THE MOVEMENT of PHILOSOPHY: FREEDOM AS ECSTATIC THINKING in SCHELLING and HEIDEGGER by ADAM C. AROLA a DISSERTATION Present
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THE MOVEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY: FREEDOM AS ECSTATIC THINKING IN SCHELLING AND HEIDEGGER by ADAM C. AROLA A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy March 2008 11 University of Oregon Graduate School Confirmation of Approval and Acceptance of Dissertation prepared by: Adam Arola Title: "The Movement of Philosophy: Freedom as Ecstatic Thinking in Schelling and Heidegger" This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in the Department of Philosophy by: Peter Warnek, Chairperson, Philosophy Ted Toadvine, Member, Philosophy John Lysaker, Member, Philosophy Jeffrey Librett, Outside Member, Germanic Languages & Lit and Richard Linton, Vice President for Research and Graduate StudieslDean ofthe Graduate School for the University of Oregon. March 22, 2008 Original approval signatures are on file with the Graduate School and the University of Oregon Libraries. 111 © 2008 Adam C. Arola IV An Abstract of the Dissertation of Adam C. Arola for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy to be taken March 2008 Title: THE MOVEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY: FREEDOM'AS ECSTATIC THINKING IN SCHELLING AND HElDEGGER Approved: Dr. Peter Warnek The question of freedom has been a present and constant concern since the inception of the occidental philosophical tradition. Yet after a certain point the manner in which this question is to be asked has been canonized and sedimented: do humans (subject) have the capacity (predicate) for free and spontaneous action? The third antinomy of Kant's Critique ifPure Reason, I argue, demonstrates the necessary failure, the perpetual aporia, of continuing to discuss whether humans conceived of as subjects possess the predicate freedom. I argue that if we do not want to fall either into the Third Antinomy, we must steer away from thinking of freedom as a predicate of a subject and reconfigure it as an experience or a comportment. Following suggestions from Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Communiry, Being Singular Plural, and The Experience ifFreedom, my dissertation argues that re-thinking of freedom as an experience simultaneously requires a re-thinking of identity, in terms of ecstasy, ek-stases, or ex-position, and accordingly a re-thinking of the activity of thinking itself. Nancy cites v Schelling and Heidegger as the thinkers who have made an attempt to think about ecstasy seriously as a fundamental ontological fact about the constitution of things. This reconfiguration of the constitution of things as either parts of organic structures (Schelling) or beings in a world (Heidegger), demands that we recognize how our identities are perpetually being constituted in all of our acts of relating with the world. We are constituted and constituting by our engagement with the things that environ us, and this environing is active and alive. If this is accepted as an ontological fact, this requires that we reconsider what it would mean to think, as all of our engagements with the world would be creative-both of ourselves and ofwhat it is that we encounter. This would also mean that the meaningfulness of all things is wildly contingent, in fact necessarily, so. Accordingly, I defend that freedom, as the experience of possibility through our awareness of this contingency due to the lack ofan origin, emerges for us in the experience of thinking. VI CURRICULUM VITAE NAME OF AUTHOR: Adam C. Arola PLACE OF BIRTH: Hancock, MI DATE OF BIRTH: February 23, 1981 GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: University of Oregon University of Michigan DEGREES AWARDED: Doctor of Philosophy, 2008, University of Oregon Master ofArts in Philosophy, 2006, University of Oregon Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, 2002, University of Michigan AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Post-Kantian Continental Philosophy History of Philosophy Indigenous Philosophy PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Adjunct Professor, University of Oregon, 2008 Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2002-2008 Vll GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS: Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2002-2008 George Rebec Prize, University of Oregon, 2005 Paideia Prize for Teaching Excellence, University of Oregon, 2004 Graduate Research Award, University of Oregon, 2005 Fighting Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2002 Scholar Recognition Award, University of Michigan, 1998-2002 PUBLICATIONS: Arala, Adam. 2007. "'A Larger Scheme of Life': Deloria on Essence and Science (in Dialogue with Continental Philosophy)," Americans Indian in Philosopf?y Newsletterfrom the American PhilosophicalAssociatz'on. Arala, Adam. 2007. "Under the Aspect of Eternity: Thinking Freedom in Spinoza's Ethics," T6picos: revista de filosofia. Arola, Adam. 2008. "The Advent of an Opening: Schelling's Image of the Human in Nature (and Vice Versa)" In The Barbarian Principle: Merleau-Pon!YJ Schelling, and the Question ofNature, edited by Pat Burke, Elizabeth Sikes, and Jason Wirth. Albany: SUNY Press. ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. Arola, Adam. 2008. "Taking on the Tradition: Sovereignty and Self-Identity." In Philosopf?y and Aboriginal Rights: A Critical Dialogue, edited by Lorraine Mayer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. Schelling, F.W.J. 2008. "Timaeus: A Platonic Essay." Trans. Adam Arala, Jena Jolissaint, Peter Warnek, Epoche: A Journalfor the History ofPhilosopf?y. Arala, Adam. 2009. "The Tyranny of Authenticity: Critical Theory, Rebellion, and Right Life," Journal ofSpeculative Philosopf?y, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. Vlll ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I need to thank my family. Without my wife Anne, my sister Kristin, my brother (in-law) Jeff, my mother Jill, and my father Burt, I would have long ago fallen into a bad kind of ecstasy from which I would never have returned to the insistence that makes me the person and the philosopher that I strive to be. Their support (emotional, moral, fiscal) has made this life of schofe possible. Also, I must thank all my grandparents: Michael, Viola, Elvie, Gerard, Myrtle, Burt, and Bernie, all of whom in their presence or absence taught me that the matter is, truly, to live well. Second, I need to thank the faculty at the University of Oregon. Without Peter Warnek's insistence on the need to suffer for philosophy, I would have inevitably undertaken a much 'easier' dissertation project-thank you for that. Without John Lysaker's constant open door, constant encouragement, and constant provocation, I never would have finished this project. Without Scott Pratt's goading, I never would have entered into the discourse ofindigenous philosophy that is now so near and dear to me. And without the rest of the department, I would have been too comfortable resting on my laurels-thank you all for making me learn to speak broadly. Further thanks are owed to Stacy Keltner at Kennesaw State College, Fred Peters in the Residential College at the University of Michigan, Jeffrey Bernstein at Holy Cross, Jason Wirth at Seattle University, and Laurie Whitt at Utah Valley State College, all ofwhom have been my long distance teachers and supporters. Thank you to the undergraduate and graduate students at Oregon who make me explain what it is that I am up to, particularly (but in no particular order), Sarah Lachance-Adams, Carolyn Culbertson, Miles Hentrup, Michael Brown, Max Goins, Brent Crouch, JenaJolissaint, John Kaag, Grant Silva, Jose IX Mendoza, Chris Emmick, Evan Haney, Chris Ruth, and everyone else I am forgetting right now. Special thanks are owed to Melissa Shew, without whom this project would truly never have been completed; it was my good fortune to share an office with someone who loves philosophy as much as I do for 4 years. x To my grandfather Gerard Barrette, Oren Krum,]ason Wicklund, and Sean Pettibone, who all taught me in different ways that the only gods and masters are those that we create-and serve-so long as we stop thinking. Xl TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. A SORT OF INTRODUCTION . 1 Section I: The History of the Concept of Freedom . 4 Section II: History's Ecstasies . 17 Section III: Thinking of Freedom . 29 Section IV: Chapter Breakdown . 38 II. THE ECSTASY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DESTRUCTION 42 OF ORIGINS . Section I: Why We Must Stand Aside (Ourselves) . 43 Section II: Time and Identity .. 53 Section III: Thinking Outside Ourselves .. 57 Section IV: Moving to the Middle Voice . 70 III. THE FREEDOM OF THE CLEARING: THINKING IN THE BEGINNING(S) .. 78 Section I: Das Denken der Lichtung . 80 Section II: The Freedom of the Abgrund .. 94 Section III: Ereignis and Gelassenheit .. 108 IV. SCHELLING'S THINKING OF THE DISSEMBLING SUBJECT OF 121 FREEDOM . Section I: Unprethinkability and Unpredictability . 123 Section II: Schelling's Eternal Past .. 136 Section III: A Tangent: There Are Three Kinds of People . 141 Section IV: Will and Onto-Theology: Heidegger's Critique of Schelling .. 147 Section V: The Dissembling Subject of Freedom .. 153 V. DECISION, THINKING, AND FREEDOM .. 164 Section I: The Rotary Motion of the Drives .. 166 Section II: Differentiating the Indifferent: Decision . 173 XlI Chapter Page Section III: The Ecstatic Emergence of the Human .. 181 Section IV: Schelling's Philosophizing: The Experience of Freedom .. 191 Section V: The Silence of Science and the Possibility for EviL . 206 VI. FREEDOM AND THE GREAT HEALTH .. 209 Section 1: Human Freedom and Evil .. 212 Section II: Evil, Error, and Conceptual Clotting .. 222 Section III: Evil and the Force of Selfhood . 229 Section IV: The Experience of Freedom and the Great Health .. 235 APPENDIX: CITATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS .. 248 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 250 1 CHAPTER I A SORT OF INTRODUCTION Ifthere is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that it has its justification for existing, then there must also be something we can call a sense of possibility. Whoever has it does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will happen, must happen; but he invents: Here this or that might, could, or ought to happen.