Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 815 – 830, 2000

Aidingdemocracy? Donors and civil societyin South A frica

JULIE HEARN

ABSTRACT Duringthe 1990sthe North hasincreasingly useda newtool, political aid,to in uence its relations with the South.More commonly known as ‘democracyassistance’ , political aidis targeted atgovernmentalstructures such as parliament,the judiciary andlocal government,as well as civil society organisations,with the aimof strengtheningthe institutions andculture of liberal democracy.However, despite its increasing deployment,the shapeand extent of foreign political aidin individual countries inthe Southremain largely undocumented.This article shows the importanceof political aidin South Africa since the pivotal elections of 1994.It thencritically examinesthe role assigned to civil society bydonors within the ‘democratisation’process. Unlike most writers onthe newpolitical aidregime, who are often bothits chroniclers and mandarins,this authorquestions the emancipatorypotential ofthe kindof democracybeing ‘ helpedalong’ by democracy assistance.

Foreignintervention has long been a factorin South Africa’ s politics.But the nature ofinternational involvement in the1990s differed substantially from thatwhich had precededit: direct engagement replaced pressure through isolation, giving foreign powersdirect real and potential in uence over domestic South African politics. 1 If youcan in uence the rules of the game, you don’ t haveto play. 2

Democracyassistance: promotingstability Duringthe 1980sanewbranch of the aid industrywas born,democracy assistance. Although‘ democracy’often entered the foreign-policy-makingvo- cabularyof the Northin the postwarperiod, it was notthe dominantform in whichthe Northrelated to the South.The principal formwas the development ofstrategic alliances with authoritarian regimes. Thenew industry arose outof amajor reconsiderationof Western foreignpolicy towards the South,particularly withinthe USA.With the USdefeat inVietnam, the Nicaraguanrevolution andother nationalist victories in the South,US foreignpolicy towards the Third Worldhad reached crisis-point bythe late 1970s.It hadfailed tostop popular anti-US regimes takingpower in South East Asia, Central America andSouthern Africa andits capacity toshape events abroadappeared severely curtailed. By the early 1980s, anewconsensus began to emergeamong policy-makers around the strategy of‘ democracypromotion’ . This involvedtwo key elements. 3

JulieHearn teaches atthe School of Oriental and African Studies, University ofLondon. She can be contacted atThornhaughStreet, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, UK. E-mail: [email protected].

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050815-16 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 815 JULIE HEARN

First was the recognitionthat coercivepolitical arrangementshad f ailed to deal with the social movementsthat hadchallenged authoritarian rule andthat formal liberal democracies werebetter able toabsorb social dissent andcon ict. It is important tounderstand that the rationale forturning to liberal democracy was that it was perceivedto be abetter guarantorof stability. Thegoal remained the same: social stability, it was simply that the means toachieve the endhad changed.This becomesclear whenwe examine the kindof democracy being promotedin the ThirdWorld. It is aboutcreating political structures that most effectively maintain the international system. It has nomore to dowith radical changethan its predecessor,authoritarianism does.As Samuel Huntington,one ofthe most inuential proponentsof formal democracy,clearly states: ‘The maintenanceof democratic politics andthe reconstructionof the social orderare fundamentallyincompatible.’ 4 Atits core,the contemporarypolitical andindus- try is abouteffective system maintenance. Thesecond point is that, whereearlier foreignpolicy had focused almost exclusively onthe strength ofthe client state andits governmentalapparatus, the newdemocracy strategy beganto recognise the important role ofcivil society. Itwas fromwithin civil society that oppositionto authoritarian rule hademerged andtherefore it was imperative ‘to penetrate civil society and from therein assure controlover popular mobilization’ (emphasis inoriginal). Robinson continues: Thecomposition and balance of power in civil society in a givenThird World countryis now just as important to US andtransnational interests as who controls thegovernments of those countries. This is ashiftfrom socialcontrol ‘ from above’ tosocial control ‘ from below… ’5 This is animportant part ofdemocracy assistance. Aidis targeted at acountry’s most inuential, modern,advocacy-orientated civil society organswhich in- clude: women’s organisations,human rights groups,national orsectoral NGO for a,business associations, private policyinstitutes, youthand student organisations, andprofessional media associations. As commentators,including those whodirect the newpolitical aid,have pointed out, this is notvery different from what the CIA usedto do, particularly within the contextof counter-insurgency and‘ low-intensity conict’ . However,former CIA director William Colbymakes akeypoint: ‘ Manyof the programswhich … wereconducted as covert operations[can now be] conducted quite openly,and consequently, without controversy’. 6 AsRobinsonpoints out: ‘Transferringpolitical interventionfrom the covertto the overtrealm doesnot change its character,but it doesmake it easier for policymakersto builddomestic andinternational supportfor this intervention.’7 This is the trump-cardof democracy promotion, it diffuses oppositionto Northernintervention. Advisor to the State Departmentand academic, Wiarda, clearly sums up: AUSstancein favor of democracy helps get the Congress, the bureaucracy, the media,the public, and elite opinion to back US policy.It helps ameliorate the domesticdebate, disarms critics (who could be against democracy?) … The democracyagenda enables us, additionally, to merge and fudge over some issues thatwould otherwise be troublesome. It helps bridge the gap between our funda- 816 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA

mentalgeopolitical and strategic interests … andour need to clothe those security concernsin moralistic language … Thedemocracy agenda, in short, is a kindof legitimacycover for ourmore basic strategic objectives. 8

Since its inceptionin the early 1980s, democracyassistance has continuedits take-off.9 Inthe 1990sthis was fuelled bythree important developments:the academic anddonor preoccupation with ‘governance’as the rootof underdevel- opment,the practice ofpolitical conditionality,that is, makingaid conditionalon political reforms,and the changingbalance of power in North – Southrelations. Duringthe 1980sanorthodoxy developed that Africa’s developmentcrisis was precipitated bya failure ofthe state andthat ‘governance’had to berecon- structed, fromthe bottomup. Shaping civil society becamethe roadto ref orming the state.10 Makingaid dependenton such changes has beenthe site ofsharp confrontations betweenthe governmentsof many sub-Saharan African countries and donors.11 InSouth Africa, no such crude coercion was needed.As international opponentsof apartheid, including Western states, unitedwith domestic combatants,a broadconsensus was forgedover the formthat anewliberal democracywould take. With the demise ofnationalist andsocialist ideologies, suchforeign, overtly political, interference was nolonger viewed with the same levels ofdistrust. Thelatter has allowedthe Northto intervenein the (civil) societies ofthe Southwith anunprecedented degree of perceived legitimacy. SouthAfrica has hada longhistory ofWestern supportto civil society. The highlycon ictual politics ofapartheid, particularly ofthe late 1970sand1980 s, generateda ‘vast arrayof more or less popular,more or less institutionalised organisations andinitiatives in broadopposition to the apartheidstate’ . 12 These includedtrade unions,community organisations, sectorally mobilised movements ofyouth, students andwomen, as well as business, lawyers andreligious associations. It is these kindsof civil society organisations ( CSOs)(althoughthey werehardly ever referred to as such)that donorsfunded. This supportbegan with Denmarkin the mid-1960sand was followedby Norwayand Sweden in the 1970s.13 It culminated inthe mid-1980swiththe imposition ofsanctions by Western governmentsand the international isolation ofthe apartheidregime. The Nordiccountries werejoined at this time bythe EuropeanUnion and the USA, whoeach provided an unprecedented $3 40million overa nineyear period to CSOs, beforethe endof apartheid and the 1994elections. 14 Despite sucha signicant involvement,a comprehensiveaccount of foreign assistance tocivil society in this periodis still to bewritten, notleast becauseof the covertnature ofthat support.With the election ofan internationally recognisedgovernment, foreigndonors began to provide aid tothe newSouth African state as well as continuingsome fundingto civil society, thoughon a smaller scale. Although this loss of nancehas hada considerableimpact, it has notbeen f ullyanalysed andthus there is substantial dispute as tohow much funding was withdrawnand howsigni cant this was. This article examines foreignassistance to civil society in SouthAfrica since 1994.The premise ofthis research is that political aid is ‘political’, that it is aboutconsciously in uencing the ‘rules ofthe game’as onedonor representative, quotedat the beginningof this article, stated in aninterview forthis study. 817 JULIE HEARN

Thekey ndingof the research is that, ofthe CSOsthat donorssupport in their political aid programmes,what we describe as ‘governance/democracy’ CSOs playa particularly prominentrole. These organisations are concernedwith promotingthe values,procedures and overall frameworkof liberal democracyin contrast to otherdonor-f undedadvocacy NGOs, whichtend to besingle-issue pressure groups,such as humanrights groupsor women’ s associations. There are at least eight suchdemocracy CSOsthat donorsfund, some ofwhich are amongSouth Africa’ s most experiencedand in uential political actors. They formedthe largest groupingof CSOsfundedby donors, they consistently received the largest foreigngrants, and they were supported by a broadcross-section of donors.Other CSOsthat featuredin donordemocracy programmes were think- tanks,legal aid groupsproviding f ree services to the poor, NGOs providing services to the development NGO community,and trade unions.However, there weref ewerof these, theyreceived less funding,and they received it fromfewer donors.Our conclusion is that adonorfocus, although by no means anexclusive focus,on liberal democracyorganisations is aresponseto SouthAfrica’ s political past. Inthe literature ondemocratisation democracyis oftenleft undened. How- ever,democracy has many,at times conicting, meanings.During the struggle against apartheid,many South Africans foughtfor a formof democracy that includedincreased controlover the economyas well as political freedom.This is certainly the kindof democracy that trade unionsespoused, who were receivingsubstantial Western fundingat the time. However,in the newSouth Africa liberal democracy,also knownas polyarchy,has cometo replace this conceptof democracy. Robinson de nes polyarchyas ‘elite minority rule and socioeconomicinequalities alongsideformal political freedomand elections involvinguniversal sufferage’. 15 Underpolyarchy, democracy is purelylimited to the political sphere.Formal, procedural democracy can exist alongside massive material inequality,because it is outside the denition of polyarchy to address the economicsphere. ‘ Perhapsmore than at anyother time in the recent past, it is nowthat the struggle tode ne “ democracy”has becomea major ideological battle.’16 This ideological battle is evidentin South Africa, where our research foundthat democracy NGOs, supportedby Western donors,have been critical in popularisingformal democracyover a residual belief in social democracy.17 Inthe light oftoday’ s highlyuncritical viewof liberal democracy amongAfricanists, amongmany sectors ofcivil society in Africa and,not surprisingly,among Western aid agencies,the article raises the questionof whetherthis is the kindof democracy that the majority ofSouth Africans want. Thepaper begins by identi fyingSouth Africa’ s main foreigndonors. We then pointout the importanceof democracy assistance toSouth Af rica comparedwill othertypes offoreign aid anddiscuss whystrengthening government structures has beenthe primaryfocus of democracy assistance since 1994.Within the contextof promoting a liberal democratic state, weask whatrole civil society has to play.We arguethat, within the eyes ofthe foreigndonor community, civil society has acritical role to playin bridgingthe link betweenthe new governmentstructures andsociety at large.As suchit will continueto beof importanceto the international donorcommunity. 818 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA

SouthAfrica’ s foreigndonors TheUSA is, byfar,the largest overall foreigndonor to SouthAfrica. From 199 4 to 1999it providedsome $530million. TheEU is the secondlargest foreign donor,providing an EU Programmefor Reconstruction and Development (EUPRD)ofnearly $42 0million between199 4and1999. Between the twoof them alone,nearly $1 billion ofinternational aid will havecontributed to South Africa’s transition. Othersigni cant foreigndonors to SouthAfrica are the Netherlands,the Nordiccountries, Germany and the UK,providingbetween $15 million and$ 45million annuallysince 1994.Canada is arelatively smaller bilateral donor,providing less than$10 million peryear. The largest actor in the international donorcommunity world-wide, the WorldBank, plays aminimal role as alendinginstitution. Nonetheless it has asignicant presencein South Africa bypresenting itself as a‘knowledgebank’ which has providedthe governmentwith ‘lessons ofinternational experience’on every aspect of policy.18

Theimportance of democracy assistance Unlikein other African countries, democracy assistance forms amajor part of foreignaid to SouthAfrica. The principal objective ofaid programmesto the countryis toin uence the political transition andto focuson democratic consolidation.This kindof aid is instark contrast toother donor programmes on the continent,which primarily supplementthe meagrenational budgetof African governmentsso that theycan provide basic services in the areas ofwelfare, agriculture,energy and infrastructure. Theseare the predominantcategories of aid in most Africancountries, where democracy assistance onaverage accounts forless than5% of total aid.South Af rica, with anaverage per capita GNP of about$3 200,is categorised as anupper middle incomecountry, along with Brazil andChile. Assuchit wouldnormally be disquali ed as anaid recipient. Danishaid, for example, is restricted tocountries withan average GNP per capita ofless than$ 2000.Aidto the countryis seen as atemporarymeasure, because, as USAID/SouthAf rica pointsout: ‘ SouthAfrica has substantial resources to address its problemsover the longterm.’ Donor programmes are termed ‘transitional’, mirroringSouth Af rica’s owntransition, andwere to endsoon after the 1999elections, commonlyperceived as the formal end-pointof the passage fromone political system to another.In South Africa, nation-wide povertyis notthe motivating forcebehind donor activity. Thewhole thrust ofaid involvementis aboutdeepening the political changesthat havetaken place since 1994andensuring that, as far as possible, ‘apointof irreversibility’ is reached beforethe endingof external assistance. 19 Foreignaid to SouthAf rica is very mucha case ofdemocracy assistance, andif wewished to study contemporary foreignintervention in acountry’s democratisation process,South Africa could notbe a better case study. Despite the gross inequality in the country,and the fact that forthe majority ofSouth Africans the struggle fora newSouth Africa was conductedin terms ofthe establishment ofan economically different society, inuenced by socialist 819 JULIE HEARN paradigms,the conceptualframework of aid programmesis that ofstrengthening anewlyemerging liberal democracy.The US aid programme, USAID, states that ‘SouthAfrica’ s transformation is, inthe rst instance political’. It continues: ‘…progressin the political arenamust continuein orderto providethe stability andoverall frameworkf orthe sustainable transformation ofall sectors within SouthAfrica.’ It reiterates the importanceof the political landscapewhen it concludes:‘ Consolidationof democracy is the most apparentchallenge in the newSouth Africa’ . Denmarkdescribes its transitional assistance programmeas being‘ clearly targeted towardsfacilitating the transition froman authoritarian minority rule toa democratic system ofgovernment’ . Theaim ofthe German KonradAdenauer Foundation is to ‘strengthendemocracy in people’s minds’ anda Dutchaid ofcial spokeof the overridingneed ‘ toanchor democracy in SouthAf rica forlong-term stability’ . 20 Suchan emphasis runscontrary to earlier views ofthe contentof donor programmes. Landsberg wrote of signi cant capital inows coming to SouthAfrica after 1994‘to assist efforts to reduce socio-economicbacklogs’ . 21 Asaresult ofthe importanceplaced on trans form- ingSouth Africa intoa stable ‘Western’liberal democracy,assistance toother sectors is also viewedin the same light—as mechanisms forcontributing to democratic consolidation.For example, USAID/SouthAfrica writes of:

theindirect support for democraticconsolidation provided by other SOs[strategic objectives]through their funding of Government and NGO programsto deliver tangiblebene ts to the majority population in education,housing, health, and other areas(which most observers believe is importantfor long-termdemocratic stability inSouth Africa). 22 Theimportance attached to political developmentis seen in boththe size of fundingand the proportionof resources allocated todemocracy projects within the overall aid budgetsof donors. The USA, as elsewhere in the world,is the lead donorin terms ofamounts of aid to democracy.In 1997 it provided$17 million fordemocracy and governance projects. Overa periodof eight years, between1996 and 2 003,it plans tospend $118 million ondemocracypromotion inSouth Africa. 23 Otherdonors are also allocating relatively large sums ofaid forpolitical development.Sweden provided about $9 million fordemocracy and humanrights projects in1997 along with some $7million forpublic administra- tion,providing a total of$16 million fordemocracy and governance in 1997.In 1998and 1999 it plannedto provideabout $18 million eachyear, with democracyand human rights projects accountingfor some $11million peryear. Denmarkallocated some $23million fordemocratisation andthe preventionof violenceover the veyear period 199 4to 1998,averaging almost $5million annually.24 TheCanadian aid programmeis probablythe most exceptionalin terms ofthe relative weightingof resources devotedto democracyand governance. In its currentbilateral programme,57% of funds go towardsa governanceprogramme, which,along with the 5%of its programmethat goestowards civil society capacity building,forms arecord-breaking6 2%.Nearly two-thirds ofthe Canadianprogramme is political aid.Such an aid prole is unreplicatedin South Africa althoughthe USprogrammecomes close andis certainly uniquein 820 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA comparisonto other US programmesaround the world.The proportion of US aid designatedfor democracy and governance ranges from 2 0%in 1997to 42%of overall aid from2 001to 2003.Needless to say,its democracyand governance sector receivedthe highest allocation off undsamong the othersectors from 1998to the endof the programme,an unusual phenomenon in itself.Inthe Swedishaid programme,democracy and governance aid accountsfor 4 0%ofthe total aid programmefrom 1997 into the beginningof the twenty-rst century. Althoughmodest in comparisonwill the previousdonors, the proportionof Danishaid goingto democracy is also high,in general aid terms, at 20%oftotal aid.Such astonishingly highproportions suggest that muchof these donors’ raison d’etre in SouthAfrica is to beclosely involvedin the political development ofthe country. 25 Sucha strongemphasis onpolitical aid inSouth Africa is hardlysurprising. Since the beginningof the century,South Africa has beenimportant to the West, bothpolitically andeconomically. It has beendescribed as ‘areliable, ifjunior, memberof the Northernclub’ . 26 TheWest’ s relationship withAfrica was largely predicatedon a long-termstrategic alliance with the apartheidregime inSouth Africa. This continuedthroughout the 1970sand into the 1980s. At the same time SouthAfrican capital, some ofwhich was inthe same leagueas that ofany Northern-basedcorporation, became thoroughly intermeshed with capital orig- inating in Europe,the USAandJapan. As globalisation advanced,South Africa becamea keyoutpost of international capital. However,with the political unrest that beganwith the 1976Soweto uprising, capital outside SouthAfrica beganto pushits SouthAfrican counterparts to search fora political solution that would involvea transition fromracial tonon-racial capitalism. Thereare twof actors at this conjuncturethat explainthe priority givento democracybuilding in South Africa bythe West after 1994. The rst factor is the involvement,from the beginning,of the donorcom- munityin shaping the transition that it nowunderstood to be unavoidable. The donorcommunity f ullyrecognised the importanceof a negotiatedsettlement and accordinglyinvested heavilyin it. Landsberghas documentedtheir involvement, fromthe establishment ofthe 1986Commonwealth Eminent Person’ s Group, which rst popularisedthe notionof a ‘peaceful negotiatedsettlement’ , to the April 1994elections. 27 Althoughmuch of the inuence that the West exertedon the transition was throughdiplomatic channels,political aid playeda role.The Germanpolitical foundationsplayed an important role inbuilding alliances with different sections ofcivil society. 28 Theconservative Konrad Adenauer foun- dationwas aligningitself withButhelezi from198 2.The liberal Friedrich Naumannfoundation supported the institute fora Democratic SouthAfrica (IDASA),an in uential CSO that broughttogether opposing political protagonists ina ground-breakingseries ofmeetings inDakar in 1987. The social democratic Friedrich Ebertfoundation has beena close supporterof the ANC,andhelped to write its macroeconomicpolicy through the Macro-EconomicResearch Groupin 1993.Thedonor community knew that this was just the rst stage andthat ifthe initial investment wereto meananything it must bef ollowedby substantial aid toconsolidate the transition. Thesecond factor that explains donorconcentration onpolitical aid is the prolongedperiod of ungovernability that SouthAfrica 821 JULIE HEARN facedin the decadeafter the Sowetouprising. The rule oflaw andany semblance ofthe social contract hadcompletely brokendown. With sucha history it is nosurprise that the donorsare makingsuch a concertedeffort to shapethe political developmentof the country. Since 1994andthe installation ofa newpolitical dispensation,f oreignaid has prioritised reshapingaspects ofthe ‘limited state’other than civil society. These haveincluded the process ofpolicy formulation; governmentstructures at provincialand local level; buildinggovernment capacity; newpolitical institutions suchas the Truthand Reconciliation Commission ( TRC);andold institutions suchas the police.Canada has providedtechnical assistance to awide rangeof South African government departments andpublic institutions relating to policyactivities andsubsequently has beeninvolved in the productionof eight greenand white papers.This policyinvolvement is supplementedby a justice system project,linking the CanadianFederal Departmentof Justice with the Ministry ofJustice inSouth Af rica. Twoprominent areas that Nordicand Dutch democracyaid havegone to are the TRC andthe police. Theemphasis ofthe USNational Democratic Institute forInternational Affairs (NDI)is onstrengthening the national andprovincial legislatures and makinggovernment more accountable to citizens throughethics codesand similar legislation. It describes its activities as developinga ‘structural frame- workfor local government’. Its main project is a$3.8million USAID-funded programmeworking with the Departmentof Constitutional Development,the secondhouse of the SouthAfrican parliament, the National Councilof Provinces (NCOP),the SouthAfrican Local Government Association andthe legislature of SouthAfrica’ s most strategically placedprovince, Gauteng. This project is supplementedby another, which has beenrunning since 1995and has received some $267000 from the USgovernment-fundedNational Endowmentfor Democracy (NED).The project aims to increase the effectiveness ofnational and regionallegislators byorganisingparliamentary studymissions to othercountries with relevant democratic experiences.In the wordsof NED:‘these missions will helpparliamentary leaders to undertakeconcrete measures to institutionalize goodgovernance norms that strengthenpublic and elite supportfor democracy.’29 After 1994the primaryfocus of the KonradAdenauer Foundation was inuencing the designof the nal SouthAfrican constitution as this wouldaffect the wholepolitical frameworkof the country.It becameinvolved in the ‘communicationof experience’ in constitutional developmentat national,provin- cial andlocal levels, whichincluded sponsoring an international seminar on ‘Federation—A comparativeperspective’ , andfunding a Germanconsultant to workon local governmentwith all the major SouthAfrican parties. Inaddition, it is involvedin policyaspects oflocal governmentand the training oflocal governmentof cials andcouncillors. It has beenparticularly active, onthe ground,in publicadministration in the NorthernProvince, helping the ANC to integrate different local governmentstructures. It describes the importanceof this work:‘ TheFoundation is verymuch aware that if democracyis tobe understoodand accepted by South Af ricans it must beseen to workwell, particularly at the local level.’ 822 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA

Thereare several reasons forsuch a state-centred focus.The primary reason was the intense illegitimacy ofthe apartheidstate. Fewother states in the world sufferedas profounda crisis oflegitimacy as that ofSouth Africa. Along with adesperate needf orreconstructing the state, 1994presenteda uniqueopening, almost a carte blanche wheredomestic andinternational actors couldbegin againto redrawthe political map. SouthAfrica: DesigningNew Political Institutions ,the title ofa bookby a groupof South African political scientists, conveysa sense ofthis. Finally, the neworder was receptive to international interventionin its efforts to re-legitimise the state. This was becausethe ANC governmentshared similar values andobjectives to the international community and,as Landsberghas pointedout, has alonghistory ofinternational cooperation.It notonly spoke but embodied the inclusive, 1990slanguageof international liberalism, epitomised in arguablythe world’s most politically correct constitution. This was anovelmoment for international actors. After years ofinvolvement in civil society, donorsnow nally hada chanceto inuence the structures andculture ofgovernment, an opportunity, we argue, that theyseized with fervour. Inthe situation profferedby 199 4,civil society was nota priority.There are anumberof reasons forthis. Inother Af rican countries,aid tocivil society is aboutestablishing somethingthat is notthere. It is aboutcreating amodern, advocacy-orientatedcivil society. InSouth Africa this alreadyexists. Usingthe lowest commondenominator of pluralist theory,which says the morecivil society groups,the better, SouthAf rica scores highly.It has adense,long- standingassociational life.Second, this associational lifeis modern,a key characteristic ofthe donormodel. Third, it is stronglyadvocacy-orientated and has provenits lobbyingabilities onthe worldstage. Fourth,in SouthAfrica, in 1994at least, donorsdid not need to convincethe newgovernment that civil society hada legitimate role to playand that the governmentmust giveit the political space in whichto operate.That was alreadywhat the government believed,since manynew government of cials came fromthe NGO sector, and as aresult there wereunusually close andsympathetic relationships between civil society andthe government. However,perhaps most importantly,many donors had established close links with civil society throughoutthe 1980sandearly 1990s.For example, a large numbersupported the workof IDASA in the late 1980sand early 1990s. IDASA is arguablyone of the most professional, effective andhigh pro le CSOs in South Africa today,and thoroughly steeped indemocratic liberalism. A1994annual reportstates that the ‘personalcredibility withinternational donors’of co- founder,Boraine, ‘ was pivotal in securinga generousfunding base forthe organisation,allowing it to expandcountry-wide and make interventions with national impact’. After the 1994elections, IDASA was renamedthe Institute for Democracyin South Africa. It nowruns some 12national programmesand projects andhas astaff of1 40. 30 This close association with donorscontinues today,possibly makingit the most donor-associateddemocracy NGO in South Africa. Wehave indicated howthe Germanfoundations developed strategic relationships with sections ofcivil society, howthe Nordiccountries were stalwart supportersof an underground civil society, andthe enormousresources 823 JULIE HEARN that the USAspent oncultivating links with CSOs. Alreadyfrom the mid-1980s the USAhadgrasped the pivotal role that civil society wouldplay in shaping the newSouth Af rica. Subsequently,it beganto attempt toin uence it, checkingthe growingradicalism amongthe blackpopulation by developing counterweight forces conduciveto the establishment ofa liberal order.This was achievedby supportingan emergent black middle class ofprof essionals whocould be incorporatedinto a post-apartheidorder; developing a networkof grassroots communityleaders whocould compete with moreradical leadership; and cultivating ablackbusiness class that wouldhave a stake instable SouthAfrican capitalism. Fromthe standpointof 199 4,donors had already made an impact in civil society. Thenext section suggests oneimportant role that donorsare nancingcivil society to playin the newSouth Africa.

Whatrole forcivil society? Areporton the democratic outlookfor South Africa byan in uential South African think-tankconcludes that the chief threat todemocratic consolidationis:

thelimited capacity of the state to govern— and, more particularly, to cement a ‘socialcontract’ with society in which government protects the rights of citizens who,in turn, meet their obligations to democratic government. 31

TheUS National Democratic Institute ( NDI)describes the situation facingSouth Africa inthe followingterms: ‘the twin challenges ofrebuilding a newunited SouthAfrica while simultaneously developingthe institutions that will conduct the daily business ofgovernment’ . Wehave shown how foreign aid has prioritised the institutional developmentof government, thereby attempting to meet the needto buildthe capacity ofthe state to govern.However, as both analysts note,the otherside ofthe equationis to link society with this new institutional framework,to cement the social contract andto build,in the words ofthe thenDeputy President, ThaboMbeki, ‘ ademocratizedpolitical culture’. 3 2 This is wherethe role ofcivil society is so important to the architects, both domestic andexternal, of the newSouth Africa. It is aparticular kindof civil society that canhelp to legitimise the newstate inthe eyes ofthe SouthAfrican citizenry andhelp to builda culture wherecitizens meet their obligations to liberal democratic government.First weshowwhy this is neededin SouthAfrica if liberal democracyis tosucceed. Then we examine which civil society institutions are available to full this functionand how donor organisations are supportingthis veryrole forcivil society. Thesame SouthAfrican report writes about‘ widespreadcitizen non-compli- ance—re ected in,among other indicators, crime andwidespread non-payment forpublic services’ . It continues: ‘Avariety off actors produceoutcomes in whichcitizen dissatisfaction is expressedin withdrawal from the publicarena andin attempts to evadethe reachof government’ . It concludes:‘ This threatens democracyas muchas overtresistance to democratic order… ’33 An annual reviewof political developmentsin South Africa in 1997,produced f orthe quarterlyjournal of the SouthAfrican Coalition of NGOsandInterf und,a 824 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA consortiumof Northern NGOs, mainly Nordic,provides the followingcommen- tary: Whethercurrently higher or merely consistent with historical trends, crime rates in SouthAfrica areunusually high … Publicinsecurity aside, the effect of crime is to reducecitizens’ con dence in public institutions at a pointwhen the success of the democratictransition requires enhanced trust and participation. 34 Anda reportwritten forthe consortiumof non-governmental donors, Interf und, writes: Akeychallenge for actorsin civil society is to capture and steer rising (and probablyinevitable) frustation into constructive, non-violent forms ofcon ict, namelypolitical pressure channeled through social movements. 34 Thepurpose of the transition was to providethe political settlement that would allow the passage fromracial tonon-racial capitalism in SouthAf rica. As we havenoted, aid programmeshave maintained this focuson political stability rather thanon socioeconomic transformation, as aresult ofwhich South Africa continuesto be a highlyunequal society with areas ofextreme deprivation. IndeedMattes andThiel assert that the inequality is worsening.Marais points outhow the kindof instability facingSouth Africa, described by the above commentators,is ‘symptomatic ofthe extreme inequalities that scar the society’.35 Ina situation ofsuch contradiction between economic inequality and political stability, political stability or‘democracy’will besimply aboutmanag- ingthat tension.Civil society is the lynchpinin holdingtogether that tension by fostering supportamong citizens fora governmentthat maintains the inequality that underminestheir lives. This,in effect, is recognisedby the abovereport whereit identies the needfor civil society to captureand steer the rising frustation. Obviously,social concessions will bemade from time totime to maintain stability, butthe primaryfunction of political society, that is the state andcivil society, will beto managethe tension betweenthe economicand political spheres.Constituents ofcivil society must understandthat this is their functionin the political economyof South Africa in the eyes ofthose whowish tomaintain capitalism, andask themselves is this the role that theywant to play? Civil society plays this role in twoways. First it is the keymediator between the newstate inSouth Africa andits citizens. Fromthe followingratings wecan see howurgently this is needed.According to Mattes andThiel, approval of the government’s performancedropped between 1995 and 1997. The national government’s apartingfell from57% to 47%;parliament’ s wentf rom53% to 46%;and overall approvalof all the provincialgovernments declined from 42% to 36%.In 1997 the approvalrating forthe newlocal governmentsintroduced at the beginningof 1996 stood at ameagre30%. No wonder then that the KonradAdenauer foundation asserts that ‘if democracyis to beunderstood and acceptedby SouthAfricans it must beseen towork well, particularly atthe local level’. Second,the CPS reportpoints outthat democratic consolidationcan only occurwhen there is widespreadagreement among political elites andcitizens on institutional rules. Theycite political developmenttheorists Linzand Stepan who see democracyas consolidatedwhen democratic rules become‘ the onlygame in 825 JULIE HEARN town’.36 Civil society has akeyrole toplay in creating amongthe populationan adherenceto the values ofliberal democracyand an acceptance of the rules of the game.Mattes andThiel arguethat, as well as structural features, an attitudinal commitment todemocracy is essential. Theywrite: ‘Thelevel ofelite andcitizen commitment to democratic processes is the single direct determinant ofthe probabilityof democratic enduranceor consolidation.’In their analysis of publicopinion polls takenon ‘ democracy’they comment: ‘Theresults raise important questions aboutSouth Africans’ understanding of democracy.’ While only27% rated as ‘essential’such key procedural elements ofdemocracy as regularelections, 48%said that equalaccess to houses,jobs anda decentincome was ‘essential’to democracy. They go on to explain why this might beso: While‘ oneman, one vote’ was alwaysthe goal, the key liberation movements subscribedto and spread to their poverty-stricken followers an economic, as opposedto a proceduralview of democracy. This is disturbingto the authorsand, of course, to those,within andoutside the country,who wish to maintain the distinction betweenthe political andeconomic sphereand maintain the tension betweengross inequality andpolitical stability. This is the wrongkind of democracy. The authors’ advise the following re-education: Thusone might urge South Africa’ s educationalsystem, civil society, and political partiesto shift their emphasis … tothe … taskof teaching people to value democraticinstitutions and processes more for theirown sake than for whatthey maydeliver in terms of immediate and tangible bene ts. 37 Whatis interesting inSouth Africa, compared with otherAf rican countries, is the numberand calibre ofCSOs gearedtowards doing precisely that, encouraginga popularcommitment toprocedural democracy. What is more, these kindsof CSOsfeature predominantlyin donorpolitical aid programmes.In ourresearch weasked over a dozendifferent foreigndonors what kind of civil society organisations theyfunded through their democracyassistance. There were vemain categories: democracyorganisations, concerned with the overall relationship betweenstates andcitizens; humanrights andlegal aid groups; conict resolution agencies; organisations servicing orrepresenting the non- governmentalsector; andthink-tanks. Of these categories, democracyorganisations werethe largest. Notonly were they the most numerous,but they also receivedthe largest amountsof aid andwere supported by the broadest cross-section ofdonors. This is notto suggest that donorfocus on the othercategories, particularly in the humanrights andlegal aid eld,is unimportant.For example, the National Institute forPublic Interest Law& Research ( NIPLAR),a consortium,received $3.25million from USAID between1996 and 1998 to create 18humanrights and democracycentres nation-wide.Along with the LegalResource Centre ( LRC) and the Black Sash Trust, NIPLAR receives donorfunds to providefree legal advice. Between1996 and 1999 USAID fundedthe IndependentMediation Service of SouthAfrica ( IMSSA)with$3 million as anumbrella granteeproviding sub- grants tocon ict resolution NGOsworkingwith local government.Another 826 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA signicant grantf romthe USAin 1997went to the Free Market Foundation,a corepartner of the Germanliberal Friedrich NaumannFoundation. This was to funda programmepromoting market-orientated economicpolicies inthe South African parliament andadministration. Manyof these internationally funded projects formpart ofa broadliberal democratic discourse; however,it is crucial to investigate whatthe specic categoryof democracy organisations doin civil society. Themost prominentis IDASA.It is fully commited toprocedural democracy, forexample, the managerof the publicopinion service at IDASA co-wrotethe abovearticle. 37 As wementioned, it is nowan organisation with astaff of14 0. It is probablyalso the most donor-funded CSO inSouth Africa. The other organisations are the Institute forMultiparty Democracy,whose name could not bemore indicative ofprocedural democracy, and Khululekani Institute for Democracy,aimed at bringingparliament closer to the people.A fourth,the Electoral Institute ofSouth Af rica, deals with that keyaspect ofprocedural democracy.A fth,the HelenSuzman foundation, undertakes similar democracy surveysto those of IDASA,andhas amapof Southern Af rica onthe backof its quarterlyenblazoned with ‘promotingliberal democracy’. 38 Asixth, the South African Institute ofRace Relations has aforeigndonor-funded Free Society project whichaims to monitorSouth Af rica’s democratic developmentand to promotethe rule oflaw, ethics, justice, the conceptof limited governmentand economicfreedom. As a1995project description,written byone of its foreign funders,the USNational Endowmentfor Democracy, explains: the programme will informkey government and non-government of cials onactivities that hinderthe developmentof a free society. Theproject seeks toachieve these aims throughthree principal means: (1)publishing‘ Frontiers ofFreedom ’,aquarterly newsletter; (2)sponsoring speci c research projects; and(3 )hostingand attend- ingspecial events,including brie ngs and lectures, frequentlyin conjunction with othernon-pro t institutions. It is interesting to notehow some ofthe languagehas changedin the 1997project description,which introduces the relatively newterm ‘civil society organisations’, talks explicitly aboutresearch- ing‘ publicpolicy alternatives’ , andreplaces the ideologically unambiguous ‘limited government’with the muchmore ambiguous and widely accepted term, ‘goodgovernance’ . It is notaltogether surprising to ndout that these civil society organisations at the forefrontof promoting procedural democracy are verymuch part ofthe SouthAfrican liberal landscape.The South African Institute ofRace Relations is oneof the oldest liberal institutions inthe country.The Helen Suzman foundationis namedaf ter arguablythe most prominentSouth African liberal politician. IDASA was started in1987 by van Zyl Slabbert formerleader ofthe oppositionand Alex Boraine, former Progressive Federal Party MP.39 What these CSOshavedone is to putprocedural democracy high up on the agendafor civil society, andfor the nation,and to establish the terms ofthe debate.This is not surprising giventhe resources allocated to them bythe international donor community. IDASA has receivedgrants notsimply oftens ofthousands of dollars, butof $1 million. In1996 it received$1.165 million fromthe FordFoundation. This is anexceptionally large grantby the Foundation’s standards,which 827 JULIE HEARN normallyprovides grants from$2 00000to $50000 to CSOsin Africa,and is by far the largest grantto anygrantee in SouthAfrica. At the same time IDASA receiveda $1million grantf rom USAID fora two-yearperiod. The South African Institute ofRace Relations andthe Institute forMulti-Party Democracyreceived similar grants from USAID overthe same period.

Conclusion As wehave seen, since 1994SouthAfrica has receivedan unprecedented amountof international political aid aimed at consolidatingits liberal democracy.Even without the benet ofan in-depth, detailed study,one can saf ely concludethat there are few,if any,aspects ofthe newSouth African political system that havenot been shaped by donor input. The external involvementin the constructionof the newSouth Af rican state raises important questions.What is the natureof the state ofa middle incomecountry that has beenso extensively ‘advised’by a myriadof international players? Howdo we understand such a state withinexisting theoretical frameworks?Does a state that is sopermeable andmalleable to external shapers exhibit the same autonomyas the states of advancedeconomies? Does it changethe natureof the state? Is it acase of autonomycompromised? What impact doesit haveon the state’s foreignpolicy and,perhaps even more pertinently, on its domestic policy? Andwhat of civil society? This article suggests that political aid tocivil society has hadtwo major consequences.First it has changedthe debateon democracy.During the past veyears, it is possible tosee aprocess inwhich democracyhas beenrede ned. Although half ofSouth Af ricans still belief that access to housing,jobs anda decentincome are essential componentsof a democratic society, this residual belief in social democracyis beingeroded and replacedby the normsand practice ofprocedural democracy. It is ourargument that the Northhas playedits role in this process byf undingthe liberal proponentsof procedural democracy in civil society, andthat, subsequently, political aid has successfully ‘inuenced the rules ofthe game’. Thesecond consequenceis that this has facilitated anewlylegitimatised SouthAfrican state to preside overthe same intensely exploitative economicsystem, butthis time unchallenged.External and domestic supportfor procedural democracy has successfullyremoved all challenges to the system. It has ensuredthat democracy in the newSouth Africa is notabout reconstructing the social orderbut about effective system maintenance.

Notes 1 CLandsberg,‘ Directingfrom the stalls? Theinternational community and the South African negotiation forum’, inS Friedman& DAtkinson(eds), TheSmall Miracle: South Africa’ s NegotiatedSettlement , Randburg;Ravan Press, 1994,p 276. 2 Interviewwith the director of a German politicalfoundation in South Africa, 1998. 3 WRobinsonhas investigatedthe development of democracy assistance inUS foreignpolicy comprehen- sivelyand critically in his ground-breaking PromotingPolyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention,and Hegemony,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996.This article appliessome ofhis broader 828 DONORS AND CIVIL SOCIETY INSOUTH AFRICA

conclusionsto thepost-1994 South African context,based on primaryresearch carried outby theauthor in 1998. 4 Citedin Robinson, PromotingPolyarchy ,p51,from a chapterHuntington wrote, interestingly entitled ‘ The modestmeaning of democracy’ . 5 Robinson PromotingPolyarchy , p 69. 6 Cited in ibid p 89 from the WashingtonPost ,14March 1982. 7 Robinson, PromotingPolyarchy , p 94. 8 Cited in ibid p 73. 9 Accordingto oneof the most recent andauthoritative accounts, US democracy aidis a $500million-a-year industry.See TCarothers, AidingDemocracy Abroad:The Learning Curve ,Washington,DC: Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, 1999. 10 See DWilliams &TYoung,‘ Governance,the World Bank and liberal theory’ , PoliticalStudies , 42(1), 1994, pp 84– 100;P Landell-Mills,‘ Governance,cultural change, and empowerment’ , TheJournal of ModernAfrican Studies ,30(4),1992, pp 543 –567;and B Beckman, ‘Theliberation of civil society: neo-liberalideology and political theory’ , Review ofAfrican Political Economy ,58,1993, pp 20 –33. 11 See SGibson,‘ Aidand politics in Malawi andKenya: political conditionality and donor support to the “humanrights, democracy andgovernance” sector’ in L. Wohlgemuth et al (eds) CommonSecurity and CivilSociety in Africa ,Uppsala:Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1999. 12 DAitkinson,G Goetz,T Rapoo,M Reitzes &KShubane,‘ Changingmodels of civil society in South Africa’, mimeo, Johannesburg:Centre forPolicy Studies, 1996, p 4. 13 G Jakobsen, Denmark—South Africa: The Decades fromResistance to Reconstruction ,Johannesburg: Ibis/INTERFUND, 1996. 14 USAID/SouthAfrica, USAID/SouthAfrica Brie ng Book ,1995,p 1;and G Olsen,‘ Europeand the promotion ofdemocracy inpost-cold war Africa: howserious is Europeand for what reasons?’ , AfricanAffairs , 97(388),1998, p 350.The Soviet Union, with its support for the liberation movement, was alsoa signicant ‘donor’, andneeds to be included in any discussion of foreign aid in this period. 15 Robinson, PromotingPolyarchy , p 356. 16 BGills,J Rocamora, RWilson(eds) LowIntensity Democracy: PoliticalPower in the New WorldOrder , London:Pluto Press, 1993. 17 See ITaylor,‘ SouthAfrica’ s “democratic transition”in a globalisedworld: the “ changeindustry” and the promotionof polyarchy’ , unpublishedworking paper, January 2000, for an excellent study of how the ideologicalbattle over democracy has beenfought in South Africa. Thepaper draws broadlysimilar conclusionsto those in this article aboutthe process. 18 USAID/SouthAfrica, USAID/SouthAfrica Country Strategic Plan ,1997,p 110;interview with the director of theEU Foundationfor Human Rights, 6 March1998; OECD, GeographicalDistribution of Financial Flows toAid Recipients , Paris: OECD,1997;and interview with the World Bank resident representative and the NGO liaisonof cer, 4March1998. Non-lending services amountto an annual $3 to $4millionBank investment inthe country. For more onthe Bank’ s inuence inSouthAfrica see JMichie& VPadayachee (eds), The PoliticalEconomy of South Africa’ s Transition ,London:Harcourt Brace, 1997. 19 USAID/SouthAfrica, CountryStrategic Plan , pp 13, 22. 20 Ibid,p15;Danida, SouthAfrica: Strategy for Danish— South African Development Cooperation , Copen- hagen:Danida, 1995, p 19;interview with the Konrad Adenauer resident representative, 10 March 1998; and interviewwith the second secretary, RoyalNetherlands Embassy, 6 March1998. 21 Landsberg,‘ Directingfrom the stalls?’ 22 USAID/SouthAfrica, CountryStrategic Plan , p 18. 23 USAID/SouthAfrica, CountryStrategic Plan, p 5. 24 Danida, SouthAfrica , p 22. 25 Aiddata comes from USAID/SouthAfrica, CountryStrategic Plan ; Danida, SouthAfrica ; Cida, Prole of CanadianAssistance to South Africa ; and Sida, Developmentin Partnership: Sida and Bilateral Develop- mentCooperation in Africa ,Stockholm:Sida, 1997. 26 DRyall,‘ Caughtbetween twoworlds: understanding South Africa’ s foreignpolicy options’ , Third World Quarterly,18(2),1997, p 399. 27 Landsberg,‘ Directingfrom the stalls?’ . 28 Interviewswith Friedrich Ebert Foundation programme manager, 26February 1998; Friedrich Naumann Foundationproject of cer, 27February 1998; and Konrad Adenauer resident representative, 10 March 1998. 29 NationalEndowment for Democracy ( NED)grantdescriptions, 1997. 30 ‘IDASA;whatwe do’, http://www.idasa.org.za/acronyms/default.htm. 31 Centre forPolicy Studies, Sector Assessment: ‘USAID/SouthAfrica democracy andgovernance programme’ , 1998, p 3. 32 Citedin H Marais, ‘Annualreivew: thevoluntary sector anddevelopment in South Africa 1996/97’, DevelopmentUpdate ,1(3),1997, p 25. 33 Centre forPolicy Studies, ‘ USAID/SouthAfrica democracy andgovernance programme,’ p 3. 829 JULIE HEARN

34 Marais, ‘Annualreview’ , p20;and N Bentzen,J Cole& DSogge,p 20.‘ Fundingfor transformation in times oftransition’ , areportof a mid-term review ofthe INTERFUND/IbisTransitional Development Assistance Programme inSouth Africa 1994 – 98, p 20. 35 RMattes &HThiel,‘ Consolidationand public opinion in South Africa,’ Journalof Democracy ,9(1),1998, p103;and Marais, ‘Annualreview’ , p20. 36 Ling& Stepan,1996, cited in Centre forPolicy Studies, ‘ USAID/SouthAfrica democracy andgovernance programme’, 1998. 37 Mattes &Thiel,‘ Consolidationand public opinion in South Africa’ . 38 Focus, 1998, pp 22– 28. 39 See Taylor,‘ SouthAfrica’ s “democratic transition”in a globalisedworld’ , forSlabbert’ s close association withSouth African businessinterests andhis very open defence ofliberal democracy as thebest political guarantorof capitalism.

Contemporary South Asia EDITORS Apurba Kundu, University of Bradford, UK Gowher Rizvi, New Delhi, India

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Examinations of South Asia’s diversity have too often been limited by the national borders of its nation-states – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – Contemporary South Asia seeks to remedy this by presenting research and analysis on contemporary issues affecting the region as a whole. It seeks to cultivate an awareness that South Asia is more than a sum of its parts—a fact of great importance not only to the states and peoples of the region, but to the world as a whole—and to address the major issues facing South Asia from a regional and interdisciplinary perspective. The overriding purpose of the journal is to encourage scholars to search for means, both theoretical and practical, by which our understanding of the present problems of co-operation and confrontation in the region, amongst its diaspora, and within the global context can be enhanced. Contemporary South Asia also includes a comprehensive book review section as well as occasional ‘Viewpoints’, non-academic opinion on current regional issues and ‘Research Notes’ of works in progress. This journal is also available online. Please connect to http://www.tandf.co.uk/online.html for further information. SUBSCRIPTION RATES 2000 – Volume 9 (3 issues) Print ISSN 0958-4935 Online ISSN 1469-364X Institutional rate: US$434; £258 (includes free online access) Personal rate: US$112; £59 (print only)

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