University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons

Departmental Papers (ASC) Annenberg School for Communication

1-1-2008

Youth, Media and Culture in the Arab World

Marwan M. Kraidy University of Pennsylvania, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers

Part of the Communication Commons

Recommended Citation (OVERRIDE) Kraidy, M. M. (2008). Youth, media and culture in the Arab world. In K. Drotner & S. Livingstone (Eds.), International handbook of children, media and culture (pp.330-344). London: Sage. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/307

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/307 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Youth, Media and Culture in the Arab World

Abstract 'Traditionally, Arab society dealt with youth in a superficial and slightly condescending manner’, an Arab columnist wrote recently, ‘offering the occasional sports club and scout troop, a usually underfunded and dysfunctional govemment ministry or organization for youth issues, and a correspondingly noncredible occasional speech by a highranking official stressing that youths are the promise of the future'(Khouri, 2005). In light of this somber diagnosis with which many analysts of the Arab world would concur, it appears paradoxical that, today, Arab youth is at the center of some of the most important and controversial debates, from the impact of Western modernity on gender roles and social relations to consumerism and radical political violence. The scope of these debates transcends the borders of the 22 states making up the Arab world in a post September 11, 2001, environment where Arab youth has become a site that is contested both internally and externally. Young Arab women and men are simultaneously subjected to competing and oftentimes conflicting messages from their parents, educational and religious institutions, the vibrant Arab satellite television industry, 'public diplomacy' from the USA, Iran and others, and the interlocking economic, technological and cultural forces of globalization.

Disciplines Communication

This book chapter is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/307 ,20

Youth. Media and Culture in the Arab World

Marwan M. Kraidy and Joe F. Khalil

INTRODUCTION women and men are simultaneously subjected to competing and oftentimes conflicting ‘ Traditionally, Arab society dealt with yOllth messages from their parents, educational and in a superficial and slightly condescending religious instihltions, the vibrantArab satellite manner’, an Arab columnist wrote recently, television industry, ‘Pllblic diplornacy’ from ‘offering the occasional sports c1 11b and scout the USA, Iran and others, and the inter10cking troop, a usually underfundεd and dysfunc• economic, technological and cultural forces of tional govemment rninistry or organization globalization1 for youth issues, and a correspondingly The central role the rnedia play in the life noncredible occasional speech by a high­ of young people is widely acknowledgεd by ranking official stressing that youths are the scholars and policy-makers. Media and infor­ promise of the future’ (Khouri, 2005). In mation technologies are instrumεntal in both ligbt of lhis somber diagnosis with which youth cultural consumption and production; many analysts of the Arab world wOllld as such, they shape the dynamics of youth concur, lt appεars paradoxical that, today, culh1fe. In acknowledgement of this context, Arab youth is at the center of some of the most the exhaustive United Nations Youth Report importallt and controversial debates, from 2005, states that ‘ it is impossible to under the impact of Westem modernity on gendεr takean 얘εctive examination ofyouth cultures roles and socia1 relations to consumerism without e.λploring young peop/e ’s relationship and radical political violence. The scope of with the media’ (Departrnent of Economic these debates transcends the borders of the and Social Affairs, 2005: 82, ernphasis 22 states making up the Arab world in a post added). Like youth in other parts of the September 11 , 2001 , environment where Arab world, young Arabs are avid users of mobile youth has becornε a site that is contested telephones and text-messaging, the inter­ both internally and extemally. Young Arab net, satellîte tεlevision anJ popular music YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 337

Aggressive advertising campaigns and syner groups, non-comparability and a 재!estεrn gies betwecn telecommunications and media cu1tura1 focus' (Depm"t mεnt of Economic and companies promote these media consumption Socia1 Affairs, 2005: 84). Because of this activitie‘ 111e explosion of commercial tele chapter's broadscope which covers numerous vision genres has contrìbuted to the crεatlOn countries, several media, and a vmiety of of a ‘hypermedia space' (Kraidy, 2006a) by socîal and political issues, some degree of activating interactìve multimedia uses for generalization is inevitable. We hope that television, the internet and mobile telephony readers wil1 make use of our references to As the development of this commercial accεss scholarship about specific Arab media hypermedia space has intensified debates lssues about the socialization of youth and chil­ Thε existence of tensions between global dren, these communication possibilities have mεdia-oriented youth culture and local tm ernpowered youth expression in new ways ditions is beyond dispute. However, Arabs The mu1tifaceted and comp1εx relationship experience lhis c1 ash in pmticularly acute between Arab youth andmεdia may, therefore, fonn, for several reasons. First is the genera be difficult to comprehend through traditiona1 tiona1 gap betwεen contemporary Arab youth research approaches that focus on one type of and their parents. According to the United media (te1evision, internet, etc.) or one issue Nations Popu1ation Fund, around 34% of the (violence, sεxuality， etc.) population of Arab countries is under the agε This chapter attempts to provide a compre of 15 , and the median age for the Arab region hensìve view of Arab youth and medìa that is 22.2 There is vmiation between states, but is multìdisciplinary, historically informed, young peop1ε make up between one-third and concεptu a11y based. lt follows a top • and one-ha1f of nationa1 pop버 ations. Whìle down approach based on both secondm"y intergenerational differences are a universal sourcεs and on fie1dwork at Arab media phenomenon, in the Arab world thesε dif organizations. To meet this objective, we ferences ride a wave of fundamental and have organized the chapter into three main far-reaching changes that have occurred over sections: The first focuses on socio• cu1tura1 the last 30 years in the political, economic, de-traditionalization, treating issues of chang­ cu1tura1 and educational structures of most ing cultural values and social nonns. The Arab countlies. These include the opening up chapte,’ s second section naITows down on the since the 1960s of higher education to most consumerist impεratives of the cornmercial Arabs, the transition from traditionaJ desert Arab media environment, and discussεs topics cu1ture to hyper-modern, oil-fuel1ed, media­ such as advertising, multimedia synergies saturated economies in the Gulf countdes, and product placements. The third section the rise of political Islamisrn, and the major dìscusses the politica1 implications of media political and military upheavals experienced dirεcted at Arab youth, ranging from loca1 by Arabs in the 1ast few decadεs. Especially FM radio stations to US propaganda in the important in shaping social and political context of the so-called ‘war on terronsm’ deve10pments in the Arab wor1d is what Our analysis will focus on established and Eicke1man (1998) called the combination of emerging trends in thε relationship between ‘mass education and mass communication’ Arab youth and the media, dwelling on key Chances are that a 40-year 01d Arab fathe, case studies while refemng to a divεrsc range today grew up in a world where there was of examples (instihltions, genr야， medium) only one state television channel, which did By ana1ytically linking 01d and new media not air advcrtisemεnts ， was the fìrst in his in the lives of chi1dren and young peop1e, family to obtai n a uni versity dεgree ， and has we hope this chapter provides a comparative had a decent1y paid job with a govemment perspective on an area of research that agency. His 1O-year-01d son, howζver ， was suffers, according to at least onε authontative born amidst the Arab information revolution, account, from ‘fragmentation, small sarnple can choose between more than 200 sate11ite 338 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE

tεlevision channels saturated with commercial by introducing hoTÏzontal value transmission me‘sages, surf the internet and use his between young people wor1dwide and within mobile tclephone to vote for his favorite the Arab region.4 This accelerates socio reality tclevision contestant or to request his cultural change to the extent that it reduces fa、rorite music video. According to World parents’ infiuence on their children in favor of Bank figures, the number of television sets increasing theÎr exposure to peer and foreign per 1000 people in the Arab world is around cultural inftuences, and increases the appe 따 200, double that of low~income countries of re1igiously couched, anti-popular culture (for example in sub~Saharan Africa), but arguments espoused by many Arab Islamist much smaller than the number in high-income groups and political parti얹 countries, which is abovε 600 (UNDP, 2004) ‘ At the same time, global culture is locally IntClTIεt penetration in the Ar배 reglOn ranges appropriated by the IsJamists, creating a from 30% of thε population in the United diffεrent hybrid where local themes are Arab Emiratcs to close to 0% in Sudan, gratìed onto global forms: examples incJ ude with Lebanon at 10% and Saudi Arabia Sami Yusuf, a British-born Muslim with Azeri below 3% (UNDP, 2004), Experiences of this origins, who has εmerged as a creator of generational gap are different from onε Arab ‘Islarnic music videos’, or, more generally, country to another, but the emerging reglonal the advent of Islamic television. In the past, youth culture, much of it revolving around the notion of Islamic ‘programs’ on Arab state hypennedia space, creates a sεnse of shared television were lÌmited to short (flεw minutes) community among those who partake in it segments that reminded Muslims of prayer The intergenerational gap is widened not only time five times a day. An εxception to this by the newly available technologi않， but by the trend was state television in Gu1f countries, behaviors and vocabularies that youth culture which routinely featured 1ive broadcasts of devε:l ops around rituals of consumption and sermons, religious talk shows and scripture technology use, which tend to be exclusive of readings. The advent of satellite tεlevision aduIts paved the way for fully dedicated religious The global youth culture, to which some channels, rnostly based in Saudi Arabia with young Arabs gravitate with various degrεes studios in Egypt and Dubai. For example, ofbεlonging determined by language ability, in 1998 the Saudi~owned Arab Radio and socio-economic c1ass and gωgraphicalloca Television (ART) estab!ished ‘Iqraa’ (Read) tion, navigates contempormy hypermedia as an Islamic channε1 appea1ing to wornen space through rituals of consumption, like and youth worldwide. Until then, Saudi wearing the same c10thing brands, listening Channel One was the main re1 igious channel, to the same pop artists, eating the same fast­ wilh 50% religious-oriεnted programming food and watching the same movi앙 Thus , thε lqraa’ s appεal rests in its 100% religlous pro­ global, media-driven, consumption-centεred gramming emulating entertainrnent television youth culture reproduces itsεIf through the with several male and female ‘born-again’ ritualized consumption it promotes. This preachers, and live interaction with audiences process does not necessarily lead to cu1tural The trend set forth by ‘ Iqraa’ was soon homogenization. It mostly results in various foJlowed by Al Majd (the Glory) and Al Risala fonns of cultural hybridity embodied in (the Message). The first grew in 2002 out so• ca1led ‘world music’ or in branded mix of a Saudi-owned Islamic publishing house and~match clothing styles which indicate‘ that to include seven television and radio sate1lite global youth culture is a hodge~podge of channels AI~Majd channel, a Kor ’an channel, international cu1tural influences.3 a science channel, a historical channel, a In the Arab world, this hybridity exac~ news channel and two chi1dren’s channels erbates intergenerational conflict because it The second, AI~Risala ， was established in hinders value transmission according to thε 2006 as part of the Rotana network with a postfigurative (hierarchical and strict) mod리 youth focus. It has a slick screen appearance YOUTH , MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 339 and features a mix of prayer, talk shows and developments reftect an intergenerational mUSIC leap, since the media world of previous These channe1s helped create two typεs gεnerations of Arabs consisted mostly of daily of religious star: the tele-nu띠 is and tele­ newspapers and state television chalme1 s‘ dai ’a (or preachers). Starring in his Al Jazeera These were cu1tural1y policed in ordεr to show titled Al Sharia wal Hayat (Islamic promote national identity and unity, and law and l(fe) , the Egyptian mufti Yusuf technically 1imited to the onε way, non al-Qaradawi is‘ues religious opinions known interactive, transrnÎssion of infonnation. The as fatwas and discusses general social and combination of an ever-increasing number of political issues. TraditionaJly, the dai’ a 18 a cultural sources of identity with the interactive born-again Muslim who dedicates his life to possibilities of hypennedia presents two rεligious preaching. Satel1 ite te1εVlS lOn gave challenges dai’ as like the Egyptian Amr Khaled superstar First, although the media provide some status. Khaled’ s charisma, trendy clothing, of the most significant component‘ for and ‘modernist’ Islamic discourse focusing bui1ding youth identity, the constmction of on youth has led to ovεr-the-air skinnishes Arab youth identity is complicated by the between him and rnore establishεd re1igious paucity of indigenous cultural production, leaders, like al-Qaradawi. In addition to including books, cinema and, to a lesser fi1ling a market niche, mainstream Islarnic extent, television. While the hypermedia media are seen as an antidote to the radical space involvεs numerous media and infor­ and sometirnεs violεnt media underground, mation technologies, television remains the largely re'‘tricted to the internet. Also, by dominant medium, and television, even when adopting ‘modern’ media technologies and in the Arabic language, Îs permeated by styles to spread their message, Islamic Western ideas and values. In other words, media indicate that as ‘the cultura1 10gic sources from which young, εspeci aJ1y rniddle• of globalization’ (Kraidy, 2005), hybridity class, English-speaking, Arabs draw on whεn can sometimes operate as counter-logic. In defining their identity tend to be inftuenced by other words, hybIidity can reftect intercul Wεstern ， mostly US , popu1ar culture and its tura1 relations with various distdbutions of focus on individual identity and consumerÏsm poweI (Khalil, 2005). T죄is is a reflεction of the

Unlike the fami1y-focused, living• room crisis of Arab cultural production at large, basεd ， fixed← time radio listεning or television detailed in the Arab Hwnan Development viewing of the past, the new hypennedia Report 2003, which was written by Arab space is basεdonpεrsonalized ， interactive and inteI1ectuals andrεsεarchεrs under the aegìs of mobile communication devices and practices the United Nations Development Programme Therεfore ， it weakens the bonds of collective and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social socia11ife onArab chi1dren and young peop1e, Dεve10pmen t. Chapter 3, ‘Knowledge pro contributing to thè transformation of their duction in arab countries’, gives a view of thc cultural identities by changing the sources CriSIS‘ Arab countries, with 5% of the wor1 d’s they use for ‘identity work’ (Ziehe, 1992) population, produce J. J % of the world’ s Although se1ecting foreign, regiona1 (Arab) books, a figure that falls be10w 1% if we and local elements for identity construclion on1y consider literary books. Wìth a potential existed before the advent ofhypermedia space audience of 270 million Arab speakcrs in (e.g. see Havens (200 J) and Kraidy (1 999)), 22 countrie1、 on1y 1000 to 3000 copies of the environment permits a proliferation of a novel are usually pub1ished (UNDP, 2004 cultural sources of identity. Also, the intε:r ac 77-78). Theatrical and cinematic production, tivity of text-messaging and intemet chatting, III spltε of the famed Egyptian cinema and the for examp1e, challenges the traditiona1, top emergence of high-quality Syrian te1εVlSIOn down modeJ of socialization by making drama, mirrors this situation. Batlered by cell young Arabs active cultural producers. These sorship, undermined by widespread illiteracy 340 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE and hlndered by the lack of funding, Arab channels, the Arab media industry’s focus litermy and dramatÎc creative talent is-unable on the oil-rich Gulf countries is increasing to thrivc and reshaping production and programming Profiting from state-private cooperation, decisions tclevision drama has raised the profile and The rising importance of thε rnarkets of the income of writers in countries likε Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Egypt and Syria and to a 1ι‘ ser extent Ernirates exacerbates the socio-economic gap Lebanon and the Gulf countries. But this trend between poor and rich Arab countries as has been thwarted, since tclcvision officials the Arab public sphere becomes increasingly prefer the low-risk, high-yield strategy of dominated by the desires, interests and voicεs f01mat adaptation. Hence, the wave of reality of the wealthy. Poor young Arabs with blεak te1evision, game-shows, music videos and employment prospects and restricted social other formats imported from North America conditions are reduced to watching advertisers or Europe domÎnates Arab entertainment cater to a select g이 den Arab youth as thεy television, most starkly transnational satellite ftaunt designer c1othes, hip mobile phones and telεvision. Thεse shows present ‘Western’ extravagant lifestyles. Whilε this is to some formats that are adaptεd and reproduced extent true of commercial media wor1 dwide, in Arabic by Arab directors, actors and the large income differences and the speed participants, and are often embedded in with which the Arab media shifted from synergistic strategies including advel1ising OI state← contro11εd monopolies to companies sponsorship dεals ， in addition to audio music motivated by a mixture of commercial and and music video deals. As we explain later political interests further complicate the in this chapteι this mixing of wor1dviews situation. Highly popular reality television has frequently triggered controversy for programs, which include participants frorn promoting commercialism and Wεstern， ← style many Arab countries, milTor the inter-Arab social relations bεtwεen fernales and mal잉， cleavage with the Gulf countries on one and for sapping putative Arab or Islamic side and everyone else on the other. Both identities a1liances between contestants on these shows Differεntial access to thε new Arab hyper­ and audiencε voting patterns fal1 into this rnedia space is the second problem. The pattern in which diffεrences in social class and advent of a comrnercial rnedia environrnent sub-regional identÎties overlap tends to exclude thoseArabs who are not desir The paucity of indigenous cultural pro able targεts of advertisers. It is wε11 known duction and differential access to the media, that the focus of the ovenνhεlming majority the two problεrns discussαJ above, indicate of Arab media products are the countries of that the cornmercial media envirornuent the Gulf Cooperation Council, which inc1 udes contributes significantly, both vertical1y and Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the horizontal1y, to segregation of the Arab Unitεd Arab EmiTates and Knwait. Television population. Vertically, it isolate1‘ young people programmers and othel' ‘content providcrs’ from their parents. In addition to a commu focus mostly on Saudi Arabia, by far the nicative umverse replete with logos, words, largest and wealthiest Arab market. Program symbols and icons that arε Western inspired previews and promotions on most satellite and unpalatablε to their parents, privileged telεvision channels, for example, give the young Arabs are increasingly spending Jeisure time of a pal1icular program in ‘Saudi Arabia time surfing the internet, chattìng on mobìle Time’ in addition to GMT 0'- the timε of the phones, playing video games or watching location of the channel. With the growing youth• specific programs on television 낌lese financialimportance of mobile phone toll cal1s relativεly solitary activitiζs are transform or text messages in the context of voting in ing Arab social relations and older media reality television prograrns, requesting music consumption habits that had been based on videos or sending love me‘sages on mUSlC cornmunal listening or viewing followed by YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 341 group or family conversations (this follows and at the other end by Arab nationalism a sin피 ar trend towards indlvidual usage and political identification. The current geo • in the West; for example, see Livingstonε political upheavals rocking the Arab region, and Bovill (1 999)). Horizontally, the new such as the invasion of Traq and the protracted commercial media enviromnent discriminates confiict between Israelis and Palestinians, between young people on the basis of social have intensified concerns about identity at a economic status. The focus on the wealthy time when the USA has made it a policy to Gulf countries and the upper middle class in change the political, economic and culture major cities 1ike Cairo, Damascus or Beirut stnlctures of Arab cOllntries. At the same time, risks exacerbating class divisions both within the isslle of political reform is a pεnnanent and between Arab countries. The media’s fixture in Arab public discourse and is perhaps exc1usion of large segments of the Arab the only area where secular liberals agree with population who are not relevant to advertisεrs Islamist activists raises a set of important qu않 tions about In this context, Arab media targεtmgyoung politìcal p따ticipation in Arab socìeties, to be people play a balancing act, on the one discussed later in tms chapter hand respecting e‘tablished traditions, but at the same time introducing new ideas both for commercial reasons and also as a socia1 and political imperative. Commercially, Arab ARAB YOUTH BETWEEN GLOBAl mεdia εntrepreneurs are cognizant that the CULTURE AND LOCAL AUTHENTICITY consumerism and sexualized semiotics of global youth culture offer tremendous profit In the new communication environment that opportunities. They also know that young significantly ovεrlaps with a global, media Arabs are alienated by the often poorly drìven youth culture, young Arabs have PH띠 uced programs that state channels offer found a new space of socialization that them, preferηng an informal and interactive is deeply permeated by ‘foreign' cultural style, a situation in which thεy are similar and socia1 values, a process that started to Western youth (e.g. Buckingham, 2000) several centurìes earlier with missionaries Socially and politically, there is a general in the Levant but that is more rεcent In sense that the status quo is llntenable, and the Gulf region. The Arab world is similar some refonn-minded media owners iI벼]se in this r앉pect to other paπs of the world the ne\ν communication environment with where youth rnedia culture now compεtes their ideas about refonning Arab societies with traditional farn i1 y-based social structure‘ Nowhere ls this search for a balanced recipe in the socialization of children and young nn잉 ng tradition and modernity, entertain• peop1e. This process, which is embedded in a ment with a social message, morε visible larger trend of ‘ dεtraditiona1ization ’ 아leelas than in the case of the Rotana rnedia et al‘, 1996), is accelerating the creation conglomerate of hybrid cultural forms and identities (for The history of Rotana mirrors that of its example in Lebanon; see Kraidy (1 999)) owner, Saudi Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal, a in processes where yOllth cobble together ‘forward-thinking’ member of the Saudi royal social identities from a resεrvoir of resources family and a Lebanese citizen by virtue of in which youth media cu1ture loorns large his Lebanese mother. Bin Ta1al is a successful What makes the Arab countnes distinct is globa1 investor whose media holdings have that it is a region in which pllblic discourse inc1 udζdthε satellite channcl of LBC and is consumed by concerns for identity and Murr Television, a now-defunct Lebanese authenticity, within a field defined at one station, in addition to Rupert Murdoch’sNews end by Islamic piety and re1igious identi­ Corporation, CNBC and StarTY. In 1995 , Bin fication (and that includes Christians such Talal acqui.red 25% of Saudi-based Rotana as Egyptian Copts and Lebanese Maronites) Audio Visual Company, which specializes 342 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE

in the production and dist!ibution of Arab rumors. The framing of the program as a music. Bin Talal'8 interest in music production coffeehouse with free-wheeling and informal increased over the years and 80 did his shares dialogue echoes the traditional role of the in Rotana, from 48% in 2002 to 100% in coffeehouse as a micro-public sphere in Arab 20035 and Ottoman culture.6 However, unlike the

Bin Talal's plan to build amεdia empire that male• only coffeεhouses that still exist in Arab integrated music production and distribution cities, the program features both genders as led him in 2003 to acquire the music channel presenters and guests, i1lustrating a subtle of the Arab Radio and Television (ART) process of localization, which εntails gratìing bouquet. Rebranded Rotana, it expanded local themes and traditions onto the global mto a nεtwork of four music channels, music television genre, a process resulting one movie channel and a religious chan­ in the partial transformation of these local nel callεd al-Risala. Valued at over US$l thernes and traditions bi1l ion, Rotana has more than 2500 music Rotana’ s business strategy i1l ustrat얹 how videos and 5000 recordεd li ve performances Arab corporations profit from hypermedia Bin Talal is now capable of producing, space. Rotana’s commercial viabi1ity rests

distributing and marketing any singer in• to a large extent on what industry insiders house. While Kingdom Holding (Bin Talal's call value-added services (VAS). These are major company) and Rotana music are based available in the form of web dow 띠 oads ， in Saudì Arabia, Rotana television is based short message services (SMS) displayed on ìn Beirut. Rotana’ s four music channels a lower third ticker, multÎ-media services do not follow MTV’s tradition of using (MMS), ring tone and web downloads. In video jockeys (VJs) in the programs; instead additìon to being profitable, these services the VJs are charged with tying different stimulatε dernand for prograrnming and programs or sequences together. For Ínstance, increase the prospects of synergy with other on the Rotana Khaleejiyyah, specializing in services. The Rotana Clip channe1 is a Arabian Gulf music, the VJs recite poεtry VAS fiagship, since it fεatures， a number as interludεs between sets of music videos of interacti ve activities: chatting, J\.α1S and Except for Rotana Clip, which caries audience SMS. Rotana Khaleejiyyah rεceived as rnany requests, the three channels have regular as 50,000 SMS messages during its first 3 days prograrnming that is primarily youth oriented on the air. 7 Through promotional c1ips, Rotana By ‘translating’ the MTV VJ tradition for an contributes to cultivating text mcssaging as a Arab audience and inserting poetry (a highJy way of life for young Arabs who use Rotana’s popu때 literary form in the Arab world) on-screen ticker to send messages to each between songs, Rotana εffectively localizes other, inc1uding love messages or simply to elements of the global youth culture inform friends that the sender will be late to Another localization strategy is visible an appOJntment in one show that addresses youth culture Rotana’s mantra of maintaining a conserva directly, Rotana Café. Following a wave of tive identity compatible with Saudi traditions youth-oriented magazine shows that started but also introducing Bin Talal's relatively in 2001 , RotallG Café showcases the latest 1iberal views makes this channel a hyblid Rotana music videos and reviews interna­ space in which traditions overlap with modern tional movies, gossip and fashion σεnds technologies. The choice ofLebanon, the Arab Presented by Lebanese, Egyptian, Saudi and world’s most culturally liberal country, as its Kuwaiti teεnagers ， this daiIy one-hour show major site of operation, reficcts this policy Îs set in a relatively large studio resembling a While Rotana’s VAS indicate that the channel café. Tt is characterized by a relaxed attitude is cognizant of and cu1tivates hip trends where presenters casually interact with a among Arab youth, Rotana’s comrnitment to handhεld camera while answering inquiries Islamic religious practices is a clear indication from callers about the most recent celebrity of its commitment to tradìtion. Dming theholy YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 343

month of Ramadan, present리 s dress more later in the Arab world when MTV began conservatively and music videos are carefully satellite broadcasting in the late 1990s. The selected. TIrroughout the year, programming program moved to LBC in 2002. Tbis daily is inteπupted for prayer five times a day for half-hour show follows a magazine format 5 minutes as slick gr‘ aphicsovεrlaid with video featuring a regular group of performers and footage of pilgrims praying in Mεcca ca11s guεst characters, with various parts, such as viewers to prayer. When the Saudi King Fahd storytεlling ， songs, cartoons ànd games‘ died in 2005, Rotana paid tribute to its Saudi The show went through several stages owner‘ hip by broadcasting mourning)lJusìc First, it focused on a simple magazine format for several days. At the S3mε time, Rótana with various segments, such as storytelling, programs reftect relatively progressivε Vlews gadgets and birthdays. It featured children as on women’ s rights, the Israeli-Palestinian a studio audience. It emphasized a European conflict and terrorisrn. ‘ feel ’, both in terrns of thε way the characters Rotana reflεcts a wider trend across the were dressed and the song lydcs in French and industry, staying within thε SOClO• political English. In the second stage, it maintained thε bounds of the Saudi mainstream whilε mtro­ previous elements with a focus on youngel ducing nεw elements from both the global perfonners, as wel1 as including children media industry and global youth culture to as actual talent. A main change was the lming audiences. In the following section inclusion of product placement as well as we analyze several youth media ‘ sites’ to sεgment sponsors. The perforrners/hosts plug explain how commercial and socio-po1itical products either by using or distributing them concerns overlap and shapε Arab youth media to the studio audience. In addition, the show to various degrees. Located on a continuum of expanded into ancillary productions: plays, most to least commεrcialized ， we analyze one video cassettes and CD song compi1ations Lebanese television program, Mini Studio, As a result of this commercia1 success, the followed by a discussion of MBC 3 and television and advertising industdes dubbed Space Toons, a satellite channel dedicated to the show as ‘Mini Market’ ‘ Aftεr being youth entertainment, and AI-Jazeera Children launched on a pan-Arab scale first through Channel, a rεcent venture launched under the h‘TV in 2000 and currently through LBC, mantra of ‘edutainment’ Mini Studio adapted to this new demographic by including English as a second language for songs and dialogue. Producers of the ARAB YOUTH BETWEEII! show selected, supported and promoted an COII!SUMERISM AII!D EDUCAT’Oll! all-singing-and-dancing childrεn band under the name Kids' Power. 9 Arab mεdia have bεcome increasingly com­ Mini Studio was a pioneering Arab tele mercial in thε past decade. Lebanese media vision program for children. Culturally, it were the ear1 y Arab pioneεrs in producing blurred the language barriers, as its performers commercially viable television programs. The crossed between Arabic, English and French, mushrooming of private television stations reflecting the Arabs’ colonial past and the in the 1990s in the absεnce of an adequate currεnt multilinguallandscape where English regulatory framework revived Lebanon as has bεcome a global language, permeating the most dynamic Arab media market for youth mεdia culture. Economical1y, this show somε time, a role Lebanese television held revolutionized the ways the advertising indus in the 1970s when it exported drama series try targeted children; it introduced systematìc to the emerging Gulf government television product placernent, with members of the channels.8 It is in this context that ιlini audiencε shown on camera using products Studio, following a French tradition of placed in the show and advertised during children programs, was launched by MUlT commercial brealcs. This helped spread the Television in 1992, first in Lebanon only, and notion that children’s television in the Arab 344 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN , MEDIA AND CULTURE

world can be a profìtable business, a lesson Ramadan issuεs. This is another example of that was not lost on the Middle East ‘ localization ’， whεre local themes are grafted Broadcasting Center as it was εxpan며 ng onto global formats to create culturally hybrid operations by essentially becoming a network programs. A key element in that expansion is MBC 3, a A venture of this scope is viable because channel exc1usively dedicated to children and it is integrated in a media conglomerate with young people three types of ancillary business: a magazine Almost 15 years after its launch, thε targeting parents and chi1dren, cornmercial Middle East Broadcasting Center rnoved to representation and advertising of toys, and create a multicasting platform for the Arab a website which ties in a11 these activities family. Moving from a traditional, one­ by offering online games and downloads channel, general audience approach, MBC Followìng the logic of integration, the mag now has two channels targeting young peoplε azine carries telεvision program schedules, MBC 2 offers Western movies that attract the toys are flεaturcd in the programs, and both youth and their parents, and has been thε wε:bsitc functions as a gateway to the particularly succεssful in Saudi Arabia, where Space Toons brand. While this company is movie theaters are banned. MBC 3, launched a case Shldy of the commercialization of from Dubai in 2005 to preempt the launch children and youth rnedia culture in the Arab of the AI-Jazeera Children Chamlel, focuses world, some of its rivals propound a radically exc1usively on childrεn and youth. During diffεrent vision of the role of thε media in the the aftεmoon ， MBC 3 features young VJs socialization of childrεn， and young people who introduce the shows, comrnent on them Reftecting a long-tcrm media Iiva1ry and Ínteract with the audience via telephone between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Saudi Program offerings are primarìly frorn the USA ownεd MBC 3 was rushεd into being to and the UK, broadcast in English, but also ‘ scoop’ the ìmrninent launch of the Qatari• inc1 ude Arabic-dubbed shows 1icensed from owned Al-Jazeera Children Channe1. While Space Toons , another Arab channel the two channels compete plimarily for the Taking advantage of the facilities provided Gulf Cooperation Council countrìes’ audi by Dubai Media City, Space Toons w‘lS ence, they reftect two different phi1osophies launched with a large Iibrary of children’s of youth media, with the former being a programs in Arabic. Its Sylian owner, Fayez commercial station and the latter proc1aiming Sabbagh, has a long history of dubbing a public serv ice mission. For that reason, and distlibuting various Asian and Europcan the AI-Jazeera Children Channel, launched cartoons in Arabic. Space Toons broadcasts on September 9, 2005, jointly by Al-Jazeera cartoons back to back in Arabic with commer­ and the Qatar Foundation for Education, cial breaks in-between, eschewing program Science anJ Community Development, is presenters conllilOll on Arab television. Space worlhy of a detailed exarnination. The Qatar Toons soon grew into a media l1Ub for Foundation, public1y financed by the Qatari chi1dren’s programming. In addition to sup• state and headed by Sheikha Moza Bint plying MBC 3 with prograrns, Space Toons is Nasser Al-Missned, wife of Qatru ’s ruler, carried by the Orbit pay-κlevision ‘ bouquεt ’， owns 90% of the venhlre, which broadcasts which blings in additional incomc as wel1 as from Education City in Qatar‘ 10 The channεl accεss to pay-for-television audicnces. It also came on the heels of the flagship Al-Jazeera, branched into Space Toons English, broad AI-Jazeera SpOltS , AI-Jazeera live (public casting Oliginal versions of its dubbed Arabic affairs) and the impending launch of the programs. Fina11y, and most interestingly, English-language Al-Jazεera English. II Space Toons ventured into producing its own Most distinctive about the new channel is Arabic cartoons in the fOffilS of vignettes the fact that it is ‘a private company but dεaling with religious themes, such as ‘ Rihlat with a pub1ic service mission and is publicly EIH엠’， about the Muslirn pilgrirnage, and funded’ , in the words of Jean Rou i11 y, CEO of YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE 11\1 THE ARAB WORLD 345

Lagardere Intemational Images, a subdivisîon Channel ... A reading of the notion and of the Prench conglomerate Lagardere, which a crÎtique of the vision’ , the 3l1icle argues that was instrumental in setting IIp the chan the new channel fills an important gap inArab nel technically. lO Thus, Al-Jazeera Childfiεn media because ‘ there were ambitioLls projects Channel is not a commercial channel, but, aiming to care for children, but they did not as Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer aI-Thani, show children a real interest and dedicated chair of the board of AI-Jazeera, explains, themselves to tal싸 ng about hobbies and a ‘bright alternative to thε CUlTcnt trends in mOVles ’ and carries a stinging indictment telcvision broadcasting where children are of Arab media as ‘ mεdia that jump at thε exposed to violent and inappropriate material peels in the absence of an 앉 sence ... arε on a daily basis' (Ohrstrom, 2005). However, in a11 their fonns sterile’ (Bouqanoun, 2005) the new channel eschewεd the didactic In contrast, AI-Jazeera ChiJdren Channel style of Arab educational or devεlopment would advocate that Arab children should tclevision programs, aiming to provide what have a voice and be productive membεrs executives called ‘educatîonal fun ’ 10 whi1e of their societies ‘We must address Arab inculcating valuεs such as tolerance, open­ C벼 dren in an interactive manner’, the mindedness and freedom of expression. In writer says, ‘ so as to transfonn them into press statements, the new channel espouses instruments of knowledge and givε them the concept of ‘edutainrnent’, through which it a productive capacity so that they express ‘opens up avenues for the Arab children to their opinions on issues that Înterest them leam about different ... cultures ... landJ help and contribute to the foundation of a better them develop posìtive self-esteem, respεct future' (Bouqanoun, 2005). The new channel their traditions and values, and appreciate would thus contribute to εducational refonn people around thlεm and develop a passion for throughout the Arab world by empowering learninearnln!l’!l 12 children and young people and focusing on The declared commitment to local produc sclf-criticism and engagement in intercultural tion expressed in statements by AI-Jazεera dialognes. The author also under1ines thε fact Children Channe1 executives makes the chan that the channel was crεated out of ‘a strong nel 이에따 tive ， at least until actual program• politic며 wi11’, widely assumed to be that of ming grids prove otherwise. The channel’s Qatm ’s influential first lady, and that becausε programrning grid comprises around 40% of of this support it was going to be viable original programrning, amounting to 6 or 7 For all thesεprollllsεs ， theAI-Jazeera Chil hours a day out of the 18 to 19 hours of dren Channel sti11 faced numerous problems transmission (Ohrstrom, 2005). According First, setting it up was a long affair that to ch31mel director I\’ahnoud Bouneb, the exceeded its budget. Plans callεd for a fully channel wi11 broadcast 18 hours per day, out digitized, completely ‘ tape-lcss’ operatlOn of which 6 hours are live, 3 hours are com from production to transmissÎon. However, missioned abroad and 4 hours are produced softwarε and budgeting problems, along 13 in thε channel’s studios. The locally madε with varying visions of sεveral key actors, programs did not shy away from controversy undermined this aim. 14 Second, [rom thε Within 1 month after launch, Seh/w wa vely first days of broadcasting, the new SalamQ (Health and Sqfety) broached the channε1 attractεd criticism for delivering le~써 issue of female genital circumcision, and than what it‘ launchers promised. Because other programs featureù children opining on of the AI-Jazeera legacy, the chamlel faced relatively sensitive social and political issues skepticism even before its launch. In a column

(Ohrstrom, 2005). This is within AJ• Jazeera’s titled ‘The children of AJ-Jazeera’ , lbrahim overall spirit to broach taboo issues 며 Ariss (2이)5) ， editor for television and An article published on the Aljazeera.nεt cinema at the pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat, hoped website provides a rationale for the that the channel will not promote extremism, channe1. Titlεd ‘ AI-Jazeera Children and that ‘ language lessons not be to learn

i 346 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE

how to wlite ta핸ri statements ... and that POLITICS. lI'OUI\IG PEOPLE AI\II> THE program guests llot be from outside of thlε MEI>IA 11\1 THE ARAB WORW era’ 15 Six weeks later, acolumnist in thε same newspaper poignantly criticized the station fm Because of the current geo-political juncture, ‘ putting amateurs in charge' and for having rnyriad issues related to Arab rnass rnedia young adult talk-show hosts who knew less have been politicized between theArab world than their children guests about thε tOplCS and the West, especially the USA, but even under discussion (Arnin , 2005). While these more significantly, within the Arab world critiques are at least partiaIIy valid, more time itself. Since the invasions of Afghanistan and 18 neεded before a systematic appraisal of Iraq by the USA and some allied forces, the the channel’s perronnance can be conducted ‘ Arab satel1ite news channels have been the It is also important to note that the channel’s sources of anxiety among Westem, rnainly avowed pub1ic service mission makes it a American, politicians and mi1itary leaders unique children-01iented media institution in Most of this anxiety and anger have focused the Arab world , 16 onAl-Jazeera, with some accusing the channel The sudden interest ofleading transnational of cooperating with AI-Qaeda and the Iraqi Arab broadcasters to youth channels needs insurgency. While a dεta i1 ed discussion of careful assεssmen t. Arguably, the need for these important issues falls beyond the scope specific demographics to attract advertisers of this chapter, American perceptions that is important, but it cannot sole]y explain the Arab meclia al'e hostile to lhe USA has surgε of interest. MBC 3 can bε understood triggered major initiatives under the pub­ as an attempt to prepare loyal adult audîences lic diplornacy umbrella, including AI-Hun'a for its llagship channel as the MBC network television, Radio Sawa, and Hi Magazine reinvents itself as the one-stop channel for the Urùike AI-Huna, a news and public affairs Arab family. In addition, MBC 3 is free to television channel for Arabs of a11 ages, Radio air, with no costs incurred by thε Vlewers‘ Sawa was consciously conceived as a blend Furlhermore, MBC 3 has been seliously of news and entertainrnent targeted at Arab attempting to present itself as a Gulf-based youth, hencε its relevance to this chapter channeJ. U nlike Al-J azeera Children Channel, Radio Sawa is the brainchild of the its road shows have focused on the Arabìan Broadcasting Boal'd of Govemors, the body Gulf. While the use of English programs is responsible for American intemational broad­ attributed 10 a scarcily of Arab children’S casts referred to as ‘public diplomacy’ bytheir productions, it a180 reflects a mu1tilingua1 proponεnts and ‘propaganda’ by critics, This audience. Thε choice of ‘Space Toons ’ as a station offlεrs a format that appeals to youth by name for another chi1dren’s channel reflects focusing mostly on music, a sharp departurε the growing pervasiveness and acceptance from Voice of America’s Arabic service’s of English by Arab audiences, itself a blend of news, CUITent affairs, documentaries symptom of media globalization. But if these and musÎc. The station was officially launched channels' prograrns are revealing about the in March 2002, and by late summer 2002 it sociaI and commercìal dimensions of Arab was reaching more Arab listeners than had youth, other mεdia take on a more political the Voicc of America (Boyd, 2002), Indeed, dimension, whether directly as in the case Sawa is the only (relative) success story in ofthε US-funded ‘ public diplomacy’ stations the US public diplomacy initiative towards the Radio Sawa and AI-Hurra television, or in Arab world , considering that Hi Magazine was the casε of rea1ity television shows that shutdown in Decembel' 2005 and the status were politicized by viewers and appropriated of A1 -Hun'a television is in question as of in street demonstrations, most notably in this writing, with the channel facing high Beirut. The following section of this chaptel' level slaff departures in thε wake of several examines how Arab youth popular culture surveys showing it with 1 않 s than 1% of the intersects with Arab politicallife Arab television news audience. Radio Sawa’s YOUTH, MEDIA AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 347

success is partly due to the recognition by its the demonstrations. Young people played overseers of the power of popular cu1ture to a pivotal part in the demonstrations, with reach young Arabs university student organizations as the 1εading Sa、Na ’ s great ìnnovation was a station for organizational force. There was clear media mat that mixed Arabic and English-language savvy among the young demonstrators, who pop music with short newscasts every hour. used color-coordínated clothing and painted How trus radio station was received is perhaps Lε:banese flags on their faces likε football best deSClibed in the numerous stories of taxi fans worldwide. Morε ìmportant1 y, several drivers in Arab capitals listening to Sawa media friendly ‘ spectacles’ were organized, music and switching to another channel when including a gigantic human Lebanese fiag the newscast began only to move the dial made by 10,000 Pεople holding green, red back when the new hour of rnusic came and white cardboard squares, the Lebanese in. Arabs liked thε music and 1istened to it, colors. Most interesting were the signs that but the newscasts were not credible because demonstrators carrieJ, which included words, listeners knew it was a US govermnent phrases and slogans from re머ity television, sεrvice. However, the innovative fonnat was such as ‘ Addoum, Nominee’ , which called SQon emulated by other stations, including for the sacking of Lebanon’s pro-Syrian Marina FM in Kuwait, thε first private FM prosecutor general station in that country and one that is rapidly On March 14, 2005, when approximately gaining 1isteners. Although il111ovative, this 1 million demonstrators filled Beirut’s centra1 fOlmat is not unprecedented in the rεg lOn ， as Martyrs Square to protest at Hariri’s assassl some of the music video sate1lite television nation and to demand the withdrawal ofSyrian channels mixed Arabic and Westem pop troops from Lebanon, many signs featured several years before the advent ofRadio Sawa pictures of dεspised p 이 iticians and security If Radio Sawa showed Washington policy officers with ‘nominations’ to be voted out rnakers that young Arabs can be reached ofthe ‘show’, a c1ear appropriation of reality by mixing politics with popular culture, television for political activism. One sign the emerging hypermedia space gave young in partícular illustrated this appropriation. 1t Arabs new opportunities for self-expression featured a photograph of Lebanese president and participation in public life. The wave of Emile Lahoud. a major ally of Syria whose reality television and music video prograrns mandate was unconstitutionally extended by and channels is evidence of the rampant Syrian fiat. with the word ‘nornmee ’ above commercialization of Arab hypennedia space the picture and the words ‘Vote 1559’ But these programs also provide Arab youth underneath it. St“r Academy, the Arabic with thε tools to parlicipate in public debates language adaptation of a format owned by Nowhere is this more evident than in the way the Dutch format house Endemol and known the rituals of reality television were ‘recruited’ in the UK as Fame AcadenlY, has been the in what We얀 elTI observers ca11ed thε ‘Cedar Arab world’s most popular and controversia1 Revolution’ in Lebanon. 17 reality television show. Every week, audience The series of street demonstrations that members call dedicated four-digit mobile occurred in Beirut in the wake of the phone numbers to vote for one of two assassination of Lebanon’ s previous Prime nominees they wish to save from expulsion Minister Rafiq al-H따iri were perhaps the from the show. In the demonstrator’ S slgn, first major Arab political event in which ‘ 1559’ is an ironic appropriation in that it the emerging hypermedia space played a refers to United Nations Security Council visible role. Demonstrators used mobile Rel‘olution 1559, which called among other phones and text-messaging to mobilize and things for the withdrawa1 of Syrian troops organize supporters, exchange crucial tactical from Lebanol1 infonnation, anJ take picture ‘ that could This overlap of politics and popular culture be easily transmitted out of the area of is indicative of a larger trend in the Arab 348 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN, MEDIA AND CULTURE world where political activists increasingly venture because it has a self-declared public appropriate elements of youth media culture service mission and at the same time it enjoys This can be seen on sevεrallevels. First of all, a secllre financial basis. As an initiative of the use of mobile phonεs and text-messaging Qatar’ s Sheikha Moza, probably the Arab to mobilize support for a re a1ity television wor1 d’s most powerful and infiuεntial first contestant and to forge alliances with like­ lady, and ample funds from Qatar’s vast natu minded viewers has been transfeπed to ral gas reserves at a time when gas is at a record the organization of political demonstrations high price, the Al-Jazeera Children Channel Second, the hip sartorial style of reality transcends two difficulties that have often pre­ telεvision and music videos is ernployed by empted successful children’s programs in the demonstrators to attract the attention oftelevi­ Arab world and elsewhere: political backing sìon cameras, something that young Lebanese and financial resources. These two i8sues are excelled at in the Beirut demonstrations most important because they determine how Third, as the sign we analyzed indicates, much support goes to local production. Also, the vocabulary of [1εality television is widely finaljudgment will havε to await the channel’s understood in the Arab world, and is thus an actual perfonnancε and the degree to which effective tool to express a political agenda it fulfills plans that for the most part are Finally, activists who protested against the still on paper. There are two other challenges auth01itarianism of the Mubarak regime in that the channel will have to overcomε Egypt, against Syrian control of Lebanon, attracting an audiencε and having competent or suppol1ed women’s political rights in management. Success in those areas may Kuwait have become adept at adopting Sh011, stimulate competitors and increase the quality memorable and media-friendly slogans like and quantity of children prograll11lling thε ones that penneate youth popular culture Sεcond ， it is c1ear that, in spite of the cornmercialization of sociallife, the new Arab commercial media environment enhances CONClUSION young people’s ability for self-expression and participation in pub1ic 1ife. The appropriation The relationship that Arab youth have with of reality tεlevision rituals and vocabulary media and inforrnation technologies is highly during the 2005 Beirut demonstrations is complex. In addition to thε economic, social perhaps the most notable εxample of how and cultural challenges faced by youth in youth media clllture contributes to 80cial developing countries, Arab youth and children and p이 itical εmpowerment ， but examples have to contend with the radical polîticization elsewhere (Egypt and Kuwait) suggest that of their relationship with media and culture this trend can be found throughout th，ε Arab Whεreas children and youlh wor1dwide are at world. The ultimate challenge for Arab youth the centεr of debates about edllcation, con• is t.ranslating the pluralism of publ ic life into sumerism and socia1ization, in the Arab wor1d inclusive goven디 ance ， taking into account the the youth and childhood are a180 a political site needs of children and young people in policy of struggle where hot-button isslles such as formulation and implernentation teIT01ism, A.Tab-Westem relations, and Arab Third, rε Ii gion is imp0l1ant in the study govεmance play OU t. The corporations and of Arab youth and media as, on the one govemments that cornpete to win over this hand a social, cultural and political force, demographic are not only Arab, but inc1 ude and, on the other hand, as a field of analysis transnational corporations and the American Having said this, we should eschew making gove111ment Islarn an independent vmiable sitting at This media environment (what we refeITed the center of political, socio-cultural and to as hypennεdia space) provided this chapte, communìcation processes in the Arab wor1 d with several revealing case studies. First, the Rather, as the dεvelopment of Islamic mεdia AI-Jazeera Children Channel Ìs a promîsing and lslamic popular culture indicate, Tslarn YOUTH , MEDIAAND CULTURE IN THE ARAB WORLD 349

is a differentiated, complex, and unstablε 4 Here we are usinq Mead’5 typology of postfigura categ Olγ Jncreasingly, the Arab media are tive, cofigurative, and pre띠 urative cultαes ， which in descending order give more importance to hierarchy bεcorning an arena of competition betwecn and vertκallearning. See Mead (1 970) various fonns of Islam, as in the example 5 See Richard Agnew (2005) and 에 z Khan (2005) mentioned before of Khaled challenging 6 For a history of some urban coffeehouses in the al-Qaradawi’ s interpretations, or of the varia• Middle East, see Kirli (2004) tions that are set to emerge between relatively 7 Second author intervi 민N with Fouad Tarabay, traditionalistIslarnic channel, such as al-Majd 10 니 nding Managing Oirector of Rotana Khale리 iah ， August 2005 and lqraa on the one hand, and, on thε 8 For a discussion of a crucìal period in the other hand, those explicitly ‘modcmizing’ development of Lebanc γ5 television market, see Islamic channels, such as al-Risala. Many Kr히 dy (1998) analysts of Arab societies, us included, believe 9 The second author of this chapter was an MTV that mainstream Islamic media provide an executive at the time. The show was renamed 'The Kids Power Show' for intellectuaJ property purposes important space for the emergence of modern, 1。 이 Jazeera launche잉 d미 dren's channel to teach i.e. self-reflexive, adaptive, and forward t 이 erance (2005, September 10). Daily Star [Agence thlnking Islamic values and identities France Pre잉 se] In this chapter we havε attempted to provide 11 In fact, 미 Jazeera offic 떠lI y declared itself a 'network', as opposed to a ’channel', in early a broad survey of the complex relationship September 2005. See 'Before launching its c비 dren ’s betwecn young people and the rnedia in the chann 빈 next Friday: 이 Jazeera becomes a network Arab world. Socio-economic c1 ass, geograph for privatization 7' (2005, September 6). Assafir icallocation, religion and 1inguistic abi1 ity are 12 셰 Jazeera launches kids chann티 (2005, some of the most important differences that September 11). Company Press Release 13 'Before laun 띠 ng its ch 뼈 ren's channel next shape how young Arabs relate to the media Friday: AI-Jazeera becomes a network for priva- We adopted a top-down, deductive and mostly tization7' (2005, September 6). Assafir theoretical approach in order to accornmodate 14 Personal interviews conducted by first author the large variety of issuεs to be discussed in with members of the launching team, November order to understand Arab youth and media 2005, Paris , France 15 The word takfiri refers to the practice by some issues. This was partly due to the paucity of radicallslamists to declare Muslims who do not agree actual audience studies in the A1‘ ab world, with t 때 r 씨 ews non-Mu찌 ims ， and thus indirectly hindered by a variety of factors, including promote violence against these ’fake' Muslims the lack of systematic indigenous research 16 There could be an 'edutainment' trend develop activity and social and religious restrictions ing in youth media, with Yemen recently announcing a new television service for young people in asso 디 atlon on field research‘ While the advantage of this with the national university there approach is to account for the breadth of the 17 See Kraidy (2006b); for a discussion of how topic, we point the readers to a variety of realηy television entered the fray of politics in Kuwait readings on Arab rnedia that provide more and Lebanon , see Kraidy (2007) location- and culture-specific sources. 18 18 For gener비 references on Arab media, see Boyd (1999) and 5akr (2001). The volume by Eickelman and Anderson (1999) has a broader, Muslim world scope. For analysis of the Arab internet, see Gonzalez-Quijano (2003/2004). For 셰 -Jazeera ， NOTES see EI-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) Lamloum (2004) For television and national identity in Egypt, see 1 We use 'Arab youth' broadly to include children Abu-Lughod (2005) and Armbrust (1996). For a We use 'children’ only when 뼈 re are issues where feminist, Islam-focused analysis, see μ ernissi (1992) chi 떠 ren ， and not older young people, are the ex 미 cìt focus of discus잉 on ， such as our discussion of 미 Jazeera Children Channel 2 The United Nations Population Fund REFERENCES Overview: The Arab 5tates. http://www.unfpa.org/ profile/arab_overview.htm [August 2007J 3 For a detailed ana 야 is and critique of this Abu-Lughod, l. 2005. Dramas 01 Nationhood. Univer잉 ty phenomenon, see Kraidy (2005) of Chicago Press 350 THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN , MEDIA AND CULTURE

Agnew, R. (2005) 'The 때 bian kings 이 cash'. Arabian Kraidy, M.M. (1998) 'Broadcasting regulation and civil 8usÎness, 21 August society in postwar Lebanon'. Journal of Broadcasting AI-Ariss, 1. (2005) 'The children 01 AI-Jazeera'. AI-Hayat, and Electronic Media, 42(3): 387-400 31 Auqust Kraidy, M.M. (1999) 'The global, the local , and the Amin , A. (2005) ，미← Jazeera kids: when we p니 t amate 니 rs hybrid: a native ethnography 01 glocalization'. Critica/ in charge and we address the chi 떠 "below his level'" 5tudies in Mass Communication, 16(4): 458-478 셰 Hayat, 10 October Kraidy, M.M. (2005) Hyψ， diα or the Cultural Logic 01 Armbrust, W. 1996. Mass Culture and Mod낭rnlsm m Globalization. Philadel메 a: Temple University Press Egyp t. Cambridge University Press Kraidy, M.M. (2006a) 'Governance and hypermedia Bouqanoun, 1. (2005) 메 Jazeera Kids .. A readinq of in Saudi Arab 떠'. First Mondaι 11(9). http:// the notion and a critique of the vision' 께azeera.ne t， iirstmonday.orglissues/speciaI11_9/kraidylindex.html 200ctober K떼 dy ， M.M. (2006b) 'Reality television and p이 itics Boyd, D. (1999) Broadcasting In the Arab W<αld. lowa in the Arab world (prelimina 대 observat띠 ns)' State University Press Transnational Broadcastinq 5tudies, 2: 7-28 B매 d ， D. (2002) 'Radio Sawa: the 다eation 이 a new U.S Kraidy, M.M. (2007) 'Idioms 01 contention: Star government Arabic service' , In Annual Meeting of the Academy in lebanon and Kuwait'. In N. Sakr (ed.) Arab-US AS5ociation for Communication Educators, Arab Media and Political Renewal: Communitι Beirut, Lebanon , November Legitimacy and Publκ LiI능 London, UK: I. B. Tauris; Buckingham, D. (2000) The Making 01 Citizens: Young 44-55 People, News and Politics.london: University College lamloum, O. (2004) AI-Jazira: Miroir Rebelle et Ambigu London Press du Monde Arabe. La Découverte Department 01 Economic and Social Af1airs (2005) World livingstone, S. and M. Bovill (1999) 'Young peo미 e ， Youth Report 2005: Young People Today, and in new media'. Report of the research 미oject Cana 이 an 2015. New York: United Natκns Young People and the Changing Media Environment Eickelman, D. (1998) 'Inside the Islamic relormation ’ london: london School 01 Economics and Political The Wilson Quarte ι 22(1): 80-89 Science Eickelman , D. and Anderson , J. (eds) (1999) New Media Mead, M. (1970) Culω， re and Commitme η t: A 5tudy 01 In The Muslim W<α"/d: The Emerging PU에t;c Sphere the Generation Gap. New York: Doubleday Indiana Univer히 ty Press Mernissi, F. (1992) /slam and Democracy. Addison­ 티 Nawawy, M. and Iskandar, A. (2002) AI-Jazeera Wesley Westvi민N Ohrstrom, l. (2005) 'New kids' channel na 씨 gates GonzaleεQuijano ， Y. (ed.) (2003-2004) l'internet “ edutainment"'. The Daily 5tar, 7 December arabe. Maghreb Machrek, 178 Sakr, N. (200 1) 5at하， 'lite Realms: Transnatíonal Televi- Havens, T. (2001) Subtitling rap: appropriating The Fresh 51C 끼 Globalization and the Middle Eas t. I. B. Tauris Prince 01 Bel 메 r lor youthlul identity 10rmation in UNDP (2004) Arab Human Development Repoη 2003 Kuwait. Gazette, 63( 1): 57-72 Bui폐'ng a Knowledge 50ciety. New York: United Heelas, P. lash, S. and Morris, P. (eds) (1996) Nations Development Program Detraditionalization. london: Blackwell Ziehe, T. (1992) 'Cultural modernity and individual­ Khalil , JJ. (2005) 'B 언 ndinq in: Arab television ization'. In J. Fornas and G. Bollin (eds) Moves and the search for programming 띠 eaζ Transna in Modernity. Stockh 이 m: Almqvist and Wiksell tional Broadcasting Journa /, 13. www.tbsjournal Internatíonal com/archives/Wint민 2004.htm Khan, R. (2005) AI띠김leed: Businessman Billíonaiflβ Prín ce. London: Harper Cc씨 rn 오 FURTHER READlNG Khouri, RG. (2005) 'Beyond sports and scouting: Arab youth imperatives'. Daily 5tar, 1 June Kraidy, M.M. and Khalil, J.F. (2007) 'The Mi 뼈 e Ki 끼 i ， C. (2004) 'Coffeehouses: public opinion in the East transnational Arab t빈 e씨 slon ’ In l. Artz and nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire'. In A. Salavatore Y. Kamalipour (eds) The Media Globe ηmds in and D. Eickelman (eds) Public /slam and the Common International Mass Medía. Lanham , MD: Rowman Good. leiden: Brill; 75-97 and little1ield; 79-98