28.11.41 - No. 18

THE CAMPAIGN

Military operations in the Gondar area have been very largely in the nature of a blockade, and in them a very large part has been played by the Patriot forces, Abyssinians serving under British officers. There has been little

fighting on a large scale, but a great deal of active patrol work whereby the been enemy has steadily driven in to a more and more confined area until at last

surrender was inevitable.

At the end of January the fall of was followed by an advance by

mobile - a column along the Gondar road which on February 7 had reached

Wahni, 30 miles W. of Chelga and 60 miles west of Gondar. It was pursuing an enemy force which fled abandoning much of its material and transport. Beyond

Wahni however the road was heavily mined and on March 3 strong resistance was encountered 22 miles along the Chelga road, and our snmall column did not proceed

further.

Meanwhile a mechanised column starting from Um Hagar 100 miles north of

Gallabat in the direction of Adowa penetrated about 40 miles and helped to isolate Gondar from the north. Further south, patriot forces, cooperating with British elements sent to their help, captured Enjiabara and Dangila, south

of Lake the had Tana, inflicting heavy casualties on enemy; by March 4 they to added their success by capturing Burye and Mancusa, taking 2,000 prisoners

the to and forcing Italians fall back on Debra Marcos. On March 12 they

captured Dambacha. By these operations the Gondar area was isolated from the

south also.

But patriot activity was being shown nearer home. On March 7 they occupied

an enemy garrison camp only 14 miles north of Gondar, and by March 25 were

astride the Gondar - thus Chelga road, cutting off the enemy force east of Wahni from Gondar. On April 10 other patriot forces occupied Mai Timchet on the

- Gondar Adowa road and received orders to start the - operations on Gondar Dessie road also.

Our regular forces now took a hand, and mechanised troops advanced down

the - On 6 Adowa Gondar road. April 1 they came up against opposition in the

Debarech area. On April 25 we captured Fort Mota, 40 miles north of Debra

Marcos, a place which had been evacuated by the enemy on April 4. With this,

the last communications between Gondar and the south were effectively cut.

Finding themselves encircled, the Italians at the end of April attempted

sporadic attacks both on the patriot positions south-west of Chelga and,

further afield, on the Belgians in the Gambela area near the border. Both and the command to withdraw the forces still were unsuccessful, enemy was obliged The north in the Metemma area, inwards to Chelga. Italians' position on a ridge

of Chelga was attacked on May 17 by units of the and by

patriots and the defenders lost 150 killed and 350 prisoners. The Debarech

garrison was withdrawn to Gondar but was attacked on route by the patriots, on May 28, and lost 40 dead; patriots now installed themselves on the Gondar -

- to Debra Tabor Dessye road, enemy made strenuous attempts recover their

position, Debarech which they had abandoned without resistance, was now

attacked and changed hands several times. By June 3 it was finally recaptured

to hold Wolchefit by the patriots, but a strong enemy force continued the Pass,

five miles to the north, though we were closing in on it both from north and

south. The surrender, on May 23, of a strong Italian force - two brigades, -

at Agibar, between Debra. Marcos and Lake Tana, made any relief from that quarter

impossible, and Debra Taber itself had been isolated for some weeks and was now, like (Gondar itself, being subjected to air attack. On July 4 Debra Tabor

with its of and at the time the whole of surrendered, garrison 4,000 men, sane the Italian forces left in Galla Sidamo, the province south and south-west of

Lake Tana, formally capitulated. Only Gondar, with its outpost at Wolchefit,

was left to carry on a hopeless struggle.

/It - 2 -

It must be borne in mind that by this time most of the Imperial and

Dominion troops who had been employed in East Africa had been transferred to other

theatres of war. The rainy season had by now made movements in Abyssinia almost

impossible, and the systematic destruction of communications by the Italians (on

the Debra Tabor - Gondar road alone 4 bridges had been blown) further impeded

at operations. The enemy positions both in Wochefit and Gondar itself were

easily defensible by nature, and frontal attacks would have resulted in

18, unnecessarily heavy losses. On July an assault on Wolchefit proved the

strength of the defences, and though on August 5 an Italian, counter attack was

repulsed with heavy casualties on their side, the blockade system was clearly the 16 right one. By August the patriots were established at and along the road to Amba Giorgis, though the Italians still held the Dara plateau to the east. of Debarech at Skirmishing was constant, and our patrols came within 800 yards the foot of the Wolchefit with its of pass; on September 29 Wolchefit, garrison 3,000 surrendered.

The road to Gondar however was still blocked by mines and rendered

impassable by rain. The Italians now shifted their forces, reinforcing their

positions at Wolaich (12 miles North of Gondar) and at Amba Giorgis, on the

Debarech from road, while they held a series of hill strongholds covering Gondar

the north - Ambazzo, Sana, Deva, Tukul Dingua, and south of the town Azzozo on

the Gorgora road. Their general position therefore extended from Amba Giorgis on

the east to a point some miles west of Chelga, and from Cola in the north to

Lake Tana, where they occupied Gorgora, an area about 50 miles by forty: and

they held also two isolated posts, Kulkaber and Feroaber, on the east shore of

the lake guarding the road from Debra Tabor.

On this comparatively restricted area constant attacks were made by the S.A. Air Force, trenches, camps and gun emplacements were regular targets: ground local activity by our patrols was also constant. Some of time chiefs in Italian of disaffection territory now came over to our side, and there were reports amongst General Nasi's troops.

On November 12 patriots and units of theregular Ethiopian Army on the west

side of the Gondar area pushed forward and after 4 hours hard fighting captured

Gianda village, on the road between Gondar and Gorgora. At the same time Kanant the last Italian Hill, outpost in the Wolaich area, was taken by assault after a sharp engagement.

As a result of these two actions general Nasi was compelled to evacuate

the Gorgora area and all his positions south of Azzozo, thus isolating his forces

from Lake Tana and the outposts east of the Lake. An attack on Kulkaber by a

on November in which 2 silenced and 110 strong raiding party 13, guns were prisoners taken, was followed by patriot raids from the north and east, driving

in the enemy outposts.

the about 16 By 20th November General Nasi was holding an area measuring

miles from North to South and 40 miles from East to West, Gondar itself had been evacuated and declared which has an open town. The strength of the garrison now

surrendered is difficult to establish, since its losses by casualties and desertion have been great; it originally comprised nine Blackshirt battalions,

the 4th Colonial Brigade and part of the 22nd Colonial Brigade; elements from the seven Blackshirt battalions and the 21st Colonial Brigade which with part of

the 22nd Colonial found their Brigade formed the garrison of Debra Tabor may have

Gondar. air bomber. way to His force has been, reduced, to one fighter and one

Opposed to the Italians there, have been units, of the Sudan Defence Force, the West and East African Forces, the patriot Forces, led by British officers, the units of regular Ethiopian army and contingents from Ras Sezum’s forces. the Throughout, S.A.A.F. has been responsible for air operations. Further

Free from Um forces, including French, are now reported to be on their way Hagar to and is above Gondar, our artillery registering on the Italian lines Chelga.

he has been to all credit Though never yet called upon fight a major action, is due to General Nasi for the obstinate resistance which he has maintained in

the most disheartening circumstances.

WAR OFFICE