Reflexive Realism: an Examination of Moral Realism in The
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REFLEXIVE REALISM: AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND FICTION OF IRIS MURDOCH By Nickolas Takamiyagi Wilson A Project Presented to The Faculty of Humboldt State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in English: Literature Committee Membership Dr. Mary Ann Creadon, Committee Chair Dr. Kathleen Doty, Committee Member Dr. Nikola Hobbel, Graduate Coordinator May 2013 ABSTRACT REFLEXIVE REALISM: AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND FICTION OF IRIS MURDOCH Nickolas Takamiyagi Wilson Iris Murdoch’s philosophy departs from the norm in analytic philosophy. Rather than set out to demonstrate the deductive certainty of her views, Murdoch takes it as self- evident that the human consciousness is inherently value-laden, but clouded by self- consoling fantasies. Her antidote is art. By viewing good art, in any medium, the individual becomes aware of a reality outside of oneself, and thereby expands the capacity for empathy. My project looks at the relationship between Murdoch’s philosophy and her fiction, arguing that the two are mutually supportive. I advance this claim by showing how Murdoch’s ethics are most clearly seen in her novels for reasons surrounding their form. With this in mind, I examine The Bell and The Black Prince. I also look at contemporary scholarship which challenges various interpretations of Murdoch’s views. My own criticism is primarily concerned with the work of David Robjant, who argues against theological interpretations of Murdoch’s work which view her moral exemplar as a Buddhist Christian. With that in mind, my argument shows the relevance of Maria Antonaccio’s interpretation of Murdoch’s work and the extent to which it can withstand Robjant’s critique. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 1: ANTONACCIO AND REFLEXIVE REALISM ...................................... 19 CHAPTER 2: MORAL REALISM IN THE BLACK PRINCE ........................................ 35 CHAPTER 3: MORAL REALISM IN THE BELL .......................................................... 52 CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 70 WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................... 78 iii 1 INTRODUCTION Iris Murdoch’s thought is a departure from the norm in traditional analytic philosophy. Rather than set out to demonstrate the deductive certainty of her founding principles, Murdoch takes it as self-evident that the human consciousness is inherently value-laden, but clouded by self-consoling fantasies which prevent us from seeing reality and achieving virtue. Her antidote is art. By engaging with good art, in any medium, the individual becomes aware of a reality outside oneself, thereby expanding the capacity for empathy. My own criticism is primarily concerned with this phenomenon as interpreted by Maria Antonaccio – a leading figure in Murdochian scholarship. I contrast Antonaccio’s thought with that of David Robjant, who argues against theological readings of Murdoch which consider her philosophy “Buddhist Christian.” Antonaccio offers this very view, and is therefore one of Robjant’s main opponents. My analysis shows the relevance of Antonaccio’s scholarship and the extent to which it can withstand Robjant’s critique. One of the best ways to accomplish this and to evaluate the relative merits of Antonaccio’s position is to look at Murdoch’s novels in which art leads to a more ethical awareness. From this we arrive at a more holistic understanding of Murdoch’s ethics, which consequently, allows us to assess the contemporary interpretations of her philosophical system. With this in mind, I examine Murdoch’s The Bell and The Black Prince, two works of fiction wherein aesthetic experiences facilitate 2 moral growth for the characters involved. Ultimately, this reveals which theorist holds the most accurate and tenable position – Antonaccio or Robjant. The debate between Robjant and Antonaccio stems from Murdoch’s rendering of the Ontological Argument, originally formulated by Anselm of Canterbury to prove the necessary existence of God, which Murdoch instead uses to establish the necessary existence of the Good. About this much there is no question. The current schism in scholarship hinges on how best to understand Murdoch’s overarching purpose for such a move. Whereas Antonaccio attempts to bridge the gap between Murdoch’s Platonism and Christian theology, Robjant objects that such readings are “scandalously insensitive” and ultimately “do violence to Murdoch’s position” (Robjant 993). There are strong cases to support both views. But before examining how Antonaccio and Robjant arrive at their respective positions, it imperative to briefly outline the origin of the dispute, namely, the Ontological Argument itself. Anselm begins the Ontological Argument by claiming that God is “that which nothing greater can be thought.” He then goes on to say that existence, which is greater than non-existence, is one of God’s inherent traits, secured by virtue of being “the most high.” According to Anselm, God cannot be thought of apart from existence since doing so would strip the concept of “God” of one of its defining features (Metaphysics 393). In this way, the mere idea of God secures his existence, since if he did not exist, he would lack a quality particular to perfection. A contemporary of Anselm’s, Guanilo, objected to Anselm’s argument on the basis that you cannot simply imagine a perfect instance, then assert that it exists (Metaphysics 397). The counterexample Guanilo uses is the perfect 3 island. That one can posit a perfect island does not prove its existence. But in response, Anselm insists that God differs from all other parts of creation on the basis that God’s existence is necessary, while everything else is contingent. Consequently, Anselm believes that God must exist by definition. Murdoch, however, says otherwise. For Murdoch, the Ontological Argument does not provide convincing evidence in support of God’s existence, but it does effectively establish the existence of something central to her philosophical program. She observes that we conceive of God first by recognizing varying degrees of good in the world, and subsequently posit a being that goes beyond the particular, representing the Good itself. For Christianity, this being is God. “[W]e conceive of him by noticing degrees of goodness, which we see in ourselves and in all the world which is a shadow of God,” writes Murdoch in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Metaphysics 396). “These are aspects of the Proof wherein the definition of God as non-contingent is given body by our most general perceptions and experience of the fundamental and omnipresent (uniquely necessary) nature of moral value, thought of in a Christian context as God” (Metaphysics 396). According to Murdoch, the Ontological Argument’s force resides in the fact that it points out the inescapability of moral value. While many ethical theories – Utilitarianism and Kantianism, for instance – focus on the formula by which to make ethical decisions, Murdoch insists that we are perpetually engaged with the moral life and that the moral sphere intersects with all areas of human activity. This is true because regardless of various cultural considerations, the human consciousness invariably interprets experience in terms of value. At any given time we are faced with countless decisions, most of which 4 are made without our even being directly aware of them. We decide what to do and where to go – this seems obvious enough. What is less obvious is that all of these minor choices will be made on the basis of how well the predicted outcomes cohere with our sense of goodness, or conversely, our self-interest. Whether mundane or momentous, our decisions are always informed by value, and thus, value is inextricably connected to human life. Stated differently – value is necessary to human experience, though this necessity is not of the deductive sort. For Murdoch, the fact that the human consciousness cannot suspend value judgments demonstrates the fundamental nature of value, and by extension, the Good. “Others who feel that perhaps the Proof proves something, but not any sort of God, might return to Plato and claim some uniquely necessary status for moral value as something (uniquely) impossible to be thought away from human experience, and as in a special sense, if conceived of, known as real” (Metaphysics 396). Later she elaborates on this same point, stating, “The idea of Good cannot be compromised or tainted by its inclusion in actual human proceedings, where its magnetism is nevertheless, and even at the lowest levels, omnipresent” (Metaphysics 399). So while Murdoch does not believe that the Ontological Argument proves God exists out of logical necessity, the syllogism does prove the existence of something just as essential to her ethics: the Good. At this stage it may seem that the scales tip in favor of Robjant’s position, that Murdoch is clearly advancing the view that the Good is necessary, although God is not. Furthermore, Murdoch is careful to differentiate God from the Good, and if the terms were operating synonymously, this semantic hair-splitting would be entirely