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Home , Calculus, Choice, Concept, Contradiction, Definition, Ethics (Spinoza book)

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)

Kenny Pearce

Great Extramural Lecture College Dublin

October 8, 2019

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 1 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716)

1 and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible

3 Monads

4 Free

5 Leibniz and

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 2 / 36 Life and Writings

1 Life and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible Worlds

3 Monads

4

5 Leibniz and Newton

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 3 / 36 1661-1667 – Begins studies in (Scholastic) and at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 – In on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian and discovers 1676 – Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 – Dies in Hanover

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Life July 1, 1646 – Born in Leipzig,

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1672-1676 – In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 – Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 – Dies in Hanover

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Life July 1, 1646 – Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 – Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1676 – Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 – Dies in Hanover

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Life July 1, 1646 – Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 – Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 – In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 November 14, 1716 – Dies in Hanover

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Life July 1, 1646 – Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 – Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 – In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 – Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Life July 1, 1646 – Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 – Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 – In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 – Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 – Dies in Hanover

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Geologist And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 And so on. . .

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. . .

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – on (published posthumously). 1695 – “New of ” (published) 1704 – Stops on New Essays on after Locke dies 1710 – (published) 1714 – of Nature and Grace and 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings published so far (since 1923): 66

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 – Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 – “New System of Nature” (published) 1704 – Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 – Theodicy (published) 1714 – Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 – Correspondence with Samuel Clarke

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 The Best of All Possible Worlds

1 Life and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible Worlds

3 Monads

4 Free Will

5 Leibniz and Newton

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 5 / 36 Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677)

I have explained ’s nature and : that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from of the will or pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or, infinite power. . . All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men. . . maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end. – , Appendix to Part I

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 6 / 36 Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677)

I have explained God’s nature and properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or, infinite power. . . All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men. . . maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end. – Ethics, Appendix to Part I

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 6 / 36 Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677)

I have explained God’s nature and properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or, infinite power. . . All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men. . . maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end. – Ethics, Appendix to Part I

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 6 / 36 Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677)

I have explained God’s nature and properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God’s absolute nature, or, infinite power. . . All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men. . . maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end. – Ethics, Appendix to Part I

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 6 / 36 Leibniz’s Early

When I considered that nothing happens by chance or . . . I was very close to the view of those who think that is absolutely necessary. . . But the consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, brought me back from this precipice. For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be impossible for others to exist in their place. . . Nor can we really deny that many [fictional] stories. . . are to be possible. – “On Freedom” (1689?), In Philosophical Essays, p. 94

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 7 / 36 Leibniz’s Early Spinozism

Principle of Sufficient When I considered that nothing happens by chance or accident. . . I was very close to the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary. . . But the consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, brought me back from this precipice. For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be impossible for others to exist in their place. . . Nor can we really deny that many [fictional] stories. . . are thought to be possible. – “On Freedom” (1689?), In Philosophical Essays, p. 94

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 7 / 36 Leibniz’s Early Spinozism

When I considered that nothing happens by chance or accident. . . I was very close to the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary. . . But the consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, brought me back from this precipice. For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be impossible for others to exist in their place. . . Nor can we really deny that many [fictional] stories. . . are thought to be possible. – “On Freedom” (1689?), In Philosophical Essays, p. 94

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 7 / 36 Leibniz’s Early Spinozism

When I considered that nothing happens by chance or accident. . . I was very close to the view of those who think that everything is absolutely necessary. . . But the consideration of possibles, which are not, were not, and will not be, brought me back from this precipice. For if there are certain possibles that never exist, then the things that exist, at any rate, are not always necessary, for otherwise it would be impossible for others to exist in their place. . . Nor can we really deny that many [fictional] stories. . . are thought to be possible. – “On Freedom” (1689?), In Philosophical Essays, p. 94

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 7 / 36 A Tension Principles of Sufficient Reason Unactualized possibles

A Resolution Divine

Leibniz’s Rejection of Spinoza

Spinoza. . . appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will. . . he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste here in refuting an so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is founded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply no . I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still exist in some place in the . Yet one cannot deny that romances such as those of Mademoiselle de Scud´ery, or as Octavia, are possible. – Theodicy (1710), §173

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 8 / 36 A Resolution Divine choice

Leibniz’s Rejection of Spinoza

Spinoza. . . appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will. . . he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is founded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply no contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still exist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such as those of Mademoiselle de Scud´ery, or as Octavia, are possible. – Theodicy (1710), §173 A Tension Principles of Sufficient Reason Unactualized possibles

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 8 / 36 Leibniz’s Rejection of Spinoza

Spinoza. . . appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and will. . . he acknowledges no goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by God. We will not waste time here in refuting an opinion so bad, and indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is founded on the nature of the possibles, that is, of things that imply no contradiction. I do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the romances one can imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still exist in some place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such as those of Mademoiselle de Scud´ery, or as Octavia, are possible. – Theodicy (1710), §173 A Tension Principles of Sufficient Reason Unactualized possibles

A Resolution Divine choice

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 8 / 36 God Exists

now we must rise to metaphysics, by making use of the great . . . that nothing takes place without sufficient reason. . . Assuming this principle, the first question we have the right to ask will be, why is there something rather than nothing?... the sufficient reason, which needs no reason, must be outside the series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is its cause, and which is a necessary , carrying the reason of its with itself. Otherwise, we would not yet have a sufficient reason where one could end the series. And this ultimate reason for things is called God. – Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (1714), §§7–8

Also see, “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” (23 November 1697).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 9 / 36 God Exists

now we must rise to metaphysics, by making use of the great principle. . . that nothing takes place without sufficient reason. . . Assuming this principle, the first question we have the right to ask will be, why is there something rather than nothing?... the sufficient reason, which needs no other reason, must be outside the series of contingent things, and must be found in a substance which is its cause, and which is a necessary being, carrying the reason of its existence with itself. Otherwise, we would not yet have a sufficient reason where one could end the series. And this ultimate reason for things is called God. – Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (1714), §§7–8

Also see, “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” (23 November 1697).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 9 / 36 ... ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

Now

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Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ... ??? ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

Now

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ... ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

Now

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Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ... ??? ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

Now

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ... ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

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Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ??? ??? ??? ??? God

God Exists

... Now

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ??? ??? ???

God

God Exists

... Now

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Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 ??? ??? ??? ???

God Exists

... Now

God

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 10 / 36 God Chooses for

the of Nature regulating movements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary. The middle course to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect . – Theodicy, §349

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 11 / 36 One may say that as soon as God has decreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles, all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, produce most , most , most significance carry the day. – Theodicy, §201

God Chooses the Best

Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil. . . here would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. . . if there were not the best. . . among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any. – Theodicy, §8

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 12 / 36 God Chooses the Best

Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil. . . here would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. . . if there were not the best. . . among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any. – Theodicy, §8

One may say that as soon as God has decreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles, all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. – Theodicy, §201

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 12 / 36 Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection. A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect . and are inextricably linked. Regularity/order is a very important good. We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy aliens!)

Some of Leibniz’s Responses

The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – , (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Voltaire (1694–1778)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect beings. Goods and evils are inextricably linked. Regularity/order is a very important good. We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy space aliens!)

The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – Voltaire, Candide (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Some of Leibniz’s Responses Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection.

Voltaire (1694–1778)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 Goods and evils are inextricably linked. Regularity/order is a very important good. We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy space aliens!)

The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – Voltaire, Candide (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Some of Leibniz’s Responses Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection. A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect beings.

Voltaire (1694–1778)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 Regularity/order is a very important good. We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy space aliens!)

The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – Voltaire, Candide (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Some of Leibniz’s Responses Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection. A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect beings. Goods and evils are inextricably linked. Voltaire (1694–1778)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy space aliens!)

The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – Voltaire, Candide (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Some of Leibniz’s Responses Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection. A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect beings. Goods and evils are inextricably linked. Voltaire (1694–1778) Regularity/order is a very important good.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 The Best of All Possible Worlds?

If this is the best of all possible worlds, what are the others like? – Voltaire, Candide (1759), tr. Adams, p. 15

Some of Leibniz’s Responses Evil is merely the absence of goodness/perfection. A perfect being would be God, but there can’t be more than one God, so if there are any creatures at all then there are imperfect beings. Goods and evils are inextricably linked. Voltaire (1694–1778) Regularity/order is a very important good. We only know about a tiny part of the universe. (Probably there are lots of very happy space aliens!)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 13 / 36 The Principle of Sufficient Reason The from Must God Create the Best? The

Continuing

Possible Worlds

Blackwell, 1986

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 14 / 36 The Argument from Contingency Must God Create the Best? The Problem of Evil

Continuing Relevance

Possible Worlds The Principle of Sufficient Reason

Cambridge, 2006

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 14 / 36 Must God Create the Best? The Problem of Evil

Continuing Relevance

Possible Worlds The Principle of Sufficient Reason The Argument from Contingency

Routledge, 2013

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 14 / 36 The Problem of Evil

Continuing Relevance

Possible Worlds The Principle of Sufficient Reason The Argument from Contingency Must God Create the Best?

“Must God Create the Best?” The Philosophical Review, 1972 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184329

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 14 / 36 Continuing Relevance

Possible Worlds The Principle of Sufficient Reason The Argument from Contingency Must God Create the Best? The Problem of Evil

This content downloaded from 130.126.162.126 on Fri, 27 Jul 2018 19:24:51 UTC All use to https://about.jstor.org/terms Indiana University Press, 1996

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 14 / 36 Monads

1 Life and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible Worlds

3 Monads

4 Free Will

5 Leibniz and Newton

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 15 / 36 The Special Composition Question in what circumstances do things add up to or compose something? When does unity arise out of plurality? – , Material Beings (Cornell, 1990), p. 31

Substantial Unity

Suppose that there were two stones, for example, the diamond of the Great Duke and that of the Great Mogul. One could impose the same for the two, and one could say that they constitute a pair of diamonds, but one would not say that these two diamonds constitute a substance. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 16 / 36 Substantial Unity

Suppose that there were two stones, for example, the diamond of the Great Duke and that of the Great Mogul. One could impose the same collective name for the two, and one could say that they constitute a pair of diamonds, but one would not say that these two diamonds constitute a substance. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

The Special Composition Question in what circumstances do things add up to or compose something? When does unity arise out of plurality? – Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell, 1990), p. 31

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 16 / 36 Medieval philosophers were wrong to use them to explain particular phenomena (dormitive faculty of opium, horodeictic faculty of clocks). Nevertheless, some kind of principle of unity is needed to answer the Special Composition Question.

Definition A (in Aristotelian philosophy) is a metaphysically real entity that unites some by organizing it toward certain ends. A (principle of life) is one example.

Leibniz on Substantial Forms

Substantial Unity

There is as much difference between a substance and [a mere heap] as there is between a man and a , such as a people, an army, a , or a college; these are moral beings, beings in which there is something imaginary or dependent on the fabrication of our . A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 17 / 36 Medieval philosophers were wrong to use them to explain particular phenomena (dormitive faculty of opium, horodeictic faculty of clocks). Nevertheless, some kind of principle of unity is needed to answer the Special Composition Question.

Leibniz on Substantial Forms

Substantial Unity

There is as much difference between a substance and [a mere heap] as there is between a man and a community, such as a people, an army, a society, or a college; these are moral beings, beings in which there is something imaginary or dependent on the fabrication of our mind. A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

Definition A substantial form (in Aristotelian philosophy) is a metaphysically real entity that unites some matter by organizing it toward certain ends. A soul (principle of life) is one example.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 17 / 36 Nevertheless, some kind of principle of unity is needed to answer the Special Composition Question.

Substantial Unity

There is as much difference between a substance and [a mere heap] as there is between a man and a community, such as a people, an army, a society, or a college; these are moral beings, beings in which there is something imaginary or dependent on the fabrication of our mind. A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

Definition A substantial form (in Aristotelian philosophy) is a metaphysically real entity that unites some matter by organizing it toward certain ends. A soul (principle of life) is one example.

Leibniz on Substantial Forms Medieval philosophers were wrong to use them to explain particular phenomena (dormitive faculty of opium, horodeictic faculty of clocks).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 17 / 36 Substantial Unity

There is as much difference between a substance and [a mere heap] as there is between a man and a community, such as a people, an army, a society, or a college; these are moral beings, beings in which there is something imaginary or dependent on the fabrication of our mind. A substantial unity requires a thoroughly indivisible and naturally indestructible being. – To Arnauld, 28 Nov/8 Dec, 1686, Philosophical Essays, p. 79

Definition A substantial form (in Aristotelian philosophy) is a metaphysically real entity that unites some matter by organizing it toward certain ends. A soul (principle of life) is one example.

Leibniz on Substantial Forms Medieval philosophers were wrong to use them to explain particular phenomena (dormitive faculty of opium, horodeictic faculty of clocks). Nevertheless, some kind of principle of unity is needed to answer the Special Composition Question.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 17 / 36 Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature//substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have?

Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap?

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have?

Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

What properties could such a thing have?

Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have?

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have? Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have? Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Perception and Appetite

Questions What kind of thing could be a real unity, and not just a heap? Ultimately, only a simple substance (one without parts). Further, such a substance needs a nature/essence/substantial form from which all of its properties flow. What properties could such a thing have? Our only model for such a substance is our own soul.

Leibniz’s Conclusion there is nothing in things except simple substances and in them perception and appetite. – To De Volder, 30 June 1704, tr. Paul Lodge

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 18 / 36 Appetite is the inborn tendency to move from one perception to another. Most and appetites are unconscious. Everything is made up of simple substances with perception and appetite (called monads). The distinctions among different types of substances (inanimate things, non-rational , ) is found in the degree of . Leibniz is here going against nearly all of his contemporaries, especially Descartes.

Perception and Appetite

Perception is the of many things in one thing.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 19 / 36 Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Everything is made up of simple substances with perception and appetite (called monads). The distinctions among different types of substances (inanimate things, non-rational animals, humans) is found in the degree of consciousness. Leibniz is here going against nearly all of his contemporaries, especially Descartes.

Perception and Appetite

Perception is the representation of many things in one thing. Appetite is the inborn tendency to move from one perception to another.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 19 / 36 Everything is made up of simple substances with perception and appetite (called monads). The distinctions among different types of substances (inanimate things, non-rational animals, humans) is found in the degree of consciousness. Leibniz is here going against nearly all of his contemporaries, especially Descartes.

Perception and Appetite

Perception is the representation of many things in one thing. Appetite is the inborn tendency to move from one perception to another. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious.

In order better to recognize these tiny perceptions that cannot be distinguished in a crowd, I usually make use of the example of the roar or noise of the sea. . . In order to hear this noise as we do, we must hear the parts that make up this whole, that is, we must hear the noise of each , even though each of these small noises is known only in the confused of all the others, and would not be noticed if the wave making it were the only one. – Preface to New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), in Philosophical Essays, p. 295

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 19 / 36 Leibniz is here going against nearly all of his contemporaries, especially Descartes.

Perception and Appetite

Perception is the representation of many things in one thing. Appetite is the inborn tendency to move from one perception to another. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Everything is made up of simple substances with perception and appetite (called monads). The distinctions among different types of substances (inanimate things, non-rational animals, humans) is found in the degree of consciousness.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 19 / 36 Perception and Appetite

Perception is the representation of many things in one thing. Appetite is the inborn tendency to move from one perception to another. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Everything is made up of simple substances with perception and appetite (called monads). The distinctions among different types of substances (inanimate things, non-rational animals, humans) is found in the degree of consciousness. Leibniz is here going against nearly all of his contemporaries, especially Descartes. See Alison Simmons, “Changing the Cartesian Mind,” Philosophical Review (2001), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2693597

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 19 / 36 There is also no way of explaining how a can be altered or changed internally by some other creature. . . The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave. . . I also take it for granted that every created being. . . is subject to change. . . It follows from what we have just said that the monad’s natural changes come from an internal principle, since no external cause can influence it internally. – Monadology (1716), §§7, 10, and 11

‘Spiritual Automata’ with No Windows

All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as everywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of spiritual automaton. – Theodicy, §52

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 20 / 36 ‘Spiritual Automata’ with No Windows

All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as everywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of spiritual automaton. – Theodicy, §52

There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature. . . The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave. . . I also take it for granted that every created being. . . is subject to change. . . It follows from what we have just said that the monad’s natural changes come from an internal principle, since no external cause can influence it internally. – Monadology (1716), §§7, 10, and 11

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 20 / 36 Consider two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways: the first is that of natural influence. . . Huygens. . . had suspended two pendula from the same piece of wood, and the swinging of the pendula transmitted similar to the of wood. . . [and thus] it happened in a marvelous way that even when the swings of the pendula had been intentionally disturbed, they came to swing together again. . . The second way to make two faulty clocks always agree would be to have them watched over by a competent workman, who would adjust them and get them to agree at every moment. The third way is to these two clocks from the start with so much skill and accuracy that one can be certain of their subsequent agreement. – “Postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval” (1696), in Philosophical Writings, pp. 147–148

Pre-established

Question If monads have no windows, how do substances interact?

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 21 / 36 Pre-established Harmony

Question If monads have no windows, how do substances interact?

Consider two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. Now this can happen in three ways: the first is that of natural influence. . . Huygens. . . had suspended two pendula from the same piece of wood, and the constant swinging of the pendula transmitted similar vibrations to the particles of wood. . . [and thus] it happened in a marvelous way that even when the swings of the pendula had been intentionally disturbed, they came to swing together again. . . The second way to make two faulty clocks always agree would be to have them watched over by a competent workman, who would adjust them and get them to agree at every moment. The third way is to construct these two clocks from the start with so much skill and accuracy that one can be certain of their subsequent agreement. – “Postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval” (1696), in Philosophical Writings, pp. 147–148

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 21 / 36 Leibniz: Yes.

the representations of the causes are the causes of the representations of the effects. – Leibniz, comments on Bayle (Philosophical Writings, p. 200)

‘Spiritual Automata’ with No Windows

Pierre Bayle (paraphrased): If monads have no windows, how could something—a dog say—go suddenly from pleasure to ? Suppose the dog is happily eating when someone comes up and whacks it with a stick. Are you trying to tell me that the change from pleasure to pain comes from within the dog itself and not from the stick?!

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 22 / 36 the representations of the causes are the causes of the representations of the effects. – Leibniz, comments on Bayle (Philosophical Writings, p. 200)

‘Spiritual Automata’ with No Windows

Pierre Bayle (paraphrased): If monads have no windows, how could something—a dog say—go suddenly from pleasure to pain? Suppose the dog is happily eating when someone comes up and whacks it with a stick. Are you trying to tell me that the change from pleasure to pain comes from within the dog itself and not from the stick?!

Leibniz: Yes.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 22 / 36 ‘Spiritual Automata’ with No Windows

Pierre Bayle (paraphrased): If monads have no windows, how could something—a dog say—go suddenly from pleasure to pain? Suppose the dog is happily eating when someone comes up and whacks it with a stick. Are you trying to tell me that the change from pleasure to pain comes from within the dog itself and not from the stick?!

Leibniz: Yes.

the representations of the causes are the causes of the representations of the effects. – Leibniz, comments on Bayle (Philosophical Writings, p. 200)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 22 / 36 The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this monads are mind-like. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally because they are never conscious at all. Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own , created by God. Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s for the best of all possible worlds.

Summary

Everything is monads!

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally minds because they are never conscious at all. Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own natures, created by God. Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds.

Summary

Everything is monads! The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this sense monads are mind-like.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally minds because they are never conscious at all. Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own natures, created by God. Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds.

Summary

Everything is monads! The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this sense monads are mind-like. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own natures, created by God. Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds.

Summary

Everything is monads! The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this sense monads are mind-like. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally minds because they are never conscious at all.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds.

Summary

Everything is monads! The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this sense monads are mind-like. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally minds because they are never conscious at all. Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own natures, created by God.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 Summary

Everything is monads! The only fundamental features of monads are perception and appetite. In this sense monads are mind-like. Most perceptions and appetites are unconscious. Although monads are mind-like, most monads are not literally minds because they are never conscious at all. Monads change only through their own internal spontaneity, which proceeds according to a law rooted in the monads’ own natures, created by God. Monads are connected by a ‘pre-established harmony’ which is part of God’s plan for the best of all possible worlds.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 23 / 36 /Panprotopsychism

Continuing Relevance

The

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 24 / 36 Idealism

Continuing Relevance

The unconscious mind Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism

Thomas Nagel (NYU)

David Chalmers (Australian National U) (U of Connecticut) Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 24 / 36 Continuing Relevance

The unconscious mind ALSO PUBLISHED BY 2 TYRON GOLDSCHMIDT is a visiting Although idealism was once a dominant view in , it has sufered assistant professor in philosophy at Wake almost total neglect over the last several decades. Tis book rectifes this situation Forest University. He has journal publications DISJUNCTIVISM by bringing together seventeen essays from leading philosophers on the topic of in metaphysics, philosophy ofPanpsychism/Panprotopsychism , and the Perception, , metaphysical idealism. of philosophy. He co-authored Berkeley’s Edited by Adrian Haddock and Principles: Expanded and Explained (Routledge, Idealism is a of metaphysical views, each of which gives priority to the mental. 2016) and edited Te Puzzle of Existence: Why Te best-known forms of idealism in Western philosophy are Berkeleyan idealism, Is Tere Something Rather TIdealisman Nothing? MATTER which gives ontological priority to the mental (minds and ) over the physical (Routledge, 2013). Metaphysics and (bodies), and Kantian idealism, which gives a kind of explanatory priority to the in the mental (the structure of the understanding) over the physical (the structure of KENNETH L. PEARCE is Ussher Assistant Kurt Smith the empirical ). Professor in Berkeley Studies (Early ) at Trinity College Dublin. He has

Te various essays explain, attack, or defend a variety of idealistic , including goldschmidt & pearce journal publications in , not only Berkeleyan and Kantian but also those developed in metaphysics, and . He is the less familiar to analytic philosophers, including and Hassidic . author of and the Structure of Berkeley’s Although a of the essays draw on historical sources, all will be of interest World (OUP, 2017). to philosophers working in contemporary metaphysics. Tis aims to spark a revival of serious philosophical interest in metaphysical idealism.

CONTRIBUTORS

Arif Ahmed Tomas Hofweber Susan Schneider Sara Bernstein Marc Lange Aaron Segal Todd Buras Samuel Lebens Robert Smithson Trent Dougherty Kris McDaniel Nick Stang IDEALISM Bronwyn Finnigan Graham Oppy Helen Yetter-Chappell Tyron Goldschmidt Kenneth L. Pearce Daniel Greco Jacob Ross

IDEALISM NEW ESSAYS IN METAPHYSICS 2 Cover image © ithinksky/E+/Getty Images

ISBN 978-0-19-874697-3 edited by 1 tyron goldschmidt & kenneth l. pearce 9 780198 746973

Oxford, 2017

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 24 / 36 Free Will

1 Life and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible Worlds

3 Monads

4 Free Will

5 Leibniz and Newton

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 25 / 36 Most libertarians: Yes, and this is the really important kind of freedom. If your are determined by prior causes, then you don’t choose freely. Most compatibilists: No. You act freely whenever you do what you choose to do, but we don’t (normally) choose to choose, and that’s fine.

Question Can the will (power to choose) be free?

Answers

Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

Definitions is the view that we can still be free even if our actions are determined by prior causes. is the view that we possess a kind of freedom that is not compatible with determination by prior causes.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 26 / 36 Most libertarians: Yes, and this is the really important kind of freedom. If your choices are determined by prior causes, then you don’t choose freely. Most compatibilists: No. You act freely whenever you do what you choose to do, but we don’t (normally) choose to choose, and that’s fine.

Answers

Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

Definitions Compatibilism is the view that we can still be free even if our actions are determined by prior causes. Libertarianism is the view that we possess a kind of freedom that is not compatible with determination by prior causes.

Question Can the will (power to choose) be free?

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 26 / 36 Most compatibilists: No. You act freely whenever you do what you choose to do, but we don’t (normally) choose to choose, and that’s fine.

Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

Definitions Compatibilism is the view that we can still be free even if our actions are determined by prior causes. Libertarianism is the view that we possess a kind of freedom that is not compatible with determination by prior causes.

Question Can the will (power to choose) be free?

Answers Most libertarians: Yes, and this is the really important kind of freedom. If your choices are determined by prior causes, then you don’t choose freely.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 26 / 36 Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

Definitions Compatibilism is the view that we can still be free even if our actions are determined by prior causes. Libertarianism is the view that we possess a kind of freedom that is not compatible with determination by prior causes.

Question Can the will (power to choose) be free?

Answers Most libertarians: Yes, and this is the really important kind of freedom. If your choices are determined by prior causes, then you don’t choose freely. Most compatibilists: No. You act freely whenever you do what you choose to do, but we don’t (normally) choose to choose, and that’s fine.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 26 / 36 The term ‘freedom’ is highly ambiguous. . . Your topic, sir, is freedom to do. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.8

In reasonings about the freedom of will. . . the question is not whether a man can do what he wills to do but whether his will itself is sufficiently independent. It is not a question about whether his legs are free or whether he has room to move about, but whether he has a free mind and what that consists in. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.21

Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man Free. – Locke, concerning Human Understanding, §2.21.8

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 27 / 36 In reasonings about the freedom of will. . . the question is not whether a man can do what he wills to do but whether his will itself is sufficiently independent. It is not a question about whether his legs are free or whether he has room to move about, but whether he has a free mind and what that consists in. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.21

Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man Free. – Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, §2.21.8

The term ‘freedom’ is highly ambiguous. . . Your topic, sir, is freedom to do. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.8

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 27 / 36 Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will

so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a Man Free. – Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, §2.21.8

The term ‘freedom’ is highly ambiguous. . . Your topic, sir, is freedom to do. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.8

In reasonings about the freedom of will. . . the question is not whether a man can do what he wills to do but whether his will itself is sufficiently independent. It is not a question about whether his legs are free or whether he has room to move about, but whether he has a free mind and what that consists in. – Leibniz, New Essays, §2.21.21

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 27 / 36 if we prefer the worse it is because we have a sense of the good it contains but not of the evil it contains or of the good which exists on the opposite side. . . I knew a man, eminent in both church and , whose ill- made him resolve to diet, but who confessed that he had been unable to resist the smell of . . . when a man is in a good frame of mind he ought to make himself laws and rules for the , and then carry them out strictly, himself away. . . from situations which are capable of corrupting him. . . Francisco Borgia, the General of the Jesuits. . . was given to drinking heavily. . . he retrenched gradually to almost nothing, by each day letting a drop of wax fall into the flagon which he was accustomed to drinking dry. – New Essays, §2.21.35

Controlling One’s Will

we must recognize that by our voluntary actions we often indirectly prepare the way for other voluntary actions; and that although we cannot will what we want to. . . we can nevertheless act ahead of time in such a way that we shall eventually. . . will what we would like to be able to. . . will today. – New Essays, §2.21.23

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 28 / 36 Controlling One’s Will

we must recognize that by our voluntary actions we often indirectly prepare the way for other voluntary actions; and that although we cannot will what we want to. . . we can nevertheless act ahead of time in such a way that we shall eventually. . . will what we would like to be able to. . . will today. – New Essays, §2.21.23

if we prefer the worse it is because we have a sense of the good it contains but not of the evil it contains or of the good which exists on the opposite side. . . I knew a man, eminent in both church and state, whose ill-health made him resolve to diet, but who confessed that he had been unable to resist the smell of food. . . when a man is in a good frame of mind he ought to make himself laws and rules for the future, and then carry them out strictly, drawing himself away. . . from situations which are capable of corrupting him. . . Francisco Borgia, the General of the Jesuits. . . was given to drinking heavily. . . he retrenched gradually to almost nothing, by each day letting a drop of wax fall into the flagon which he was accustomed to drinking dry. – New Essays, §2.21.35

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 28 / 36 The ability to reflect on our motives//choices, evaluate them, and seek to change them is crucial to free will and .

Continuing Relevance

Compatibilist can, and perhaps should, distinguish freedom of action from freedom of will.

[By drawing] a distinction between want- ing and valuing [a compatibilist can] make sense of the of an unfree action. – “Free ,” Journal of Philosophy (1975), p. 206, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2024703

Gary Watson (U of Southern California)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 29 / 36 Continuing Relevance

Compatibilist can, and perhaps should, distinguish freedom of action from freedom of will. The ability to reflect on our motives/desires/choices, evaluate them, and seek to change them is crucial to free will and personhood.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 29 / 36 Continuing Relevance

Compatibilist can, and perhaps should, distinguish freedom of action from freedom of will. The ability to reflect on our motives/desires/choices, evaluate them, and seek to change them is crucial to free will and personhood.

Just as the question about the freedom of an agent’s action has to do with whether it is the action he wants to perform, so the question about the freedom of his will has to do with whether it is the will he (Princeton) wants to have. – “Freedom of the Will and the of a ,” Journal of Philosophy (1971), p. 15, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/2024717

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 29 / 36 Continuing Relevance

Compatibilist can, and perhaps should, distinguish freedom of action from freedom of will. The ability to reflect on our motives/desires/choices, evaluate them, and seek to change them is crucial to free will and personhood.

We [humans] need reasons because our impulses must be able to withstand re- flective scrutiny. – The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, 1996), p. 93

Christine Korsgaard (Harvard)

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 29 / 36 Leibniz and Newton

1 Life and Writings

2 The Best of All Possible Worlds

3 Monads

4 Free Will

5 Leibniz and Newton

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 30 / 36 c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for ” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus).

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 The Calculus Controversy

c. 1665 – Newton discovers calculus. He does not publish his work. 1673 – Leibniz visits London. Leibniz is shown some of Newton’s mathematical papers, but not the unpublished papers on calculus. He may have heard rumors of Newton’s achievements. c. 1675 – Leibniz discovers calculus. 1684 – Leibniz publishes “A New Method for Maxima and Minima” (the differential calculus). 1687 – Newton’s Principia Mathematica appears, containing some of his calculus and many applications of calculus to physics. 1699 – Newton’s friends, including Nicolas Fatio de Dullier, begin accusing Leibniz of plagiarism. Leibniz and his friends begin accusing Newton of the same. 1711 – Leibniz writes a letter to the Royal Society defending himself against accusations of plagiarism and demanding an apology. 1712 – Newton, as president of the Royal Society, convenes a committee—chaired by himself and filled entirely by his friends—to ‘investigate’ Leibniz’s complaint. Newton himself composes the committee’s report condemning Leibniz.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 31 / 36 Living (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to another body in by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2. Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy lifted to some height above the earth.

According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause (F = ma) unless opposed by another force. According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total of force in the universe is always conserved.

Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force ( vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 Living force (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to set another body in motion by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2. Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy object lifted to some height above the earth.

According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total quantity of force in the universe is always conserved.

Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two concepts weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of classical physics today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘energy’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force (Latin vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton. According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause acceleration (F = ma) unless opposed by another force.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 Living force (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to set another body in motion by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2. Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy object lifted to some height above the earth. Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two concepts weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of classical physics today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘energy’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force (Latin vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton. According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause acceleration (F = ma) unless opposed by another force. According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total quantity of force in the universe is always conserved.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy object lifted to some height above the earth. Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two concepts weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of classical physics today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘energy’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force (Latin vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton. According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause acceleration (F = ma) unless opposed by another force. According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total quantity of force in the universe is always conserved. Living force (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to set another body in motion by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two concepts weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of classical physics today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘energy’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force (Latin vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton. According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause acceleration (F = ma) unless opposed by another force. According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total quantity of force in the universe is always conserved. Living force (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to set another body in motion by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2. Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy object lifted to some height above the earth.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 The vis viva Controversy

The concept of force (Latin vis) is central to the physical theories of both Leibniz and Newton. According to Newton, force is exerted by one object on another, and will cause acceleration (F = ma) unless opposed by another force. According to Leibniz, Force is something possessed by an object and the total quantity of force in the universe is always conserved. Living force (vis viva) is a moving body’s capacity to set another body in motion by colliding with it, and is proportional to mv 2. Dead force is a sort of ‘reservoir’ of force that can be converted into living force. Leibniz’s favorite example is the force possessed by a heavy object lifted to some height above the earth. Leibniz and Newton argued about who had the ‘right’ notion of force, and their followers continued arguing for some time after their deaths, but their two concepts weren’t really inconsistent: textbooks of classical physics today use the term ‘force’ for (roughly) Newton’s concept and ‘energy’ for a concept very close to Leibniz’s.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 32 / 36 although Newton[’s of gravitation] is satisfactory when one considers only a single planet or satellite, nevertheless, he cannot account for why all the planets of the same system move over approximately the same path, and why tehy move in the same direction. . . That is what we observe, not only for the sun’s planets, but also for those of Jupiter and Saturn. – Leibniz to Huygens (1690), in Philosophical Essays, p. 310

the main of is. . . to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical. . . to resolve these and such like Questions. . . To what end are Comets, and whence is it that Planets move all one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, while Comets move all manner of ways in Orbs very excentrick, and what hinders the fix’d Stars from falling upon one another? – Newton, , 2nd ed. (1716), query 28

God and Physics

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 33 / 36 the main Business of Natural Philosophy is. . . to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical. . . to resolve these and such like Questions. . . To what end are Comets, and whence is it that Planets move all one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, while Comets move all manner of ways in Orbs very excentrick, and what hinders the fix’d Stars from falling upon one another? – Newton, Opticks, 2nd ed. (1716), query 28

God and Physics

although Newton[’s theory of universal gravitation] is satisfactory when one considers only a single planet or satellite, nevertheless, he cannot account for why all the planets of the same system move over approximately the same path, and why tehy move in the same direction. . . That is what we observe, not only for the sun’s planets, but also for those of Jupiter and Saturn. – Leibniz to Huygens (1690), in Philosophical Essays, p. 310

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 33 / 36 God and Physics

although Newton[’s theory of universal gravitation] is satisfactory when one considers only a single planet or satellite, nevertheless, he cannot account for why all the planets of the same system move over approximately the same path, and why tehy move in the same direction. . . That is what we observe, not only for the sun’s planets, but also for those of Jupiter and Saturn. – Leibniz to Huygens (1690), in Philosophical Essays, p. 310

the main Business of Natural Philosophy is. . . to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical. . . to resolve these and such like Questions. . . To what end are Comets, and whence is it that Planets move all one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, while Comets move all manner of ways in Orbs very excentrick, and what hinders the fix’d Stars from falling upon one another? – Newton, Opticks, 2nd ed. (1716), query 28

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 33 / 36 blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. – Newton, Opticks, Query 31

Sir and his followers have a very odd opinion concerning the work of God. According to them, God Almighty needs to wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the of God’s making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work. . . I hold that when God works , he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God. – Leibniz’s First Paper to Clarke (1715), Philosophical Essays, pp. 320–321

God and Physics

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 34 / 36 Sir Isaac Newton and his followers have a very odd opinion concerning the work of God. According to them, God Almighty needs to wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the machine of God’s making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work. . . I hold that when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God. – Leibniz’s First Paper to Clarke (1715), Philosophical Essays, pp. 320–321

God and Physics

blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. – Newton, Opticks, Query 31

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 34 / 36 Sir Isaac Newton and his followers have a very odd opinion concerning the work of God. According to them, God Almighty needs to wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the machine of God’s making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work. . . I hold that when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God. – Leibniz’s First Paper to Clarke (1715), Philosophical Essays, pp. 320–321

God and Physics

blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. – Newton, Opticks, Query 31

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 34 / 36 God and Physics

blind Fate could never make all the Planets move one and the same way in Orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable Irregularities excepted which may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation. Such a wonderful Uniformity in the Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice. – Newton, Opticks, Query 31

Sir Isaac Newton and his followers have a very odd opinion concerning the work of God. According to them, God Almighty needs to wind up his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the machine of God’s making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work. . . I hold that when God works miracles, he does not do it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Whoever thinks otherwise must needs have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of God. – Leibniz’s First Paper to Clarke (1715), Philosophical Essays, pp. 320–321

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 34 / 36 Newton’s absolute space is —we can never tell whether an object is really in motion! Leibniz’s can’t deal with uniform circular motion. These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Leibniz Space and time are among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Problems

Space and Time

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 Newton’s absolute space is unobservable—we can never tell whether an object is really in motion! Leibniz’s relational theory can’t deal with uniform circular motion. These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Leibniz Space and time are relations among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Problems

Space and Time

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 Newton’s absolute space is unobservable—we can never tell whether an object is really in motion! Leibniz’s relational theory can’t deal with uniform circular motion. These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Problems

Space and Time

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Leibniz Space and time are relations among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 Leibniz’s relational theory can’t deal with uniform circular motion. These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Space and Time

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Leibniz Space and time are relations among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Problems Newton’s absolute space is unobservable—we can never tell whether an object is really in motion!

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Space and Time

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Leibniz Space and time are relations among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Problems Newton’s absolute space is unobservable—we can never tell whether an object is really in motion! Leibniz’s relational theory can’t deal with uniform circular motion.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 Space and Time

Newton Space and time exist necessarily, before God creates the universe. Space is like a container that God puts the universe inside.

Leibniz Space and time are relations among actual objects and events. No objects, no space. No events, no time.

Problems Newton’s absolute space is unobservable—we can never tell whether an object is really in motion! Leibniz’s relational theory can’t deal with uniform circular motion. These problems were ultimately solved by Einstein.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 35 / 36 Recommended Reading

Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, edited by Ariew and Garber (Hackett, 1989) Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz: An Biography (Cambridge, 2011) Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World (Norton, 2006) An account of Leibniz’s relationship to Spinoza, with lots of amusing historical anecdotes as well as interesting philosophy. , The Best of All Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God, and Evil in the Age of Reason (Princeton, 2008) An account of the debate about God and evil, with particular emphasis on Leibniz, Arnauld, and Malebranche. Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (Routledge, 2005) An introduction to Leibniz’s philosophy.

Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) October 8, 2019 36 / 36