Vet. App. No. 19-3129 ______

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS ______

VYTAUTAS L. RAMUNAS, Appellant,

v.

ROBERT L. WILKIE, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Appellee. ______

ON APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ______

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ______

WILLIAM A. HUDSON, JR. Principal Deputy General Counsel

MARY ANN FLYNN Chief Counsel

KENNETH A. WALSH Deputy Chief Counsel

JESSICA K. GRUNBERG Senior Appellate Attorney Office of General Counsel (027J) U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 810 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20420 (202) 632-6745

Attorneys for Appellee TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... iii I. ISSUES PRESENTED ...... 1 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...... 2

A. Jurisdictional Statement ...... 2

B. Nature of the Case ...... 2

C. Statement of Relevant Facts ...... 2

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ...... 6 IV. ARGUMENT ...... 8

A. Standard of review ...... 8

B. The Board adequately explained that the evidence of record, including an adequate February 2013 lumbar spine examination, weighs against a

finding that Appellant’s lumbar spine disorder is related to service ...... 9

C. The Court should vacate and remand the part of the Board decision

denying service connection for a cervical spine disorder ...... 15

D. The Court should vacate and remand the part of the Board decision dismissing claims for service connection for hepatitis and a rating in excess of 10% for facial acne ...... 18

V. CONCLUSION ...... 19

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Acevedo v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 286 (2012) ...... 11 Acree v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1009 (2018) ...... 18 Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405 (1994) ...... 9 Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303 (2007) ...... 9, 16 Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ...... 14 Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498 (1995) ...... 8 Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ...... 15 D’Aries v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 97 (2008) ...... 9, 15 DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 45 (2011) ...... 18 Deloach v. Shinseki, 704 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ...... 12 Fears v. Wilkie, 21 Vet.App. 308 (2019) ...... 11 Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258 (2015) ...... 14 Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49 (1990) ...... 8, 12, 15 Hyder v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 221 (1991) ...... 11 Kern v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 350 (1993) ...... 10 Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ...... 14 Monzingo v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 97 (2012) ...... 11 Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ...... 8 Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 429, 433 (1995) ...... 12, 15 Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 458 (1993) ...... 16 Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 40 (2010) ...... 12, 13 Solomon v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 396 (1994) ...... 8 Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120 (2007) ...... 9, 11, 15 Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369 (1998) ...... 19

iii Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 362 (2005) ...... 12

Statutes 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) ...... 8, 17 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) ...... 2 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) ...... 8

Regulations 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b)(1) (2018) ...... 18

RECORD CITATIONS

R. at 4-12 (March 2019 Board decision) ...... passim

R. at 22 (December 2018 statement) ...... 6, 17

R. at 30-53 (October 2018 Board hearing) ...... 5, 6, 18

R. at 2963 (October 2014 VA Form 9) ...... 5

R. at 3125-26 (May 1984 separation examination) ...... 2, 13, 14

R. at 3127-28 (May 1984 report of medical history) ...... 2, 13, 14

R. at 3130-31 (March 1988 report of medical history) ...... 13, 14

R. at 3201 (DD 214) ...... 2

R. at 3237-71 (August 2014 SOC) ...... 5

R. at 3457-77 (December 2013 lay statement and evidence) ...... 5, 17

R. at 3551-53 (September 2013 NOD) ...... 5

R. at 3660-68 (May 2013 rating decision) ...... 5

R. at 3698-731 (February 2013 VA examinations) ...... passim

R. at 3743 (December 1988 treatment record) ...... 16

R. at 3754-55 (April 2004 treatment record) ...... 3

iv R. at 3768 (December 2012 report of general information) ...... 3

R. at 3769-72 (November 2008 treatment record) ...... 3

R. at 3796 (August 1983 STR) ...... 2, 10

R. at 3798-809 (September 2012 claim) ...... 3

R. at 4001-07 (September 2011 claim) ...... 3

R. at 4017 (September 2011 report of general information) ...... 3

R. at 4336-38 (April 2004 treatment record) ...... 3

R. at 4362-64 (June 2003 treatment record) ...... 3

R. at 4507 (March 1993 treatment record) ...... 3, 16

R. at 4510 (July 1993 treatment record) ...... 3, 16

R. at 4656-57 (December 1984 rating decision) ...... 3

R. at 4665-67 (August 1984 C&P examination) ...... 3, 15

R. at 4669-70 (June 1984 claim) ...... 3

v IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

VYTAUTAS L. RAMUNAS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Vet. App. No. 19-3129 ) ROBERT L. WILKIE, ) Secretary of Veterans Affairs, ) ) Appellee. )

______

ON APPEAL FROM THE BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ______

BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS ______

I. ISSUES PRESENTED

In denying service connection for a lumbar spine condition, did the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) correctly find that VA’s duty to assist was satisfied by a February 2013 VA lumbar spine examination that is based on Appellant’s medical history, and adequately explain that the probative evidence weighs against this claim?

Should the Court vacate and remand the parts of the Board decision denying service connection for a cervical spine condition and dismissing claims for hepatitis and an increased rating for facial acne?

1 II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Jurisdictional Statement

The Court has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a), which grants the

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims exclusive jurisdiction to

review final decisions of the Board.

B. Nature of the Case

Appellant, Vytautas L. Ramunas, appeals the March 11, 2019, Board

decision that denied claims of entitlement to service connection for a cervical

spine disorder and a lumbar spine disorder, and dismissed claims for service

connection for hepatitis and a rating in excess of 10% for facial acne. [Record

Before the Agency (R.) at 4-12].

C. Statement of Relevant Facts

Appellant served in the United States Air Force from June 1980 to June

1984. [R. at 3201]. His service treatment records (STRs) show that he sought treatment for upper back pain in August 1983, at which time he stated that he had been involved in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) a few months prior. [R. at

3796]. Appellant described his pain as occurring in his “upper [and] mid back” and radiating “from past cervical over to between shoulder blades.” Id. He was assessed with a trapezius muscle strain. Id. At his separation examination in

May 1984, his spine was evaluated as normal. [R. at 3125-26]. And in an accompanying report of medical history, Appellant denied recurrent back pain and arthritis. [R. at 3127-28].

2 Immediately after his separation from service, Appellant filed a claim for

compensation for lymphoma. [R. at 4669-70]. In connection with his claim, he underwent a VA examination in August 1984, during which he reported “[n]o history of musculoskeletal difficulties.” [R. at 4666 (4665-67)]. He was later

awarded service connection for Woringer Kolopp disease and a groin scar from

residuals of a biopsy. [R. at 4656-57].

Subsequent treatment records show that Appellant complained of neck pain in 1993. [R. at 4507, 4510]. Ten years later, he again began to complain of neck pain. [R. at 4362-64] (June 2003 treatment record noting complaints of occupational neck pain and assessing left neck stiffness); see also [R. at 3754-

55 (April 2004 diagnostic report noting complaints of “neck pain left

sided for years”), 4336 (4336-38) (April 2004 treatment record noting Appellant

complained of “neck pain [that] might be related to anxiety”), 3769-72 (November

2008 outpatient note recording complaints of “chronic neck pain x 10 years”)].

In September 2011, Appellant filed claims for service connection for, inter

alia, hepatitis and acne scarring. [R. at 4001-07, 4017]. In 2012, Appellant filed

additional claims for service connection for a cervical spine disorder and a

lumbar spine disorder. [R. at 3768 (December 2012 report of general information

showing Appellant called regarding a claim for service connection for a lumbar

spine condition), 3798-809 (September 2012 claim for a cervical spine

condition)].

3 In February 2013, Appellant underwent VA examinations for his cervical and lumbar spine conditions. [R. at 3698-731].

The cervical spine examination report shows that the VA examiner

reviewed the record and conducted an in-person examination. [R. at 3719]. In

describing the medical history related to Appellant’s cervical spine condition, the

examiner stated that Appellant was involved in an MVA during service in March

1983 and subsequently sought treatment in August 1983 for “mid and upper back

pain of [a] one month duration.” [R. at 3720]. The examiner noted that the August

1983 STR contained a diagnosis of trapezius muscle strain, and the examiner

stated that the “next documented neck pain was on 6/18/1993 [10 years after

MVA].” Id. Ultimately, the VA examiner diagnosed degenerative disc disease and

spinal stenosis of the cervical spine but opined that the cervical spine conditions

were less likely than not incurred in or caused by service. [R. at 3700]; see [R. at

3720, 3730]. The examiner reasoned that there was no documented neck injury

at the time of the MVA, and that there was no documented neck pain between

August 1983 and June 2003. [R. at 3700].

The lumbar spine examination report also shows that the VA examiner

reviewed the record and conducted an in-person examination. [R. at 3707]. As to

the lumbar spine, the examiner diagnosed degenerative disc disease (DDD).

[R. at 3707]. The examiner noted that STRs were silent for low back pain, but

that Appellant “state[d] that he has been having low back pain . . . since MVA in

service in 1983.” [R. at 3708]. The examiner then opined that the lumbar spine

4 condition is less likely than not related to service. [R. at 3704]. The examiner stated that STRs did not document low back pain, and that such reports of pain were not documented “until recently.” Id.

In May 2013, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office

(RO) granted service connection for facial acne/acne vulgaris with scarring,

which it rated 10% disabling. [R. at 3666 (3660-68)]. The RO also denied service

connection for hepatitis, a cervical spine condition, and a lumbar spine condition.

[R. at 3662-63].

Thereafter, Appellant filed a September 2013 notice of disagreement

(NOD), in which he expressed disagreement with the acne vulgaris rating and the

denials of service connection for the three other conditions. [R. at 3551-53]. He

also submitted a lay statement and evidence in support of his cervical spine

claim in December 2013. [R. at 3457-77]. In his lay statement, Appellant

asserted that evidence “clearly invalidate[s] the statement made by the

examining ” that records do not show “complaints of my neck hurting

from 1983 to the year 200[3].” [R. at 3474].

In August 2014, the RO issued a statement of the case (SOC) continuing

the denial of a rating in excess of 10% for facial acne and the denials of service

connection for a cervical disc condition, a lumbar condition, and hepatitis. [R. at

3237-71]. Appellant then perfected his appeal to the Board. [R. at 2963].

Appellant testified before the Board in October 2018. [R. at 30-53]. The

Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) noted that one issue on appeal was “entitlement to an

5 increased rating greater than 10 percent for facial acne” but that it was her understanding that Appellant “wish[ed] to drop that issue.” [R. at 31]. The VLJ asked if her understanding was correct, to which Appellant responded “[y]es, correct.” Id. Similarly, the VLJ noted that “entitlement to service connection for hepatitis is also going to be dropped” and asked Appellant if that was correct. Id.

Again, he replied “[y]es, correct.” Id. The VLJ stated that “we’re going to drop those two issues.” Id. Appellant then testified about his claimed cervical and lumbar spine conditions. He stated that he was involved in an MVA during service that caused back and neck pain, and that he continued to have back and neck issues after service. [R. at 35, 39].

In December 2018, Appellant submitted a statement reiterating his contention that the February 2013 VA cervical spine examiner incorrectly stated that “neck pain was nowhere to be found until June 2003.” [R. at 22].

In May 2019, the Board issued a decision denying service connection for lumbar and cervical spine conditions, and dismissing the claims related to hepatitis and facial acne. [R. at 4-12]. This appeal followed.

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court should affirm the part of the Board decision denying service connection for a lumbar spine condition. The Board properly relied on a February

2013 VA lumbar spine examination, which is based on Appellant’s medical history, to include his lay reports of back pain since service and STRs showing no complaints of low back pain. Appellant fails to show that the examination is

6 based on an inaccurate factual premise, as he concedes both that STRs do not document low back pain and that the examiner considered his lay statements regarding pain since service. Appellant also fails to show that the Board relied solely on the absence of lumbar pain in service to find that the evidence of record outweighed Appellant’s reports of low back pain since service. As the Board explained, Appellant’s separation examination shows that he had a normal spine, and Appellant did not complain of service-related low back pain until many years after his separation. Additionally, the record contains evidence contemporaneous to Appellant’s service showing that he explicitly denied recurrent back pain.

The Court should vacate and remand that part of the Board decision denying service connection for a cervical spine disorder. The February 2013 VA cervical spine examination relied on by the Board is based upon an inaccurate factual premise, because the examiner incorrectly stated that Appellant did not complain of neck pain between 1983 and 2003. Additionally, the Board did not address medical evidence showing that Appellant complained of neck pain in

1993.

The Court should also vacate and remand that part of the Board decision dismissing claims for service connection for hepatitis and a rating in excess of

10% for facial acne. Although the Board correctly stated that Appellant expressed his desire to withdraw those claims at the October 2018 Board hearing, the

Board did not adequately explain if Appellant fulfilled the necessary requirements for a valid verbal withdrawal of his appeals.

7 IV. ARGUMENT

A. Standard of review

The Court reviews the Board’s findings of fact, including its service

connection determinations, under the “clearly erroneous” standard of review.

38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4); see Solomon v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 396, 402 (1994).

Under this deferential standard of review, the Court must affirm the Board’s

factual findings if they are “plausible in light of the record.” Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1

Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990).

The Court also reviews whether the Board has supported its decision with

a written statement of reasons or bases for its factual findings and conclusions of

law. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). To comply with this requirement, the Board must

analyze the probative value of evidence, account for evidence it finds persuasive

or unpersuasive, and explain why it rejected evidence materially favorable to the

claimant. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 (1995). The Board is not required

to address each item of evidence, as it is presumed to have considered all

evidence of record. Newhouse v. Nicholson, 497 F.3d 1298, 1302 (Fed. Cir.

2007).

8 B. The Board adequately explained that the evidence of record, including an adequate February 2013 lumbar spine examination, weighs against a finding that Appellant’s lumbar spine disorder is related to service

1. February 2013 VA lumbar spine examination

The February 2013 VA lumbar spine examination is adequate because it is based upon Appellant’s medical history, to include his lay reports of pain since service.

Once the Secretary undertakes the effort to provide an examination, he must provide an adequate one. See Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 303, 311

(2007). A medical opinion is adequate “where it is based upon consideration of the veteran’s prior medical history and examinations and also describes the disability, if any, in sufficient detail so that the Board’s ‘evaluation of the claimed disability will be a fully informed one.’” Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 120, 123

(2007) (quoting Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 405, 407 (1994)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Whether a medical opinion is adequate is a finding of fact subject

to review under the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard. D’Aries v. Peake, 22

Vet.App. 97, 104 (2008).

The 2013 VA examiner reviewed Appellant’s claims file and conducted an

in-person examination. [R. at 3703]. The examiner then correctly stated that

Appellant’s STRs do not document low back pain and that low back pain had not

been documented in medical records “until recently.” [R. at 3703-04]. Appellant

points to no evidence contradicting the examiner’s statement, and instead argues

9 that the examination “appears to be based upon an inaccurate factual premise” because an August 1983 STR shows he complained of “upper and mid back

pain” that radiated to his shoulder blades. Appellant’s Brief (Br.) at 11 (emphasis

added); see [R. at 3796] (August 1983 STR). But, as Appellant recognizes, the documentation of upper and mid back pain does not show that STRs documented low back pain. See id. (“[T]o the extent that it matters that Appellant

did not complain of low back pain . . . .”). Appellant’s concession that his STRs

do not document low back pain undermines his argument that the VA examiner

inaccurately stated that there is “[n]o documented low back pain in his STR[s].”

[R. at 3704].

Notably, the VA examiner considered the August 1983 STR documenting

“mid and upper back pain” in evaluating Appellant’s separately claimed cervical

spine condition. [R. at 3720]; see also [R. at 8]. Appellant fails to explain why the

VA examiner should have addressed “the medical significance” of this STR when

evaluating his low back, rather than his cervical spine. See Appellant’s Br. at 11.

To the extent Appellant contends that the STR documenting upper and mid back

pain is relevant to his low back condition—and not the cervical spine condition as

noted by the VA examiner—the Secretary submits that neither Appellant nor his

attorney have shown that they are qualified to explain the significance of medical

evidence. See Kern v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 350, 353 (1993) (rejecting an

unsupported medical hypothesis because “appellant’s attorney is not qualified to

provide an explanation of the significance of the clinical evidence”); Hyder v.

10 Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 221, 225 (1991) (explaining that lay hypothesizing serves

no constructive purpose). Additionally, the 2013 VA examiner is presumed

competent to know how to properly evaluate a condition. See Monzingo v.

Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 97, 106-07 (2012); see also Fears v. Wilkie, 21 Vet.App.

308 (2019).

The Court should also reject Appellant’s argument that the VA examiner

failed to consider lay reports of pain since service, as Appellant concedes that

the February 2013 VA examiner recorded his reports “that ‘he has been having

low back pain . . . since MVA in service in 1983.’” Appellant’s Br. at 12-13; see

[R. at 3708]. There appears to be no dispute, therefore, that the VA examiner

considered both Appellant’s lay statements of pain since service and the STRs

containing no documentation of low back pain. This shows that the VA

examination report is based upon consideration of Appellant’s medical history, to

include his reported medical history. See Stefl, 21 Vet.App. at 123. Further,

although Appellant contends that the examiner should have provided a

“meaningful discussion” of his lay statements, this argument confuses the duties

of a medical examiner with those of the adjudicator. Appellant’s Br. at 13-14; see

Monzingo, 26 Vet.App. at 105 (rejecting an appellant’s argument that the

examiner was required to “provide a detailed review” of his medical history); see

also Acevedo v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 286, 293 (2012) (holding that VA

examiners are not bound by a reasons-or-bases requirement).

11 In sum, the February 2013 VA examination is adequate because it is based on Appellant’s medical history, and Appellant fails to show that the Board erred by relying on it.

2. Reasons or bases

The Board adequately explained that the evidence of record “weighs against a finding of continuity of relevant symptoms” since service, [R. at 9], and

Appellant’s argument to the contrary is merely a disagreement with the Board’s probative value assessment.

It is the Board’s responsibility to assess the credibility and probative weight of evidence, Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 362, 368 (2005), and the

Court may only overturn the Board’s probative value determinations if they are clearly erroneous, Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 40, 48 (2010). See Owens v.

Brown, 7 Vet.App. 429, 433 (1995) (explaining that it is the responsibility of the

Board to assess the credibility and weight to be given to evidence). Under the

“clearly erroneous” standard of review, the Court must uphold the Board’s determinations “if there is a ‘plausible’ basis in the record for the factual determinations of the [Board], even if this Court might not have reached the same factual determinations.” Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 53; see Deloach v. Shinseki,

704 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Court “may not weigh any evidence itself”).

The Board here considered Appellant’s competent reports of experiencing lumbar spine pain since service, but it found that his statements were outweighed

12 by evidence contemporaneous to his service. [R. at 9]. Such evidence included

Appellant’s separation examination, which shows that his spine was evaluated as normal. Id.; see [R. at 3125]. A report of medical history accompanying the

separation examination also shows that Appellant explicitly denied recurrent back

pain and arthritis. [R. at 3127]; see also [R. at 3130] (March 1988 report of

medical history continuing to deny recurrent back pain and arthritis). Further, the

Board correctly stated that there was a “well over 25 year gap in time between

separation from service and the Veteran’s first assertion of an in-service onset of

spinal problems” and that Appellant had not claimed a back condition when

initially applying for disability benefits in 1984. [R. at 9] (noting that the February

2013 VA examination was also more probative than “lay assertions made in connection with the claim[]” for benefits).

The Board’s probative value assessment is not clearly erroneous because

it is supported by a plausible basis in the record. See Smith, 24 Vet.App. at 48.

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the Board did not rely solely on the “absence

of documentation relating to . . . a lumbar spine disorder” in finding lay

statements less probative. Appellant’s Br. at 19. Rather, the Board relied on

evidence contemporaneous to Appellant’s separation, which shows that

Appellant denied recurrent back pain and had a normal spine. [R. at 9]; see [R. at

3125 (May 1984 Report of Medical Examination containing an “X” in the “normal”

column for line 38, regarding the spine), 3127 (May 1984 Report of Medical

History containing a check-mark in the “no” column next to “[r]ecurrent back

13 pain”)]; see also [R. at 3130] (1988 report of medical history showing Appellant denied recurrent back pain). Appellant attempts to argue that he was not expected to report back pain during service or at separation, see Appellant’s Br. at 20, but this argument is unpersuasive because his service records show that he explicitly denied recurrent back pain in 1984 and 1988.

The Board also did not err in considering the 25-year gap in time between

Appellant’s service and his report of in-service low back pain, in addition to contemporaneous service records showing that Appellant denied recurrent low back pain. But see Appellant’s Br. at 21-22. As the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained, the Board may consider “evidence of a prolonged period without medical complaint, along with other factors.”

Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Buchanan v.

Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that the Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against lay evidence, but cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility solely based on the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence). Similarly, Appellant fails to

show that the Board erred in finding probative that Appellant’s initial claim for

benefits did not mention a low back condition, as this is just one factor the Board

considered in finding that the evidence weighed against Appellant’s assertion

that he has experienced low back pain since service. [R. at 9]; see Fountain v.

McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 258, 273 (2015) (explaining that the Board “may not rely

solely on the fact that the appellant did not file, at a particular point, a claim for

14 VA benefits”) (emphasis added). Notably, a VA examination provided in connection with that initial claim shows that Appellant denied a “history of musculoskeletal difficulties” at that time. [R. at 4666] (August 1984 examination).

In sum, the Board’s finding that Appellant’s lay assertions of low back pain since service were outweighed by contemporaneous evidence is supported by a plausible basis in the record, to include reports of medical history showing that

Appellant denied recurrent back pain in 1984 and 1988. Appellant thus fails to show that the Board’s probative value assessments are clearly erroneous, and his argument amounts to a mere disagreement with the Board’s analysis and its ultimate denial of service connection. See Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 53; Owens, 7

Vet.App. at 433. As a final matter, the Secretary notes that he has limited his response to only those arguments raised by Appellant in his opening brief and submits that any other arguments or issues should be deemed abandoned. See

Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 34 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

C. The Court should vacate and remand the part of the Board decision denying service connection for a cervical spine disorder

1. February 2013 VA cervical spine examination

The Court should vacate and remand that part of the Board decision denying entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine disorder because the Board relied on an inadequate February 2013 VA cervical spine examination.

See D’Aries, 22 Vet.App. at 104; Stefl, 21 Vet.App. at 123.

15 The Secretary agrees with Appellant that the February 2013 VA cervical spine examination is inadequate because it is based on an inaccurate medical history. See Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 458, 461 (1993) (“An opinion based upon an inaccurate factual premise has no probative value.”); see also

Appellant’s Br. at 17. The VA examiner stated that, after August 1983, “[t]he next documented neck pain was on 6/18/2003 [10 years after MVA].” [R. at 3720]. But the record shows that treatment records dated in 1993 contain complaints of neck pain.1 See [R. at 4507 (March 1993 consultation sheet noting complaints of neck pain and containing a provisional diagnosis of arthritis), 4510 (July 1993 treatment record stating “refer to for neck pain”)]. Accordingly, the

Secretary concedes that remand is warranted to obtain a new VA examination.

See Barr, 21 Vet.App. at 311.

Notably, although Appellant contends that the VA examiner also failed to consider his lay reports of pain since service, such an argument is undermined by his concession that the examiner noted his reports of neck pain since service.

Appellant’s Br. at 12-13 (“Appellant reported during the February 2013 VA examinations, that . . . his neck pain ‘has persi[s]ted’ since service.”); see [R. at

3720] (noting that Appellant’s “pain has persi[s]ted” since service). Appellant, therefore, does not show that the VA examiner also erred by failing to consider his lay statements. The Secretary also notes that any error by the Board in failing

1 Appellant also asserts that a December 1988 treatment record documents neck pain, but that record notes only a swollen lymph node in the cervical region and some “past neck pain.” [R. at 3743]; see Appellant’s Br. at 17.

16 to address the adequacy of the February 2013 VA examination is moot, given the

Secretary’s concession that the VA examination is inadequate and that a new VA examination is warranted. See [R. at 22 (Appellant’s December 2018 statement

asserting that the VA examiner’s notation that “documented neck pain was

nowhere to be found until June 2003” was “false and inaccurate), 3474

(December 2013 lay statement asserting that evidence invalidates the

examiner’s notation that he did not complain of neck pain between 1983 and

2003)]; see also Appellant’s Br. at 23 (arguing that the Board erred by failing to

address the adequacy of the VA examination).

2. Reasons or bases

The Secretary further agrees with Appellant that the Board erred by failing to consider the 1993 medical records documenting complaints of neck pain. See

38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1); see also Appellant’s Br. at 17 (arguing that the records

“bolster [his] contentions regarding continuity of cervical spine symptoms since

service”). In any subsequent decision, the Board should consider such evidence.

Although the Secretary does not agree with Appellant’s related argument that the

Board failed to adequately weigh his lay statements against the other evidence of

record, he declines to further address the alleged deficiency because the Board

will be required to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases in a

subsequent decision on this claim.

17 D. The Court should vacate and remand the part of the Board decision dismissing claims for service connection for hepatitis and a rating in excess of 10% for facial acne

The Secretary agrees with Appellant that the Court should vacate and remand the part of the Board decision finding that Appellant withdrew his appeal with respect to the hepatitis and facial acne claims at an October 2018 Board hearing, because the Board provided an inadequate statement of reasons or bases for this finding. [R. at 6]; see Appellant’s Br. at 25.

The Federal Circuit has explained that the withdrawal standard established in DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 45 (2011) is a reasonable standard and applies to hearing withdrawals under 38 C.F.R. § 20.204(b)(1) (2018). See Acree v. O’Rourke, 891 F.3d 1009 (2018). Thus, to effectively verbally withdraw an appeal at a Board hearing, the withdrawal must be “explicit, unambiguous, and undertaken with a full understanding of its consequences.” Id. at 1013; see

DeLisio, 25 Vet.App. at 57.

In this matter, the Board failed to address whether Appellant’s withdrawal of the hepatitis and facial acne claims at the October 2018 Board hearing was done with a full understanding of the consequences. Rather, the Board stated only that Appellant “withdrew his appeal with respect to [these] claims” at the

Board hearing. [R. at 6]; see [R. at 31] (Board hearing showing that Appellant replied “[y]es, correct” when asked by the VLJ if Appellant wished to drop the facial acne and hepatitis issues). Thus, the Secretary concedes that remand is warranted for the Board to adequately address whether Appellant fulfilled the

18 necessary requirements for a valid verbal withdrawal of his appeals at the Board

hearing. See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (explaining that remand is the appropriate remedy where the Board provided an inadequate statement of reasons or bases).

V. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the Secretary respectfully

submits that the part of the Board’s March 11, 2019, decision denying service

connection for a lumbar spine disorder should be affirmed, and that the

remainder of the Board’s decision should be vacated and remanded.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM A. HUDSON, JR. Principal Deputy General Counsel

MARY ANN FLYNN Chief Counsel

/s/ Kenneth A. Walsh KENNETH A. WALSH Deputy Chief Counsel

/s/ Jessica K. Grunberg JESSICA K. GRUNBERG Senior Appellate Attorney Office of General Counsel (027J) U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 810 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20420 (202) 632-6745

Attorneys for Appellee Secretary of Veterans Affairs

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