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Individual Questionnaire STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS The Republic of Uganda THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER INDEX UGANDA (SIGI) SURVEY 2014 INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONNAIRE MODULE 4A: IDENTIFICATION PARTICULARS 1. HOUSEHOLD SERIAL NO.: 2. PERSON ID CODE (PID): 3. NAME: THIS SURVEY IS BEING CONDUCTED BY THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS ACT, 1998. UGANDA BUREAU OF STATISTICS P.O. BOX 7186 KAMPALA, TEL: +256-414-706000 FAX: 0414-237553 E-MAIL:[email protected] WEBSITE: www.ubos.org ~ 1 ~ MODULE 4B: STAFF DETAILS AND SURVEY TIME 1. NAME OF INTERVIEWER DD MM YYYY 2. DATE OF INTERVIEW 3. NAME OF SUPERVISOR DD MM YYYY 4. DATE OF CHECKING Visit Visit Visit 1 2 3 Date 5. INTERVIEWER VISITS Result HRS 6 . STARTING TIME 7 A. RESPONSE CODE: Codes for Item 8A: 1 = Completed 2 = Not at Home 3 = Postponed 4= Refused 5= partly completed 6=Incapacitated 7=Other (Specify………………………. 8. REMARKS BY INTERVIEWER: 9. REMARKS BY SUPERVISOR: ~ 2 ~ MODULE 5: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND TIME USE 500 501 502 503 504 In the last 12 months, what type In the last 7 days, what type of How much do you receive in cash/kind from How much do you receive in cash/kind from Who mainly of main or secondary activity main or secondary activity were [ACTIVITY]? [ACTIVITY]? decides how the were you engaged in? you engaged in? money you earn is What is the periodicity of the pay? What is the periodicity of the pay? used? 1=Wage employment (not 1=Wage employment (not including casual day labour but including casual day labour but List up to 2 hh including paid apprenticeship) including paid apprenticeship) members 2=Non-farm self-employment 2=Non-farm self-employment (employer) (employer) Main Periodicity Secondary Periodicity PID1 PID2 3=Non-farm self-employment 3=Non-farm self-employment (own-account worker) (own-account worker) Cash Kind (value) 1= Hourly Cash Kind (value) 1= Hourly 4=Non-farm self-employment 4=Non-farm self-employment 2= Daily 2= Daily (unpaid family worker) (unpaid family worker) 3= Weekly 3= Weekly 5=Family farming 5=Family farming 4= Every two 4= Every two 6=Casual day labourer 6=Casual day labourer weeks weeks 7=Unpaid apprenticeship 7=Unpaid apprenticeship 5= Twice monthly 5= Twice monthly 8=Not engaged in economic 8=Not engaged in economic 6= Monthly 6= Monthly activity activity 7= Annually 7=Annually 9=Other, specify…………. 9=Other, specify…………. 96= Other, 96= Other, specify……….. specify……….. Main Secondary Main Secondary ~ 3 ~ 505 506a 506b 506c 506d 506e 506f In the last 7 days, how many In the last 7 days, how many hours did you spend (including travel time) on: hours did you spend (including travel time) working for pay? Cooking for the Taking care of the Main Secondary Fetching water Fetching firewood Taking care of children Taking care of the sick household elderly ~ 4 ~ MODULE 6: DISCRIMINATORY FAMILY CODE 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 At what age At what age In your opinion, who in In practice, who in the In your opinion, who In practice, who would In your opinion who would be In practice, who would be can a girl can a boy the household would be household would be would be charged with be charged with the role charged with the role of charged with the role of be married? be married? charged with the role of charged with the role of the role of making of making decisions for making decisions for a son making decisions for a son making decisions for a making decisions for a decisions for a daughter a daughter on on marriage? on marriage? child less than 15 yrs child less than 15 yrs on marriage? marriage? regarding education and regarding education and 1= Himself 1= Himself health? health? 1= Herself 1= Herself 2= Father 2= Father 2= Father 2= Father 3=Mother 3=Mother 1= Father 1= Father 3=Mother 3=Mother 4=Both Parents 4=Both Parents 2=Mother 2=Mother 4=Both Parents 4=Both Parents 5=Clan elders 5=Clan elders 3=Both Parents 3=Both Parents 5=Clan elders 5=Clan elders 6=Other relative, specify 6=Other relative, specify 96= Other, specify….. 96= Other, specify….. 6=Other relative, specify 6=Other relative, specify 7=Non-relative 7=Non-relative 7=Non-relative 7=Non-relative Education Health Education Health 609 610 611 612 Is bride price a common In practice, who in the household In your view does a widow have equal opportunity as a In practice does a widow have equal opportunity as a widower practice in your community? makes decisions for the bride widower towards: towards: price? 1=Yes 2=No 1=Father 1=Yes 1=Yes 2=Mother 2=No 2=No 3=Both Parents 4=Clan elders 5=Other relative, specify……………….. 6=Non-relative a)Inheritance of land b) Inheritance of c)Re-marrying a)Inheritance of land b) Inheritance of c) Re-marrying non-land assets non land assets ~ 5 ~ MODULE 6: DISCRIMINATORY FAMILY CODE (continued) 613 614 615a 615b 616a 616b When a widow gets re-married Is levirate marriage a common practice? In your view can girls inherit [ASSET] like sons? In practice do girls inherit [ASSET] like sons? outside her husband’s clan, can she keep the inheritance? 1=Yes 1=Yes 1=Yes 2=No 2=No 2=No 1=Yes 2=No a) land b)Non-land assets a) land b)Non-land assets 617: Give your opinions on the following practices. Using the following codes, write the code that corresponds to the rating in the table below 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3.Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree Statement Code a) Girls and boys should spend the same amount of time on domestic work b) Men and women must share equally household tasks and child caring if both are working. c) Men must be responsible for household chores. d) Many women who are housewives would prefer to work outside the house if there were jobs available. e) Women can relax while they are looking after children. f) If there are too few jobs for everyone, employers must hire women first. g) Most men would prefer their wives to be housewives instead of going out to get a job. ~ 6 ~ MODULE 7: SON PREFERENCE 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 Have you any How many boys and What is Would you Which sex Do girls and boys In your opinion, should male children usually be In your opinion, should female children biological girls do you have? the sex of consider would you spend the same [ACTIVITY]? usually be [ACTIVITY]? children? your last having (a) prefer? amount of time on child? another domestic work? 1=Yes 1=Yes 1-Yes child? 1=Boy 2=No 2=No 2=No >>704 1=Boy 2=Girl 1= Yes 2=Girl 1=Yes 3=Any 2= No 2=No >>706 Activity Code Activity Code a) No. of b) No. of boys girls a) Fetching water a) Fetching water b) Fetching firewood b) Fetching firewood c) Cooking food c) Cooking food d) Caring for children d) Caring for children e) Caring for the e) Caring for the elderly/sick elderly/sick f) Digging f) Digging g) Construction of dwelling g) Construction of dwelling h) Milling and Processing h) Milling and Processing food for own consumption food for own consumption i) Making handicrafts for own i) Making handicrafts for consumption own consumption j) Hunting and Fishing j) Hunting and Fishing k) Working for pay k) Working for pay l) Other, specify l) Other, specify ~ 7 ~ 709: Give your opinions on the following practices. Using the following codes, write the code that corresponds to the rating in the table below 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3.Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree Statement Code a) A marriage requires a bride price b) If a man pays a bride price for his wife it means that he owns her c) A bride price gives a status for a girl d) It is more important that a boy gets higher education than it is for a girl. e) Households should spend the same amount of resources on girls and boys regarding education f) Households should spend the same amount of resources on girls and boys regarding health g) Domestic work is an educational ground for girls h) Domestic work is an educational ground for boys ~ 8 ~ MODULE 8: SECURE ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND ASSETS I 801 802 803a 803b T E Do you or any Who in the household owns at least How many How much do you value M member of the one [ITEM]? [items] does the [ITEM] at present? household own your household C ITEM [ITEM]? List up to 4 hh members. own at present? O D 1=Yes E 2=No >> next item Number Total estimated value 98=Don’t know PID1 PID2 PID3 PID4 (in U. shs) 401 Bed 402 Charcoal stove 403 Kerosene stove 404 Electric iron 405 Electric Kettle 406 Refrigerator 407 Radio 408 Television 409 Mobile phone 410 Computer 411 Bicycle 412 Motor cycle 413 Car 414 Pick-up truck 415 Jewelry and watches ~ 9 ~ MODULE 8: SECURE ACCESS TO RESOURCES AND ASSETS (continued) 804: Give your opinions on the following practices. Using the following codes, write the code that corresponds to the rating in the table below 1. Strongly agree 2. Agree 3.Not sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly disagree Statement Code a) It is easier for men than for women to own Land b) It is easier for men than for women to access credit c) It is easier for men than for women to establish a business d) Women face constraints to work outside the home e) Women and men should be able to establish a business on their own f) Women and men should find it easy to work outside home 805 Women and men should have the same access to 1.
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