Reflexive Realism: an Examination of Moral Realism in The

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Reflexive Realism: an Examination of Moral Realism in The REFLEXIVE REALISM: AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND FICTION OF IRIS MURDOCH By Nickolas Takamiyagi Wilson A Project Presented to The Faculty of Humboldt State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in English: Literature Committee Membership Dr. Mary Ann Creadon, Committee Chair Dr. Kathleen Doty, Committee Member Dr. Nikola Hobbel, Graduate Coordinator May 2013 ABSTRACT REFLEXIVE REALISM: AN EXAMINATION OF MORAL REALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND FICTION OF IRIS MURDOCH Nickolas Takamiyagi Wilson Iris Murdoch’s philosophy departs from the norm in analytic philosophy. Rather than set out to demonstrate the deductive certainty of her views, Murdoch takes it as self- evident that the human consciousness is inherently value-laden, but clouded by self- consoling fantasies. Her antidote is art. By viewing good art, in any medium, the individual becomes aware of a reality outside of oneself, and thereby expands the capacity for empathy. My project looks at the relationship between Murdoch’s philosophy and her fiction, arguing that the two are mutually supportive. I advance this claim by showing how Murdoch’s ethics are most clearly seen in her novels for reasons surrounding their form. With this in mind, I examine The Bell and The Black Prince. I also look at contemporary scholarship which challenges various interpretations of Murdoch’s views. My own criticism is primarily concerned with the work of David Robjant, who argues against theological interpretations of Murdoch’s work which view her moral exemplar as a Buddhist Christian. With that in mind, my argument shows the relevance of Maria Antonaccio’s interpretation of Murdoch’s work and the extent to which it can withstand Robjant’s critique. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER 1: ANTONACCIO AND REFLEXIVE REALISM ...................................... 19 CHAPTER 2: MORAL REALISM IN THE BLACK PRINCE ........................................ 35 CHAPTER 3: MORAL REALISM IN THE BELL .......................................................... 52 CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 70 WORKS CITED ............................................................................................................... 78 iii 1 INTRODUCTION Iris Murdoch’s thought is a departure from the norm in traditional analytic philosophy. Rather than set out to demonstrate the deductive certainty of her founding principles, Murdoch takes it as self-evident that the human consciousness is inherently value-laden, but clouded by self-consoling fantasies which prevent us from seeing reality and achieving virtue. Her antidote is art. By engaging with good art, in any medium, the individual becomes aware of a reality outside oneself, thereby expanding the capacity for empathy. My own criticism is primarily concerned with this phenomenon as interpreted by Maria Antonaccio – a leading figure in Murdochian scholarship. I contrast Antonaccio’s thought with that of David Robjant, who argues against theological readings of Murdoch which consider her philosophy “Buddhist Christian.” Antonaccio offers this very view, and is therefore one of Robjant’s main opponents. My analysis shows the relevance of Antonaccio’s scholarship and the extent to which it can withstand Robjant’s critique. One of the best ways to accomplish this and to evaluate the relative merits of Antonaccio’s position is to look at Murdoch’s novels in which art leads to a more ethical awareness. From this we arrive at a more holistic understanding of Murdoch’s ethics, which consequently, allows us to assess the contemporary interpretations of her philosophical system. With this in mind, I examine Murdoch’s The Bell and The Black Prince, two works of fiction wherein aesthetic experiences facilitate 2 moral growth for the characters involved. Ultimately, this reveals which theorist holds the most accurate and tenable position – Antonaccio or Robjant. The debate between Robjant and Antonaccio stems from Murdoch’s rendering of the Ontological Argument, originally formulated by Anselm of Canterbury to prove the necessary existence of God, which Murdoch instead uses to establish the necessary existence of the Good. About this much there is no question. The current schism in scholarship hinges on how best to understand Murdoch’s overarching purpose for such a move. Whereas Antonaccio attempts to bridge the gap between Murdoch’s Platonism and Christian theology, Robjant objects that such readings are “scandalously insensitive” and ultimately “do violence to Murdoch’s position” (Robjant 993). There are strong cases to support both views. But before examining how Antonaccio and Robjant arrive at their respective positions, it imperative to briefly outline the origin of the dispute, namely, the Ontological Argument itself. Anselm begins the Ontological Argument by claiming that God is “that which nothing greater can be thought.” He then goes on to say that existence, which is greater than non-existence, is one of God’s inherent traits, secured by virtue of being “the most high.” According to Anselm, God cannot be thought of apart from existence since doing so would strip the concept of “God” of one of its defining features (Metaphysics 393). In this way, the mere idea of God secures his existence, since if he did not exist, he would lack a quality particular to perfection. A contemporary of Anselm’s, Guanilo, objected to Anselm’s argument on the basis that you cannot simply imagine a perfect instance, then assert that it exists (Metaphysics 397). The counterexample Guanilo uses is the perfect 3 island. That one can posit a perfect island does not prove its existence. But in response, Anselm insists that God differs from all other parts of creation on the basis that God’s existence is necessary, while everything else is contingent. Consequently, Anselm believes that God must exist by definition. Murdoch, however, says otherwise. For Murdoch, the Ontological Argument does not provide convincing evidence in support of God’s existence, but it does effectively establish the existence of something central to her philosophical program. She observes that we conceive of God first by recognizing varying degrees of good in the world, and subsequently posit a being that goes beyond the particular, representing the Good itself. For Christianity, this being is God. “[W]e conceive of him by noticing degrees of goodness, which we see in ourselves and in all the world which is a shadow of God,” writes Murdoch in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Metaphysics 396). “These are aspects of the Proof wherein the definition of God as non-contingent is given body by our most general perceptions and experience of the fundamental and omnipresent (uniquely necessary) nature of moral value, thought of in a Christian context as God” (Metaphysics 396). According to Murdoch, the Ontological Argument’s force resides in the fact that it points out the inescapability of moral value. While many ethical theories – Utilitarianism and Kantianism, for instance – focus on the formula by which to make ethical decisions, Murdoch insists that we are perpetually engaged with the moral life and that the moral sphere intersects with all areas of human activity. This is true because regardless of various cultural considerations, the human consciousness invariably interprets experience in terms of value. At any given time we are faced with countless decisions, most of which 4 are made without our even being directly aware of them. We decide what to do and where to go – this seems obvious enough. What is less obvious is that all of these minor choices will be made on the basis of how well the predicted outcomes cohere with our sense of goodness, or conversely, our self-interest. Whether mundane or momentous, our decisions are always informed by value, and thus, value is inextricably connected to human life. Stated differently – value is necessary to human experience, though this necessity is not of the deductive sort. For Murdoch, the fact that the human consciousness cannot suspend value judgments demonstrates the fundamental nature of value, and by extension, the Good. “Others who feel that perhaps the Proof proves something, but not any sort of God, might return to Plato and claim some uniquely necessary status for moral value as something (uniquely) impossible to be thought away from human experience, and as in a special sense, if conceived of, known as real” (Metaphysics 396). Later she elaborates on this same point, stating, “The idea of Good cannot be compromised or tainted by its inclusion in actual human proceedings, where its magnetism is nevertheless, and even at the lowest levels, omnipresent” (Metaphysics 399). So while Murdoch does not believe that the Ontological Argument proves God exists out of logical necessity, the syllogism does prove the existence of something just as essential to her ethics: the Good. At this stage it may seem that the scales tip in favor of Robjant’s position, that Murdoch is clearly advancing the view that the Good is necessary, although God is not. Furthermore, Murdoch is careful to differentiate God from the Good, and if the terms were operating synonymously, this semantic hair-splitting would be entirely
Recommended publications
  • Psychology and Philosophy of Existentialism in the Early Novels of Iris Murdoch
    Journal of Awareness Cilt / Volume 4, Sayı / Issue 1, 2019, pp. 45-52 E - ISSN: 2149-6544 URL: http://www.ratingacademy.com.tr/ojs/index.php/joa DOİ: 10.26809/joa.4.004 Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF EXISTENTIALISM IN THE EARLY NOVELS OF IRIS MURDOCH Salima Jabrail GASIMOVA* *Baku Slavic University, AZERBAIJAN E-mail: [email protected] Geliş Tarihi: 15 Aralık 2018; Kabul Tarihi: 21 Ocak 2019 Received: 15 December 2018; Accepted: 21 January 2019 ABSTRACT It is generally accepted in science that existential theory, naturally, largely transformed and became the basis of Murdoch's novels of the 50s – 60s. According to a number of scientists, the writer's passion for existentialism went through several phases and was replaced by the construction of her own ethical and aesthetic system based on Platonism. The attitude of Iris Murdoch, philosopher and writer, to existentialism has always been dual. Already from the first works analyzing this problem, it is clear that Murdoch, enthusiastically exploring existentialism, paying due tribute to it, but at the same time criticized it. Murdoch's novels are not psychological in the classical sense of the concept. The writer was so immersed in the inner world of man that the reality in her novels sometimes eluded the field of view of the author, did not exist outside the consciousness of the hero, dissolved in his experiences. In such statement of a question the crisis tendency was concealed. Even at the very beginning of creativity in search of some special inner, spiritual, psychological, and therefore universal truth Murdoch was fascinated by the study of dark, destructive principles and forces in the human psyche, focused on the analysis of painful aspirations and feelings.
    [Show full text]
  • Illusion and Reality in the Fiction of Iris Murdoch: a Study of the Black Prince, the Sea, the Sea and the Good Apprentice
    ILLUSION AND REALITY IN THE FICTION OF IRIS MURDOCH: A STUDY OF THE BLACK PRINCE, THE SEA, THE SEA AND THE GOOD APPRENTICE by REBECCA MODEN A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY (Mode B) Department of English School of English, Drama and American and Canadian Studies University of Birmingham September 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis considers how Iris Murdoch radically reconceptualises the possibilities of realism through her interrogation of the relationship between life and art. Her awareness of the unreality of realist conventions leads her to seek new forms of expression, resulting in daring experimentation with form and language, exploration of the relationship between author and character, and foregrounding of the artificiality of the text. She exposes the limitations of language, thereby involving herself with issues associated with the postmodern aesthetic. The Black Prince is an artistic manifesto in which Murdoch repeatedly destroys the illusion of the reality of the text in her attempts to make language communicate truth. Whereas The Black Prince sees Murdoch contemplating Hamlet, The Sea, The Sea meditates on The Tempest, as Murdoch returns to Shakespeare in order to examine the relationship between life and art.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Attention, Self and the Sovereignty of Good' Was Published in Anne Rowe
    ‘Attention, Self and The Sovereignty of Good’ was published in Anne Rowe (ed.) Iris Murdoch:A Reassessment Palgrave Macmillan, October 2006. ChrístophetMole 73 There arc at least two strategies for avoiding this problem. The first strategy avoids the problem by taking Murdoch's view of the self to 6 entail something less than a com!Iete prchibition on attention to the and The Sovereignty self. Perhaps self-directed attention comes in different forms, only some Attention, Self of which are prohibited, or perhaps the prohibition on self-directed of Good attention only applies in certain circumstances. Samantha Vice employs this strategy in her contdbution to this yolume. The present paper pur- Christopher Mole sues a different stategy. It avoids the problem by understanding the morally important states of mind as something other than inner occur- rences taking place on the private stage of consciousness. Vice's view is that the strong prohibition on attention to the inner life is neither plau- sible, nor waÍanted by Murdoch's position. My view is that we can keep the strong prohibition on attention to the innet, but must reject the In 1958, Elizabeth Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy'1 forcefuUy idea that the morally important states of mind and character are inner launched the idea that character traits and states of mind are molally states, and think of them instead as b eiîg world inyolyíng. important in ways that could not be seen from the point of view of the contemporary moral psychology. 'ffioral philosophy', she wrote, The moral importance of the mind 'should be laid aside [.
    [Show full text]
  • Attending to Reality: Iris Murdoch on the Moral Good
    Ante Jerončić: Attending to reality - Biblijski pogledi, 21 (1-2), 101-114 (2013.) UDK: 224.5:227.87:22.06 Izvorni znanstveni članak Pripremljen u ožujku 2013. ATTENDING TO REALITY: IRIS MURDOCH ON THE MORAL GOOD Ante Jerončić Andrews University, Michigan, USA “Th e good and just life is thus a process of clarifi cation, a movement towards selfl ess lucidity, guided by ideas of per- fection which are objects of love.”– Iris Murdoch1 SUMMARY: Attending to Reality: Iris Murdoch on the Moral Good Even a scant acquaintance with current cultural and philosophical trends will readily point to a widespread predilection for subjectivist forms of moral reasoning. By “subjectivist” I refer to various non-cognitivist and constructionist paradigms in moral philosophy and popular parlance that reduce ethical statements to expressions of individual or collective preferences, feelings, or prejudices stripped of any object-given normativity. Th e following are but some of the factors that fuel such perspectives: the proverbial fact/value dichotomy and anti-realist sentiments pervading large swaths of analytic philosophy; poststructuralist and postcolonial “genealogies” that tie the language of universal morality to discourses of power, patriarchy, and totalitarian agency; and the utilization of the language of virtues, values, and “moral clarity” for a specifi c set of domestic and foreign policy commitments. Such intellectual positions, accor- 1 Profound thanks go to the friends and colleagues whose feedback made an invaluable contribution to the thinking in this article: L. Monique Pittman, Karl Bailey, and Vanessa Corredera. I also owe a debt of grati- tude to my research assistant Mercedes McLean who labored with me in correcting and clarifying the fi nal draft .
    [Show full text]
  • Sovereignty of Good
    REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL Dialektika A disciple of Plato among British Moral Philosophers: A review of The Sovereignty of Good UN DISCÍPULO DE PLATÓN ENTRE LOS FILÓSOFOS MORALES BRITÁNICOS: UNA REVISIÓN DE LA SOBERANÍA DEL BIEN 1* Rogney Piedra Arencibia 1* Doctorando en Filosofía, Queen’s University, Canadá Email: [email protected] Recibido: 14/06/2019 Aceptado: 13/08/2019 REVIEW Para Citar: Piedra Arencibia, R. (2019). Un Discípulo de Platón entre los filósofos morales británicos: Una revisión de La Soberanía del Bien. Dialektika: Revista De Investigación Filosófica Y Teoría Social, 1(2), 47-49. Recuperado a partir de https://journal.dialektika.org/ojs/index.php/logos/article/view/14. LA PALANCA FÍSICA EN LA FILOSOFÍA 47 SEPTIEMBRE-DICIEMBRE. (2019). Vol. 1 (2), pp. 47-49. REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL Dialektika Murdoch, Iris. The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Routledge, 2001, 126 pp., $16.76 USD (pbk), ISBN 13: 979-0-415-25552-3 (pbk) he Sovereignty of Good is a short volume (70 pages in its first, (D). (It is curious that here Murdoch retains the pedantic 1970, edition) composed of three previously separately analytical style of using symbols for no reason at all in her published essays on moral philosophy by the British intent to argue against this very tradition, perhaps in an T philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch. One of its many attempt to not appear as a complete outsider). Our evaluation appeals is that it is not like the typical (grey-soberly of an object is true when we see it how it is through just, analytical) British philosophy text.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iris Murdoch Review
    The Iris Murdoch Review ISSN 1756-7572 Volume I, Number 2, The Iris Murdoch Review Published by the Iris Murdoch Society in association with Kingston University Press Kingston University London, Penrhyn Road, Kingston Upon Thames, KT1 2EE http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/KUP/index.shtml © The contributors, 2010 The views expressed in this Review are the views of the contributors and are not necessarily those of the Iris Murdoch Society Printed in England A record for this journal is available from the British Library 1 The Iris Murdoch Society Appeal on behalf of the Centre for Iris Murdoch Studies by The Iris Murdoch Review is the publication of the Society the Iris Murdoch Society, which was formed at the Modern Language Association Convention in New York City in 1986. It offers a forum for The Iris Murdoch Society actively supports the short articles and reviews and keeps members Centre for Iris Murdoch Studies at Kingston of the society informed of new publications, University in its acquisitioning of new material symposia and other information that has a for the Murdoch archives. It has contributed bearing on the life and work of Iris Murdoch. financially towards the purchase of Iris Murdoch’s heavily annotated library from her study at her Oxford home, the library from her If you would like to join the Iris Murdoch London flat, the Conradi archives, a number of Society and automatically receive The Iris substantial letter runs and other individual Murdoch Review, please contact: items. More detailed information on the collections can be found on the website for the Centre: Penny Tribe http://fass.kingston.ac.uk/research/Iris- Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Murdoch/index.shtml Kingston University London The Centre is regularly offered documents, Penrhyn Road individual letters and letter-runs that are carefully evaluated and considered for funding.
    [Show full text]
  • Running Head: MS. MURDOCH's EXISTENTIALIST FOIL
    Running head: MS. MURDOCH’S EXISTENTIALIST FOIL 1 Ms. Murdoch’s Existentialist Foil in The Idea of Perfection Neminemus Author Note [email protected] Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3845363 MS. MURDOCH’S EXISTENTIALIST FOIL 2 Abstract In her Idea of perfection, Ms. Murdoch criticizes what she takes to be an existentialist conception of ethics. This conception is not, however, existentialist, either in the sense in which Sartre characterized it, or any of those other existentialists from Dostoyevsky onwards. Whether her alternative ethic is better or worse than that of the existentialist, I do not know; but the one is not in contrast to the other. Keywords: Iris Murdoch; Jean-Paul Sartre; Existentialism; Ethics; Behaviourism. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3845363 MS. MURDOCH’S EXISTENTIALIST FOIL 3 Ms. Murdoch’s Existentialist Foil in The Idea of Perfection Ms. Murdoch takes as a philosophic foil an ethical conception which is ‘behaviourist, existentialist, and utilitarian in a sense which unites these three conceptions’.1 She calls this the ‘choice and argument’ model,2 or the ‘existentialist-behaviourist view’.3 She takes the existentialist pole of this ethic as ‘unrealistic, over-optimistic, romantic, because it ignores what appears at least to be a sort of continuous background with a life of its own’.4 Her ethic of attention, ‘a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’, 5 is meant to take account of this moral continuity. Existentialism is not, however, what Ms. Murdoch thinks it is. She does not address ‘a wide tradition stretching from Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre’,6 but something ‘existentialist-sounding’ belonging to ‘a certain familiar intellectual milieu’.7 As a consequence, this existentialist foil is a lacunary philosophy; a faith without its faithful, a belief without its believers.
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Actualization on Women's Pilgrimage to Goodness in The
    International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 5, No. 6(1); May 2014 Self-actualization on Women’s Pilgrimage to Goodness in the Good Apprentice XU Ming-ying PhD Associate Professor School of Foreign Languages Dalian University of Technology Dalian, China FU Xiao-na PhD Professor College of Comprehensive Foundation Studies Liaoning University Shenyang, China Abstract The paper reveals the difficulty in the formation of female self by portraying female characters’ personal growth through increased awareness of themselves and the relationship with others in The Good Apprentice. Murdoch illustrates that blind hatred and revenge as well as the lies all hinder women from the integration of female self and from reaching the state of Goodness. Meanwhile, Murdoch endows the female character with an unusual trait that is seldom found in her other female characters: the consideration of others’ welfare and attention to others’ life. This is just what Murdoch advances in her philosophy as the way to achieve goodness. Apart from the integration of female selfhood, Murdoch has also explores how women could achieve happiness and reach the state of goodness in her later period to a greater extent than in her early period. While Murdoch conveys her philosophical thoughts in her novels, her creation of characters and plots in turn enriches and deepens her philosophy. The paper focuses on the reconstruction of female selfhood through Murdoch’s elaboration of the multiple ways that the women use to integrate their female self by actualizing themselves on their way to Goodness in the Good Apprentice. Keywords: Iris Murdoch; The Good Apprentice; Selfhood; goodness Murdoch deepens her exploration of the reconstruction of female selfhood in her later novels with the development of the society and the advancement of women’s rights though she holds the consistent attitudes to women’s liberation and the role of female characters in her fiction.
    [Show full text]
  • Detection of Longitudinal Development of Dementia in Literary Writing
    Detection of Longitudinal Development of Dementia in Literary Writing A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Torri E. Raines May 2018 © 2018 Torri E. Raines. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Detection of Longitudinal Development of Dementia in Literary Writing by TORRI E. RAINES has been approved for the Department of Linguistics and the College of Arts and Sciences by David Bell Associate Professor of the Department of Linguistics Robert Frank Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT RAINES, TORRI E., M.A., May 2018, Linguistics Detection of Longitudinal Development of Dementia in Literary Writing Director of Thesis: David Bell Past studies have suggested that the progression of dementia, especially Alzheimer’s disease, can be detected in the writing of literary authors through analysis of their lexical diversity patterns. However, those studies have used oversimplified measures and vague definitions of lexical diversity. This study uses a multi-faceted, computationally operationalized model of lexical diversity innovated by Scott Jarvis to analyze a total of 129 novels by five authors (three with dementia and two without), with the purpose of identifying the lexical characteristics of dementia in literary writing. A total of 22 novels by two authors with suicidal depression were also analyzed in order to determine whether this condition also leads to changes in authors’ lexical diversity patterns. Analyses were conducted with six individual lexical diversity measures and two supplementary lexicosyntactic measures. Results suggest that dementia as well as the effects of healthy aging manifest in different aspects of lexical diversity for different authors, and that this model of lexical diversity is a robust tool for detecting lexical decay indicative of dementia.
    [Show full text]
  • Iris Murdoch's Five Ways from Art to Religion
    Religions 2015, 6, 875–890; doi:10.3390/rel6030875 OPEN ACCESS religions ISSN 2077-1444 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions Article Images of Reality: Iris Murdoch’s Five Ways from Art to Religion Elizabeth Burns Department of Philosophy, Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W8 5HN, UK; E-Mail: [email protected]; Tel.: +44-020-7795-6600 Academic Editor: Jonathan Hill Received: 8 May 2015 / Accepted: 13 July 2015 / Published: 30 July 2015 Abstract: Art plays a significant role in Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy, a major part of which may be interpreted as a proposal for the revision of religious belief. In this paper, I identify within Murdoch’s philosophical writings five distinct but related ways in which great art can assist moral/religious belief and practice: art can reveal to us “the world as we were never able so clearly to see it before”; this revelatory capacity provides us with evidence for the existence of the Good, a metaphor for a transcendent reality of which God was also a symbol; art is a “hall of reflection” in which “everything under the sun can be examined and considered”; art provides us with an analogue for the way in which we should try to perceive our world; and art enables us to transcend our selfish concerns. I consider three possible objections: that Murdoch’s theory is not applicable to all forms of art; that the meaning of works of art is often ambiguous; and that there is disagreement about what constitutes a great work of art.
    [Show full text]
  • Platonic Perfectionism in John Williams' Stoner
    SATS 2020; 21(1): 39–60 Frits Gåvertsson* Platonic Perfectionism in John Williams’ Stoner https://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2019-0028 Published online October 12, 2020 Abstract: I argue that given a plausible reading of John Williams’s Stoner (2012 [1965]) the novel throws light on the demands and costs of pursuing a strategy for self-realisation along Platonic lines which seeks unification through the adoption of a single exclusive end in a manner that emulates the Socratic maieutic teacher. The novel does not explicitly argue either for or against such a strategy but rather vividly depicts its difficulties, appeal, and limitations, thus leaving the ultimate evaluation up to the reader. Keywords: John Williams, Stoner, Philosophy and Literature, Aristotle, Plato 1 Introduction The philosophical insight to be gathered from literature is often thought of as somewhat opaque, or at least unsystematic, in character since it is usually sug- gested that the primary virtue of fiction lies in its attention to the particular (on this see Goldberg 1993; Hämäläinen 2016a; Nussbaum 1990; Winch 1972, 1987), its highlighting of the interplay between form and content (e.g., Nussbaum 1990: 3– 53), or in its ability to go beyond conventional philosophical prose and argu- mentative techniques (cf. e.g., Diamond 1993; Hämäläinen 2016b; Moyal-Sharrock 2016; Wittgenstein 1922: 6.421; Winch 1972, 1987). Sometimes, however, it seems that literary works present us with easily identifiable philosophical arguments (on this see Green 2010, 2016). A third way in which literary texts can provide insight in a way that is neither opaque nor strictly argumentative is by scrutinizing philo- sophical positions in a manner that elucidates or poses problems for the position(s) *Corresponding author: Frits Gåvertsson, Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Box 192, 221 00, Lund, Sweden, E-mail: frits.gavertsson@fil.lu.se.
    [Show full text]
  • If the Good Were God: Platonic Meditations on Theism
    [Expo. 3.1 (2009) 5–21] Expositions (print) ISSN 1747-5368 doi:10.1558/expo.v3i1.5 Expositions (online) ISSN 1747-5376 If the Good were God: Platonic Meditations on Theism JAMES WETZEL Villanova University [email protected] Abstract The usual way to relate Platonism to theism is to contrast an impersonal conception of the Good with a God of absolutely benevolent will. I call into question the usefulness of that contrast and argue for a reading of Plato that takes centrally into account Socratic service to the god. My overall aim is to suggest that a genuinely philosophical faith tends to defy the distinction between an ethics of will and an ethics of vision. Keywords: Plato; Socrates; theism; ethics; will; Murdoch; Korsgaard Augustine assumed that Plato was a monotheist or at least that Plato’s philosophy required monotheism as its working presupposition. The most apparent conclusion to draw from Plato’s dialogues, however, is that he, like his teacher Socrates, believed in many gods and never singled out a particular one of them to be the sum and substance of all goodness. In the Euthyphro, Plato’s dialogue about the proper object of piety, Socrates encounters a self-styled seer by the name of Euthy- phro, who is about the odd business of prosecuting his own father for impiety. Since Socrates himself is on his way to trial, to face a charge of impiety, he is naturally anxious to profit from a supposed vision- ary’s insight into what piety is. As all readers of the dialogue know, Euthyphro never delivers on the goods, and the dialogue founders on an unresolved choice: “For consider,” says Socrates to Euthyphro, “is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?”1 Long after philosophers have ceased to care about gods and the way that gods may be said to love, the choice, in altered form, still beckons us.
    [Show full text]