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Altruism Syllabus June 2019.Pdf Stephen G. Post, Ph.D. [email protected] HCB 512 Altruism & Bioethics (Rm 067 Depart of Family, Population and Preventive Medicine, LH3) June 3, 2019 ALTRUISM AND BIOETHICS: Professional, Philosophical, Scientific, and Clinical Perspectives The term “altruism,” which derives from the Latin alter (“the other”), means literally “other-ism.” It was created by the French sociologist and positivist Auguste Comte (d.1798-1857) to displace a plurality of terms, including benevolence, mercy, charity, love, kindness and any notions with a theological history (1975 [1851], p. 556). It was suggested by a French legal expression, le bien d’autrui (“the good of others”). It resonates with compassion, kindness, and many other words. Altruism refers to any action that is primarily motivated by a genuine concern for the well-being and security of another. In essence, altruism (“other-regarding”) is the basis of most ethical motivation and behavior, although there is also a moral duty of self-care that if ignored suggests to some the idea of “pathological altruism.” Altruism stands at the center of professionalism in that the clinician “professes” (professio) by public oath a commitment to the good of patients. Thus, “profession” is something more than “occupation” (occupare or occupy) and “career” (careo or carry). Yet without self-care altruism cannot be sustained. Altruism need not include extreme self-sacrifice, although in its certain intense expressions it might. The balance between care for others and for self is a complex matter, and will vary between individuals, although it is safe to state that contributing to the lives of others is closely associated with well-being, happiness, and flourishing. In the western world, the altruism of medicine and the health professions did not emerge from Greek or Roman times at all, but rather from the influences of the Abrahamic traditions, which gave rise to the idea of a true passion for the good of patients. The writings of Hippocrates, for example, recommend against treating those who are dying, infectious, poor, or noncitizens. Yet altruism does not imply that doctors, nurses and other providers are indefatigable, invincible, and beyond the need for respite and care of the self. No one cares optimally for patients if they are depleted and exhausted. During this course we will be addressing topics in medicine and healthcare, but as a means to reflect on the altruistic impulse and its groundings in evolution, affect, logic, and even spirituality. We will be reading one major general philosophical/scientific text across the entire course, bit by bit. That text is written by one of greatest Buddhist thinkers of our time, Matthieu Ricard. It is Altruism: The Power of Compassion to Change Yourself and the World (2013). 1 READINGS Articles will be sent to students as attachments for each class session. Students will need to purchase (on line via Amazon) two books: TIME Special Edition (2019) The Science of Good & Evil. We are reading this very recent update on good and evil in human nature so as to ground ourselves in a balanced view of the human moral capacity. Matthieu Ricard, Altruism: The Power of Compassion to Change Yourself and the World. 2013. Ricard is probably the most well regarded writer on this topic. SG Post with Jill Neimark, Why Good Things Happen to Good People (this will be given out to students rather than purchased). SCHEDULE Tuesday June 4 (6 a.m. – 8:30 p.m.) TOPIC: THE BASICS OF ALTRUISM What is Altruism and Where Does it Come From? View Video at Home Ricard’s The Altruism Revolution At https://vimeo.com/164267900 Password VIAALTREV44 This video will help you get through Ricard’s book. We will watch parts of it in class to stimulate conversation. Readings Ricard, Parts I & II Wednesday June 5 (6 a.m. – 8:30 p.m.) TOPIC: ALTRUISM & MORAL PSYCHOLOGY/NORMAL & PATHOLOGICAL ALTRUISM Readings Ian Parker, “The Gift,” The New Yorker, Aug. 2, 2004, pp. 54-63. 2 AJ Henderson, MA Landolt, et al., “The Living Anonymous Kidney Donor: Lunatic or Saint? American Journal of Transplantation, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, pp. 203-213. Beth J. Seelig and Lisa S. Rosof, “Normal and Pathological Altruism,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2001, pp. 933-959. Moral Psychology There is no moral life without some degree of concern for others. Every ethical theory has to include some moral psychology that allows some strategy or disposition by which human nature is capable of taking into account the good of others as well as of self. Category I Psychological Egoists: The bleak Contractarians (e.g., Hobbes, Freud) are pessimistic about any significant human capacity for benevolence that goes beyond immediate kin, and deem even parental love as tainted with narcissism. Benevolence is weak and highly myopic, consistent with today’s “selfish gene theory” espoused by Richard Dawkins. Rationality is relatively powerless to overcome selfishness, and is really a form of rationalization (Freud) rather than anything especially “pure” (Kant). But even self-interested prudential reasoning can allow us to agree “as if by contract” on certain very minimal preventive prohibitions necessary for surviving together in society. Society is an artificial prudential arrangement and there is no serious argument for the ideal of oneness and interconnectivity. Ethically, we can create minimalistic social/legal restrictions on lying, violence, and violations of privacy. As a result, Contractarians are ethically minimalistic, but they can recommend “do no unjustified harm” as a thin principle, enforced and sustained by threats imposed by the state (Hobbes’ “Great Leviathan”). These prohibitions are easily set aside by classism, greed, hostility, and egoism. Thus Freud wrote of civilization as a very thin veneer over a seething cauldron of Id, and as something that leaves humanity discontented. There is no moral idealism at all, no Good Samaritanism expected or required, no motivational altruism that withstands critique. Not all Contractarians are so bleak (e.g. Locke, Daniels, Bok). Some are more hopeful about the self-restraining power of rationality (i.e., of self-controlling “enlightened” self- interest) absent coercive threat and legal punishment. They think that our natural state is a bit more social and wired for reciprocal altruism, but Hobbes’ famous “war of all against all” is never that far away. Category II The Rational Altruists: While there may be all sorts of selfish human tendencies, the Rationalists (e.g., Plato, Kant, Nagel, Rawls) are convinced that reason alone rises above such tendencies in a triumphant clarity of logic that simply by virtue of its clarity can and does motivate us to transcend the baser elements of human nature into a life of equal-regarding universal respect based on universal principles. Whatever affective disposition exists in human nature such as compassion or social emotions are unreliable. We are endowed with reason and through this gift of the mind we can achieve moral enlightenment and abide in it. Reason is not just instrumental, but pure and 3 powerful enough to overcome adverse inclinations. Hence, then, the Enlightenment ideal lives on. Category III The Affective Altruists: There are those who observe and celebrate a biologically natural set of social-moral sentiments such as kindness, compassion, warm altruism and love of humanity. Indeed, natural affective (empathic) dispositions have, through the evolution of group selection at various levels beyond kin, gained a strength that is potentially universal. There is still a bleak side to human nature that is selfish and insular, and the product of individual selection, but at least there is a powerful substrate of compassion and empathy that, with the exception of the occasional sociopath, provides an internal moral sense that is based in our emotional nature. Reason need play only a quite a secondary guiding role, but it can provide perspective and wisdom. These are the affective or psychological altruists. For example, the Dalai Lama refers to this sense as innate compassion, as does Ricard, Adam Smith and David Hume. Darwin wrote of a “natural benevolence” based on group-level selection. Darwin, however, saw that the flip side of the coin of in-group altruism is out-group hostility, and ultimately appealed to the rational altruism of Kant to ensure a sense of a common humanity. After all, the differences between “them” and “us” that we think are morally significant are not. Category IV Virtue Altruists/Theorists: These days, many philosophers are neo- Aristotelians. They simply recognize human nature as a vast mixed bag capable of pretty much anything. However, we human beings are thankfully malleable creatures of habit, and we can be habituated to almost anything, including to benevolence. We learn altruism by observing good role models within families and wider communities, and we are nothing if not inspired by those around us who are worthy of imitation and emulation. Here literature comes into play, as we read about the habits of inspiring people (e.g., Paul Farmer, Cicely Saunders, Gandhi, MLK, etc.) and take them into our core. We take shape in communities of character with symbols, teachings, expectations, role models, rewards, and identity formation over time. We live in symbols and symbols live in us. Category V Metaphysical or Spiritual Altruists: There are those who think of altruism in metaphysical/spiritual terms. Thus the Hassidic artist Marc Chagall, or the poet W.H. Auden, who described his quiet experience as follows: One fine summer night in June 1933 I was sitting on a lawn after dinner with three colleagues, two women and one man. We liked each other well enough but we were certainly not intimate friends, nor had anyone of us a sexual interest in another. Incidentally, we had not drunk any alcohol.
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