Introduction

Toward the end of his life, the Paduan humanist Sperone Speroni (1500–1588) in his Apologia dei dialogi (1574) muses retrospectively over the extravagances of some dialogues written in his youth. Despite increased scrutiny from post- Tridentine censorship, which had prompted him to write an apology in de- fense of his own dialogues, Speroni recognizes in the genre of the dialogue a distinctive fluidity of expression that results from its inherent characteristics of varietas and digression. Cultivating variety in the largest sense of the term (of speakers, topics, arguments, rhetorical models of spoken exchanges, etc.) the dialogue, rather than creating meaning and truth according to strict dia- lectical or methodical patterns of discourse and thought, poetically ‘wanders’ obliquely in order to reflect a multiplicity of truths and perspectives. As if embarking on a side topic, Speroni recognizes that this variety and digressiveness are particularly apt to capture the essence of amorous matters: “il parlare dello amore, massimamente filosofando e vagando per lo gran mare della sua essenzia . . . non è disdetto al dialogo”.1 In contrast with other genres of poetry and prose the dialogue can treat so well of love because its proteiform nature allows it to wander at random in the “great sea of its substance”, which due to its nature cannot be organized in a methodical manner. After exten- sively developing another metaphor in this respect, namely that of the laby- rinth, to convey dialogue’s playfully erratic method, Speroni harks back to the speaking of love but now emphasizes an important mimetic quality dialogue exploits to the fullest in this domain: “Chiamo piacevole labirinto non già lo amare per amore e intricarsi ne’ suoi diletti, ma ragionar delli innamorati e imitarli senza lo affetto nelle parole”.2 Dialogue understood as a “pleasant laby- rinth” allows “to discourse of lovers” and to “imitate” them naturally. In other words, dialogical discourse is well-suited to discuss love because its labyrin- thine nature mimes the evasive rhetoric and erring behavior of lovers them- selves without directly recasting the excessive emotionality of their language. Speroni thus emblematizes in his defense of his own dialogues (among which

1 “speaking of love, broadly philosophizing and wandering over the great sea of its sub- stance . . . is not inappropriate for dialogue” (Sperone Speroni, Apologia dei dialogi, in Trattatisti del Cinquecento, ed. Mario Pozzi [Milan & Naples: Ricciardi, 1978], vol. 1, p. 698). Emphasis is mine. All English translations of the Apologia are mine. 2 “I call a pleasant labyrinth not really loving for love’s sake and ensnaring oneself in its de- lights, but rather the discoursing of lovers and imitating them without recasting the exces- sive emotion in their words” (Speroni, Apologia dei dialogi, p. 712).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004343719_002 2 introduction a typical Dialogo d’amore, discussed in detail in Chapter Two) the capacity of the dialogue genre to exploit wisdom in amorous matters by interlocutors who mimetically experience the vast, disorderly, and paradoxical feelings of love themselves. In other words, dialogue allows both to speak of love and to mime love in speaking. In this respect, Speroni’s insights point to a unique link between the development of the dialogue and thinking and debating on amo- rous matters. Taking Speroni’s intuitions as point of departure, this study offers a new perspective on the use and the development of the dialogue in Italian and French literature. Its subject is the Renaissance love dialogue and the ways in which it substantiates a correlation between the revival of the dialogue form and the period’s mentalities and of love, de- sire, and affection. Driven by a heritage of moral, philosophical, and rhetori- cal dialogues from classical antiquity, the French and of the Renaissance had witnessed a striking re-emergence and reinvigoration of the genre and its hallmark rhetorical features, such as characters voicing both sides of an argument (in utramque partem), open-endedness, and Socratic question and answer patterns. At the same time, the period is known for its rediscovery of ancient thinking on love, desire, and affection, in particular ideas from seminal texts such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Plato’s Symposium. Ever since the commentary on Plato’s Symposium (written in 1469) and the translation of Plato’s complete works from Greek into (in 1484) by the Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino appeared, Neoplatonism had be- come the Renaissance’s dominant discourse on love and amorous desire. This ideology is flanked, however, by equally influential existing cultural mentali- ties and codifications of love and the amorous experience, such as the ideal- ized esthetics of the poet’s inner love conflict displayed in the widely-imitated poetry of Petrarch in praise of his beloved Laura; the remnants of medieval cultivations of courtly behavior in literary romances (fin’amor); and humanist and theological discourses outlining precepts on love and sex. The Renaissance love dialogues that are the subject of this book thrive at the intersection of these two developments, i.e. the revival of the dialogue and the (re-)elaboration of amorous ‘philosophies’. These dialogues, which were written and published between 1540 and 1580, showcase a unique literary in- teraction between ideas (content) and ‘speaking’ (form), the latter understood as the imitation of real-life debate or conversation in textually recorded voices, fictionalized to varying degrees. Treating love dialogues as a distinct corpus with idiosyncratic features, this book seeks to substantiate two interrelated claims: the love dialogue a) rearticulates early modern ideologies of love and desire in a distinctly mimetic discourse that allows their content to be more