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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) Kenny Pearce Great Philosophers Extramural Lecture Series Trinity College Dublin October 8, 2019 Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 1 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) 1 Life and Writings 2 The Best of All Possible Worlds 3 Monads 4 Free Will 5 Leibniz and Newton Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 2 / 36 Life and Writings 1 Life and Writings 2 The Best of All Possible Worlds 3 Monads 4 Free Will 5 Leibniz and Newton Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 3 / 36 1661-1667 { Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 { In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 { Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 { Dies in Hanover Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Life July 1, 1646 { Born in Leipzig, Germany Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1672-1676 { In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 { Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 { Dies in Hanover Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Life July 1, 1646 { Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 { Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1676 { Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 { Dies in Hanover Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Life July 1, 1646 { Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 { Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 { In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 November 14, 1716 { Dies in Hanover Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Life July 1, 1646 { Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 { Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 { In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 { Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Life July 1, 1646 { Born in Leipzig, Germany 1661-1667 { Begins studies in (Scholastic) philosophy and law at Leipzig and Altdorf 1672-1676 { In Paris on a diplomatic mission, begins studying Cartesian physics and discovers calculus 1676 { Hired as librarian and historian to the Duke of Hanover November 14, 1716 { Dies in Hanover Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Theologian Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Geologist And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 And so on. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Occupations Diplomat Privy Councillor Librarian Historian Private Tutor Mining Engineer Mathematician Physicist Theologian Geologist And so on. Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646{1716) October 8, 2019 4 / 36 1710 { Theodicy (published) 1714 { Principles of Nature and Grace and Monadology 1715-1716 { Correspondence with Samuel Clarke Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) Philosophical Writings Volumes published so far (since 1923): 66 Total contents of Leibniz Archive (Hanover): about 50,000 items (150,000-200,000 pages) Correspondence: about 20,000 letters exchanged with about 1,300 different people 1686 { Discourse on Metaphysics (published posthumously). 1695 { \New System of Nature" (published) 1704 { Stops work on New Essays on Human Understanding after Locke dies Kenny Pearce (TCD) Gottfried
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