1. II. AFRICA 1 China in Africa: Much Ado about Investment 1 Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States 2 Competing in Africa: China, the European Union, and the United States 2 Foresight Africa viewpoint - African economies and global value chains 2 China and the East African railways: Beyond full industry chain export 3 [Various Titles] 3 China Is Turning Ethiopia Into a Giant Fast-Fashion Factory 3 The Risks and Rewards of Resource-for-Infrastructure Deals: Lessons from the Congo’s Sicomines Agree- ment 4 Can China Realize Africa’s Dream of an East-West Transport Link?

4. II. AMERICA, NORTH 4 The global industrial rebalance will benefit China and the world

5. III. ARCTIC 5 China Launches the Polar Silk Road 5 China’s Arctic Dream 5 Polar Silk Road’: Greenland’s courting of China for airport projects worries Denmark 6 Arctic gas plant threatens native peoples 6 The Sino-Russian partnership in the Arctic

7. IV. ASIA, CENTRAL 7 China’s one-track mind in Kazakhstan 7 China’s Conditional Aid and Its Impact in Central Asia 8 Chinese Loans in Central Asia: Development Assistance or “Predatory Lending”? 8 Hegemonic or Multilateral? Chinese Investments and the BRI Initiative in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [sic] 9 One Belt, One Road: A New Source of Rent for Ruling Elites in Central Asia? 9 Silk Road Economic Belt: Effects of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Kazakhstan 10 Project to exploit Afghanistan’s giant copper deposit languishes 11 Georgia Positions Itself on China’s New Silk Road: Relations between Tbilisi and Beijing in the Light of the Belt-and-Road Initiative 12 “Information on the projects should be available to the public” 12 Carefully, Kazakhstan Confronts China About Kazakhs in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps 13 Is Kazakhstan’s rising star fading? 14 Kyrgyzstan Ranks Third Most Vulnerable to Climate Change Impacts in Central Asia 14 How Western Disengagement Enabled Uzbekistan’s “Spring” and How to Keep it Going

i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 31 31 31 30 30. 29 29 29. 28 28 27 27 27 26 26. 25 25 24 23 23. 22 22 22 22. 21 21 21. 19 19 19. 18 17 17 16 16 16. 15 15. 15 The Panda’s Pawprint:Theenvironmental impact oftheChina-ledre-primarization inLatinAmericaandthe Down ButNotOut:ChineseDevelopment FinanceinLAC,2017 Chinese FinancetoLACin2016 Does ChinaUnderstandLatinAmericaBetterthantheU.S.? XIII. LATIN AMERICA The QuadrilateralSecurityDialogueandtheMaritimeSilkRoad Initiative Ports UnderHeaven:China’s StrategicMaritime Infrastructure intheIndo-Pacific XII. INDO-PACIFIC German angstaboutChinaincreases China goestoSerbia:infrastructure andpolitics Is China’s investmentininfrastructure projects driving Western Balkannationsintodebt? Chinese banksmoveintoBosnianpowersector EU-China LeadershipinTrade Policy:Feasible?Desirable? EU ambassadorsbandtogetheragainstSilkRoad XI. EUROPE The RiseofChina-Europe Railways European EconomicAreaThe StrategicPotentialoftheEmergingWider How Russia’s EconomicRecessionBenefitsMoscowPoliticallyinits“NearAbroad” EDB Macroreview 06’2018:EDBeconomies:insearch ofnewgrowth drivers X. EURASIA Why DoesEveryoneHateMadeinChina2025? What’s happeningwithChina’s fintechindustry? Lower forLonger:TheImplicationsofLowOilandGasPricesChinaIndia IX. CHINA China’s softpowerfrom theBRICStoBRI 600 blnUSDshortfallinB&Rinfrastructure investment VIII. “BELT ANDROAD” Fact Sheet:Kunming-Singapore HighSpeedRailNetwork Mekong countrieslooktobolstercooperation VII. ASIA,SOUTHEAST How ChinaGotSriLankatoCoughUpaPort Modi-Xi talksoffer hopeforbetterrelations China’s beltandroad initiativeandIndia’s options:Competitivecooperation How IndiabecameChina-leddevelopmentbank’s mainborrower The WEBofTransport CorridorsinSouthAsia VI. ASIA,SOUTH South Korea’s Infrastructure Vision V. ASIA,EAST Fast socialandeconomicchangeringsinaneweraforUzbekistan iii

Caribbean 32 China looks to expand Colombia’s Buenaventura port 32 Mexican ‘Silk Road’ trade corridor is set to spice up US tension 33 Mexico looks to boost trade with China as NAFTA talks falter 33 Mexico’s former ambassador to China explains ‘how China capitalizes where the United States is retreating’

33. XIV. OCEANIA 33 Baseless rumours: why talk of a Chinese military installation in Vanuatu misses the point

34. XV. WORLDWIDE 34 China’s Foreign Agriculture Investments

36 Private Data, Not Private Firms: The Real Issues in Chinese Investment TABLE OF CONTENTS 36 Slowing Down, Powering Up: 2017 Chinese Energy Development Finance 36 Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective 37 The Belt and Road’s Barriers to Participation 37 The Belt and Road’s Biggest Impact: Small, High-Risk Markets 38 AIIB investments top 4.2 billion USD in 2017: report 38 The AIIB needs to deliver governance to match its rhetoric 38 China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures 39 Vassal States? Understanding China’s Belt and Road MoU 39 China’s Alternative to GPS and its Implications for the United States 40 Global Value Chain Development Report: Measuring and Analyzing the Impact of GVCs on Economic Devel- opment

40. XVI. UNCATEGORIZED 40 The Globalization of Chinese Energy Companies: The Role of State Finance 43 Industry Trend Analysis - Belt And Road: Four Charts Tracking Investment And Projects Activity

Annotated Bibliography of Sources Relevant to Researching the Belt and Road Initiative

Leo Zucker

I. PREFACE Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States2 The 77 sources listed below were summarized by Leo Region: Africa Zucker of the Emerging Markets Forum in the course of Sector: Uncategorized his research on the Belt and Road Initiative. These sources Year of Publication: 2015 include reports produced by government officials, working Type: Working paper papers and blog posts by academics and experts, works Author: KISHI, Roudabeh, Clionadh RALEIGH of journalism, and more. They are organized alphabetically Author Affiliation: University of Sussex by region, then by country, and lastly by sector. When- ever possible, source titles are rendered exactly as they Academic literature on the effects of traditional (i.e. were published. Western) official development assistance (ODA) flows on intra-state conflict suggests that aid fuels rebellion II. AFRICA by making the “prize” of state rents more attractive to insurgents. Yet traditional ODA usually conditions disburse- China in Africa: Much Ado about Investment1 ments on anti-corruption measures, respect for the rule of Region: Africa law and human rights, and other progress toward good Sector: Investment governance; however, Chinese ODA features no such Year of Publication: 2018 conditionality. This does not necessarily mean that Beijing Type: Blog prefers pariah regimes over respectable states in its aid Author: PAIRAULT, Thierry budget. In Africa, Chinese aid as a share of GDP is uncor- Author Affiliation: CNRS related with autocracy, and is in fact slightly correlated with democracy. Chinese aid is negatively correlated with the This three-part guest blog series highlights the various rule of law in Africa at the five percent level, though. Beijing ways in which semantic laxity distort the true nature of thus appears willing to do business with any type of regime Chinese investment in Africa. To start, what many media in Africa. Meanwhile, non-Chinese aid as a share of Afri- sources (including the Financial Times’ Africa Investment can countries’ GDP is positively correlated with democracy Report) call investment counts not only Chinese outward and the rule of law, and uncorrelated with autocracy. But FDI, but also Chinese lending and services. Moreover, the starkest difference between Chinese and non-Chinese lending and services are sometimes passed off as invest- ODA for Africa is not which countries receive it, but how ment before an official commitment has been made for the countries use it. Chinese ODA as a share of GDP has a provision of either. These practices lead to serious over- positive and statistically significant effect on the number estimations of Chinese investment in Africa. According to of armed conflict events (10% level), the number of con- MOFCOM’s own figures, FDI in Africa peaked in 2008 and flict events involving the state (1% level), the number of has fallen every year since 2014. Meanwhile, the value of instances of state violence against civilians (10% level), and Chinese services provided to Africa—proxied by turnover the number of state battles against competitors (1% level) of overseas construction contracts—was more than 25 in a given year in African countries. Non-Chinese ODA has times higher than the level of Chinese outward FDI in Africa. no significant effect on any of these four indicators. Addi- tionally, Chinese ODA has no significant effect on either the 1. http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2018/02/guest-post-china-in-africa-much-ado-part-1.html; http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2018/02/ guest-post-china-in-africa-much-ado.html; http://www.chinaafricarealsto- 2. https://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLED_ ry.com/2018/02/guest-post-china-in-africa-much-ado_22.html Working-Paper_Chinese-Aid-paper_final.pdf

1 LEO ZUCKER 2 1999 through 2012.] This disturbingtendency—aswellasthefactthatnon-Chi African countries;however, onlyafewcountries(namely Additionally, theEUpromised to“mobilizemore than$54 duty-free accessforaround 6,400products toabout40 moredriven bythefactthatitmakescentralgovernments Competing inAfrica:China,theEuropean (both domesticallyandinneighboringcountries),popula (Contrary tothebodyofacademicliterature, non-Chinese concluded orisnegotiatingeconomicpartnershipagree volumes exceeded$300billionin2017(compared to$200 conflict—suggests thatAfricanleadersexploittheuncondi either.) Theseconclusionscontrol forpreexisting conflict ODA hasnosignificanteffect onthese twoindicators and OpportunityAct(AGOA)since2000.UnliketheEU’s approach to Africa has centered on the African Growth actors againstthestateinagivenyearAfricancountries. squarely onbilateraltradeties since2007.EU-Africatrade structure lending,theEU’s approach to Africahasrested the fifth EU-AfricaSummitin2017.Meanwhile,theUS’ try-years considered in this regression analysis run from that conditional ODA makes significantly less attractive. It tionality ofChineseODAtobolsterthedominancetheir tion, and democracy. Thus, the finding that Chinese ODA ments (EPAs)—which will“liberalize about80percent of regimes through violentrepression, acourseofaction makes itsAfricanrecipient statesmore conflict-ridden is nese ODAasashare ofGDPshowsnoeffect onintra-state number of rebel conflict events or the number of armed EPAs, AGOAisanon-reciprocal trade agreement: itgrants Union, andtheUnitedStates 3. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/04/16/compet imports over 20 years”—with 40 sub-Saharan nations. it creates pariah states with its giving. [NDLR: the coun is thuswrong toclaimthatChinagivespariahstates; ians; rebel activityappearstohavenothingdowithit. billion in‘sustainable’investmentforAfricaby2020”at billion forSino-Africantradein2015)andBrusselshas ing-in-africa-china-the-european-union-and-the-united-states/ likely touseviolenceagainstdomesticoppositionandcivil Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author While Chinese engagement with Africa centers on infra Sector Region : Blog : SCHNEIDMAN,Witney, JoelWIEGERT : Uncategorized : Africa : Brookings : 2018 3 ------4. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/01/19/fore 2017, “largelyduetoU.S.energyself-sufficiency.” These China andtheEastAfricanrailways:Beyond (IFDC). Formedfrom US-OPICandpartsofUSAID,IFDC only around 300oftheavailableduty-free product lines of GVC membership must soon be spread totherest of vices inmanagingsupplychainsandofsoftware inmany state-backed funds. stronger, however, ifCongress approves thecreation of start, butnotanendinandofthemselves:thebenefits some countrieshavesoughttojoinGVCsbysettingup South Africa,Lesotho,Kenya,Mauritius,andEthiopia) SEZs, whichconcentratereform efforts andinfrastructure and-the-east-africa-railways-beyond-full-industry-chain-export/ sight-africa-viewpoint-african-economies-and-global-value-chains/ would doubleOPIC’s current lendingcapof$30billionand and globalvaluechains total equity. These measures would improve the compet DevelopmentFinanceCorporation the USInternational the country. the servicesectorclosed.Givenimportanceofser tries thatwanttoparticipateinGVCsmustn’t makethe make equity investments worth upto20% ofaproject’s receive plaudits on the continent for their honorable busi results are disappointing,giventhattheUSleadsworld manufactured goods,thisisalosing strategy. Additionally, mistake ofopeninguptotradeingoodswhilekeeping ness practices. American engagement in Africa may grow umes havefallenfrom $100billionin2008to$39 not onlytoSoutheastAsia,butalsoEastAfrica.Coun itiveness of American financing vis-a-vis that of Chinese in termsofFDIAfricaandthatAmericancompanies investment inafixednumberoflocations.SEZsare agood have beenutilized.Moreover, US-Africabilateraltradevol have madesignificantuseofAGOAinnon-oilsectors,and 5. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2017/07/06/china- Foresight Africaviewpoint -Africaneconomies full industry chainexport full industry Type Year ofPublication As laborcostsriseinChina,GVCsare beingoffshored Author Affiliation Author Sector Sector Region Region : Blog : DOLLAR,David : Trade : Infrastructure : Africa : Africa,East : Brookings : 2018 4 5 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 3 ------8 : 2018 : 2018 : SAIS-CARI : Bloomberg : Africa, Southern (Congo, DR) : Infrastructure : Manufacturing : LANDRY, David : LANDRY, : DONAHUE, Bill : Blog : Journalism Region Sector Since 2014, the Ethiopian governmentSince 2014, the Ethiopian four has opened Sector Author Author Affiliation Bank, “Under an RFI arrange to the World According Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type low local labor costs. These government-backed industrial ing-ethiopia-into-a-giant-fast-fashion-factory Infrastructure Deals: Lessons from the Congo’s the Congo’s Deals: Lessons from Infrastructure 8. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bd 8. however, which have the potential to boil over into civil civil into over boil to potential the have which however, RFI deals, accepting 48 of them—mostly from West RFI deals, accepting 48 of them—mostly from Sicomines Agreement nue stream for oil or mineral extraction, adjusted for risk.” nue stream rience gleaned from Chinese RFI deals, specifically the the specifically deals, RFI Chinese from gleaned rience ment, a loan for current infrastructure construction is is construction infrastructure current for loan a ment, publicly-owned industrial parks, with plans to open eight parks, with plans to open eight publicly-owned industrial corporations—particularly by 2020. Multinational more ethnic and rural tensions, exacerbating severe risk projects this challenge— political clout. [NDLR: how Beijing handles an eye-opening case study on BRI’s offer reaction—will nes+-+Landry+-+Version+3.pdf In Africa, Angola was the first extensive user of oil-backed war. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, has been has been largest ethnic group, Ethiopia’s The Oromo, war. Sicomines copper agreement in DR Congo, highlight the Sicomines copper agreement stakes for governance.] reve value of a future securitized against the net present Expe evolved.” and “grown has practice the then since staging mass protests since 2015 in opposition to land land to since 2015 in opposition protests staging mass among other things. The same phenomenon has report among other things. The same phenomenon to the Ethiopian government’s as well as how it responds ern China Ex-Im lenders—during the 1980s and 1990s. extended its first oil-backed loan to Angola in 2004, and grabs from farmers to build government-planned factories, grabs from which lack the Oromo’s edly faced smaller ethnic groups Chinese and Sri Lankan garment manufacturers—have garment manufacturers—have Chinese and Sri Lankan income tax due to their generous flocked to these parks super- as well as waivers, tariff import and derogations c29/t/5afb24e9575d1fe4c2388206/1526408425497/Brief+22+-+Sicomi The Risks and Rewards of Resource-for- The Risks and Rewards - - - - : 2018 : 2017 : The East African : Brookings 7 6 : Africa, East (Ethiopia) : Africa, East : Transport : BARIGABA, Julius, Allan OLINGO : SUN, Yun : Journalism : Blog Region Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type offer to them, linked as those well articles, as These Two recently completed Chinese-build and funded funded completed Chinese-build and recently Two Type [Various Titles] [Various kchlqi/index.html Kenya-Uganda-seek-funding-from-China—/2558-4103598-format-xhtml- Fashion Factory 6. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-rethinks-Kenya- 6. insights on recent efforts to develop a standard gauge gauge a standard develop to efforts recent on insights 3935306-phdp9p/index.html; http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ 3935306-phdp9p/index.html; tafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-ditch-Kenya-SGR-route-Tanzania/2560- SGR-funding-gaps/2560-4253722-yr6y8s/index.html; http://www.theeas SGR-funding-gaps/2560-4253722-yr6y8s/index.html; unlike colonial-era African railways, these two new lines two new lines unlike colonial-era African railways, these undergird China’s overseas infrastructure push. In both In both push. overseas infrastructure China’s undergird railway network between Kenya, Uganda, and other East other and Kenya, Uganda, between network railway on hold. put the project reportedly railway. railway. ply them. Finally, the Chinese contractors will operate both ply them. Finally, a and will retain railways for up to a decade after opening rely on the standard rail gauge that China uses. As a result, rail gauge that China uses. As a result, standard on the rely projects, the fruits of Chinese lending quickly trickled back the fruits of Chinese projects, case in the contractors; Chinese for the and profits ment, railways in East Africa—linking Addis-Ababa to Djibouti Addis-Ababa to Djibouti railways in East Africa—linking that Chinese-manufactured locomotives and carriages will carriages and locomotives Chinese-manufactured that the railroad equipment that will serve these railways will equipment that will serve these railways will the railroad to China: in the Kenyan case, 60% of the financing went of the financing Kenyan case, 60% in the to China: equip Chinese of purchases hiring Chinese personnel, to also need to follow Chinese standards, virtually ensuring virtually ensuring also need to follow Chinese standards, a quarter of the $4 billion total project cost. Additionally, cost. Additionally, a quarter of the $4 billion total project ery, equipment, and construction materials accounted for ery, of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, imports of Chinese machin of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway, (completed 2016) and the Nairobi to Mombasa (completedto the Nairobi (completed 2016) and China Is Turning Ethiopia Into a Giant Fast- China Is Turning 2017)—reveal the manifold economic calculations that calculations that the manifold economic 2017)—reveal African states. Funding difficulties on the Kenyan side have side Kenyan the on difficulties Funding states. African 7. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-03-02/china-is-turn 7. 10% stake of the Djibouti portion of the Ethiopia-Djibouti Ethiopia-Djibouti 10% stake of the Djibouti portion of the LEO ZUCKER 4 4,500km, by way of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, financing toextend TAH5 eastward to Djibouti. Arailway Currently itconnects DakartoN’djamena,adistanceof quality standards indeveloping the promised infrastructure Can ChinaRealizeAfrica’s Dream ofanEast- of infrastructure finance. contractors byavoidingacompetitivetender. Finally, due extractive orinfrastructure sector[sic]generallypartner component,” that lender has little incentive to enforce revenuecommitted government stream from the resource ect deliveryentailsaseriousrisk:sincethelenderfor agreements ofSenegaland in2015withthegovernments and Cameroon. TAH5 istheonlytrans-Africahighway and commercial agreements—RFI deals tend to be less significant tradeoffs inherent in these agreements. On east-west-transport-link/ with financiersandsubmitunsolicitedbidstohostgovern the 1,228kmstretch betweenDakarandBamako.China to matchisalsoenvisaged,startingwithupgrades to have been completed in its entirety, but it suffers from transparent andmore difficult tointerpret thanotherforms to theiromnibuscharacter—combiningmultiplefinancial to credit. They also keep the money to be invested in the upside, RFI deals provide guaranteed infrastructure poor upkeepinplaces.TheAUistheprocess offinding posed trans-AfricahighwaysputforthbyUNECAin1971. ments,” thusinflatingprojects’ pricetagsandbindingthe part ofRFI projects, firms seeking opportunities inthe unless the government takes initiative to impose oversight. unless the government Railway Construction Corporation [reportedly] reached RFI dealscanalsofacequalityissuesfrom thestart:“as However, divestmentfrom government infrastructure proj Mali worth$1.24and$1.5billion, respectively, toexecute West Transport Link? infrastructure componentwill“lookforrepayment tothe ishing theriskofstatemismanagementorembezzlement. infrastructure hands,thereby outofgovernment dimin investments, andquickly, incountrieswithlimitedaccess host government to a single consortium of financiers and host government 9. https://jamestown.org/program/can-china-realize-africas-dream-of-an- Trans-Africa Highway5(TAH5) isoneofninepro Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Region : Blog : VAN STADEN, Cobus : Transport : Africa,West : JamestownFoundation : 2018 9 - - - - “will be directly implemented by the African Development 10. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10671-The- A keypotentialbeneficiaryoftheseefforts istheUnited The globalindustrialrebalance willbenefit global-industrial-rebalance-will-benefit-China-and-the-world?mc_ci China has also [reportedly] agreed to finance an $8 bil Chinese energy-intensivemanufacturingis notoriously China andtheworld 2011 and2016;thealuminumindustrydidn’t fare much concerns, Beijinghassoughttowind downoroutsourceconcerns, of all Chineseenergyconsumption.Inresponse to these cement, andglassindustriesaccountforaround aquarter experts, fineparticulatematter resulting from industrial only drives China’s industrial overcapacity issues, but of itsdecades-longindustrialbuildup.Thissituationnot cement—than therest ofthe worldcombinedasaresult and fiscallimitations.[NDLR:thoughupdatesontheserail all Chinesemanufacturingindustrieseveryyearbetween also exactsasevere tollonpublichealth:according to suffer geographicbarriers, from acute securityconcerns, same sectorsinChinaforthefirsttimeever2016.Amer d=04233b9412&mc_eid=0931f545a5 States, whichreceived more FDIinitsbasicmaterials, these upgrades,whichare dueforcompletionby2022. [NDLR: thisarticlealsoindicatesthattheseupgrades projects are scarce, China appears more heavily implicated railways eastward toDjiboutipresents agargantuan chal metal, andmineralsectorsfrom Chinathanitsenttothe many energy-intensivemanufacturingplantsathome. production kills157,000Chineseeachyear. Additionally, uncompetitive: itssteelindustrywastheleastprofitable of ufactured goods—namely steel, aluminum, glass, and Bank’s Program forInfrastructure DevelopmentinAfrica.”] in West Africaninfrastructure thanI’dpreviously thought.] ica’s advantageinthese sectorsisduetoitslowenergy better. Atthesametime, thecombinedsteel,aluminum, II. AMERICA,NORTH lenge, however, ascountriesalongtheproposed route lion railwaydealtolinkMaliConakry. Extendingthese Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author China nowproduces more energy-intensiveman Sector Region : Blog : TAN Hao : Manufacturing : America,North(USA) : ChinaDialogue : 2018 10 - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 5 - - - - 13 12 : 2018 : 2018 : CSIS : Arctic (Greenland) : Arctic : Arctic : Transport : Uncategorized : CONLEY, Heather : CONLEY, : Journalism : Report Region Region Sector Sector China’s new Arctic policy aims to secure and ensure and ensure policy aims to secure new Arctic China’s Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type leading economic position in the region and subsequently region the in position economic leading for airport projects worries Denmark for airport projects Polar Silk Road’: Greenland’s courting of China courting of Polar Silk Road’: Greenland’s been in discussions with the governor of Arkhangelsk governor the with in discussions been Arkhangelsk of by China,” thus planting China’s Arctic ambitions squarely ambitions squarely Arctic China’s by China,” thus planting Wv4jwbmZ in northern Russia. China also enjoys flourishing trade and and northern invested in mining operations in Greenland take a to seeks China development, resource Arctic in tion/180220_Conley_ChinasArcticDream_Web.pdf?3tqVgNHyjBBkt.p_ reportedly been in discussions about laying a high-speed reportedly print. When Western sanctions over its aggression toward toward sanctions over its aggression print. When Western addi terminal; export Sabetta associated the and project road-greenlands-courting-china-airport-projects-worries-denmark/#.Wrl Ukraine barred Russian companies from borrowing from from borrowing from companies Russian barred Ukraine tionally, CNPC and the Silk Road Fund ended up with a CNPC and the Silk Road Fund ended up with a tionally, the Arctic and Asia across telecom cable between Europe within the Belt and Road framework. Russia remains Russia remains within the Belt and Road framework. sNnwuOxHDXs.ip36 and Alaska. By investing significant quantities of capital and Alaska. By investing significant quantities of capital Western banks for more than 30 days, China’s policy banks days, China’s than 30 banks for more Western LNG $12.2 billion in loans to complete the Yamal approved combined 30% of the project’s equity. COSCO has also COSCO has also equity. combined 30% of the project’s ports Oblast about developing railways and deep-water Chinese companies have in the region, Ocean. Elsewhere China’s Arctic Dream Arctic China’s diplomatic relations with Finland, with which China has has China which with Finland, with relations diplomatic extraction in Iceland Canada, as well as in hydrocarbon development. of the region’s dictate the pace and nature China’s unfettered scientific and economic access to the access to the scientific and economic unfettered China’s grounded is policy This capabilities. exploratory China’s a “multi-tiered firmly in international law and proposes foot its Arctic partner for growing ideal near-term China’s Arctic and reduce opportunities by Arctic nations to limit nations to limit opportunities by Arctic and reduce Arctic framework” which would include the cooperation Arctic 12. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publica 13. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/03/23/business/polar-silk- “provision of expertise, technology, capital, and markets and markets capital, of expertise, technology, “provision - - - - 11 : 2018 : CSIS : Arctic : Uncategorized : NAKANO, Jane, William LI : Blog Energy reserves are a key driver of China’s interest in interest a key driver of China’s are Energy reserves Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type limited search-and-rescue capabilities. Moreover, the the capabilities. Moreover, limited search-and-rescue lar-silk-road/ III. ARCTIC but also from cleaner production, with Chinese steel man with Chinese cleaner production, but also from ing centers, as well as the vicissitudes of the commodities ufacturers emitting on average 24% more carbon than their than carbon more 24% average on emitting ufacturers market. China is also interested in the Arctic’s shipping shipping in the Arctic’s market. China is also interested Northeast Passages could The Northwest and potential. feet per annum, exemplifies this interest. Development of feet per annum, exemplifies this interest. these routes generally suffer from poor infrastructure and poor infrastructure from generally suffer these routes the Arctic. The region boasts 13% of the world’s undis boasts 13% of the world’s The region the Arctic. to soaring domestic shale gas output. Consequently, Consequently, output. gas shale domestic soaring to with piracy in the Red Sea and with US naval dominance waters, can only be accessed by the heaviest icebreaking icebreaking heaviest the by accessed be only can waters, ships to circumvent maritime security threats associated associated maritime security threats ships to circumvent ships. Nevertheless, these Arctic routes may allow Chinese routes ships. Nevertheless, these Arctic shave weeks of intercontinental shipping times, though shipping times, though of intercontinental shave weeks steel producers benefit not only from cheaper production, cheaper production, only from not benefit steel producers steel production and 14-40% in glass production—thanks production—thanks in glass and 14-40% steel production are often the targets of Chinese attempts to outsource its attempts to outsource often the targets of Chinese are over the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca. climate, limited infrastructure, and distance to manufactur distance and limited infrastructure, climate, covered crude oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas. natural undiscovered its 30% of oil and crude covered energy-intensive manufacturing industries, these countries countries these industries, manufacturing energy-intensive environment cannot match the high-quality institutional by the US and other developed countries. offered costs—which make up 40% of total production costs in in costs production total of 40% up make costs—which China Launches the Polar Silk Road China’s involvement in the Yamal LNG project, from which which from project, LNG involvement in the Yamal China’s of 195 billion cubic a long-term offtake China has secured Arctic energy resources is hampered by the region’s harsh by the region’s is hampered energy resources Arctic American competitors. Though Belt and Road countries countries Road and Though Belt competitors. American American industrial energy consumers pay rates nearly nearly rates pay consumers energy industrial American 11. https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/china-launches-po 40% lower than their Chinese counterparts do. American 40% lower than their Transpolar Sea Route, which cuts through international Sea Route, which cuts through Transpolar LEO ZUCKER 6 This route passesthrough thecountry’s exclusive eco 14. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10551-Arc Yamal Peninsulaistransportedinspecially-builtcargo Arctic gasplantthreatens nativepeoples Greenland, reportedly onWashington’s orders. Copenhagen, the US military enjoys virtually unlimited Copenhagen andWashington aboutChineseintentionsin could reach 100milliontonsperyearin2030,upfrom 1.5 SeaRoute estimates thatcargoflowsthrough theNorthern on the island, reigniting in both longstanding concerns access totheArctic highseasforitsfishingfleetsassea a shippingpolicythatexcludesnon-Russianshipsfrom and politicians.Similarsituationstothisonehavearisen shortest flightpathbetweenNorthAmericaandEurope. seven othermajorfishingnations,signeduptoa16-year transporting hydrocarbons SeaRoute. alongtheNorthern system.Assuch,the the US’ballisticmissileearlywarning the Arctic. Greenland holdsgreat strategicvaluetothe United States, given its mineral wealth and location on the million tonsin1998.Meanwhile,Chinaseekstoguarantee ment in Greenlandic airport upgrades or risk repercussions rights inGreenland, where theThuleairbasehostspart of nomic zoneof200nauticalmiles”andwouldbeaboonto nese lendersandcontractorstoupgradethree airports December 2017. Russian shippers. A report from the Ocean Conservancy mustblockChineseinvolve Danish centralgovernment Pursuant to a1951agreement between Washington and tic-gas-plant-threatens-native-peoples?mc_cid=0ca0478e28&mc_eid= ice recedes. In spite of this, China, along with the EU and investor from buying aformermarinestationinsouthern in itstransatlanticrelationship, according toDanishofficials ban on commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean in before: blockedaChinese in2016,theDanishgovernment 0931f545a5 Type Year ofPublication YAMAL LNG. Gas shipped from Sabetta Port on the ARCTIC ACCESS.Russiaisreportedly “formulating Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Author Greenland’s iscourtingChi autonomousgovernment Sector Region : Report : JOHNSON,Jenny : Reuters : Energy : Arctic (Russia) : ChinaDialogue : JapanTimes : 2018 14 - - - - - 15. https://cpianalysis.org/2018/03/15/sino-russian-partner Arctic LNG2,asecondproject onwhichitwillcollaborate The Sino-RussianpartnershipintheArctic Council untilBeijingrecognized “thesovereignty ofArctic (especially whencompared to Sino-Russian dynamics in group nativetotheYamal Peninsula.Theydependonfish environmental impact. on floatingplatforms,whichostensiblywould reduce their channels toaccessSabetta,dredger vesselsremoved 70 environmental damageoftheYamal LNGproject hasargu of -260degrees Fahrenheit, wouldnotbelongatall.] The enterprises, the environmental impact of an LNG spill in over itsArctic waterwaysbyallowingonlyRussianships other regions) indeterminingChina’s accesstotheArctic. compensation whenpastures are slatedfordevelopment, could be used for reindeer grazing. The Nenets receive and 2017.Thisactionnotonlydisruptedthehabitatsof ably already beendoneintheformofdredging. To give alization oftheYamal Peninsula istakinguplandwhich shipping accidentsposeamajorrisktoArctic shipping LNG.[NDLR:though ships thatrunonclean-burning states andtheUNConventiononLawofSeaas stakeholder in the Arctic, Russia plays a significant role ship-in-the-arctic/ with CNPCperanMoUsignedinNovember2017.Arctic the Arctic would last only aslong as the gas remains liq the guidingframework.”Russiaalsokeepsatightgrip the GulfofObhaveplummetedinrecent years;extractive many valuablewhitefishspecies,butriskedsalinizing million tonsofseabedfrom theGulfofObbetween2014 upstream watersanddestroying fishhabitatsthere too. uefied—which, giventhatLNGisstored atatemperature LNG 2wouldconsistofagasplantsandstorageunits LNG shipstherequisite 300-meter-wide, 15-meter-deep Russia resisted givingChinaobserverstatusontheArctic Novatek, the developer of Yamal LNG, is already pursuing ing andreindeer herding fortheirlivelihood.Fishstocksin industries maybepartlytoblame.Additionally, industri but theirwayofliferemains under threat. Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector EFFECTS ON LOCALS. The Nenets are the ethnic Despite China’s attempts to paint itself as a natural Region : Blog : WISHNICK,Elizabeth : Multisector : Arctic (Russia) : MontclairStateUniversity : 2018 15 - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 7 ------: 2018 : CAP, GWU : CAP, 17 : Asia, Central : Lending : HAO Tian : Book chapter Region in other Pursuant to its principle of non-interference Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type law, thus hitching its wagon to Russia’s preferred broad broad preferred Russia’s to wagon its hitching thus law, Book_.pdf highly visible megaprojects that signify progress. Yet Chi Yet that signify progress. highly visible megaprojects be an enduring feature of commerce along the Belt. of commerce be an enduring feature industries in which Chinese investment is critical, Chinese Kazakhstan, a centralized state whose elites depend on Kazakhstan, a centralized state whose elites depend on nese ODA is anything but unconditional: recipients must must recipients unconditional: but anything is ODA nese Tibet, policies vis-a-vis Taiwan, not only support Beijing’s nothing to address the fundamental incompatibility of the the fundamental nothing to address network to standard gauge. Kazakhstan is also a signa Kazakhstan is gauge. standard network to migrant workers are kept segregated from the general general the from kept segregated migrant workers are population, thus limiting opportunities for violent disputes materials, equipment, technology, and services procured” procured” and services materials, equipment, technology, on their soil varies on to Chinese economic activity react routes pass through Central Asia, this incompatibility may Central Asia, this incompatibility pass through routes for infrastructure projects financed by Chinese conces financed projects for infrastructure freight trains. Instead, China could opt to extend its stan trains. Instead, freight to Central Asia’s authoritarian governments—though fear to Central Asia’s and political sys corrupt bureaucracies their extremely long-term and vulnerabilities growing of time a “at tems In the basis of national economic and state architecture. tory of the EEU’s Joint Declaration towards unified railway unified towards Declaration Joint EEU’s the of tory but this would be unsuitable for to handle two gauges, viable rail-based Since all of SREB’s two railway gauges. strategies in two key ways: first, Chinese ODA sustains strategies in two key ways: first, Chinese ODA sustains development legitimizes their rule by financing structure China. How Central Asians from sional loans be sourced as many traditional donors do. This not only endears Chinaas many traditional donors do. This not only and Xinjiang, but also accept that “no less than half of the are limited. Central Asia could upgrade its railway network limited. Central Asia could are countries’ domestic affairs, China does not condition its China does not condition its countries’ domestic affairs, with this appre of their immense neighbor may mingle ciation—but also enhances these governments’ survival lending for infra challenges”; second, Chinese official gauge. Solutions to this Sino-Central Asian incompatibility gauge. Solutions to this China’s Conditional Aid and Its Impact in Conditional Aid and Its China’s Central Asia development assistance on political and economic reforms economic reforms and political on development assistance dard gauge lines into Central Asia, though this would do do would this though Asia, Central into lines gauge dard 17. http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_ - - - - 16 : 2018 : S. Rajaratnam School of InternationalSchool S. Rajaratnam : : Asia, Central : Infrastructure : WU Shang-su : Blog Region Sector Often touted as SREB’s Grand Central Station, the Grand Central Station, the Often touted as SREB’s Author Affiliation Author Year of Publication Year Type IV. ASIA, CENTRAL IV. interests in that the both aim to reduce NATO’s role in in role NATO’s reduce to aim both the in that interests icebreaker due to concerns of “reverse engineering that that engineering concernsto due “reverse of icebreaker Moscow’s need for Chinese investment in its Arctic infra need for Chinese investment in its Arctic Moscow’s Northern Sea Route its internal waters. Additionally, Russia Northern Sea Route its internal waters. Additionally, Northern article Sea Route, and—pursuant to UNCLOS Kazakhstan have no intention of harmonizing their railway Khorgos dry port on the Sino-Kazakh border is actually actually is border Sino-Kazakh the on port dry Khorgos European states to join its 16+1 initiative, Russia’s EEU EEU states to join its 16+1 initiative, Russia’s European nese trains operate on standard (1.435m) gauge, whereas whereas gauge, (1.435m) on standard operate trains nese undermine European unity by inviting Central and Easternand Central inviting by unity European undermine nautical miles of an ice-covered waterway”—deems the the waterway”—deems an ice-covered of miles nautical railroad gauges. The dry port is necessary because Chi railroad may undermine Sino-Russian alignment on Arctic policy: policy: on Arctic may undermine Sino-Russian alignment [have] plagued Russian military sales to China.” None [have] plagued Russian thus obviating Russia’s legal basis for jurisdiction there; legal basis for jurisdiction there; thus obviating Russia’s theless, China and Russia have seen a convergence of Russia have seen a convergence of theless, China and this alignment is not an alliance, and their Yet the region. to transport energy through the region, requiring the use the use requiring the region, energy through to transport while China seeks to enhance its influence over smaller smaller over influence its enhance to seeks China while stan/ Studies symptomatic of a liability at the heart of the Belt: different symptomatic of a liability at the heart of the Belt: different structure would wane. would structure seeks to close off the Eurasian economic space from the the the Eurasian economic space from seeks to close off strategies to counter the Western alliance differ sharply: sharply: strategies to counter the Western alliance differ alternatively, if Western sanctions on Russia are removed, removed, are on Russia Western sanctions if alternatively, West. Furthermore, “unpredictable factors” down the road factors” down the road “unpredictable Furthermore, West. gauge. Khorgos’ existence also suggests that China and gauges. Kazakhstan has invested significantly in its broad its transferring of cost the raising thus railways, gauge global warming could rid the Northern the rid could warming global ice, of Route Sea of its own icebreakers to accompany ships traversing the traversing ships accompany to icebreakers its own of China’s one-track mind in Kazakhstan China’s 234, “which gives coastal states jurisdiction over 200 200 over jurisdiction states coastal gives “which 234, Central Asian trains operate on Russian broad (1.52m) (1.52m) Central Asian trains operate on Russian broad did not cooperate with China in producing the latter’s first latter’s the producing in China with cooperate not did Arctic states through infrastructure investments and and investments infrastructure through states Arctic 16. https://cpianalysis.org/2018/02/22/chinas-one-track-mind-in-kazakh LEO ZUCKER 8 18. http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_ Additionally, underthe terms ofthe 2011 Sino-Tajik border Asia’s naturalresources are theclear targetofChinese Assistance or“Predatory Lending”? ditions theseloansontheinclusionofChinesecontractors, Central Asian leaders. The results of China’s lending push find the region’s corrupt politics and unfavorable invest Chinese LoansinCentralAsia:Development 2014, theTajik handedover twogoldminesto government cial indicatesthat“Chinesecompaniesown60percent of clear. In exchange for power generation and transmission gone from holdinganegligible share ofCentralAsiandebt consequences theirinitiativesmayhaveonCentralAsian officialsof government andare feared forthelong-term opinion-makers. Inbothcountries,however, popularsenti government’s initiativesinKyrgyzstananeasytargetfor as welltheirChineseemployees,inproject construction. and Kyrgyzstan,where Chinese loansconstituted67%of are evidentinTajikistan, where Chinese loansconstituted actors are linkedinthepublic’s mindtothecorruption are veryvisibleintheeconomy, makingthemandtheir states’ sovereignty. whose merchants profit from the reexport ofChineseman the shares ofmore thanhalfofthegoldminesinTajikistan.” the powerproject’s Chinesecontractor, TBEA.Infact,offi the country’s bilateral debt portfolio at end-2016. Turkmen to beingtheregion’s biggestlender. Overthisperiod,Bei to arise.Meanwhile,inKyrgyzstan,adecentralizedstate 88% ofthecountry’s bilateraldebtportfolioatend-2015, may be in a similar situation, though the extent of Chinese ment climatesunattractive,andthefiscalirresponsibility of ment toward Chinaisstrongly negative:Chineseeconomic ufactures tootherCentralAsianstates,Chinesemigrants FDI intheregion. Anecdotesfrom Tajikistan makethispoint infrastructure worth$750millionbuiltbetween2009and debt-freeistan, whichostensiblywasexternal asof2009, jing exploitedboththereticence ofWesternlenders,who Book_.pdf lending to Ashgabatis unknown. Additionally, Beijing con Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author CONTROL OF EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES. Central Sector INFRASTRUCTURE LENDING. In a decade, China has INFRASTRUCTURE LENDING.Inadecade,Chinahas Region : Bookchapter : JABOROV, Safovudin : Uncategorized : Asia,Central : CAP, GWU : 2018 18 ------1,000 square kilometersofTajik territorytoChinain2013. 19. http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_ Asia: vastinfrastructure networksfacilitatedtheexportof Central AsianrawmaterialstotheindustrializedEuropean demarcation treaty, Tajikistan transferred 3%ofitsdisputed Chinese companies have recently invested in Tajikistan’s despite a2007bilateralfriendshipagreement, Sino-Tajik exports toChinataketheformof“mineralfuels,lubricants often importChineselabortoexploitthem,thuscausing observers believethatChineseactorsusecorruptionto and related materials”—namelynaturalgas—whilemanu acquire naturalresource concessionsinCentralAsia.Once also positioningitsSOEstoacquire majormineraland alone.” CloseSino-Tajik relations are anewphenomenon: and Rahmonmeeting“seventimesinthelastthree years SSRs, which manufactured final goods and exported them Since then,Sino-Tajik andSino-Kyrgyzeconomic relations warmer thanSino-Kyrgyz relations, withPresidents Xi and Kyrgyzstan[sic] these concessionsare inChinesehands,theirowners territory—lands likelyrichinminerals—toChina.Beijingis to bothCentralAsianstatesforinfrastructure projects, factured goodsdominateChineseexportstoCentralAsia. friction withthelocalpopulation.TRADE.Chinadisplaced reminiscent ofSovieteconomicmanagementinCentral mineral processing and real estate sectors in magnitudes relations didnotwarmupuntilTajikistan agreed tocede $50 billion in 2013. Yet Sino-Central Asian bilateral trade Russia as Central Asia’s largest trading partner in 2008; Beijing sincethelaunchofBRI,Sino-Tajik relations appear Dushanbe haveaffirmed theireconomicpartnershipwith is imbalanced inits composition: 67% of Central Asian back toCentralAsia. bilateral tradevolumesgrew from $1.5billionin2001to hydrocarbon stakesinKyrgyzstanandKazakhstan.Many have diverged somewhat. While China has lent significantly have divergedsomewhat.WhileChinahaslentsignificantly Investments andtheBRIInitiativeinTajikistan Hegemonic orMultilateral?Chinese Book_.pdf Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author CONCLUSION. Taken together, are thesepatterns Sector ECONOMIC RELATIONS. ThoughbothBishkekand Region : Bookchapter : WOLTERS, Alexander : Uncategorized : Asia,Central : CAP, GWU : 2018 19 - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 9 - 21 20 : 2018 : CAP, GWU : CAP, : Asia, Central : Asia, Central : Uncategorized : TOKTOMUSHEV, Kemel : TOKTOMUSHEV, : Book chapter MULTILATERALISM. Development practitioners in in practitioners Development MULTILATERALISM. Region Region Sector in life economic of fixture is elites by capture State Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type launch of BRI. Chinese representatives continue to avoid representatives launch of BRI. Chinese Book_.pdf Book_.pdf Ruling Elites in Central Asia? has not moved in a more multilateral direction since the the since direction multilateral more a in moved not has heightened not only by the opaque practices employed employed heightened not only by the opaque practices by Chinese contractors and lenders overseas, but also by by Chinese contractors and lenders overseas, be used for personal and business purposes.” Sometimes implementation,” with no other donor prepared to make a no other donor prepared implementation,” with in two Kyrgyz corruption scandals in 2016 alone. In light in two Kyrgyz corruption scandals in 2016 alone. In light Bishkek and Dushanbe agree that Chinese economic Chinese economic that agree Dushanbe Bishkek and Soft Power Diplomacy in Kazakhstan Silk Road Economic Belt: Effects of China’s of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt: Effects 20. http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_ 21. http://centralasiaprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OBOR_ new source of rent for Central Asian elites. This risk is is for Central Asian elites. This risk of rent new source notations of unfair play: though not necessarily a source preexisting dynamics, BRI runs the risk of becoming a dynamics, BRI runs the risk of becoming a preexisting in Central Asia if and deliverables jeopardized reputation for their kleptocratic leaders. rent practices as “isolationist in nature and exploitative in their in exploitative and nature in “isolationist as practices tendencies in order to gain market access. Given these these Given access. market gain to order in tendencies that can relationships beneficial and mutually trustworthy of the public comes to view the initiative as a new source a Chinese social behavior called guanxi, which consists consists which guanxi, called behavior social Chinese a counter-offer of remotely comparable scale. of remotely counter-offer of “building and maintaining a personalized network of of “building and maintaining a personalized network of to social capital, guanxi nonetheless has con compared of corruption on its own, guanxi tends to thrive in corrupt benefits. private securing of as a means environments see its Sinophobia, BRI could entrenched of the region’s companies must often indulge local elites’ rent-seeking rent-seeking companies must often indulge local elites’ One Belt, One Road: A New Source of Rent for One Belt, One Road: A New Source Guanxi has already had an effect on Central Asia, featuring had an effect Guanxi has already development engagement with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with engagement development Tajikistan, In countries. both in meetings coordination donor describe Chinese development development practitioners and foreign Domestic kleptocratic regimes. Central Asia’s ------PUBLIC DISCOURSE. In Tajikistan, the state deems the state deems PUBLIC DISCOURSE. In Tajikistan, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyzstan and DEVELOPMENT. INFRASTRUCTURE has to do with the fact that BRI has little currency in the in the has to do with the fact that BRI has little currency hampered by Sino-Kyrgyz disagreements and Russian and Russian by Sino-Kyrgyz disagreements hampered investment rarely reference BRI. Concerns and grievances reference investment rarely Kyrgyz media: the initiative has yet to produce any big- Kyrgyz media: the initiative has yet to produce Persian Gulf; however, the proposed route would follow would follow route the proposed Persian Gulf; however, centers population Asian Central bypassing thus D, Line na’s orbit, an IMF representative has praised Bishkek’s has praised Bishkek’s orbit, an IMF representative na’s negative effect on that country’s reexports of Chinese Chinese of reexports country’s that on effect negative rhetorical hay out of BRI, going so far as to associate it with it to associate as far so going BRI, of out rhetorical hay initiative. to nothing to do with the have next that projects posals. Though the Xinjiang-Persian Gulf railroad remains remains railroad Gulf the Xinjiang-Persian posals. Though into Chi further leaning states Asian Central to resistance far greater share than Kyrgyzstan. The project is currently currently is project The Kyrgyzstan. than share greater far the chances of a productive Sino-Kyrgyz partnership. the chances of a productive to address them. In this context, local experts criticize suc to address ticket projects in Kyrgyzstan, thus discussions of Chinese ticket projects they want, where they want it.” they want, where ties. Nevertheless, Kyrgyz policymakers make extensive make extensive ties. Nevertheless, Kyrgyz policymakers this route and suggested more economically advantageous economically and suggested more this route thus far unmatched in Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, Kyrgyz Additionally, in Kyrgyzstan. thus far unmatched when pressed. Conversely, in Kyrgyzstan, the government Conversely, when pressed. would also host a prospective railway from Xinjiang to the railway from would also host a prospective shape the public discourse on relations with China. This This China. with relations on discourse public the shape stan’s admission to the EEU has reportedly had a strongly had a strongly EEU has reportedly admission to the stan’s as the way that corruption and rent-seeking have derailed as the way that corruption and rent-seeking about Chinese activities in Kyrgyzstan, however, are many are however, in Kyrgyzstan, Chinese activities about little does state Kyrgyz the though circulated, widely and and experts take on BRI specifically and China generally. and experts take on BRI specifically and China generally. attracting Chinese investment to Kyrgyzstan; meanwhile, meanwhile, attracting Chinese investment to Kyrgyzstan; alternatives, but Beijing has dismissed these counterpro and Dushanbe were supportive. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan supportive. and Dushanbe were have criticized and industrial hubs. Kyrgyz political leaders cessive Kyrgyz administrations’ lack of initiative in framing expresses strong support for BRI but has little capacity to strong expresses grants periodically occur, Tajiks gloss over these and all gloss over these and all Tajiks grants periodically occur, other concerns in their country about Chinese activities out ‘strings attached’” and dictates the line that the media efforts to shape this project in service of domestic priori this project to shape efforts on hold due to joint Sino-Uzbek reticence, though Bishkek reticence, on hold due to joint Sino-Uzbek goods to the rest of Central Asia. goods to the rest discussions about Chinese economic penetration, as well about Chinese economic penetration, discussions China “a great friend and savior that offers its help with friend and savior that offers China “a great China Gas Pipeline if constructed, with Tajikistan hosting a hosting constructed, with Tajikistan China Gas Pipeline if Yet this normative branding has had minimal success in normative branding has had minimal success in this Yet Thus, while clashes between Tajiks and Chinese immi Chinese and Tajiks between clashes while Thus, Tajikistan will both play host to Line D of the Central Asia- both play host to Line D of the Central will Tajikistan “Tajik leaders have long received the [Chinese] investment the [Chinese] leaders have long received “Tajik LEO ZUCKER 10 “if youwanttogoabroad, English.Ifyouwanttostay learn “‘states withinstates,’completelyclosedtooutsidersand These efforts haveconsistentlybeenhampered bythe China’s development andstability, theyseelittleappealin CCP’s monopolyonsoftpowercreation anditsinabilityto develop anormativesoftpowerbrandcapableofcompet viduals andcivilsociety. Asaresult, whileKazakhsadmire Kazakhstanandthe resultingcompanies in western need one thatappearstohavesomestatesupport—says even described Chinese enterprises in Kazakhstan as verify that these capacity transfers comply with Kazakh of relevant negotiations,expertscannotindependently environmental degradation,uncheckedChineseimmigra observers fearthatthesecapacitytransferswillleadto extend the maximum tenure of foreigners leasing Kazakh appears more appealingtoCentralAsianelitesthan to allow Chinesesoftpower’s organicdevelopment byindi a classofsoftpowerambassadorsforChina,isdisputed. an estimated5%everymonth.AcertainKazakhadage— agricultural landfrom 10to25years—whichAstanatem state efforts toteachtheChinese languageinCentralAsia, students into Chinese culture and norms, and thus created the number of Kazakh students learning Chinese rises by the number of Kazakh students learning tion, andChineselandassetgrabs.Giventheopacity from theopportunitytostudyin ChinathankstoBRI-re for Chineselanguageskills.Inadditiontotrain programs havesuccessfullysocialized Kazakh exchange production capacity of 51 Chinese industrial plants to reignited by offering Kazakh consternation to move the appease Sinophobicsentiment—Beijing porarily shelvedto Kazakhstan at the 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou. Kazakh Kazakhstan atthe2016G20summitinHangzhou.Kazakh FERS. Ontheheelsofpublicoutrageoveraproposal to its political system and social values. Chinese soft power ing withAmerica’s haveseenmixedresults inKazakhstan. ing in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs have increasingly benefited in partreflects thegrowing prominence ofChineseenergy Chinese.”Thissentiment in Kazakhstananddowell,learn inaccessible tothemedia.” lated scholarshipandexchangeprograms. Whetherthese laws onforeign ownershipandlabor migration.Oneexpert Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author CHINESE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. Asaresult ofChinese CONCERNS OVERPRODUCTIONCAPACITY TRANS Sector LIMITS OFCHINESESOFTPOWER.Chineseefforts to : Bookchapter : DAVE, Bhavna : Uncategorized : CAP, GWU : 2018 ------749b056eb&mc_eid=0931f545a5 Aynak, anuntouchedcopperdepositcontainingawhop Aynak, wasdesigned for theexport of minedcopper; the of Kabul.Thesecontractsnotonlypromised “favourable ordinary citizens,however:China’s professed valuesof of progress atMesAynak. contractors by Taliban militants—also may explain the lack of phosphateresources, andperiodicrocket attackson excavations thattakepriorityovermineralextraction,lack villagers living within the exploitation area, archaeological competition.) Localfactors—includingdifficulties resettling consortium isattemptingtorenegotiate itscontract:the coal andphosphatefrom Afghanistanforuseat northern deposit languishes security of theirregimes and theinviolability of theircoun second, linking Kabul to the Uzbek border, would carry Said infrastructure wasduetoinclude twonewrailways: ect-to-exploit-Afghanistan-s-giant-copper-deposit-languishes?mc_cid=b with othersinSouthAmericaandAfrica,wasacquired the first,connecting KabultothePakistanborder viaMes tracts withAfghanistan’s MinistryofMinestodevelopMes tries’ territorialintegrity. tion are unrealistic, states a recent US Institute of Peace to begin,asdoestheconstructionoftwoproposed the mine.Ten yearson,exploitationofMesAynak hasyet for strategic reasons in view of shutting out international premium androyalty paymentstotheAfghangovernment, ping 450 million metrictons of ore, inLogar Province south report, especiallygiventhelow price ofcopper. (Rumor promised copperroyalties andtermsofrailwayconstruc railways. According to provincial authorities, the Chinese non-intervention andstabilityreassure localelitesofthe 22. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10577-Proj ing MesAynak inthemediumterm: thisdeposit,along but alsotheconstructionofmuchneededinfrastructure.” has it that the consortium had no intention of develop Project toexploitAfghanistan’s giantcopper Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector In April2008,aconsortiumofChinesefirmssignedcon Region : Journalism : MARTY, Franz : Mining : Asia,Central(Afghanistan) : ChinaDialogue : 2018 22 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 11 ------INFRASTRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS. Physical infra INFRASTRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS. build the port, a Georgian-American consortium won the baijan cofinanced the Georgian section of BTK, apparently baijan cofinanced the Georgian section of BTK, apparently inaugurated in October 2017. With an annual capacity of 1 and freight of tons million 5 around carries currently it in exchange for a ban on Armenia using the railway until MDBs to include Armenia in the railway was rejected. Azer rejected. was railway the in Armenia include to MDBs Batumi, Anaklia will be able to handle Panamax-class ships, BTK’s opening, the project never received a vote of con never received opening, the project BTK’s and Poti of ports the Unlike handle. can south further Poti non-tradable sectors. nia; and CIS countries Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, as nia; and CIS countries pushed forward with two big-ticket transport infrastruc pushed forward that accompanied million passengers. Despite the fanfare on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is made. Geor progress push to improve its competitiveness as a transport hub. as a transport hub. its competitiveness push to improve country members; every Central Asian members and EFTA than 2 billion consumers [NDLR: market access to more many business leaders are skeptical of this assessment: of this assessment: skeptical leaders are many business In addition to China, Georgia enjoys free trade with all EU Georgia enjoys free In addition to China, 900,000 TEU—more than half of what what the port of of port the what what of half than TEU—more 900,000 thereby eliminating the need to transfer Georgian imports thereby ter ports. Though a Chinese-Georgian consortium bid to ture projects. The first is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (BTK), The first is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars projects. ture the deep-water port under construction at Anaklia, whose they fail to see how the FTA will ameliorate Georgia’s low low Georgia’s will ameliorate see how the FTA they fail to low generally and workforce, underqualified sectors, tural make full use Georgia. To to their production to relocate social and safety product rules of origin and the EU’s the country’s to date has overwhelmingly focused on well as preferential trade access to the American, Cana American, the access to trade preferential well as its emer when China is included.] will not only facilitate that their Georgian operations respect will need to ensure structure. In tandem with its free trade efforts, Georgia has trade efforts, tandem with its free In structure. standards. Furthermore, Chinese investment in Georgia Chinese investment in Georgia Furthermore, standards. and exports to larger or smaller ships at foreign deep-wa and exports to larger or smaller ships at foreign are also planned. Georgia’s leaders believe their country’s country’s leaders believe their Georgia’s also planned. are gia’s second big-ticket transport infrastructure project is is project infrastructure transport big-ticket second gia’s export diversity, uncompetitive manufacturing and agricul uncompetitive export diversity, is one the Sino-Georgian agreement export potential. But broader a of part as concluded has Tbilisi many FTAs of Azerbaijan, and Arme neighbors Turkey, except Tajikistan; firms entice Chinese hub, but also transport a as gence Chinese manufacturers of these advantages, however, fidence from international investors: BTK was financed by fidence from first operational phase (due to begin in 2020) will handle dian, and Japanese markets. FTA negotiations with India with negotiations FTA markets. Japanese and dian, Turkey and Azerbaijan after a proposal by a consortium of and Azerbaijan after a proposal Turkey 17 million tons of freight and 3 million passengers annually, and 3 million passengers annually, 17 million tons of freight - - - - - 23 : 2018 : German Institute for International: German Institute for and : Asia, Central (Georgia) : Transport : SMOLNIK, Franziska : Report Region STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. Georgia’s leadership Georgia’s CONSIDERATIONS. STRATEGIC Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year TRADE CONSIDERATIONS. Between 2000 and 2010, Between TRADE CONSIDERATIONS. Type Road: Relations between Tbilisi and Beijing in Tbilisi and Beijing between Road: Relations has long hoped to transform their country into a transport has long hoped to transform their country BRI is the and Asia. In their view, hub between Europe key to realizing this ambition. Georgia has thus linked its this ambition. Georgia has thus linked its key to realizing in Georgia’s FDI receipts from China. Georgia’s leadership China. Georgia’s from FDI receipts in Georgia’s in their diversity: whereas China exports a wide range China exports a wide range in their diversity: whereas Hualing one source—the in Georgia comes largely from in China’s favor. In 2017, Chinese exports to Georgia Georgia to exports Chinese 2017, In favor. China’s in the Light of the Belt-and-Road Initiative the Light of the Belt-and-Road Moreover, Sino-Georgian trade flows are imbalanced imbalanced Sino-Georgian trade flows are Moreover, Kingdom’s first with a Eurasian country—as a boon for the Kingdom’s 23. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/com prevent Russia from using military aggression against against using military aggression Russia from prevent prochement with Beijing, Georgia remains committed to its Beijing, Georgia remains with prochement [Georgia]...since Moscow will take care not to endanger endanger to not care take will Moscow [Georgia]...since ments/2018C13_smk.pdf touts its recently inaugurated FTA with China—the Middle inaugurated FTA touts its recently trade relations are characterized by massive imbalances massive imbalances characterized by are trade relations that it’s prepared to recoup the costs of future Russian Russian the costs of future to recoup prepared that it’s Sino-Georgian trade volumes grew 100-fold. Yet these these 100-fold. Yet volumes grew Sino-Georgian trade Security Affairs sist mainly of metals and wine. By contrast, Chinese FDI FDI Chinese contrast, By wine. and metals of mainly sist sanctions against its exports by increasing its trade with its trade with sanctions against its exports by increasing strategic alliance with the West; in fact, inasmuch as their strategic alliance with the West; as complementary. Tbilisi also has strategic motives for Tbilisi also has strategic motives for as complementary. country’s economy, since most Chinese exports to Geor economy, country’s customs duties (whereas from exempted already gia were of goods to Georgia, the latter’s exports to China con of goods to Georgia, the latter’s exceeded Georgian exports to China by a factor of 3.5. exceeded Georgian exports to China by a factor of 3.5. gia’s leaders view BRI membership and Western alignmentWestern and membership BRI view leaders gia’s leaders, to Georgia’s According embracing BRI, however. own development strategy with the BRI label in the hope own development strategy with the BRI Despite its economic rap of boosting its image abroad. and Asia, Geor country acts as a bridge between Europe Georgia Positions Itself on China’s New Silk New Silk China’s Positions Itself on Georgia Georgian wines exported to China weren’t). However, However, Georgian wines exported to China weren’t). Group—which has contributed to large annual fluctuationscontributed to large has Group—which Chinese investments [at home].” BRI also lets Tbilisi signal Chinese investments [at home].” BRI also China instead. “extensive Chinese economic interests in Georgia should in Georgia should “extensive Chinese economic interests LEO ZUCKER 12 Turkmenistan inthecontextofTrans-Caspian Inter Anaklia’s successmaybeundercut byexistinginfrastruc quicker optionforhigh-valuegoods.]Inlightofthesechal Georgia, Ukraine,Azerbaijan,andMoldovainthecontext Georgia isinvestingheavilyinregional cooperation,par due toitspromise tohire asmuchGeorgianlaborpos 2027, only3%ofsuchfreight isprojected tofollowthe on becomingaregional, ratherthanglobaltradinghub. overcome itscompetitivedisadvantagesrelative tothe of theGUAMOrganization for DemocracyandEconomic of that port. Additionally, BTK connects Georgia’s railways competition from Anaklia—hasannouncedtheexpansion employing mainlyChineselabortoconstructinfrastructure contract notonlybecauseitoffered betterterms,but also asian rail-borne freight, andairfreightasian rail-borne remains amuch and Potiportsisnonethelessencouraging.Softinfra structure. To complementitsphysicalinfrastructure push, sible. Asinmanyplaces,Chinesecontractors’practicesof since 2007. Ontop ofthis, trans-Eurasian rail freight route,southern whichincludesfreight thatreaches Turkey south Caucasus,expertspredict thatRussiawillcontinue with Anaklia.Chinesecompanies’interest inbothAnaklia wants togoglobal;physicalinfrastructure isanecessary transport ofhigh-costgoodswhosequickavailabilityis route routethe southern haslostfreight tothenorthern to handlethe lion’s share of trans-Eurasian rail freight: by ticularly with Azerbaijan and Turkey in the context of BTK; to Turkish ports,thusputtingthemindirect competition ture. TheoperatoroftheportPoti—probably inlight of from CentralAsiaviaIranalone. Analysisevenshowsthat Indeed, Georgiamustattract significantly more tradeifit remains 3-3.5timesmore expensivethanocean-go placed onaglobaltransporthub,itsandlogistics rail freight across the Caspian Sea. While Georgia itself has prices/fees, as well as the unavoidable difficulties of getting northern (Russo-Kazakh)corridor.northern Thesedisadvantages national Transport Route (TITR). Such cooperation will nese companieshavesomeinvolvementintheproject. Yet Development; andUkraine,Azerbaijan,Kazakhstan, important. [NDLR:Chinaheavilysubsidizestrans-Eur ing freight, thusmakingrailfreight usefulmainlyforthe industries leavemuchtobedesired. include administrativehurdles, customs processes, and in Georgiaattractsthepublic’s ire. Despitethissnub,Chi but not sufficient condition for this. In attempting to boost brought itsbusinessenvironment inlinewiththedemands trans-Eurasian corridor to be imperative for the southern lenges, somehavesuggestedthatGeorgiasetitssights FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS. Despiteoptimisminthe ------“ranging from developing thechemical industry and trans “Information ontheprojects shouldbe Astana’s lackoftransparent andinclusivedecision-making Carefully, KazakhstanConfronts ChinaAbout exports toChinaare growing: giventhedifficulties ofship gap. BRIcanbeawin-winforCentralAsiaifcountries contrast, the Khorgos dry port and free economic zone adopted a“specialprogram totransferindustrialcapacity significant gap remains betweenKazakhelites’enthusiasm some buildingsunfinishedandabandoned.”Additionally,a should-be-available-to-the-public/ when itcomestoBRIprojects hasnothelpedbridgethis available tothepublic” this program willhelpdiversify theircountry’s economy. By tures around 50 projects worth approximately $28 billion, from ChinatoKazakhstan”in2016.Thisprogram fea fellow arch-adversary of theKremlin. Ukrainian agricultural for BRIandordinary Kazakhs’deep-seated Sinophobia. na-about-kazakhs-in-xinjiang-re-education-camps/ portation infrastructure tosupportingagribusiness and route isapromising alternative. ping trans-Eurasian these exports via Russia, the southern repression ofXinjiang’s nativepopulation, movingswiftly nance inwhichcitizens’voicesare central. use theinitiativeasanopportunitytopracticeopengover 25. https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/carefully-kazakhstan-confronts-chi 24. http://www.fes-connect.org/people/information-on-the-projects- Kazakhs inXinjiangRe-EducationCamps information technologies.”Kazakhshavehighhopesthat its tradevolumes,GeorgiamayfindafriendinUkraine, built up,the Kazakh sideisstillunderconstruction, “with has been less of a success: while the Chinese side is well Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Author Within thecontextofBRI,ChinaandKazakhstan Within Sector Since 2017,ifnotbefore, Chinahasintensifiedits Sector Region Region : Interview : Journalism : KASSENOVA, Nargis : PUTZ,Catherine : Uncategorized : Uncategorized : Asia,Central(Kazakhstan) : Asia,Central(Kazakhstan) : FES : TheDiplomat : 2018 : 2018 24 25 - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 13 - - - - - PREPARING FOR LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION. A SUCCESSION. A FOR LEADERSHIP PREPARING A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT? Once Nazarbayev Nazarbayev SOCIAL CONTRACT? Once A NEW life; second, to enshrine his presidency as a “golden age” life; second, to enshrine his presidency have not yet been implemented, however, and previously and previously have not yet been implemented, however, allow would which intact, status nation” the of “leader his his of cultivate his internationalto him rest the for image because Kazakh elites have more diversified assets than diversified assets than because Kazakh elites have more elites appreciate become a matter of contention. Kazakh elite, which will manage the state regardless bureaucratic incentives to maintain elite coherence in order to keep to keep in order incentives to maintain elite coherence the that reflect implementation of constitutional reforms voice Kazakhs increasingly is expected to emerge. Young important ends: first, to let Nazarbayev step down with step down with important ends: first, to let Nazarbayev a toward moved and prospered Kazakhstan which in Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. no-nationalist narratives. This phenomenon is partly a a partly is phenomenon This narratives. no-nationalist phenomenon of demographics, including the accelerating (Oral poor social conditions of ethnic Kazakh repatriates rural total) of (45% still-large Kazakhstan’s and mans), of “national-patriots,” share growing to the Due population. priorities of democratic development, human rights, rule rule development, human rights, priorities of democratic public spending, which the Kazakh public increasingly dis increasingly the Kazakh public which public spending, supervisory parliament’s designed to strengthen reforms to the governresponsibilities powers, transfer presidential ment, and modernize the judicial system. These reforms system, in juxtaposition to the austerity democratic more the next government to impose. Com measures will have competitive will likely be more petition for the presidency for that event by building constructive ties with the Kazakh than that of successions in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan than that of successions in Turkmenistan family, of Nazarbayev’s those of their neighbors. The future face strong and the dangers of intra-elite conflict, however, eth toward strongly their political beliefs, which trend which includes heavyweights in politics and energy, may may and energy, which includes heavyweights in politics slowdown—President Nazarbayev has announced Nazarbayev has announced slowdown—President attracting FDI. Though the EU will have minimal influence and originator of inward FDI (50% of total), the EU can play FDI (50% and originator of inward move beyond oil. in helping Kazakhstan a critical role economic in light of the country’s advance of this—and on governance have had little effect announced reforms seek two Nonetheless, these reforms and the rule of law. assisting the private sector, but also on reining in lavish in lavish on reining but also private sector, assisting the over the eventual succession, Brussels can prepare itself over the eventual succession, Brussels can prepare and by prioritizing the of who assumes the presidency, EU-Kazakhstan the in inclusion society civil and law, of change of leadership is expected in Kazakhstan. In is expected in Kazakhstan. In change of leadership decline in the Russian-speaking minority’s numbers, the numbers, the decline in the Russian-speaking minority’s departs the presidency, a more plural political landscape plural political landscape a more departs the presidency, dains. As Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner (40% of total) largest trade partner (40% of total) dains. As Kazakhstan’s ------26 : 2018 : EUCAM : Asia, Central (Kazakhstan) : Uncategorized : LARUELLE, Marlene, Jos BOONSTRA : Report Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year THE END OF AN OIL DREAM. President Nazarbayev’s Nazarbayev’s THE END OF AN OIL DREAM. President Type legitimacy is built on economic growth. Kazakhstan’s per Kazakhstan’s legitimacy is built on economic growth. Briefs/EUCAM_PB36_Is_Kazakhstans_rising_star_fading_.pdf Is Kazakhstan’s rising star fading? Is Kazakhstan’s have quietly complained to their Chinese counterparts to their Chinese counterparts have quietly complained has seen anywhere between tens of thousands and one of thousands and one between tens has seen anywhere been declining since 2014. In this context, the Kazakh gov icies are “‘counterproductive’ domestically as well as in its “‘counterproductive’ icies are in Kazakhstan, it has the potential to not only exacerbate in Kazakhstan, it has the potential to not ited pleas appear to be having a “limited effect” thus far. far. thus effect” ited pleas appear to be having a “limited 26. http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Policy_ union, Kazakhstan is effectively stuck in the EEU for secu union, Kazakhstan is effectively rity reasons. Kazakhstan must adjust to the “new normal” rity reasons. membership only made matters worse: though Astana has Astana though worse: matters made only membership million people detained in re-education camps, has tar in re-education million people detained with connections to Kazakh Kazakhs and those religious from vocally lobbying for their release lest they imperil their lest they imperil their lobbying for their release vocally from to improve the population’s living standards, which have which have living standards, the population’s to improve tenge lost nearly 100% of its value. Kazakhstan’s EEU EEU tenge lost nearly 100% of its value. Kazakhstan’s to change unless Beijing recognizes that its repressive pol repressive its that recognizes Beijing unless change to tive of Kazakh elites prioritizing deals with China to enrich tive of Kazakh elites prioritizing deals with Experts interest. themselves at the expense of the national whom hold Kazakhstani citizenship. According to reports, to reports, citizenship. According whom hold Kazakhstani Sinophobic sentiment there, but also reinforce the narra but also reinforce Sinophobic sentiment there, suggest that the situation for Kazakhs in Xinjiang is unlikely suggest that the situation for Kazakhs in Xinjiang strategic and economic relations with China; Astana’s lim with China; Astana’s strategic and economic relations stan are targeted in particular. The Kazakhstani authorities The targeted in particular. stan are attempted to weaken the EEU’s level of integration and level of integration and attempted to weaken the EEU’s about the detention of their citizens in Xinjiang, but refrain of their citizens in Xinjiang, but refrain about the detention of 2-3% GDP growth in 2018-2019; this rate is insufficient in 2018-2019; this rate is insufficient of 2-3% GDP growth ernment its exports and must focus not only on diversifying exceeded 1% over the following two years and the Kazakh within the even engaged in trade wars with Moscow from capita GDP rose sixfold between 2002 and 2013. After sixfold between 2002 and 2013. After capita GDP rose barely growth GDP however, 2014, in collapsed prices oil geted not only Uyghurs, but also ethnic Kazakhs, some of geted not only Uyghurs, confiscation of passports, to mass detentions and incar detentions and to mass passports, of confiscation which This repression, camps.” ceration in ‘re-education’ dealings abroad.” Though this repression has yet to cause a mass uproar a mass uproar has yet to cause Though this repression “from the collection of DNA of individuals en masse, to the of DNA of individuals the collection “from LEO ZUCKER 14 The University ofCentral Asia’s (UCA) Mountain Societies quent heat extremes, leading to increased incidence of due tothesensitivityofitsagriculturalsystemsclimatic diversity of political systems, each with its traditional and Climate ChangeImpactsinCentralAsia gramme ashavinghighrecurrences ofpovertyandhighor changes andtoenablecommunitiescontinuethriving. could cause altered precipitation and more patterns fre change. Impactssuchasclimatetemperature change cratic principlesoftransparency, accountability, divisionof grapple withthecountry’s closerelations withRussia,the of foreigners infringingonKazakhstan’s sovereignty, and aridity anddrought, particularly in the mountain pastures. a desire tokeepKazakhculture distinctfrom outside subjective resilience measures toevaluatehouseholds,and studies of villages in the Naryn, Bazar-Korgon and Batken Since Kyrgyzstan’s landarea is90%mountainous,it take intoaccountdifferent contextsanddemographics.” the rest ofthecountry. MSRI’s usedanewtoolforhouse to measure climateresilience trends. Theydevelopedcase the publicsphere, andtheneedforamore pluralpolitical medium riskof natural climatechangeshocks, relative to regions, whichare categorised bytheWorld FoodPro powers, free electionsandrespect forhumanrights.” public’s appetitefor“Kazakhvalues,”theplaceofIslamin 27. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lBDXLcDfUWSqtRQMq0oqZe Research Institute(MSRI)conductedhousehold surveys Kyrgyzstan is the third most vulnerable to climate change Kazakhstan, theEUmust“makeclearthatitrepresents a Kazakhs havereported values,fear aversiontoWestern Kyrgyzstan RanksThird MostVulnerable to increasingly importanttobuild resilience to theseclimate Europe andCentralAsia,primarilyimpacts inEastern influences. Kazakhstan’s nextpresident willthus have to hold surveys,whichusesgeneralisedandshock-specific historical peculiarities,butallbasedonthesamedemo 0k2uCIkxI0/view?usp=sharing life. Inpromoting democraticvaluesandcitizens’rightsin “Recent climate resilience research has shown that Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Region : Journalism : seeauthoraffiliation : Agriculture : Asia,Central(KyrgyzRepublic) : MountainSocietiesResearch Institute : 2018 27 - - - - - “stand tobenefitfrom increased opennessandtrade.” dal—as oftenhappenswhenthepoliticalterrainshifts—he find more tryingtimesahead.Ifhis reforms provoke ascan dealt himastrong handfornow, theUzbekpresident may Going elites whodependonhim“viewreform asanopportunity, country sincehiselection.Yet thereforms now underway erated civilsociety, itselites’limitedappetiteforreform, cess topreserve powerandprivilege.”Similarly, hispolitical can troop presence inAfghanistan,nowneitherMoscow guiding role intact.Furthermore, whileRussiaandChina cerated or exiled and civil society crushed, Mirziyoyev got are only impressive in comparison to the policies pursued Western audienceswouldlikeandkeepthestate’s skills mayprove lesseffective intherelatively more liberal enabled-uzbekistans-spring-and-how-keep-it-going which President Mirziyoyevhasbegunopeningupthe were hostiletoanychangesinCentralAsiathatcould terms includemarketreforms that are lessaggressive than to choreograph thereform danceonhisownterms.These tral Asiaplayedacriticalrole. Whereas Western actorshad possible reforms thatlieahead.” premiership during some of the country’s darkest author ment from its neighborhood, and Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s might betemptedto“scuttletherest ofthereform pro political acumenandthepopularityofhisreforms have previously pushed forambitiousreforms that Central Asian rather than athreat”? Western disengagement from Cen nor Beijingisaversetoreform inUzbekistanbecauseboth unleash forces beyondtheir control: withdissidentsincar 28. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/how-western-disengagement- Uzbekistan’s “Spring”andHowtoKeepit itarian moments, few could have anticipated the way in its overreliance oncottonproduction, Westerndisengage by President Karimov, notincomparisonto“theextentof have causedinstabilityduringtheperiodofheavyAmeri had littlereason tothink thatMirziyoyev’s reforms would How Western DisengagementEnabled leaders viewedaspotentiallydestabilizing,Uzbekelites Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author ORIGINS OFREFORM.WhydidMirziyoyevandthe WILL REFORMSCONTINUE?ThoughMirziyoyev’s Sector EXPECTATIONS UPENDED.Given Uzbekistan’s oblit Region 28 : Blog : SCHATZ, Edward : Uncategorized : Asia,Central(Uzbekistan) : PONARSEurasia : 2018 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 15 ------: CSIS PAST AND PRESENT. The South Korean admin Korean The South AND PRESENT. PAST Author Affiliation THE NEW NORTHERN POLICY. The contemporary iter contemporary The NORTHERN NEW POLICY. THE in these connectivity proposals. [NDLR: inasmuch as as inasmuch [NDLR: proposals. connectivity these in industry—have identified a powerful intersection of inter istration of President Moon Jae-in has embarked on a a on Jae-in has embarked Moon President of istration intricate, multipolar environment, in East Asia to a more recently, US. More on the of overreliance danger igate the North Korea, which could benefit significantly if included which could benefit significantly if included North Korea, participation is key to the success of these North Korean reaction, pending Pyongyang’s New Northern Policy are Northern” and “New Southern” together aim to Policies Korean joint infrastructure such as ports, railways, natu infrastructure joint Korean on many facets of the progress summit.] Whereas Korea shipping and cooperation on Arctic Russo-South Korean Koreas. The New Northern Policy is itself far from novel: Northern The New novel: Koreas. far from Policy is itself a test run of its administration carried out Park’s President program to help shipbuilding companies win more projects, projects, to help shipbuilding companies win more program particularly for LNG tankers.” ral gas pipelines, electric grids, and Arctic shipping lanes, ral gas pipelines, electric grids, and Arctic reduce South Korea’s economic dependence on China on China economic dependence South Korea’s reduce and ultimately connect it with Central Asian railway rea and Trans- railway networks, including the Trans-Mongolia [(“Nordpolitik”)] a central tenet of his foreign policy” to mit a central tenet of his foreign [(“Nordpolitik”)] from Russia’s Yamal LNG plant through Arctic waters. The Arctic LNG plant through Yamal Russia’s from to build 15 ice-class tankers to transport LNG originating LNG transport to tankers ice-class 15 build to the 2017 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, features Eastern 2017 the features Vladivostok, in Forum Economic and joint industrial complexes. In pursuing fisheries, ture, link economic its diversifies only not Seoul strategy, this two-pronged regional infrastructure vision. The “New vision. The “New infrastructure regional two-pronged Roh “made northern-centric then-President diplomacy which needs cheaper and faster ways to export LNG—and South Korean government has also hatched a $1.9 billion South Korean Seoul—which needs to revive its flagging shipbuilding its flagging shipbuilding Seoul—which needs to revive Silk Road Express, “which sought to expand the Trans-Ko the expand sought to “which Express, Road Silk shipbuilding has already borne fruit. Indeed, Moscow— shipbuilding has already shifted the previous bipolar US-Soviet power dynamic bipolar US-Soviet power dynamic shifted the previous a “9-Bridge Strategy” centered on expanding Russo-South expanding on centered Strategy” “9-Bridge a agricul as well as bilateral cooperation on shipbuilding, of part the on behavior good incentivizes also but ages, until after the impending US-North worth discussing aren’t and the US by strengthening its ties to new markets and and the US by strengthening Moon announced at which President ation of Nordpolitik, connectivity proposals, the prospects for their realization realization their for prospects the proposals, connectivity ests: “In 2017, Daewoo Shipping won a $4.8 billion deal exploring avenues to reduce tensions between the two two the between tensions reduce to avenues exploring during the 1980s, when Sino-American rapprochement Sino-American rapprochement during the 1980s, when China railways,” in 2015. ------30 29 : 2018 : 2018 : Global Markets : Asia, East (Korea) : Asia, Central (Uzbekistan) : Infrastructure : Trade : LEE, Kristine : FURNESS, Virginia : Blog : Journalism Region Region Sector Since Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s assumption of the Uzbek assumption of the Uzbek Since Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Sector Author Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type Uzbekistan&utm_term=Fast%20social%20and%20econ Markets&utm_medium=email%20editorial&utm_medium=email%20 News%20NO%20AD%20v2&utm_source=EBRD%202018%20Global Fast social and economic change rings in a Fast social and economic 30. https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/south-ko tm_campaign=C8E0040E0002&utm_term=Fast%20social%20and%20 new era for Uzbekistan EBRD’s return to the country, and a forthcoming Eurobond and a forthcoming Eurobond country, to the return EBRD’s South Korea’s Infrastructure Vision Infrastructure South Korea’s 21503c7a5d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_04_24&utm_medium=e 29. https://www.globalcapital.com/article/b183jttn6x4zn4/fast-so nomic actors and reduce the state’s role in the economy. in the economy. role the state’s nomic actors and reduce V. ASIA, EAST V. ment with its neighbors, which is necessary to get Uzbek presidency in 2016, his government2016, his in on a embarked has presidency of governance economic liberalization, program reforms, coun the Moreover, trajectory. new Uzbekistan’s reflect political climate that his reforms may bring about. And, bring about. And, may that his reforms political climate promise. belie this system’s if results reforms reas-infrastructure-vision/?utm_source=Members&utm_campaign= mail&utm_term=0_e842221dc2-21503c7a5d-210791821 marketing&utm_content=Editorial&utm_content=Attend%20an%20 In the context of these reforms, BRI presents a significant a significant BRI presents In the context of these reforms, try’s low public debt, healthy foreign exchange reserves, reserves, exchange low public debt, healthy foreign try’s needs to draw this investment, Tashkent tors. However, eco as it concernsframework to upgrade its legal foreign while “market authoritarianism” is currently in vogue in in vogue in currently is authoritarianism” “market while source=%5BProof%201%5D%20GlobalMarkets%20Daily%20 event&utm_campaign=FCP_1848982265_636615376254244848&u economic%20change%20rings%20in%20a%20new%20era%20for%20 soon. A more immediate prize for Uzbekistan is rapproche soon. A more and high GDP growth rates are attractive to foreign inves attractive to foreign rates are and high GDP growth and regional opening. Exchange rate liberalization, the opening. Exchange rate liberalization, the and regional opportunity for Uzbekistan, but Beijing should not expect opportunity for Uzbekistan, but Beijing should exports onto the global market. Central Asia, Mirziyoyev may scale back his economic economic his back scale may Mirziyoyev Asia, Central cial-and-economic-change-rings-in-a-new-era-for-uzbekistan?utm_ Tashkent to abandon its strategic independence anytime to abandon its strategic independence anytime Tashkent LEO ZUCKER 16 Asian countriesmaywanttorequest suchasupranational The WEBofTransport CorridorsinSouthAsia China’s game of buying influence through infrastructure, during atourofSoutheastAsiainNovember2017,itsearly cept intoasuiteofimplementableprojects. [NDLR:Central committees canhelptranslate across-border corridorcon constructing thesecorridors,onlytoseethemserveas other hand,thispolicymaybeabenignattempttogrow cooperation betweentheirmanufacturingindustriesto overtures havecentered During onIndonesiaandVietnam. a more concertedeffort toupgradeitscooperativerelation ship with Vietnam tooneofa‘comprehensiveship withVietnam partnership.’ so-called economiccorridorsthatcross through theirter Such transit countries may need to focus on their feeder transit corridorswithlittlelastingeconomicimpactlocally. though onasmallerscaleandinfewercountries.Onthe the onehand,Seoulcouldbeperceived astryingtoplay Policyarethe geopoliticsofNewSouthern murky. On to increase itsinvestmentsinVietnam’s infrastructure, this agreement isamonga“seriesofpacts”worthupto the policy’s unveiling,President MoonsignedanMoUwith ties with ASEAN countries. Announced by President Moon In a March 2018 summit, the two countries agreed to boost Indonesia todevelopanewlightrailsystemforJakarta; ritory. Thesecountriesruntheriskofinvestingheavilyin VI. ASIA,SOUTH markets forSouthKorean goods.Linkagesbetweenthe port ofthesegrowth targets,SouthKorea hasalsovowed reach atargettradevolumeof$100billionby2020.Insup $1.9 billion. On the same tour, President Moon “launched nomic benefitsofhostingtransitcorridors.Supranational networks and on reforms that maximize the socioeco nomic anddiplomaticdiversificationplanalsofocuseson 25W2vOIqVh4i9/view?usp=sharing New Southern Policy and either Chinese or Indo-Japanese PolicyandeitherChineseorIndo-Japanese New Southern 31. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ukGm-V24AYOo_K0eTSh initiatives intheregion are worthwatchingfor. including road andairportconstructionprojects.” [NDLR: Type THE NEWSOUTHERNPOLICY. SouthKorea’s eco Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Landlocked countriesshouldbecautiousabout Region : Report : seeauthoraffiliation : Transport : Asia,South : ADB,DFID,JICA,WBG : 2018 31 ------Additionally, policymakersshouldavoidcorridorprojects cle/2129686/how-india-became-china-led-development-banks-main financing theconstructionoftransportcorridorstoo,but corridors iftheirwidereconomicbenefitsare tobemaxi environment isnegativeand evenmore significant.Finally, coverage) andstrengthening(by publicsectorgovernance or savingtime.To achievethesewidereconomicbenefits, of foregone developmentopportunities,suchasgreater guarantee that their populations enjoy the socioeconomic committee tooverseetheconstructionofSREBsoas est beneficiaryofAIIBlending sincetheBank’s founding cross-border transportinfrastructure initiatives. or financialsustainabilityoftransportinfrastructure, and appear tobethemostpromising typesofcomplemen short-term profit isoftenincompatible withpublicsector sector involvementdoesnottendtoimprove thequality welfare are statistically significant,theirimpactonthe wider economicbenefitsshould receive priorityoverthose with narrow objectives.Projects thattarget andamplify that whilethepositiveimpactofcorridorsoneconomic tary interventions.Policymakersshouldalsobeaware tions: upgradingskills(byimproving educationqualityand that focusexclusivelyonreducing vehicleoperatingcosts the highopportunitycostsofcorridorprojects interms the high risk of coordination failures arising from corridor their involvementisnotnecessarilyagoodthing:private India’s ongoing boycott of BRI, India has been the great mized. Private sector investors can be directly involved in policymakers must consult the private sector in developing policymakers should implement complementary interven projects, privatesectorinvestors are especiallywaryof ments required toachievethem.Furthermore, dueto may infactworsenboth.Privatesectoractors’pursuitof 32. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti improving landadministrationsystems)around corridors investments in education, health, orwaterandsanitation. benefits ofthiscorridor.] Policymakersmustbearinmind How IndiabecameChina-leddevelopment bank’s mainborrower leaders’ developmenttargetsandthelong-terminvest Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Despite still-tense Sino-Indian border disputes and Region : Journalism : LO,Kinling : Lending : Asia,South(India) : SCMP : 2018 32 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 17 - - - - - 34 : 2017 : China Dialogue : Asia, South (India) : Transport : GUPTA, Joydeep : GUPTA, : Journalism Region Sector SINO-INDIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. Trade volumes Trade SINO-INDIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS. China has made its peace with the fact that India will Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type leum products, and iron ore.” This gap could be reduced This gap could be reduced ore.” and iron leum products, leads India by miles in terms of concessional lending to Sri leads India by miles in over this Yet lion in 2000-2001 to $66 billion in 2013-2014. Modi-Xi talks offer hope for better relations Modi-Xi talks offer but China ranks a distant 7th in terms of FDI in India this but China ranks a distant 7th in terms of between the two countries is expected to give Sri Lankan to two countries is expected between the million from India versus $118 from billion in remittances $2 bil from grew between the two largest Asian countries if Chinese companies invested in manufacturing in India, in India, if Chinese companies invested in manufacturing the on improving imports, India should nonetheless focus 34. https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/10607-Modi-Xi-talks-offer-hope- 34. for-better-relations/en?mc_cid=6cc6658516&mc_eid=0931f545a5 Lanka: between 2012 and 2015, China disbursed almost Lanka: between 2012 not formally join BRI. Nonetheless, Beijing is still pushing not formally join BRI. Nonetheless, Beijing is still pushing $2.5 billion (mainly through CHEXIM), while India disbursed $2.5 billion (mainly through Moreover, 2015-2016. in billion $50 topped it billion; $36 rupee—and attracting more Chinese FDI. CONCLUSION. Chinese FDI. attracting more rupee—and than half of the world economy. prise more Indian goods with cheaper products. While India still leads While with cheaper products. Indian goods for India’s participation in the BCIM corridor, and India and India participation in the BCIM corridor, for India’s tances: in 2015, South Asian countries absorbed $5.9 absorbed $5.9 tances: in 2015, South Asian countries $1 billion to trade deficit to China swelled from time, India’s since 2005. Though the current Sino-Sri Lankan trade bal the current since 2005. Though ance “overwhelmingly favours China,” a forthcoming FTA favours China,” a forthcoming FTA ance “overwhelmingly century. Though many clamor for tariffs against Chinese Chinese against Though many clamor for tariffs century. competitiveness of its exports—namely by devaluing the Only by pursuing “competitive cooperation,” rather than can India and China achieve an outright confrontation, catching up, having quadrupled its exports to Sri Lanka Lanka Sri to exports its quadrupled having up, catching China However, markets. Chinese access to goods greater (for Pakistan except country every in Yet million. $660 only remit of source a as China leads India reasons), obvious machinery and industrial computer hardware, equipment, to exports main India’s while goods,” manufactured other China are raw materials like “cotton yarn, copper, petro raw materials like “cotton yarn,China are copper, China in its trade relationship with Sri Lanka, China is fast with Sri Lanka, trade relationship China in its than half of which went to India. China, more “Asian century” in which their combined economies com “China’s biggest exports to India are telecommunications telecommunications biggest exports to India are “China’s - - - - - 33 : 2017 : GWU, NIPFP : Asia, South (India) : Uncategorized : CHHIBBER, Ajay : Published paper REGIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. In 2005, China China 2005, In ECONOMIC RELATIONS. REGIONAL Region STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS. In response to its to its response In CONSIDERATIONS. STRATEGIC Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type jOTk1aklYLVNZN09veG4w/view?usp=sharing body of water—and East Asia through its partnership with body of water—and East Asia through by deepening cultural bonds, ensuring maritime security, maritime security, by deepening cultural bonds, ensuring baijan—and has a highest number (5) and value ($1.186 number (5) and value ($1.186 baijan—and has a highest AIIB Since pending. currently applications loan of billion) in September 2014), has launched its own initiative to pre in September 2014), has launched its own is a rules-based multilateral lender with transparent pro lender with transparent is a rules-based multilateral BRI, whose ambiguity hostility toward inconsistent with its in 2016. India has received $1.074 billion in loans for five $1.074 billion has received in 2016. India 33. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9QMHNIqFfm1OWgtcVhvcUZtUTl MSR as a “maritime supplement” to the BCIM Economic Mongolia. Yet China’s seemingly aggressive posturing in posturing in seemingly aggressive China’s Mongolia. Yet Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, displacing many displacing many largest trading partner, Bangladesh’s Route, the Blue Revolution, and “Security and Growth for and “Security and Growth Route, the Blue Revolution, nations. India has also sought involvement in South China perceived encirclement by China’s MSR (particularly in light by China’s encirclement perceived Mausam, the Spice Route, the Cotton to as Project referred projects—compared to $600 million for second-place Azer second-place for million $600 to projects—compared India than a strategy to generate alternative import routes India than a strategy to generate alternative import routes for Middle Eastern oil if its supply lines through the Strait Strait the Eastern Middle for through lines supply its if oil to build 20 ports on the Indian Ocean. India could also viewalso could India Ocean. Indian the on ports 20 build to the Indian Ocean may be less of an attempt to marginalize to attempt an of less be may Ocean Indian the tion India at the center of the Indian Ocean’s governance Ocean’s Indian the of center the at India tion with Vietnam and its insistence on freedom of navigation, with Vietnam and its insistence on freedom Sea affairs—mainly through its hydrocarbon relationship relationship its hydrocarbon through Sea affairs—mainly and broadening economic connectivity with Indo-Pacific economic connectivity with Indo-Pacific and broadening exploited ongoing border difficulties to usurp India as to usurp India as difficulties exploited ongoing border of Malacca threatened. Under this mentality, India could could India mentality, this Under threatened. Malacca of given that almost 25% of India’s trade passes through this trade passes through given that almost 25% of India’s of a PLA Navy submarine’s docking in the port of Colombo Colombo of port the in docking submarine’s Navy PLA a of Ocean. Variously vent Chinese domination of the Indian cedures, New Delhi’s enthusiasm toward the Bank isn’t isn’t Bank the toward enthusiasm Delhi’s New cedures, and strategic dimensions India of terms, debt implications, often criticizes. China’s belt and road initiative and India’s initiative and India’s road belt and China’s Corridor, which India supports. Corridor, dovetail MSR with its own Sagarmala project, which seeks dovetail MSR with its own Sagarmala project, options: Competitive cooperation All in the Region” (SAGAR), this initiative seeks to posi All in the Region” (SAGAR), this initiative LEO ZUCKER 18 1 or 2 percent after the global financial crash of 2008”; Chinese lendersforanadditional $757millionin2012.To financiers refusing tofund it. TheinitialCHEXIM loan of$307 Chinese lenderssignedon—thisdespitefeasibilitystud 2012, itdocked34ships,compared tothePortofColom exorbitant sumthatmayhaveincludedkickbacksforPres on November18,2010,andcontinuedtoblockbusiness entering. Theboulderremained asoftheport’s opening open—and thatanambitiousexpansionbegin10years oversaw thebrutalendofSri Lanka’s civilwar. Asaccu ahead ofscheduledespiterisingcosts,Rajapaksaasked ahead of schedule—with great fanfare on his 65th birthday advisers had laid out aresults-based roadmap for when appears amenabletostrengthening transitlinksbetween support, militaryequipmentandpoliticalcoveratthe sations ofhumanrightsviolationsisolatedhisregime would eventually form Hambantota’s harbor. Yet in their the harbor’s entrance and prevented large ships from the followingyear. Theproject’s Chinesecontractor, China torpedoed these plans in 2009 bydemanding that the port United Nationstoblockpotentialsanctions.”Then,when request, workingaround theclocktodredge thebasinthat projects charge ratesbelow0.5%.Thoughpresidential million “cameatavariableratethatusuallysettledabove project in hisnativedistrictofHambantotaaround 2007, until China Harbor blasted it a year later for $40 million—an until ChinaHarborblasteditayearlaterfor$40million—an Harbor EngineeringCompany, accededtoRajapaksa’s Hambantota Portcouldexpand after opening,Rajapaksa Rajapaksa proposed implementingplansforavastport Rajapaksa wontheSriLankanpresidency in2005and Kolkata andKunming. 35. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9QMHNIqFfm1Nlg4TVZCdk9DS ident Rajapaksa. Hambantota Port had a lackluster start: in ident Rajapaksa.HambantotaPorthadalacklusterstart:in ies deemingtheproject economically unviableandIndian internationally, Rajapaksarelied onChinese“economic bo’s 3,667.Determinedtocontinue theport’s expansion by comparison,Japaneseinfrastructure loansforsimilar haste, ChinaHarboroverlookedaboulderthatblocked How ChinaGotSriLankatoCoughUpaPort FEzWElod2RUa2tRM083UVFr/view?usp=sharing Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector EXPLOITING DEBAUCHED LEADERSHIP. Mahinda Region : Journalism : ABI-HABIB,Maria : Lending : Asia,South(SriLanka) : NewYork Times : 2018 35 - - - - - “demanded thataChinesecompany[ultimatelyChinaMer And, whilethenewownershiparrangement“barsforeign deshi government debarreddeshi government the company from winning dential election—in which the opposition railed against Sri Colombo effectively hasnosovereignty overtheport’s land. ena withadisastrous fiscalsituation.In2016,Sirisena election, leavingincomingpresident MaithripalaSiris company, ChinaCommunicationsConstructionCompany, get thesefunds,Rajapaksaagreed torenegotiate theinitial geostrategic. Moreover, according toaSriLankanofficial only justificationforChina’s involvementinHambantota is observers, thisoutcomewouldmakesense.Indianana it’sgranted permissionbythegovernment,” conceivable countries from usingtheportfor militarypurposesunless ena accepted,andthenewarrangementtookeffect in chants Port,anSOE]takeadominantequityshare inthe any future contractsforattemptingtobribeanofficial with and China’s ambassadoropenlylobbiedvoterstosupport agreements” withChina—ChinaHarbordispensedatleast an “integral”partoftheportdeal. appearance of Sri Lankan ownership” of Hambantota Port, sure ColombotoletthePLA Navytodockthere. To many was alsodebarred from biddingonWorld Bankprojects for who participatedininitialnegotiationsforChinesefinance, worth the $1.1 billion it would pay for its equity. Again Siris that Beijingwouldusethepromise of debt relief topres then “demanded15,000acres oflandaround theportto 8 years in 2009 due to“corrupt practices inthe Philippines.” may notbeananomaly. InJanuary2018,theBangla port in return.” WhenSirisenaagreed,port inreturn.” ChinaMerchants $100,000 stuffed intoaboxoftea.ChinaHarbor’s parent $1.7 milliondelivered directly tothepresidential palace), $7.6 milliontoRajapaksa’s campaignaffiliates (including $307 millionloantoa6.3%fixedinterest rate.Rajapaksa’s Port from thestate’s balancesheet,butChineseofficials Rajapaksa. China Harbor’s corrupt practices in Sri Lanka Lanka’s risingdebtandthreatened to“tearupeconomic Beijing privatelymadeclearthatintelligencesharing—that December 2017.Thoughthecurrent setupleaves“some is, letting China know who was docking at the port—was build anindustrialzone,”arguingthattheportalonewasn’t launched negotiationswithBeijingtoremove Hambantota loyalty didnounrewarded: inadvanceofthe 2015 presi lysts, seeing no economic rationale for the port, believe the lysts, seeingnoeconomicrationalefortheport,believe A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT. Rajapaksalostthe2015 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 19 - - - : 2017 : Geopolitical Monitor 37 : Asia, Southeast : Transport : see author affiliation : Fact Sheet Length: 427 km. Region RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER MEKONG ORGANIZA MEKONG WITH OTHER RELATIONSHIP Sector Cost: $6.04 billion. Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type high-speed-rail-network/ Fact Sheet: Kunming-Singapore High Speed Fact Sheet: Kunming-Singapore Rail Network has shared hydrological data with China since 2002, and hydrological has shared key is to tie together the efforts of the six members while key is to tie together the efforts joint studies and MoUs between MRC and LMC are forth LMC are MRC and MoUs between and joint studies if he did represent the Chinese government’s position, then the Chinese government’s if he did represent 37. https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/fact-sheet-kunming-singapore- Beijing’s parallel goals for LMC.] Beijing’s Kunming-Vientiane note: “In the next five years,” Xu Liping, a researcher who who researcher a note: “In the next five years,” Xu Liping, may have been speaking in an unofficial capacity; however, capacity; however, may have been speaking in an unofficial may have helped to inspire LMC, is quoted as saying, “the may have helped to inspire minimising while mechanism the forward pushing region; It isn’t mentioned directly in any way, though a provincial though a provincial way, in any directly mentioned It isn’t Lumpur-Singapore) from member states. from MRC Indeed, priorities. mutual of pursuit in cooperation for the impact of political uncertainties in certain transitional transitional the impact of political uncertainties in certain Southeast Asia may be policy toward trine-esque foreign to mind. Additionally, the piece closes on a rather grim grim a rather on closes piece the Additionally, mind. to will “build a community of common destiny” keeps it close will “build a community of common destiny” Central Route (Kunming-Vientiane-Bangkok-Kuala Central Route (Kunming-Vientiane-Bangkok-Kuala and LMC, observers of both institutions note the potential and LMC, observers countries outside the foreign avoiding interventions from annual youth innovation competition for university students innovation competition annual youth countries, such as Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand.” Xu Doc and a Monroe of authoritarian regimes entrenchment established by lower Mekong states, as well as the US, as the US, as well states, lower Mekong by established River Commission, a joint initiative of these is the Mekong Thailand, and Vietnam,of Cambodia, Laos, established in elephant in the room. coming. [NDLR: BRI is this piece’s exchanges people-to-people LMC’s that assertion official’s Japan, South Korea, India, and IFIs. The most prominent IFIs. The most prominent India, and Japan, South Korea, TIONS. LMC joins a patchwork of multilateral mechanisms TIONS. LMC joins a 1995. Despite the possibility of competition between MRC 1995. Despite the possibility ------36 : 2018 : China Dialogue : Asia, Southeast : Uncategorized : WANG Yan : WANG : Journalism PRIORITIES. LMC identifies three pillars of coop PRIORITIES. LMC identifies three HISTORY. The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) Cooperation (LMC) The Lancang-Mekong HISTORY. Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type kong-countries-look-to-bolster-cooperation?mc_cid=025899345b&mc_ Mekong countries look to bolster cooperation Mekong countries including some pre-existing and suspended projects, were were and suspended projects, including some pre-existing their imple identified at the first leaders’ meeting; through ity cooperation and infrastructure development, as well a ity cooperation and infrastructure information sharing among LMC members—an achieve members—an LMC among sharing information in March 2016. Since its foundation, the mechanism has in March 36. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10559-Me Mechanism is a Chinese initiative that includes all five includes all five Mechanism is a Chinese initiative that LMC and give it credibility to relaunch suspended projects. suspended projects. to relaunch LMC and give it credibility an people-to-people exchanges, LMC features Regarding LMC lifts a page from the BRI playbook: Beijing promised the BRI playbook: Beijing promised LMC lifts a page from LMC: whereas Mekong basin countries previously failed failed basin countries previously Mekong LMC: whereas nism has improved water management coordination and and water management coordination nism has improved $3.2 billion worth of loans to promote industrial capac $3.2 billion worth of loans to promote mentation, Beijing sought to quickly build confidence in mentation, Beijing sought to quickly build confidence in ment whose effects were demonstrated when China when China demonstrated were ment whose effects drought to alleviate downstream water upstream released reduction. Water management is particularly central to management is particularly central to Water reduction. people-to-people exchanges—and five [sic] priority priority [sic] five exchanges—and people-to-people rated in November 2015 and held its first leaders’ meeting rated in November 2015 and held its first VII. ASIA, SOUTHEAST VII. ASIA, facilitated three leaders’ meetings, three foreign minis foreign leaders’ meetings, three facilitated three ted through LMC. As concerns As LMC. development, economic through ted to quickly negotiate solutions to water crises, the mecha to quickly negotiate solutions to water crises, ters’ meetings, five meetings of senior officials, and six six and senior officials, meetings of five meetings, ters’ working groups. eid=0931f545a5 Southeast Asian nationals along the Mekong as well as as well as Mekong the along nationals Asian Southeast special fund to support small- and medium-sized coop sustainable development; and social, cultural, and and cultural, social, and development; sustainable areas—interconnectivity, industrial capacity, cross-bor industrial capacity, areas—interconnectivity, eration projects due to be established no later than 2023 eration projects conditions in March 2016 pursuant to a request submit 2016 pursuant to a request conditions in March eration—political and security issues; economic and and economic issues; security and eration—political (?). A crop of 45 “early achievement” cooperation projects, of 45 “early achievement” cooperation projects, (?). A crop der economy, water resources, agriculture, and poverty and poverty agriculture, water resources, der economy, China. First proposed by Chinese Premier Li at the 17th at the 17th Li by Chinese Premier China. First proposed inaugu was officially Summit in 2014, LMC China-ASEAN LEO ZUCKER 20 Thailand decidedtoself-financeitsportionofthe route, At issue were the interest rates being offered by Chinese Vientiane-Nakhon Ratchasima Vientiane-Nakhon China lineforfreight. ThisleftthenewLaos-Thailandhigh- China andThailand.Afterlengthynegotiationsfollowing deep fiscaldeficit.Theraillineisthelargestinfrastructure (one metergaugeand1.435Chinastandard gauge)from countries. over one-third ofthecountry’s GDP. ever undertakenbyLaos,anditstotalcostisequivalentto of China and other Chinese banks. Laos is already highly coming intheformofloansfrom theExport-ImportBank on thehookfor30%ofcost,withmuchmoney is veloped economylikeLaos.TheLaotiangovernment of 2021. venture) with construction contract awarded to China a laterdate. and leavingthematteroflinkingupatLaosborder to speed raildependentonpassenger travelforprofit, arisky which wouldeffectively allowittocompete with thenew with Thailand’s Nakhon Ratchasima, hasbeen shelved the Laosborder toBangkok. the signingofamemorandumunderstandingin2014, tion commencedin2016;expectedcompletiondate for the time being due to financing disputes between from theone-metergaugecommoninSoutheastAsian preexisting metersingle-tracktostandard double-track, ment afternegotiations with theChinesesidefellthrough. use theChinesestandard of1,435mm,whichisdifferent Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima Railway Group. indebted withapublicdebtofaround 70%ofGDPanda beginning withtheBangkok-NakhonRatchasimasection, licly at 1.9%), and the Thai government’s plan to convert couldborrowlenders (2%,whentheThaigovernment pub The project willbefinancedsolelybytheThaigovern Top speed:250km/h. The originalplanwastocreate an850kmdual-track The nextportionoftheCentralRoute,linkingVientiane The Laosportionoftherailwaywillbesingle-trackand The railproject isaverybigdealforsmall,underde Top speed:160km/hpassenger&120freight. Cost: $5.4billion. When: Constructionexpectedtobegininearly2018. When: Groundbreaking ceremony in2015;construc Who: Laos-ChinaRailwayCo.,Ltd.(China-Laosjoint Length: 252km. - - - - Japanese, Chinese,andEuropean companies.There’s a 2018; targetedcompletiondateoflate2026. given ThailandandChina’s strugglestogetadealonthe out toChineseinterests. There have been rumors that growing influence inthe region. Thetwocountries are coastal railway. also require ahugeinvestmenttogetoff theground, and and rural areas that would provide little economic benefit a verylongdistance,muchofitthrough underdeveloped and Malaysiahavetakenplace. airlines operatingintheregion. accusing PrimeMinisterNajibRazakofsellingMalaysia since itwillneedtoexpanditsexpensiveChina-Laosrail single trackbetweenKunmingandHanoitostandard dou Singapore prefers aJapaneseorEuropean bidderwhile Singapore-Kuala Lumpur way southward inorder tomakeitfinanciallytenablein to therailway’s operators.Unsurprisingly, theproject would the future. fruit ofanyregional railnetwork.Itwouldhavetotraverse intoofferingforce betterterms, theChinesegovernment Phnom Penh-Bangkok-KualaLumpur-Singapore) Eastern Route (Kunming-Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City- ming-Singapore railwaywouldbethehighest-hanging pledged tobuildahigh-speedlinkbetweenBangkokand proposition giventheabundanceoflow-costpassenger many ofwhichstemfrom Vietnam’s suspicionofChina’s political element here, as opposition politicians have been Bangkok-Vientiane portiondone,aKualaLumpur-BangBangkok-Vientiane Kuala Lumpur-Bangkok Nakhon Ratchasima.Manybelievethemoveismeantto Malaysia prefers aChineseone. kok initiativewon’t beforthcoming anytimesoon. ble-track andcreating ahigh-speedtrackalongVietnam’s The KualaLumpur-Bangkok sectionoftheKun The route presents various geopoliticalchallenges, routeThe eastern foresees convertingpre-existing After negotiationsfellapart,theThaigovernment Cost: $15billion. When: Proposed; earlynegotiationsbetweenThailand Will allowforSingapore-KL servicein90minutes. Will When: Callforbidsinlate2017;contractawarded in Length: 1,500km. Bidding process expected to be competitive between Length: 335km. - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 21 - - - - 39 : 2018 : Hong Kong Baptist University : Belt and Road : Uncategorized : SPARKS, Colin : SPARKS, : Published paper Region Sector Author Author Affiliation soft power producing about the means of Arguments Year of Publication Year Type loans worth more than $200 billion. Moreover, “by the end Moreover, than $200 billion. loans worth more be “casually, unconsciously, realistically, [sic] embedded embedded [sic] realistically, unconsciously, “casually, be in infrastructure investment every year. This compares to to compares This year. every investment infrastructure in in popular cultural artefacts” that would inspire foreign foreign in popular cultural artefacts” that would inspire 39. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2059436418778935 unprecedented success in lifting its population out of success in lifting its population out of unprecedented elites, and particularly those in narrative is instead foreign power. Unlike the United States—whose population has Unlike the United States—whose population has power. convincingly to enough affluent near nowhere are people quite unlikely that this achievement could it’s poverty, did and still masses in the way that American prosperity ment annually between 2016 and 2020, whereas the public the whereas 2020, and 2016 between annually ment issuing projects,” related than 2,600 participated in more United States used as the bedrock of its immense soft soft immense its of bedrock the as used States United tural artefacts it exported around the world—the Chinese tural artefacts it exported around totaled more than 810 billion yuan, or around $130 billion. yuan, or around than 810 billion totaled more tries had set up institutions in China.” since 1945 and made this fact known through the cul through since 1945 and made this fact known soft-power attraction. Though China can rightfully claim authoritarian countries for whom the attraction of American and private sectors can only provide $200 billion annually. $200 billion annually. only provide and private sectors can that the aside, China lacks the basis of positive attraction of 2017, a total of 55 banks from 21 Belt and Road coun banks from of 2017, a total of 55 cessful model for organising social life” and thus develop values is minimal. (arguably) enjoyed the highest standard of living on earth (arguably) enjoyed the highest standard China’s soft power from the BRICS to the BRI soft power from China’s does. The ideal target audience for China’s development development does. The ideal target audience for China’s China) will need $500 billion worth of infrastructure invest infrastructure of worth $500 billion need will China) ADB’s assessment that the Asia-Pacific region (excluding region (excluding the Asia-Pacific assessment that ADB’s BRCsto loans Ex-Im China outstanding 2018, March of As inception, “Chinese banks have since BRI’s Additionally, “present [their country] as the world’s most materially suc materially most world’s as the country] [their “present - - : 2018 : Xinhua 38 : Belt and Road : Infrastructure : see author affiliation : Journalism Region Despite the collapse of the original agreement, China Despite the collapse of the original agreement, Previous plans to build a high-speed rail link between Previous Sector Vietnam has sought other partners to help develop a a develop help to partners other Vietnam sought has Author Author Affiliation of the to Zhou Xiaochuan, vice chairman According A Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City high-speed link is link is A Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh City high-speed Year of Publication Year Type The 1,920 km route would have allowed for speeds of The 1,920 km route The original contract was signed in 2011 with the ChinaThe original contract was signed in 2011 with The Vietnamese government would be reluctant to The Vietnamese government to reluctant would be kok-Kuala Lumpur-Singapore) investment has been building its own track from Kunming to Ruili at at Ruili to Kunming from track own its building been has its own meter-gauge national network. At present, China’s China’s network. At present, national its own meter-gauge 38. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/14/c_137109547.htm Belt and Road regions suffer from a $600 billion shortfall shortfall billion $600 a from suffer regions Road and Belt Boao Forum and former Chinese central bank governor, Boao Forum and former Chinese central bank governor, Railway Engineering Corporation. It would have involved have involved Railway Engineering Corporation. It would Kunming and Rangoon were shelved in 2014 following shelved in 2014 following Kunming and Rangoon were Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City with a Japanese partner. Minh City with a Japanese partner. Hanoi and Ho Chi up to 240 km/h. north-south high-speed rail network. In 2009 it announcedit 2009 In network. rail high-speed north-south VIII. “BELT AND ROAD” VIII. “BELT most of the financing coming from China, and a Chinese most of the financing coming from popular protests in Myanmar. popular protests plans to build a 1,600 km high-speed rail link between km high-speed rail link between plans to build a 1,600 ming and the Vietnam border at Hai Phong. ming and the Vietnam border the border via Dali. the border tag: $56 billion by some estimates. A feasibility project is project tag: $56 billion by some estimates. A feasibility Western Route (Kunming-Mandalay-Rangoon-Bang Route Western also being considered, but it too is in the early stages but it too is in the early stages also being considered, already clashing openly over sovereignty of the South of the South over sovereignty clashing openly already into encroach to network standard-gauge China’s allow entity operating the railway on a 50-year concession. entity operating the railway on a 50-year of planning. currently being carried out, and the National Assembly is currently in 2019. expected put it to a final vote sometime only meter-gauge track is the 466 km link between Kun track is the only meter-gauge China Sea. 600 bln USD shortfall in B&R infrastructure 600 bln USD shortfall in B&R infrastructure The plan has since stalled due to the project’s high price high price The plan has since stalled due to the project’s LEO ZUCKER 22 This oversupplyhasnotledtocheapgasinChina,how 41. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/08/ 40. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ fields. China’s national oil companies (NOCs) thus began due to poor productivity in operational oilfields and low domestic demand.Production hasfalleninrecent years ever: the government-set priceofgasis3.5timeshigher ever: thegovernment-set of oversupplyduetothesecontracts,withnoendinsight. growth decelerated,China’s LNGsystementered astate growth rates and gas scarcity Beijing was a concern, equal proportion. Before 2015, when China enjoyed higher covers 66%ofitsgasdemandthrough domesticproduc oil priceswouldremain high,however;NOCswere thus oil marketforaccesstoreserves abroad andoffer loans of theconsequentdealssawChinatradeaccesstoits signed boatloadsofcontractsforimportedLNG.But,as sometimes atbelow-market prices. Manyoftheseagree and GasPricesforChinaIndia the priceofcoal. than itisintheUS,meaningthatgascannotcompetewith tion; pipeline importsandLNGmakeupthegapin to gas,Chinaisinasomewhatdifferent situation.China to foreign energycompaniesthatcouldberepaid inoil, punished whenoilpricesplummeted,andtheiroverseas ments were concludedundertheassumptionthatworld prospects ofproductive extractionfrom undeveloped What’s happeningwithChina’s fintech whats-happening-with-chinas-fintech-industry/ fp_20171019_lower_longer_china_india.pdf investments plungedin2015and2016.Whenitcomes investing in a wide variety of foreign oil producers. Some industry? IX. CHINA Lower forLonger:TheImplicationsofLowOil Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Author Chinese oil production now covers only one third of Sector Sector Region Region : Blog : Report : DOLLAR,David : GROSS,Samantha : Energy : Technology : China : China 41 : Brookings : Brookings : 2017 : 2018 40 - - - Thailand, Singapore, andSouthKorea. [NDLR:justasChi 42. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2025 Chinese fintechcompaniesare seekingto replicate itin firms have resorted toacquisitionsofforeign techcompa quotas to manufacturers in order to not openly violate WTO documents. Though bureaucrats deny that these targets China 2025aimsforChinesedominationoftheseindus Germany, the US,SouthKorea, andJapanhave,Madein dominates advanced industries like robotics, advanced 2016, Fujian-basedSan’anOptoelectrics—which shares gests thattheseinvestmentsformpartofacoordinated espionage. Experience from overseas acquisitions sug cific quotas are laidoutformanufacturers insemi-official advanced technologies,BRCsshouldconsiderhowtheir are official policy, a recent report arguesthatBeijingis and telecommunicationequipmentby2025”;more spe and basicmaterialsinindustrieslikeaerospace equipment 2025? strategy. For instance, shortly before Fujian Grand Chips’ ting-edge Chinesetechnologytodomesticfirms.] thus investedinfintechstartupsIndia,thePhilippines, tries worldwide.Specifically, thestrategy“laysouttargets to transform the country into a hi-tech powerhouse that foreign markets. Alibaba’s Alipay has done this by targeting for achieving70%‘self-sufficiency’ incore components partnerships withChinacouldresult inthetransferofcut populations underserved by existing financial institutions payment and online lending platforms. Given this success, public takeoverofGermanmachine makerAixtron in rules. InpursuitofMadeinChina2025’s aims,Chinese nese firmsofteninvestinforeign marketstogainaccess nies, forced technologytransferagreements, andindustrial using semi-official documentstotransmit“self-sufficiency” But insteadofseekingexcellenceintheseindustriesas Why Does Everyone HateMadeinChina Why DoesEveryone in collaborationwithlocalpartners.Alipay’s operatorhas industry, withmassivepublicuptakeofinnovativemobile information technology, aviation,andnewenergyvehicles.” “Made inChina 2025 is a blueprint for Beijing’s plan Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author China has become theworldleaderinfintech Sector Region 42 : Blog : LASKAI,Lorand : Technology : China : CFR : 2018 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 23 . . . - - - - . Infla Monetary Monetary Fiscal policy . Q1 growth . Q1 growth Forecasts Monetary policy Monetary policy . Inflation is expected to . Inflation is expected . Q1 saw a budget surplus surplus a budget . Q1 saw Macro trends Macro . Q1 growth accelerated to accelerated to . Q1 growth Forecasts Fiscal policy Fiscal Macro trends Macro . Inflation stood below the target range in Q1 due to . Inflation stood below the target range in RUSSIA. KYRGYZ REPUBLIC. low global and regional food prices. The refinancing rate rate food prices. The refinancing low global and regional lowered the base rate 1 percentage point in Q1 in response in Q1 in response point the base rate 1 percentage lowered higher social spending. Government debt grew 6% QoQ QoQ 6% Governmentspending. social higher grew debt budget predicts a surplus of 0.5% of GDP. GDP. a surplus of 0.5% of predicts budget before) due to a 22.5% YoY increase in hydrocarbon rev hydrocarbon in increase YoY 22.5% a to due before) boosted by a positive trade balance, household consump boosted by a positive trade balance, household its key interest rate on two occasions, to 7.25%, in Q1. rate on two occasions, to 7.25%, in Q1. its key interest increased demand for Russian exports (up 23% YoY). New demand for Russian exports (up 23% YoY). increased in Q1, though external debt decreased. in Q1, though external debt decreased. Budget spending decreased 6% YoY in Q1, and the 2018 6% YoY Budget spending decreased policy 5% in Q1, within its target range. remained in trade partners, gold mining, moderate growth reduced output manufacturing though sectors, power and mining volatile. remains rate of spending growth remained constant. remained rate of spending growth Industrial production returned to growth, supported by the to growth, returned Industrial production Inflation remained within the 5-7% target range. Regulatorsremained within Inflation US sanctions put downward pressure on the ruble-dollar pressure US sanctions put downward 5-7% by mid-2019, supported by rising domestic demand5-7% by mid-2019, supported by rising domestic tion should rise slowly and reach the target range by of the target range by of tion should rise slowly and reach to signs of disinflation. to signs of disinflation. in trading partners, growth oil prices, stable to recovering domestic capital formation. tion, and gross stay within the target range, which will fall to 4% by end- stay within the target and global energy prices. GDP growth should slow due to and global energy prices. GDP growth and systemic factors. and rising domestic demand and investment. and rising domestic revenues higher to before—due a year deficit a smaller though the and lower spending on non-financial assets, comparatively high in 2017. The central bank lowered comparatively high in 2017. The central bank lowered exchange rate, thus boosting the current account surplus. exchange rate, thus boosting the current to a deficit of 1.3% a year of 1.8% of GDP (compared revenues. non-hydrocarbon in 5% increase a and enues growth and a 13.5% YoY jump in expenditures due to to due expenditures in jump YoY 13.5% a and growth (including mining, which saw large in manufacturing growth was During 2017, GDP growth however. steadily, grew to Q1 saw a budget surplus of 1.1% of GDP—compared year prior, despite slowing revenue and transfer payment and slowing revenue despite year prior, 2020. Steady GDP growth is expected in the long term due term long the in expected is growth GDP Steady 2020. due to a slowdown in consumer price growth, which was due to a slowdown in consumer price growth, declined to 1.3% YoY from 5.2% a year before due to slow due before 5.2% a year from YoY to 1.3% declined net and zero downs in the service and construction sectors trades and retail key wholesale The in production). drops YoY jump in real wages, benign commodity prices, and and prices, commodity benign wages, real in jump YoY 12-month inflation reached a historic low of 2.2% in Q1 Q1 in 2.2% of low historic a reached inflation 12-month 1.3% YoY (following a slowdown in 2017Q4) due to a 9.5% (following a slowdown in 2017Q4) due 1.3% YoY ------. Q1 . The refi . The Fiscal policy 43 . Q1 growth of 4.1% due . Q1 growth Monetary policy Monetary . Q1 growth of 9.6% follows of 9.6% follows . Q1 growth . The budget deficit grew YoY, YoY, . The budget deficit grew : 2018 : EDB Macro trends Macro Fiscal policy Macro trends Macro : Eurasia : Uncategorized : see author affiliation . High economic growth, sustained by domestic . High economic growth, : Report KAZAKHSTAN. KAZAKHSTAN. Region Sector ARMENIA. Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type EDB Macroreview 06’2018: EDB economies: in EDB Macroreview hand over important intellectual property in order to merely to merely in order intellectual property hand over important but imports grew 39%. Construction and agriculture 39%. Construction and agriculture but imports grew interest rates spurred an acceleration of lending growth. growth. lending of acceleration an spurred rates interest in debt servicing costs in Q1. in Q1. costs servicing in debt Forecasts nancing rate remained unchanged in Q1, but with inflation nancing rate remained ment debt increased in 2017, leading to 17% YoY growth growth in 2017, leading to 17% YoY ment debt increased more, technology transfer agreements with foreign firms firms with foreign agreements technology transfer more, to rising oil prices, export growth, domestic demand, and domestic export growth, to rising oil prices, the regulator will gradually have to abandon its expansion the regulator search of new growth drivers of new growth search saw a small budget surplus, compared to a small deficit a a small to compared surplus, a small budget saw sectors, as well as in wholesale and retail trade. The bal sectors, as well as in wholesale and retail sector growth accelerated YoY while manufacturing sector manufacturing while YoY accelerated growth sector ance of payments surplus also doubled. ary monetary stance. approaching its target, the Central Bank may tighten mon approaching as spending cuts were offset by falling revenues. Govern revenues. falling by offset were cuts spending as and the rest of the world” by requiring foreign firms to firms to foreign of the world” by requiring and the rest market. access the Chinese a Beijing-controlled common investor with Fujian Grand Fujian Grand investor with common a Beijing-controlled growth in the manufacturing, services, and construction in the manufacturing, services, and construction growth continue through 2020. Inflation should remain within the 2020. Inflation should continue through etary policy in the medium term. Decreasing bank loan bank loan etary policy in the medium term. Decreasing growth slowed. slowed. growth grew 34% YoY in Q1, supported by a weaker currency, in Q1, supported by a weaker currency, YoY 34% grew exploit the “asymmetries in market access between China exploit the “asymmetries grounds, sending its stock tumbling and presenting Fujian and presenting sending its stock tumbling grounds, X. EURASIA demand, export growth, and monetary stimulus, should and monetary stimulus, should demand, export growth, target range over the medium term, though Central Bank’s demand and double-digit growth in remittances. Exports Exports in remittances. demand and double-digit growth Chips— “canceled a critical order from Aixtron on dubious on dubious Aixtron from a critical order Chips— “canceled opportunity to swoop in.” Further Grand Chips with an 43. https://eabr.org/upload/iblock/14f/EABR_Macroview_EN.pdf 40% investment growth YoY. Oil price increases supported Oil price increases YoY. 40% investment growth 11% growth in 2017Q4, supported by rising consumer in 2017Q4, supported by rising consumer 11% growth LEO ZUCKER 24 13% YoY). 16% YoY. Ongoing investmentprojects laythegroundwork 7% targetinMarch 2018,down from its9%peakinJune YoY), agriculture, retail, andbuilding materials (production YoY, upfrom 6.5%ayearprior, duetostrong growth in 2018, thoughinflationisexpectedtorisetoward thetarget 2017, duetoalargeharvest.Non-foodsectorinflation over 2/3oftheconsumerbasket,inflationfellbelow expenditure decreased 5%. Budget revenues, both tax over the medium term, supported by higher budget spend growth of1.8%isexpectedin2018,withhighcommodity expected to be lowered further in 2019. on interest ratessincethen,butthekeyinterest rate is and remittances. Low inflation should remain throughout and non-tax,grew whiletheshare ofnon-budgetreve surplus of2.8%GDPrepresents a1.7-folddecrease tain domesticgrowth trade in2018through international two cutsduringQ1.Despitemeasures takentorevive the tariffs brought inflationinthissectorto6.3%.Thecentral to 20%YoY inQ1. Budgetcutstargetedspendingon the construction,textile(fabricproduction increased 3.7x target rangeoverthemediumterm. from 2017Q1. Budget revenues decreased 11% YoY while for continuedgrowth. Nominal exportgrowth of38%YoY Inflationary risksgrew lateinQ1withincreased volatility range thereafter. prices, and growth in key economic partners should sus remained stableat4%inQ1, whileincreased publicutility public administration (24.4% YoY), agriculture and man motive ofGDPgrowth, nonethelesssawaslowdownof prices andrisinghouseholdincomescompensatingforthe ufacturing (20%YoY), andotheritems(39%),whilepublic nues collapsed.Tax revenue growth more thandoubled nearly halfsince2016Q4. negative effects ofsanctions.1.7%GDPgrowth expected Forecasts investments inthepowersectorcontinuetoincrease (by increased atleast1.8xYoY) sectors.Mining,stillaloco inflation toward its4%targetin2018andkeepitthe ing andeconomicreforms. Inflationary pressures willpush indeterminate. Thecentralbankhastougheneditsrhetoric in theruble,buttheireffect ininflationaryexpectationsis banking sector, theshare ofoverdue loansremains high. bank lowered therefinancing ratefrom 16%to14%in lowered thecurrent accountdeficitto2.5%ofGDP, down TAJIKISTAN. . Investment activity, higher cotton and aluminum Monetary policy Macro trends . With foodproducts makingup . With Fiscal policy . Q1 growth stood at 7% . TheQ1budget Forecasts . GDP - - - - - 44. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/how-russias-economic-reces CIS members,forcing currency devaluationsand,inthe 2014-2015, characterizedbysignificantinflationandcur case ofBelarus,redenomination. Butalthoughthesecoun of theirlegitimacy”:thedeliverypoliticalstabilityandeco over effects oftheRussian recession squeezedthefiscal air defense systems to Belarus and Kazakhstan; and led austerity setin,manyCISregimes lostan“importantbasis appreciated against the ruble. This put severe downward sanctions overMoscow’s annexationofCrimea,whichled security. Despiteitseconomichardships, Moscowhas space ofimpactedcountries,especiallyinCentralAsia. slashed Russianimportsfrom CIScountries,andpartic sion-benefits-moscow-politically-near-abroad whammy senttheRussianeconomyintorecession in with depressed consumer demand, the weak ruble also with those sent to Tajikistan falling by 26%. In tandem tries’ currencies depreciated 25-55% against the dollar, the to capitalflightfrom Russia;plummetingoilprices;and the yearssince2014.Astheseregimes facedthethreat of those withRussia,allowingtheEEUtoshore upitsgripon trade volumeswiththeEUfellevenmore steeplythan foundation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—the recession quicklyspilledover intotheeconomiesofother recovery in2016-2017ascapitalflightcontinued.Russia’s rency depreciation againstthedollar, withonlyafeeble retained orincreased itssecuritypresence initsneighbor past) astheonlyreliable guarantorofincumbentregimes’ revolution, Russiasuccessfullybilleditself(asithasinthe popular protests againstdecliningeconomicconditionsin pressure onremittances of CISmigrant workers inRussia, ruble declined 76%: Russia’s neighbors’ currencies thus nomic growth. Many of these states seen unsanctioned ularly from EEU members. Yet, in the case of Kazakhstan, Russian countersanctionsagainsttheWest. Thistriple Russian economysuffered a“triplewhammy”:Western Kazakhstan’s trade.Taken external together, thesespill hood: itmaintaineditstroop garrisoninTajikistan; provided How Russia’s EconomicRecessionBenefits Moscow Politicallyinits“NearAbroad” THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. In 2014—coinciding with the THE ECONOMICCRISIS.In2014—coincidingwiththe Type THE POLITICALCONSEQUENCES. As inflation and Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Region : Report : OMELICHEVA, Mariya : Uncategorized : Eurasia : PONARSEurasia : 2018 44 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 25 - - - - 46 : 2018 : CSIS : Eurasia : Transport : HILLMAN, Jonathan : Report Region ser rail freight The first direct AND PRESENT. PAST Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type half of 2017, cargo value increased 144% compared to to 144% compared half of 2017, cargo value increased improvements in hard and soft infrastructure. [NDLR: See and soft infrastructure. in hard improvements years. For instance, perishable goods in recent increased including an EU-EEU FTA. In an encouraging sign, the the sign, encouraging an In FTA. EU-EEU an including Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus under a single customs Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus under northeast China or Mongolia; or the middle Railway from which would Russian rail network. A southern corridor, EEU is replacing its Soviet-era system of technical prod system of technical its Soviet-era EEU is replacing uct standards with European and international regulations and international regulations with European uct standards may soon be included. However, high-value cargo—such high-value may soon be included. However, regime. Trans-Eurasian trains follow one of two routes: routes: two of one follow trains Trans-Eurasian regime. could potentially develop pending significant products, map in article for visualization of corridors; note that the services is weaker than on the coast. The maritime freight these services, since the high cost of rail freight can be be can freight rail of cost high the since services, these the northern corridor, which picks up the Trans-Siberian which picks up the Trans-Siberian the northern corridor, the same period in 2016. On the Chinese side, the most the rest of Ukraine while respecting the former’s self-gov the former’s of Ukraine while respecting the rest follow. the separatist authorities and Kiev could with 1,470 direct services from China to Europe and 730 China to Europe services from with 1,470 direct withdrawal of heavy weapons; this would allow people andwithdrawal of heavy weapons; between and a trade agreement with the Kiev authorities services gained a boost in 2011, when the EEU brought brought EEU the when 2011, in a boost gained services fre Service Iran.] southernthrough pass may corridor During the first to China last year. Europe services from as laptops, cell phones, and auto parts—still dominates as laptops, cell phones, and auto parts—still dominates avoid Russia and associated sanctions on European avoid Russia and associated sanctions on European competition from inland, where points are active departure and standards. The question of sanctions over Ukraine Ukraine over sanctions of question The standards. and can travel by rail in refrigerated cars, and hazardous goods cars, and hazardous can travel by rail in refrigerated corridor, which traverses Kazakhstan before joining the joining the which traverses Kazakhstan before corridor, could be resolved by applying the steps used to defuse the by applying the steps could be resolved and regions to occur between the separatist commerce of separatist enterprises ernment; in time, registration and began in 2008. These vices between China and Europe quency has increased substantially over the past few years, quency has increased trans-Eurasian trains has also diversity of cargo aboard The Rise of China-Europe Railways The Rise of China-Europe 46. https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways Transnistrian crisis: a durable ceasefire would precede the would precede ceasefire crisis: a durable Transnistrian ------45 : 2018 : CEPS : Eurasia : Trade : EMERSON, Michael : Report President Putin has expressed interest in developing in developing interest Putin has expressed President Region Sector GOING FORWARD. New American sanctions imposed GOING FORWARD. Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type laborers from non-EEU countries in order to push their their to push order in countries non-EEU from laborers European Economic Area European hard. CIS member states that do business with these com these with business do that states member CIS hard. increased levels of protectionism for its industrial sectors insectors industrial its for protectionism of levels increased internalcould which election, 2018 the after liberalization its practice of mainly employing Chinese labor in overseas its practice of mainly employing Chinese in August 2017 hit Russian energy companies particularly in August 2017 hit Russian Minsk under WTO law. Additionally, Russia has significantly Russia has Additionally, Minsk under WTO law. ness and exceptional loans to states in its neighborhood ness and exceptional potentially be complemented by external liberalization, recent years. In the coming years, however, the situation the situation years. In the coming years, however, recent ment in the short term are dim. Since Belarus is not a dim. Since Belarus is not a ment in the short term are migrant laborers returning from Russia. returning from migrant laborers projects, particularly in countries facing large influxes of particularly in countries facing large influxes of projects, panies are liable to see their energy prices jump, which liable to see their energy prices jump, which panies are the EEU hopes to establish official relations with the EU relations with the EU the EEU hopes to establish official Western sanctions agreement. a non-preferential through to keep CIS countries in its fray: it has offered debt forgive in its fray: it has offered to keep CIS countries the first CIS counterterrorism military exercises, which which exercises, military counterterrorism CIS first the with the WTO are ostensibly “serious,” with accession pos with accession ostensibly “serious,” with the WTO are were to be opened, the prospects of a deep trade agree of a deep trade prospects to be opened, the were while increasing burdensome requirements on migrant on migrant requirements burdensome while increasing were noteworthy in that Uzbekistan participated—Moscow in that Uzbekistan noteworthy were sible in the coming years. Russia may take up a program of sible in the coming years. Russia may take up a program strong economic partnerships in the region, it must curtail region, in the partnerships economic strong WTO member, Brussels is barred from forming an FTA with FTA an forming from barred is Brussels member, WTO a Lisbon-to-Vladivostok common economic space, and a Lisbon-to-Vladivostok common economic space, and Ukraine have pre toward against Russia for its aggression and Tashkent had not held joint military exercises since since had not held joint military exercises and Tashkent could shift in favor of rapprochement. Belarus’ negotiationsBelarus’ rapprochement. of favor in shift could vented any opening of EU-EEU relations. Even if relations Even if relations vented any opening of EU-EEU relations. counterweight to Russia, yet like Russia, China is under counterweight to Russia, yet like Russia, going a decline in external demand. If China is to form could reignite the inflationary spirals they’ve seen since since seen they’ve spirals inflationary the reignite could countries into the EEU. 2014. For some CIS countries, China is an economic is an economic 2014. For some CIS countries, China 2005. Russia has also resorted to carrot-and-stick tactics to carrot-and-stick resorted 2005. Russia has also The Strategic Potential of the Emerging Wider The Strategic Potential of the Emerging 45. https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/PI2018_05_ME_WEEA.pdf LEO ZUCKER 26 16 days to make the journey betweenShanghaiandHam 16 daystomakethejourney China-Europe rail freight faces anuphillbattleto make a Chinese tradewithEurope, itsleadingexportdestination, Chinese subsidies coincided with their rise. Market factors China’s reportedly provincial spentmore governments deeper tiesandgreater economicgains,regardless oftheir growing expertiseinthebusinessofnegotiatingpaper generously: subsidiescanrangefrom $1,000to $5,000per economic merits.Chinaalsosubsidizestheseservices competitiveness since both Shanghai and Hamburg are evolution ofShanghai-to-Hamburgtransittimeandcost, offset bylowerinventorycosts.Rail’s competitivenessin air freight. OnekeychallengeisEurope’s $190 billion as shipssailatlowerspeedstoreduce fuelcosts.Thishas sidies predate theemergence oftheseservices;however, speed andcosthasalsoincreased. In2017,atraintook significant dentinthebusinessofmaritimeshippingand work thataccumulatesincross-border logistics. work hasattimesoutpacedtheavailabilityofcommercial 30-40% eastbound. Empty trains returning to China will trade deficitwithChina,whichaffects allmodesoffreight transport, thustemporarilyboostingrail’s competitiveness. than $300milliononChina-Europe blocktrainsubsidies tion onChina-Europe tradebymode,weight,andvalue.] freight railservices.Maritime shippinghasbecomeslower for railwayinfrastructure andoperations, thoughthesesub rail-borne goods shipmentsarerail-borne westbound,leavingonly movement. This means that 60-70% of Sino-European port, hasslashedprocessing timesatcrossings, ashas rail’s competitive edge. China’s rapidly-growing rail net ments inhard andsoftinfrastructure havecontributedto rail’s relative competitivenessinspeedandcost.Growing reduced the supply of maritime shipping, thus improving port cities; additionally, see figures 2a and 2b for informa $113 billionthatChinaplanstospendonitsownrailways Europe are believedtobeaccelerating.Finally, improve FEU, withsomereports findingsubsidiesofupto$7,000. New infrastructure at borders, such asthe Khorgos dry in 2018.Theseserviceshavealsoreceived EUsubsidies is trumpetednotonlyinChina,butalsoabroad, where ically symbolicevidenceofBRI’s success.Theiradvent between 2011and2016,amodestsumcompared tothe bearing in mind that this measure underestimates rail’s burg, compared to36in2006.[NDLR:Seefigure 1for has also helped, and exports of rail-friendly goods to have alsoimproved thecompetitiveness ofChina-Europe leaders see rail freight links with Chinaasan opening for CHALLENGES. Despiteitsimpressive growth oflate, DRIVERS. For Beijing, trans-Eurasian trainsare polit ------47. https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/eu-ambassadors-beijing-chi China-Europe railfreight services]donotaddupto XI. EUROPE on thefuture ofChinesesubsidiesfortrans-Eurasiantrains, graphic spacetherailwayspassthrough willexperience of China-Europe railfreight services. are aboutcompetitionfrom concerned railservicesonChi also enjoysfreight capacitythatrailcanneverrival:aNew as accessibletothegeneralpublic,andopportunities services willremain hobbledbyexistinginfrastructure. The shipping routes ice-free forlonger. Airfreight executives single block train. Additionally, global warming may work subsidies are considered; rail’s timesavingsare unlikely which isanyone’s guess.Finally, China-Europe railfreight wide-ranging economic or political impacts. Maritime to astandard-gauge trainuponreaching theEUborder. train toabroad-gauge train uponleavingChinaandback to theadvantageofmaritimeshippingbykeepingArctic to compensate for this price disparity. Maritime shipping freightthird evenwhenChinese ofthecostrail-borne trade willremain dominant.Thevastmajorityofthe geo former USSR’s broad gaugerailwaysnecessitatesthat na-silk-road-912258 rail-borne freight betransferredrail-borne from astandard-gauge remain afactoflifeinthetrans-Eurasianrailfreight busi provide servicesaround themare limited.” na-Europe routes, butfuture investmentsinChina’s airport ness. Ontopofthis,maritimeshippingremains roughly one no difference. The railways are not roads. They are not Furthermore, Europe’s railwaynetworksuffers from capac Rail’s advantageoverseaandairalsodependscritically Panamax ship can carry222 times as much cargo asa Klaus STRATMANN ity constraints projects, and is undergoing modernization infrastructure mayboostthecompetitivenessofairfreight. both of whichcreate time delays that reduce the reliability Road EU ambassadorsbandtogetheragainstSilk Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Region PROGNOSIS. “[Thechangesbrought aboutby 47 : Journalism : HEIDE, Dana, Till HOPPE, StephanSCHEUER, : HEIDE,Dana,Till : Uncategorized : Europe (EU) : HandelsblattGlobal : 2018 - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 27 - - - - 50 : 2018 : China Dialogue : Europe, Central and Eastern (Montenegro) : Europe, : Europe, Central and Eastern (Bosnia) : Europe, : Energy : DAVIES, Jack, Jelena PRTORIC : DAVIES, : Journalism 49 Region Region Six large coal power plant projects—several of which Six large coal power plant projects—several Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type lending for energy projects in the Western Balkans raise in the Western Balkans raise lending for energy projects leaders have delivered on very few of their promises and very few of their promises on leaders have delivered 50. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/arti Is China’s investment in infrastructure projects projects investment in infrastructure Is China’s have even allowed retrogression in some regulatory areas; areas; in some regulatory have even allowed retrogression billion. With a quarter of their population unemployed as initiate significant reforms. At the November 2013 Third Third 2013 November the At reforms. significant initiate Chinese on, years Four strong. appeared reforms ing to those related implementation of reforms—particularly Plenum, China’s appetite for such structural and wide-rang and structural such for appetite China’s Plenum, scaled back. have been strongly ambitions reform Beijing’s underway in Bosnia, with a combined cost of around $2.44 underway in Bosnia, with a combined cost of around restrictions are all areas in which China would have to in which China would have to all areas are restrictions market access and market functioning. public procurement rules, intellectual property rights, geo property rules, intellectual public procurement nese-banks-move-into-Bosnian-power-sector?mc_cid=556bfc3504&mc_ for its eventual accession to the EU. Bosnia’s abundant abundant Bosnia’s EU. the to accession eventual its for them. Though billed as job-creating “investment,” Chinese them. Though billed as job-creating labor. Chinese using constructed often are themselves the EU. the EU; is a CAI is included, China’s gains would be even the EU; is a CAI is included, China’s sector eid=0931f545a5 significant concerns about public debt, and the projects concernssignificant projects the and debt, public about Balkan nations into debt? driving Western are financed by Chinese policy banks—are planned or or planned banks—are policy Chinese by financed are an EU-China FTA would be 2.5 times greater than that of would be 2.5 times greater an EU-China FTA of 2016, Bosnian political leaders enthusiastically accept of 2016, Bosnian political leaders enthusiastically accept and the Chinese lending needed to construct coal projects consist of lignite, whose use is banned in coal reserves graphical indications, SOE-dominated sectors, and FDI FDI sectors, and indications, SOE-dominated graphical in these gains, the EU needs to engage realize To greater. with the highest level open-ended talks on how to proceed to accelerate its of Chinese leadership, and China needs Chinese banks move into Bosnian power Chinese banks move into Bosnian cle/2147293/chinas-investment-infrastructure-projects-driving 49. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10589-Chi Additionally, Bosnia’s push in coal power has implications Bosnia’s Additionally, This is unfortunate for China because its GDP gains from China because its GDP gains from This is unfortunate for - - - : 2017 : CEPS 48 : Europe (EU) : Europe : Trade : HU, Weinan, Jacques PELKMANS : HU, Weinan, : Blog Region Sector 27 of 28 EU ambassadors to China signed a report China signed a report ambassadors to 27 of 28 EU As the US undermines the world trade system, the As the US undermines the world trade system, the Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type liberalizing trade and [pushing] the balance of power in [pushing] the balance of power in liberalizing trade and EU-China Leadership in Trade Policy: Feasible? EU-China Leadership in Trade Desirable? bilateral dealings with EU member states on BRI—and the on BRI—and EU member states dealings with bilateral by “‘pursuing domestic political goals like the reduction of political goals like the reduction by “‘pursuing domestic investment (CAI) is reached. Order of operations aside, of operations aside, Order investment (CAI) is reached. EU and China should respond by liberalizing their own by liberalizing their own EU and China should respond willing to consider such in 2014; the EU is EU-China FTA EU positions on China,” signed on.] The report warns that signed on.] The report EU positions on China,” nies will lose out on BRI contracts. Illustratively, Germany’s Germany’s nies will lose out on BRI contracts. Illustratively, roadblock in the way of an eventual EU-China “deep and roadblock rejected by Beijing. The report also notes that China’s also notes that China’s by Beijing. The report rejected it puts on their leaders to endorse BRI when they pressure favor of subsidized Chinese companies.’” [NDLR: Hun favor of subsidized trade regimes. President Xi even suggested exploring an an exploring suggested even Xi President regimes. trade then-minister of economy and other EU officials refused refused officials then-minister of economy and other EU Belt last May’s from to sign the joint declaration resulting the EU pushes China to respect international standards internationalthe EU pushes China to respect standards the past made common cause with Hungary to “weaken the past made common which China exploits.’” surplus capacity, the creation of new export markets and of new export markets the creation surplus capacity, to raw materials’” though BRI; unless access safeguarding an accord, but only once a comprehensive agreement on agreement but only once a comprehensive an accord, restrictions, sector service measures, phytosanitary and as well as international standards of transparency—was as well as international of transparency—was standards and Road Forum after their proposed amendment to the and Road Forum after their proposed ambassadors is remarkable, since Greece, which has in which has in since Greece, remarkable, ambassadors is comprehensive” FTA: technical barriers to trade, sanitary technical barriers to trade, sanitary FTA: comprehensive” visit Beijing—“‘leads to an unequal distribution of power power of distribution unequal an to Beijing—“‘leads visit opportunities for all investors in transport infrastructure’” infrastructure’” opportunities for all investors in transport of transparency in public procurement, European compa European in public procurement, of transparency gary’s ambassador alone refused to sign the report. As As report. the sign to refused alone ambassador gary’s criticizing BRI as “‘[running] counter to the EU agenda for to the EU agenda as “‘[running] counter criticizing BRI China’s myriad market access restrictions are a formidable are access restrictions myriad market China’s declaration—to include wording guaranteeing “‘equal guaranteeing “‘equal declaration—to include wording China seeks to “shape globalization to suit its own interests” interests” own its suit to globalization “shape to seeks China cy-feasible-desirable 48. https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-china-leadership-trade-poli Jonathan Hillman notes, the near-unanimity among the among the the near-unanimity Jonathan Hillman notes, LEO ZUCKER 28 due touncompetitiveallocationofcontracts.Upgrades Commission haltedtheHungarianportionofproject GDP by2019insteadofrisingto78%. debt to high levels. The project compelled Podgorica to China goestoSerbia:infrastructure and ern legwillbegin. AswasthecaseinHungary,ern contractsfor and thatthecountry’s debtwouldhavefallento59%of and raisecertainexcisetaxestoservicetheCHEXIMloans slash welfare spending,cutwagesforstateemployees, though: Russiahasalsoprovided financingandequipment tender. Chinaisn’t aloneinupgradingSerbia’s railways, the Greek portionofthisrailwaywillbeallocatedbypublic though Chinahasnotdisclosedwhenworkonthesouth the upgradeswillstillgoforward. TheBudapest-Belgrade tender; thoughChinese companies may not win the tender, tracts fortheHungarianportionwillbedistributedbypublic the Serbianleghavegoneforward nonetheless,andcon these upgrades.China’s planstoupgradetheBuda to Serbia’s energyandtransportinfrastructure notonly transeuropeo that financeditsfirststagebetween2015and2017.The to Serbia—has played a key role in raising Montenegro’s IMF estimatesthatthisfiscaladjustmentwouldhavebeen na-goes-to-Serbia-infrastructure-and-politics-185401 railway willeventually extend toPiraeusvia Macedonia, pest-Belgrade railwayfacedasetbackwhentheEuropean ment toChinesecontractors,butalsobecauseSerbia unnecessary hadthehighwayproject notgoneforward, politics infrastructure project connectingtheMontenegrincoast because Chinese-financedprojects givepreferential treat 51. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Serbia/Chi lacks domesticcontractorsofsufficient scaletohandle Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author According totheIMF, theBar-Boljare highway—aBRI Author Affiliation Author Chinese companiesare heavilyinvolvedinupgrades Sector Sector Region : Interview : Journalism 51 : MARTINO, Francesco : MARTINO, : ELMER,Keegan : Infrastructure : Infrastructure : Europe, (Serbia) CentralandEastern : SCMP : Osservatoriobalcaniecaucaso : 2018 : 2018 - - - - - T0ifQ%3D%3D JyaDdZbVdNYU1VdVA1UHltZWdZMVByUFRnNmdWb0J4aDE1Rkh1cV deploying in order to do so. In recent years, Chinese dominance inthisarea—and thetoolsChineseare German angstaboutChinaincreases of Chinese financing and the feasibility ofprojects, but on Kosovo.Serbiahasalsobeenopaqueabouttheterms cal partiesseemtosupportChinese“investment”—really creation ofanEU-wideinvestmentscreening mechanism. considered hostile,epitomizeswhyGermanysupportsthe great lengthstohidethescope oftheirinvestments:such companies havemountedanaggressive pushtoinvestin omy, Berlin is worried about Beijing’s quest to develop its In addition to China’sconcerns. weak intellectual property ods insettlingitscommercial disputeswithBeijing,German against protectionist rhetoric emanating from the White are notdebatingtheimplicationsofChineseinvolvement Western European firms in order to acquire their technolog ship over the past decade and fomented a common front stake ofDaimlerwhilemeticulouslycircumventing rules which havebolstered theSino-Germanpoliticalrelation than 3%. This investment,which German policymakers that require investorstopubliclydeclare anystakegreater favorable terms. with good results.for railway modernization, Serbian elites ment and will help Belgrade secure support for its position GVhUUN1cVNSTXJ4RTFsWjg2QWoyTGUzRDc0MzhXcjgyNWNRP regime (in response to which Germany may join the US policymakers share manyoftheirAmericancounterparts’ House. Yet despiteits repudiation ofWashington’s meth tional+relations&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTXpBeU1XUmhPVFk0T1dGbSIsInQiOi try=Germany&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Interna in theirinfrastructure onadeeplevel,though.Allpoliti is thecaseofGeely’s owner, LiShufu,whoacquired a10% ical know-how. Insomeinstances,Chineseinvestorsgoto in itsWTOprocedure againstChina)andclosedecon high-end manufacturingsector—adirect threat toGerman 52. http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1986615782&Coun DRRcllRVkdcLzFsazhJaWdpT1BTMXVydWxZcVBpYlFxMkhZc2JCe lEb3F0MjFWK1lROVcybktHWER0bUl3OWMrUnk0QUlWNHRHSER3Z lately the government as pushed China to accept morelately the government lending—on thevaguepremise thatit’s goodfordevelop Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author China andGermanyenjoyrobust bilateraltrade ties, Sector Region : Blog : seeauthoraffiliation : Trade : Europe, Western (Germany) : EconomistIntelligenceUnit : 2018 52 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 29 - - - - - 54 : 2018 : CSIS : Indo-Pacific : Uncategorized : BARKER GALE, Jesse, Andrew SHEARER : BARKER GALE, Jesse, Andrew : Blog Region Dialogue Security Quadrilateral The BACKGROUND. Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type B5OPVpG2A Maritime Silk Road Initiative 54. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180403_ 54. hardening American policy toward China under Presidents China under Presidents American policy toward hardening had pledged to control. A lesser known case is that of of that is case known lesser A to control. pledged had bers’ shared concerns about China’s increasingly muscular increasingly concerns about China’s bers’ shared ing practices toward Maritime Silk Road (MSR) countries, ing practices toward in earnest, the organization effectively dissolved the same dissolved in earnest, the organization effectively Moreover, the Quad’s resurrection is motivated by its mem resurrection the Quad’s Moreover, naval patrols in the Indian Ocean), and its predatory lend predatory its and Ocean), Indian the in patrols naval GaleShearer_QuadSecurityDialogue.pdf?hlHffGF4EEduy4GkD6Ed1qA rity relationship. The Quad’s reemergence in November in November reemergence The Quad’s rity relationship. region, be it in its continued in the Indo-Pacific presence naval power military purposes, its stated goal of increased Chinese frequent seen in more (and already projection million down payment, UDG has occupied the land gratis million down payment, tsunami. After meeting only once in 2007 as the Quad as the Quad tsunami. After meeting only once in 2007 strategic ties with the US—with PM Modi to strengthen which fuel corruption and political and social divisions. who is committed to strengthening these ties; a decade of who is committed to strengthening who refused to leave. who refused subsequent Australian governments to mend their secu stakeholder companies denied the Sri Lankan government companies denied stakeholder assistance providers in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean assistance providers a land concession of 36,000 hectares of coastal land. This 36,000 hectares a land concession of year due to Australia’s withdrawal from the group and PM group the withdrawal from year due to Australia’s of Chinese interfer and revelations Obama and Trump; ence in Australian domestic politics and higher education. control of security operations at the port, which Colombo at the port, of security operations control and coastline Cambodia’s of 20% concession makes up a $1 Aside from of 10,000 hectares. exceeds the legal limit those and threatened local residents, ever since, expelled (UDG) used a Cambodian-registered business to acquire acquire to business Cambodian-registered a used (UDG) of humanitarian Group” (or Quad) began as the “Core 2017 was made possible by PM Abe’s return to power in return 2017 was made possible by PM Abe’s development of insular claims in the South China Sea for Cambodia: in 2008, Tianjin Union Development Group TianjinCambodia: in 2008, Union Development Group The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Abe’s resignation; moreover, India rebuffed attempts by attempts by India rebuffed moreover, resignation; Abe’s Japan; the replacement of PM Singh—who was hesitant of PM Singh—who was hesitant Japan; the replacement ------53 : 2018 : CSIS : Indo-Pacific : Uncategorized : THORNE, Devin, Ben SPEVACK : Blog Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Though Chinese officials dismiss the notion that MSR Though Chinese officials Type PAIGN_2018_05_23&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e842221dc2- Maritime Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Infrastructure Ports Under Heaven: China’s Strategic Strategic Ports Under Heaven: China’s 53. https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/ports-under-heav between Beijing and Baluchistan rebels since 2013—and since rebels Baluchistan and Beijing between jing to buy influence in Europe through investment in these investment through in Europe jing to buy influence itary personnel have been quoted as stating that MSR that MSR itary personnel have been quoted as stating should investments in overseas maritime installations MSR’s strategic dimension. Chinese strategists and mil MSR’s Beijing; (6) unprofitability in many cases, which points to to points in many cases, which Beijing; (6) unprofitability Berlin, Chinese investment in EU member states among in EU member states among Berlin, Chinese investment Berlin has also voiced discomfort about China’s influence about China’s also voiced discomfort Berlin has non-commercial motives. The implications of these charac non-commercial raising the prospect of project benefits slanted toward toward slanted benefits project of prospect the raising ports with industrial development and other infrastructure, ports with industrial development and other infrastructure, forces at Gwadar Port and has seen direct negotiations negotiations at Gwadar Port and has seen direct forces teristics are evident in Pakistan—which will host PLA Navy teristics are tries [which host some of the most euroskeptic regimes in regimes of the most euroskeptic tries [which host some against EU investment. Luckily for the EU, NDLR] to hedge up to expectations. the 16+1 has not lived en/?utm_source=Members&utm_campaign=c1bf25d707-EMAIL_CAM Sri Lanka—where vague ownership structures of Chinese vague ownership structures Sri Lanka—where sis finds that MSR maritime installations are not so much sis finds that MSR maritime installations are serves geostrategic ends as a “revealing a biased ‘Cold ‘Cold biased a “revealing a as ends geostrategic serves all of which could provide logistical support for the PLA; (3) all of which could provide War mentality,’” their private statements all but confirm confirm but all statements private their mentality,’” War energy intake points; (2) dual-use formats, which combine generate Chinese political influence in recipient countries, generate Chinese political influence in countries, as well as a lucrative opportunity for these coun these for opportunity lucrative a as well as countries, over the Central and Eastern Europe-China “16+1” group. “16+1” group. and Easternover the Central Europe-China XII. INDO-PACIFIC (5) low transparency in dealings with the host government, (5) low transparency (1) strategic proximity to key sea lanes, choke points, and (1) strategic proximity Communist Party influence on port operations; (4) Chinese majority stakes and long leases; through financial control driven by win-win cooperation but by six characteristics: driven by win-win cooperation but by six characteristics: China’s strategic environment more advantageous. Analy advantageous. more environment strategic China’s German policymakers view the 16+1 as a means for Bei for means a as 16+1 the view policymakers German c1bf25d707-210791821 “stealthily” expand China’s military presence, and make and make military presence, “stealthily” expand China’s LEO ZUCKER 30 “undermine [their] governance andrender“undermine [their]governance [them]more vul Japan’s energysecuritybyrouting alargershare ofGulf Japanese policymakers fret that China could jeopardize Japan worriesaboutthepotentialforMSRtodisruptits Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)withIndiaasameans China’s economicvisionfor the Indo-Pacific region, the US’ Columbia University.] 2017, addressed sevencore themes:therules-based order in Asia, freedom of navigation and overflight in the expansion intoLatinAmerica,which,according toUSmili of diversifyingitsaccesstofacilitiesandresources. energy suppliesthrough GwadarPort,“ultimatelytobe cle India. By routing CPEC through Pakistani-controlled Washington nowstrugglestodeveloparegional alternative and ultimatelyconstrainourability towork withourpart an FTA withChinain2014andbothjoinedAIIBsold as ofMarch 6,2018,ChinaintendstousetheGwadar stored orresold byChina,limitingtheamountofenergy ship (TPP) offered to an attractive rules-based alternative withdrawal from TPPhas made China’s jobofspreading basessince2011,italsosigned warplanes atitsnorthern to bothMSRandTPP. tary leaders,could“compromise communicationnetworks, the PortofDarwintoaBRI-linkedcompanyin2015. to China: whereas Australia has hosted US marines and tegic alliance with the US with greater economic openness that passes through the Strait ofMalacca.” Partly in the mouth of the Persian Gulf, none of China’s activities ter port which the Chinese navy could feasibly use near territory claimedbyIndiaanddevelopingadeep-wa to NewDelhiaspartofamulti-pronged effort toencir maritime commons,respect law, forinternational enhanc Japanhaspursuedtheresponse totheseconcerns, port asanavalbase,according toAlexanderCooleyof ners,” hasputtheUSondefensiveinitsownbackyard. nerable tocoercion.” na’s increasing project aidtoPacificislandnationsmay Furthermore, Australianministers are thatChi concerned Despite thesemoves,Australiahasrefused tojoinBRIor ing connectivity, maritime security, the North Korean threat its influencethrough MSRsignificantlyeasier. BRI’s recent in India’s neighborhood put New Delhi at ease. [NDLR: hydrocarbon importsfrom thePersianGulf.Inparticular, link its Northern AustraliaInfrastructurelink itsNorthern FacilitywithMSR. JAPAN. Given that itimports 90percent of its energy, AUSTRALIA. Canberrahassoughttobalanceitsstra QUAD 2.0. “The first Quad meeting on November 12, UNITED STATES. Whereas the Trans-Pacific Partner INDIA. Taken together with CPEC, MSR comes across ------‘quadrilateral.’” Thesedifferences, albeitminor, indicatethat American policymakers,butalecture ontherisksofdoing China doesn’t appeartohaveuseditseconomicinfluence XIII. LATIN AMERICA of afree, open,andinclusiveIndo-Pacific region. economic, diplomatic,andsecuritycooperationinpursuit values, high-end capabilities, and complementary geog excluded from thegroup isrequired. Nonetheless,the sensitivitiesamongcountries Quad membersandexternal careful sensitivitiesamong managementofbothinternal on anymentionof“connectivity”;andonlythestatements or maritime security; the Japanese statement demurred of navigationandoverflight, law,respect forinternational of engagementifitwantstoclosethegapwithChina.In cation oftradeandinvestment,Chinahasendeared itself and nonproliferation, andterrorism. However, theofficial and Caribbean votes in the UN aligned increasingly with stand-latin-america-better-than-the-us wan-related checkbook diplomacy). In fact, Latin American the USanddecreasingly withChinafrom 2006to2015. the meantime,Washington can take solace in thefact that to thecountriesinWashington’s backyard. Asaresult, from Australiaand the United States utilized the term favorable viewofChinathantheUS.Chinesebusiness Indo-Pacific region are converging.Dueto“theirshared Instead, theUSneedstopursueademand-drivenmodel raphy,” the Quad statesprovide arobust foundationfor readouts ofthemeetingdiffered inemphasisandspecific pledging tosupportindustrialdevelopmentanddiversifi nearly alloftheregion’s topeconomiesnowhaveamore than theU.S.? interests ofQuadmembersandlike-mindednationsinthe ity. TheIndianstatementomittedanyreference tofreedom in LatinAmericatoextractpoliticalcompliance(exceptTai interests inLatinAmerica are among acauseofconcern business withChinawouldfallflat regional elites. 55. https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/does-china-under Does ChinaUnderstandLatinAmericaBetter Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector Region By addressing LatinAmerica’s infrastructure gapsand : Blog : MYERS,Margaret : Infrastructure : LatinAmerica 55 : Inter-American Dialogue : 2018 - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 31 - - - - - 58 : 2016 : GEGI : Latin America : Uncategorized : RAY, Rebecca : RAY, : Working paper : Working Region Sector of value added Since 2004, the manufacturing share Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type launched in 2017 have been touted as BRI investments; BRI investments; launched in 2017 have been touted as lifeline to the region’s most fragile economies. Venezuela most fragile economies. Venezuela lifeline to the region’s China initiated a new $20 billion Chi lending. Additionally, Latin America and the Caribbean 58. http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2017/07/Panda.Final_.pdf however, a prospective Sino-Panamanian railway project Sino-Panamanian railway project a prospective however, in impact of the China-led re-primarization having received $20 billion more in lending since 2005 than $20 billion more having received activities of Chinese state-owned however; the growing is being called such. in previous years, Chinese finance overwhelmingly accrued years, Chinese finance in previous Argentina absorbed 31%, in exchange for oil shipments. international banks, may also explain declining policy bank Peru to build a hydroelectric dam. Conspicuously, Venezu Conspicuously, dam. Peru to build a hydroelectric up Venezuela, as well as unfulfilled promises of support support of promises unfulfilled as as well up Venezuela, cooperation promote will which 2017, in Fund na-Brazil no conditions on borrowers, but was often contingent on contingent but was often on borrowers, no conditions re-primarization: by raising demand (and thus prices) for by raising demand (and thus prices) for re-primarization: domestic needs, primary goods to meet rapidly growing 59%, or $5.3 billion; of this, $5 billion went to Petrobras of this, $5 billion went to Petrobras 59%, or $5.3 billion; turing, and agriculture. None of China’s policy bank loans policy None of China’s turing, and agriculture. value to overall relative has declined LAC economy to the the use of Chinese construction firms and equipment. As equipment. firms and of Chinese construction the use Argentina and Brazil with countries, of subset small a to for highway construction and to to Jamaica and Guyana to serve as a to Cuba, cast doubt on their commitment which was dedicated to renovating a railway and devel to renovating which was dedicated added. As a result, the region’s economy has undergone economy has undergone the region’s added. As a result, mer positions among LAC’s prominent assumed more accounting for 91% of total lending. Brazil alone absorbed accounting for 91% prop to refusal banks’ nation. The policy LAC other any chandise-producing sectors. China is largely behind this this behind largely is China sectors. chandise-producing on infrastructure, resource extraction, equipment manufac resource on infrastructure, oping solar parks. The policy banks lent the remainder remainder the lent banks policy The parks. solar oping despite 2017, in lending bank policy new no received ela often in concert with other banks in the region, commercial China incentivized primary goods production in LAC in LAC goods production China incentivized primary does not account for the entire drop in lending in 2017, in lending in 2017, drop does not account for the entire The Panda’s Pawprint: The environmental Pawprint: The environmental The Panda’s “re-primarization” as agriculture and extractive industries and extractive industries as agriculture “re-primarization” - - - - - 56 57 : 2018 : 2017 : GEGI, Inter-American Dialogue : GEGI, Inter-American : GEGI, Inter-American Dialogue : GEGI, Inter-American : Latin America : Latin America : Lending : Lending : MYERS, Margaret, Ken GALLAGHER : MYERS, Margaret, : MYERS, Margaret, Ken GALLAGHER : MYERS, Margaret, : Report : Report Region Region Sector Sector Chinese policy banks lent $9 billion to LAC governments Chinese policy banks lent $21 billion to LAC governChinese policy banks Author Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type lending to LAC continued to exceed IDB, CAF, and WB indi lending to LAC continued to exceed IDB, CAF, lent in any year between 2011 and 2014. As in previous and 2014. As in previous 2011 lent in any year between lend WB and IDB unlike Yet 2016. in LAC to lending Finance-to-LAC-2017.pdf Down But Not Out: Chinese Development Finance in LAC, 2017 56. http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2017/11/Chinese-Finance-to-LAC-in- 57. https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Chinese- however. Commercial banks are increasingly active in Latinin active increasingly are banks Commercial however. in a vast corruption scandal; repayment in oil shipments in oil shipments in a vast corruption scandal; repayment state oil company, is anticipated. PDVSA, Venezuela’s ing, which financed a wide variety of LAC governments, financed a wide variety ing, which 2016-Web-and-email-res.pdf nese policy bank lending to the region, while Ecuador and Ecuador while region, the to lending bank policy nese $21 billion in 2016. Despite this drop, Chinese policy bank $21 billion in 2016. Despite this drop, range of Chinese lenders are taking an interest in LAC, in LAC, taking an interest range of Chinese lenders are most fragile economies: Brazil absorbed 72% of all Chi most fragile economies: Brazil absorbed dominated Extractive industries remainder. the received ments and state run companies in 2016—down from companies in 2016—down from ments and state run funds have initiated projects worth tens of billions of dollars. funds have initiated projects and state-run companies in 2017—down significantly from and state-run companies in 2017—down significantly from accounted for all of that country’s Chinese loan receipts. receipts. loan Chinese country’s that of all for accounted almost $25 billion in 2015 but significantly more than was 2015 but significantly more almost $25 billion in vidual lending to the region in 2017. This lending contained contained lending This 2017. in region the to lending vidual economies in the years to come. Signs show that a wider show that come. Signs years to in the economies years, this lending surpassed that IDB and WB individual years, this lending surpassed that IDB and Chinese Finance to LAC in 2016 Finance to LAC in Chinese China’s policy banks will remain a lifeline for LAC’s fragile for LAC’s a lifeline policy banks will remain China’s Chinese lending to LAC. Petrobras received most of Bra received Chinese lending to LAC. Petrobras Chinese finance overwhelmingly accrued to the region’s region’s to the Chinese finance overwhelmingly accrued Venezuela together absorbed 20%. Bolivia and Jamaica Jamaica together absorbed 20%. Bolivia and Venezuela zil’s share of Chinese lending, despite being embroiled of Chinese lending, despite being embroiled share zil’s America and other regions, while joint China-LAC regional while joint China-LAC regional America and other regions, LEO ZUCKER 32 40% andwaterusedinexportsrose 59%.ThoughChina Argentina) adhere tothetrend. AsChina’s consumption GHG-intensive inLACbecauseoftheimportanceland (GHG) intensityofitsprimarygoodsexports.Unlikein of itsexport-basedwaterusegrowth. of itsexport-basednetGHGemissionsgrowth, and33.4% consumed only7.8%ofLAC’s real exportsin2013,it grew 37%,whilenetGHGemissions from exportsgrew of LAC exports grows, so too does the region’s environ countries. Overthesameinterval,LACexportstoChina goods to market. These environmental costs are evident extraction, andaccess roads necessary to bringprimary globe generally),where themostGHG-intensiveexports goods are the most water-intensive type of export, with of inexpensive manufactured goods,China outcompeted countries; andbyintensifyingcompetitionintheproduction accounted for19.8%oftheregion’s exportgrowth, 22.7% among LACcountries,thelargestexporters(Mexico,Brazil, are processed primary goods, low-tech manufactures, and a result, Chinaaccountedfor40%ofLAC’s primaryand statistically significant,thoughitdoesnotholdforallLAC were 175%more water-intensive thanthosetoRoW; again, the trend is highly significant, andthough varianceexists tion, muchofwhichoccurred tomake room foragriculture, tensive exports;processed primary goodsare second, technological inputs: primary goods are the mostGHG-in tured exportgrowth. From anenvironmental standpoint, the region’s totalexportgrowth and4%ofitsmanufac factured goodsinthatorder. Primarygoodsexportsare so followed by low-tech, medium-tech, and high-tech manu mental footprint. Between 2003 and 2013, LAC exports more GHG-intensive thanthosetoRoW; thistrend ishighly medium-tech manufactures, GHG-intensityofLACexports most middle-incomecountries(andregions ofthe processed primary goods coming second. This is the case re-primarization does not bode well for LAC. Primary processed primary export growth, compared to 20% of use change in their production: between 2001 and 2012, not justforLAC,buteveryregion andnationalincome From 2004through 2013,LACexportstoChinawere 16% LAC exportstoChinaandtherest oftheworld (RoW). Brazil accountedfortwo-thirds ofglobaltropical deforesta LAC formarketshare inworldmanufacturingexports.As in thedisparitiesGHGandwaterintensitivitybetween is negativelycorrelated withlevelsofprocessing and level. Bycontrast,LACisuniqueinthegreenhouse gas - - - - - doesn’t specifywhetherthis“investment”isFDI,lending, China has“expressed itsintenttoinvestaround $16million” Chinese investmentinBuenaventuraissmall;nonetheless, China lookstoexpandColombia’s compared toitsneighbors.[NDLR:thepresent scaleof or something elseentirely.] Underthe developmentplan of AMLO’s economicadvisersseesChinaas anatural only create tothePanamaCanal,butalso analternative also receive taxincentivestoestablishanassemblyplant a deeplyimpoverishedcityonColombia’s Pacificcoast stimulate the southern Mexico’sstimulate thesouthern depressed economy. One spice upUStension that hoststhecountry’s largestport.[NDLR:thearticle to cost$7billioninitsfirstyearalone,wouldaimnot the GulfofMexicoonMexicansoil.Thisproject, expected this couldamounttothedownpaymentonwhatmight for Buenaventura,aChinesecarmanufacturer would funder fortheproject, givenitsBeltandRoadambitions pec, thenarrowest pointoflandbetweenthePacificand revitalize arailroad spanningtheIsthusmusofTehuante ness inColombiaandSouthAmerica.To date,Colombia Buenaventura will turn the city into a hub for Chinese busi Buenaventura will turn in thecity. ThehopeisthatChina’s initialinvestmentin in aneffort todevelopthelocaleconomyofBuenaventura, in theJuly2018Mexicanpresidential election,wantsto 60. https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9QMHNIqFfm1dnRBNG1INHFYb become ahubofBRIinSouthAmerica.] has received very littleChineseinvestment[orlending] 59. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10250-China- Buenaventura port DhxRkdsc0FERXk2d3FVbXJ3/view?usp=sharing Mexican ‘SilkRoad’tradecorridorissetto looks-to-expand-Colombia-s-Buenaventura-port Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Andres Manuel LopezObrador(AMLO),frontrunner Author Affiliation Author Sector Sector In an MoU signed with the Colombian government, In anMoUsignedwiththeColombiangovernment, Region Region : Journalism : Journalism : PALAU, Mariana : WEBBER,Jude : Uncategorized : Infrastructure : LatinAmerica(Colombia) : LatinAmerica(Mexico) : ChinaDialogue : FinancialTimes : 2017 : 2018 59 60 - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 33 ------: 2018 : The Guardian : Oceania (Vanuatu) : Uncategorized : MCGARRY, Dan : MCGARRY, : Journalism 63 Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type Though both Beijing and Port Vila denied rumors in lia.” In recent years, China has financed a “mixed bag” of lia.” In recent MP=share_btn_tw Baseless rumours: why talk of a Chinese Baseless rumours: why talk of a Chinese has already committed US$60m to the nation’s airports, airports, committed US$60m to the nation’s has already 63. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/11/baseless-rumours- island of Espiritu Santo, hosted one of the world’s largest island of Espiritu Santo, hosted one of the world’s island nation: Japan has built a $70 million wharf in Port why-talk-of-a-chinese-military-installation-in-vanuatu-misses-the-point?C military installation in Vanuatu misses the military installation in Vanuatu point Mexico has paid less attention to such strategic concernsMexico has paid less attention to such strategic Despite these myriad efforts, China has done a uniquely China has done a uniquely these myriad efforts, Despite Pacific) has agreed to fund a $30 million urban infrastruc Pacific) has agreed used to structure its telecommunications and oil explora its telecommunications used to structure military bases during WWII, and “whoever controls Vanuatu Vanuatu military bases during WWII, and “whoever controls a $90 wharves, and buildings in Vanuatu—including roads, “questionably in Luganville—through million wharf project the and donor in Vanuatu (still the largest Australia project; ment won’t occur because China and Mexico are both both China and Mexico are occur because ment won’t however, term, Trump’s President start of Since the petitors. tary base, the idea is hardly far-fetched. Luganville, on the far-fetched. tary base, the idea is hardly in the interest other lenders’ may have revived to Vanuatu Bank in the capital; “the World development project ture tion contracting systems in ways that were deferential to to deferential in ways that were tion contracting systems in the oil and telecom offers the United States; Chinese though, First, America of rise the Since relationship. tegic sectors were rebuffed for the sake of the US-Mexico stra for the sake of the US-Mexico rebuffed sectors were and is reportedly considering upping the ante to US$150m.” and is reportedly advantage in domestic markets. For example, Mexico markets. For example, Mexico advantage in domestic at face value. offers Chinese commercial and considered are unlikely to realign with China in the way that they were they were in the way that with China unlikely to realign are once aligned with the US. For Mexico’s part, this realign part, Mexico’s with the US. For once aligned com strategic thus and goods, manufactured of exporters an China given have attitudes Mexican in changes certain early April that Vanuatu will be the site of a Chinese mili will be the site of early April that Vanuatu Austra and US the between traffic sea and air controls XIV. OCEANIA XIV. Vila on “much more favorable terms” than the Luganville favorable terms” than the Luganville Vila on “much more ‘concessional’” loans from China Ex-Im. Chinese lending China Ex-Im. Chinese lending ‘concessional’” loans from - - - - - : 2018 : 2018 61 : Business Insider : China Dialogue 62 : Latin America (Mexico) : Latin America (Mexico) : Uncategorized : Uncategorized : WOODY, Christopher : WOODY, : SOUTAR, Robert : SOUTAR, : Interview : Journalism Mexico may turn to China to mitigate the fallout of Region Region Sector Sector Author Author Affiliation toambassador Mexico’s Guajardo, Jorge to According Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type looks-to-boost-trade-with-China-as-NAFTA-falters Mexico’s former ambassador to China explains Mexico’s Mexico looks to boost trade with China as Mexico looks to boost NAFTA talks falter NAFTA is retreating’ half a million jobs between 1995 and 2011 through trade through 2011 and 1995 between jobs million a half 61. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10420-Mexico- 62. http://www.businessinsider.com/jorge-guajardo-interview-us-chi interval through trade with China. Sino-Mexican economic interval through ico’s exports are overwhelmingly (67%) manufactured (67%) manufactured overwhelmingly exports are ico’s years.the last five over have declined China to exports ican infrastructure projects. infrastructure Moreover, research shows that Mexico lost more than than shows that Mexico lost more research Moreover, NAFTA’s possible collapse. Experts warn that this is Experts warn possible collapse. is that this NAFTA’s practices in tendering. relations were also strained over the past decade due to were relations region have enjoyed a trade boom with China of late, Mex have region na-power-balance-policies-2018-3 Unlike the primary exports of other LAC economies, Mex Unlike the primary exports of other LAC that taints previous Chinese investments in big Mexican in big Mexican Chinese investments that taints previous the project to be strongest. If China does back this proj If China does to be strongest. the project with China, making it the worst-affected LAC country; for with China, making it the worst-affected an unsatisfactory strategy on its own. 80% of Mexico’s Mexico’s of 80% own. its on an unsatisfactory strategy and its deepening engagement with Latin America; how with Latin America; engagement and its deepening comparison, Brazil gained 1.35 million jobs over the same comparison, Brazil gained 1.35 million jobs goods. Whereas primary goods-intensive exporters in the goods. Whereas exports go to the US, compared to only 1% to China. to only 1% to China. exports go to the US, compared ever, another AMLO advisor expects American interest in American interest advisor expects another AMLO ever, the legacy of corruption to confront ect, AMLO will have China between 2007 and 2013, Latin American countries American 2013, Latin 2007 and between China Chinese disregard for environmental standards and best and best standards for environmental Chinese disregard ‘how China capitalizes where the United States ‘how China capitalizes where LEO ZUCKER 34 “should cause concern inCanberra.” “should causeconcern Chinese agriculturalventures overseasselltheirgoods Chinese agrobusinesses have soughttogaincontrol over China—and Africa.However, in recent years, many large China’s Foreign Agriculture Investments (excluding investmentsinprocessing, trading,transport, XV. WORLDWIDE view ofacquiringforeign firms’technologyandmanage entire overseassupplychainsthrough M&As,oftenin cultural sectors are carried out by small companies in coincided withincreases inbothChina’s agricultural clusion, regardless oftheveracityrumorsabout Chinese good jobatingratiatingitselftoVanuatu’s politicaleliteby and thepotentialthreat thatnewimportsposedtodomes about both the security of their country’s food supplies and inputmanufacturing) grew more than six-fold, inline stock. Between2010and2016,China’s agriculturalFDI stood at $26billionand made up1.1% of China’s FDI stock of Chinese agrobusiness investments overseas spinning its infrastructure projects as vote-getters. In con security strategyinChina’s 11thFive-Year Plan(2006-10), which encouragedChineseagrobusinesses to “goglobal” with growth inothersectors’investments.Thisgrowth tic industries. These concerns informed the nationalfood tic industries.Theseconcerns the WTOin2001,Chinesepolicymakersgrew concerned tors operatingabroad wasimportedtoChina. trade deficitandthenation’s foreign exchange reserves. policy environments inhost countries.Additionally, most management deficienciesontheChinesesideandpoor ment expertise. Financially, Chinese overseas agricultural military bases,Beijing’s popularityinVanuatu’s highplaces Belt and Road countries—particularly those that border Numerically, mostChinese overseasinvestmentsinagri f?v=43213 increase inimportsthatresulted from China’s accessionto investments tendtoperformbelowexpectationsdue 64. https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/88572/eib-192.pd locally; only10%ofthegrainproduced byChineseinves “GOING GLOBAL”INAGRICULTURE. Followingthe Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Sector REVIEW OFCHINESEINVESTMENTS. In2016,the Region : Report : GOOCH,Elizabeth,Fred GALE : Agriculture : Worldwide : USDA : 2018 64 ------Concessional loansfrom China’s policybanksare the Chinese agricultural investments overseas: China both dis diversification due to reliance on two suppliers for imports, Commodities forwhichChinarelies overwhelmingly—if domestic food production, but also to diversify import 2012-13, technologyhasbecomeaprominent feature of gies from more advanced countries.Butwhereas China countries and imports cutting-edge agricultural technolo culture as one of six priority sectors as of 2017. Since efficiency,” andthelaunchofBRI,whichfeatures agri global” inagriculture shiftedwiththerelease ofanupdated control of the good’s supply chains in supplier countries. ceived politicalrisksofimportinggoodsfrom fewsources global” inagriculture aimsnotonlytocobbledeficitsin of domesticcollateral,however. Since theadventofBRI, of “goingglobal”inagriculture. Suchconcessionalloans abroad “arrangingdealsorproviding low-interest loans, and the opportunity to earn “greaterand the opportunity to earn bargaining and and Oceania.Thisdiversificationdrive responds totheper a small number of countries—often ones in the Americas agricultural goodsonabilateralorunilateralbasis. are oftenavailableonlytolargecompanieswithplenty seminates its own agricultural technology to less advanced seminates its own agricultural technology to less advanced sources of agricultural goods that are currently supplied by workhorse financinginstrumentforoverseasinvestments which Chinaproduces plenty, yetnonethelesstargetsfor the lastcenturythrough inflowsofFDI,itnowprimarily through large-scalecultivationofstaplecrops onrented the Chinesestatehasalsosupported“goingglobal”by the ChinaInvestmentCorporationalsolendinsupport facilitation programs attheministryandprovincial levels. food securitystrategyin2012,whichemphasized“boost porting role tofirmsmakingagrobusiness investments price-setting power for its imports.” When diversification of uses acquisitionsofforeign companiesthatboastexcellent upgraded itsowntechnologyduringthefinaldecadesof not exclusively—onimportsfrom twoorfewercountries nese agrobusinesses are nonethelessencouragedtogain national suppliersisnotanoptionforacertaingood,Chi R&D andindustryexpertisetoachievethesamegoal.As information, oradvice,”includingnumerous “goingglobal” in so many sectors, the Chinese state plays a key sup ing domesticproduction through technologyandgreater include corn andrapeseed. include corn include palm oil, soybeans, and olive oil; commodities of improving the soft infrastructure trade in of international in agriculture, thoughstate-owned commercial banksand land overseasforimporttoChina.Thefocusof“going TARGET COMMODITIES.China’s strategyof“going ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 35 - - - - - STRATEGIC SHIFT TO M&AS. Though greenfield invest SHIFT TO M&AS. Though greenfield STRATEGIC large Dutch commodity trading companies in 2016, giving linked to development assistance, including technological linked to development assistance, including in China’s foreign agricultural policy. For example, COF example, For policy. agricultural foreign China’s in ments—which usually take place in developing countries countries ments—which usually take place in developing a subset FDI, agricultural outward China’s of most up make the overcome to M&As, Chinese agrobusinesses resorting from benefiting while investment greenfield in entailed risks two and policy goals—acquired both commercial reflects ments in Australia. Africa. Despite supplying only 2.5% 2.5% only supplying Australia. Africa. Despite ments in buyers, Chinese by purchased reportedly hectares million an exceptional plantation in Zimbabwe which received food security strategy through these and other acquisitions, acquisitions, other and these through strategy security food for Chinese agricultural FDI. The region’s dairy exports to dairy exports region’s agricultural FDI. The for Chinese to which most Chinese overseas agricultural investors lack investors agricultural overseas Chinese which most to the stellar technology, R&D capacities, and managerial R&D capacities, and managerial the stellar technology, to MOFCOM, M&As comprised less than 1% of all Chinese over agricultural assets at all stages of the the firm control through 2025 while raising the maximum limit on, and the 2025 while raising the through invest Chinese of, screening mandatory for threshold and human capital devel transfers and infrastructure where technological inputs are few and yields are low—still low—still are yields and few are inputs technological where which slashed Chinese consumer confidence in domestic which slashed Chinese supply chain in 26 countries. In executing the revised (2012) supply chain in 26 countries. In executing the revised sesame seeds, fruit, and nuts. access. Private Chinese agrobusinesses have also played access. Private Chinese agrobusinesses ambitious campaign of acquisitions of, or mergers or joint acquisitions of African agricultural land, though the figures the figures acquisitions of African agricultural land, though exemption from indigenous ownership laws), cotton, wool, exemption from have lately embarked on an of Chinese agrobusinesses with, agricultural firms in developed countries. By ventures According possess. agrobusinesses that foreign expertise and fishing in forestry, investments in agriculture, outward exports to China have grown since the implementation of a grown exports to China have China to on agricultural exports tariffs eliminate gradually 2015, and 2010 between imports agricultural China’s of to Chinese opment. Much attention has been drawn often exaggerated: out of 6 cited in such discussions are con be could purchases of hectares-worth 240,000 only Chinese-owned of tobacco (such as that exported by a 2015, yet those that did take place reflect a sea change a sea change 2015, yet those that did take place reflect 2009 bilateral FTA; meanwhile, the China-Australia FTA will FTA the China-Australia meanwhile, FTA; bilateral 2009 sometimes in Africa are 2014. Chinese investment projects COFCO has benefited from extensive policy bank lending COFCO has benefited from CO—a giant state-owned agrobusiness whose mandate whose mandate CO—a giant state-owned agrobusiness China jumped after the 2008 melamine in milk scandal, melamine in milk scandal, after the 2008 China jumped and dairy meat New Zealand’s Additionally, dairy products. to China mainly consist exports firmed. African agricultural Africa absorbed 12% of China’s outward agricultural FDI in agricultural outward Africa absorbed 12% of China’s ------TARGET REGIONS. Southeast Asia. According to to Asia. According REGIONS. Southeast TARGET ities. Yet, while the region accounted for 27% of China’s accounted for 27% of China’s while the region ities. Yet, is rented by northeastern is rented companies or farmers Chinese in both Cambodia and Laos, Chinese agricultural invest agricultural Chinese Laos, and Cambodia both in in the region. Major targets of Chinese agrobusiness agrobusiness Major targets of Chinese in the region. whose Chinese-owned palm investors include Indonesia, M&As. Several Sino-Latin American infrastructure projects projects M&As. Several Sino-Latin American infrastructure MOFCOM estimates cumulative Chinese investment in MOFCOM estimates cumulative Chinese investment in MOFCOM, the stock of Chinese investment in Southeast investment in Southeast the stock of Chinese MOFCOM, Due to China’s rising demand for dairy, beef, and sheep sheep and beef, for dairy, demand rising China’s to Due Latin America’s agricultural supply chain, all with the goal Latin America’s Russian agriculture, forestry, and fishing at over $3 billion. forestry, Russian agriculture, supplies Latin America and the Caribbean. This region East in an individual capacity. Starting in 2005, Heilongji 2005, in Starting capacity. individual an in East products, developed Oceania is an attractive destination developed Oceania is an attractive destination products, more than half of China’s soybean imports—looking at at imports—looking soybean China’s of half than more passed 460,000 hectares of Russian land, much of which passed 460,000 hectares ments and foreign aid are often combined. Russia. Since aid are ments and foreign tered significant difficulties, precipitating a shift toward toward precipitating a shift significant difficulties, tered the Heilongjiang government. However, due to high border to high border due the Heilongjiang government. However, crops few Russia, in weaknesses institutional and taxes the production of rubber, timber, and sugar. Furthermore, Furthermore, sugar. and timber, rubber, of production the northeasternthe province from farmers Chinese 1990s, the strengthened the soft infrastructure around Sino-Russian Sino-Russian around the soft infrastructure strengthened small. remains since then, though their overall market share agricultural exports to China. Australia and New Zealand. Zealand. New and China. Australia exports to agricultural agricultural imports between 2010 and 2015, it absorbed agricultural commerce. Russian exports of soybeans, veg agricultural commerce. associations and cultivated with machinery subsidized by associations and cultivated with machinery ang provincial- and county-level authorities began forming ang provincial- their Russian partnerships with agricultural development only 6% of China’s agricultural FDI in 2014. Additionally, agricultural FDI in 2014. Additionally, only 6% of China’s under consideration have the potential to boost currently of strengthening Chinese access to the region’s commod Chinese access to the region’s of strengthening you, Brazil—as well as significant amounts of sugar, grain, you, Brazil—as well as significant amounts of sugar, oilseeds, and meat. Given the vitality of this relationship, etable oils, and corn to China have increased dramatically etable oils, and corn to China have increased grown by Chinese businesses in Russia were exported to Chinese businesses in Russia were by grown counterparts. As of 2011, these partnerships encom counterparts. As of 2011, these partnerships of Heilongjiang have moved their operations to Russia’s Far Russia’s to operations their moved have Heilongjiang of oil plantations and processing facilities are expected to to expected are facilities processing and plantations oil leases around 2020, and Cambodia, which through grow end-2016, with greenfield investments being common investments being common end-2016, with greenfield 240,000 hectares of public land to Chinese companies for of public land 240,000 hectares Chinese greenfield investments in the region have encoun investments in the Chinese greenfield Chinese agrobusinesses invest at virtually every point of of point every virtually at invest agrobusinesses Chinese China before 2014, when a spate of bilateral agreements 2014, when a spate of bilateral agreements China before due to the “low upfront financial investments” required required investments” financial upfront “low the to due Asian agriculture, forestry, and fishing was $3.1 billion at fishing was $3.1 billion at and forestry, Asian agriculture, LEO ZUCKER 36 The worldwidevalueoftheseprojects isexpectedtorange Zealand’s andAustralia’s dairysectors.According toNew 2013, privateporkproducer Shanghui(nowknownas of improving transparency. Reportingfailure ofBRIprojects owned constructioncompaniesappeartohavebecome of anyyearonrecord.] Significantgrowth inthevalueof company whosesaleswere twicethoseofShanghuiat critical roles in implementing the food security strategy. In acquisition) aswithacquiringSmithfield’s cutting-edge WH Group) acquired SmithfieldFoods—anAmerican pork sition of an American agro-enterprise. Though Shanghui Smithfield pork has been imported to China since the SOEs stilldominateChina’s overseasconstructionprojects. er-Jan2018.pdf these contractsisnotexpectedduetoChina’s shrinking this levelmatchesthatof2016,whichwasthehighest to buildgoodwillintargetmarketswhere hostilitytoChi try’s fragmentedporkindustryandupgradeitsfoodsafety technology, highsafetystandards, andexcellentmanage the time—for$4.7billioninlargest-everChineseacqui for domesticeconomicreasons—and theprospect of may nolongerbepoliticallyacceptable toBeijing. private enterpriseshasincreased dramaticallyunderBRI, practices. AnotherprivateChineseagrobusiness, New policymakers’ recent attemptstoconsolidatetheircoun ment capacity. TheSmithfieldacquisition reflected Chinese pork supplies for the Chinese market (though very little nese investmentmaybehigh. never stated its motives for acquiring Smithfield, observers Hope, thisstrategyofavoidingoutrightacquisitionsseeks Hope Group, route has taken the alternative of pursuing joint ventures withforeign companies,particularlyinNew 65. http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/China-Track between $100 billion and $110 billion in 2018. [NDLR: believe theacquisitionhadasmuchtodowithaccessing Issues inChineseInvestment Private Data,NotFirms:TheReal less inclinedtoreport setbackstotheirprojects afteryears low returns oninfrastructure projects. Additionally, state- labor force—thus obviatingsending workers overseas Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author While theshare ofChinese outward FDIattributableto Sector Region : Report : SCISSORS,Derek : Construction : Worldwide : AEI : 2018 65 - - - - - 46.5% in2016. (CDF) for energy. Lending for power generation projects— ernments for energy projectsernments in 2017, down from $47.4 growth ratesexist,whileotherstudiesindicatethatthe of large-scaleinfrastructure investmentsleadingtohigh energy in2017includeEurope/Central Asia, LatinAmer and hydro), andmultipurposeprojects (namely forgas/ accounted for $10.9 billion; the two policy banks cof and 2016. China Development Bank (CDB) accounted and lowerinperiodsofabove-averagepublicinvestment. absorbed 55.9%ofCDFforenergyin2017,compared to while South Asia’s level stagnated. The 68 original BRCs and RoadInitiativefrom a Policy Perspective for $14.7 billion of lending in 2017, while China Ex-Im particularly inthehydroelectric sector—grew substantially Slowing Down,PoweringUp:2017Chinese LNG) ledtolastyear’s drop inChinesedevelopmentfinance PORTELANCE East sawtheir levels ofCDF for energy increase in 2017, tions-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf in 2017,however. Regions whichsawreduced CDFfor inanced oneproject worth$1.7billionaswell.Falling investment andeconomicgrowth ismixed.Instances ica/Caribbean, andSoutheastAsia;AfricatheMiddle 67. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implica 66. http://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2018/03/03.2018_China.Global.Energy. billion in2016and$28.8onaveragebetween2013 benefits ofinfrastructure developmentare short-term Energy DevelopmentFinance Examining theDebtImplicationsofBelt Database_-Jin.Gallagher-1.pdf lending in 2016), energy transmission (particularly in gas lending for extractive activities (which comprised 46% of Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Author China’s policybankslent$25.6billiontoforeign gov Sector Sector Region Evidence ofacausalrelationship betweenpublic Region : Report : Report : JIN,Junda,KevinGALLAGHER : Energy : Infrastructure : Worldwide : Worldwide : HURLEY, John,ScottMORRIS,Gailyn : GEGI : CGD : 2018 : 2018 66 67 - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 37 ------69 : 2018 : CSIS : Worldwide : Infrastructure : ZHANG, Christian : Blog Region Sector Author Author Affiliation Database, Key Projects to BMI Research’s According Year of Publication Year Type High-Risk Markets bringing Western China closer to energy and commodity 69. https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-and-roads-big include the Vientiane-Boten Railway, the Savannakhet-Lao include the Vientiane-Boten Railway, investors and contractors in Laos, often at the expense ipated in Chinese-funded projects through joint ventures ventures joint through projects Chinese-funded in ipated have a fair shot at benefiting from ing domestic enterprises Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa. In terms of the value Malaysia, Russia, and South Africa. In terms Pakistan hosts a greater value ($80+ billion) of Chi billion) of ($80+ value greater a hosts Pakistan plants, which and a handful of hydropower Bao Railway, Bank- and ADB-funded projects, this share is 29%. Some Some 29%. is share this projects, ADB-funded and Bank- na-backed infrastructure projects than any other country; other any than projects infrastructure na-backed resources in Central Asia.” Valued at $4.5 billion, these at $4.5 billion, these in Central Asia.” Valued resources projects are executed by Chinese contractors; in World in World by Chinese contractors; executed are projects country governments must take the lead in ensur recipient paign=c1bf25d707-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_05_23&utm_medium=e mail&utm_term=0_e842221dc2-c1bf25d707-210791821 In the case of Laos, China-backed infrastructure projects projects In the case of Laos, China-backed infrastructure 80-100%; Kyrgyzstan comes fourth with around 60%; 60%; 80-100%; Kyrgyzstan comes fourth with around the next seven most significant hosts, in no particular order, no particular order, the next seven most significant hosts, in than $17 billion. These proj valued at more together are In positions in the Laotian economy. tionally held strong proj the case of Kyrgyzstan, “China-backed infrastructure these paradigms appear unlikely to change on their own, own, their on change to unlikely appear paradigms these while Pakistan, Armenia, the Maldives, Cambodia, Kenya, with Chinese companies. This model has the potential to with Chinese companies. appear to be Bangladesh, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Indonesia, Britain, India, Great Bangladesh, appear to be all have 20-40%. and Bosnia and Herzegovina (in that order) of China-backed infrastructure projects as a share of of share a as projects of China-backed infrastructure countries’ nominal GDPs, Laos ranks first with just above of Chinese the market share ects have significantly grown Japanese, and Thai firms that have tradi of the French, pipelines gas and lines, transmission roads, include ects contractors in recipient countries have successfully partic countries contractors in recipient but market, Chinese the to access firms domestic give Since theft. property of intellectual comes with the risk Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Chinese-funded infrastructure Consequently, 89% of Chinese-funded transportation transportation 89% of Chinese-funded Consequently, gest-impact-small-high-risk-markets/?utm_source=Members&utm_cam The Belt and Road’s Biggest Impact: Small, Biggest Impact: The Belt and Road’s 100%; Mongolia and Belarus rank second and third with with third and second rank Belarus and Mongolia 100%; - - - - - 68 : 2018 : CSIS : Worldwide : Infrastructure : HILLMAN, Jonathan : Blog Despite BRI’s stated aims of openness and inclusion, inclusion, and of openness aims stated BRI’s Despite Region Sector Author Affiliation Author Year of Publication Year Type late for them to submit a bid. (In fairness, this opaqueness leases of infrastructure (or both in the case of Hambantota leases of infrastructure but it is also unlikely that all participating countries will countries will but it is also unlikely that all participating 68. https://reconnectingasia.csis.org/analysis/entries/belt-and-road-barri in November 2017, however. In conclusion, BRI is unlikely in November 2017, however. Port) to territorial transfers (as in the case of Tajikistan). The of Tajikistan). Port) to territorial transfers (as in the case Republic, Laos, Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Mongolia, Montenegro, Republic, Laos, Maldives, BRCs, an 80:20 debt-to-equity ratio is estimated for CPEC ratio is estimated for debt-to-equity BRCs, an 80:20 nese contractors must complete Chinese-funded projects. projects. must complete Chinese-funded nese contractors non-Chinese companies face an uphill battle to profit from from non-Chinese companies face an uphill battle to profit pete with China’s state-owned construction majors due to pete with China’s countries have competitive domestic contractors, recipient projects; this ratio is 75:25 for projects outside of CPEC. of CPEC. outside projects this ratio is 75:25 for projects; the latter’s experience, subsidies, and scale. Even when experience, subsidies, and scale. Even when the latter’s tries are unaware of business opportunities until it’s too too of business opportunities until it’s unaware tries are the initiative. Due to the low transparency standards of of standards the initiative. Due to the low transparency to be plagued by widespread debt sustainability problems, debt sustainability problems, to be plagued by widespread terms of these solutions are generally not disclosed; this this disclosed; not generally are solutions these of terms Banking Regulatory Commission the Paris Club. China’s and ADBC the overseas activities of CDB, China Ex-Im, their debt-to-GDP ratios and China’s share of total public share and China’s their debt-to-GDP ratios will likely not change as long as China remains outside outside remains China as long as change not likely will ers-participation/ avoid debt distress. ally seeks case-by-case solutions ranging from forgiveness from ally seeks case-by-case solutions ranging and Tajikistan—are very likely to encounter debt distress likely to encounter debt distress very and Tajikistan—are countries boast construction contractors that can com can benefit not only Chinese companies, but also elite can benefit not only Chinese companies, but also elite currently at risk of debt distress, with representation in in with representation at risk of debt distress, currently both pipelines may increase project owing to how their BRI (in the case of many HIPCs) to debt-for-equity swaps or or swaps (in the case of many HIPCs) to debt-for-equity China often resorts to “tied” aid, which stipulates that Chi China often resorts Chinese-funded projects, contractors in recipient coun contractors in recipient Chinese-funded projects, few recipient domestic political constituents.) Additionally, did take its first-ever steps to increase risk controls for for controls risk increase to steps first-ever its take did debt. When debt sustainability issues arise, China gener debt. When debt sustainability The Belt and Road’s Barriers to Participation Barriers to The Belt and Road’s Asia, Africa, and Europe. Of these, eight—Djibouti, Kyrgyz Of these, Asia, Africa, and Europe. As concerns Chinese-financed infrastructure projects in in projects As concerns infrastructure Chinese-financed named, and possible BRCs, 23 are Among 68 confirmed, LEO ZUCKER 38 “no commitmenttotime-bounddisclosure ofcrucial “the PublicPolicyonInformationandtheComplaintsHan Joachim vonAmsbergassertsthatAIIBpublishessocial 71. https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/10692-The- 70. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/24/c_137277073.htm AIIB investmentstop4.2billionUSDin2017: 4cc32&mc_eid=0931f545a5 The AIIB needs to deliver governance tomatch The AIIBneedstodelivergovernance AIIB-needs-to-deliver-governance-to-match-its-rhetoric?mc_cid=bac6e dling Mechanism were due last year but are still kicking 2017, upfrom $5millionin2016. case. To make mattersworse,AIIBstilllacksafinalized year ago,AIIBhasdisbursednearly$1billionfor5fossil around indraft.”Thedraftsare deficientintheirown and environmental documentation on projects funded by time ofwriting.AIIBlendstosuchprojects [atleastin funds,” whichare notnecessarilysubjecttoAIIB’s envi fuel projects outofatotal$4.59 billioninvestedasofthe project documentsforhighriskprojects priortoboard right. UnlikeWBandADBpolicies,AIIB’s policy impose public informationpolicyandaccountabilitymechanism: ronmental andsocialregulations. ThoughtheBank’s SVP part] by investing in financial intermediaries, i.e. “funds of more than $560 million worth of private cofinancing in market share inKyrgyzstan’s constructionsector. projects havehelpedChinesecontractorsclaima24% $167 milliontheprevious year. Additionally, AIIBprovided Bank’s netprofits stoodat$252millionin2017,upfrom report its financialintermediaries,thisdoesnotappeartobethe in 2017, up from $1.7 billion to 8 projects in 2016. The its rhetoric Type Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author AIIB lent/invested$4.2billionto23approved projects Author Affiliation Author Sector Sector Despite itspresident’s claimstothecontraryonlyone Region Region 70 : Blog : Journalism : GEARY, Kate : seeauthoraffiliation : Lending : Lending : Worldwide : Worldwide 71 : ChinaDialogue : Xinhua : 2018 : 2018 - - - ‘core interests.’” However, Beijing’s recent useofsuch 72. https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/China_Use_FI China usestoinfluenceauthoritarianstatesare lesseffec China’s UseofCoercive EconomicMeasures out complaintsfrom communitiesaffected byco-financed consideration.” Additionally, the Bank’s draft Complaints coercive economicmeasures astoolsofstatecraft,” China eral coercive economicmeasures, Beijingrelies largelyon eral economiccoercion are democraticcountries,since coercive economic measures againstsmallercountries employing coercive measures are expanding in line with anisms giveChinathecoverof plausibledeniability(thus while refraining from deployingsuchmeasures against tic politicalsystem,ortootherofitsexplicitlyarticulated to filingacomplaint,”andtheBank“isproposing torule the timeofwriting,Chinalackedentirely). Informalmech tory oversight,SOEs,andthemedia—insteadofaformal tive indemocraticcontexts. the positiveinducements,corruption,andbriberythat transgressions. Moreover, mostvictimsofChinese unilat the threshold ofwhatconstitutes atriggeringeventmay though theaforementioned Australiancaseindicatesthat these measures “inresponse tospecifictriggeringevents,” in bilateral relationsturn suggests that China’s criteriafor perceives a challenge to its territorial claims, its domes policy goalssinceatleast2010. projects, whichare currently 72%ofAIIB’s portfolio.” measures againstAustraliainresponse toamere down Handling Mechanism has “insurmountably high barriers Edoardo SARAVALLE imposes unilateral coercive economic measures “when it informal mechanisms—including state control over regula its self-identified core interests. China generally deploys be falling.Furthermore, Beijingtends toresort tounilateral has employedsuchmeasures insupportofitsforeign NAL-1.pdf?mtime=20180604161240 legal regime of sanctions and tradecontrols (which, as of larger, more advancedcountriesthatcommitidentical Type Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author WHEN, WHY, ANDAGAINSTWHOM?Chinaprimarily Sector Despite yearsofoppositiontotheuse“[unilateral] Region METHODS ANDTARGETING. Inexecutingitsunilat : Report : Uncategorized : HARRELL,Peter, ElizabethROSENBERG, : Worldwide : CNAS : 2018 72 ------ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 39 - - - - 74 : 2017 : 2018 : U.S.-China Economic and Security : U.S.-China Economic and Security : Dezan Shira & Associates 73 : Worldwide : Worldwide : Technology : Uncategorized : WILSON, Jordan : DEVONSHIRE-ELLIS, Chris : Report : Blog Region Region Sector Sector China’s Beidou satellite navigation system was was system navigation satellite Beidou China’s Author Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Year of Publication Year Type Type that China The MoUs on Belt and Road cooperation launched in 1994 and is predicted to achieve global cover launched in 1994 and is predicted let the PLA deploy conventional strike weapons accurately for the United States Road MoU is denied. China also plans to use Beidou as a diplomatic if access to GPS, which is controlled by the US Air Force, by the US Air Force, if access to GPS, which is controlled investment relationships away from Beijing, but these these but Beijing, from away relationships investment for%20the%20United%20States.pdf Review Commission China%27s%20Alternative%20to%20GPS%20and%20Implications%20 Vassal States? Understanding China’s Belt and China’s States? Understanding Vassal binding agreements, to extant legally making reference infrastruc to which China is not a party, groupings regional policies. Additionally, some victims of Chinese economic economic victims of Chinese some policies. Additionally, understanding-chinas-belt-road-mou/ tiations, Beijing may choose to read legitimacy into these tiations, Beijing may choose to read ture to which China hopes to gain access, these MoUs hopes to gain access, these MoUs to which China ture While it remains those concerned with the letter of the law. nego future in MoUs these use will China how seen be to signatory may not. share globally. share by non-binding; however, signs with partner countries are age in 2020, at which point Beidou will become the fourth global navigation satellite system (GNSS) to do so. Bei coercion have responded by diversifying their trade and and trade their diversifying by responded have coercion market to significantly dilute China’s unlikely are efforts on lost themselves that may be convey legitimacy upon China’s Alternative to GPS and its Implications China’s documents and their provisions in a way that the other other the that a way in provisions their and documents chief value to the Chinese government is its ability to dou’s 73. https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2018/02/08/vassal-states- 74. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_ ------COERCION IN THE FUTURE. China is likely to expand COERCION IN THE FUTURE. China is likely harass specific foreign companies operating in China, operating in China, companies harass specific foreign become fora for interstate economic coercion. Future use Future coercion. economic interstate for fora become by the CCP’s monopoly on domestic media), and restric by the CCP’s benefit Chinese sectors and companies at the expense and companies at the expense benefit Chinese sectors if China’s proposed “BRI Courts” become the initiative’s “BRI Courts” become the initiative’s proposed if China’s including both overt export bans and capital controls including both overt export bans and capital controls Chinese subsidiaries payments from intended to prevent increasingly assertive foreign policy posture and efforts to and efforts policy posture assertive foreign increasingly its use of coercive economic measures in the future. The in the future. economic measures its use of coercive imports of certain goods on the basis of national origin, on the basis of national origin, imports of certain goods BRI offers China numerous avenues to use coercive eco avenues to use coercive China numerous BRI offers unconcerned about the reputational effects of its coercive of its coercive unconcerned effects about the reputational nomic measures against participant countries. Through its countries. Through against participant nomic measures new forms of economic coercion in the coming years, in the coming years, new forms of economic coercion unilateral sanctions), reduce the likelihood of a success reduce unilateral sanctions), primary dispute settlement mechanism, they too could could primary dispute settlement mechanism, they too using after damage in Japan and South Korea reputational planned investments, defer loan disbursements, seek early BRI infra the operation of or impair debts, of repayment payoffs of economic coercion for foreign policy ends. Coer for foreign economic coercion of payoffs mechanisms of unilateral economic coercion include include economic coercion mechanisms of unilateral ful WTO challenge, and reinforce domestic policies that that policies domestic reinforce and challenge, WTO ful to punish participant countries that draw China’s ire. And, ire. to punish participant countries that draw China’s to their targeted foreign parent companies. Additionally, companies. Additionally, parent to their targeted foreign the Chinese economy: as it continues to grow, so do the so grow, to continues it as economy: Chinese the those countries. too) overseas. As to who bears the brunt of these tactics, too) overseas. As to who bears the brunt to in order tion to the events that trigger these measures, tions on flows of Chinese tourists (and potentially students tions on flows of Chinese tourists (and potentially such measures in both countries, though Beijing appears such measures structure run by Chinese firms post-completion in order order by Chinese firms post-completion in run structure sway the (usually) democratically elected governmentssway the (usually) democratically elected of selective enforcement of domestic regulations (to restrict (to restrict of domestic regulations selective enforcement at politically and economically sensitive constituencies in in sensitive constituencies and economically at politically and allowing it to maintain its stated public opposition to to opposition public stated its maintain to it allowing and of unilateral coercive measures entails risks for China, how measures of unilateral coercive serious Some evidence suggests that China suffered ever. control of SOEs and major lenders, Beijing could curtail of SOEs and major lenders, Beijing could curtail control cive economic measures are also in keeping with Beijing’s Beijing’s keeping with also in are economic measures cive efficacy of these measures is proportionate to the size of is proportionate of these measures efficacy offending countries, most of which have no direct connec countries, most of which have no direct offending or—in rare instances—to halt exports of certain Chinese halt exports of certain Chinese instances—to or—in rare boycotts popular markets), overseas particular to goods companies (made possible by foreign of goods produced of their foreign competitors. Beijing’s preferred informal informal preferred Beijing’s competitors. foreign their of offering Beijing flexibility on when to lift its punitive measures measures to lift its punitive flexibility on when Beijing offering develop nationalist sentiment at home. China may deploy home. China at sentiment develop nationalist China targets its unilateral coercive economic measures economic measures China targets its unilateral coercive LEO ZUCKER 40 These non-tariff barriershitsmallfirmsparticularly hard, 76. http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Globalization.Fi 75. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440081499424129960/ The GlobalizationofChineseEnergy on EconomicDevelopment Global Value ChainDevelopmentReport: Companies: TheRoleofStateFinance XVI. UNCATEGORIZED costs byeliminatingnon-tariff barriers. Thesebarriersare coverage to mostcountries along the Belt and Road. WTO agreement withThailandinwhichBeijingwouldfundthe since largeronesare better suitedtodeveloptheirown tape, corruption,etc.—hamperthedevelopmentofGVCs. the transportsector—andsoftinfrastructure—due tored tation. Sincethen,Chinahasreached agreements with tool, though. By 2018, China hopes to expand Beidou ment [NDLR: the author is probably working under an antiquated nal_Gallagher%20and%20Kong.pdf primarily infrastructural:poorhard infrastructure—mainly in panies touseitinoperationsabroad. promotion of Beidouin Thai publicsector management, understanding ofwhichcountriesare alongtheBeltand Beidou’s viabilityandlaythegroundwork forChinesecom Brunei, Laos,andPakistan“toprovide Beidou-equipped Road.] Inconjunctionwiththis,Chinasignedat$297billion infrastructure for government andmilitaryusers,alsoatinfrastructure forgovernment including disasterrelief, powerdistribution,andtranspor hard infrastructure andnavigatecomplexenvironments. heavily subsidizedcosts.”Theseinitiativesaimtoprove Measuring andAnalyzingtheImpactofGVCs Measuring-and-analyzing-the-impact-of-GVCs-on-economic-develop Type The keytobuildingmore inclusiveGVCsiscuttingtrade Type Year ofPublication Year ofPublication Author Affiliation Author Author Affiliation Author Sector Sector Region Region : Report : Report : KONG,Bo,KevinGALLAGHER : seeauthoraffiliation : Trade : Energy : Uncategorized : Worldwide : GEGI : WBG,IDE-JETRO,OECD,UIBE, : 2017 : 2016 75 76 - - - - “take advantageofinvestmentopportunitiesbrought forth 14-fold, makingitthethird-largest intheworld.Additionally, 1%. Bycontrast,nearlytwothirds (byvalue) ofoverseas Asia (9.1%), and sub-Saharan Africa (6.2%) have absorbed Asia (9.1%),andsub-SaharanAfrica(6.2%)haveabsorbed due largelyto China’s success at importing, digesting, dollar debtbetween2010and 2014—andeuros—partic dollars—leading toafivefoldincrease inChinesecorporate Chinese companieshaveresponded totighteningcredit at Chinese overseasenergyinvestment,fossilfuelsaccount 2015, theseinvestmentsgrew 4.5-foldbetween2008-15 2014, theChinesecorporatebondmarket’s valuegrew ($258 billion)ofglobalFDIinenergybetween2000and (16.3%); industrializedeconomiesabsorbedlessthan energy companies’ and financial institutions’ efforts to greenfield investments (18%), a trend thathas acceler overwhelmingly taketheformofM&As(82%)ratherthan over their2000-07total.Additionally, theseinvestments gies. Furthermore, China’s overseasenergyinvestments equipment. In 2013, China’s shares of global exports in emerging Asia(39.3%),MENA(36.8%),andCentral value ofChinesegreenfield energy investmentsoverseas: global financialcrisis.”Astothesectoraldistributionof ated since2008.Thesetrends owe largely toChinese absorbing, modifying,andindigenizingforeign technolo all sectorsbutnaturalgasandcoal,China’s exportgrowth and M&As,respectively, byvalue.Intermsofgeography, sources ofcorporatefinancein2004.Between2009and the photovoltaicequipment,hydropower equipment,and ofthemillennium,Chinahasgonefromturn beinganon- trialized countries;onlyLatinAmerica(14.6%),emerging three developing regions comprisemore than 92%by far outpacedthatoftheworldbetween2000and2013, for more than 90%and 95% of greenfield investments United States by factorsof 5, 4, and2, respectively. And, in power planttechnologysectorsexceededthoseofthe player intheglobalenergymarkettobeingoneofits rate bondmarketshavegrown rapidlysinceauthorities more than$10billioninM&Asthiscentury. $476 billionworthofenergyproducts, technology, and ularly duetodollarappreciation againsttheyuan.Equity M&As byChineseenergycompaniestookplaceinindus by thecollapseofcommoditiespricesfollowing2008 have beenontherise:thoughtheyrepresent only3.5% home andlowinterest ratesabroad byissuing bondsin leading players.Between2000and2013,Chinaexported launched efforts to generate alternatives tobanksaslaunched efforts togeneratealternatives THE ROLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS.China’s corpo CHINA’S GLOBAL ENERGY FOOTPRINT. Since the - - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 41 ------THE ROLE OF STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS. COMMERCIAL STATE-OWNED OF THE ROLE loans used overseas, significantly narrows the number of loans used overseas, significantly narrows latory Commission (CBRC) lifted rules prohibiting Chinese latory Commission (CBRC) lifted rules prohibiting Banks (SOCBs) to State-owned Commercial led China’s regulations by constrained is projects such to lending but also coal and uranium. According to a circular issued to a circular According but also coal and uranium. budget to include a small amount of support (31 million million of support (31 include a small amount budget to ital is distributed through three funds. The first (unnamed) funds. three ital is distributed through to cover up to subsidies direct in 2010, this fund “gives to a 2004 istering their operations overseas. According M&A costs” and limit the length of M&A loans to 7 years; nese energy companies’ overseas acquisitions. However, nese energy companies’ overseas acquisitions. However, nese companies have to borrow for the actual cross-border for the actual cross-border nese companies have to borrow $108 million from the state budget; other than that, the the that, than other budget; state the from million $108 magnitude of these funds and the support they provide is they provide magnitude of these funds and the support along with the implementation of ments. This reform, mineral development. The second (also unnamed) fund unnamed) fund mineral development. The second (also economic cooperation projects, and foreign resources name two undergone has (which fund third The project. loan dis subsidies and direct range of sectors through In 2008, the State Council and the China Banking Regu 50% of the pre-development costs related to due diligence, costs related 50% of the pre-development for 188 overseas projects totaling $56.3 billion” between totaling $56.3 billion” between for 188 overseas projects fund primarily supports overseas exploration for “hard overseas exploration for “hard fund primarily supports the country’s “going out” strategy in the banking sector, “going out” strategy in the banking sector, the country’s loans acquisition alone “provided China (BOC) Bank of the total the of 50% “at loans M&A of amount the cap that lenders’ along with Chinese commercial this restriction, the most recent year for which data is available. This cap year for which the most recent appraisal, prospecting, and provides loan discounts if Chi and provides appraisal, prospecting, expansion with domestic lending. Due to an uptick in expansion with domestic lending. Due to an uptick in counts for front-end expenses and insurance-related costs. insurance-related and expenses front-end for counts loans for equity invest issuing banks from commercial yuan between 2010 and 2015) to the overseas expansion to the overseas expansion 2010 and 2015) yuan between than This support peaked at more of Chinese companies. lead, zinc and nickel,” iron, copper, commodities such as expenses that companies investing and covers front-end per this fund caps its support at below $600,000 circular, called the Special Fund for For changes and is currently and Economic Development) assists a wide eign Trade 2009 and 2015. Some of this lending has supported Chi demands for credit guarantees and collateral at home for demands for credit Chinese energy companies that may finance international finance and shadow finance, Chinese firms seeking direct difficult to discern. to difficult For example, finance a surge of M&As at home and abroad. As of 2009, this fund had reportedly received a total of of total a received reportedly fund had this 2009, of As 10 million yuan in 2014 before falling to 1 million in 2015, 2015, in million 1 to falling before 2014 in yuan million 10 “especially those related to oil and gas,” incur before reg before incur gas,” and oil to related those “especially ------THE ROLE OF FISCAL BUDGETS. The Chinese state THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN ALIGNING FINANCE FINANCE IN ALIGNING THE ROLE OF THE STATE human resources department, which appoints executives human resources kets hinder the competitiveness of the country’s energy energy of the country’s kets hinder the competitiveness justice if summarized.] involvement in Chinese overseas operations in the energy the in operations overseas Chinese in involvement its “energy-germane and finance-germane bureaucracies.” its “energy-germane and finance-germane bureaucracies.” including energy firms. its reliability as a source of corporate finance. Following Following finance. corporate of source a as reliability its nary detail; these pages are essential reading for those for those essential reading nary detail; these pages are ulations and consequent rent seeking, as well as frequent seeking, as well as frequent ulations and consequent rent resumed the collection of dividends from centrally-owned the collection of dividends from resumed ment. The second channel consists of the alignment of ment. The second channel consists of the alignment of political offices and state-owned economic actors, which actors, economic state-owned and offices political markets, the Chinese state must mobilize most of the most of the markets, the Chinese state must mobilize role in financing the globalization of Chinese companies, companies, Chinese of globalization the financing in role points lower than private companies do. Furthermore, companies do. Furthermore, points lower than private passed peak in 2010. Chinese energy firms have availed passed peak in 2010. [NDLR: Pages 11-13 map the bureaucratic ecosystem of ecosystem bureaucratic the map 11-13 Pages [NDLR: for the majority of Chinese corporate equity finance. On finance. On for the majority of Chinese corporate equity for Chinese companies, and reached a hitherto unsur a hitherto reached companies, and for Chinese two channels to align its financial system with its energy with its energy two channels to align its financial system the suspension of domestic IPOs and increased regula increased the suspension of domestic IPOs and IPOs in 2013, overseas markets accounted tion of future albeit growing markets play a marginal, the whole, capital tial treatment in the bond market and from lenders: they they lenders: from in the bond market and tial treatment themselves of all of these options to finance their overseas themselves of all of these who want to understand the mechanics of SOE and SFI who want to understand the mechanics of SOE and SFI with central government their corporate manage policy in SOEs in 2007 after having abandoned the practice in 1994. sector—or perhaps any sector—and would not be done done be not would sector—and any perhaps sector—or state support to overseas energy activities in extraordi in activities energy to overseas support state same way that it appoints high-level local and central gov aspire to (and often earn)aspire high political positions to comply and face loan interest premia more than 10 percentage than 10 percentage more premia and face loan interest account for 90% of all Chinese corporate bonds issued all Chinese corporate bonds issued account for 90% of ernment officials. This generates a revolving door between ernment This generates a officials. incentives for those SOE and SFI executives who creates companies’ needs. The first runs through the CCP’s CCP’s the through runs first The needs. companies’ in the (SFIs) institutions financial state-owned SOEs and of government intervention in the stock market which reduce government intervention in the stock market which reduce expansion. Certain structural factors in China’s capital mar factors in China’s Certain structural expansion. finance that Chinese energy firms use to expand abroad. abroad. expand to use firms energy Chinese that finance domestic equity financing is burdened by burdensome reg by burdensome domestic equity financing is burdened firms, however. SOEs systematically receive preferen receive systematically SOEs however. firms, financing, both domestic and overseas, is also an option overseas, is also an both domestic and financing, Aside from state ownership of these firms, the state uses Aside from AND ENERGY. Given the weakness of domestic capital Given the weakness of domestic capital AND ENERGY. This extra income has allowed the central government’s This extra income has allowed the central government’s LEO ZUCKER 42 CDB leading the charge. With a balance of $328 billion at CDB leading the charge. With differing mandatesleadto divergent sub-sectoralfocuses CHEXIM appearstogenerallychargelowerinterest rates CHEXIM andCDB,respectively, cosignedpledgeswith 2004, both banks issued $128 billion worth of energy loans 2004, bothbanksissued$128billionworthofenergyloans 2002 and2012,88%camefrom CDBorCHEXIM.The (2) promoting exports of Chinese goods, services, and of alldevelopmentbankscombinedatthetimewriting. erential orconcessionaryloansonthe basisof[China’s] on energyloansbecauseofitsmissiontoprovide “pref overseas, ofwhichCDBaccountedfor67%.Nonetheless, cific projects and energy-backedloans.Between2000 of bothdirect loanstoforeign forenergy-spe governments opment andReformCommission(NDRC)toimplement overseas expansion. companies’ secondmostimportantsource offinancefor especially from SOCBs,thusconstitutesChineseenergy commercial banks’share oftotalsocial financeinChina ant source ofCDB’s funding,statecapital injectionsfrom Where does the CDB source its funding? Once an import and helpingthementernewmarketsthrough M&As.Asa and (4) enhancing the competitiveness of domestic firms agency. and “SolelyownedbytheChinesegovernment, share ofFDIfinancingforChineseenergycompanies,with sub-Saharan Africaduetoitspropensity fortradefinancing. significant supporttohydroelectric damconstructionin worth more than$1.88trillion,thebankwastwicesize within theenergysector. Forexample,CHEXIMhasoffered the endof2015,CDBaccountsfor29%alloutbound the “goingout”strategy. Forinstance,in2003and2005, the ChinaDevelopmentBank(CDB)emergedasworld’s foreign aidbudget.”Additionally, thetwobanks’slightly fell from 76%in2009to55%2013.Commercial lending, policy banks’supporttotheenergysectortakesform result, ofthe$144billionworthloansprovided toChi nese companiesinsupport of “going out” FDI between under thedirect leadershipoftheStateCouncil,”both By contrast, CDB has never financed a hydropower project Bank ofChina(CHEXIM)istheworld’s largesttradefinance NDRC topromote overseasprojects aimedat(1)secur in Africa. In conclusion, the policy banks assume the lion’s in theregion, butlendssubstantiallyforfossilfuelprojects ing resources forwhichdomesticsuppliesare insufficient; banks workinclosecoordination withtheNationalDevel lending byfinancialinstitutionsinChina;withtotalassets labor; (3) acquiring foreign technologies and practices; largest overseaslenderafter2008,whiletheExport-Import THE ROLEOFCHINADEVELOPMENT BANK. THE ROLE OF POLICYBANKS. Both founded in 1994, ------Additionally, since2008,SAFEhaslentashare ofChina’s finance China’s global energy expansion? A key impetus of CDB’s bondscarrythestatusofsovereign bonds,since Chinese government, forthatmatter)overthecourseof Chinese government, China. Underhisleadership,CDBnotonlytookinitiativeto CDB’s supportfortheglobalexpansionofChinesecompa 2002, before thebankhaddiversifieditsfundingsources. overseas loansstoodat$250billion,ofwhichtwothirds of yuan-denominated andforeign currency-denominated of Chinesehouseholds.CDBalsoissuesasmalleramount chases are financedbythelow-interest savingsdeposits energy SOEs themselves in pursuit of state priorities. CDB energy-related loans,andparticularlyforrenewable energy explore opportunitiestohelp Chinesecompaniesexpand chairman between1998and2013,hisdream ofbuild almost 24%.CDBraised70.5%ofitscapitalfrom financial abroad, but actively advised those companies (and the sometimes are mortgaged on energy exportsto China;the standards, CDBchargesrelatively higherinterest ratesfor were in fact entrustedloansfrom SAFE.HowdoestheCDB these loanstosupportthe“goingout”ofChinesecompa they are defactostate-backedandrisk-free. Thebiggest the Ministry ofFinance andtheStateAdministration of their negotiations and risk assessments. On an institutional their negotiationsandriskassessments.Onaninstitutional foreign used exchangereserves toCDB,whichinturn form ofnegotiatedloanstoCDBfrom SOEs—madeup further 5%, while corporate deposits—usually taking the provide discounted loans, they usually go to Chinese projects. Suchloansalsotendtorequire collateraland pressure toseekhigherreturns, bothofwhichhaveledthe nies. As of January 2013, CDB’s outstanding balance of national goalofrenminbi internationalization. nies canbefoundinthepersonofChenYuan, thebank’s Foreign Exchange (SAFE) made up barely 0.5%ofthe Russia, Turkmenistan, andVenezuela. WhenCDBdoes ing a“worldclassbankandsuperinvestmentbank”in bonds overseas,where theyalsoholdsovereign status. bonds issued by Chinese policy banks—whose bond pur buyers ofCDB’s bondsare SOCBs—whichhold80% of bonds—down from more than90% between1998and bank’s fundingin2014.Financialborrowing madeupa bank tofrequently lendondemandingterms thatare clearly lending (including energy-backed loans) also supports the latter hasfeatured inloanagreements withBrazil,Ecuador, less competitivethanthoseoffered byIBRD.Byitsown level, CDBfacescompetitionfrom SOCBsandexternal - - - - ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SOURCES RELEVANT TO RESEARCHING THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 43 - - - - - : 2018 : Fitch : Uncategorized : Uncategorized : see author affiliation 77 : Fact Sheet Region Sector Chinese outward investment globally declined slightly globally declined slightly investment Chinese outward Author Author Affiliation Year of Publication Year Type FA0a0RHdjdja29wWDRRTVNuNitydzVKcVJGZnpTY3JpbTFtUVQzYzlr Road_Four_Charts_Tracking_Investment_And_Projects_Activity_. Industry Trend Analysis - Belt And Road: Four - Belt And Analysis Industry Trend WUZ3T0NxeWhmQmN5eFNidFJrQlB2QXFnMmVSV3k1bFpLeERxME ing a plateau in China’s global trade flows since then. By ing a plateau in China’s in 2017, but significantly in BRCs. [NDLR: Figures drawn Figures in 2017, but significantly in BRCs. [NDLR: BRCs haven’t meaningfully increased since 2014, reflect meaningfully increased BRCs haven’t many BRCs, especially in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia. many BRCs, especially in Sri Lanka and privately held debt and capital outflows, whose effects will whose effects capital outflows, held debt and privately pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWkRjNE5USTRNamszTVRNNCIsInQiOiJyb pucjJRZCJ9 from CGIT.] This is the result of Beijing’s crackdown on on crackdown of Beijing’s This is the result CGIT.] from and business) from China have surged since 2013 in China have surged since 2013 in and business) from Overseas revenue growth slowed for many large Chinese slowed for many large Chinese growth Overseas revenue coinciding with a string construction companies, however, BRI projects. of cancellations and delays of high-profile contrast, international visitor arrivals (both for tourism continue to be felt in 2018. China’s trade volumes with trade volumes with continue to be felt in 2018. China’s Charts Tracking Investment And Projects Projects Investment And Charts Tracking Activity T2RGdXlNcXozRjN5cFhQRUl1ZDQ5blBkWndlV2I2ZVVmTHhjbitNSElx 77. http://your.fitch.group/rs/732-CKH-767/images/Belt_And_

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