Russia's Exercise of Power

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Russia’s exercise of power

A comparative case study of Russia’s use of command power, soft power and smart power in Georgia and Ukraine

Author: Linnea Nilsson Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson

Examiner: Heiko Fritz Term: VT19 Subject: Peace and Development Studies

Level: Bachelor

Course code: 2FU33E

Abstract

Despite a vast research of Russia’s means of power, including its military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, no comprehensive comparison of Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine has been accomplished, even though they are the most prominent cases of post-Soviet states that have been subjects for Russian military aggression. This study compares the forms of power Russia has been using to implement its foreign policy objectives in Ukraine and Georgia, in order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior and strategies, through an abductive qualitative approach with a comparative method. Russia’s means of power are analyzed through the glasses of the analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts of command power, soft power and smart power. The findings suggest that Russia’s main foreign policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, are to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western orientation in the region, make its neighboring countries dependent on Russia, establish closer ties with its neighbors and incorporate them in the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), but also to achieve military supremacy in the region. It is further apparent that Russia uses similar strategies and means of power in Georgia and Ukraine, both through military actions and economic pressures, that can be categorized under command power, but also through diplomatic means, other economic means, informational tools and co-optation. However, in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives most efficiently, Russia combines command power and soft power. This study can contribute to the research of other dominant countries and unequal relationships; and from the learnings of this study, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy moves can be detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power towards less powerful states.

Keywords Russia, dominant countries, foreign policy, exercise of power, Ukraine, Georgia, conflict, command power, soft power and smart power

Acknowledgements I want to thank my research supervisor Manuela Nilsson for her dedicated involvement, assistance and support through every step in the process of the thesis. I am very grateful for her support and understanding during these weeks.

List of abbreviations ECU - Eurasian Customs Union EU - European Union NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Table of Content

1. Introduction ...... 7 1.1 Background ...... 7 1 1.2 Literature review, research problem and research relevance ...... 8 2 1.3 Research objective and framing of questions ...... 11 3 1.4 Analytical framework ...... 12 4 1.5 Methodological framework ...... 12 5 1.6 Disposition of the thesis ...... 13

6 2. Analytical framework ...... 13 7 2.1 Soft power and command power ...... 13 8 2.2 Smart power ...... 14 9 2.3 Alternative concepts of power ...... 15

10 3. Methodological framework ...... 18 11 3.1 Qualitative method ...... 18 12 3.2 Comparative method ...... 19 13 3.3 Abductive approach ...... 20 14 3.4 Sources ...... 21 15 3.5 Limitations ...... 22 16 3.6 Delimitations ...... 23 17 3.7 Ethical considerations ...... 24

18 4. Empirical results ...... 24 19 4.1 A short review of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine ...... 24 20 4.1.1 Georgia ...... 24 21 4.1.2 Ukraine ...... 26 22 4.2 Russia’s main foreign policy objectives in the post-Soviet space ...... 28 23 4.3 Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia ...... 30 24 4.3.1 Military tools ...... 30 25 4.3.2 Diplomatic tools ...... 32 26 4.3.3 Economic tools ...... 34 27 4.3.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ...... 36 28 4.4 Russia in Ukraine ...... 38

29 4.4.1 Military tools ...... 38 30 4.4.2 Diplomatic tools ...... 39 31 4.4.3 Economic tools ...... 40 32 4.4.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ...... 41

33 5. Analysis ...... 43 34 5.1 Russia’s use of command power in Georgia and Ukraine ...... 43 35 5.2 Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia and Ukraine ...... 45 36 5.3 Russia’s use of smart power in Georgia and Ukraine ...... 48

37 6. Conclusions ...... 51

38 7. Bibliography ...... 53

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In 2019, the United States, Russia, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea were ranked as the ten most powerful and influential countries in the world, based on five state attributes related to power: military strength, the characteristics of the leader, political influence, economic influence, and the international alliances a country has (US News World Report, 2019). These dominant countries have a great ability to achieve their foreign policy objectives, compared to other states on the international arena, through their exercise of power towards less powerful countries. The United States has over many years been considered as the sole dominating superpower in the global world order (Foot, R., 2006:77), but it has also been argued that the US hegemony is in decline and challenged by other powerful countries (Roberts, J. T., 2011:776). Another dominant country that has received much attention in its exercise of power towards less powerful countries is Russia. By investigating the case of Russia, conclusions may be drawn on how other dominant countries may use their power strategies, as well as which consequences their great power status and exercise of power can get. After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, there has been a widespread concern of a possible Russian invasion, among inhabitants in several post-Soviet states (Lanoszka, A., 2016:175). Since 1991, when fifteen new states became independent after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2), Russia has made military interventions in two of these post-Soviet states, namely in Georgia in 2008 (Cheterian, V., 2008:155) and Ukraine in 2014 (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). In 2008, Moscow recognized the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and Russian troops moved into

these areas, which ended up in a war between Georgia and Russia (Cheterian, V., 2008:156). Six years later, Russia commenced the annexation of Crimea, which officially was a part of Ukraine (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). The country also supported pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, who were inspired by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which led to a conflict with the Ukrainian army and paramilitary nationalists. Russian soldiers were also involved in Eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In parallel, Russia has by various means of power attempted to influence both countries, which also occurs in other post-Soviet states. There is also a discussion of Russia’s underlying aims behind these interventions and endeavor to influence its neighboring countries (Lanoszka, A., 2016:176).

1.2 Literature review, research problem and research relevance

As a dominant country with a great power status, Russia has a great ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives, through its exercise of power over less powerful states, such as Georgia and Ukraine. The available literature provides much information about Russia’s power and foreign policy behavior. For instance, Professor Charles E. Ziegler, states that the emergence of post-modern global norms, dominated by the West, are strongly linked to the persisting tensions between Western states and Russia (Ziegler, E., C., 2012:400). Many researchers, such as Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk (2015:473), seem to agree that Russia’s main foreign policy objective, related to other post-Soviet states, is to tie these countries closer to Russia and to prevent them from being more integrated with the West, but also from joining the European Union or NATO. Much has been written about Russia’s behavior and foreign policy strategies in other post-Soviet states, including its exercise of power in Ukraine and Georgia - and there is high emphasis on Russia’s military actions in Georgia and Ukraine. The sequence of events before the war in Georgia is also well documented, including of how the internal clashes

between different ethnic groups started after the nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia came into office after the first elections and the emergence of pro-Russian separatist groups, as well as the breakaway regions’ fight for independence (Oskanian, K., 2013:6-7). Research also has focused on Russia’s military actions towards Georgia and the Russian-Georgian Five- Days War. The Russian occupations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the Russian troops’ direct military confrontation with the national Georgian army, are further well documented (Lanskoy, M., Areshidze, G., 2008:156-157). The available literature also describes the sequence of events before the conflict in Ukraine broke out, including how the choice of a closer economic cooperation with Russia led to grievance among EU-supporters (Nilsson, M., Silander, D., 2015), which turned into demonstrations in Kiev and the deposition of President Viktor Janukovytj, which was replaced by a more EU-friendly leadership (Tolstrup, J., 2015). After this deposition, Russia annexed Crimea with its military forces. In parallel, a conflict broke out in Eastern Ukraine, in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, with direct confrontations between pro-Russian separatists and Russian troops on one side and paramilitary Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian army forces on the other side (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). These military actions, performed by Russia, have got much attention in the international society and they are well documented in the available literature. Russia’s non-military exercise of power in the post-Soviet space has also been increasingly emphasized in the literature - and this is also the case in Georgia and Ukraine. For instance, there are material that presents how Russia is using diplomacy, economic tools, informational tools in Georgia (Nilsson, N., 2018:5), but also how the country supports separatists and pro- Russian groups in Georgia, in order to get increased influence over the country (Ibid.:37). This is also the case in Ukraine, where one of Russia’s foreign policy priorities is to tie Ukraine closer to Russia, by pointing out the two countries’ cultural similarities and communal heritage (Bogomolov, A.,

Lytvynenko, O., 2012:1-2, 5). The available literature further provides information about Russia’s support of pro-Russian groups in Ukraine, including NGOs and political parties (Pelnēns, G., 2010:253, 264), as well as its information warfare in the media space (Polyakov, L., 2015:127, 129) and its use of economic tools (MacFarlane, N., Menon, A., 2014:97-98). Even though there are material available in the existing literature that presents these alternative, non-traditional means of power, the largest emphasis within the literature written about Russia’s foreign policy behavior in Georgia and Ukraine, is on Russia’s military actions. Thus, as seen in the literature review above, the available literature provides plenty of material about Russia’s exercise of power in both countries separately. However, the literature mainly focuses on obvious types of power, such as military or economic power. It does not compare Russia’s use of different forms of power in Ukraine and Georgia, nor does it investigate patterns in Russia’s foreign policy behavior and strategies, in relation to these two countries. Concerning the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, there is much focus in the literature on Russia’s military presence in its neighboring countries, while the other means of power gets less attention in Georgia and Ukraine. The predominant focus on military means is, however, not remarkable, since the use of military power may frighten people to a larger extent, since it threatens their physical security. Since Ukraine and Georgia are the eminent post-Soviet states that have been subjects to Russian military interventions, an investigation, identification and comparison of Russia’s behavior and exercise of power in these two countries is of great importance and has a lot of relevance for the understanding of military intervention and the use of power in conflict, since it can indicate patterns in Russia’s foreign policy, as a prominent example of a great power, in relation to its neighbors. It is important to see which power strategies Russia has used so far - and to look into more than one case at the time. If Russia has used the same strategies in both Ukraine and Georgia,

there is also a chance that similar strategies and means of power are used in other post-Soviet states, or beyond that, in other countries bordering the Russian sphere of influence today. Therefore, the identification and comparison of Russia’s means of power in Georgia and Ukraine can make it easier to notice warning signals in other post-Soviet states that could be the next subjects to Russian invasion. It can also contribute with material to an information base, that may provide states, security organizations, defense institutions and other international organizations with information about Russia’s behavior and strategies, related to its exercise of power. This can facilitate the work to prevent that international law, respect for national borders and human rights are violated in the future. It may be disputable to which extent Russia’s foreign policy behavior can be countered, but anyhow, some scholars underline that Russia has not respected national borders and human rights - and the country has been breaking the international law (Sayapin, S., et. al., 2018:4). Therefore, Russia’s aims, behavior and strategies must be identified, so the international community and nation states can prepare and develop strategies to prevent these violations. The investigation of Russia’s foreign policy strategies is also relevant for studies of other dominant countries. Russia can serve as an example of other states with high power levels, where learnings can be drawn from Russia’s role as great power and its foreign policy behavior. From these learnings, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy moves can detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power towards less powerful states.

1.3 Research objective and framing of questions

The objective of the study is to compare the forms of power Russia has been using to implement its foreign policy objectives in Georgia and Ukraine, in order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior and strategies. In order to

achieve the research objective, the following research questions have been formulated:

• Which main objectives in Russian foreign policy, related to its exercise of power in its neighboring states, are identified in the current literature? • Which forms of power is Russia using towards Georgia respectively Ukraine? How is Russia using these means of power? • Which main similarities and differences are there, in Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine?

The second and third research questions are the main questions for this study, while the first one is relevant for understanding the other questions, since a country’s foreign policy objectives need to be defined, in order to get a deeper understanding of its behavior in other states.

1.4 Analytical framework

Joseph Nye’s concepts of soft power, command power and smart power will be used as the analytical framework for this study, which will examine Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine. The study will focus on Nye’s three power concepts; however, it will also be open to detecting other forms of power, that might not fit into this analytical framework. Nye’s concepts of power and why this analytical framework was chosen will be further explained in chapter 2 of this thesis.

1.5 Methodological framework

A qualitative desk study and a text analysis will be done in this paper, with an abductive approach. A comparative method will be used, by comparing Russia’s power strategies in Georgia and Ukraine. Chapter 3 will explain the chosen methodological framework further.

1.6 Disposition of the thesis

The coming sections of this study will present the analytical framework and the methodological framework, including the limitations and delimitations of the study. In the findings section, relevant material and information about Russia’s exercise of power in Ukraine and Georgia will be presented, as well as Russia’s foreign policy objectives, related to its post-Soviet neighbors. These results will later be compared in the analysis, which also will categorize Russia’s power instruments under Nye’s concepts of command power, soft power and smart power. The analysis will be followed by the conclusion of the study, including future research suggestions.

2. Analytical framework

2.1 Soft power and command power

The concept of power is contested and complex - and there is no encompassing theory, nor one overarching analytical approach that most researchers agree on (Hurrell, A., 2017:90). Some scholars do the largest distinction between soft power and command power. According to Joseph S. Nye, professor at Harvard University, the proof of power has traditionally been laying in military resources. In more recent times, the concept of power increasingly emphasizes the ability to affect the behavior of other states, by attraction (Nye, J. S., 1990:154-155), rather than coercion, which Nye describes as the concept of soft power, which he developed in 1990 (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-167). His concept of soft power refers to the ability to shape another actor’s preferences, decisions and behavior through attraction; by actions of evoking appreciation or interest for something or someone. A country can achieve its preferred outcomes in foreign policy, because other states or actors either are willing to support it, or have allowed situations and conditions that may produce these outcomes. Instead of ordering other

countries to behave in a certain manner, the exercise of soft power, or co- optive power, occurs when a state gets other actors to want and behave in a similar way as itself. This force of attraction is often associated with ideological, cultural and institutional influence, but also with policies and political values, that are considered to be legitimate and have a moral authority (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-167). According to Nye, the opposite of soft power is command power, even called hard power. This is the more traditional form of power, that was mentioned above. Command power includes economic pressure means, coercive actions, threats or military means, which is used in order to reach certain political aims (Nye, J. S., 2008:95). Joseph Nye’s first work on soft power challenged the assumption that the United States’ power was declining. Instead, he argued that US’ power was more comprehensive, if other power resources are examined, besides the traditional power factors such as economic wealth, military capacity, population and geographic size of a country (Nye, J. S., 1990:8). Nye claimed that soft power resources are of greater importance in the US, as well as in other countries, in the new era, when the world is becoming increasingly interdependent (Nye, J. S., 1990:32). Some of the most common examples of soft power, is the use of trade, diplomacy, propaganda, media and co-optation (Nye, J. S., 1990:166- 167). Economic means can, depending on the context, be attributed to either command power or soft power. Trade and economic cooperation are two examples of soft power, while economic pressure means, such as sanctions, would be categorized as hard power (Feklyunina, V., 2015).

2.2 Smart power

The concept of smart power was later developed under the 21st century, when political scientists realized that the most effective type of power is when a state combines soft power and command power. Joseph Nye stated that it is more strategic for countries to use a combination of attraction and

coercion in their foreign policy, in order to be as powerful as possible. According to Nye, there are three main ways for an actor to affect and shape the behavior of others, in order to get it wants, namely payment, coercion and attraction. Command power is the use of payment and coercion, while soft power is the use of attraction. By only using either command power or soft power separately, it is harder for a state to get its desired outcomes. It is, according to Nye, more effective for a state to use both payment, coercion and attraction in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, instead of just one or two of these (Nye, J. S., 2009:160-162). There are also other scholars that, more recently, have renewed and supplemented Nye’s material, so it fits more into the daily context. For instance, the American scholar Ernest J. Wilson, develops Nye’s ideas and states that both diplomacy advocates and hard power advocates have a narrow understanding and ignore other essential means of power. A lacking debate about means of power, leads to poor decision making, according to Wilson. Therefore, he advocates smart power, similar to Nye (Wilson, E. J., 2008:110-111).

2.3 Alternative concepts of power

There are, however, other definitions of power, as well as other theorists and political scientists that writes about concepts of power, that is related to the exercise of power in international politics, which partly would fit as analytical frameworks for this study, in order to answer the research questions. Some political scientists, such as Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, use to differ between various levels of power. These include compulsory power, which refers to the relation where one actor has direct control over another actor, institutional power, where an actor has indirect control over others, for instance, by controlling an agenda, exclude issues that may threaten certain interests and determine the decisions and structural power, which refers to the constitution of an actors’ capacities in a direct structural relation to another actor (Barnett, M., Duvall, R., 2005:43). Others

do the largest distinction between constructive power and destructive power, where the former is related to that kind of constructive influence with a positive intention, that appears when actors are cooperating and working together, while the latter; the destructive power, is the exercise of power with a negative attention, that is related to intimidation, fear and coercion (Baker, G., 2008), which are similar to the concepts of command power and soft power. The political scientist Robert Dahl attempts to define power based on the concept of influence. Influence is related to relationships and to what extent an actor can influence another actor's behavior and actions. He considers the state as an important and powerful actor, both nationally and in the international system. Dahl means that other actors often try to win the state's favor, since they often can enforce their agenda with the help of the government. Dahl has a positivist attitude to how power can be understood and means that it is possible to determine, through empirical investigations, which actor, among others, that possesses the greatest power (Dahl, 1961, 102-104, 164). Steven Lukes is another political scientist that has been doing research about different concepts of power. He goes in a similar direction as both Dahl and Nye, but Lukes divides exercise of power in three various dimensions. In short, his One-Dimensional Power means that A is directly exercising power over B (Lukes, S., 2005:17), where he draws much of this dimension on Robert Dahl’s work on “The Concept of Power”, where Dahl states that one kind of power relation is when “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, R., 1957:80). Lukes’ Two-Dimensional Power is more subtle and means that exercise of power can be noticed in existing values, structures and institutional practices, which can inhibit one group and be in favor of another (Lukes, S., 2005:17:20-21). The Third-Dimensional Power is when someone exercise power through authority, as well as manipulation (Ibid.:27). Lukes dimensions do, to a larger extent, focus on intra-state relations, while Nye’s

concepts of power are fitting better on inter-state relations, which are examined in this study. Lukes dimensions can also be considered as different combinations of soft and command power and thereby be based on Nye. Joseph Nye is the one that first defined the concept of soft power. Even though there are many other ideas and concepts of power, the others that would have been relevant for answering the research questions of this study, are often either based on Nye or they do not provide with anything better than Nye, in order to form an analytical framework that better would help to answer the research questions of this study. Nye’s concepts are preferred as analytical frameworks in this paper, since they may contribute to more precise answers of the research questions. Further, Nye wrote his first material at the end of the Cold War - and takes the division and the tensions between the West and East into account, which also is relevant for this thesis, since both Georgia and Ukraine has been torn between the West and the East, since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Joseph Nye’s concepts of soft power, command power and smart power will be used as the analytical frameworks for this study, in order to identify, compare and analyze Russia’s exercise of power in these two post-Soviet states. This paper will investigate the different forms of power Russia has been using towards Georgia and Ukraine, in order to pursue its foreign policy objectives. According to Jakob Gustavsson (Gustavsson, J., 2018), foreign policy has generally three primary goals, namely to ensure a country’s ideology, welfare and national security. Some of the most common methods that are used to achieve these goals are the practice of diplomacy, propaganda, economic means and military means (Gustavsson, J. et al., 2014:259). These means can also be categorized under Nye’s concepts of soft power and command power. They will be used in the investigation of Russia’s exercise of power in this study, under the four categories of: 1) military tools, 2) economic tools, 3) diplomacy tools and 4) propaganda, informational tools and co-optation, based on the methods Jakob Gustavsson

presented, which are used in order to categorize the findings of this study. Military tools and certain economic tools, such as economic sanctions and pressures, are the most prominent command power means (Nye, J. S., 2008:95), while diplomacy, propaganda, informational tools, co-optation, as well as other economic tools, such as trade and economic cooperations, normally are categorized under soft power (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-167). This study will also investigate Russia’s use of smart power towards Georgia and Ukraine, which is the combination of these command and soft power tools mentioned above.

3. Methodological framework

In this chapter, the methodological framework of the study will be outlined. In order to achieve the objective of this study, by answering the research questions, an abductive qualitative desk study with a text analysis will be done and a comparative method with two case studies will be used in the paper, which will be explained in the paragraphs below.

3.1 Qualitative method

In contrast to the quantitative method, which put much emphasis on numerical data (Bryman, A., 2016:375), the qualitative method describes and explains events, phenomena and actors in detail, in order to provide a deeper exposition of the context in which individuals’ and actors’ behaviors and actions take place (Ibid.: 394). This paper will present a qualitative study, where Russia’s means of power in Georgia and Ukraine will be explained in detail, in order to provide a deeper account of the context of Russia’s exercise of power, potential threats and Russia’s underlying aims in foreign policy. In order to be able to answer the research questions properly, a qualitative text analysis will be conducted, which aims to sort out the most essential content in a text, that is relevant for answering the research

questions, by a careful reading of the text’s sections and entirety, but also of its context (Esaiasson, P., et. al. 2017:211). Since Russia’s means of power in Georgia and Ukraine from 1991 are well documented in the available literature, this paper will present a desk study, where documents and texts will be collected, interpreted and analyzed (Strang, V., Szabo, V., 1997:377- 379).

3.2 Comparative method

A comparative method will be used in this study, to detect common strategies in Russia’s exercise of power. The comparative method is a scientific approach aimed at describing, explaining and analyzing the empirical differences, as well as the relationships between different entities. This comparative method can be used to compare different phenomena that have significant similarities with each other, but also different results. In contrast to a statistical method, fewer number of cases are examined in the comparative method (Lijphart, A., 1971:684). The paper will present a multiple case study, which takes the form when a qualitative method with a comparative design is applied. A multiple case study occurs when the investigated case studies are more than one. By comparing various cases, a researcher can also develop or suggest new concepts, theories or ideas (Bryman, A., 2016:67-68). In this study, Georgia and Ukraine are the entities or cases that will be analyzed - and Russia’s exercise of power in these countries is the phenomenon that will be compared. These two countries are selected, since the study will compare Russia’s exercise of power in the cases of sovereign post-Soviet states where Russia has made military interventions, in order to fulfill the objective of the thesis - and Georgia and Ukraine are the only countries Russia has invaded. Therefore, more than two different case studies can not be done within this subject. However, these two countries are comparable, not only because they are post-Soviet states and have been subjects for Russia’s military

interventions, but also because both Georgia and Ukraine have been facing a dilemma, where they have been forced to choose between either closer ties with Russia or with the West. Today, they are both searching for a closer integration with the West. Similar to each other, both Georgia and Ukraine are also the inferior part in their relationship with Russia - and are in many respects dependent on the Russian state. Therefore, Russia’s exercise of power in relation to these countries will investigated and compared - and thereby, conclusions may be drawn on other unequal state relationships, where one of the states is far more dominant than the other.

3.3 Abductive approach

By taking an abductive approach, a researcher uses one or several analytical frameworks in order to describe and explain a certain phenomenon (Danermark, B., et. al, 2008:90). The researcher’s worldview, in a study with abductive reasoning, will be based on observed and collected data (Bryman, A., 2016:401). In this study, an abductive approach will be taken, since the concepts of soft power, command power and smart power will be used as the main analytical frameworks, in order to analyze Russia’s behavior and exercise of power. This lens is, however, not exclusive, but leaves the investigation open to detect other forms of power that might not fit into the applied analytical framework. The paper will provide information about how Russia has been using various forms of power in Georgia and Ukraine, in order to detect how these strategies may be recognized in other post-Soviet states the future. This study does not aim to create new theories or concepts, where the theory is generated from the research, which is the case in an inductive approach. Neither will it test a theory or a theoretical based hypothesis, which is the case in a deductive approach (Bryman, A., 2016:690-691). Unlike the inductive approach, which provides an empirical generalization, the abductive approach starts to describe general patterns, which will be done in this study. Abduction also differs from the deductive

approach, since it is does not provide a rigid logical conclusion (Collins, R., 1985). It will rather use existing concepts, in order to provide a greater understanding of Russia’s exercise of power and indicate patterns in Russia’s relations to its neighbors, by examining the topic through the lens of an analytical framework.

3.4 Sources

Source criticism is a method for evaluating whether information is credible, probable and anchored in reality. There are four criteria that often are used when doing a traditional evaluation of sources, namely: 1) Authenticity; is the source what it claims to be? 2) Time; when was the source presented? 3) Dependency; is the source independent or does it belong to or build on other sources? 4) Tendency; is the information biased (Alexanderson, K., 2012:7, 10-11)? When selecting material for this study, the relevance, reliability and objectivity of potential sources are examined, by testing them through these four criteria presented above. This paper is mainly based on scientific articles and books, in order to present as relevant, objective and reliable information as possible. There is a great availability of sources that are relevant for answering the research questions, especially material that concerns Russia’s use of command power. Instead of reviewing one or a few documents, the findings are based on several different articles and texts. However, in some cases, online sources and official statements are also used, in order to provide additional information that is relevant for the study. For instance, primary sources of Russian official statements are used, such as the Russian Prime Minister Dmitrij Medvedev’s direct messages to Ukraine’s former President Viktoru Yushchenko (Medvedev, D., 2009). Statements like these are naturally biased, but the use of these sources is not aiming to collect objective facts or information about an occurrence, but rather to show how Russia concretely expresses its foreign policy objectives.

However, since this paper presents a desk study and implements a secondary analysis of sources - and mainly uses secondary sources of information, including the scientific articles and online sources, the material used in this research may have been generated, biased or conceived in a certain way. Few texts are completely objective, rather, articles normally reflect the author’s fundamental worldviews and preconceptions. They often have something in mind and/or want to prove a statement or phenomena when they do their research (Strang, V., Szabo, V., 1997:67-69). When material is collected for this study, this will be kept in mind and efforts will be taken to select sources with high objectivity and reliability, in order to provide the reader with such a fair depiction of reality as possible.

3.5 Limitations

One limitation is that Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine cannot provide a complete template of how Russia is using its power in other states. The comparison of these case studies and an identification of the similarities in Russia’s behavior and foreign policy can, however, present which similar strategies Russia has used so far and indicate which methods the country may use in other neighboring states. If Russia would have invaded more neighboring countries, conclusions could have been drawn with greater accuracy. However, it may be possible to see similar behavior and strategies in different post-Soviet states, which can identify warning signals of Russian behavior in other neighboring states. Another limitation is the lack of language proficiency, since it obstructs the use of additional sources of information presented in the Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian languages. This limitation will be certainly apparent in the investigation of Russia’s foreign policy objectives, when examining foreign policy statements in Russian media.

3.6 Delimitations

The investigation of Russia’s foreign policy manner and exercise of power is consciously delimited to Russia’s sovereign neighboring countries, that became independent right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The study will not investigate Russia’s behavior in other regions where the country has used military means of power, such as in the Middle East, where Russia rather acts as a intervening great power, instead of having the possible intention to conquer land areas. The case of Chechnya will neither be deeper investigated, since it is still a federal subject of Russia - and not an independent and recognized state (Romaniuk, S., 2008:72). It is the post- Soviet states that will be examined, whose land areas have been, or may be subjects for Russian invasion or annexation. Another delimitation that will be drawn, is that the study will not do a deeper analysis of how Russia has been using its power in all individual post-Soviet states. It will rather do a deeper analysis and comparison of Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine - and with this analysis as a basis, in combination with the identification of Russia’s foreign policy aims, more generalizing warning signals for Russian invasion in the other post-Soviet states will be presented. The study is also delimited to the time period between 1991 and the present, since there were, obviously, no post-Soviet states before 1991. Further, it is delimited to the analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts of soft and smart power, and will not analyze levels of power related to Russia. The study will rather focus on how Russia uses various means of power, which can be categorized under soft power and command power, in order achieve the research objective. The final delimitation for this study is to neither make a deeper investigation in Russia’s foreign policy objectives, nor to present and analyze official statements by Russian politicians, but rather to define its main objectives, according to the existing English speaking literature, in relation to

Georgia and Ukraine, in order to get a clearer understanding of Russia’s behavior and foreign policy actions in these states.

3.7 Ethical considerations

This paper presents a desk study, based on published literature, which means there is no ethical considerations that will be taken into account, since it is dealing with non-sensible information, as there will be no meetings with organizations or interviewees.

4. Empirical results

4.1 A short review of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine

4.1.1 Georgia

Modern Georgia gained its independence in 1991, in connection to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2). The first elected president was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was a nationalist leader that spoke for the country’s ethnic Georgians. This resulted in armed clashes and disputes in South Ossetia between ethnic Georgians and the minority group Ossetians (Oskanian, K., 2013:6-7). The fighting ended in 1992 with a ceasefire and the installment of a peacekeeping force. Gamsakhurdia was replaced by the former foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze. That same year, another separatist conflict occurred in the region of Abkhazia, which is a larger and more strategically significant autonomous region, located at the coast of the Black Sea, where the Abkhazians have strived to break free from Georgia (Lanskoy, M., Areshidze, G., 2008:156). Georgia has not been able to maintain its territorial sovereignty, since it lost the political control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which has exacerbated the country’s problems as a weak and fragile state. The regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have close ties to

Russia and have for a long time attempted to secede from Georgia. South Ossetia already declared independence in 1990 and sought to break free from Georgia and join the Russian region of North Ossetia (Phillips, D. L., 2004:17), while Abkhazia declared its independence in 1992 (Oskanian, K., 2013:7). During Shevardnadze’s rule, the population suffered from corruption, poverty and criminality, which resulted in peaceful mass demonstrations, called the “Rose Revolution”, which led to a new election in 2004, where president Mikheil Saakashvili was appointed (Mitchell, L. A., 2004:343-345). His main objectives were to unite Georgia and recapture Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which provoked the South Ossetians and increased the tensions (Ibid.:348). In 2008, the Georgian authorities attempted to retake South Ossetia, while Russian troops backed the separatists and occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as other areas in Georgia - and in August 2008, a five days long war broke out, with direct military confrontations. Both Georgia and Russia signed a peace agreement after five days, but Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states after the war (Lanskoy, M., Areshidze, G., 2008:156-157) and turned them effectively into Russian protectorates. Therefore, the territorial and ethnic issues are still not solved - and Russia continues to control Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has kept its military bases in the regions. The deep economic, social and intergovernmental linkages between the two regions and Russia undermines the regions’ autonomy (Bader, M., Gerrits, A., 2016:297).

Figure 1:1

(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2013)

4.1.2 Ukraine

Similar to Georgia, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1991, when it was proclaimed as an independent state (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2). Until 1954, Crimea belonged to the Russian part of the Soviet Union, but was then moved to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; the Ukrainian part of the Soviet Union (Duke, D. F., Marples, D. R., 2007:261). After the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimea was recognized as a part of the new Ukrainian state, even though the majority of the Crimean citizens were ethnic Russians (Bebler, A., 2015:197-198). Today, Ukraine borders both to the European Union and to Russia - and has interests of having good relations with both parts. However, various groups prefer a closer cooperation with either EU or Russia. It was the choice between a closer relation to either the West or to Russia that was the starting point of the conflict in Ukraine. The European Union offered an association agreement with Ukraine, which would draw Ukraine closer to the EU. However, this agreement would prevent Ukraine from joining an economic union led by Russia in the future. This proposal forced President Viktor Janukovytj to choose sides. Initially, he was positive to a closer cooperation

with EU. At the same time, he did not want to distance the nation from Russia. Therefore, he signed a trade agreement with Russia instead, which aroused grievance among EU-supporters in Ukraine (Nilsson, M., Silander, D., 2015). In November 2013, large demonstrations took place on Maidan Square in Kiev, which were motivated by discontentment around the new agreement with Russia, corruption and poor governance of the country. The government’s brutal confrontation led to an escalation of the clashes in the Ukrainian capital - and Janukovytj was deposed by the parliament, in February 2014. He was replaced by the temporary president Oleksandr Turtjynov - and in June, Petro Poroshenko was elected as president (Tolstrup, J., 2015). Janukovytj was replaced by a Western-oriented government, which was a major defeat for the Russian state (Johansson, G. B., 2016:101). Russia strongly reacted on the deposition and took control over Crimea with its military forces. Russia already had a military base on the peninsula, so the operation was rapidly accomplished. However, most states do not recognize Crimea as a part of Russia (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). Russia’s behavior and actions on the Crimean Peninsula was partly motivated by the fear that the new Ukrainian regime would use Crimea as a NATO-base. Russia did also support pro-Russian rebels in the eastern parts of Ukraine, who were inspired of the annexation of Crimea. This led to clashes between the Ukrainian army and paramilitary nationalists on one side and pro-Russian separatists on the other side. The battles mainly occurred in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. Russian soldiers were also involved in these battles (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In September 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSSE) arranged a peace agreement, that was signed by Russia, Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists. However, the peace agreement has been violated several times - and the conflict escalated further in 2015 (Pettersson, T., Wallensteen, P., 2015:542).

Figure 1.2

(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2016)

4.2 Russia’s main foreign policy objectives in the post-Soviet space

Regarding Russia’s foreign policy objectives in relation to other post-Soviet states, the political elite in Russia has not expressed a concrete wish to restore the Soviet Union. The Russian administration realizes that it would be impossible, however, there is no agreement of what would replace the USSR (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:2). Many scholars, including Kataryna Wolczuk and Laure Delcour, point out that Russia rather searches to retain its great power status and to make its neighbors dependent on Russia and well integrated with other post-Soviet states. One of Russia’s main foreign policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, is to prevent the European Union and the United States from gaining influence in the region and to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western orientation, as well as Western norms and values in its neighboring countries. Russia wants to prevent its neighboring countries from joining EU and NATO and instead establish closer ties with its neighbors and incorporate them in a Russian-led custom union (Delcour, L., Wolczuk, K., 2015:473). Russia has been aiming

to undermine post-Soviet countries’ relationship to Western actors and to isolate them from the international system. Another objective in Russia’s foreign policy in relation to its neighboring states has also been to influence their security- and foreign policy decisions (Nilsson, N., 2018:26-28, 37). Russia further attempts to provide an alternative perception of worldwide events and international politics and aims to influence audiences abroad, especially its neighboring countries. A priority in Russia’s foreign policy is to spread its own values, norms and ideology, as well as to achieve increased military influence and control in the post-Soviet space. However, some scholars claim that today’s Russia rejects the totalitarian ideology, that was in place in Soviet Union - and is not aiming to force its own political model upon its neighboring states. It rather wants to avoid to be surrounded by pro-Western states and does not want its neighbors to be allied with the West, since it constitutes a security threat towards Russia. Therefore, Russia makes strong efforts in order to keep other post-Soviet states friendly towards Russia, or at least to make them hold a neutral position (Lukin, A., 2016). Concerning Russia’s main objectives with its military interventions in the post-Soviet space, one of Russia’s main objectives with its military operations in Ukraine, was to prevent Crimea from serving as a NATO-base, since it would threaten Russia’s national security (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1), while its main objective with its military intervention in Georgia 2008 was to gain control over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in order to get an increased strategic position in the Caucasus region, but also to establish sea and air supremacy. Another main objective Russia had was to prevent reinforcements of Georgian troops, as well as foreign troops (Pallin, C. V., Westerlund, F., 2009:403). As Jakob Gustavsson claimed, foreign policy generally has three main goals, namely to ensure a country’s national security, welfare and ideology (Gustavsson, J., 2018). As seen above, it is apparent that Russia

cherish its national security, through its objective to achieve military supremacy in the post-Soviet states, as well as its welfare, through the objective to prevent its neighboring states from a closer economic cooperation with the EU and instead integrate them in a closer cooperation with Russia, which economically would benefit the Russian states. The country also cherish its ideology, through its foreign policy objective to spread its own values and norms, including its anti-Western messages to other post-Soviet states. In order to achieve these foreign policy objectives, related to its neighbors in the post-Soviet space, Russia has been using various means of power, which will be presented in the paragraphs below.

4.3 Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia

4.3.1 Military tools

Georgia is one of the post-Soviet states that has been most harshly and frequently exposed to Russia’s exercise of power, which gained increased attention after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia has combined several pressure points, in order to influence the public opinion in Georgia, as well as the Georgian government’s decision making, especially in its security- and foreign policy. The pressure points Russia has been using in Georgia include traditional sources of power, such as coercion, threats and military force - and the control of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Nilsson, N., 2018:5). Russia’s military presence within and around Georgian territory is the most apparent tool the country has been using towards Georgia. In 2008, Russia deployed a troop of 20 000 men to Georgia and took control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia within five days - and proved thereby its ability to quickly achieve military supremacy. This operation was carefully planned and completed according to the plan, with trained units and formations that were coordinated together with other means of power, such

as a diplomatic offensive and cyber warfare (Pallin, C. V., Westerlund, F., 2009:400-401), that will be further explained later on. As seen in paragraph 4.2.1, one of Russia’s main objectives of its military intervention in Georgia 2008, was to take full control of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The establishment of military bases in these provinces and the control over mountain crossings have strengthened Russia’s military position in the Caucasus. Russia also started to prepare for a naval base for its Black Sea Fleet at the Abkhazian town of Ochamchire, but also to redevelop a former Soviet airbase, also located in Abkhazia, in the city of Gudauta. In order to fulfill its military objectives related to Georgia, the Russian strategy was to combine a support of naval and air operations with massive deployments on the ground, so the country could achieve a supremacy in numbers. This kind of military strategy goes in line with the military thinking in the former Soviet. Russia further managed to achieve its objective to prevent Georgian troop reinforcements, by cutting off important roads, ports and railroads in Georgia. Russia also attempted to debilitate Georgia’s military capability by seizing equipment and destroying infrastructure. During the Five-Day War in August 2008, the Russian forces were instructed to focus on military targets. However, some military commentators argued that Russia’s operation would be more effective and successful if the troops were allowed to focus on political targets as well, such as Georgia’s political leadership (Pallin, C. V., Westerlund, F., 2009:403). The Georgian authorities have still not managed to retake the control over the breakaway regions. In 2014-2015, treaties of an integration with South Ossetia and Abkhazia were signed by Russia. Georgia has not developed an anti-annexation strategy and will, similar to Ukraine, continue to have problems of fighting legitimacy of its annexed territories (Kapanadze, S., 2015:181).

4.3.2 Diplomatic tools

Russia’s pressure points towards Georgia also include the use of diplomatic tools. As seen in paragraph 4.2.1, one of Russia’s foreign policy objectives, related to Georgia, has been to isolated Georgia from the international system and weaken the country’s relation to the West. Russia’s interests in post- Soviet states differs, to a large extent, from Western interests in same region. While Western leaders have regarded certain policies in post-Soviet states as more or less preferable, the same policies have been considered as crucial for the national security in Russia, by the Russian government (Nilsson, N., 2016:27). In order to resist and counter the West, Russia has been keen to establish itself as an indispensable and essential partner in those issues that Western governments and institutions has considered as critical and important, such as the unrest in Afghanistan and Syria. Russia also attempts to deal with post-Soviet states, including Georgia, within the framework of its relationship to other great powers in the West. Russia has been keen to have influence over Georgia and prevent the country from establishing closer relations to the West. However, several Western governments are committed to Georgia’s sovereign right to formulate and develop its own foreign policy without interference from Russia, but also to Georgia’s right to independently pursue membership in EU, NATO and other Western organizations. When Saakashvili came to power by an election in 2004, the Bush administration started to showcase Georgia as a success of United States’ democracy promotion and demonstrated how a Western-inspired model of governance also was attainable in post-Soviet states, besides the Baltic countries. The image of Georgia as a relatively democratic state creates much support and commitment to the country, from the United States and other Western governments. Therefore, Russia has striven hard to remind and enlighten the West of the downsides of the domestic development in Georgia, as seen in paragraph 4.3.4 (Nilsson, N., 2016:27-28).

Russia’s primary diplomatic pressure towards Georgia before the war in 2008, was the support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in their attempts to separate from the Georgian state, but also to make the regions’ leaderships dependent on Russia for their endurance as independent entities. Since Russia controlled the peacekeeping forces in these breakaway regions, it were allowed to be military present on the ground - and by maintaining the conflicts in the regions unresolved, Russia constantly reminded Georgia of its political vulnerability and its weak territorial integrity. The undetermined status of the breakaway regions also made it possible for Russia to offer a potential reward, if Tbilisi decided to return the country’s foreign policy course to Russia’s fold, but it did not happen. After the Five-Days’ War in 2008, when Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, the potential carrot connected to a possible reunification of Georgia was removed (Nilsson, N., 2016:28-29). After 2012, when the Georgian Dream came to power, the tense relation between Moscow and Tbilisi started to be more relaxed. The trade increased, the communication improved, visa regimes were removed by Georgia and the Georgian government did not officially support Ukraine in the dispute with Russia in 2014. Russia’s use of military tools in Georgia has decreased since 2012 and it has been replaced by alternative means of power. Central in Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet states in recent years is the lack of tolerance towards its neighbors’ attempts to integrate into economic, military and political systems, based in the West. This creates a strategic dilemma for states such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, especially since a clear guarantee of membership in the EU and NATO is absent. Should they receive those benefits Russia offers or should they continue to follow their pro-Western line at all costs (Kapanadze, S., 2015:162-164)? Russia also uses its labor market as a means of attraction towards Georgians. Since 1991, up to one million Georgians have moved to

Russia as legal migrant workers. There is also a large number of illegal Georgian workers in Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2007:23). Around 50 percent of the total value of remittances in Georgia are sent from Russia. Therefore, the labor market in Russia is attractive for many Georgians and is important for the Georgian economy. In 2000, visa requirements for Georgians were introduced by Russia - and they have still not been removed, even though Georgia removed its visa regime for Russian citizens in 2012. However, in 2013, Russia gradually eased the visa rules for businessmen, scientists and journalists. A removal of all visa requirements for Georgians is a power card and an inducement Russia uses, in order to force the Georgian government to restore the diplomatic ties and also repeal the “Law on Occupied Territories”, which criminalized Russian entry to South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Kapanadze, S., 2015:164-166).

4.3.3 Economic tools

Russia also exercises considerable economic pressure on the Georgian state, particularly after 2015, when the GDP growth in Georgia slowed down. Even though Georgia’s economic development was generally positive until its economic decline in 2015 (Nilsson, N., 2016:30-31), 69.4 percent of the total population lived in moderate poverty and 32.2 lived in extreme poverty in 2014 (World Bank Group, 2015:4). External economic pressures and manipulation is threatening Georgia’s vulnerable economy. The country’s economic links with Russia have recently been reestablished, however, it gives Russia more occasions to hurt the Georgian economy. In 2012, when the political party Georgian Dream came to power, Georgia began to work on normalized economic relation with Russia. The country wanted Russia to reopen its market for Georgian products, which gradually occurred in 2013, which benefited Georgia’s economy and the producers in the country - and Russia became the most important export destination for the Georgian-produced wines and the fourth largest export

destination for Georgian goods in the world (Baranec, T., 2015). Russia removed bans on tea, potatoes, nuts and other Georgian agricultural products in 2013 and 2014. This means that Georgia becomes more economically dependent on its exports to the Russian markets. Whenever Russia decides to close its market for Georgian goods, the Georgian economy risks to be seriously damaged (Kapanadze, S., 2015:167-168). However, Russia has imposed several trade sanctions applied to Georgian products, legitimized by falsely accusing food products, imported from Georgia, of having sanitary flaws. Russia has done the same to Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Polish and Moldovan products. In 2014, Georgia signed the “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (DCFTA) with the European Union, in the hope that the agreement would increase its export to EU and boost the country’s agricultural production, but the essential consequence was that Russia cancelled its trade agreement with Georgia and banned several products that earlier was imported from Georgia, such as wines and brandies (Baranec, T., 2015). Since 2012, Russian Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Georgia has increased. However, Russia’s investments in Georgia have not represented more than 10 % of the total FDI in Georgia since 1996, which means that Moscow does not have serious tools to destroy the Georgian economy by its companies’ direct investments. Russia and pro-Russian groups are rather capable to influence Georgia’s investment climate through the Georgian Co- investment Fund (GCF), which is a vehicle for private investments, which is aiming to finance projects in cooperation with other private investors. The energy sector is also a potential area for Russia’s exercise of power, since Russia has been using energy dependency as a instrument in its neighboring countries, in order to achieve its political objectives. Georgia is, however, not heavily dependent on Russian gas, since the country has diversified its supplies of natural gas. Azerbaijan is the main gas supplier to Georgia - and only 10 percent of country’s gas is imported from Russia. However, Georgia

is increasingly dependent on Russian electricity. In 2014, roughly 80 percent of Georgia’s electricity imports came from Russia, compared to 45 percent in 2010 (Kapanadze, S., 2015:169-171).

4.3.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation

In order to promote its international objectives, Russia is strategically presenting narratives that support an alternative perception of international politics. These narratives are assorted with its already existing anti-Western and nationalistic discourse - and they are aimed to target and influence audiences abroad. Currently, there are many domestic actors in Georgia that supports this political discourse - and these can be found mainly among pro- Russian NGOs, political parties, groups within the Orthodox church, as well as in alternative Internet-based media (Nilsson, N., 2016:37). Many of these pro-Russian and anti-Western actors, in particular the NGOs, more or less cooperate with Russian organizations, that are supported by the Russian authorities (Ibid.:41). The Alliance of Patriots and the Democratic Movement are the largest Georgian political parties that have close connections to Russia. Representatives from the parties have arranged several meetings with high officials, including President Vladimir Putin and the Prime Minister Dmitrij Medvedev. Both parties advocate Orthodox and conservative values - and they criticize the injustices that were committed by the former government. Furthermore, both parties have gained more support by the Georgian population in recent years, especially the Democratic Movement, which appeared to be increasingly funded after the leader’s meetings with President Putin, that started in 2010 (Ibid.:37-38). In order to present its account of different events on the international arena and leverage the perception of foreign actors, Russia makes strong efforts to be dominant in the information space. Noticeably, Georgia’s domestic politics and relation to Western governments and organizations has been a subject for a narrative contest, particularly between Russia and

Georgia. For instance, Georgia depicted the Rose Revolution as the people’s uprising against the flawed election, while Russia considered it as a coup towards a legitimate government, instigated by the United States. Further, Georgia is often described as a liberal and reformist democracy, but Russia would rather depict it as an unstable and repressive post-Soviet states; and finally, Russia would describe the war in 2008 as an necessary intervention in order to prevent a massacre of South Ossetians, rather as a Russian invasion that violates Georgia’s territorial boundaries (Nilsson, N., 2016:42- 43). Georgia is also differently depicted by representatives of the Russian government, as well as in Russian media, such as Sputnik and Russia Today, which are presented in English. Instead of being presented as a democratic state in the post-Soviet space, Georgia is rather depicted as a hybrid regime with authoritarian elements, featuring suppression of freedom of speech, assaults of political opponents and violation of the human rights (Nilsson, N., 2016:27-28). Russia also supports anti-Western and pro-Russian media channels and newspapers in Georgia. Alia, Georgia and the World, Asaval- Dasavali and Sakinform are some of the most popular pro-Russian news agencies and newspapers read by the public in Georgia, which often propagates anti-Western, homophobic, misogynic and xenophobic attitudes (Kapanadze, S., 2015:174). The Georgian Media Development Foundation (MDF) lists in its media monitoring report several anti-Western ideas and statements that often are repeated in the Georgian media, which often is associated with political parties or NGOs. The most common theme is to present which negative impact an EU integration would have on the Georgian society. A frequently used argument is that an integration with the European Union would threat Georgian values and traditions. For instance, the liberal view of homosexuality threatens the family traditions in Georgia. Western countries are also depicted as antagonistic towards the Orthodox strand of Christianity. Another theme portrays Western involvement in

Georgian, as well as in international politics as destructive. For instance, the crisis in Ukraine is simply explained by Western aggression towards Russia. Finally, Georgian NGOs that supports openness, liberal reforms and democratization, that are funded by the West, are portrayed as spies that serves external forces (Kintsurashvili, T., 2017). A feature of all statements like these, is that they avoid being openly pro-Russian, since Russia and its foreign policy continues to be unpopular among a large part of the population in Georgia. Therefore, anti-Western messages tend to depict the West in an adverse light - and Georgia’s relation with the West as a threat to the country’s traditions and values. Russian authorities are supporting and funding several NGOs, media outlets and political parties in Georgia, even though they are not openly pro-Russian, in order to influence and spread anti-Western ideas to the public opinion in Georgia (Nilsson, N., 2016:45- 46).

4.4 Russia in Ukraine

4.4.1 Military tools

Similar to Georgia, Ukraine has also been a subject for Russian military aggression. As previously mentioned in this study, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, which was rapidly accomplished, since Russia already had a military base on Crimea (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). Most states and actors in the international community do not recognize or legitimize the annexation and continue to consider the Crimean Peninsula as a part of Ukraine. The annexation has also worsened Russia’s relation to the West (Bebler, A., 2015:196). The annexation of Crimea was partly motivated by the deposition of the pro-Russian president Janukovytj and the fear that the new regime would use the Crimean Peninsula as a NATO-base. This annexation also inspired pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, which were supported by Russia. Clashes emerged between pro-Russian separatists and

Russian soldiers on one side and Ukrainian paramilitary nationalists and the national army on the other side. The fights mainly occurred in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In 2014, Ukraine moved about eleven thousand troops to eastern Ukraine, while Russia approximately deployed forty thousand troops at the border to eastern Ukraine, where the battles take place (MacMahon, R., 2014). The Russian and pro-Russian side has a greater military capacity and continues to hold the territories of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk. The Ukrainian regime is, similar to Georgia, unable to regain the control of their territories - and Russia continues to hold them as a strategic card in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives. However, Moscow is still not able to achieve a stable and friendly relation with Kiev, since it continues to maintain control over regions in southern and eastern Ukraine, in a protest against the current pro-Western regime. Russia also solidifies a dependency of local pro-Russian regimes on the support from Russia. Russia can thereby maintain its current position, but also to press Ukraine to allow a re- integration with Russia, where Russia can achieve a long-term influence over the foreign and domestic policies in Ukraine (Malyarenko, T., Wolff, S., 2018:191).

4.4.2 Diplomatic tools

One of the foreign policy priorities for Russia is to maintain influence over Ukraine - and many political elites consider Ukraine as an important part of Russia’s own identity. Russia attempts to bind Ukraine into a ‘common future’ with other post-Soviet countries, by referring to their communal heritage and cultural similarities. Mikhail Zurabov, the former Russian ambassador in Kiev, has been stated that Ukrainians and Russians belongs to the same nation (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:1-2, 5). Further, in 2009, Dmitry Medvedev, the seated Russian president, stated in an official message to the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, that “for Russia,

Ukrainians since the dawn of the time have been and remain not only neighbors, but a brotherly people”. Therefore, Medvedev considered it as an obligation for Ukraine to maintain solidly ties and a close cooperation with Russia (Medvedev, D., 2009). Simultaneously, Russia attempts to isolate Ukraine from the West and prevent them from joining EU or NATO. Russia regards Ukraine’s, as well as Georgia’s membership in NATO as security threats. The current president Vladimir Putin has aggressively called for Ukraine’s accession to a Russian-led customs union on his official visits to Kiev, in order to prevent Ukraine from joining a closer economic cooperation with the European Union, or apply for a membership in the EU (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:3-4). Russia’s diplomatic means is closely related to its economic means of power in relation to Ukraine, which will be deeper presented in next paragraph. The Ukrainian leadership has been divided in the clashes between Russia and EU - and has sought to resolve them by using metaphors, such as ‘creating a bridge between the European Union and Russia, simultaneously as they integrate with the EU (Janukovytj, V., 2010). However, the Russian administration would propose the other way around: that Ukraine could function as Russia’s bridge to the European Union, by a closer integration with Russia (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:5).

4.4.3 Economic tools

Russia has for a long time been the dominant supplier of natural gas and a large provider of oil to Europe and post-Soviet states. Many countries, including Ukraine, are heavily dependent upon Russian gas supplies, which means that Russia to a large extent can dictate the prices of natural gas. In 2006, Russia cut of its gas supply to Moldova and Ukraine, since they did not agree on the prices. A large part of Russia’s gas is transported through Ukraine, in order to be exported to other European countries. When several European states complained, Russia restored the gas supply (Gelb, B. A.,

2007:3-4). In 2012, 29 % of Ukraine’s total external trade was with the Eurasian Customs Union, which is led by Russia, and 33 % was with the EU - and Ukraine felt dependent on both EU and Russia. Ukraine has been facing an economic and political dilemma, since if the country signs an association agreement offered by the EU, a membership of the Eurasian Customs Union would be precluded - and crucial trade with Russia will be lost. Russia was well aware of the dilemma and knew that Ukraine was internally divided in the question, so Russia offered benefits from a closer economic relation with the Eurasian Customs Union, but threatened to cut off the trade if Ukraine chose a closer economic cooperation with EU instead, which would seriously harm the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine was forced to choose one side (MacFarlane, N., Menon, A., 2014:97-98). When the pro- Russian president Viktor Janukovytj signed an agreement with Russia, EU- supporters started to demonstrate in Kiev. When Janukovytj later was deposed by the parliament (Nilsson, M., Silander, D., 2015), Russia reacted by taking control over the Crimean Peninsula (Grant, T. D., 2015:68).

4.4.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation

Some researchers, including Leonid Polyakov, argues states that Russia more or less has failed to affect the public opinion in Ukraine and to create a viable alternative towards the democratic European Union, despite its attempts to illuminate the two countries’ common history and cultural affinity. After the country’s independence in 1991, support and experiences from the U.S. and European democracies became available - and soon eminently appreciated in the Ukrainian civil society. Both EU and Russia attempt to affect Ukraine through media space and non-governmental activities, but there has been a growing support for the West and an EU integration in the civil society in Ukraine. Horizontal contacts have been created between Ukrainians and Western NGOs, where Ukrainians have learned from the NGOs and applied the new knowledge on their own needs. With time, Ukrainian NGOs have

been growing stronger and activists have had confidence to challenge the country’s authorities - and criticized them for abusing European values and norms, corruption and violations of human rights. The civil society in Ukraine is very strong and vibrant, which has been apparent in the Orange Revolution in 2004, the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 and in other activities and protest movements, that have involved millions of Ukrainian citizens (Polyakov, L., 2015:122-124). Russia also offers education as a tool to make Ukrainians more Russian-friendly. Each year, it offers roughly 280 governmental scholarships for Ukrainians to study in Russia. In 2013, around 7000 Ukrainians studied in Russia, but most students prefer to study abroad in EU countries instead. During the same year, 29 000 Ukrainians studied in Europe - and more students chose both Germany and Poland rather than Russia. Furthermore, between 2014 and 2020, over 4000 Ukrainians will be able to go abroad to EU countries through the Erasmus programme - and over 7000 will be involved in exchange projects (Euukrainecoop, 2014). Russia has made strong efforts to counter this EU-trend. By using a top-down approach, the presidential administration in Moscow has created puppet pro-Russian “NGOs” in Ukraine, as well as programmes such as the “Federal Programme of Support of Compatriots”, in order to deliver campaigns that promotes Russian interests and regional policy imperatives (Polyakov, L., 2015:125-126). There have also been genuine pro-Russian NGOs and political parties in Ukraine, supported by Russia. However, political forces often deny their pro-Russian strands, since it can affect the parties’ electoral ratings negatively, but their rhetoric reflect indirectly Russian interests. The pro-Russian Rodina Party and the Progressive Socialist Party, have had small electoral bases. Their strongest support have been in eastern and southern Ukraine (Pelnēns, G., 2010:253, 264). The Russian power instruments in relation to Ukraine has, however, been more aggressive in the media space, than through pro-Russian

NGOs. Since 1991, The media space in Ukraine has worked as a battlefield between imperial/post-Soviet Russian discourses and Western approaches. In other words, Russia has been active in its information warfare even in Ukraine. Russian TV outlets, like Russia 24, NTV and Life-News have focused to influence Ukrainian and Russian audiences with aggressive anti- Western and pro-Russian messages, including references to the linguistic, religious and cultural commonalities, which is assumed to have contributed to anti-Ukrainian and separatist actions in south-eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Simultaneously, their colleagues at Russian media networks, such as Sputnik, Russia Today and Voice of Russia have been spreading deceptive information about Ukraine all around the world (Polyakov, L., 2015:127, 129).

5. Analysis

5.1 Russia’s use of command power in Georgia and Ukraine

As seen in the results of this study, Russia has been using its command power in both Georgia and Ukraine. One of the main forms of Russian command power in these two neighboring countries is the use of its military force. Russia has made military interventions in both countries; in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian territories in Georgia, as well as on the Crimean peninsula and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine. However, most states on the international arena condemn Russia’s behavior in these regions and continue to recognize these territories as parts of Georgia, respectively Ukraine. Russia’s attempts to strengthen its military bases in both countries and weaken the enemy’s strategic positions and prevent their troop reinforcements, in order to achieve military supremacy in the region, over both land areas and seafaring, are also categorized as command power moves. In Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea partly because the country was

afraid that the peninsula would serve as a NATO-base in the future, which, according to Russia, would threaten its own national security. Crimea is also a strategic position for a military base, since the Russians can get control over the seafaring to the Sea of Azov, that connects cities in South-Eastern Ukraine with the Mediterranean Sea. Russia does also have military bases in Eastern Ukraine, where the fight with the Ukrainian national army and paramilitary groups is still ongoing. In Georgia, Russia has established military bases in the breakaway regions, redeveloped an old Soviet airbase and prepared for a naval base in Abkhazia, at the Black Sea coast. The great difference is that there is still fights ongoing in Eastern Ukraine, but not in the Georgian breakaway regions, even though Russia continues to be military present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Another form of command power Russia has been using towards the two countries is economic pressures. Several trade sanctions have been imposed by Russia on Georgian and Ukrainian products, which have been legitimized by false accusations of sanitary flaws on the food products, imported from Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has also been cutting off the trade to these two countries, when they not have acted or made decisions in line with Russia’s interests; however, for different reasons. When Georgia signed a trade agreement with the EU, Russia banned several products from Georgia and cancelled their trade agreement. The gas supply to Ukraine was also cut off by Russia, when Ukraine did not agree on Russia’s proposed gas price. Finally, Russia has been using coercion and threats against both countries, in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. Some aspects of Russia’s attempt to include the two countries in the Eurasian Customs Union and prevent them from a closer economic integration with the EU can be categorized under command power, since Russia has been using threats and forcing them to choose side. If they, according to Russia, prefer ‘wrong’ partner of cooperation, Russia threatens to cut off the trade with Georgia and

Ukraine, which seriously would harm their economies, which Russia is well aware of. An underlying threat of Russian military intervention has also been apparent. As noted above, Russia has not stayed at empty threats, but has cut off the trade and used military means in practice in both countries. Based on these findings, it is apparent that Russia is using both intimidation- and punishment tactics in Georgia and Ukraine, through its threats, coercion and punishments, related to its military actions and economic pressures, which both can be categorized under the exercise of command power.

5.2 Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia and Ukraine

In parallel with Russia’s exercise of command power in Georgia and Ukraine, it is also using different forms of soft power, that may be not as visible as command power, but are nonetheless important as means of influence. Russia’s most apparent soft power means in Georgia and Ukraine are diplomacy, certain forms of economic strategies, information tools and co-optation with different pro-Russian actors. These various forms of soft power are, to a large extent, interrelated to each other, especially the diplomatic and economic strategies, since a considerable part of the diplomatic relations regards economic issues. Concerning Russia’s diplomatic relations with Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has made great efforts to weaken both states’ relations to the West and isolate them from the international system. These efforts have been most apparent in Russia’s attempt to attract them with the benefits from economic cooperation - and thereby tie them closer to Russia, make them more dependent on Russia and distance them from the West. A common soft power strategy for Russia in Ukraine has also been to frequently refer to Ukraine’s and Russia’s similarities, common heritage and to claim that Russians consider Ukrainians as brothers, through statements from high officials, such as Medvedev and Putin, and thereby claim that there is an

obligation for Ukraine to maintain close ties with Russia, as they share a natural bond. Specific for Georgia, another mean of attraction has been the Russian labor market and the gradually eased visa rules for Georgian workers. The Russian government is using a total removal of visa requirements for Georgian citizens as an incentive under the condition that the Georgian administration restores full diplomatic ties and stops criminalizing Russian entry to the breakaway regions. The Russian administration has also officially supported South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s fights for separation from Georgia and recognized them as independent from Georgia. Similar to Ukraine, diplomatic dialogue that does not concern economic issues has not occurred relatively often and the official relations between the governments have been quite tense, even though they became more relaxed in Georgia after 2012. As seen in chapter 5.1, there is one command power aspect of Russia’s economic tools and attempts to achieve a closer economic integration of Georgia and Ukraine. However, Russia also uses trade as a soft power instrument in both countries and emphasizes the economic benefits of increasing trade. Both countries are already dependent on trade with Russia. Ukraine is highly dependent on its gas import from Russia, while Georgia is mainly economically dependent on exports to Russia, certainly on wine and food products. Georgia is not dependent on Russian gas, but rather on electricity from Russia. These dependency relations give Russia the power to set the conditions for trade, which makes it possible for the Russians to maintain a trade beneficial for themselves, simultaneously as they can tie Georgia and Ukraine closer to Russia. As has been shown above, Russia also uses propaganda and information tools against both Georgia and Ukraine and attempts to be dominant in the international information space. It strategically presents its own narratives that are assorted with its anti-Western and nationalistic

approach, in order to provide an alternative perception of different occurrences and international politics. These narratives go in line with its foreign policy objectives and they are aimed to target both an international audience and a local public in both countries. Concerning the international information space, Russia frequently uses media channels such as Russia Today and Sputnik, presented in the English language, through which the country spreads deceptive information about Georgia and Ukraine, among others. In parallel, Russia attempts to impact and influence domestic actors and civil society in these two post-Soviet states, both through media channels and co-optation. There are pro-Russian domestic actors in both countries, including political parties, NGOs and factions within the Orthodox church, but also separatist movements, which are supported by the Russian government. Through these actors, Russia can spread its anti-Western and conservative ideas to civil society and affect public opinion in Georgia and Ukraine. However, there are considerable regional differences in the attitude towards Russia in Ukraine, where people who are living in Eastern Ukraine are generally more positive to Russia than those who are living in the western parts of the country. Mother tongue and identity play an important role in the attitude towards Russia - and most Russian-speakers live in Eastern Ukraine. Except for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regional differences in the perception of Russia are not as clear in Georgia. Another soft power strategy are Russia's attempts to attract many Georgians with work opportunities, which may give them a more positive attitude towards Russia. More noticeable in the case of Ukraine are the scholarships offered by Russia, even though most Ukrainian students prefer to study within the EU instead of Russia. Thus, the offering of both education and work opportunities are two examples of Russia’s exercise of soft power in its neighboring countries, in order to make people more Russian-friendly. However, it seems to be harder for Russia to affect the

public opinion in Ukraine than in Georgia, since there is a growing support for an EU integration and large part of the civil society is very strong and confident in its pro-Western approach. Western-friendly NGOs in Ukraine have grown and activists have been criticizing Ukrainian authorities for abusing European values and norms, which not is as apparent in Georgia as in Ukraine. Simultaneously, there is still a strong support for Russia in some parts of Ukraine. There are clear contrasts in the attitudes towards Russia in Ukraine - and it seems to be hard for Russia to attract new supporters, since the support for either Russia or the West depends a lot on the individual’s language and identity.

5.3 Russia’s use of smart power in Georgia and Ukraine

In line with Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power, Russia’s command power and soft power instruments walks hand in hand and strategically complement each other, in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives more efficiently. The country uses means of attraction and offers different benefits to Georgia and Ukraine, but always attaches those rewards to the condition that the latter behave or act in a certain manner. In parallel, Russia uses intimidation methods and punishes these neighboring countries if they do not act in line with Russian interests and objectives. This stick-and-carrot approach, combining rewards with punishments in order to induce a certain behavior, is apparent in Russia’s behavior and smart power strategy towards both Georgia and Ukraine. Concerning Russia’s use of attraction, it attempts, among other things, to attract foreign actors by using diplomacy and put emphasis on the cultural ties and similarities with the neighboring post-Soviet countries with the rhetoric ‘you are like us’. It also uses media channels, through which Russia delivers its anti-Western messages and alternative perceptions of events and occurrences on the international area, angled to its own advantage - and supports pro-Russian actors in Georgia and Ukraine. Economic

cooperation is also an important mean of attraction. Russia’s offering of rewards include the benefits from trade, education, working opportunities and eased visa rules, which are examples of soft power means. All of these tools are used to improve foreign actors’ perception of Russia and to make them behave in a pro-Russian manner. Russia wants to tie them closer to the country and keep them away from Western associations, such as the EU and NATO, which is an important foreign policy objective for Russia. In combination with its use of attraction and its reward system, Russia threatens with, or actually gives punishments to Georgia and Ukraine, such as economic sanctions, trade cut-offs and military interventions, if they do not act in a pro-Russian manner. However, Russia does not give punishments, such as military interventions, solely in order to foster Georgia and Ukraine in a manner that goes in line with its own interests, but gets simultaneously the chance to expand its territory and to get increased regional control, which also is one of its foreign policy objectives in its neighborhood. Concerning economic issues, Russia can efficiently combine soft and hard means of power. The country attracts Georgia and Ukraine with trade benefits and makes them dependent on trade of certain products with Russia; and can thereby dictate the trade conditions. Whenever Russia decides to cut off the trade with Georgia and Ukraine, both countries’ economies risk to be seriously harmed. A disputable question is if Russia’s command power counteracts its use of soft power. By reviewing the case of Ukraine, Russia’s military intervention seems to have resulted in that even more Ukrainians are increasingly positive to an integration with the EU and NATO. Even actors in other countries condemn Russia’s military behavior. Does this kind of command power go in line with Russia’s soft power behavior, that attempts to depict its own country in a favorable light? It depends on how successful its use of soft power is in comparison to command power. An indication for this in the findings, is Leonid Polyakov’s claim that Russia partly has failed

to attract the public opinion in Ukraine, especially after the military interventions, since there is an incredibly strong support for an EU integration in the civil society, which is not as clear in Georgia. However, even though Russia provides its own narratives of the crisis in Ukraine, as well as in Georgia, there is a risk that many people see through their strategies, which can make it hard to attract new actors, except from those that already are pro-Russian. However, Russia still got the opportunity to expand its territory, but also, as Russia probably would formulate it; to ensure its national security and counter the threat from the EU and NATO, which go in line with its foreign policy objectives. Finally, Russia’s smart power strategy creates a dilemma for both Ukraine and Georgia. They can choose to behave in a more pro-Russian manner and take out their rewards from Russia, but must in that case be prepared to lose their chances of an integration with the EU or NATO and to drift further from the West. The alternative is to receive punishments from Russia, which already have harmed many civilians in Georgia and Ukraine, both through Russia’s military actions, economic sanctions and trade cut- offs. Russia ensures that there will only be these two options available for Georgia and Ukraine and uses all possible means in order to integrate them with Russia instead of Western actors and associations. Russia seems to be taken the opportunity to make an offensive, while the Georgian and Ukrainian states are weak and not yet well-integrated with the West, since it may be easier to influence and exercise its soft power and command towards other states when they are weak and fragile, without a sufficient military support that is strong enough to protect them from Russia. Russia had probably not dared to enter either Crimea, Eastern Ukraine or the Georgian breakaway regions with its military, if Ukraine and Georgia were members of NATO. Both Georgia and Ukraine, with its weak and fragile states, have been easy prey for Russia’s exercise of power, especially when Russian influence seems to be prioritized over regional stability.

6. Conclusions

Russia’s foreign policy behavior and exercise of power towards Georgia compared to Ukraine has many similarities, and clear patterns in its strategy in both countries can be distinguished. Based on Russia’s objectives and strategies in Georgia and Ukraine, identified in the findings of this study, possible warning signals for Russian military interventions in other post- Soviet states can be outlined. As seen in the results, Russia makes strong efforts to tie its neighboring post-Soviet countries closer to itself and attempts to prevent them from an EU integration. Warning signals in other post-Soviet states mainly include Russia’s attempts to affect and attract them with its soft power instruments, such as economic cooperation, information dissemination, education, work opportunities and statements that emphasize the countries’ similarities and common heritage with Russia, which is implied that they should be a part of, or be closely tied to Russia, instead of Europe. It is important to keep an eye open after the stick-and-carrot tactics, when Russia combines attraction and rewards with punishments, such as economic sanctions and trade cut-offs, when its neighboring states do not act in line with its interests. The results of this study indicate that post-Soviet states located near Europe can expect a strong response from Russia when they clearly are prioritizing a closer integration and cooperation with the European Union before Russia. Those post-Soviet states that already are members of the EU or NATO, such as the Baltic states, are probably no longer at risk for a military intervention, since Russia seems to target those countries that have a positive perception of the West and strive for an EU integration, but still are ambivalent and unstable - and have not been integrated yet with the West, such as Armenia and Moldova (similar to Georgia and Ukraine). Russia probably has the greatest chance to exercise its power and achieve its foreign policy objectives in these countries.

However, the results and lessons learned from this investigation are not limited to Russia and the post-Soviet space, but may also predict the behavior of other dominant countries on the international area, such as China and the United States, and contribute to more awareness of common power strategies, used by strong powers. Similar to Russia, other great powers also cherish their ideology, welfare and national security - and have a greater chance to protect these and achieve their foreign policy objectives through their exercise of power over less dominant countries. Their exercise of power maintains unequal relationships where less powerful countries become even more dependent on dominant countries. The great powers can fulfill their interests and foreign policy objectives at the expense of other states’ welfare, national security and ideology, which also is the root of suffering among civilians in many less dominant countries, for instance through economic pressures and military actions, as seen in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. Therefore, it is important that actors in the international community act, in order to reduce the suffering and violation of human rights, make the world fairer and to prevent that international law is broken time after time. A subject for future research is therefore to examine what measures should be taken, in order to most efficiently counter Russia’s, as well as other great powers’ violations, through their use of command power. It would also be relevant for future research to do a closer and more critical investigation of how soft power versus command power, and the combination of these, actually affects people. Perhaps, smart power is the winning concept, as Joseph Nye claimed, or maybe soft power or command power alone would be better after all. A more in-depth bottom-up field studies would be desirable, in order to examine how governments are influenced by these types of power in their decision making and how citizens respond to these power strategies. Another relevant issue could also be to examine if Russia’s power strategies really are applicable to other great powers, or if Russia stands for itself. For instance, Russia does not necessary

use same types of attraction instruments as China or the United States. Therefore, another area for future research is also to compare different great powers’ power strategies with each other and investigate how far similar patterns in their strategies and foreign policy behavior might be seen., To conclude, this study has identified Russia’s foreign policy objectives and exercise of soft power, command power and smart power in Georgia and Ukraine. These findings can neither draw accurate conclusions about Russia’s exercise of power towards other states, nor about other dominant countries’ use of power. However, they can indicate which foreign policy strategies that may be used by other great powers and which possible warning signals there may be for other military interventions. These indications can, in turn, facilitate the work towards a more just world and against violations made by dominant countries.

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