The Culture Machine

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UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

The Culture Machine

Thinking about culture, society and politics beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state

10880437 Hannah Achterbosch

Supervisor Prof. Dr. H. Y. M. Jansen

Second Reader Dr. F. Russo

December 8, 2015

Al wat je ooit zag of hoorde, al wat je dacht te weten, is niet meer dat, maar anders.1

Hella S. Haasse

Sleuteloog (Amsterdam: Querido’s Uitgeverij, 2002)

1 Translation from Dutch: ‘All that you ever saw or heard, all that you thought to know, is no longer that, but different.’

TABLE OF CONTENTS

0 Introduction ……………………………………………………...... 4

1 Reduction of Being ……………………………………………………..... 11

1.1 A Philosophical Criticism on Sociology ………………………………….. 12

1.2 The Integration Discourse ………………………………………………… 13

1.3 Integration and Society …………………………………………………… 16

1.4 Reduction of Cultural Beings …………………………………………….. 17

1.5 Culture as Problematic Concept ………………………………………….. 22

1.6 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………... 24

2 Weakening of being ……………………………………………………… 25

2.1 Machine as a Bad Model ………………………………………………….. 26

2.2 Weakening of Cultural Being ……………………………………………... 30

2.3 Imagining Multiple Cultural Worlds ……………………………………… 32

2.4 Analogy with the Museum ………………………………………………... 34

2.5 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 36

3 The Dutch Case: The Blue Diamonds…………………………………... 38

3.1 Political, Cultural and Societal Awareness………………………………... 39

3.2 Indorock Representing Exotic Otherness …………………………………. 41

3.3 A Cultural Hegemony? Dutch Versus Indonesian Culture ……………….. 44

3.4 Cultural Connectedness as Political Stake ………………………………… 48

3.5 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 51

4. Discussion & Conclusion……………………………………………….... 52

5. References ………………………… ……………………………………... 59

0 INTRODUCTION

The arrival of more than 300.000 Dutch Indonesians in Dutch society between 1946 and 1968 as consequence of the decolonization of Indonesia lies at the very heart of rethinking the relationship between the concepts of culture, politics and society underpinning the Dutch nation-state. No longer was it possible to build on the existing presumed self-evident nation- state, because Dutch politics was gradually undermined by Indonesia’s struggle for independence and Dutch society had to make space for at least 300.000 citizens with another cultural background. Besides these political and societal consequences, the cultural arena served as a place where young Indonesian migrants, such as the Indorock formation, The Blue Diamonds, made the presence of the new cultural group with other cultural expressions visible. Despite this fundamental historical event resulting in social, political and cultural change, in social-political philosophy the emphasis is still on theorizing within the borders of the powerful nation-state. Admittedly, attempts have been made to elaborate on the cultural component of society, which can be described as ‘the cultural turn,’ described by, for example, Geertz (1973) and Bourdieu (1984) and later by Appadurai (1996). This cultural turn, however, did not lead to a renewed, solid philosophical theory. Subsequent studies focus almost exclusively on national or societal citizenship (see for example: Boele van Hensbroek & Vega, 2012; Koopmans, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995 & Modood, 2007). The focus on citizenship in these subsequent studies results in a theorizing and understanding of the concepts of culture, politics and society limited to the borders of nations-states. This thesis will argue that the understanding of the concepts of culture, politics and society could and should be philosophically deepened.

The sociologist Willem Schinkel (2007 & 2008) and philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1989 & 2003), both enter the academic and public debate about the interrelated understanding of culture, politics and society – and about cultural diversity and cultural emancipation, in particular. Schinkel (2009) criticizes the Dutch obsession with integration in

particular and even uses citizenship in that respect as an example of problematic thought concerning cultural emancipation. He states that the focus lies too heavily on moral and cultural citizenship, which results in the exclusion of cultural minorities on the basis of their adjustment to Dutch norms and values. Vattimo takes this critique a step further, looking beyond one particular society, and states that philosophers should consider the relationship between culture, politics and society in a more global perspective. His focus is not necessarily on citizenship or exclusion, but rather on how the understanding of cultural emancipation can be refined in the context of globalization. This thesis will discuss the two recent critiques from Schinkel and Vattimo on socio-philosophical thought concerning cultural diversity and cultural emancipation. Their critiques will be examined in the context of a case study describing the introduction and increase of Indonesian cultural expressions in the Netherlands, in particular, Indorock.

Philosophical context

To a large extent, the relationship between culture, politics and society in social and political philosophy still seems to be based on Anderson’s (1989, p. 154) Imagined Communities where he describes the nation as:

‘An imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know their fellow-members […] yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. Communities are to be distinguished […] by the style in which they are imagined.’

What is important in this definition is the role culture plays in the political unity of the nation-state. This political unity results from imagined shared cultural values as Anderson (1986, p.6) states:

‘A nation can be described as an imagined community which is the product of cultural norms and values within a territory.’

Two important assumptions that are still dominant in recent sociological and philosophical research arise from his definition. The first is the assumption that politics and culture coincide within the nation-state or society. The second is that a nation or society is collectively imagined as a cultural unity, where the concept of imagination is of great importance. Recent social and philosophical studies still base their assumptions on Anderson’s imagined communities, to the extent that they associate the weakening of the nation-state with the rise of cultural diversity as opposed to cultural unity. For example, Rattansi (2012, p. 4) explains how cultural diversity is assumed to lead to an unravelling of the nation-state on the basis of the ‘triple transition’. This transition consists of the state losing power to separatist demands of minorities, such as global institutions, the unpredicted effects of the use of guest workers, and the retrenchments relating to the welfare state. On the basis of Rattansi, it can be argued that the apparent order that resulted from the creation of nation states is on the wane. For many decades, the nation was considered as an organizational structure with an eternal lifespan, but recently, the question is raised whether nations can be maintained in this century of supranational processes, in which culture plays the leading role. Moreover, this weakening of nation-states due to the rise of cultural diversity is often not perceived neutrally, but rather as highly problematic by socio-political philosophers, politicians and the majority of the nation (as for example explained by Rattansi, 2011 & Schinkel, 2007). Boomkens (2006, 235) goes so far as to state that the presumed weakening of nation-states is seen as ‘a great discomfort’ or ‘crisis of the community’ amongst philosophers. There are two ways in which cultural diversity is problematized in relation to the decreasing power of nation-states. On the one hand, the majority culture is presented as a reason for protecting the nation and its politics, as people conceive of the nation as a result of a common, homogeneous culture. On the other hand, cultural diversity (the rise of cultural minorities within nation states) is used as an explanation for the lack of power of national policies. In the case of the latter, culture is sometimes described as problematic from the inside – for example, when populations in the Middle East rebelled against national regimes in order to start cultural and political renewal under the name of Arab Spring. It is more common, however, that culture is perceived as a threat from the outside, when migration and refugees greatly affect both national politics and the majority culture because of their ‘otherness’. More philosophically formulated, cultural diversity is seen as undermining the collective imagination of a cultural unity that once resulted in the nation-state.

The notion of cultural diversity as a causal factor for the decreasing power of the nation-state results in a problematic understanding of cultural emancipation and cultural minorities. Although the decreasing power of nation-state cannot only be blamed on cultural diversity, as an aging population, economic globalization and modern technologies also undermine the power of the nation-state, cultural diversity is represented as the main problem of the nation state (Schinkel, 2007 & 2008). This is supported by Boomkens (2005, p. 63) who states that ‘Politics took on the shape of a cultural war’. Cultural diversity is seen as a problem, for example, because it is assumed that cultural minorities are not sufficiently integrated into the majority, and therefore pose a threat for the national, cultural identity (Koopmans et al., 2005, p. 178; Rattansi, 2011, p. 20; Roggeband & Verloo, 2007, p. 277- 278). In addition, both the concrete and the imagined increase of Muslims in the Western world is experienced as a threat to Western identities (van der Veer, 2006, p.121; Modood, 2007, p. 12). In summary, seeing cultural diversity as a causal factor for social and political phenomena results in the notion definition that cultural emancipation and cultural minorities pose a threat to nation-state and society.

Moreover, defining cultural diversity as a causal factor for the weakening of nation- states ignores the effects of globalization. In fact, the imagination of cultural diversity in this manner is still limited to the Imagined community. This suggests that cultural minorities and emancipation can only be imagined in line with the unity and order of the nation-state, while in fact, the nation state is just one of the possible products that can result from (collective) imagination. This criticism is supported by Appadurai (1996) who argues that imagination is formed by five global dimensions of cultural flows or ‘scapes’: ethnoscape, technoscape, financescape, ideoscape and mediascape. For this introduction, a detailed explanation of these scapes is not relevant, but it is important to note that according to Appadurai, these scapes contribute to the fact that imagination has become a collective, social fact providing a diversity of imagined worlds, rather than a homogeneous imagined world as the nation-state (Appadurai, 1996, p.5). Due to the emergence of the scapes, different cultural flows detach from territorial boundaries, spreading globally, allowing for a diverse imagination.. Globalization thus creates a context in which imagination no longer serves cultural unity, but serves cultural diversity.

In the philosophical tradition of Appadurai (1996), an oppositional voice arose from the end of the 20th century onwards, concentrating on the oppressive effects of the national and nationalist imagination, This oppositional voice, of, for example Stoler (1995) challenges

Anderson’s implicit assumptions that politics and culture coincide, and that society should be seen as a collectively imagined cultural unity. On the basis of Foucault, Stoler challenges the coincidence of politics and culture, arguing that contemporary thought about cultural diversity is still based on a ‘colonial order of things’ (referring to Foucault’s Order of things, 1966). She concludes: ‘The point is to register explicitly that what appears as distinctively French, Dutch or genetically European in the late nineteenth century were sometimes cultural and political configurations honed and worked through the politics of empire earlier’ (Stoler, 1995, p. 208). Many more examples could be cited to show that more and more philosophers contest the idea of cultural imagination within the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state on which the dominant, western imagination of cultural diversity is based.

Scientific relevance

Two relevant philosophical works that explicitly challenge the inaccurate problematization of cultural diversity as a result of the socio-philosophical tradition based on Anderson are the aforementioned Willem Schinkel (2007 & 2008) and Gianni Vattimo (1989 & 2003). Both Schinkel and Vattimo claim that today’s imagination about cultural diversity and cultural emancipation is too limited as it results from an emphasis on collective unity. The importance attributed to unity is based on an outdated metaphysical tradition in philosophy, where a continuous functional coherence is seen between culture, politics and society. In fact, society is thought of as it is a machine, where the various parts each have a functional role in order to maintain order and unity. For Schinkel and Vattimo, this model of thinking is no longer tenable in philosophy, and therefore they propose two new ways of thinking, or imagining. These new ways build on or perhaps reject the idea of imagined communities, as described by Anderson, in order to actualize cultural emancipation within the context of globalization. Schinkel defines problematic thinking about society not so much as a machine, but rather as a ‘social body’ that is threatened by the disease of cultural diversity. Society is seen as a homogeneous unity, almost like a body, threatened by different diseases, such as ageing and cultural diversity. ‘Society as a whole is involved with the obsession about corporeality and a fascination with the healthy, young but long-lived and especially beautiful – balanced and symmetric – body (Schinkel, 2007, p. 42-43)’. This obsession results in culturist thinking, which suggests that culture as theoretical concept is constantly, whether appropriately or not, used to explain societal problems such as criminality or a paucity of

integration, while the dominant culture remains protected from criticism. In fact, this organistic thinking creates a cultural hierarchy in which the dominant culture is the more legitimate form, which limits the imagination of cultural minorities, and even causes a reduction of being of these cultural minorities. To oppose this reduction, Schinkel proposes an ‘integer, utopian thinking’, in which the distinction between dominant and minority culture is abandoned. Vattimo, however, argues that it is not so much a reduction of cultural minorities that occurs, but rather a weakening of being, in general, due to globalization. This weakening is rather a multiplication of worldviews that results in ‘awareness of the modest position that is taken by one worldview among many others’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 20). Not only minority cultures suffer from this weakening, according to Vattimo, but so does the majority culture. According to Vattimo, the realization of weakening, actually offers the opportunity to prevent one ideal (or one cultural group) from seizing power too easily. Therefore, he does not propose, as Schinkel, the dissolution between different cultural groups by an integer, utopian imagination, but rather proposes an increasing awareness of ‘otherness’ in order to actualize cultural emancipation. Vattimo therefore proposes a heterotopic, weak thought.

Method and structure

In this thesis, the theoretical work of Schinkel and Vattimo will be used to answer the question: To what extent can a philosophically broader conception of cultural emancipation be formulated that moves beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation-state? The aim of this research is to create a renewed understanding of the imagination of culture within a sociopolitical and societal context, by examining the relationship between the concepts of culture politics and society. My hypothesis is that renewed philosophical theory is needed to create this broader understanding. The criticisms of Schinkel and Vattimo serve as a framework for this thesis because both use the rejection of metaphysics in order to arrive at a renewed conception of cultural emancipation, although in the end they arrive at divergent conclusions. Their conclusions will be examined on the basis of a case study concerning the arrival of (Dutch) Indonesian culture in Dutch society, and the rise of Indorock, in particular. Although I have already established that culture moves beyond territorial and socio-political boundaries of the nation-state, the main focus of this research will be on cultural diversity in the Netherlands.

The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 is an examination of Schinkel’s findings with the emphasis on his work related to integration and cultural diversity: De gedroomde samenleving2 (2008) and Denken in een tijd van sociale hypchondrie3 (2007). Because Schinkel proposes a radical change in thinking about diversity, and because he is one of the few philosophically embedded sociologists in the Netherlands, his work serves as starting point for analyzing and interpreting today’s thinking about cultural diversity in the Netherlands. In chapter 2 Schinkel’s findings will be philosophically explored further on the basis of Vattimo’s essay on weak thought: Dialectics, Difference and Weak Thought (1984) and Vattimo’s books, Nihilism and Emancipation (2003) and The Transparent Society (1989). Vattimo’s findings will be used to complement Schinkel’s sociological view emphasizing solidarity, by paying exclusive attention to ‘otherness’ as an important precondition for cultural emancipation. Chapter 3 will translate both Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s philosophical findings, into societal practice, by the aforementioned case study. Finally, in the Discussion and Conclusion, the central question of this thesis will be answered.

2 Translation from Dutch: The Dream Society 3 Translation from Dutch: Thinking in Times of Social Hypochondria

1 REDUCTION OF BEING

‘What about the mortality of society?’ is the central question of Schinkel’s studies, Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie (2007, p. 15) and De gedroomde samenleving (2008) about the integration discourse in the Netherlands. This integration discourse is the totality of vocabulary resembling today’s societal obsession with integration, and the integration of cultural minorities in Dutch society, in particular. Schinkel argues that the integration discourse promotes the belief that cultural minorities threaten society with extinction, while, in fact, the discourse itself is a threat to cultural minorities, as it reduces their right to exist, – i.e. in Dutch society. This reduction of being is caused by the limited representation of a dream society, i.e. an ideal of how society should be instead of how society is. ‘In sociology, the society is as God. She is everywhere, but no one has ever seen her’ (Schinkel, 2014, p. 15). The fact that Schinkel problematizes the ideal of society, and not the presence of cultural minorities in Dutch society, makes his work on integration immensely relevant for studying contemporary thought on the relationship between concepts such as society, culture and politics. The aim of this chapter is to use Schinkel’s work to explain that not only is society a problematic concept within the integration discourse, but also that culture, as a scientific concept, is an invisible God of contemporary social-political research. In order to do so, this chapter will first elaborate on Schinkel’s general critique on sociology as the scientific discipline researching society (paragraph 1.1). This will be illustrated by his analysis of the integration discourse (paragraph 1.2), in which Schinkel problematizes the concepts ‘integration’ and ‘society’ (paragraph 1.3). Secondly, this chapter will elaborate on the reduction of being of cultural minorities as a result of the integration discourse (paragraph 1.4). Thirdly, on the basis of the former paragraphs, the chapter will explain why culture, as well as society, are problematic concepts within social-political research (paragraph 1.5). Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief summary of its philosophical findings (paragraph 1.6).

1.1 A Philosophical Criticism on Sociology

As explained in the introduction (p. 9), Schinkel’s work is a philosophical critique of sociology, going back to the roots of sociological thinking. According to Schinkel, sociological thinking has become a problematic metaphysical consideration of society, that is, the consideration of society as a metaphysical entity, representing one reality. Schinkel relates the metaphysics of society to the main problem of perceiving sociology as a scientific discipline: ‘the affaire of sociology with the scientific method of natural sciences’ (Schinkel, 2007, p. 440-442). In practice, this means that contemporary sociology has a normalizing, standardizing function based on a limited understanding of sociology as a science, while sociology should describe society as complex and contingent as it is. Schinkel formulates three challenges for sociology in order to replace the metaphysics of society with a renewed sociological thinking: becoming more sensitive to language, accepting complexity and contingency, and opting for a new perspective on social reality that moves beyond the dominant perspective (Schinkel. 2007, p. 453-458). He claims that sociologists are too obsessed with numbers, measurements and statistics, neglecting the importance of the complexity of language for social studies. Despite his rejection of the scientific method of natural sciences as a model for sociology, Schinkel (2007, p. 427) claims one should not forget the distinction between common sense knowledge reflected in everyday language about society and the more complex and contingent approach of science. To put it simply, speaking of societal problems is not the same as speaking of scientific problems. Sociology as a science has a complexity that cannot be understood by the non-scientific members of society because science reflects on society from the outside, and not from the inside (Schinkel, 2007, p. 451). A part of this complexity in sociology results from the fact that sociologists participate in their own research object. In order to take distance from their object of research, sociologists should therefore deviate from what seems normal, the dominant view of social life. The only way sociologists can deal with ‘the normal’ is in explaining why some ideas, concepts or phenomena are considered as normal. This relates to the idea of contingency in sociology, ‘the possibility of being different from the existing’. Sociologists should not rely on common sense explanations and the necessity of causality, but should remain aware of the possibility of alternative explanations.

Schinkel attaches great importance to the possibility of alternative explanations because alternatives counterbalance metaphysics. As a counterbalance to the metaphysics of sociology, a new perspective on sociology is needed. First, there is a need for a revaluation of thinking in sociology, as ‘sociology lost the appreciation of thought’ (Schinkel, 2007, p. 458). Schinkel suggests that nowadays there is a lack of (alternative) thinking in sociology, especially in thinking about normalized concepts, such as society and integration. Second, a revaluation of thinking and thereby a letting go of convictions about social reality will lead to a new social ontology, ‘a new being of the social’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 453). This new social reality should relinquish firm ideas resulting from metaphysical thinking, and opt for a double role, by not only critically considering social life, but also by critically examining sociology and its role in science.

1.2 The Integration Discourse

According to Schinkel, the inadequate metaphysical tradition in sociological thought results in organistic thought (2007, p. 42). This organistic thought is illustrated by the description of society as a suffering body, in which the importance of order and unity is emphasized. It formulates a utopia of how society should be, where the sociologist is no longer the researcher or the describer of society, but is seen as the 'doctor of the social' (Schinkel, 2008, p. 411), a doctor who should implement policies in order to cure the social body from diseases that threatens its unity and order. According to Schinkel (2007, p. 33), society is not an ordinary patient, but a patient that suffers from social hypochondria: ‘Society as a whole has been involved in an obsession with the corporality and a fascination for the healthy, young, but still long-lived and especially beautiful – balanced, symmetrical – body.’ Integration is seen as one of the most important threats to this social body, as illustrated by the integration discourse. This integration discourse can be defined as the comprehensive discussion related to integration, which is based on assumptions of society as an organism, balancing between the whole and its functional parts. On the basis of this discourse, people with a cultural background other than the dominant one are seen as a threat to the unity and order of society.

‘What happens in integration research is the adoption of a dominant view on society, which assumes that some opinions do not belong to society. Thus, there is nothing to society other than to regard this other opinions as not integrated. It is assumed that society is fixed and homogenous.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 44)

Organistic thought thus results in the idea that ‘cultural others’ must integrate in the fixed utopia of what society should be because society as a social body needs to be protected from others who threaten the unity and order of this body. Many other scholars support the idea that the Western world is dominated by the idea that ‘other cultures’ threaten their ‘healthy societies,’ and therefore should integrate in society (for example: Jansen, 2015 and Kristeva, 1989). The analysis of discourses show that immigrants – or people with another cultural background than the dominant one – are seen as a threat to the unity and order in society, and therefore need to be integrated in order to maintain the unity of the societal body. For Schinkel (2008, p. 52), the Dutch word allochtoon – which literally means not from this soil – is one of the many examples in which immigrants or cultural minorities are characterized as harmful intruders to the established dominant group. Another example of such a discourse is shown in the use of the word stranger (Kristeva, 1989) and the word illegals for refugees (Jansen, 2015, p.15-30). According to Schinkel, the problematic discourse in the Netherlands is the integration discourse, which contain all these problematic words, and this discourse is uncritically taken over by sociology. Therefore, Schinkel (2008, p. 35) does not examine integration itself, but analyzes the phenomenon of society investigating itself on integration. The main problem of the integrations discourse can be found in the underpinning unequal power relations. This inequality results in a kind of exclusion of certain members of society that represent views other than the dominant one. The integration discourse is typified by the reproduction of inequality between cultural groups. Schinkel (2008, p. 15) claims, for example, that freedom of speech is defended in favor of the dominant class, but is criticized when giving freedom to cultural and religious minorities. In an interview on Dutch television (Ruyg, 2008 in Zomergasten), Schinkel’s point of view is clearly summarized by the interviewer, where he states that a lack of interest in Sinterklaas (the Dutch counterpart of Santa Claus) is not a problem if it is caused by an increasing appreciation of Christmas, but it is a problem when it is caused by ethnic or religious protests of cultural minorities against the colored servants, Zwarte Pieten (Black Petes in English) of Sinterklaas. In his explanation,

Schinkel refers to Foucault (1975) who criticizes several institutions, apparently defined as neutral, while these institutions – one could see discourse as one of them – produce and maintain inequalities through normalized ideas represented by them. Until now, Schinkel’s work may not have seemed so revolutionary. Already in 1978 Edward Said wrote the work Orientalism about the Orientalist discourse, which can be compared to Schinkel’s analysis of the integration discourse. Both scholars examine a discourse on the problematic conception of (cultural) otherness. In his book, Said describes the problematic academic conception of the East (the Arabic world in particular) as fundamentally different from the West, and labels this conception as the Orient. On the basis of this presumed opposition, the Orientalist discourse resembles a collection of Western power discourses, and produces thereby simultaneously the superiority and hegemony of the West over the East. Both Said and Schinkel thus suggest that a limited conception of cultural otherness leads to unequal power relations on which an implicit and explicit exclusion of cultural minorities can be based. Said suggests that the orientalist discourse is based on the simple idea that the West is fundamentally different from the East, just as the integration discourse represents immigrants as fundamentally different from society. Moreover, neither Said nor Schinkel question the distinction between the different groups themselves, but describe the problematic status of concepts such as ´the orient´ or ´integration´ which are rarely questioned because of their normalized status (Schinkel, 2008, p. 35; Said, 1978). The most significant problem in the orientalism and the integration discourse is the reproduction of otherness as a normalized concept, without actually defining what this otherness is. The elusiveness of the term makes it difficult to criticize otherness, because what is there actually to criticize? The discourses may suggest that this question can be easily answered as the concepts and terms are conceived as ‘normal’, while in fact, the question cannot be answered. Schinkel illustrates this problem by examining the terms “society” and “integration”. He states that there is friction between the absence of a definition of these terms and the strong belief that these terms play an important role in examining social life. This friction results in a situation where it is not easy to criticize the terms, or to come up with alternative terms. Schinkel (2008, p. 124) concludes: ‘Above the limited conception of integration as such, the elusiveness and vagueness of terms as integration and society immunize the integration discourse of fundamental critique’.

1.3 Integration and Society

An important question remains: Why and how did integration and society become such dominant concepts in the integration discourse? More specifically, why are we so certain that integration is an important means of curing our societal body from life-threatening diseases such as cultural otherness? Schinkel does describe how integration is perceived, but insufficiently describes or explains why integration is perceived as such, and why integration and society have become such dominant subjects in contemporary debates. Schinkel suggests that integration is the main focus of his research because of the simple fact that integration dominates today’s discourse. He argues that integration – as a problematic term in the discourse – is ‘one of the unrealistic convictions we should liquidate’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 34). For Schinkel, integration seems to be just one among many convictions that one should eliminate. Similar unrealistic convictions are, for example, unemployment and criminality, which are also deemed as threatening to the unity and order of the societal body. On the basis of Schinkel's theoretical work on integration, one can suggest three reasons for why the obsession with integration and society has become so important. Firstly, according to Schinkel (2008, 25-27), the problematizing of integration is a result of the insecurity of the existence and the survival of society, or nation-state caused by globalization. In this respect, his argumentation about the obsession with integration aligns with the tradition of thinking described by Appadurai:

‘The sound intuition that given the growing multiplicity and contingency, there is a sense of radical uncertainty about people, situations, events, norms and cosmologies. Highly differentiated social systems, consisting of complex subsystems, in combination with globalization – influencing locality through large transnational networks of capital and goods – create insecurities in the identification of the nation and the self.’ (Appadurai, 2002, p. 906):

Moreover, Appadurai (2002, p. 4) argues that the deeper reasons why increased numbers and diversity have sparked such high levels of political conflict are related to the impacts of migration and ethno-cultural diversity on increased uncertainty. Secondly, one might suggest that nation-states use the concept of integration to place conceived problems with cultural minorities outside the borders of their state or society. Schinkel argues that cultural minorities and immigrants are depicted as a problem from

outside the nation-state. That is, immigrants and cultural minorities are defined as strangers or others, and on this basis they are placed outside the nation-state. This distinction is paradoxical: On the one hand, groups of immigrants are seen as part of society when depicted as part of the low social class, for example. On the other hand, immigrants are defined as outsiders or strangers. That immigrants are often seen as strangers can be supported by Kristeva (1989), who recognizes that in modern society one fails to see that the stranger is not something from the outside, but that the stranger lives within both the physical nation-state and the imagination of this nation-state. Schinkel argues that the distinction between outside and inside has a social function in creating a utopian idea of society where people are alike, and have the same norms and values. He illustrates this with a comparison of integration and imprisonment. Although the prison comprises a physical location within society, it relegates people who do not meet the standards of the ideal society outside society just as minorities are cast outside society. The third reason for the rise of integration and society as dominant concepts of the integration discourse is the notion of culture as an explanatory, causal factor for sociopolitical problems. Schinkel defines this notion as the birth of 'culturist' thinking in the integration discourse, which results in ‘culturism’. In this culturism, culture is thought of as an explanatory factor for the way citizens are. Norms and values are explained by the cultural background of citizens. Moreover, culture is used to explain why cultural minorities are different from the majority. For many decades societal problems were explained by economic and social factors, but from the 80’s onwards, there was a shift to where culture was regarded as an explanatory variable for societal problems (Schinkel, 2008, p. 70-80). To conclude, on the basis of these three reasons, it can be argued that integration and society have become part of a dominant discourse as a result of a convergence between the concepts of nation- state/society and culture within a global context.

1.4 Reduction of Cultural Beings

The three explanations for the growing emergence of the integration discourse, as illustrated in the previous section, clearly illustrate why culture has become an explicit part of Schinkel’s analysis. According to Schinkel, the notion of culture as an explanatory factor for societal problems within a global context results in a problematic understanding of culture. In order to explain this, it is first necessary to explain the origin of culture as an explanatory factor. The notion of culture as an explanatory factor was founded in a tradition of thought

17 popular in the early 90’s, wherein cultural citizenship was described on the basis of cultural capital. In brief, the line of argumentation based on cultural capital is ‘focusing on citizens capacities for civic virtue or responsible civic action’ (Vega & van Hensbroek, 2012, p. 3). What is important in this argument is that citizenship has become more than a legal status by adding cultural elements to citizenship. Schinkel explains that this debate developed into an idea concerning citizenship, in which culture is not seen as a precondition for civic virtue, but rather as determining the incapability of some cultures for becoming ‘civil’. Additionally, ‘capital’ suggests, on the one hand, that culture is something you can gain or lose, and on the other hand, it suggests that culture is a choice, rather than the consequence of historical development. An excessive use of culture as an explanatory factor resulted in what Schinkel defines as an essentialist definition of culture.

'The underpinning premise of culturist thought is the idea that culture is something one can maintain. [...] This concerns both the cultural minorities as the dominant cultural group. Culture is seen as something with essential characterizations on the basis of which "this culture" can be defined and identified.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 78)

The main problem is that this essentialist definition of culture results in a power inequality between the minority and the majority because the essential characterizations of the dominant culture are seen as more legitimate than those of cultural minorities, and should be maintained. On the contrary, the maintenance of culture by minorities is seen as a causal factor for social problems. In culturism, the essentialist characteristics of the dominant culture are used to explain societal success, and those of the minority cultures are used to explain societal failure. In other words, culturism suggests – other than racism – that the dominant culture is not only more legitimate, but also that ‘those who are not adjusted to the dominant culture are more racist than the dominant culture itself’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 86). Schinkel's claim that the dominant culture is seen as more legitimate and tolerant than cultural minorities within nation-statescan be illustrated on the basis of what Modood (2007, p.20) labels as the liberalism bias. In short, this bias is the presupposition that liberalism is the idea of a neutral state accommodating the recognition of cultural differences instead of liberalism as a product of Western culture itself (Modood, 2007, p. 20-33). This bias emerges, according to Schinkel (2008, p. 91-98), when immigrants or cultural minorities are accused of undermining liberal values, such as women’s empowerment, without recognizing

that the values linked to the empowerment of women are the result of the dominant culture. According to Schinkel, the main problem in this liberalism bias – although he does not explicitly refer to Modood – is not that culture as such is problematized, but that only minority cultures are questioned, while the dominant culture remains immune to questioning. Schinkel (2008, p.33) literally states ‘we only question the empowerment of women when discussing it in relation to minority cultures and forget that also the emancipation of women in Dutch culture is not completed yet’. That sociology has taken over this fairly essentialist understanding of culture can be evidenced by the way culture is measured in most qualitative sociological research (as supported by Schinkel, 2007, p. 440-442). Several techniques measuring culture assume a limited conception of culture, as Schinkel (2007, 486-487) substantiates with the following examples. One of these techniques is based on the aforementioned liberalism bias, where the degree of integration is measured as the degree of individualization. Here, the assumption is made that cultural minorities claiming group rights is contradictory to individual rights. A second example of a limited measure of integration is genealogy in the measurements. In the Netherlands, successive generations of migrants are called second- or third-generation immigrants (in Dutch allochtoon). They are called immigrants or allochtonen even though these successive generations are born in the Netherlands. Because of their historical background of migration, successive generations are also defined as outsiders in the sociological research discourse The problematic outcome of culturism is defined by Schinkel (2008, p. 90-91) as violent, as it causes a reduction of being of cultural minorities. Schinkel rightly points out that the implicit assumptions made about culture within the integration discourse result in a reduction of being of minority groups in society. On the one hand, cultural minorities are placed outside society - one might even say excluded from society – on the basis of their cultural characteristics, which are deemed unsuitable for the society’s needs. Therefore, these minorities are not imagined within society as they are placed outside society. On the other hand, and perhaps even more striking, the cultural characteristics of cultural minorities are simultaneously used to explain societal problems or societal failure, even though they had previously been excluded from society. Therefore, minorities are not only not imagined, but they are not even able to participate in the imagination of society themselves as they are seen as citizens who are not able to contribute to society’s success. As Boele van Hensbroek (2012, p. 73) points out, the fact that minorities are not seen as full citizens because of their

culture is problematic as ‘cultural citizenship should capture such a notion in the definition of cultural citizenship as the ability to co-author the cultural context in which one lives.’ According to Schinkel, the reduction of being of cultural minorities is an ontological problem, which means that minorities are reduced in their (cultural) being. This means that the right of cultural minorities to exist is limited as a consequence of their exclusion from the imagined domain.

‘The exclusion from the imagined domain of society has the effect that some people get more opportunities than others. It causes a judgement on the basis of someone’s being instead of someone’s acting. And it judges therefore about people independent from their actions.’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 90)

The definition of ontology that is used here is the philosophical study of existence and being. Schinkel claims, in fact, that the ontological state of society is overrated, while the ontological state of cultural minorities is too limited. Schinkel emphasizes the weak ontological status of cultural minorities because it contrasts with the stronger imagined being of society. ‘All dominant imagination is violent, reduces people to less than they are.’ (Schinkel, 2014). Schinkel (2008, p.1 47) concludes that the essentialist understanding of culture not only results in a reduction of cultural minorities, but also results in the fact that ‘society is reduced to culture’. This conclusion can be approached in two different ways, depending on how one interprets the relationship between the concepts society and culture. The most likely interpretation is that Schinkel tries to explain that society, Dutch society in particular, is reduced to one culture (the ‘Dutch’ culture), as society is imagined as one culture, that is, the unitary, homogeneous system of values and meanings. As mentioned in the introduction, this conclusion relates to Anderson’s theory about imagined communities, where culture and political organization coincide in what we call the nation state. ‘The nation is conceived, imagined, as a deep, horizontal comradeship’(Anderson, 1983, p. 7). Schinkel builds on Anderson’s theory by arguing that this imagination is still dominant in thinking about the relationship between concepts such as nation-state, society and culture, although this imagination is outdated and limited. Therefore, Schinkel proposes a new form of nationalism that allows for a broader imagination. Schinkel (2012) replaces nationalism with critical nationalism. This nuance is important because it shows that today’s nationalism is based on a noncritical form of imagination that avoids contingency and

complexity. Schinkel (2008; 2012) takes Anderson’s argument further by arguing that today’s imagination is wrongly reduced to the imagination of the nation-state as representing one culture. He argues that the imagination should be directed towards a new way of living together, or a solidarity which is critical of the 'classical' nation-state, in which only one dominant culture can be imagined in one nation-state. To put it more simply, the imagination on which the nation-state is based, should be more critical about the idea of a ‘horizontal comradeship’. The second interpretation of the ‘reduction of society to culture,’ as described by Schinkel, is more general. This interpretation emphasizes that theories about society are constantly dominated by culture as an explanatory variable for societal problems, for example, that the structural subordination of migrants concerning income, educational opportunities and housing are increasingly being treated as cultural problems. Typically, the culture of minorities is seen as the underlying cause of a wide range of societal problems, because the cultural background of minorities restrains those cultural minorities from becoming part of the dominant whole. This reinforces the distinction between society and outsiders as represented in the integration discourse. Both interpretations – the reduction of society to one culture and the reduction of society to culture in general – lead to the conclusion that today’s imagining about social and political phenomena is dominated by (a) culture as an explanatory factor, while Schinkel states that society is a lot more than (a) culture. According to Schinkel, the critical imagination in sociology as an alternative for the imagined homogeneity, as described by Anderson, should focus on integrity and a new utopia (Cohen, 2012; Schinkel, 2007; Schinkel, 2014 in de Correspondent). In general, Schinkel claims that the metaphysical tradition in sociology can only be counterbalanced if imagination no longer focuses on a fixed imagination of society. Sociology should base its imagination on the assumption that social life is complex and contingent, as opposed to society being an ordered unit. He describes this as thinking in terms of integrity, critically examining dominant discourses and creating alternatives to these dominant discourses. Thinking in sociology should not be aimed at conserving what is, like a museum conserving cultural heritage. Instead of holding on to old dreams based on outdated concepts, such as society, new, alternative and more utopian dreams should be developed, in which cultural minorities are no longer seen as outsiders, but are part of the imagination and utopian project of social life. Schinkel (2008, p. 160) concludes: ‘Amid the irony of the dream society is the

possibility to develop the social world creatively. No one knows what it will bring, but it will be something new, something else. If it is only a better dream.’

1.5 Culture as a Problematic Concept

Although Schinkel proposes a new way of imagining or thinking about social life, he does not explain how cultural otherness is to be imagined within this new social utopia. Schinkel only criticizes the essentialist premises concerning culture as a problematic result of the lack of imagination of society, but does not elaborate on how cultural otherness is to take shape within this new utopia of social life. This raises the question: where is society exactly reduced to if Schinkel does not elaborate on the imagination of culture itself? Schinkel is not able to answer this question as he seems to maintain a limited sociological definition of culture himself in emphasizing the social function of culture. He elaborates on the integration discourse as the result of a problematic imagination of social life or living together more than he elaborates on the problematic imagination of cultural difference. Schinkel is indeed correct when he states that a dominant imagination is violent regarding cultural minorities, but in arguing in favor of a new utopian imagination, he seems to overlook the existence of actual cultural differences. And so Schinkel seems to partially confirm the dominant sociological discourse, which asserts that culture is not separate from the social imagination. Moreover, Schinkel compares the obsession with culture as an explanatory factor for the breakdown of society’s unity and order with other factors, such as criminality and unemployment. Can culture so easily be related to its economic and sociological counterparts without defining culture itself? And if so, why does Schinkel choose to reevaluate only the obsession with culture, and not the obsession with criminality or unemployment in his research? The only explicit suggestion he makes is that culture is one of the things we subscribe to being a citizen;he nams it moral citizenship (2007; 2008). This addition of a cultural component to citizenship is problematic according to Schinkel because emphasizing the moral terms makes citizenship as a precondition for political and legal equality secondary. ‘Immigrants have to prove their informal capability of becoming a citizen in order to deserve the legal status of a Dutch citizen’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 21). In conclusion, it seems that Schinkel wants to make culture less important in the sociological discourse, comparing integration and culture with other explanatory factors for social and political problems. He claims that the integration discourse proves that culture

22 plays too important a role in the imagination of citizenship and dreaming about society. This can be illustrated by the aforementioned example of Sinterklaas (see paragraph 1.2, p. 13). Schinkel offers both ‘society’ and ‘Sinterklaas’ as examples of unrealistic convictions that should be liquidated. In the Netherlands, there is an ongoing debate about the national holiday Sinterklaas. The debate focuses primarily on Sinterklaas’ colored servants, named Zwarte Pieten, (Black Petes in English). Briefly explained, cultural (colored) minorities protest against Black Pete, because of racist connotations. For them, Black Pete alludes to slavery. On the other side of the debate, Dutch ‘natives’ (autochtonen in Dutch) claim that Sinterklaas is a children’s holiday, which has nothing to do with slavery, but is simply a Dutch tradition that should be protected. Schinkel states that Sinterklaas, Black Pete in particular, is the evidence of culturism. He states: ‘If you convince Sinterklaas long enough that he is Sinterklaas, he will believe he is Sinterklaas although he does not exist’. His analysis is only partially true. Sinterklaas may not literally exist as a historical figure, and the tradition may be based on a myth, but it exists for better or for worse in the imagination of Dutch culture. Or more precisely, the debate about Black Pete exists in the imagination of Dutch culture. The fact that different cultural groups and countries are debating about a Dutch holiday proves that Sinterklaas is not a false conviction, or a false cultural opposition, as Schinkel claims. Rather it proves that culture is debatable and can move beyond borders. The basic premise of sociology, as made clear from the former sections, seems to be that there is a paucity of attention for the imagination of cultural difference to deal with culture in a social or political context. Even though the essentialist definition of culture is criticized, culture is never thought of separate from its social or political function. In sociological research, the sociopolitical function of culture is recognized, but a broad cultural imagination (of otherness) is missing. This shortage of imagination of cultural otherness is not only shown in Schinkel’s analysis, but is also shown by the following statement of Modood, which states that the sociological starting point is often difference, rather than culture (or cultural difference) in order to emphasize that group-differentiating dimensions are central to their social constitution. ‘Rather than derive a concept of multicultural politics from a concept of culture, it is better to build it up from specific claims, implicit and explicit policy responses [….] to achieve some form of acceptance and equal membership’ (Modood 2007, p. 36). This raises the question of whether or not it is the reverse of what Schinkel stated. Is it not (a) culture that is reduced to both the physical and theoretical borders of social life?

1.6 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the problematic imagination of society, which results in a reduction of being of cultural minorities. Schinkel rightly points to the fact that today’s imagination of social and political life is dominated by the idea that the unity and order of society is threatened by cultural minorities and immigrants. According to Schinkel, this problematization of culture stems from an essentialist cultural understanding, which results in a problematic emphasis on cultural otherness. He proposes an alternative imagination that speaks out against the ‘metaphysics of society’ by building on Anderson’s Imagined Communities, proposing an alternative, more critical imagination of social life. However, in doing so, Schinkel neglects to explain how cultural otherness could be imagined. Schinkel not only rejects the essentialist understanding of cultural difference, but also overlooks the idea of cultural difference in general by proposing an imagination focusing on living together, rather than paying attention to the imagination of culture or cultural otherness.

2 WEAKENING OF BEING

‘The conviction of a degree of unity was accompanied by a degree of monoculturalism, – and this may be rational but is nonetheless “mono”. Today we are aware that, in imposing this kind of universal monoculture, we do violence to others’ (Vattimo, 2002, p. 462). According to Vattimo, this awareness should result in ‘weak thought’, which is ‘by no means a weakness of thinking as such’, rather it is modest thought in the sense that it no longer claims to have a monopoly on the one truth. In his work Dialectics, difference, and weak thought (1984), The Transparent Society (1989) and Nihilism and Emancipation (2003), Vattimo proposes weak thought as the framework for thinking about the day to day practice of cultural emancipation.

At first sight, Vattimo’s work bears some resemblance to Schinkel’s analysis as they both start with the rejection of the metaphysical tradition in socio-political thought conerning cultural emancipation. However, Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysics differs in two important respects from Schinkel’s. First, Vattimo challenges the idea that a reduction of being of cultural minorities takes place as a result of a persistent metaphysical idea of society. Vattimo (1989, p. 13) argues that an inevitable dissolution of metaphysics will lead to a ‘new experience of humanity’ in general: ‘A postmodern emancipation ideal that should be based on an awareness of plurality’. This awareness of plurality is what Vattimo names the ‘weakening of being’. Second, Vattimo does not criticize the limited imagination of society, but rather he criticizes today’s limited imagination of multiple cultural worlds. These two differences result in Vattimo’s proposal for a framework of thought that fundamentally differs from Schinkel’s, as will be explained on the basis of an analogy of the museum. This analogy is essential, as Vattimo opens the way for making culture not only theoretically but also practically visible by using the museum as model for ‘society’.

The aim of this chapter is to complement Schinkel’s work with Vattimo’s philosophy of weak thought. In order to do so, this chapter will first compare Vattimo’s rejection of metaphysics with Schinkel’s (paragraph 2.1). Next, this chapter will explain the main differences between Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s analysis, firstly, by examining the difference between the reduction of being and the weakening of being (paragraph 2.2), and secondly, by comparing Schinkel’s critique on the limited imagination of one cultural world incarnated in the concept of ‘society’ with Vattimo’s critique on the limited imagination of multiple cultural worlds (paragraph 2.3). Furthermore, on the basis of these two main differences, Vattimo’s proposal for a new framework of thought will be explained) with the model of the museum as opposed to the model of the machine (paragraph 2.4). This chapter will conclude with a summary of the philosophical findings resulting from a comparison between Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s analysis.

2.1 The Machine as a Bad Model

As argued before, both Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s proposals for a new way of thinking about cultural emancipation are based on the rejection of metaphysical thinking. According to them, the main problem concerning metaphysics is the idea that society or culture should be considered as a unity. This way of thinking is no longer relevant because of the contemporary reality of (cultural) pluralism or diversity challenging any unitary view. As previously explained (paragraph 1.1, p. 12), Schinkel opposes the metaphysical thought focused on ‘society’. His book Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie (2011) can be described as ‘proposing a new vocabulary, opposed to the metaphysics of society’. Vattimo’s approach is not aimed at the rejection of the ‘metaphysics of society’, but is based on a more general philosophical shift from metaphysics to postmodernism. In short, according to Vattimo, metaphysics is a philosophy which examines the nature, or the being, of reality. For Vattimo, metaphysics is no longer worth pursuing because it restrains us from imagining (cultural) pluralism as metaphysics represents a problematic monolithic way of thinking.

One could use the model of the machine as an illustration of this abstract description of metaphysics, as the ordinary machine was used for a long time as a model for examining social life (Schinkel, 2007, p. 22; Vattimo, 2003, p. 14). Schinkel (2008) sees ‘organistic thought’ as the contemporary version of this metaphysical thinking, and in doing so, he compares the model of the machine with the model of the body: ‘Both the social mechanism

and the social body can be seen as perfected by a rational examination. The machine can be lubricated; the social body can be healed.’ Nevertheless, it is wrong to make a too simplified comparison between mechanics and the body, according to Schinkel, because the model of the machine is materialistic, while the model of the body is more idealistic. The main agreement in Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s way of thinking is based on the presupposed existence of a unity, or communality, in which all physical or mechanical parts play a functional role governed by a central control in order to maintain order and unity (Schinkel, 2007, p. 22; Vattimo, 1989, p. 13).

Despite the agreement in their thinking, Vattimo states that contemporary thought concerning social life is still wrongly based.– He uses Adorno & Horkheimer (1944) and Heidegger (1977) as examples of the outdated model of the machine with one central engine which controls the whole. ‘The fact is that Heidegger never escaped from a vision […] dominated by the model of the engine and mechanical energy, so for him modern technology could do nothing except bring about a society subordinated to a central power dispatching commands to a purely passive periphery, as gear wheels are driven, whether these commands were mechanical impulses, political propaganda or commercial advertising’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 14-15). This observation can be translated into the outdated idea that social life is controlled by a central government. Instead of using the old model of the machine for examining social life, Vattimo argues in favour of a postmodern thinking that should be based on a more decentralized interpretation of power (in line with Foucault, 1975), in which it is impossible to define a central engine. To put it simply, according to Vattimo (1989, p. 13) ‘it is impossible to define a centre or essence on the basis of which a distinction can be made about what belongs to reality and what is unreal and marginal’.

Although Vattimo, as Schinkel, criticizes metaphysical thought, Vattimo already perceives a transition towards a new way of thinking. This transition is in line with the philosophical shift from modernity into postmodernity. What is central in postmodernity is ‘the end of the grand narratives’ which Lyotard (1979, p. 85-87) describes as the loss of overarching philosophical theories of science and history which dominated thought until then. Or as Vattimo (1989, p. 18) states: ‘Modernity ends if it is no longer possible to regard the world as a unit’. In fact, postmodernism was a critique on grand (metaphysical) narratives which regarded the world as a unity, in which special attention is paid to culture. This idea is supported by Boomkens (2006, p. 31) who states that ‘Postmodern authors ensured the

27 visibility of identities and cultures which were made invisible in the universal discourse of the grand narratives’.

According to Vattimo, who positions himself as postmodernist, this new way of thinking stemmed from political and social changes in the west, as for example decolonization.

‘The decline of the West, meaning a dissolution of the ideas of progress and non-linear historicity, is a complex matter, more social and political than philosophical. […] It was the realization of the European ideal as an ideal among other ideals. It was not necessarily worse than other ideals, but it was no longer able to present itself as the one truth of all people without the use of violence.’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 20-22)

In stating this, Vattimo emphasizes that social and political change can precede thinking, while Schinkel explains it in reverse, suggesting that thinking precedes social change. For now, no argumentation in favor of one or the other will be laid out, but it is important to keep the relationship between thought and social and political practice in mind.

According to Vattimo, the end of European dominance was the precondition for the ‘end of grand narratives’, also labelled as the birth of nihilism, which can be seen as: ‘the dissolution of any ultimate foundation, the understanding that in the history of philosophy, and of western culture in general, “God is dead” and “the real world has become a fable”’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. xxv). For Vattimo, Nietzsche’s statement ‘God is death’ is more of an announcement of a new way of thinking than a judgement or explanation of this new thinking, as Vattimo argues in favour of a practical interpretation of nihilism. For him nihilism is not so much the loss of Europe’s ideal, but rather the realization that the European ideal is only one way of thinking among many other ways. ‘When western philosophy realizes it is just one ideal among many others, it becomes nihilistic; it acknowledges that its own argumentative process is always historically and culturally situated, that even the idea of universality is “grasped” from a particular point of view’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. xxv).

What is striking in Vattimo’s interpretation of nihilism is not only the historical and practical foundation of the decline of the west, but also his suggestion to not mourn about the loss of foundation. In fact, he interprets nihilism as ‘affirmative’, because nihilism does not mean a loss of reality or meaning in the dramatic sense of the word, rather it means a

28 weakening of meaning and reality. Vattimo (1989, p. 24) states: ‘If the multiplication of worldviews means that we lose our sense of reality, it is not a great loss’. Nihilism is in essence the end of absolutist and fundamentalist claims on truth. This formulation suggests that nihilism is more of an increase of meaning(s) than a loss of meaning in general, although these multiple meanings may be weaker than in the modern era of ‘grand narratives’. Therefore, Vattimo interprets nihilism as ‘weak thought’, which he defines as: ‘The impossibility of silencing argumentation and suppressing plurality in the postmodern world, in which difference and dialogue constitute the fundamental factors of every culture, politics and religion’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 180).

To return to the aforementioned relationship between (weak) thought and sociopolitical practice, Vattimo argues that weak thought developed from a particular social change. Vattimo points to the example of decolonization as a precondition for weak thought, and, generally speaking, Vattimo argues that weak thought originates in the rise of cultural pluralism as a result of diaspora – the dispersion of cultural groups from territorial boundaries. Thought is thus directly related to the social practice, and not purely based on a universal theoretical reasoning. As Vattimo states: ‘They [philosophical currents] accompanied, or at any rate reflected profound social transformations’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 39). Vattimo’s argument suggests that until now, it was assumed that philosophy (thinking) shaped social life, while it neglected to acknowledge that social and historical change also determines thinking.

Although Schinkel also elaborates on the relationship between thinking and modelling social life, he emphasizes that ‘thought’ is a priori for social change. In examining society, Schinkel argues that society does not exist as is a limited imagination based on an unrealistic desire for unity and order. One should bear in mind that Schinkel stated that sociology became prescriptive, rather than descriptive, as a result of the strong conviction that society exists. Vattimo, on the other hand, does not exclusively criticize society as such. He actually argues that thinking itself is unfounded and sensitive for change, rather than arguing that a concept like society is theoretically or philosophically unfounded. After all, new ways of thinking are not the ‘fruits of pure ratiocination. Weak thought realizes this, as it is the consciousness of the unfoundedness of thought’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 39; see also Vattimo, 1984). In brief, Schinkel only criticizes the metaphysics of society, whereas Vattimo criticizes metaphysical thought in general.

2.2 Weakening of Cultural Being

Now that the relationship between social change and weak thought is made clear, one question remains: What in this social change opened the way for ‘weak thought’? The simple answer, as was already mentioned, is the decline of the West: ‘The dissolution of the idea that there was a unitary significance and direction to the history of mankind’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 30). Subjacent to colonialism, imperialism and nationalism was the idea that there was one universal historical line towards civilization of which the West was the progressive example. It was in this same period that the ‘total organization’ of societies took shape: societies as ordered and unitary functional systems. The dramatic consequences of the First World War and Second World war, followed by violent decolonization, were the practical refutations of the successful functioning of the, until then, so important universal organisation of societies. During the struggle for independence of the colonies, the assumption that this universality was a matter of course was no longer valid (as supported by Boomkens, 2011, p. 246). ‘The collapse of the centrality of the West and its political hegemony has set free numerous cultures and visions of the world that no longer submit to being considered as moments or parts of an overarching human civilization, with the West as its curator’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 28).

But in order to understand the implications of this historical event for today’s thinking, one should move beyond this practical answer, and explore what in this event specifically changes the way of thinking. The underlying philosophical implication of the decline of the West is, according to Vattimo, the ‘transformation of (the notion of) being as such’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 4). The West not only changed in its practical mode of existence because of a transformation of political and social organisation, but it also transformed thought about existence or being. Vattimo defines this as a transformation into ‘an ontology of actuality’. ‘Being’ is no longer conceived as an ‘object’, but as an ‘event’. To put it more simply, because of the decline of the West, ‘being’ can no longer be defined as a matter of course, but rather as something that originates or occurs within a historical and sociological context. As Vattimo (2003, p. 6) states: ‘Being “is” not, but “comes about”’. Finally, this transformed notion of being is exactly what created the ‘identification of philosophy with sociology’.

Both Vattimo and Schinkel therefore perceive the conception of being as important for today’s socio-philosophical thinking. The main difference between their perspectives is, however, that Schinkel challenges the being of society, in particular, which causes a reduction of the being of cultural minorities, whereas Vattimo challenges the idea of being, in general. Vattimo recognizes that holding on to a being of societies as if they are a unity may result in a wry power relationship between cultural groups, but argues furthermore that everyone ‘suffers’ from a reduction of being. Not only cultural minorities are ‘reduced’ in their being, but also the being of the majority has changed because of this new philosophical idea of being as ‘event’. One could interpret Schinkel’s ‘reduction of being’ as misrepresentation of what being philosophically is, or rather, how being comes about nowadays. Although both researchers attach importance to ‘being’ as a philosophical concept, Vattimo’s interpretation is far more optimistic, albeit ‘weak’ and ‘reduction’ may seem semantically quite similar. In Vattimo’s argument, ‘weakening of being’ is not so much a reduction as it is a rise of a modest being because of the confrontation with other worlds. According to Vattimo, the confrontation with other cultural worlds does not inevitably lead to a strengthening of ‘society’ and a reduction of cultural minorities, as Schinkel seems to suggest. Although Vattimo indeed sees a possible revival of fundamentalism as an attempt to strengthen being again, he sees this merely as a result of a previous and unavoidable weakening of being. Vattimo does not deny the possibility of an unequal difference in power, but emphasizes that the Western world, or dominant groups, are affected by the weakening of being as well. ‘The West is not only externally in an explosive situation because of the confrontation with other cultural worlds, but also internally, as if the apparently unstoppable pluralization makes every unitary conception of the world and history impossible’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 22). This discrepancy in the expected impact of a changed conception of being also exposes a different conception of ‘otherness’ in Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s work. Schinkel emphasizes that integration and society are two words in the integration discourse which represent a false contradiction which needs to be eliminated because it serves the dominant groups. However, according to Vattimo, ‘otherness’ (Vattimo himself uses the word ‘difference’) is necessary in order to create cultural emancipation because his otherness forces the Western world into a dialogue with other cultural worlds. The only way of experiencing the weakening of being is ‘the encounter with other beings, in creating a dialogue’ (Vattimo, 1982, p. 87). In short, according to Vattimo, today’s being comes about

as otherness. The subtle dissimilarity in Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s conception of being is caused by different views concerning otherness. On the one hand, Schinkel presupposes that otherness is used by the dominant group to protect one’s own culture. On the other hand, Vattimo presupposes otherness as a precondition for emancipation, as this makes clear that a strong conception of ‘being’ no longer exists.

2.3 Imagining Multiple Cultural Worlds

One could challenge Vattimo’s emancipatory notion of otherness by arguing that the day to day practice leaves much to be desired as it is marked by cultural struggles on the basis of incompatible differences. Vattimo recognizes that the rise of new cultural worlds does not necessarily lead to equality, or even to non-violent coexistence: ‘The manifold visions of the world do not peacefully coexist like a collection of artistic styles and lifestyles in an imaginary museum. They give rise to conflicts, claims of validity, and assertions of belonging [..]’(Vattimo, 2003, p. 29). In this explanation, violence does not necessarily refer to a fight, actually it refers to the silencing of voices and excluding cultural groups from the dialogue. According to Vattimo, this is exactly what is happening in pluralism today. Admittedly, there is a multiplication of cultural voices, but each voice ‘continues to live as if it were the sole and supreme human culture possible’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 54). In practice, this means that in the experience of cultural otherness, the danger of cultural dominance, or cultural inequality, remains. An important reinforcing factor of that danger is globalisation. As Boomkens (2006, p. 229) explains: ‘Globalisation first seemed a cultural or economical process, but nowadays it is politicised. It raises the question: With whom or what rests the political power? And this question cannot be answered easily.’ In The Transparent Society (1998), Vattimo supports Boomkens’ observation that there is no easy answer to this question. Especially the media (or Appadurai’s mediascape, as described in the introduction, p. 8) is of great importance in globalisation, ‘creating a communicative chaos and an ontological disruption’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 12). It is precisely in this chaos, that there is the danger of the development of a new political hegemony. As Boomkens (2006, p. 244) describes: ‘Globalization is the only process able to achieve an even greater unification than nationalism’. However, Vattimo more than Schinkel, emphasizes that this cultural chaos, which is reinforced by globalisation, is experienced with uneasiness by dominant groups as well, as, for example, the West.

‘What I like to claim is: (1) The mass media [as important part of globalisation] played an important role in the rise of de postmodern society. (2) The mass media did not make this society more transparent, self-conscious or enlightened, rather more they made society complex and chaotic. (3) And exactly in this relative chaos lies our hope for emancipation.’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 20).

On the one hand there is indeed the fear that globalisation leads to a great unification, undermining authenticity and originality and neglecting different (sub)cultures (Vattimo, 1989, p. 13). On the other hand, globalisation stimulates the rise of weaker communities as transnational subcultures of which the exact identity is uncertain and fragile (Vattimo, 1989, p. 21). Vattimo therefore recognizes the lack of transparency caused by globalisation, but does not exclusively interpret this chaos as danger, but rather more as a positive possibility.

For Vattimo, Schinkel’s idea that Western culture is unavoidably linked to political domination is a problematic point of view. Schinkel’s pessimistic scenario is indebted to the idea that society, or the organisation of social life, has one centre, which, in a certain way, coincides with politics or the government. However, here again, the truly optimistic scenario, in which it is presumed that the decentralization of power leads to equality, is problematic. See also Boomkens (2006, p. 242) who claims that Vattimo’s analysis should be interpreted as a possibility, not as an exclusively positive scenario. According to Vattimo, the defragmentation should not be understood in a purely democratic way, as the chaos that results from it does not fully prevent one ideology from seizing power. In fact, Vattimo states that in this chaos lies the possibility for true emancipation, because ‘it prevents that one ideology, power or perspective dominates social developments and change too easy’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 24).

This difference in argument can be interpreted as a difference in the understanding of (cultural) imagination. Even though Vattimo is a politician and political philosopher, he describes imagination as more independent from society and political power than Schinkel does. Or at least, he argues that although there may be a certain political domination, this does not mean that other cultures have no right to exist, or to imagine themselves. First, Vattimo emphasizes that globalisation has reinforced the possibilities of imaginations, as imagination came loose from territorial boundaries, and is no longer limited to the imagination of (a) (transparent) society. It is no longer possible to imagine a singular reality,

as a multiplication of imagined worlds has arisen. Schinkel seems to assume that a western political dominance remains, or is even reinforced by globalisation, through which a singular society is imagined. On the other hand, Vattimo (1989, p. 21) argues that despite the attempts to imagine a singular society, an ‘explosion and proliferation of Weltanschauungen arose’.

Secondly, the difference in Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s understanding of imagination is based on their divergent point of view regarding displacement. Both philosophers acknowledge that this ‘explosion of Weltanschauungen’ is not without consequences, as it results in a lurking feeling of displacement or discomfort because of the dissolution of ultimate foundations. According to Schinkel, this feeling of displacement is problematic as it results in excluding cultural groups in order to secure the safe feeling of order and unity within a society. Vattimo, however, links the feeling of displacement (discomfort) to the consciousness of pluralism, and it is this consciousness that offers the possibility for cultural emancipation.

‘Having a voice does not necessarily lead to political freedom […] but it shows other possible worlds and it thus raises consciousness about the relativity and contingency of the “real” world we limited ourselves to.’ (Vattimo, 1989, p. 26)

It can then be argued that society or politics is not reduced to (one) culture, as Schinkel suggested, but that cultural imagination in a political and social way is unjustly framed to the “real world”, as Vattimo ironically points out. On the basis of Vattimo, we can turn Schinkel’s problematization around: Society is not reduced to (a) culture, but the imagination of culture is still too often reduced to the idea of a “real world”, (a) society.

2.4 Analogy with the Museum

In order to explain the importance of the realization of a plural imagination, a comparison between society and the museum can be made. For Vattimo, society should be an imaginary museum, ‘where a collection of artistic styles and lifestyles peacefully coexist’. Moreover, the pieces of art in a museum literally visualize pluralism.

‘Experiencing a piece of art is not a one-fold meaning, rather it is a confrontation with the openness and totality of (possible) meanings, the being of the world itself.’ (Vattimo, 1998, p.11)

In relating pieces of art to the museum, Vattimo shows that cultural imagination takes place outside the political arena (also), visualizing the historical contingency of cultures, and raising awareness for a multiplication of possible worlds. One of the possible interpretations of Vattimo’s vision of art is that art may be able to give pluralism a voice in the public debate outside politics.

Schinkel (2007; 2012) however attacks the analogy between the museum and society, claiming that museums are aimed at purifying the cultural heritage and protecting it from outsiders with security guards. He deems it to be a negative analogy, stating that the dominant visual culture is protected in a museum and alternative cultural worlds are not imagined. Vattimo’s view of the museum differs from Schinkel’s for two reasons. First, a piece of art is on its own not the imagination of a pure culture, but represents the (possibility) of multiple (alternative) worlds. Moreover, even if one piece did represent a purification of one culture, the totality of the museum would always represent the variation of imagined worlds. Secondly, the analogy with the museum must not be taken all too literally. Vattimo does not describe the classical, somewhat elitist, museum, but rather he points to the importance of the visual, physical presence of multiple cultural worlds. This view can be supported by Peeren (2015), who argues that visualisation is of great importance when it comes to migration. She points out that ‘in contemporary visual culture, attempts are made to refocalize irregular migration […] by invoking other perspectives, including those of irregular migrants, as counterpoints (Peeren, 2015, p. 175). Thus, the model of the museum points to the importance visualising of and raising awareness about multiple cultural worlds.

A more important criticism of the ‘global museum’ can be formulated on the basis of Schinkel’s argument about how the rise of plurality and displacement also raises questions concerning social cohesion.

‘As opposed to the great dissolution a great solidarity should take a stand, which realizes that ‘solidarity’ is not a socialistic ideal of equality, but a reminder of the connections which underlie the precarious, museological buildings we call “society”.’ (Schinkel, 2012, p. 18).

To put it simply, Schinkel’s view of the museum differs from Vattimo’s because Schinkel raises questions about collective identities. Even if the museum were not a representation of the dominant culture, the pluralisation would cause an even greater experience of displacement and dissolution of collective identities. Boomkens (2006, p. 236) names this reaction to globalisation and increasing defragmentation ‘the crisis of the community, where a longing for the restoration of a collective identity arises’. Although Schinkel criticizes thinking about collective identities as a cultural product of the dominant group, he expresses a longing for the collective identity, emphasizing the problematic character of the dissolution of solidary foundation. The analogy of the museum reveals, next to a different view on cultural imagination, a different view on the experience of solidarity. Schinkel’s longing for solidarity should counterbalance the aforementioned feeling of displacement, while Vattimo argues that we should embrace this displacement. ‘Emancipation exist in this displacement, which at the same time is the liberation of differences […] When I avow my value system in this multicultural world, I also have the keen awareness of the historicity, contingency and finiteness of all these systems, starting with my own’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 24). This does not mean that Vattimo denies the importance of (the existence of) collective identities, or that displacement is not emancipatory in definition (see as well: Boomkens, 2006, p. 246). However, Vattimo emphasizes that it is not the strengthening of collectives which precedes emancipation, but rather it is the weakening of being, as this forces different views to dialogize. ‘If the conflict of interpretations is not to turn into a physical contest with victory going to the strongest […], then every interpretation has to step forward with its arguments’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 95). This way of thinking can be named: heterotopic thought.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter focused on complementing Schinkel’s work with the more postmodern philosophy of Vattimo. Although Vattimo’s and Schinkel’s proposals for a new way of thinking about culture are both based on a rejection of metaphysics, their work results in two divergent conclusions due to their different views on the concept of being and their different emphasis concerning forms of imagination. As concluded in chapter 1, Schinkel neglects to explain how cultural otherness should be imagined. Vattimo compensates for this neglect by emphasizing that it is not a reduction of being that takes place, but a general weakening of

being, which raises awareness about, and visualizes a plurality of other cultural worlds. In doing so, Vattimo also emphasizes that it is not a problematic imagination of society that is at stake, but rather a problematic imagination of otherness (or difference). Schinkel concludes that otherness is used as a means for maintaining a political hegemony of the dominant culture, while Vattimo argues that imagining otherness (difference) offers possibilities for cultural emancipation, as this raises awareness of the historical context and contingency of one’s own cultural imagination.

Concluding, Vattimo’s heterotopic thought can be interpreted as a critique on Schinkel’s utopian thought. Schinkel (2012) tends to think about culture within the borders of social and political organisation of solidarity: ‘The nation-state can only promote solidarity when you see it as an unfinished utopian project.’ What is important in this utopian project is an imagination that is broader, and more inclusive than it is now, on the basis of which a new solidarity can be created. Vattimo recognizes that the pluralisation of cultural worlds – the dissolution of any (cultural) foundation – challenges a collective solidarity. Nevertheless, he emphasizes the importance of ‘otherness’ and ‘displacement’ as preconditions for solidarity, as this narrows down the risk that one dominant view seize the power too easily. For Vattimo, solidarity is not ‘leaving anyone free to set about making their own interpretation of the world prevail’, but rather it is being modest about one’s own cultural position among others. ‘The transition from utopia to heterotopia is the liberation of the ornament, with the weakening of being as ontological meaning’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 90).

3 THE DUTCH CASE: THE BLUE DIAMONDS

For the Netherlands, the loss of its largest and wealthiest colony, Indonesia, was ‘the collapse of its centrality and political hegemony´ (see: paragraph 2.2 , p. 30). The Netherlands became aware that the Dutch view of history, human civilization and culture was (no longer) shared by Indonesia and many other nation-states. Decolonization, and the official loss of Indonesia in 1949, in particular, had a great effect on philosophical, political and sociological thinking about the sustainability of the Dutch nation-state and the Dutch cultural identity, since historical events are strongly related to the development of thought and philosophy. This notion is supported by Vattimo (2003, p. 35), who states: ‘Philosophy follows paths that are not insulated or cut off from the social and political transformations of the West. The end of metaphysics is unthinkable without the end of colonialism and Eurocentrism.’

Therefore, it is interesting to explore to what extent the decolonization of Indonesia has had an effect on Dutch thought specifically, and how this can be traced back to Vattimo’s more general philosophical findings about the West and Schinkel’s socio-philosophical findings with regard to the Dutch case in particular. After all, the official independence of 1949, not only made the loss of a colony a fait accompli, it also raised awareness concerning the contingency of (thinking about) the Dutch nation-state, in general, and politics, society and culture, in particular, because of the arrival of the East Indian culture in the Netherlands. This effect of the decolonization of Indonesia on Dutch thinking concerning culture, politics and society will be discussed on the basis of the anthropological research by Van Leeuwen, (Ons Indisch Erfgoed4, 2008), which discusses the East Indian culture in the Netherlands and the musicological research by Mutsaers (1989), which discusses the rise of Indonesian rock music, Rockin’ Ramona, in the Netherlands.

4 Translation from Dutch: Our East Indian Heritage

The aim of this chapter is to refine Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s theoretical philosophical findings, by relating them to the practical example of the decolonization of Indonesia, and thereby the arrival of East Indian culture in Dutch society. In order to do so, this chapter will first describe the rising awareness about the contingency of (thinking about) Dutch politics, culture and society embedded within the context of the rise of popular culture (paragraph 3.1). Secondly, this chapter will elaborate on the role of the concept of “otherness” in the arrival of East Indian culture in the Netherlands (paragraph 3.2). This will be made concrete by applying the concept of otherness to the rise of Indonesian rock music in the Netherlands, as this is the literal arrival of East Indonesian culture in Dutch society. Thirdly, in paragraph 3.3 the mutual, strained relation between Dutch and Indonesian culture will be examined. Fourthly, this chapter will elaborate on the Dutch political interest in emphasizing cultural connectedness between Dutch and Indonesian culture within a societal context (paragraph 3.4). Finally, in paragraph 3.5 this chapter will conclude with explaining the relationship between the Dutch case and the philosophical findings of Schinkel and Vattimo.

3.1 Political, Cultural and Societal Awareness

At first, the political awareness of the Dutch arose mainly from the world powers ‘negative reactions to the violence that accompanied the Netherlands’ attempt to retain the colony of Indonesia. The United Nations, especially, exerted international pressure on the Netherlands in order to facilitate Indonesian independence because they did not agree with the Dutch violent ‘policy’ (Scagliola, 2012, p. 422). The violence committed by the Dutch military was internationally known as de politionele acties, Dutch for police actions. An important political consequence of the interference of the United Nations was that the Netherlands lost its reputation as a respectable world power to a certain extent. Moreover, within the borders of the nation-state, an awareness arose concerning the loss of political power. The struggle for the independence of Indonesia also raised questions about Dutch nationalism among the Dutch themselves. For over 300 years, the Netherlands and Indonesia were connected, so what did the development of an Indonesian national movement, in which there was no internal role for the Netherlands mean for the Dutch nation-state and its politics? The Netherlands became aware that Indonesian independence could potentially harm the Netherland’s political position as world power.

Secondly, Indonesian independence would put an end to the historical continuity of cultural affinities, which threatened the cultural self-confidence of the Netherlands. Over the years, not only a political affiliation, but also a long cultural affiliation had developed (although under political coercion). Indonesia was a special case in comparison with the other colonies, such as Surinam and the Antilles, as it was seen as the most valuable colony of the Netherlands (Oostindie, 2009, p. 143). From the Dutch perspective, the Dutch had brought civilization to Indonesia; moreover Indonesia had made the Netherlands a prosperous world power. On the one hand, this meant that the Indonesian culture was highly valued and in part incorporated in the Dutch identity. This is reflected in the expression Tempo Doeloe, which means the good old days when the Netherlands and Indonesia were one. On the other hand, it meant that the Dutch invested more in Indonesia than in other colonies by providing extensive Dutch education in the colony, for example, whereby the cultural connectedness was strengthened. In addition, Indonesian history was made a point of attention in the Dutch educational system. Indonesian independence would therefore not only create a break in the Indonesian cultural identity, but also in the Dutch one. The collapse of the Dutch empire raised therefore not only a political, but also an awareness about cultural dissolution.

Finally, decolonization led to a societal awareness. The Netherlands was essentially forced to make room for a large number of Indo-Europeans, who were not able to stay in Indonesia because they were not safe under the new Indonesian national reign or because they wanted to keep their Dutch nationality. The Dutch society was therefore obliged to make arrangements for this influx of more than 300 thousand Indo-European migrants, or repatriates, as the Dutch called them. Even though it was a fairly quiet integration, the Netherlands was confronted with conflicting views. Migrants from the former Dutch East Indies, for example, exerted lawsuits against the government concerning pensions and unpaid salaries (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 339) and also brought new customs and habits. With the arrival of migrants, new worldviews were definitively established within the Dutch borders, which caused a societal awareness. Boomkens (2006, p. 35) points out that decolonization was one of the first and most concrete signs of the start of globalization in the Netherlands, which was initially seen as a societal, as well as philosophical discomfort. Or as Vattimo (2003, p. 65) would claim more generally, decolonization was a historical cause for a new philosophy: ‘It is the discovery of the existence of other cultures that resist being assigned a backward and primitive place on an evolutionary line leading to western civilization’.

This political, cultural and societal awareness was reinforced by the rise of popular culture due to the globalization in the ‘60s and ‘70s. The rise of Indonesian rock music in the Netherlands played a major role in this process, especially the rock and roll duo, The Blue Diamonds. In fact, the postcolonial debate in the Netherlands took place almost exclusively in the cultural arena, rather than in social and political spheres (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 338). While the group of over 300 thousand Indonesian migrants became part of Dutch society quite inconspicuously, The Blue Diamonds, two Dutch-Indonesian brothers named Riem and Ruud de Wolff, gave these migrants a voice and a face. Their repertoire, very popular among a Dutch audience, consisted mainly of covers of the American rock group, The Everly Brothers. Nevertheless the (Dutch) Indonesian cultural component of their music was indispensable. In fact, the name of the music group itself, The Blue Diamonds, referred to their Indo-European cultural background. Initially the native Dutch miscalled the migrating Indo-Europeans ‘blue ones’ (In Dutch blauwe), but soon it became a nickname for Indo- Europeans. Because of the important role that popular music played in raising awareness about other cultural worlds, and thereby the dissolution of Dutch culture, The Blue Diamonds will be the central focus of this case study.

3.2 Indorock Representing Exotic Otherness

The popularity of The Blue Diamonds in the Netherlands was mainly due to its perceived exotic character. The Blue Diamonds was an important part of the rise of a new music genre within the Netherlands: Indorock. This music genre entailed exotic influences because of its origin in (Dutch) Indonesian culture. In one of the few scientific articles on Indorock, the author states:

‘The confrontation with Indorock was a revelation: it sounded mature, idiosyncratic, exotic, and yet it had elements of the enthusiastic but simplistic, pure rock and roll that you hear from amateur bands around the corner today. Indorock is special, because it coloured rock and roll with a shade of emerald’ (Mutsaers, 1990, p. 315-316).

This exotic identity was two-fold. First of all, the musicians of these groups were exclusively migrants from Indonesian or sometimes Moluccan origin, usually from the lower class of the former Dutch East Indies society (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 82). The colonial society

comprised, roughly speaking, three layers: Totoks (people of Dutch origin living in Indonesia), Indo’s (a mix of Indonesian and European blood), and Indonesians (people from Indonesian origin). Indorockers were predominantly Indo. Secondly, some of these Indorock bands, for example, The Tielman Brothers, were already founded in the former Dutch East Indies, which reinforced the presumed exotic character of Indorock (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 82).

This emphasis on the ‘exotic’ character of Indorock corresponds to Schinkel’s ‘integration discourse’ in the sense that it emphasizes the ‘otherness’ of the Indonesian culture. According to van Leeuwen (2008, p. 92), the Dutch Indorock culture resembled an orientalist representation by emphasizing this otherness. Earlier, (paragraph 1.2, page 15) the integration discourse was compared with Edward’s Said’s notion of orientalism. This concept of orientalism also appears in Van Leewen’s position, where she argues that orientalism, a dominant Western concept of the East, continues to exist within the within the nation-state after decolonization. The emphasis on otherness shows that the persistent premise in the Dutch approach of migration – the idea that migrants have and cling to their ‘own essential different culture’ (Schinkel, 2013, p. 145-146) - was already spawned with the first wave of migration into the Netherlands. The relatively innocent ‘exotic’ labelling of Indorock seems to contain an essentialist cultural understanding, emphasizing otherness, also present in Said’s orientalism (which was colonial par excellence) and the integration discourse described by Schinkel.

However, contrary to what Schinkel’s analysis of the integration discourse would lead us to expect, The Blue Diamonds was considered different in an affirmative sense. Rather than attempting to keep the Indonesian music out of Dutch society because of its ‘otherness’, it seemed that the Dutch (youth) embraced the Indonesian influenced music because of its ‘otherness’; at least this was the case for a significant part of the population. This positive attitude towards the expressions of Indonesian culture, i.e., Indorock, is only partly reflected in the political articulation of the arrival of the migrants, who were called ‘repatriates’ by the Dutch. The emphasis in this ‘repatriate discourse’ was on the return of Indo-Europeans to their ‘homeland’, even though most of them had never been in the Netherlands before.

Although, the repatriation terminology may suggest a friendly welcome, and seem to emphasize an affiliation between the Netherlands and the ‘other’ Indonesians, in practice, it resembled a surreptitious coercion to adapt to Dutch society. It should also be said that the

Dutch politicians refused the arrival of many returnees because they feared that several Indo- Europeans would not be able to adjust to the Dutch cultural climate. Apart from the political struggles, the Dutch had culturally seen an appreciation for the Indonesian music wherein ‘otherness’ or ‘difference’ cannot simply be dismissed as the revival of orientalism or an essentialist idea of Indonesian culture. The popularity of Indorock exposed a sharp contrast with the existing political view on repatriation; the music itself offered a new and exciting cultural world to Dutch youth outside the narrow-minded political climate they were used to.

Nonetheless, it can be questioned whether this ‘revelation’ of otherness caused by the rise of Indorock truly reflected an openness to (Dutch) Indonesian culture. Indorock, after all, was not exclusively Indonesian, but rather a postcolonial genre which arose from Indonesian, Dutch-European, and American music styles. In fact, the older Dutch Indonesian generations criticized the music because they associated it with Kroncong (Krontjong in Dutch), an Indonesian music style which was based on a nostalgic longing for colonial times. One could interpret this criticism as the lack of ability to imagine alternative worlds. Otherness, in this case, seems to refer to former colonial times more, than to a new, alternative cultural imagination. Indorock certainly suggests the imagination of an alternative world, but judging from van Leeuwen and Mutsears, one could argue that the Indonesian culture can only be imagined according to the Dutch colonial code by always including a western or colonial element. ‘Indonesian music, either Indorock and Pop, was very popular by a young public that reached beyond borders, but it was no longer a concept that was associated with Indonesian culture […] The Indorock hype can be explained as an expedient and orientalist discourse’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 339).

Nonetheless, identifying Indorock as colonial revival is itself based on a too essentialist idea of culture. It suggests that Indorock could, or even should, refer to a pure form of Indonesian culture. In Vattimo’s view, this is a vestige of metaphysical thought. Art, in the broadest sense of the word, never does refer to one culture. ‘Art is no longer a pure imagination’ (Vattimo, 1998, p. 98). We find a similar interpretation in Boomkens (2006, p. 180-181): ‘With the advent of globalization, art still exists but is no longer self-evident as it is a starting point for discussion about the essence of culture’. This idea is empirically supported by the rise of Indorock as part of the rise of a new global public sphere, i.e., popular (youth) culture. Admittedly, this popular culture was not an imagination of the ‘authentic Indonesian’, but it certainly was a new, alternative imagination wherein multiple cultural views merge.

That Indorock was not exclusively linked to a colonial code and opened the way for new, alternative imaginations can be supported by the popularity of The Blue Diamonds with both a Dutch, an Indo-European, and an Indonesian audience. In 1965, the Indonesian government led by Soekarno (the first president of the Republic of Indonesia) arranged a concert in Indonesia with The Blue Diamonds and the Dutch Indonesian singer, Anneke Grönloh, who was at the time a true superstar in Indonesia. The Blue Diamonds were also exceptionally popular among the Indonesian audience (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 85). The music was therefore not exclusively linked to a Dutch colonial code, but also had meaning for the inhabitants of Indonesia. Although it is not clear whether the audience at the time was exclusively Indo European or Indonesian, the fact remains that the popularity of The Blue Diamonds moved beyond Dutch borders and beyond a simple revival of colonialism, as Soekarno was certainly not part of a renewed colonial code. In short, people from different cultural backgrounds clearly recognized themselves in Indorock, came into contact with worlds outside their own because of the different cultural influences within Indorock, and ultimately, interpreted the meaning of Indorock according to a variety of worldviews.

3.3 A cultural hegemony? Dutch versus Indonesian Culture

The variety of cultural influences within Indorock may be obvious; the question remains whether one of these cultural influences (presumably the Dutch one) is predominant. On the basis of Schinkel’s culturistic thought, it can be suggested that either the ‘repatriation discourse’ or the ‘otherness’ of The Blue Diamonds cause a reduction of being of the Indonesian component in Dutch Indonesian culture. In his description of culturism, Schinkel (2007, p. 480) identifies two problematic causes, which result in a hierarchy of cultures in which the dominant culture is the most legitimate form (and the other cultures are thus reduced in their being). The first cause is that some cultures are not acknowledged: i.e., they simply do not exist in the dominant discourse. For The Blue Diamonds, this is not necessarily the case because they were visible and aurally present in the global public sphere. The second cause is that certain cultural groups are unable to participate in thinking or dreaming about the society or social context they live in (as much as others). For The Blue Diamonds this was partly the case because their identity was to a large extent determined by a dominant Dutch code. This second cause will be further elaborated on in the following sections.

As was previously mentioned, to the younger Dutch audience, The Blue Diamonds offered a slightly rebellious attractive otherness, and to the older generation, they offered a nostalgic longing for Tempo Doeloe. These are not only theoretical ideas, as history shows that it was indeed the Dutch code that determined the success of Indorock. First, the attractive otherness frequently resulted in small riots. Among the youngsters, this was referred to as pubertal fights over girls and popularity. The small riots certainly showed racist traits, but it was preferably not seen this way (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 76). In addition, The Blue Diamonds only became a commercial success after they adopted a Western repertoire (The Everly Brothers); other popular Indo rock stars were ignored by Dutch media; and often the Indonesian identity was ignored as the artists were identified as Dutch (Mutsaers, 1989, p.33- 40). This exclusion, on the basis of cultural traits, may not be as obvious as in the integration discourse described by Schinkel. but it seems as if the exclusion of Indorock in essence, consisted of a highly selective inclusion of Indo European elements that already fitted the dominant cultural view in the Netherlands. In actuality, the being or existence of Indorock as representative of Indonesian culture was very limited.

A first criticism of this perceived reduction of the Indonesian being of The Blue Diamonds concerns the associated strengthening of being of the dominant or majority group. Schinkel (2008, p. 33) argues, in his description of the integration discourse, that keeping out ‘harmful’ others reinforces the idea of a strong society – ‘social body’ – and its associated legitimate culture. The case of The Blue Diamonds illustrates that a strengthening of Dutch being does not necessarily result from the distinction between inside or outside, but instead results from including (the attractive parts) of this otherness. This Indonesian otherness is indeed ‘selected’ according to a dominant code, but the tension towards an inclusive identity with Indonesian and Dutch components marks an important difference between the integration discourse and the case of Indorock. As for the ‘repatriation discourse’, the developments associated with The Blue Diamonds were due primarily to a redefinition of Dutch culture by including an Indonesian component. From this perspective, the strengthening of the Dutch and the weakening of the Indonesian is more a result of inclusive, than exclusive, imagination.

The second criticism of this perceived reduction concerns the extent to which a reduction of being of Indorock actually took place. Mutsaers (1989, p. 127-130) problematizes the temporary popularity and lack of commercial success of Indorock. She argues that the ´real Indonesian´ pioneers disappeared when Dutch musicians took over the

musical elements of Indorock. This argument, however, seems to ignore the diverse cultural background and the diverse audience of Indorock and its successors. The two brothers who formed The Blue Diamonds were indeed Indo Europeans who repatriated to the Netherlands after Indonesian independence. However, several music groups, which were seen as Indorock, were actually Moluccan (who were a different cultural group from the repatriates), or were rooted in Timor, as for example The Tielman Brothers, who are actually connected to the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL). In fact, Indorock was a catchall term for any musical formation that had its origin in the former Dutch Indies. Moreover, the audience of Indorock was as varied as their cultural background. Not only was Indorock very popular among the Dutch and Indonesian audience, it also became very successful in Germany, and in fact, due to the rise of popular youth culture, the genre gathered a global audience to some degree. It is therefore difficult to say whether a reduction of being actually took place, as being no longer (if it ever really did) concerned a being limited to the borders of one culture or country.

These two critiques strongly relate to Vattimo’s (1998, p. 20) observation that a ‘dissolution of centered perspectives’ took place as result of the crisis in European colonialism and imperialism, which was subsequently reinforced by the spread of popular culture through the increase of global communication. The two former sections illustrate the ‘relative chaos’ that was caused by the dissolution of centered perspectives where a variety of cultures (and cultural expressions) intertwined. As was previously explained (paragraph 2.3, page 32), Vattimo argues that this chaos of various (sub) cultures potentially prevents one group alone from absolute domination.. To extend Vattimo’s argument, the danger, therefore, is not in emphasizing the otherness of Indorock in comparison with Dutch cultural expressions, as Schinkel would argue, but rather the danger is in trying to transform this otherness into an inclusive, overarching identity. It could be argued that according to Vattimo, the conceived ‘otherness’ should be retained, as it is actually the precondition for developing a cultural identity that can lead to emancipation. The danger then does not actually lie in the concept of ‘otherness,’ but in the inclusivist vantage point from where one tends to view this otherness.

What is still unclear when observing the Indorock case is whether or not the realization of ‘otherness’ would actually lead to emancipation. Dutch recognition of other cultures as “different” is the precondition for cultural emancipation, and this ‘weakening of thought’ had apparently not taken place yet. Vattimo (2003, p. 180) argues that the

46 dissolution of the West and the encounter with other (cultures) has led to the understanding that Western culture is no longer central and to the realization of ‘the impossibility of silencing argumentation and suppressing plurality’. A multiplication of cultural views and cultural dialects certainly took place with the rise of Indorock, but still there were forces impeding this multiplication. The most resistant force was the rise of Nederbeat, which quelled a further development of Indorock causing it to fade into the background of popular culture (Mutsaers, 1989, p. 128).

During the Indorock period, the white youth did not play in Rock ‘N Roll Bands, but instead they played a major role in the Nederbeat (also known as Nederbiet in Dutch), another musical discipline which was gradually emerging at the time. Indorock was actually at the basis of the development of Nederbeat, but nevertheless they collapsed. Mutsaers (1989, p. 128-130) mentions several reasons for this collapse: Nederbeat drew for example a lot of attention from the media, and the Dutch bands handled the commercial record executives better than the Indorock bands. Despite the fact that the Nederbeat would never have gained popularity without the preceding rise of Indorock, Nederbeat somehow surpassed them, and soon Indorock was no longer seen as important. In essence, the dissolution and chaos caused by a the rise and the mixing of (sub)cultures, which according to Vattimo, was so emancipatory, essentially seems to have led to a strengthening of the Dutch culture for Indorock. It was as if the relative chaos about the (Dutch) Indonesian identity surrounding Indorock opened the way for a new form of cultural dominance, whereby the realization of otherness had a very short lifespan. Indorock brought the Netherlands new impulses for the music industry on the basis of otherness, but in the end, this otherness was not solid enough to result in a viable musical genre in Dutch society.

Nonetheless, on the basis of Vattimo’s argumentation a necessary differentiation can be made concerning ‘otherness’. The example of The Blue Diamonds shows that not only is the notion of otherness problematic, in that it often forms the basis of exclusion as Schinkel seems to claim, but that the inclusion of otherness has problematic consequences concerning cultural emancipation as well. The example of Indorock shows that to dismiss otherness as a basis for exclusion is problematic, as it ignores the complex character of (a) culture(s). In brief, the example shows that the contrast between inclusion and exclusion is too harsh when one concludes that otherness inevitably leads to exclusion. The very fact that the Dutch made themselves familiar with Indorock as if it were an expression of Dutch culture itself causes a lack of recognition of the Indonesian identity of Indorock. The colonial inheritance and the

long-lasting cultural connectedness restrained the Dutch, but maybe also the (Dutch) Indonesians, from conceiving the other as truly different. And it could have been this ‘otherness’ on which a musical, or even cultural, recognition could have been based.

3.4 Cultural Connectedness as Political Stake

In brief, the former paragraphs have described an area of tension between cultural otherness on the one hand and cultural connectedness on the other hand, and this tension needs further consideration. In the cultural arena this tension was far spread : It questioned to what extent Indorock was actually different from Dutch culture since Indorock did contain an element of Western identity. It also questioned why Indorock only seemed to have commercial success when it enlarged its western repertoire. The older Dutch Indonesian generation had regarded the music as an after effect of colonial times, and after the decline of Indorock’s popularity, and the Dutch took on this perspective to some degree as well. (see: van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 339; Mutsaers, 1989). Although Indorock was at first regarded as ‘otherness’ or ‘different from the usual Dutch’, the connectedness of this music with colonial times made it difficult to define what this otherness implied exactly. What was even more complicated was the question of whether or not this otherness actually arose from a colonial past of connectedness where cultural hierarchy had played an important role. The cultural hierarchy resulting from colonial times greatly influenced what was later seen as different, but the ignorance of this colonial heritage made notions as connectedness, difference and cultural identity elusive. It was in this confusion about otherness and connectedness that Indonesian culture found its (temporary) place in the cultural arena, not managing to retain definitive social or political recognition. As van Leeuwen (2008, p. 96) writes: ‘The migrants from the former Dutch East Indies had control of the Dutch cultural market, but did not make use of this position politically.’ Contrary to Schinkel’s critique on cultural essentialism (see paragraph 1.4, p. 18), in the case of Indorock it seems as if the lack of an Indonesian ‘essence’ brought about an inadequate recognition of Indonesian culture and its fruitful contribution to Dutch culture. In addition, the policies concerning migrants from the former Dutch East Indies focused on repatriation into Dutch society, whereby the difference between the Dutch and migrants from the Dutch East Indies was ignored. Too little attention was given to the implications of what it meant to ‘come from the Dutch East Indies’ in relation to the ‘typical’ Dutch identity. The Indonesian component was overshadowed by the long-term cultural connectedness and the political will to maintain this connectedness. It is evident that this

connectedness hindered the imagination of a Dutch Indonesian culture ánd thereby the creation of a political category. In part this had to do with the multitude of cultural influences in Indorock as described in paragraph (3.2, p. 41). Dutch politics concerning the integration was based on the connectedness of the Indonesian and Dutch culture, and this was, more or less, accepted by the migrants (Oostindie, 2010, p. 41)5. This mutual acceptance cannot only be blamed on political coercion from the Dutch government. It was also the division within the group of migrants from the former Dutch East Indies, which hindered the rise of a collective new cultural identity on which political rights and recognition could be based. Indorock did not resemble a collective identity that was supported by all migrants. Groups such as The Blue Diamonds were essentially individual expressions of the Dutch Indonesian culture that was appreciated by some, but not by all. The Dutch did not mourn the end of Indorock, and neither did the Dutch Indonesian migrants, but once it was gone, Indorock was romanticized and labeled as ‘the bankruptcy of Dutch Indonesian culture’ (van Leeuwen, 2008, p.89). At the time of its death the (Dutch) Indonesian community was in fact no more than an occasional alliance (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 338). However, the cultural connectedness was also misused by Dutch politics. In an attempt to move on from its colonial past, politicians concentrated on the cultural connectedness by defining the arrival of Dutch Indonesian migrants as repatriation.. Not only did this ignore the ‘otherness’ - which is defined as an important factor concerning cultural emancipation by both Vattimo and Schinkel – it also ignored the unequal relationship that was at the bottom of this connectedness. By ignoring cultural difference, political inequality on the basis of a hierarchical cultural segregation derived from the former colonial society was also ignored. Van Leeuwen (2008, p. 339) states: ‘this cultural connectedness stood in the way of a definitive decolonization. The only domain where Indonesian culture could be reflected was the cultural domain. In fact, this cultural domain implicitly served as a substitute for the political domain, where culture was used to neutralize the political connotations of the colonial inheritance.’ This political neutralization also affected Indorock, which was depicted as nostalgia: an appreciation of ‘otherness’, based on the idea that this otherness was once an important part of Dutch culture itself.

5 Oostindie (2008) describes that the Indonesian group of migrants integrated relatively silently and were more aimed at adjustment into Dutch society in comparison to other groups of migrants. Of course this is a generalized claim based on a description of the public sphere. It is possible that the heated discussions concerning the integration took place behind closed doors.

The pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) of Dutch society in the 50’s and 60’s reinforced this problematic character of cultural connectedness. Pillarization was the political organization of segregation within society. Dutch society was ‘vertically’ divided into several ‘pillars’ according to different religions and ideologies. All these pillars had their own social institutions much like political parties. The original goal of this segregation was the emancipation of different populations. Because of the limited recognition of Dutch Indonesian culture, the migrants from the former Dutch East Indies did not have their own pillar. After all, they did not propagate a new obvious ideological category, and the Dutch government formally labeled them as ‘Dutch’. Although the Dutch Indonesians did not get their own pillar (for the broadcasting of Indorock the musicians were for example particularly reliant on pirate stations (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 87)) the vertical division of society based on equality seemed incompatible with the former hierarchical division of colonial society. Regardless of whether Dutch politicians were aware of the effect of pillarization on Indonesian culture or not, Dutch Indonesian culture was in fact reduced to the political structure of the pillarised nation-state because of the limited imagination of the Dutch Indonesian culture. The Dutch nation-state did not make room for a new category because that category simply did not exist (not in a emancipatory way and not in a hierarchical way). The observation that an (Dutch) Indonesian category did not exist, is quite similar to Schinkel’s analysis which states that a lack of cultural imagination, i.e., a lack of presentation of the other, is problematic for cultural emancipation. The subtle distinction, however, is that Schinkel (2008, p. 81) claims that society is reduced to (one) culture as a result of the dominant idea that the culture of the ‘other’ is intrinsically problematic and incompatible with the dominant culture. In the case of Indorock it seems to be the reverse: culture is reduced to one nation-state because the ‘other’ culture is not different enough. The translation of a colonial history into a strong and (so-called) equal political connectedness within the Dutch society brushes aside ‘cultural otherness’ and ‘former colonial hierarchies’. What is equally significant is that the end of pillarization was partly set in motion by the rise of popular youth culture in which Indorock played a leading role. The depillarisation was caused by a movement towards the development of multiple individual and (sub)cultural identities, which was set in motion by the rise of popular (youth) culture. This historical event reassembles Vattimo’s philosophical description of ‘weakening’ more than Schinkel’s description of ‘reduction’.

According to Vattimo’s argument, on the one hand the rise of youth culture opened the way for multiple new (sub)cultures, and on the other hand caused the weakening of the current ‘strong’ identities in the form of the pillars. Therefore, it only seems logical that the development of a strong Dutch Indonesian cultural imagination failed to occur. The rise of chaotic imaginations, such as Indorock, could be interpreted as no more than the dissolution of the (colonial) connectedness between Indonesian and Dutch culture, which affects both Dutch and Indonesian culture. The music of The Blue Diamonds must be seen as no more than an announcement of the possibilities of new imaginations, which would not necessarily lead – but could lead – to new forms of cultural emancipation and political recognition of difference.

3.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s argumentation show two different sides of the same coin when considering the case of Indorock, and The Blue Diamonds. Schinkel seems to claim that a lack of imagination of the ‘other’ and of the dominant self, results in an essentialist cultural understanding, which leads to one culture being more legitimate than another. In line with his argumentation, it is problematic to use cultural expressions from The Blue Diamonds to fight a political battle because the identity on which the battle is based is not ‘strongly’ imagined, i.e., not able to counterbalance the cultural identity of the majority. In brief, the cultural expression is not utopic enough, and does not adequately show what cultural identity could be. ‘Promoting solidarity (within a nation-state) only works when you see it as unfinished, as a utopian project. Not if you consider solidarity as something from the past that needs to be preserved as in a museum’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 156; see also Schinkel, 2012).

On the other hand, the case of Indorock demonstrates that it is precisely this reliance on a broad (as opposed to small) cultural imagination that is problematic because this tends to result in an essentialist cultural understanding even more. Interpreting the presence of The Blue Diamonds according to Vattimo’s theory shows that the imagination or being of a culture is inherently ‘weak’. Indorock refers to multiple cultural aspects and interpretations, even though the day to day societal practice seems to be based on one strong imagination of a dominant culture. Therefore thinking about otherness is essential for cultural recognition and

51 cultural emancipation as it not only results in a weakening of a cultural minority, but also to a weakening of the majority. Therefore Vattimo proposes a heterotopic, rather than a utopic, thought. Only the heterotopic, ‘weak’ imagination of culture can mirror (cultural) being since decolonization, and only a ‘weak’ imagination of culture is able to create new and ongoing possibilities towards cultural emancipation. It is not the ideas on which nation-state solidarity are based that are problematic in Vattimo’s view, but it is the idea of a strong national solidarity (connectedness) that is outdated. Eventually, cultural freedom is nothing more than ‘going back and forth between belonging and displacement’ as Indorock was nothing more than going back and forth between a Dutch and Indonesian cultural categorization.

DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

The relationship between culture, politics and society in social and political philosophy is implicitly still based on Anderson’s (1989) idea of Imagined Communities when scholars keep associating the weakening of the nation-state with the rise of cultural diversity. Anderson asserts that the nation-state is a collective consciousness in which people who do not know each other, still imagine themselves as being part of a horizontal comradeship, a unity. In his view, the nation-state is a formal product of a cultural collective. The everyday practice of the nation-state is what one would call society. Recent social and philosophical studies (Rattansi, 2012) still base their assumptions on Anderson’s imagined communities, in that they regard the rise of cultural diversity (as a result of migration for example) as undermining the collective imagination and cultural values on which these nation-states are based. In addition, on the basis of Appadurai (1996), it can be argued that holding on to the nation-state as an ultimate political form denies the effects of globalization on cultural imagination. This is problematic considering cultural emancipation, especially the emancipation of cultural minorities within nation-states as they are often conceived as a threat for the unity of the society. These criticisms on Anderson’s imagined communities lead to the main question of this research: To what extent can a broader conception of cultural diversity and cultural emancipation, which moves beyond the theoretical and physical borders of the nation state, be formulated? This question is answered on the basis of two scholars, Schinkel (2007 & 2008) and Vattimo (1989 & 2003) and a practical example of a Dutch case: the decolonization of Indonesia. Both Schinkel and Vattimo explicitly challenge Anderson’s idea in both the academic world and the public debate. They claim that the coincidence of a cultural and political community is no longer tenable as a philosophical concept as this results in an inaccurate problematization of cultural diversity. Therefore, both philosophers reject the metaphysical tradition in sociological and political thought as this emphasizes the presumed

importance of unity, cultural unity in particular, ignoring the complex and contingent characters of nation-states and societies. They propose two new ways of thinking, or imagining, that build on, or perhaps even reject, Anderson’s imagined communities in order to actualize cultural emancipation within the context of globalization. In this thesis the proposals for a new way of thinking of Schinkel and Vattimo are practically supported and refined by the example of what happened with the arrival of more than 300.000 Dutch Indonesians in Dutch society between 1946 and 1968.

Summary

The common ground of Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s critique is their rejection of metaphysics, a way of thinking which can be illustrated by the model of the machine. For Schinkel this machine is rather a social body, although both illustrations emphasize the importance of inner unity to operate or to live. In order to stay healthy, it is thought that the social body needs to be protected from harmful outsiders. Today, cultural minorities or cultural others are often seen as these harmful ‘outsiders’ in the Netherlands as Schinkel shows when empirically investigating the ‘integration discourse’. This results in culturist thinking, ‘a cultural hierarchy in which the dominant culture is the most legitimate form of culture’ (Schinkel, 2007, p. 480). This cultural hierarchy dominates the imagination (or dreaming) of the cultural others, as they are not acknowledged by the dominant culture, and not able to participate in the imagination of the dominant or their own culture. The major consequence of limited imagination is the reduction of being of minorities. In order to contest this reduction, Schinkel proposes a utopian thought. This utopian thought is a form of imagination that allows for alternatives that contest the existing hierarchy because this utopia is an unfinished project of totality in which no distinction is made between insiders and (harmful) outsiders. Even though Schinkel points at important problems concerning this cultural hierarchy, he fails to address the imagination of possible cultural worlds when concentrating on a problematic imagination of society. He seems to argue that culture should be less important in the sociological discourse. Schinkel argues in favor of a kind of cultural blindness in the socio-political discourse in which (cultural) difference or otherness should be neutralized because otherness is the basis on which cultural minorities are reduced in their being. Vattimo, by contrast, does not reject the metaphysics of society as such, but rather rejects metaphysics in total. He argues that our thinking concerning cultural emancipation should take a step further in imagining cultural otherness. Vattimo regards the emphasis on otherness

not as a causal factor for reduction, but as the cause for weakening: ‘the impossibility of silencing argumentation and suppressing plurality’. In Vattimo’s view, the weakening of being prevents a dominant (sub)culture from seizing the power too easily. In fact, one could interpret this weakening as a reduction of being in general (also of majorities), that carries the possibility of emancipation because of an awareness and imagination of otherness. Vattimo replaces the machine with the model of the museum, which is an illustration of heterotopic rather than utopic thought. The model of the museum is not a proposal for a new societal imagination, but rather it focuses on the imagination of multiple cultural worlds. The case study of the migration wave of Dutch Indonesians after decolonization, concentrating on the rise of Indorock which is illustrated by the rock group, The Blue Diamonds, illustrates how ‘otherness’ can be interpreted differently from either Schinkel’s or Vattimo’s analysis. If we follow Schinkel’s analysis, the case study shows that ‘otherness’ is not an innocent label as the ‘exotic’ otherness of The Blue Diamonds seems to represent an orientalist discourse that results from former colonial cultural hierarchies. In this case the imagination is limited due to a colonial inheritance that is ignored by the dominant Dutch cultural code. The problem is not that the Dutch Indonesian culture is not imagined in this case, but rather that the Dutch Indonesians are restricted in participating in the imagination of their own culture. Moreover, the ‘exotic’ otherness is not strong enough to counterbalance the majority culture. On the other hand, according to Vattimo’s line of argumentation, the case shows that including this otherness is even more problematic, because it seems to neglect otherness in general. The connectedness between Dutch and Indonesians limits the possible imagination of the (Dutch) Indonesian cultural identity of The Blue Diamonds. Ignoring otherness does not do justice to the complexity and multiplicity of today’s (sub)cultures, and therefore does not give the opportunity for cultural emancipation. Cultural emancipation must be based on a kind of conception of otherness, if only because it is a precondition for an awareness of a generally weakening of being, as Vattimo so eloquently explains.

Conclusion

To return to the central question of this thesis, both Schinkel and Vattimo contribute to a philosophically broader conception of cultural emancipation as they show two different sides of the same coin, focusing on the philosophical conceptions of being and the imagination of otherness. First, Schinkel does not necessarily contest the idea that a political community and a culture coincide within a nation-state or ‘society’, but argues that society should be imagined in a more utopian way in order to overcome today’s problematic imagination of cultural otherness. According to Schinkel cultural minorities are threatened in their being because of the emphasize on cultural otherness. An utopian imagination should strengthen the collectivity of the imagination through which the struggle over ‘otherness’ is no longer a problem. Instead of seeing ‘otherness’ as a problem from the outside on which cultural exclusion can be based, ‘otherness’ should become part of society from within. Then, utopian thought not only results in cultural minorities having political power in contributing to the collective imagination, also the majority culture is forced to interpret the totality of in- and outside in association with minorities. Proposing a new utopia, Schinkel points at an important aim of imagination: the imagination of alternatives which may result in an overarching collectivity and solidarity. Schinkel follows in the footsteps of Anderson quite obviously, transforming nationalism as a community of national solidarity by critical nationalism as a source for global solidarity. ‘Sociological thinking is a search for alternative forms of living, for living-together’ (Schinkel, 2008, p. 157; Schinkel, 2012). However, Vattimo’s heterotopic thought can be seen as nuancing Schinkel’s utopian thought and even as a radical critique on striving for a collective imagination in which the distinction between inside and outside is not made. First, the nuance is that a lacking imagination of otherness could be even more dangerous than imagining otherness, because cultural otherness can be seen as the foundation of cultural recognition and freedom. Moreover, the radical critique on Schinkel’s analysis which can be formulated on the basis of Vattimo is a rejection of emphasizing collectivity. As Vattimo points out, the world does not consist of one collective imagination but of multiple imaginations. Schinkel could object that that imaginations of ‘others’ are not strong enough to counterbalance the majority and therefore a new overarching solidarity should cover up the distinction between outside and inside. Following Schinkel’s line of thought, Vattimo could be labeled as a relativist, denying the importance of (global) solidarity.

This critique, however, is limited because Vattimo does not argue that solidarity or collectives are impossible, he only claims that these collectives and solidarities should be weaker, in the sense that they are temporarily and locally contingent. The only way imagination can be emancipatory is when there is an awareness that imaginations can be counterbalanced by other imaginations (others or otherness), thus by being and thinking heterotopic and weak. ‘We did not just drop the barriers, leaving anyone free to set about making their own interpretation of the world prevail […] if the conflict of interpretations is not to turn in a physical contest, then every interpretation has to step forward with its arguments’ (Vattimo, 2003, p. 95). According to Vattimo, the imagination of the other(ness) is thus a precondition for emancipation, and therefore Schinkel’s view (a revisited Anderson) is limited, although Schinkel too points at important hierarchical and solidarity issues considering cultural emancipation.

Discussion

Admittedly, this explanation too is insufficient. Vattimo’s analysis can indeed be seen as a critique of Schinkel’s work in that it shows that harsh contrasts, for example between inclusion and exclusion, outside and inside, and alikeness and otherness, lack attention for cultural difference or otherness in a fundamentally philosophical way. Vattimo’s analysis shows that including otherness or an appreciation of otherness can be as problematic as exclusion on the basis of this same otherness. Nevertheless, the longing for a strong solidarity and living with kindred spirits seems to be an important aspect of human nature. People want to belong and give meaning to their lives, but most of all they want to be part of a powerful solidarity. Although, as Vattimo argues, weakening does serve as a precondition for emancipation, it is evident that human nature is inclined to strive for a stronger form of living together. History may have shown the dissolution of Western societies, but even more, it has shown its will to survive. Finally, Vattimo effectively describes the relationship between historical events and thinking, but this also uncovers a limitation of this research. In proposing a new way of thinking or imagining in order to provide cultural emancipation, the implicit assumption is made that thinking models the world we live in. However, while this may be true, our thinking is also shaped or caused by historical events and sociopolitical change. A retrospective reflection of history may uncover the relationship between events and

57 philosophy, but what does this say about the here and now? If it is only possible to reflect on thinking after an event, what can we do, say or think at the time of the event (consider the refugee crisis, Charlie Hebdo, and the bombings in Paris)? It suggests, in fact, that this research, and perhaps all philosophical research, undergoes the risk of its results being outdated at the very moment of publishing. Nonetheless, this does not imply that this philosophical research is irrelevant for present political and social organization, as the effects of historical events and sociopolitical change are long-standing. The example of Indorock shows the long-standing effects of the historical event of decolonization. It is an interesting example of how the struggle of independence and the arrival of Indonesian Europeans shaped Dutch thinking within a global context. It is not a recent example, and it does not provide precise guidelines for how to deal with contemporary migration, partially because today’s migrants often do not share a long history of cultural connectedness with the Dutch, and are therefore more ‘other’ than the Dutch Indonesians were. Nevertheless, the migration of Dutch Indonesians helped spawn the thinking about cultural emancipation and emancipation policy in the Netherlands. Therefore, the example clearly shows the danger of clinging to tradition of thought, as it identifies the risk of an ignored, but still lived colonial inheritance. According to Schinkel’s and Vattimo’s argumentation, Indorock became in essence a plea for a continuous pursuit of social, political, but moreover, philosophical change. Hopefully, human longing for a uniformity and solidarity is as strong as human longing for change. If we are to believe the Indorockers it clearly is.

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