Name of the As of the end of 1997 Type of corporate rehabilitation procedures chaebol Number of Total Borrowings affiliates (billion won) Top Daewoo 250 25,347 Workout (1999. 8.26) 30 Kia 40 5,819 Corporate Reorganization (1998. 4.15) chaebols Ssangyong 75 9,004 Workout (Ssangyong Construction 1998. 11.1) Halla 36 4,501 Composition (1998. 3.20) Kohab 25 3,384 Workout (1998. 7.14) DongAh 42 3,696 Corporate Reorganization (DongAh Construction: discontinuance of corporate reorganization 2001. 3.9) Jinro 32 1,443 Composition (1998.2.3) Hanil 20 1,578 Corporate Reorganization (1999. 1.19) Anam 34 2,217 Workout (Anam Semiconductor: 1998. 10.30) Haitai 37 3,254 Corporate Reorganization (2001. 4.11) Shinho 33 1,569 Workout (1998. 7.16) Tongil 18 1,373 Corporate Reorganization (1999. 4.23) New Core 18 691 Corporate Reorganization (1998.11.16) Dongkuk 24 1,091 Workout (1998. 10.27) Saehan 24 1,805 Workout (2000. 5.27) Kabeul 23 832 Workout (1998. 7.24) Keopyong 20 1,960 Workout (1998. 7.23) 17 chaebols 751 69,564 31-63 Byuksan 20 1,064 Workout (1998. 8.14) chaebols Daenong 26 1,137 Corporate Reorganization (1997. 12.30) Woobang 14 833 Workout (1998. 7.25) Soosan Heavy 18 506 Corporate Reorganization (1998. 9.22) Kangwon 29 1,566 Workout (1998. 7.28) Industry Chungkoo 20 750 Corporate Reorganization (19998. 8.17) Sepoong 10 531 Workout (1998. 7.24) Bosung 12 543 Workout (1998. 5.6) Jindo 24 807 Workout (1998. 7.23) Corporate Reorganization (2001. 5.16) Shinwon 26 870 Workout (1998. 7.24) Nasan 20 881 Corporate Reorganization (1998. 7.14) Keukdong 19 899 Corporate Reorganization (1998. 7.6) Daedong 9 334 Composition (2000. 3.22) 13 chaebols 247 10,721 30 chaebols 998 80,284 Source: The Board of Audit and Inspection (2001), “An Audit Report on Management and Oversight of Public Funds”
The Top 30 Chaebols in 2006
Number of Total assets Debt/equity ratio Chaebols Rank in 1997 affiliates (Trillion won) (%) 1. Samsung 59 115.9 49.9 2 2. Hyundai Motors 40 62.2 74.7 Not on list 3. SK 56 54.8 125.3 5 4. LG 30 54.4 87.8 3 5. Lotte 43 33.0 69.2 10 6. POSCO 21 30.2 33.3 Not on list 7. GS 50 21.8 97.9 Not on list 8. Hanjin 22 20.7 184.7 7 9. Hyundai Heavy Industry 7 17.3 243.9 Not on list 10. Hanwha 31 16.5 159.3 9 11. Doosan 18 13.7 199.9 14 12. Gumho 23 13.0 193.5 11 13. Hynix 5 10.4 65.7 Not on list 14. Dongbu 22 8.7 211.8 22 15. Hyundai 9 7.1 203.5 1 16. Shinsegae 14 7.0 126.2 Not on list 17. CJ 56 6.8 91.8 Not on list 18. LS 19 6.6 122.6 Not on list 19. Daelim 13 6.5 91.8 15 20. GM Daewoo 3 6.5 176.4 Not on list 21. Hite 13 6.0 238.4 22 22. Daewoo Construction 11 6.0 126.2 Not on list 23. Dongkuk 12 5.7 102.5 18 24. Daewoo Shipbuilding 5 5.4 257.1 Not on list 25. STX Pan Ocean 10 4.9 168.9 Not on list 26. Tongyang 15 4.6 230.9 23 27. Hyosung 17 4.5 194.6 17 28. Hyundai Oilbank 2 4.4 191.4 Not on list 29. Hyundai Department 23 4.4 68.3 Not on list 30. Kolon 23 4.4 217.6 20
Share of Firms with IPCR below 1 (Number of firms, trillion won) IPCR < 1
Two Consecutive Years Three Consecutive Years 2005 (2004 and 2005) (2003, 2004 and 2005) Number of 107 56 19 Top 70 firms (18.2%) (9.5%) (3.2%) Chaebols 16.7 2.6 0.9 Borrowings (9.7%) (1.5%) (0.5%) Number of 2,642 1,469 664 Non- firms (27.5%) (15.3%) (6.9%) Chaebols 81.2 50.43 23.5 Borrowings (43.2%) (26.8%) (12.5%) Number of 2,749 1,525 683 firms (27.0%) (15.0%) (6.7%) Total 97.9 53.0 24.3 Borrowings (27.3%) (14.8%) (6.8%) Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the share of firms and the share of total borrowings in each group.
3 < Table 2-5 > Key Items of Minority Shareholders’ Rights
Former Commercial Code Amendments Securities and Exchange Act 3% 0.5%(0.25%) Removal of a Director 5% (Art.385 ) (Art.191/13 ) 1% 0.5%(0.25%) Right to Injunction 5% (Art.402) (Art.191/13 ) 1% 0.01% Derivative Suit 5% (Art.403) (Art.191/13 ) 3% 1%(0.5%) Shareholder's Proposal - (Art.363 ) (Art.191/14 ) 3% 3%(1.5%) Demand for Convocation 5% (Art.366 ) (Art.191/13 ) Right to Inspect Account 3% 1%(0.5%) 5% Books (Art.466 ) (Art.191/13 ) Right to Inspect Affairs 3% 3%(1.5%) 5% and Company Property (Art.467 ) (Art.191/13 ) 3% 0.5%(0.25%) Removal of Liquidation 5% (Art.539 ) (Art.191/13 ) * Parentheses show the case of corporations with more than 100 billion won, paid-in capital in the end of the recent business year.
4
Corporate Governance and Investor Protection Institution Index Enforcement Index (A)-(B) (A) (B) Disclosure and Audit 0.79 0.50 0.29 Disclosure 0.88 0.47 0.41 Audit 0.63 0.53 0.10 Supervision and Litigation by shareholders 0.72 0.39 0.33 Independence of supervisory bodies 0.50 0.47 0.03 Power of supervisory bodies 1.00 0.51 0.49 Litigation by shareholders 0.67 0.19 0.48 Accountability of managers 0.90 0.45 0.45 Shareholders’ rights 0.88 0.34 0.54 Market for corporate control 1.00 0.56 0.44 Director/controlling shareholders’ liability 0.83 0.45 0.38 Overall 0.80 0.45 0.35 * Index score ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 being the perfect score ** The institution index is constructed by examining the legal framework, while the enforcement index is based on a survey of experts Source: Youngjae Lim et. al (KDI, 2003), Recited from OECD (2004)
5
Financial Institutions Closed or Merged
(As of October, 2006, unit: number of institution)
Prompt Corrective Actions in Korea (Revised in March 1999)
Conditions when measures are taken Decision- Measures Details of Measures BIS maker Others ratio 1. Above the third rate in Governor 1. Restructuring of organization CAMELS, but below of Financial 2. Cost reduction the fourth rate in terms Supervisory 3. Increasing the efficiency of of quality of assets or Service business unit Management Management capital adequacy (FSS) 4. Restrictions in fixed asset Below Improvement 2. It seems evident that investment, entry to new business, 8% Recommendations the above cut-off and new financial investment conditions are not 5. Management of insolvent assets satisfied because of the 6. Recapitalization large financial debacle 7. Restriction of dividend payout Special allowance for bad debts. 1. Below the fourth rate in Governor 1. Closure or consolidation of existing CAMELS of FSS business units or restriction of new 2. It seems evident that the (After the ones above cut-off conditions FSC vote) 2. Retrenchment of organization are not satisfied because 3. Restriction of holding risky assets of the large financial and management of assets debacle 4. Restriction of deposit rate Management 5. Restructuring of subsidiaries Below Improvement 6. Requirement of management 6% Requirements turnover 7. Partial suspension 8. Planning of M&A, or transfer of business 9. Measures specified in Clause 2, Article 34 of the Act Concerning Structural Improvement of Financial Industry Unsound financial FSC 1. Write-off of shares Institutions specified in 2. Prohibition of execution by Management Clause 3, Article 2 of the management and nomination of Below Improvement Act Concerning Structural manager 2% Orders Improvement of 3. M&A Financial Industry 4. Suspension for less than 6 months 5. Transfer of contracts
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission
9
Loan Classification Standard and Required Provisions
Prior to July 1998 Since July 1998 Definition1 Normal - - Precautionary 3~6 month past due 1~3 month past due More than 6 months past More than 3 months past Substandard due, secured due, secured More than 6 months past More than 3 months past Doubtful due, unsecured due, unsecured Estimated Loss Expected losses Expected losses Loan loss reserve requirement Normal 0.5% 0.5% Precautionary(Special mention) 1% 2% Substandard 20% 20% Doubtful 75% 75% Estimated Loss 100% 100% Provisioning for outstanding 20% of “substandard”, 75% Not required of “doubtful”, and 100% of Guarantees “estimated loss” Source: Financial Supervisory Commission.
10
Ceilings on Credit Exposures of Financial Institutions
Commercial Merchant Bank Insurance
Bank Company Company Credit Exposures to a Up to 20% of Up to 20% of bank’s
Single Borrower bank’s capital capital Combined Credit Up to 25% of Up to 25% of bank’s Up to 3% of total Exposures to Firms bank’s capital capital assets Affiliated with the Same Chaebol Total Sum of Large Up to 5 times of Up to 5 times of Loans and Credit Exposures bank’s capital Bank’s capital securities holdings up to 5% of total assets, respectively Credit Exposures to Large Up to ownership Up to ownership Shareholders of Financial shares of the Shares of the Institutions 1) Shareholder in Shareholder in
question with question with maximum of 25% maximum of 25% of of bank’s capital bank’s capital
Note: 1) Large shareholders refer to those that own 10% or more of total shares with voting rights. Source: Financial Supervisory Commission
11
Financial Conglomeration by Types in Banking, Insurance, Securities, and ITCs (Trillion Won, %)
16 Distribution of Operating Profitability for All Manufacturing Externally Audited Firms
0.40 1996 0.35 2003 2004 0.30 2005
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00 -50 -25 0 25 50
17 Distribution of Operating Profitability for High-Tech Industry
Distribution of Operating Profitability for Medium-High Tech Industry
18
Distribution of Operating Profitability for Medium-Low Tech Industry
Distribution of Operating Profitability for Low Tech industry
19
20 Share of Troubled Firms (IPCR<1) by Industry Group After the Crisis: Large Firms
30% low tech midium low tech midium high tech high tech 25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Share of Troubled Firms (IPCR<1) by Industry Group After the Crisis: SMEs
45% low tech midium low tech midium high tech 40% high tech
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0% 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
21 Selection of the Board Directors (1992, 1999)
1992 1999
Government Stockholder Stock- Stockholder holders Chair of C.E.O Chair of Group Chaebol Chair of Group
Financial Institution Client Group C.E.O C.E.O Others
Source: Kim, Kim and Kim (2001)
Background of CEO (1992, 1999)
Second or third 1992 1999 generation of the founder of the Founder of the chaebol chaebol Financial institution Others Founder of Second or third the chaebol generation of Government the founder of the chaebol Another Second or Promotion cor poration third within the firm generation of the founder Government of the Government chaebol Another Promotion within corporation Promotion the firm withn the firm Financial institution
Source: Kim, Kim and Kim (2001)
22
Investment/GDP ratio
45 Inv estment 40 Facility Investment Construction Investment 35
Note: 1) CR1: market share of the first largest bank in the market. 2) CR3: market shares of the top 3 largest banks in the market. 3) HHI: Herfindhal-Hirshman Index
33 Profitability: Profits/Losses for Financial Industries (Trillion Won)
k k p n k e k k k k an u up an an an b B ang iban b b in gr o an k m an Gro ch Cit bu Hanaba al irst us n nh F Ex Daeguban P o Kook C Je Shi S inanci F Korea i oor W
37 Market Share of Foreign Owned Banks in Korean Banking Sector
25
20
15
10
5
0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
38 Market Share of Foreign Owned NBFIs by Industry
30 Securities 25 Insurance Investment Trust
20
15
10
5
0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
39 Foreign Investor’s share of Equities and Bond Market
40 Outstanding Loans by Financial Institutions by Sector
350
300
250
200 Firms
150
100
50 Consumers
0
41 > Growth of Household Credits and Housing Prices
25 25 20 20 Household home 15 financing credit Housing prices 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 -5 -5 I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
42 > Ratio of Consumer Credits to Personal Disposable Income