APPENDIX 1 0 THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRU K

The recounting of this episode would have been left to the military historian if Mr in The Grand Alliance, the third volume of his history of the Second World War, had not presented the story a s being largely a story of political controversy affecting the reputation o f successive Australian Prime Ministers . In so doing he did not have recours e to the Australian documents, but prepared his narrative from communica- tions which passed between himself and Menzies, Fadden and Curtin . In a message of 21st June 1941, sent to the G .O .C., A.I.F., about the situation in the , Menzies asked among other questions whethe r Blarney was satisfied that could hold out or should be totall y evacuated, and Blamey replied that the Tobruk garrison could hold out "for the present" and there was no immediate anxiety although evacuatio n was being considered as part of the study of the whole question . These messages, however, were the outcome of a general anxiety about th e military situation and did not raise the question of withdrawing n troops and continuing to hold Tobruk with other troops. ' So far as Australian political leaders and the Australian War Cabine t were concerned, the starting point in discussion of the withdrawal of th e Australians was the receipt on 19th July 1941 (nearly eight weeks after Mr Menzies had returned to Australia from London via the United States ) of a personal telegram addressed to the Prime Minister by General Blarney . Blarney said that the garrison at Tobruk had been engaged in continuous operations since March ; its fighting value was now on the decline ; and he was pressing for its relief . Furthermore, he was also pressing for th e congregating of the whole of the A .I.F. in Palestine as a unified force in accordance with the agreement for its use which had been made betwee n the United Kingdom and Australian Governments . He urged the general argument that after any series of operations it was most desirable that th e troops involved should be given a respite to refresh them, restore discipline and re-equip . Blamey advised the Government that, during the next fe w weeks, a respite from operations in Tobruk was probable and that th e only real obstacle to providing fresh troops for Tobruk or to reassemblin g the A.I.F. in Palestine was the unwillingness of the Middle East Comman d to do so. Blarney stated that only the movement of personnel was involved . When Blarney sent this telegram the Syrian campaign had just ende d and the 7th Australian was in and redeploying in defensive positions. The campaign had been arduous and costly and the division wa s below strength . One of that division was in Tobruk with the 9t h Division; during the Syrian campaign the 7th had been brought up to strength by adding to it an improvised brigade made up from units o f the that had suffered less severely than others in Greece and

'Telegrams from Menzies to Blarney, 21 Jun 1941 ; and Blarney to Menzies, 23 Jun 1941 .

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRUK 617 Crete. The remainder of the 6th Division was in Palestine reforming an d retraining after Greece and Crete . Of its nine battalions two , though depleted, had been hurried into Syria in June, three had bee n captured in Crete in May and were being rebuilt from the ground up, four had lost heavily in Greece and Crete, where the artillery regiments ha d been forced to abandon all their guns . On 12th July one battalion of the 6th Division was 107 strong, the other eight ranged from 458 to 687 ; the division was 10,000 strong (its establishment was about 17,500) ; there were 913 troops in the reinforcement depot, 2,113 at sea . Thus after four campaigns and with a fifth in progress the A .I.F. was still widely dispersed : two of the and one of the 6th in Syria ; two brigades of the 6th in Palestine; the plus one brigade of the 7th i n Tobruk; and a unit of the 7th on Cyprus . On the day on which he despatched his cablegram to the Prime Minister, Blarney also wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, Genera l Auchinleck, recommending that action be taken forthwith for the relie f of the Tobruk garrison . His case rested on first, the effect of continuou s operations on the 9th Division, including the report of "a Senior Medica l Officer recently down from Tobruk" that in the last few weeks there ha d been "a definite decline in the health resistance of the troops" and, second , the agreed policy that the Australian troops should operate as a singl e force. On the second point, Blarney pointed out that the Australian Corp s was probably the most completely organised body in the Middle East, i t would certainly be required for operations within the next few months an d if it was to render full value in accordance with the wishes of the Australian Government and as agreed by the United Kingdom Government it shoul d be reassembled as early as possible. On 20th July Menzies sent a personal cablegram to Churchill . He stated first that the Australian Government regarded it as of first-class importanc e that, now the Syrian campaign had concluded, Australian troops in th e Middle East should be aggregated into one force . This would not only give an opportunity for refreshment, restoration of discipline and re-equip- ment after strenuous campaigns, but would also give immense satisfaction to the Australian people, for whom there was great national value an d significance in knowing that all Australian soldiers in any zone forme d one Australian unit . This principle had been fully accepted by both governments when Australian troops were first despatched to the Middl e East. Second, Menzies stated the particular case of the Tobruk garriso n which had been in continuous operations since March . If they could be relieved by fresh troops, the movement of personnel only being involved , the reassembling and the re-equipment of the A .I.F. in Palestine woul d then present no major difficulty . He asked Churchill to give directions t o the Middle East Command along these lines and concluded : "The com- parative lull now obtaining in seems to make this an ideal tim e for making the above move, to which we attach real and indeed urgen t importance".

618 THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRU K Over a fortnight later, Menzies, having received no reply from Churchil l to these representations and having in the meantime received by mail a copy of the letter from Blarney to Auchinleck, sent a further personal cablegram to Churchill on 7th August, asking for an early reply to his representations. He said that his War Cabinet was "considerably perturbed" over the report from Blarney about the condition of the troops and, as fresher troops were available, he pressed for the early relief of the 9t h Division and the re-assembling of the Australian . A reply from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on 9t h August—Churchill was then absent from London at the Atlantic meetin g with Roosevelt—informed the Australian Government that the telegram s from Menzies had been referred immediately to Auchinleck with a direction that the Australian views should be given full and sympatheti c consideration. Auchinleck was in London for consultation and the point s in the further cablegram of 7th August had been discussed with him . "We entirely agree in principle that the A.I.F. should be concentrated into on e force as soon as possible," the Secretary of State said, "and Genera l Auchinleck has undertaken to see to this immediately on his return . He does not anticipate any difficulty except in regard to the garrison of Tobruk . He is as anxious as you in this connection to relieve this garrison ." Between the 19th and 29th August the was withdrawn fro m Tobruk to rejoin the 7th Division. On 29th August Fadden became Prime Minister. On 4th September a telegram was received from Blarney asking the Government to insist upo n the reassembling of the A .I.F. as a single force and, in order to effect this , the withdrawal of the 9th Division from Tobruk . Unless the Government took a very firm stand he was convinced that the 9th Division would b e left in Tobruk indefinitely. In support of his plea, Blarney reported that the relief of the garrison was strongly opposed in the Middle East an d he had been asked to put the 9th Division artillery into Tobruk t o relieve the British artillery there, but he had refused as he considere d that such a move would mean that the 9th would be kept in Tobru k indefinitely. The garrison had now been besieged for five months and there had been a definite decline in physical condition . If relief were not insisted upon the decline in the fighting value of the 9th would b e considerable and the period of recovery correspondingly long . Further, should the force be attacked with strength and determination after one o r two months of further decline, it would not be fit to withstand such attac k and "catastrophe" was possible. Those left behind after the relief of th e 18th Brigade would feel that they were being let down if they were kep t much longer in Tobruk . Blamey also repeated gossip to the effect tha t when Auchinleck was recently in England Churchill told him that h e would "make it right with Australia" if Auchinleck did not see fit t o relieve the 9th. Ministers had also had additional information from Sir Iven Mackay who had recently returned to Australia. Mackay told the Advisory Wa r Council on 3rd September that the 9th was "in good trim" although the

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRUK 619 wear and tear on the men had been considerable, due to constant strai n and monotony, and they had been a long time without relief.2 On 5th September Fadden cabled to London drawing Churchill 's atten- tion to the representations made by Menzies and referring in general term s to information from Blarney which had thrown some doubt on the possi- bility of the general relief of the garrison . Fadden said that in view of th e decline in "the health resistance" of the troops and the fact that freshe r troops were available he reiterated the request of Menzies that direction s be issued to Auchinleck to relieve the 9th Division. The Australian Parlia- ment was meeting in the middle of the month and he wanted to announce to it that withdrawal had been completed and the A .I.F. had been con- centrated as a single force . "This is a vital national question here," he added, "and should any catastrophe occur to the Tobruk garrison through further decline and inability to withstand a determined attack there would be grave repercussions ." On 9th and 10th September, the Australian Government received fro m Blarney a report that Auchinleck still objected to the relief and, at som e length, he answered point by point the arguments which he understoo d Auchinleck would use . The arguments used by Auchinleck (not as ascribed to him by Blarney but in the text of a telegram which he sen t to London and which the Dominions Office repeated in its entirety t o Australia on 11th September) were that the naval risks were appreciable , as nearly all the ships engaged in the recent relief of the 18th Brigad e had been attacked by aircraft ; the continuation of the relief would thro w an added burden on the fleet of destroyers at the expense of other nava l operations; during the recent relief five fighter squadrons were permanently employed in escorting the ships at the expense of offensive air operations ; the relief of the garrison could only be carried out during the moonles s periods of 17th to 27th September and 16th to 26th October ; there were a variety of reasons, which Auchinleck traversed in some detail , why other troops were unsuited or unavailable to relieve the 9th Division ; half of the relief would have to take place during the latter half of October , but during this period it was hoped to concentrate the maximum ai r effort in gaining air superiority in the Western Desert and to complete all arrangements for a sortie from Tobruk . In conclusion, Auchinleck said : "The health and morale of the Tobruk garrison are very good, but th e power of endurance of the troops is noticeably reduced, and this is likely to be further reduced as time goes on, and I detect signs of tiredness i n those in responsible positions. An alternative solution to relief would b e to strengthen the powers of resistance of the garrison" . He suggested send- ing a battalion of infantry tanks into Tobruk during the latter half of September. This would have the advantage of morally and materiall y increasing the defensive powers of the garrison in addition to increasing it s offensive powers in future operations. With this reinforcement he felt confident about Tobruk's power of resistance to attack . Behind Auchin-

8 Advisory War Council Minute 510, 3 Sep 1941 .

620 THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRU K leek's arguments was the intention to launch an offensive at the earlies t possible date in accordance with his assurances to Churchill . He concluded by saying that he had given Blarney the facts and a n opportunity of stating his views and had consulted Generals Cunningha m and Morshead . He had finally placed the matter before the Minister of State in the Middle East, Lyttelton, and the naval and air Commanders-in - Chief at a meeting of the Defence Committee, and the Committee ha d agreed with his opinion that to attempt any further relief of the Tobruk garrison, however desirable it might be politically, was not a justifiabl e military operation in the circumstances and would definitely prejudic e the chances of success of the projected offensive in the Western Desert . Subject to Churchill's approval, he proposed therefore to abandon the idea of a further large-scale relief of Australian personnel in Tobruk and to reinforce the garrison at once with an infantry tank battalion . At the same time as these views were forwarded to Australia, Churchill sent to Fadden a personal message on 11th September, pointing out th e difficulties and adding, "If, however, you insisted that Australian troops must be relieved, orders will be issued accordingly, irrespective of the cos t entailed and the injury to future prospects . I trust, however, that you will weigh very carefully the immense responsibility which you woul d assume before history by depriving Australia of the glory of holding Tobruk till victory was won, which otherwise, by God's help, will be theirs for ever". The communications received from Blarney on 9th and 10th September 3 admitted but tended to minimise the arguments relating to naval and ai r operations and the prospective Western offensive and described the argu- ments in respect of the availability of other troops as "untenable". He thought the proposal to put tanks into Tobruk discounted the difficultie s of air protection and naval transport in view of the difficulties of handlin g tanks against the ease of handling personnel only . He made his main point, however, on the condition of the troops . "Health and morale are good," Blarney said, "but there is increasing and convincing evidence of a decline in physical powers . Tiredness is general and not confined to the more senior commanders . Experience shows that a physical decline tends t o increase at a progressive rate . If not relieved, certainly it may be reckone d that the troops in Tobruk will be required to stand up to a total perio d of eight to nine months' continuous front-line service under condition s of great hardship, at the end of which they are to carry out an offensive operation in cooperation with other operations . . . . Whilst anxious t o cooperate to the fullest degree, I cannot find the reasons given as sufficiently convincing to concur in the retention of a tired division on the battle front under continued conditions of strain . If the present garrison is retained, apart from the reasons previously submitted, it does not appear possible that it can give a good account of itself in any offensive action . It will be in grave danger of being unfit for service for a long period after the

3 Telegrams 181 and 184 to Prime Minister .

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRUK 62 1 desert campaign and, even if relieved forthwith, will require considerabl e rest." Blarney quoted Morshead in support of his view that relief was necessar y on account of the condition of the troops and that at the end of anothe r two or three months the troops would be quite unfit for any offensive. Fadden thus had before him Churchill's appeal, the arguments put up by Auchinleck, and the arguments put up by Blarney . The advice of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as the senior military adviser in Aus- tralia, had also been sought. The opinion of Major-General Rowell was that, as there was an Australian Commander in the Middle East appointed by the Australian Government, the Government must be guided by th e advice of that commander. He supported Blarney's recommendation fo r withdrawal on the ground that the troops had been continually engage d in front-line operations since early April in what were undoubtedly th e worst climatic conditions experienced by British troops in this war ove r an extended period . On 14th September Fadden sent a cablegram to the Secretary of State maintaining the request for the relief of the 9th Division and the concen- tration of the A .I.F. He said that the concentration of the A .I.F. in one corps under its own commander, who had a direct responsibility to the Commonwealth Government, was "fundamental to the effective coopera- tion of Dominion Forces in Empire Armies" and "vital to the Australia n people's conception of the control and direction of its expeditionary forces". He disposed of Auchinleck's arguments in the same manner as Blarney had done and concluded: In view of the responsibilities reposed in the G.O.C., A.I.F., and the advice ten- dered by him and the G .O.C. 9th Division, which is supported by the Government's advisers here, I am bound to request that the relief of the 9th Division and th e reconcentration of the A .I.F. be proceeded with. Any reverse suffered by the garrison of Tobruk in the light of the reports and the requests that have been made ove r an extended period would have far-reaching effects . We do not consider that the military considerations put forward by the Commander-in-Chief outweigh the cas e for the relief of the garrison. On 15th September the United Kingdom informed Australia that order s would at once be given in accordance with the Australian decision. This action was reported to the War Cabinet, of which Menzies was a member , on 16th September 1941 and was approved . On 29th September Blarney reported that the relief of the Group from Tobruk had been completed but that approximately half o f the division still remained for later relief. Churchill has recounted his own feelings at the Australian decision an d the further discussions he had during the second half of September wit h Auchinleck and the Minister of State in the Middle East . On 30th September Churchill asked Fadden if he would reconsider his decision that the last two Australian brigades must be pulled out of Tobruk. At the outset he mentioned that he and the Minister of State i n the Middle East had with difficulty prevented Auchinleck from resigning

622 THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRU K his command on grounds that the Australian Government had no con- fidence in his military judgment. "Had your decision been based on political grounds, he would not have felt the want of confidence implied, " Churchill added. This observation by Churchill suggests that Churchill recognised wha t the Australian documents make clear that, up to that stage at least, th e Australian Government had in fact been backing the opinion of their own Commander, Blarney, against the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief , Auchinleck, on matters relating to the operational use of the A .I.F., and that the main issue was a matter of military judgment, influenced on th e Australian side by concern for the principle of a unified A .I.F. under Blamey and for the well-being of Australian troops. Churchill now based his request for a reconsideration of the Australia n decision first on the ground of its effect on impending operations and second on a more general ground of Allied cooperation. He referred to a "great impending operation" by which he trusted all troops in Tobruk would be relieved and said that the withdrawal of the Australians durin g the moonless period in October would certainly handicap the air force i n their preliminary fight for air superiority before the battle, inasmuch a s they would have to divert their strength to provide air cover for the ship s carrying the Australian brigades out of Tobruk . Every day's delay in delivering the attack would make the Allied task more formidable . The probable date of the offensive was early November and the period during which the two Australian brigades would be involved was very short . Then he referred to the implication that an undue burden had been throw n on Australian troops and after alluding to British losses, said: "We feel that we are entitled to count on Australia to make every sacrifice necessary for the comradeship of the Empire" . Churchill's appeal was now undoubtedly an appeal reaching above a question of military judgment. It was an appeal to the Australian Govern- ment to forego independent judgment and to accept British leadership i n the interests of Empire cooperation . This message was received in Australia on the day when the Labou r party had launched its attack on the Budget which overthrew the Fadden Government. Fadden resigned on 3rd October and the reply sent to Churchill on 4th October, over Fadden's signature, was discussed b y Fadden with Curtin before it was despatched . Fadden denied any want of confidence in the military judgment of Auchinleck. He denied the implication that the Australian Government thought an undue burden had been thrown on Australian troops . He declared that Australia appreciated fully the facts put forward by Churchill . But, after "most full and careful further consideration" the Australia n Government thought the considerations they had put forward in their cable - gram of 14th September outweighed the other considerations urged b y Churchill. They maintained their request for withdrawal . On 13th October, the Curtin Government having assumed office , Churchill approached Curtin asking him to reconsider the issue once again .

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRUK 623 "I have heard from General Auchinleck that he would be very greatly helped and convenienced if the remaining two Australian brigades could stay in Tobruk until the result of the approaching battle is decided . I will not repeat the arguments which I have already used, but I will only add that if you felt able to consent, it would not expose your troops t o any undue or invidious risks and at the same time would be taken ver y kindly as an act of comradeship in the present struggle ." This telegram was given by Curtin to the War Cabinet at a meetin g on 15th October, together with a detailed review of all the communications that had passed since 5th September . There is no evidence that the War Cabinet had any additional information or military advice before it con- cerning either the condition of the troops or the situation in the Middl e East. It decided to adhere to the decision of the previous Government (i .e. d4W'Fadden Government) that the relief of the 9th Division should be &fff4ed out.4 The decision was reported to the Advisory War Council on f8lowing day, but there is no record of any discussion or any reques t i rT th!nrouncil ' s concurrence. 5 -n TiIkie0ly from Curtin to Churchill stated simply : "War Cabinet ha s 6ltle6ur request but it is regretted that it does not feel dispose d t 4' dfOeVrebious Government ' s decision which was apparently reache d after the fullest review of all the considerations involved. " • n Y 'Ql?e, Itnd'. liiamey reported that the relief of the remainder of the 9'ifin hrAlfgif1 §' oceeding and would be completed on the 26th . Curtin aPeci fe.to3 &'Advisory War Council on the 23rd and added tha t 8TAlpaiNii.kle6ErO of Medical Services, Major-General R . M. Downes, halc c fitilyllr . thed from the Middle East had stated that the firs t i?I:I 'i **lfEl'IWi een transferred from Tobruk (i .e . those relieve d il4''~fYleir}v~41 ' dffred a considerable decline in their physica l fs''rIn' rltli m g r -ahinet on the previous day the Chief of the v 10 R.f~ i$d t4utf& r1'ibwnes to similar effect . "The men did not thin k f1 tai d' rhi 'C'}2r1gra''Downes' view was that few of them would b e ~ ~~i~ht•'~r'iflr~' b; P•ErefitQclfi s mall en sent on the 26th . "Relief is being carrie d r?ifif~'aEQ "wffl Ybiir'decision which I greatly regret . " ar t (a.gi ii h etIT Aerj returned to Australia on a visit from th e f~i?if . tait'' thd QgfR -i)if' ffik was one of several subjects covered in Eugabl3.54i tth oA i f),Vdri Council. The discussion was summarised ivat IO i h .?fifl8ii,is

1501va- 11uz.1 2 r \(~ T ;rrluz3in 'Rr aib. ~he e raY a??~y thane lis first request for the relief of Australian troops "~pbru '{tdal nd Auchinleck] agreed, but after his return ~tidtfe i yadi411#1g`~1 ~l~ rib, in view of the forthcoming Western Deser t offei(OBJim zE II9w ar, {EnaiIOrfis bn i Some inconvenience was caused by the relief, but this was not great . The Aus- tralians at Tobruk were good troops and the Commander-in-Chief wished to keep them there to make sorties in connection with the offensive . General Blarney's vie w

'-War Cabinet.Minute_1404,_15_Oct__1941__an d War__Cabinet Agendum 326/1941 . 6 Advisory War Council Minute 534, 16 Oct 194P. t Advisory'*ar r~oiln¢ii Mlnate 5491013 tAat _j194kt i> « V

624 THE WITHDRAWAL FROM TOBRU K was that they were not fit to do this and his opinion had been confirmed b y subsequent reports as to their physical condition. One battalion and one (circa 1,000 men) had still to be relieved, actio n having been temporarily suspended due to an attack on a convoy . It was intended to complete the relief during the dark period late in November . ? The relief had been carried out between the 18th and 28th Septembe r and the 12th and 26th October by the 70th British Division (formerly called the 6th) . The 2/13th Battalion, however, remained until the en d of the in December 1941 . The only ship lost during th e relief was the British minelayer, Latona (2,650 tons), which was sunk by enemy bombs on 25th October . Latana was not carrying any troops at th e time. The above account has been prepared strictly as an account of events as seen from the Australian War Cabinet room . Yet it is clear that in their origin and in their consequences the events were military . What may have passed between Auchinleck and Blarney before Blarney appealed to th e Australian Government concerned matters of military judgment . The question whether or not the 9th Division was in a reduced physical con- dition and the question whether their withdrawal would seriously affec t operations are both military questions . Such matters will be examined separately and in sufficient detail in other volumes . 8 At the outset it would appear that the only elements in the situation , as viewed from Australia, were Blarney's report on the fatigue of the men , and Blamey's opinion that the time was suitable, after the tangled event s of the first half of the year, to reassemble the A .I.F. as a single force in accordance with one of the basic principles on which it had been mad e available for service overseas . These were matters of military judgment and the Australian Government backed the judgment of its own commander . That decision, originally made by the Menzies Government, was main- tained by both the Fadden and Curtin Governments . If any comparison is to be made between them it can only be made because of the differenc e in circumstances between July, September and October and the differenc e in the nature of the request made by Churchill to Australia . The origina l request for withdrawal was made during a lull in operations ; it was sustained during a time of preparation for an offensive . At the same time , it has to be recognised, insofar as the Australian decision was influenced by concern for the health of the men of the 9th Division, the decision wa s made when the men had been in Tobruk for four months ; it was sustained when they had been there for seven months, and presumably had suffered further loss in condition . When the request was first made the sole questions at issue seemed to be those of military judgment ; it was sustained in the face of a plea that was political and emotional as well as military .

', Advisory War Council Minute 564, 11 Nov 1941 . 8 See the third volume of the army series and the second volume of the medical series.