Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, Jefrey W. Taliaferro, eds.. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 322 pp. $79.47, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-51705-8.

Reviewed by Sten Rynning

Published on H-Diplo (July, 2009)

Commissioned by Christopher L. Ball (DePaul University)

Why is it necessary for the primary analysts through a ffty-to-sixty-year detour through the of international power--realists--to write a book in social science of structural realism. The latter, 2009 explaining how states make foreign policy? which comes in both an ofensive and defensive One would think that realists, with their proud version, is predicated on the argument that classi‐ pedigree, had provided answers somewhere cal realism was too complex, that there was no along the road. Realists did, as a matter of fact. real theory of power politics involved, and that Classical realists wrote prolifcally on foreign poli‐ too much of the intellectual efort relied on schol‐ cy in the half century 1900-1950. Their motive ars' intuition and sense of history as opposed to was quite clear: because liberalism had penetrat‐ the cannons of scientifc inquiry. NCR largely buys ed the state during the course of the nineteenth into this criticism, yet it wants to turn away from century, beginning really with the French Revolu‐ structure to focus on foreign policy. Beginning in tion of 1789 and continuing with the imposition of the mid-1990s, some realists therefore began to constitutions and parliaments throughout Europe, theorize how foreign policy (the dependent vari‐ someone had to remind liberals that politics had able) was shaped by international power (the in‐ its own inner logic, related to power of course, dependent variable) but considerably pushed and and that politics could not be reduced to simple pulled by domestic politics (the intervening vari‐ questions of economics or morality. Foreign policy able). This became NCR. The focus was on foreign was about power and indeed should be about policy, and all three levels of analysis were power, according to classical realism. present (the international, the state, and the indi‐ Neoclassical realism (NCR), including this vidual), and so it was neoclassical. Like structural book, represents an attempt to regain the initia‐ realism, though, NCR attributes ultimate causal tive, to once again understand foreign policy via power to the international level and seeks to build power analysis, now that realism has been real theories. This may sound slightly schizo‐ H-Net Reviews phrenic and so cleaning up the house of NCR be‐ Chapters 2 and 3 by Steven E. Lobbell and comes one of three primary goals of this book. Mark R. Brawley, respectively, take on the issue of The three goals are: (a) to refne and systematize why foreign policies vary even if we know the NCR, (b) to set NCR apart from both classical real‐ threat. Lobbell defnes a so-called complex threat ism and structural realism, and (c) to develop the identifcation model that informs us why states, concept of the state (p. 5). even with a fxed threat, sometimes veer of The book as a whole but notably the introduc‐ course and get their balancing acts wrong. This tion does a good job of realizing ambition (b). We can happen, according to the model, because poli‐ learn that NCR sets itself apart from structural re‐ cymakers can disagree on components of enemy alism by defning foreign policy, not recurring power, which is more complex than aggregate patterns of behavior, as its dependent variable. levels of power, and then disagree on appropriate We also learn that NCR shares the classical goal of responses. Brawley takes this type of dynamic focusing on the state and its relationship to soci‐ into the international arena: during the interwar ety (or, how liberal society manages to penetrate years everyone knew that German power was a the state, which was where the classicals began), potential threat, yet they ofered contrasting and but NCR aspires to "greater methodological so‐ sometimes contradicting national responses to it. phistication" than these classical predecessors (p. The reason, Brawley argues, has to do with the na‐ 19). This is nicely laid out in the book and in table ture of the threat: though known, it was not immi‐ 1.1 (p. 20) in particular. There is therefore no nent. A permissive environment thus enabled di‐ doubt that this book is a must read for realists verse national responses to the same threat. who wish to work on foreign policy. It is the frst Brawley efectively combines questions one and book to take stock of NCR after slightly more than two above (threat and strategic adaptation). a decade's worth of intellectual labor, and it will Chapter 4 by Jennifer Sterling-Folker likewise now defne a new point of departure. It is clear, straddles questions one and two, and she roots concise, at times thought-provoking, and a valu‐ her discussion in "bio-political" foundations be‐ able guide to further research. cause "tribalism is a fact of human existence" (p. The individual contributions focus on ambi‐ 110). Tribalism explains why states come to see tions (a) and (c), by and large, and they do so by each other as threats and why strategic adjust‐ responding to questions asked by the editors. ment as opposed to continued confrontation can There are three sets of questions, with one con‐ be difcult. Sterling-Folker observers this phe‐ cerning threat assessment (i.e., who gets to defne nomenon in the case of Chinese-Taiwanese rela‐ a state's threats?), another strategic adjustment tions. She fnds fault with liberalism because it (i.e., who gets to defne the response to threats?), overlooks that tribalism may trump interdepen‐ and the fnal concerning resource extraction (i.e., dence. Interestingly, she is eager to seek dialogue how do states get resources to actually re‐ with constructivists who have theorized identity spond?).The chapters (eight in all, excluding the politics, although these constructivists would no editors' introduction [chapter 1] and conclusion) doubt disagree on the inclusion of identity politics progressively address these questions and while in a realist framework. The chapter thus illus‐ there is some overlap, inevitably, it is clear that trates the way in which NCR is able to fll the mid‐ chapters 2 and 3 deal with threat assessment, dle part of the theoretical equation--that part fall‐ chapters 4-6 with strategic adjustment, and chap‐ ing between the independent variable (interna‐ ters 7-9 with resource extraction. tional power) and the dependent variable (foreign policy decisions)--with analytical stuf that many would say is foreign to realism. These critics

2 H-Net Reviews would be right when it comes to structural real‐ the resource extraction department but this is not ism but not necessarily in the case of NCR. the most interesting part of the story. Fordham ar‐ Two chapters in the debate on strategic adap‐ gues, in brief, that U.S. foreign policy changed in tation, chapters 5 and 6, are less strong. Chapter 5 the course of the Cold War because international by Colin Dueck confronts pure theories of Innen‐ factors caused some U.S. policymakers to reverse politik to argue that domestic politics shape not positions. What Fordham is saying more funda‐ the "whether" but the "when" and "how" of for‐ mentally is that you cannot defne the external eign interventions; chapter 6 by Norrin M. Rips‐ threat without knowing your subject (the decision man proposes that the domestic players yielding makers of the state you study). This is not an addi‐ vetoes of various sorts over executive decision tive business: external threats do not defne a makers will be able to infuence decision making. framework within which decision makers act Neither chapter presents propositions that ad‐ more or less wisely. This business is interactive: vance the debate much beyond what was threats and decision makers interact. In Ford‐ achieved in the introductory chapter. Their case ham's words, we need to know the motive and in‐ illustrations are short and selected to verify broad terests of a state "before anything can be said ideas, not subject specifc NCR claims to strong about the implications of international events and tests. conditions" (p. 255). This stance by Fordham caus‐ es the editors to defne Fordham as a non-realist. Chapters 7 and 8 by Jefrey Taliaferro and In table 10.1 in the conclusion (p. 283) all realists-- , respectively, enter into the dy‐ all the contributors save Fordham--are located in namics of resource extraction. Chapter 7 (Taliafer‐ the left-hand column because their theories con‐ ro) argues that not all states are able to emulate tain "Clear information on threats"; Fordham, (i.e., copy winners) or innovate: only states that hinging threat defnitions on domestic conditions, are powerful vis-à-vis society can hope to do so, is put into the right-hand column, "Unclear infor‐ and of those states it is really only the most vul‐ mation on threats," where liberalists, construc‐ nerable that will feel compelled to actually do so. tivists and other non-realists presumably also fg‐ Taliaferro's chapter is sophisticated and interest‐ ure. ing and ready to inspire new research in this do‐ main. Chapter 8 by Randall Schweller argues that It is at this point that the book takes a turn land powers in Eurasia have not fought more that ultimately detracts from its three goals, and wars of hegemony not because it was impossible the key problem is related to (b)--setting NCR (it was possible) but because it is difcult to defne apart from classical and structural realism. All the ideological construction that will inspire peo‐ chapters refne the theory and all of them address ple at home and thus mobilize grand resources the state as a concept (ambitions [a] and [c], re‐ for grand conquests. Fascism had what it takes in spectively), but it happens in a context in which expansion terms, Schweller notes, which is not NCR has been so defned, so distinguished from the case for either realism or liberalism. classical and structural realism that the achieve‐ Schweller's chapter is thought-provoking and it ments in directions (a) and (c) become limited. Put will be interesting to see what Schweller and oth‐ diferently, there is a limit to what can be ers will do with the implied argument that we achieved in terms of theory refnement and state must now integrate state ideology in our ap‐ conceptualization as long as NCR is skewed the proaches. way it is here. The book de facto seeks to associate NCR with structural realism's emphasis on inter‐ This point brings us to chapter 9 by Benjamin national power because international power is O. Fordham. The editors categorize the chapter in the key which make threats so easy to identify. If

3 H-Net Reviews one can easily deduce threats from power, then derstand power politics, then we must under‐ one enables theory-building, and this is what the stand what really motivates concrete actors in‐ book wants. The three thematic questions of the stead of making general assumptions about aver‐ book (who gets to defne the threat, respond to it, age actors.[1] mobilize resources against it) follow from this Rational theory is the reason why this book alignment with structural realism. First one de‐ discards motives and their variation. Taliaferro, duces threats from power, then one examines the one of the editors, is quite clear in his analytical making of foreign policy within this context. This chapter: "in order to create a foreign policy theo‐ is what Fordham calls additive analysis: as an an‐ ry, one must begin with a set of assumptions alyst one knows the threat (via one's assump‐ about the broad preferences of those charged tions), which is then reality, and one subsequently with making grand strategic decisions on behalf studies how well decision makers respond to real‐ of states" (p. 224). Quite so, which is why the clas‐ ity. Footnote 84 of the introduction (p. 31) is re‐ sics gave up on theory. NCR, it seems, has given up vealing: here we learn that the editors do not on part of reality to promote theory. Table 10.1 is wish to examine "variation in the interests of the clearest evidence. states." It is this move that sets up the book: frst One might ask whether this is a fair criticism. an agenda related to threats as power; then con‐ After all, it is legitimate to have theoretical ambi‐ tributions examining threat management; then f‐ tions, and the editors do acknowledge (in footnote nally a conclusion regarding theories with "Clear 84) that motives are part of the NCR agenda (it's information on threats." just that they don't pursue it). My point is that this The book thus discards the most valuable is really a matter of defning the heart and soul of bridge to the classical literature--namely its in‐ NCR. If we downplay motives, we lean more heav‐ sights into state motives and changes herein. ily on structural realism and favor theory-build‐ Thucydides invoked fear, honor, and interest; ing. This is so because we have a frm grasp of the Machiavelli talked of men, fox and lions, Hans independent and dependent variables. If we in‐ Morgenthau followed Max Weber and spoke of clude motives, we engage classical theory and fa‐ power, self-interest, and prestige; and Henry vor understanding over explaining. We mess up Kissinger and Raymond Aron dealt in various theory, of course, because motives become de‐ types of status quo and revisionism. Classical real‐ tached from power yet must be accessed to evalu‐ ists considered these the real building blocs of un‐ ate power. Randall Schweller's 1998 book, Deadly derstanding because if we understand state mo‐ Imbalances, mentioned in footnote 84, considers tives, then we understand what is at stake inter‐ both power and motives but interestingly does nationally. Of course, with motives varying inde‐ not theorize motives (i.e., why do some states be‐ pendently of external power, there is no possibili‐ come revisionist; why do they remain revision‐ ty of creating a theory like in the feld of mathe‐ ist?). matics, but such is the nature of international pol‐ If we follow the lead of the book under re‐ itics, noted Aron once. Rationalist theory can in view here, we head in a direction where neoclas‐ fact be dangerous, as Morgenthau noted, because sical realism gradually morphs into neostructural it can reach a degree of rationalist certitude that realism for the simple reason that the edifce in creates the belief that politics can be rationally time will build on key structuralist assumptions controlled and steered. But rationalism is not the and discard that which the classicals considered end of the story because human nature involves essential: motives. I believe the latter direction, other dimensions--biology and spirituality, as the inclusion of motives, is more fruitful if only Morgenthua labeled them--and if we wish to un‐

4 H-Net Reviews because the conceptual inventory of this version aware of this because their choices will greatly of NCR is more complete and enables better un‐ impact on the unfolding NCR tradition and its bal‐ derstandings of foreign policy. This change of em‐ ancing act between classical and structural realist phasis will not violate NCR foundations because scholarship. This book declares its ambition to as the editors acknowledge, motives form part of pull NCR in the latter direction of positivist theory the NCR agenda. NCR will have to develop difer‐ absent a theory of changing motives and interests. ently, though. It can no longer maintain the neat The book enlightens and intrigues, and most fun‐ distinction between international power as the in‐ damentally is a timely reminder that much is at dependent variable and domestic stuf (including stake in the realist debate on foreign policy analy‐ motives) as intervening variables. It will have to sis. look at the interaction between these factors, and Note it will become tied to single and comparative case [1]. , Scientifc Man vs. Pow‐ studies of limited reach (i.e., just a few cases) be‐ er Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, cause it will lack a theory of motives. 1946). Positivist theory will be the loser in all this. This loss may not be signifcant, and this is where the book contains its fnal clue. Virtually all NCR works, including the chapters in this book, state a general theoretical ambition, which also marks the conclusions that tend to seek further studies to corroborate general propositions, but the bulk of the analyses concerns in-depth case studies. If general theory is the overarching ambition, then NCR should soon arrive at some type of validated general theory (of course, the theory will apply to certain kinds of states put in certain positions, not to all states across the board). This is not about to happen, judging from the NCR literature. I suspect the reason is that NCR scholars typically fnd their one or few cases so interesting that they wish to understand them in depth. In addition, NCR schol‐ ars, we know, appreciate conceptual development and refnement. They are therefore classical real‐ ists by heart: concepts and cases are the ingredi‐ ents in the employed by classi‐ cal realists. It is in the nature of honest disagree‐ ments that structural realists have turned their back to this approach and tradition. This is not the case for NCR scholars who, judging by this book at least but also the wider literature, harbor theoret‐ ical ambitions on the one hand while practicing classical realist scholarship on the other. There is thus ambiguity in the house of neoclassical real‐ ism. Neoclassical scholars should be acutely

5 H-Net Reviews

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo

Citation: Sten Rynning. Review of Lobell, Steven E.; Ripsman, Norrin M.; Taliaferro, Jefrey W., eds. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. July, 2009.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24339

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

6