Contributions to Political Economy (2013) 32,51-71
FROM CONTAGION TO INCOHERENCE TOWARDS A MODEL OF THE UNFOLDING EUROZONE CRISIS
YANIS VAROUFAKIS* *University of Athens and University of Texas at Austin
Based on an account of the macroeconomic foundations and political economy underpinning European Monetary Union, this paper presents a simple dynamic model of the mutual reinforcement feedback between (i) the Eurozone’s contagion dynamic and (ii) the policy responses of the European Union, including the creation of new institutions (e.g. the European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF, and European Stability Mechanism, ESM), the signing of new treaties (e.g. the Fiscal Past) and, of course, the novel’ policies of existing institutions (e.g. the ECB).
I. INTRODUCTION While contagion within the Eurozone has been perhaps the most discussed dynamic economic process in recent times, it is nevertheless telling that little has been done analytically to capture the interplay between contagion and Europe’s institutional responses.1 This paper offers a simple analysis of the nexus between:
(i) a monetary union whose very design removed internal shock absorbers while, at once, magnifying both the probability and the magnitude of a future crisis, (ii) a political response to the (preordained) crisis that involved the creation of toxic bailout funds which accentuated the crisis, (iii) the underlying macroeconomic imbalances which are in fact deepening, thus rendering the European Union’s fiscal and monetary strategies logically inco- herent, and (iv) the European Central Bank whose decisive intervention to offer medium-term financial stability came at the price of reinforcing long-term disintegration.
1 See Arestis and Sawyer (2012) for a review of the literature from which this interplay is largely absent and Holland and Varoufakis (2011, 2012) for a discussion of this interplay as well as a proposal for how it could be short-circuited.
Received: 23 February 2013 Accepted: 11 March 2013 # The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved 52 Y. VAROUFAKIS
Section 2 discusses the state of the Eurozone before the global financial crisis of 2008, a period during which global capital and trade flows were bestowing upon Europe’s elites a false sense of security while, simultaneously, ensuring that the Eurozone would enter the Great Recession as the global economy’s most vulnerable bloc. Once the Credit Crunch struck global finance, it set in motion the process that, beginning with the effective insolvency of most of Europe’s banks, led to the se- quential bankruptcy of member states and their respective banking systems, with Greece and Ireland as its early victims. Section 3 then examines analytically Europe’s institutional response to the crisis and, in particular, the process that began with Greece’s original bailout (May 2010) and soon after occasioned the two bailout funds (the European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF, and more recently, its permanent replacement, the European Stability Mechanism, ESM). Using a simple dynamic model, Section 4 shows why the introduction of these new institutions was bound to accelerate the crisis, spread- ing the contagion from peripheral nations such as Greece to the Eurozone’s core. Its point is that contagion spread because of (rather than despite) the very design of the new fiscal institutions. Section 5 extends the analysis to the two major moves by the European Central Bank, under its third President, Mr Mario Draghi, which succeeded in arresting the contagion within the financial and bond markets; namely the provision of infinite li- quidity to the Eurozone’s banks (the long-term re-financing, or LTRO, programme) and, since September 2012, the announcement of the ECB’s readiness to purchase infinite amounts of Spanish and Italian sovereign debt in the secondary markets (the outright monetary transactions, or OMT, programme). However, according to the offered model, the calmness that the ECB has purchased by these means accentu- ates further the forces of disintegration that are pushing the Eurozone’s real economy to the breaking point. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the pre- dicament facing European leaders who are utterly committed, on the one hand, to the Eurozone and, on the other, to policies that lead to its disintegration.
II. EUROPE’S GOLD STANDARD If the Gold Standard experience of the 1920s taught us anything,2 it is that fixing exchange rates between economies whose capital utilisation and degree of oligopoly in their manufacturing sectors diverge significantly, especially when underpinned by effectively undifferentiated inflation-targeting monetary policies, is a recipe for large capital flows from the surplus to the deficit nations. Given that the deficit economies lack the high concentration of networked, globa- lising conglomerates that can convert automatically such capital inflows into productivity-enhancing investments, the result, naturally, is rampant asset value inflation (e.g. real estate bubbles) in the deficit economies and a growth rate that far
2 See Hansen (1938). FROM CONTAGION TO INCOHERENCE 53 exceeds the rate of accumulation in their exportables’ sector. In contrast, the surplus economies, whose manufacturing is by definition highly oligopolised, and in fact lack competitors in the deficit nations (e.g. countries like Greece produce no cars), experience high investment rates into productivity-enhancing capital and a consider- ably lower concomitant growth rate.3 The combination of growth rates that exceed (trail) fixed capital formation rates in the deficit (surplus) countries gives rise to a tension between (i) the underlying economic reality of a slow burning recession in crucial sectors across the surplus- deficit nation divide and (ii) the epiphenomenal growth that seems to typify the whole common currency or fixed exchange rates bloc4 and in underpinned by a new form of financial exploitation of working and middle classes.5 At some point, this tension ruptures into a financial crisis which soon turns into a classic debt- deflationary spiral with the burden of adjustment disproportionately placed on the shoulders of the weakest member states. This is what the world witnessed in the run up to the Crash of 1929 and it is precisely the same process that we witnessed in the Eurozone recently. It is as if the common currency’s designers chose purposely not to heed the lessons of the dreadful mid-war era that conspired to cause humanity’s greatest tragedy. There are, of course, important differences between the Gold Standard and the Eurozone. One such difference stems from the fact that the creation of a common currency, as opposed to fixing exchange rates across different currencies, made it im- possible for a deficit nation asphyxiating under the inevitable debt-deflationary spiral to cut itself loose, devalue its currency, and thus cut through the Gordian Knot of debts, bankruptcies and austerity. In an important sense, Greece and Ireland found themselves in 2010 in the situation that Britain would have faced in 1931 if it had no currency of its own to un-peg from the Gold Standard and, instead, had to create one from scratch so as to devalue it many months later. A second critical difference stems from the extent to which our era’s financialisa- tion creates hitherto unheard of linkages between real wage differentials, real estate bubbles, sovereign debt instruments and, not least, exotic financial products. When, for instance, real wages were repressed in Germany, following the nation’s well- documented ‘corporatist response’ to the country’s re-unification, real estate prices rose fast in the deficit countries, while aggregate demand was ‘exported’ from them to the surplus countries courtesy of the latter’s lower growth rate (which was trailing the rate at which new excess capacity was being formed).6 Meanwhile, overall growth was only sustained with the help of a form of financialisation whose depth and rapidity only modern technology (e.g. computerised trading and algorithmic financial models) could sustain.
3 See Halevi and Lucareli (2002) and Halevi (2010). 4 See Priewe (2007). 5 See Bryan and Rafferty (2006). 6 See Niechoj et al. (2011). 54 Y. VAROUFAKIS
Meanwhile, and at least since 1980, America’s twin deficits operated like a huge vacuum cleaner sucking into the USA the net exports of Germany, Japan and later China, thus generating the aggregate demand that their factories craved. At once, almost 70% of these exporters’ profits formed tsunamis of capital that gushed into Wall Street as if in a bid to finance America’s twin deficits, and thus closed the global ‘loop’ of real and financial surpluses. On the back of these tsunamis, a wave of financialisation developed flooding the banks, including the French and German ones, with untold liquidity.7 The combination of accumulating profits in the Eurozone’s core (due largely to the repression of Germany’s wage share) and abundant toxic, or private, money minted by the financial sector (primarily by the City and Wall Street) ensured that no decent returns could be found in the sluggish Eurozone core itself. It was thus unsurprising that torrents of credit rushed from the surplus to the deficit Eurozone countries in the form of loans and sovereign debt purchases. For 12 years (1997– 2008), the capital inflows into the Periphery reinforced themselves by strengthening the demand for the core’s net exports, part of which was utilised in helping German multinationals globalise beyond the Eurozone (in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America). Figure 1 offers a snapshot of the relative macroeconomic position of the Eurozone’s deficit and surplus member states in relation to their budget, current account and net investment positions. Letting si ¼ Si 2 Ii, i.e. savings in excess of investment for country i, ti ¼ Ti 2 Gi, i.e. govenrment i’s budget surplus, and ri ¼ Xi 2 Mi, i.e. the difference between the export income and income spent on imports, while subscripts D and S refer to the deficit and the surplus Eurozone member states, respectively, the downward slopping lines in Figure 1 depict the loci that deficit and surplus countries are constrained on by the standard identities of na- 8 tional income categories. Points D1 and S1 reflect the Eurozone’s stylised facts prior to the Credit Crunch of 2007 and the Crash of 2008: the deficit countries oc- cupied a point on their rD constraint which reflected a current account deficit 1 1 ðrD , 0Þ, a budget deficit ðti , 0Þ and investment exceeding savings, as a result of the capital inflows from the Eurozone’s core (as well as from the City and Wall Street). In contrast, the surplus member states where finding themselves in the adja- 1 cent quadrant since, by definition, their current account was in surplus ðrS . 0Þ.In the meantime, aided by America’s energetic aggregate demand global ‘production’, the Eurozone as a whole experienced a small but discernible trade surplus with the 1 1 rest of the world ðrEZ ¼ rD þ rS . 0Þ.
7 See Varoufakis et al. (2011) and Varoufakis (2012, 2013). 8 From the standard identities Y ¼ C þ I þ G þ X 2 M (where Y ¼ gross domestic product, or GDP, C ¼ consumption, I ¼ investment, G ¼ government expenditure, X ¼ export-generated income and M ¼ income spent on imported goods and services) and Y ¼ C þ S þ T (where S ¼ domestic savings and T ¼ taxes), it turns out that S þ T ¼ I þ G þ X 2 M or (S 2 I) þ (T 2 G) ¼ (S 2 I). FROM CONTAGION TO INCOHERENCE 55
FIGURE 1. Before the crisis.
While deficit countries were protected from exchange rate speculative attacks, they were always open to the threat of a credit crunch. Indeed, a situation like that in Figure 1 (underpinned by a growth rate in the Periphery in excess of that in the Eurozone’s core) was simply unsustainable, even in view of the Eurozone’s trade surplus with the rest of the world. Put simply, while the deficit nations had a com- bined debt to GDP ratio well above that of the surplus member states, the observed anaemic growth rate in surplus nations’ nominal GDP, in conjunction with their substantial budget deficits, was placing the surplus countries’ debt to GDP ratios in 56 Y. VAROUFAKIS a trajectory that would push them to unsustainable levels above those of the deficit countries.9 Moreover, the overwhelming pressure to conform with the Maastricht Treaty’s 3% deficit-to-GDP limit meant that the maintenance of aggregate demand in both surplus and deficit countries necessitated the shifting of their positions in Figure 1 in the direction of the thick arrows: from D1 and S1 to D*1 and S*1 respectively. The reason, of course, was that the Maastricht requirement that the t’s should not sink further into negative territory meant that the only way that the Eurozone’s pre-2008 internal dynamic could be maintained was by means of the following feedback loop:
D