Elections 2012

Elections, Imperialism, Socialism, and Democracy: Coups and Social Change in

Stephen Maher

n 1960, Fidel Castro declared that “’s example would convert the Andean Cordillera into Ithe hemisphere’s Sierra Maestra,” referring to the mountains in eastern Cuba that served as the guerrillas’ base during the revolutionary war.1 After seizing power from U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba’s revo- lutionaries actively promoted “continental revolution” to destroy the network of military states that constituted the U.S. empire in Latin America, and eliminate the capitalist order that sustained them. Armed revolution has long since subsided in Latin America, but over the past decade the revolutionary vi- sion of sovereign, socialist development has resurfaced— though in modified form. The success of ’s Bolivarian Revolution, followed similarly in and , has again raised the banner of socialism and regional independence, but this time through electoral means. For Latin Americans pursuing social change, Ven- ezuela, rather than Cuba, has become the model to follow. The Cuban revolutionary model was based on com- plete social and institutional reconstruction, which en- tailed the total destruction of the existing state appara- tus. Only such a radical approach, the revolutionaries believed, could prevent the region’s tremendous wealth from continuing to flow into the pockets of multinational corporations and their local oligarchic allies who, together with the U.S. government, worked to perpetuate a social order that relegated millions to lives of desperate poverty.

Stephen Maher is a political theorist and Ph.D. candidate in political science at York University in Toronto, . His work has appeared in the Monthly Review, the International Socialist Review, the Guardian, and elsewhere. He blogs at Drawings by Rini Templeton. rationalmanifesto.blogspot.com.

WINTER 2012 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 59 The Venezuelan model has taken a significantly differ- kidnapped by the military in the middle of the night ent course. In stark contrast to the Cuban method, the and removed from the country.6 While most of the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador—not to world denounced the coup, the Obama administration mention a decidedly leftward turn in many of the region’s did everything it could to assist the culprits. Though other governments—have used existing electoral mecha- the administration admitted it knew of the plot in ad- nisms and state apparatuses to compel the capitalist social vance, Washington refused to officially condemn it as a order and its beneficiaries to make compromises with the “coup,” which would have legally required the full ces- masses of the poor. sation of aid. Though the coup leaders justified their The achievements of these regimes have been consid- actions by falsely claiming that Zelaya was illegally at- erable: In Venezuela, for example, the Chávez govern- tempting to extend his presidential term, diplomatic ment succeeded in cutting the poverty rate in half in just cables released by WikiLeaks reveal the classified judg- five years (2003–08), while extreme poverty was reduced ment of U.S. Ambassador to Hugo Llorens: It by 72%.2 Furthermore, these governments are the leading was an “open and shut case” of an “illegal and uncon- voices in a growing chorus of opposition to U.S. hege- stitutional coup.”7 mony, objecting in particular to the neoliberal “Washing- Again, while the entire region and much of Europe re- ton Consensus” developmental model that has aggravated pudiated subsequent sham elections, Washington instant- social inequalities and produced the worst long-term eco- ly recognized the “victory” of Porifiro Lobo and pressured nomic growth in a century.3 multilateral organizations to readmit Honduras.8 Hondu- ras has since been transformed into a raging hurricane of violence and in- Although the new “revolutionary” regimes timidation, with the highest homicide rate in the Americas. Chief among the have accomplished a great deal, the victims have been journalists, human electoral approach to social change has rights advocates, dissidents, politi- cians, and campesinos fighting for inherent weaknesses that the United land reform.9 Meanwhile, Honduras’s new leaders seem intent upon using States and its allies have shown an the country as a laboratory for far- increasing ability to exploit. right experimentation, including pro- posing the construction of “model cit- But in each case, capitalism remains alive and well— ies” under the control of private companies and financed in fact, healthier than ever—though the national wealth by a U.S.-based venture capital firm, in which constitu- is distributed more equitably and political participation tional rights and labor protections would be permanently broadened.4 annulled.10 Alongside such enlightened and progressive And although the new “revolutionary” regimes have measures, U.S. military and other assistance to Honduras accomplished a great deal, the electoral approach to social has grown under the guise of the “War on Drugs.”11 change has inherent weaknesses that the United States Predictably, right-wing elements throughout the region and its allies have shown an increasing ability to exploit. took note of the success in Honduras and were encour- Following a template designed to counteract the new aged to follow suit: In September 2010, leftist Ecua- revolutionary model, the U.S.-backed coup in Honduras doran president barely survived a similar in 2009 and the recent impeachment of ’s Presi- attempt.12 Zelaya’s overthrow has inaugurated a new dent Fernando Lugo highlight some of the difficulties of template for coup making designed to exploit the inher- pursuing progressive social change through existing state ent weaknesses of the electoral revolutionary approach, structures. which relies on existing institutions and procedures for legitimacy. As Argentine president Cristina Fernández de fter having signed the Washington-backed Kirchner said, “It would be enough for someone to stage Central American Free Trade Agreement a civilian coup, backed by the armed forces, or simply a (CAFTA), Honduran president civilian one and later justify it by convoking elections. . . A 13 began to move closer to the socialist camp, joining the [T]hen democratic guarantees would truly be fiction.” Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas As she feared, a similar blueprint has now been imple- (ALBA) in 2008.5 Then, on June 28, 2009, Zelaya was mented in Paraguay, where the removal of president Lugo

60 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS VOL. 45, NO. 4 again highlighted the difficulty of using existing electoral , and Mexico, the few remaining pro-U.S. conser- processes to bring about deep social change. vative bastions, criticized Lugo’s removal. Bolivia, Cuba, Paraguay has long been one of the most unequal coun- Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, , Chile, , tries in the hemisphere, with among the highest concen- , and Mexico all recalled their ambassadors. But, in trations of land ownership. In 2008, after 61 years of rule an ominous echo of Honduras, as the entire region de- by the right-wing Colorado Party, just 2.6% of landown- nounced the obvious chicanery, the United States stood ers owned 85.5% of the land.14 That year, the party’s six- behind Paraguay’s reactionary feudal oligarchs. As the decade rule came to an end with the election of Fernando State Department put it, “As a general matter, we haven’t Lugo, a Roman Catholic bishop supported by Paraguay’s called this a coup because the processes were followed.”23 poor majority.15 Lugo refused to accept the presidential salary because it “belongs to more humble people.”16 He espite the justice in Lugo’s goals, he was instituted free health care for the poor in public hospitals, unable to marshal the existing state apparatus supported low-income housing programs, cash transfers Dto challenge the power of the oligarchy and for the desperate, and tried to advance other modest so- achieve the social transformation that is so desperately cial reform.17 But even these limited measures proved too needed in Paraguay. The reactionary forces that dominate much for Paraguay’s tiny class of fabulously wealthy oli- both the existing social formation and state institutions garchs and their Colorado Party representatives, who re- are formidable and have demonstrated an unwillingness lentlessly blocked his proposals for land reform.18 to permit even modest changes to the status quo while Then on June 15, 2008 100 landless peasants took the United States stands solidly in support. This backing matters into their own hands and occupied lands illegally was made possible, in part, by the oligarchs’ ability to turn seized by one of the wealthiest men in the country, who the very mechanisms on which Lugo based his legitimacy is also a member of the Colorado Party. When 300 po- against him. lice officers descended on the farm and the peasants re- The historic solidarity against Lugo’s removal is en- fused to leave, an eight-hour gunfight ensued in which 10 couraging, and a clear message to the United States that campesinos and seven police officers were killed.19 Lugo times have changed. Still, it is hard to take this defeat as immediately condemned the incident, and the minister of anything other than what it clearly seems to be: an indica- the interior and the police chief resigned. In a last-ditch tion of the shortcomings of relying on existing structures attempt to preserve his position, Lugo replaced these of- to bring about fundamental change in deeply ingrained ficials with Colorado Party members, thereby effectively social inequities, especially in cases where progressive surrendering control of the repressive state apparatus and forces do not control an overwhelming majority in rep- galvanizing the Liberal Party against him.20 The Colorado Party then drew up articles of impeachment accusing Lugo of “encouraging land seizures and fomenting vio- lence,” and he was given 24 hours, notice of the proceed- ings, in which he would have just two hours for his de- fense.21 On June 21, the Chamber of Deputies voted 76 to 1 to impeach, and the next day the Senate voted 39 to 4 for the same.22 Before the final vote, all 12 foreign ministers from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) traveled to Paraguay to insist that the move to impeach Lugo violated UNASUR’s democracy clause. Brazil’s moderate president Dilma Rouseff proposed suspending Paraguay from both UNASUR and (the regional trading bloc of Southern Cone states), both of which did so soon there- after. Argentina’s Fernández de Kirchner, the Dominican Republic’s Leonel Fernandez, Bolivia’s , Ec- uador’s Correa, and Cuba’s Raúl Castro announced they would not recognize Franco as President. ALBA, the so- cialist bloc of Latin American countries, issued a state- ment condemning the act as a coup. Even Colombia,

WINTER 2012 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 61 resentative bodies. In Venezuela and Bolivia, for instance, slogan “Occupy, Resist, Produce,” risked—and lost— such majorities have enabled wider institutional rear- their lives in direct action against a grotesquely unjust rangements, including the drafting of new constitutions, social order. Though few tears have been shed for them, seemingly impossible in Paraguay. This means that the they are the true revolutionary martyrs, not Fernando landless peasants and indigenous organizations, so long Lugo. And unless the feudal barons and their Colorado the subjects of brutal state repression and social exclu- Party guardians sense the shifting direction of the winds, sion, could be more promising bearers of social progress and permit the changes that are so clearly necessary than those operating within the state, however well- through electoral means, they may find themselves vis- intentioned the latter may be. ited by the specter of Che Guevara: the swift and brutal The peasants courageously occupying land under the fire of revolutionary justice.

1. John Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolution- 7. Confidential Cable from Ambassador Hugo Llo- 2008. ID: 08ASUNCION358. ary Life (Grove Press, 1997), 476. rens in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa to 16. “Latin America’s leftwing swells with new Para- 2. Mark Weisbrot, “Venezuela in the Chávez Years: Washington, D.C., 2009-07-24. guay president,” AFP, August 8, 2008. Its Economy and Influence on the Region,” in 8. BBC News, “Hillary Clinton urges OAS to readmit 17. The Economist, “The Boy and the Bishop,” April Thomas Ponniah and Jonathan Eastwood, The Honduras,” June 7, 2010. 30, 2009. Revolution in Venezuela: Social and Political 9. Amnesty International, 2011 Annual Report, Hon- 18. Peter Orsi, “Land Reform, Paraguay’s ticking Change Under Chávez, eds., (Harvard University duras. political time bomb,” Associated Press, June Press, 2011), 193–223. 10. Dana Frank, “Honduras: Which Side Is the U.S. 29, 2012. 3. Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, and David Rosnick, On?” The Nation, May 22, 2012. 19. “Paraguayan president replaces officials after “The Scorecard on Development: 25 Years of 11. Ibid. deadly clashes,” CNN, June 16, 2012. Diminished Progress,” Center for Economic and 12. “Ecuador ‘Coup Attempt’ Draws Attention to 20. “Rubén Candia Amarilla es el nuevo ministro del Policy Research, September 2005. Rafael Correa’s Presidency,” Los Angeles Times, Interior,” La Nacion, June 16, 2012. 4. Ibid. See also Gregory Wilpert, “Venezuela’s October 4, 2010. 21. John Quigley and Randall Woods, “Paraguay Experiment in Participatory Democracy,” in Pon- 13. Alexandra Olson, “Latin leftists fear a Honduras Swears in Franco After President Lugo Im- niah and Eastwood, 99–129. coup domino effect,” Associated Press, August peached,” Bloomberg News, June 25, 2012. 5. Thelma Mejia, “Honduras: Joining ALBA ‘A Step 19, 2009. 22. Ibid. Toward the Center-Left,’ Says President,” Inter- 14. “Paraguay,” Oxfam International. available at 23 Victoria Nuland, Daily Press Briefing, Washing- Press Service News Agency, August 26, 2008. oxfam.org/. ton, D.C., June 26, 2012 6. “Thousands Defy Honduras Curfew,” The Tele- 15. “President-Elect Fernando Lugo: A Profile,” se- graph, September 22, 2009. cret cable from U.S. Embassy, Asuncion, June 2,

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