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EENF Wheelwright Pond Dam Removal Project

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EENF Wheelwright Pond Dam Removal Project Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) Office Environmental Notification Form For Office Use Only EEA#: MEPA Analyst: The information requested on this form must be completed in order to submit a document electronically for review under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, 301 CMR 11.00. Project Name: Wheelwright Pond Dam Removal Project Street Address: Mill Street (Hardwick) Municipality: Hardwick and New Braintree Watershed: Chicopee Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinates: Latitude: 42.352418 Zone 18T E 735805.26, N 4692876.78 Longitude: -72.136976 Estimated commencement date: Aug. 2022 Estimated completion date: June 2026 Project Type: Dam Removal Status of project design: Dam Removal 95%complete MassCentral Rail Trail Bridge: 25% Complete RJ McDonald Mitigation: 75% Complete Proponent: Raitto Industrial Park, Inc. Street Address: 36 Mill Street Municipality: Wheelwright State: MA Zip Code: 01094 Name of Contact Person: Kristin Dippold Firm/Agency: Tighe & Bond, Inc. Street Address: 1 University Ave Municipality: Westwood State: MA Zip Code: 02090 Phone: (814) 335-0763 Fax: (413) 562-5317 E-mail: [email protected] Does this project meet or exceed a mandatory EIR threshold (see 301 CMR 11.03)? Yes No If this is an Expanded Environmental Notification Form (ENF) (see 301 CMR 11.05(7)) or a Notice of Project Change (NPC), are you requesting: a Single EIR? (see 301 CMR 11.06(8)) Yes No a Special Review Procedure? (see 301CMR 11.09) Yes No a Waiver of mandatory EIR? (see 301 CMR 11.11) Yes No a Phase I Waiver? (see 301 CMR 11.11) Yes No (Note: Greenhouse Gas Emissions analysis must be included in the Expanded ENF.) Which MEPA review threshold(s) does the project meet or exceed (see 301 CMR 11.03)? ENF and Mandatory EIR ñ 301 CMR 11.03(3)(a)(4): structural alteration of an existing dam that causes any decrease in impoundment capacity ñ 301 CMR 11.03(1)(a): alteration of one or more acres of bordering vegetated wetland; ñ 301 CMR 11.03(3)(a)(1)(b): alteration of ten or more acres of any other wetlands ENF and Other MEPA Review if the Secretary so Requires ñ 301 CMR 11.03(3)(b)(1)(b): alternation of 500 or more linear feet of inland bank ñ 301 CMR 11.03(3)(b)(1)(d): alternation of >5,000 sf of bordering vegetated wetlands ñ 301 CMR 11.03(3)(b)(1)(f): alternation of >1/2 acres of any other wetland (LUW, BLSF, Riverfront Area) Effective January 2011 Which State Agency Permits will the project require? ñ Chapter 253 Dam Safety Permit (MassDCR) ñ Section 401 Water Quality Certification (MassDEP) ñ Wetlands Protection Act Order of Conditions (MassDEP) ñ Waterways Chapter 91 License (MassDEP) Identify any financial assistance or land transfer from an Agency of the Commonwealth, including the Agency name and the amount of funding or land area in acres: EEA Dam & Seawall Repair and Removal Fund: $75,000 MassDER Priority project funding: $48,000 (FY21) Summary of Project Size Existing Change Total & Environmental Impacts LAND Total site acreage 300 acres +/- New acres of land altered 75 acres +/- Acres of impervious area 2.5 acres +/- No change 2.5 acres +/- Square feet of new bordering 1,564,000 square vegetated wetlands alteration feet+/- Square feet of new other wetland 1,700,000 square feet+/- alteration Acres of new non-water dependent N/A use of tidelands or waterways STRUCTURES Gross square footage N/A N/A N/A Number of housing units N/A N/A N/A Maximum height (feet) N/A N/A N/A TRANSPORTATION Vehicle trips per day N/A N/A N/A Parking spaces N/A N/A N/A WASTEWATER Water Use (Gallons per day) N/A N/A N/A Water withdrawal (GPD) N/A N/A N/A Wastewater generation/treatment N/A N/A N/A (GPD) Length of water mains (miles) N/A N/A N/A Length of sewer mains (miles) N/A N/A N/A Has this project been filed with MEPA before? Yes (EEA # ) No Has any project on this site been filed with MEPA before? Yes (EEA # ) No - 2 - GENERAL PROJECT INFORMATION – all proponents must fill out this section PROJECT DESCRIPTION: Describe the existing conditions and land uses on the project site The Wheelwright Pond Dam is a run-of-river dam located on the Ware River between Hardwick and New Braintree, Massachusetts. The dam was associated with an adjacent mill and is located approximately 3.1 river-miles downstream of Wheelwright Road (Route 32) in Ware and approximately 1.8 river-miles upstream of Hardwick Road in Hardwick and New Braintree. The Ware River flows through Worcester and Hampden County, and joins with the Quaboag River in Palmer to form the Chicopee River. The Chicopee River is the largest single tributary to the Connecticut River. The drainage area to Wheelwright Pond Dam is approximately 129 square miles and is primarily composed of forested areas. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) StreamStats application shows that less than 10-percent of the drainage area is composed of developed (urban) land as defined by the 2011 National Land Cover Database (2011) (the dataset used by StreamStats), and approximately 10-percent of the drainage area is composed of wetlands. In the area of the dam, an upstream gravel mining and washing business (R. J. McDonald, Inc.) draws water from the impoundment formed by the dam. A railroad bridge crosses the river approximately 2.8 miles upstream from the dam, and Wheelwright Road (Route 32) crosses the river upstream from the railroad bridge, approximately 3.1 miles upstream from the dam. In between RJ McDonald and the railroad bridge, the river corridor is surrounded by forest and wetland areas. Barre Falls Dam (MA00962) in Hubbardston, Massachusetts, is located on the Ware River approximately 10 miles upstream of Wheelwright Pond Dam. Barre Falls Dam is a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) flood control dam that “substantially reduces flooding along the Ware, Chicopee, and Connecticut Rivers”1. The closest dam located upstream of Wheelwright Pond Dam along the Ware River is South Barre Mill Pond Dam (MA00091) in Barre, Massachusetts, located approximately 4.5 miles upstream of Wheelwright Pond Dam. The closest downstream dam on the Ware River is the Ware Industries Upper Dam (MA00594) in Ware, Massachusetts, located approximately nine (9) miles downstream of Wheelwright Pond Dam. Wheelwright Pond Dam does not affect flood levels or operations at the neighboring dams. The dam is surrounded by the remains of the former mill complex at the right abutment on the west side, and the clearing for the runway of the Tanner-Hiller Airport is located on the east side. The dam is a significant obstruction on a particularly scenic and undeveloped section of the Ware River. The impoundment extends upstream from the dam approximately 2.5 miles, and immediately downstream from the dam the river is artificially wide to accommodate discharges from the spillway. Although the impoundment is narrow, the presence of the dam floods a portion of what would be surrounding floodplain and wetlands, including former oxbows, and separates stream segments that would total approximately 130 miles of connected river corridor and habitat. Removal of the dam would serve to benefit ecological communities, state-listed special concern species, and human recreation. The dam is also deteriorated; it was inspected and rated in Poor condition during a required dam safety inspection as long ago as 2006. The dam owner began compliance with subsequent dam safety orders, including having performed a Phase II inspection completed in 2009-2010. Although the dam has subsequently been found in marginally improved condition, the dam owner is not financially able to implement needed repairs. In 2018, given the significantly important natural resources along the Ware River near the project site and the potential for restoring ecological processes impacted by the dam, the Massachusetts Department of Fish and Game Division of Ecological Restoration (MassDER) selected removal of the Wheelwright Pond Dam as a Priority Project. A team of project partners with shared goals, including MassDER, the East Quabbin Land Trust (EQLT), and the dam owner (Riatto Industrial Park, Inc.), subsequently assembled. 1 www.nae.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/Flood-Risk-Management/Massachusetts/Barre-Falls/ - 3 - In addition to ecological restoration and public safety benefits through dam removal, the project partners seek to increase recreational opportunities by developing a new river crossing for the MassCentral Rail Trail, which will provide a critical link between Central and Western Massachusetts. Successful accomplishment of these goals also requires that adverse impacts to infrastructure that have developed around the impoundment be appropriately mitigated. This protect partner group, led by MassDER, has worked to identify resources of concern that may be adversely impacted by the dam removal and develop strategies to avoid, minimize, or mitigate these impacts so that the project can proceed without significant adverse impacts. Please refer to the EENF narrative for additional project details. Describe the proposed project and its programmatic and physical elements: This run-of-river dam consists of several distinct components, with a total length of approximately 500 feet, and a maximum structural height of approximately 17 feet. Beginning at the right (west) abutment, the primary spillway extends approximately 75 across the river, then angles approximately 22 degrees upstream, and then continues left approximately 65 feet. This section of spillway is ogee in shape and approximately 10 feet in height. The date of construction is unknown, although design or construction information is shown on drawings prepared by the Worcester County Commissioners dated March 8, 1921.
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