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Security Sector Reform in Ukraine ICDS development cooperation project 2016-2018 “RESILIENT UKRAINE: civil society support for strengthening national resilience and security in Ukraine” Title: Security Sector Reform in Ukraine—Finding the Place for Civil Society Author: Bulakh, Anna Project director: Teperik, Dmitri Publication date: February 2018 Category: Analysis Cover page photo: Ukrainian National Guard members walk past a woman wearing a colourful costume as they patrol near Independence Square in Kyiv on November 22, 2016 (AFP / Sergei Supinsky). Keywords: security sector reform, rule of law, law enforcement, governance, civil society, Ukraine Disclaimer: Research for this paper was funded by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its Development Cooperation Programme. The views and opinions contained in this paper are those of its author only and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other organisation. ISSN 2228-2076 ©International Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd., 10152 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], www.icds.ee rates. The tendency of hiring more instead of better-trained people persisted until 2014.2 The asymmetric and well-integrated use of various instruments of coercion and subversion From 2014-2015, ad hoc methods were by Russia to annex Crimea and create the adopted in the most difficult situations, violent conflict in eastern Ukraine something that soon became a common demonstrated the urgent need for practice. The fragmentary nature of reforms comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) in Ukraine. However, while the Russia’s aggressive campaign in Ukraine exploited political will to reform is institutional weaknesses in order to undermine trust present, vested interests and in the government by a myriad of non-military means: endemic institutional corruption pose considerable disinformation, internal subversive operations, cyber challenges to the and physical attacks on critical infrastructure and 1 implementation of reforms. fomenting public unrest. Russia’s aggressive campaign in Ukraine exploited institutional weaknesses in order to undermine was aggravated by the fact that many initiatives trust in the government by a myriad of non- were launched as pilot projects, without a military means: disinformation, internal general understanding of the broader state of subversive operations, cyber and physical the security and defence sectors. Pilot projects attacks on critical infrastructure and fomenting included for example introducing changes to public unrest. In general, a gap of trust between certain military units with the hope of broader 3 government institutions and society creates a implementation in future. Unsurprisingly, window of opportunity for destabilisation many such projects came to an end or were operations. In Ukraine this gap was wide open, never adopted on a larger scale; nevertheless, with only weak links among civil society and their introduction was a way for the authorities government institutions in the security and to meet the public demand for rapid changes. defence sector. Reforms aimed at closing this Before the conflict, the Ministry of Defence gap are of utmost importance in order to (MoD) and the General Staff of the Armed strengthen Ukraine’s resilience to hybrid Forces pursued “specialisation” reform, threats posed by Russia. accompanied by rhetoric about potential future NATO membership. In reality, military personnel numbers are gradually decreasing, while those at the MoI increased—reflecting the greater emphasis placed on internal Since 1991, reforms in the security and defence security. MoI law enforcement structures were sector were more imitation than reality. After valued by the political leadership at the time the dissolution of the Soviet system, Ukraine’s because of their usefulness as a tool to interior and defence ministries underwent a maintain internal stability, influence local series of superficial transformations that did business, and consolidate power. not challenge the core of the institutions: their personnel, especially at the management level. Increasing the numbers rather than the 2 qualifications of personnel was a priority. In the Дмитрий Козлов, “Реформа сектора безопасности 1990s, the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) Украины в кривом зеркале СМИ: проблемы и пути решения“ [Reform of the security sector of Ukraine boosted its staff numbers due to higher crime through the distorted mirror of the mass media: problems and solutions], Defense Express, 26 января 2017 (accessed April 16, 2017). 3 Andriy Zagorodnyuk “The Turning Point For Ukrainian Military Reform: What Is the Strategic Defence Bulletin 1 Stabilising Ukraine and the future of security sector and Why Is It So Important?” Ukrainska Pravda, July 11, reform, CEPS (accessed April 20, 2017). 2016 (accessed April 16, 2017). The military threat coming from the east To be successful, SSR requires the coordinated confronted the Ukrainian government with an participation of a number of actors both inside unprecedented task: to bring about real and outside the security and defence sectors, transformations creating effective armed forces including justice and public administration. The in wartime conditions marked by post-Maidan governance of and interaction among these chaos, economic crisis, deeply-rooted problems structures became one of the core challenges in with corruption, and a polarised society. Even though international donors have heavily Furthermore, it had to reform the invested in projects that increase the general collapsing structure of the MoI to capacity of Ukraine’s civil society, these projects confront internal threats, notably a surge in crime. The asymmetric rarely focus on engagement with the security nature of the external threat sector—and so the gap between the public and demonstrated the necessity of security/law enforcement remains. managing the “home front,” notably by promoting situational Ukraine’s SSR process.5 In Ukraine, ministries awareness and raising civilian preparedness. To and agencies operate independently with little do this, the MoI and its subordinate agencies— accountability or coordination; they generally such as the police, border guard, and rescue have the freedom to administer their own services—had to be “reset.” This task could not resources, make their own decisions, and even set their own tasks. Furthermore, the overly broad scope of the It is of vital importance for countries responsibilities given to certain implementing security sector reforms during ministries has led to duplication with times of military conflict—whether active or other government agencies, a frozen—to avoid postponing human security problem exacerbated due to the effective lack of interagency issues until “better times,” or to focus only on coordination or even traditional state security issues. communication.6 The same problem is also seen in civil society, among wait: as other examples show, it is of vital volunteers, volunteer organisations, importance for countries implementing SSR and other NGOs. Even though international during times of military conflict—whether donors have heavily invested in projects that active or frozen—to avoid postponing human increase the general capacity of Ukraine’s civil security issues until “better times,” or to focus society, these projects rarely focus on only on traditional state security issues.4 engagement with the security sector—and so the gap between the public and security/law The enduring isolation of security and defence enforcement remains. Accordingly, building structures from civil society made the goal of trust between civil society and the security bringing both sectors together a challenge. The sector remains a core challenge in SSR and low level of public trust in military and law merits further attention.7 enforcement was a key factor undermining the transformation process. Moreover, given the number of personnel and density of the 5 bureaucracy, comprehensive reform was always Måns Hanssen, International Support to Security Sector Reform in Ukraine, A Mapping of SSR Projects (Folke going to be difficult—even without taking the Bernadotte Academy, 2016), (accessed April 22, 2017). ongoing conflict into consideration. 6 Olga Oliker, Lynn E. Davis, Keith Crane, Andrew Radin, Celeste Ward Gventer, Susanne Sondergaard, James T. Quinlivan, Stephan B. Seabrook, Jacopo Bellasio, Bryan Frederick, Andriy Bega, Jakub Hlavka, Security Sector 4 Maksym Khylko, Oleksandr Tytarchuk (eds.), Human Reform in Ukraine (Santa Monica, California: RAND Security and Security Sector Reform in Eastern Europe Corporation, 2016), (accessed December 10, 2016). (Kyiv: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2017). 7 Hanssen, Support to Security Sector Reform in Ukraine. that Ukraine: clarify responsibilities of the existing security and defence structures; strengthen coordination between ministries and agencies; align the roles and functions of The composition of actors in the national internal security agencies; and ensure the security sector slightly differs in every state, accountability of security and defence from the names of the agencies to, the way structures to the public, thereby “bring[ing] they are governed. In general, agencies them closer” to society.8 responsible for internal security are separate from defence structures. However, the hybrid All in all, Ukraine has stepped forward in nature of the war in Ukraine challenged carrying
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