Civil War in the Horn of Africa? Four Possible Trajectories for Ethiopia
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POLICY MEMO Civil War in the Horn of Africa? Four Possible Trajectories for Ethiopia BY JAMES BARNETT November 2020 Table of Contents Tensions, Once Simmering, Now Boil ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Scenario One: A Precarious Ceasefire and an Attempt at Mediation .................................................................................. 3 Scenario Two: A Protracted and Bloody Stalemate ............................................................................................................... 6 Scenario Three: A Federal Occupation of Tigray and an Ensuing Insurgency .................................................................... 6 Scenario Four: An Expansion of the Conflict That Draws in Outside Powers ..................................................................... 6 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Endnotes .................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 CIVIL WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA? HUDSON INSTITUTE FOUR POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES FOR ETHIOPIA 1 A civil war is erupting in Ethiopia—Africa’s second most in any conflict.5 As of November 8, media reports suggested populous state, a geopolitical fulcrum in the volatile Red Sea that the ENDF had suffered nearly one hundred casualties in arena, and the seat of the African Union (AU).1 The question the fighting and TPLF officials claimed to have shot down an now is whether a ceasefire can quickly be brokered that Ethiopian warplane.6 would, in the best case, serve as the basis for a broader national dialogue aimed at stabilizing the country’s political The hostility between the TPLF and Abiy’s government has transition; or whether the situation will devolve into a been long in the making. Although Tigrayans only constitute multisided conflict that draws in neighboring states and further roughly six percent of Ethiopia’s population, they have been destabilizes what is already one of the world’s most fragile the politically dominant faction in Ethiopia since 1991, when regions. As of this writing, the latter unfortunately seems the TPLF led a multiethnic rebel coalition in toppling the more likely, but there is still hope for a ceasefire, particularly if Marxist-Leninist regime known as the Derg. Upon assuming Ethiopia’s regional and international partners make a concerted power, the TPLF-dominated coalition set about building an push for de-escalation. authoritarian developmental state that sought to placate (or, in the eyes of its critics, divide and repress) the country’s One should not use the term “civil war” lightly, but this many ethnic groups through a controversial system of ethnic appears to be the course that Ethiopia is on. While in recent federalism.7 Ethiopia appeared to be embarking on a new years the country has suffered from intercommunal clashes, political trajectory when Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister in assassinations, a coup attempt, and a low-level insurgency, the spring of 2018 on the wave of anti-government protests. this is the first time that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Abiy, who hails from the long-marginalized Oromo ethnic group government has faced a direct challenge from a well-armed (Ethiopia’s largest), oversaw reforms at a breakneck pace in his state within the state. first year in office. Among other achievements, he made peace with Eritrea, which had fought a border war with Ethiopia from The stakes are high. With a population of over 100 million, the 1998 to 2000, an effort for which he was awarded the Nobel United States Institute of Peace’s senior study group on the Peace Prize in 2019.8 Red Sea warns that Ethiopia’s disintegration would constitute “the largest state collapse in modern history.”2 Upon assuming power, Abiy’s government sacked many TPLF officials in what his allies described as a necessary Tensions, Once Simmering, Now Boil move against a “deep state” that it blamed for sabotaging On November 4, Prime Minister Abiy ordered the military the country’s transition. (It has provided no evidence for these to take action in the northern state of Tigray after accusing claims.) In turn, TPLF officials condemned this as anti-Tigrayan security forces loyal to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front discrimination. In late 2019, Abiy dissolved the ruling coalition, (TPLF), Tigray’s ruling party, of attacking a base belonging to a move decried by the TPLF.9 Meanwhile, Abiy’s reforms the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). On November opened the lid on long-repressed grievances against the 5, as clashes continued, the ENDF announced that it was in state which often assumed ethnic overtones. Intercommunal a state of war with the TPLF.3 Then on November 7, Ethiopian violence increased dramatically and displaced three million parliament voted to dissolve the TPLF and approve an interim people.10 As local militias proliferated and the security forces government for Tigray.4 TPLF officials, for their part, denied began to show signs of fracturing, analysts warned of a launching the initial attack but have stated that they will prevail Yugoslavia-style breakup. CIVIL WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA? HUDSON INSTITUTE FOUR POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES FOR ETHIOPIA 2 The crisis between the TPLF and Abiy’s government escalated As of November 8, there were reports that the command with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prompted was not responding to orders from ENDF leadership.18 Abiy Abiy’s government to postpone elections that were originally has begun mobilizing troops from elsewhere in the country, scheduled for August 2020.11 Defying the federal government, including special police forces from certain federal states, Tigray held its own elections in September, which prompted though it is not clear how numerous these forces are and parliament to vote to sever ties with the state. Abiy’s finance when they would arrive on the front.19 ministry subsequently stopped sending funds to the TPLF while parliament authorized Abiy to use force against the In short, some degree of ENDF fracturing appears to already “traitorous” state. TPLF officials issued calls for Abiy to be underway, but it is impossible to assess where the loyalties step down and signaled their preparedness to fight. In late of many specific units lie or how strong they are. It would October, the TPLF refused to allow newly appointed ENDF therefore be futile to “war game” this situation given the commanders to take up their posts within the Tigray-based paucity of open-source information. Northern Command.12 Nevertheless, we can consider, in broad terms, four scenarios All of which leads us to the clashes that began in the early of how the conflict might evolve in the coming weeks. hours of November 4. Even if the TPLF initiated the fighting as Abiy claims, his forces were not unprepared. Reports suggest Scenario One: A Precarious Ceasefire and an that ENDF units had been moving towards Tigray for days.13 Attempt at Mediation The best-case scenario is that some combination of a military The situation on the ground could change rapidly. The federal stalemate (or fear thereof), international pressure, or the government’s decision to cut off phone and internet services exigencies of domestic politics force Abiy’s government and in Tigray makes it difficult to assess operations in real time and the TPLF to begrudgingly accept a ceasefire that could serve also gives Abiy’s government the upper hand in controlling as the basis for a mediation effort. Unfortunately, the escalation the narrative.14 Given the large number of actors both within in fighting that has occurred over the past several days makes Ethiopia and the wider region that are liable to become a cessation of hostilities unlikely in the near-term. It is not out involved in this situation, it is difficult to predict where this of the question, however, particularly if Abiy’s “limited and conflict is headed. achievable” operation is stymied in the coming weeks, as seems likely. Each side, but particularly Abiy’s government, The other crucial caveat to any analysis is that there is limited would have reason to seek de-escalation rather than a open-source information about the composition of either protracted conflict given that each faces immense challenges side’s forces. The TPLF claims that its paramilitary units that such a conflict is likely to distract from, if not exacerbate. and militias, which are battle-hardened and well-equipped, number as many as 250,000, though these numbers have not For Abiy, the TPLF poses only one of several challenges, been independently verified.15 In theory, Abiy’s forces should albeit the most pressing one at present. Abiy is increasingly include the entire Northern Command, which reportedly unpopular with segments of his own Oromo community, who constitutes approximately half of ENDF personnel and view his government as having failed to redress the historical mechanized units.16 However, many of the command’s officers injustices against their people. Intercommunal violence are Tigrayan and some have already defected to the TPLF.17 simmers in Oromia state and elsewhere. To take the latest CIVIL WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA? HUDSON INSTITUTE FOUR POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES FOR ETHIOPIA 3 example,