asan wereexplanation theirdifferent, objectives Flemish-dominatedthe againsthad The legislature. partiesyet demands both strong and factthat linguisticprotect their identity, andcultural whereas Walloonsthe protect their to tried economy During 1978and the 1988conflicts, ethnic had groups reciprocal demands. The Flemish tried to time. each longer become has level political the at conflict ethnic indicates, stalemate political haveintoa turned it stable ethnofederation. However, asthe growingnumber of days stuck in a fragmentation. further ethnic led to minoritythis showsthat pattern satisfyingThis groups. the furtherresearch aimedat led reforms to differentstate reforms since 1970 nevermanagedbring to aboutstability in the country,instead they morefurther Inthecase extremedemands,which strengthens group. the Belgium, five of the have to incentives the and means the both with minorities empowers It it. increases conflict, ethnic Autonomy secessionismhas moreAutonomy or become popular undoubtedly within elitessince the should that Lijphart by defined institutions consociational the all established has Belgium Consociationalism, as it has been demonstrated by asit case the Consociationalism, has been of of instead demonstrated Belgium,reducing Conclusion 39 CEU eTD Collection between the different ethnic groups achieves the opposite effect, it promotes conflict and ethnic and conflict promotes it effect, opposite the achieves groups ethnic different the between subsequent political crisis resulting ina deadlock. Consociationalism, instead mitigating of conflict generate of issuestensions groups. the ethnification that certain and policies between has the cleavages. This led ofcross-cutting potentials to integrating the linesreducing along ethnic autonomy in homogenous ethnic like groups Flanders and Wallonia have strictly the divided groups Territorial inthe legislature. seats gain can various parties proportional representation through party to lead linesbesides itfragmentation duplicates ethnic as ideological parties along and cleavages the can itself system consociational The formation. coalition and cooperation majority several parties have be to incorporated into the executive, reducing the chances of efficient problematic fragmentation achieve inBelgium the high due to In to parties. aworkingof order become similarly has coalitions grand of formation The concessions. further grants party other the bydeadlock one until a other the producing sidetothreaten one between theparties, canempower a mechanism,protectiveisit alsoablocking instead a mechanism which leadingconcession to of up of BHV Itsusage haltbenegotiations.the is can district. to it seriously thus meant Even though split- the vetoed Francophones the secondtime as matter,for hasnow the a secondary become used lookingprominent by case atthe sinceMinority of Belgium.hasveto, it been used in only 1985 on effect. power to regionsthe satisfying theirfurther autonomy, for claims achieving aparadoxical thereby different the of implementation the consociational with highly correlates secessionism and autonomy for claims Flemish and federalin in increase the Thus, Flanders. party popular andthemost become have tone separatist a stronger reforms.adopted Alliance Flemish New the like Every parties, right-wing mainstream even Recently, grew. Belang) time, this resultedparties (Vlaams separatist extreme of the popularity century twentieth the beginning of By the in the devolution regions. autonomous or three have two should Belgium whether became conflict of the core and the of more The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate how each state reform led howeach demonstrate of uptothe state hasbeen thisto The purpose thesis become have mechanisms consociational the of terms in flaws inherent the of Some 40 CEU eTD Collection conditions lessconditions favorable. are where cases holdpossibly inanyother it up cannot consociation, for asuccessful case ideal arguableif that cannotethnic conflict be resolved in hasBelgium, been which identified as most the is thus itresearch, current the and of theory the implications wider the Regarding fragmentation. 41 CEU eTD Collection Lijphart, Arend. Lijphart, 59-79. (ed.) Horowitz, Donald. “Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes.” In Reynolds, Andrews. 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