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Russia's Exercise of Power C-thesis Russia’s exercise of power A comparative case study of Russia’s use of command power, soft power and smart power in Georgia and Ukraine Author: Linnea Nilsson Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson Examiner: Heiko Fritz Term: VT19 Subject: Peace and Development Studies Level: Bachelor Course code: 2FU33E 2 Abstract Despite a vast research of Russia’s means of power, including its military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, no comprehensive comparison of Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine has been accomplished, even though they are the most prominent cases of post-Soviet states that have been subjects for Russian military aggression. This study compares the forms of power Russia has been using to implement its foreign policy objectives in Ukraine and Georgia, in order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior and strategies, through an abductive qualitative approach with a comparative method. Russia’s means of power are analyzed through the glasses of the analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts of command power, soft power and smart power. The findings suggest that Russia’s main foreign policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, are to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western orientation in the region, make its neighboring countries dependent on Russia, establish closer ties with its neighbors and incorporate them in the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), but also to achieve military supremacy in the region. It is further apparent that Russia uses similar strategies and means of power in Georgia and Ukraine, both through military actions and economic pressures, that can be categorized under command power, but also through diplomatic means, other economic means, informational tools and co-optation. However, in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives most efficiently, Russia combines command power and soft power. This study can contribute to the research of other dominant countries and unequal relationships; and from the learnings of this study, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy moves can be detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power towards less powerful states. 3 Keywords Russia, dominant countries, foreign policy, exercise of power, Ukraine, Georgia, conflict, command power, soft power and smart power Acknowledgements I want to thank my research supervisor Manuela Nilsson for her dedicated involvement, assistance and support through every step in the process of the thesis. I am very grateful for her support and understanding during these weeks. List of abbreviations ECU - Eurasian Customs Union EU - European Union NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 4 Table of Content 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 7 1.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 7 1 1.2 Literature review, research problem and research relevance ................. 8 2 1.3 Research objective and framing of questions ......................................... 11 3 1.4 Analytical framework ............................................................................. 12 4 1.5 Methodological framework .................................................................... 12 5 1.6 Disposition of the thesis ......................................................................... 13 6 2. Analytical framework ................................................................................... 13 7 2.1 Soft power and command power ............................................................ 13 8 2.2 Smart power ........................................................................................... 14 9 2.3 Alternative concepts of power ................................................................ 15 10 3. Methodological framework .......................................................................... 18 11 3.1 Qualitative method ............................................................................. 18 12 3.2 Comparative method .......................................................................... 19 13 3.3 Abductive approach ............................................................................ 20 14 3.4 Sources ............................................................................................... 21 15 3.5 Limitations .......................................................................................... 22 16 3.6 Delimitations ...................................................................................... 23 17 3.7 Ethical considerations ........................................................................ 24 18 4. Empirical results ........................................................................................... 24 19 4.1 A short review of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine ..................... 24 20 4.1.1 Georgia ........................................................................................ 24 21 4.1.2 Ukraine ........................................................................................ 26 22 4.2 Russia’s main foreign policy objectives in the post-Soviet space ...... 28 23 4.3 Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia ............................................... 30 24 4.3.1 Military tools ............................................................................... 30 25 4.3.2 Diplomatic tools .......................................................................... 32 26 4.3.3 Economic tools ............................................................................ 34 27 4.3.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ........................ 36 28 4.4 Russia in Ukraine ............................................................................... 38 5 29 4.4.1 Military tools ............................................................................... 38 30 4.4.2 Diplomatic tools .......................................................................... 39 31 4.4.3 Economic tools ............................................................................ 40 32 4.4.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ........................ 41 33 5. Analysis ........................................................................................................ 43 34 5.1 Russia’s use of command power in Georgia and Ukraine ................. 43 35 5.2 Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia and Ukraine ........................... 45 36 5.3 Russia’s use of smart power in Georgia and Ukraine ....................... 48 37 6. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 51 38 7. Bibliography ................................................................................................. 53 6 1. Introduction 1.1 Background In 2019, the United States, Russia, China, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea were ranked as the ten most powerful and influential countries in the world, based on five state attributes related to power: military strength, the characteristics of the leader, political influence, economic influence, and the international alliances a country has (US News World Report, 2019). These dominant countries have a great ability to achieve their foreign policy objectives, compared to other states on the international arena, through their exercise of power towards less powerful countries. The United States has over many years been considered as the sole dominating superpower in the global world order (Foot, R., 2006:77), but it has also been argued that the US hegemony is in decline and challenged by other powerful countries (Roberts, J. T., 2011:776). Another dominant country that has received much attention in its exercise of power towards less powerful countries is Russia. By investigating the case of Russia, conclusions may be drawn on how other dominant countries may use their power strategies, as well as which consequences their great power status and exercise of power can get. After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, there has been a widespread concern of a possible Russian invasion, among inhabitants in several post-Soviet states (Lanoszka, A., 2016:175). Since 1991, when fifteen new states became independent after the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2), Russia has made military interventions in two of these post-Soviet states, namely in Georgia in 2008 (Cheterian, V., 2008:155) and Ukraine in 2014 (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). In 2008, Moscow recognized the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and Russian troops moved into 7 these areas, which ended up in a war between Georgia and Russia (Cheterian, V., 2008:156). Six years later, Russia commenced the annexation of Crimea, which officially was a part of Ukraine (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). The country also supported pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, who were inspired by Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which led to a conflict with the Ukrainian army and paramilitary nationalists. Russian soldiers were also involved in Eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In parallel, Russia has by various means of power attempted to influence both countries, which also occurs in other post-Soviet states. There is also a discussion of Russia’s underlying aims behind these interventions and endeavor to influence its neighboring countries
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