Exploiting Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities in Connman for Iot Devices
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Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks Via Pointer Taintedness Detection
Defeating Memory Corruption Attacks via Pointer Taintedness Detection Shuo Chen †, Jun Xu ‡, Nithin Nakka †, Zbigniew Kalbarczyk †, Ravishankar K. Iyer † † Center for Reliable and High-Performance Computing, ‡ Department of Computer Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, North Carolina State University 1308 W. Main Street, Urbana, IL 61801 Raleigh, NC 27695 {shuochen, nakka, kalbar, iyer}@crhc.uiuc.edu [email protected] Abstract formal methods have been adopted to prevent Most malicious attacks compromise system security programmers from writing insecure software. But despite through memory corruption exploits. Recently proposed substantial research and investment, the state of the art is techniques attempt to defeat these attacks by protecting far from perfect, and as a result, security vulnerabilities are program control data. We have constructed a new class of constantly being discovered in the field. The most direct attacks that can compromise network applications without counter-measure against vulnerabilities in the field is tampering with any control data. These non-control data security patching. Patching, however, is reactive in nature attacks represent a new challenge to system security. In and can only be applied to known vulnerabilities. The long this paper, we propose an architectural technique to latency between bug discovery and patching allows defeat both control data and non-control data attacks attackers to compromise many unpatched systems. An based on the notion of pointer taintedness . A pointer is alternative to patching is runtime vulnerability masking said to be tainted if user input can be used as the pointer that can stop ongoing attacks. Compiler and library value. A security attack is detected whenever a tainted interception techniques have been proposed to mask value is dereferenced during program execution. -
Representing and Reasoning About Dynamic Code
Representing and reasoning about dynamic code Item Type Proceedings Authors Bartels, Jesse; Stephens, Jon; Debray, Saumya Citation Bartels, J., Stephens, J., & Debray, S. (2020, September). Representing and Reasoning about Dynamic Code. In 2020 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE) (pp. 312-323). IEEE. DOI 10.1145/3324884.3416542 Publisher ACM Journal Proceedings - 2020 35th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering, ASE 2020 Rights © 2020 Association for Computing Machinery. Download date 23/09/2021 23:26:56 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Version Final accepted manuscript Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/652285 Representing and Reasoning about Dynamic Code Jesse Bartels Jon Stephens Saumya Debray Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Department of Computer Science The University Of Arizona University Of Texas The University Of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721, USA Austin, TX 78712, USA Tucson, AZ 85721, USA [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT and trace dependencies back, into and through the JIT compiler’s Dynamic code, i.e., code that is created or modified at runtime, is code, to understand the data and control flows that influenced the ubiquitous in today’s world. The behavior of dynamic code can JIT compiler’s actions and caused the generation of the problem- depend on the logic of the dynamic code generator in subtle and non- atic code. E.g., for the CVE-2017-5121 bug mentioned above, we obvious ways, e.g., JIT compiler bugs can lead to exploitable vul- might want to perform automated analyses to identify which anal- nerabilities in the resulting JIT-compiled code. -
Linux Foundation to Host Meego Workgroup
Linux Foundation To Host MeeGo Workgroup New Open Source Software Platform Backed by Intel and Nokia will Power the Next Generation of Computing Devices SAN FRANCISCO, February 15, 2010 – The Linux Foundation, the nonprofit organization dedicated to accelerating the growth of Linux, today announced it will host the MeeGo project, the open source software platform for the next generation of computing devices. MeeGo combines Intel’s Moblin™ and Nokia’s Maemo projects into one Linux-based platform. MeeGo, announced today in a joint release by Intel and Nokia, will be deployed across many computing device types - including pocketable mobile computers, netbooks, tablets, mediaphones, connected TVs and in-vehicle infotainment systems, and brings together the leaders in computing and mobile communications as the project’s backers. MeeGo is designed for cross-device, cross-architecture computing and is built from the ground up for a new class of powerful computing devices. The workgroup will be hosted by the Linux Foundation as a fully open source project, encouraging community contributions in line with the best practices of the open source development model. The Linux Foundation expects MeeGo to be adopted widely by device manufacturers, network operators, software vendors and developers across multiple device types and for many organizations and developers to participate in the workgroup. “With MeeGo, you have the world’s leader in computing – Intel – uniting with the world’s leader in communications – Nokia – in a true open source project hosted at the Linux Foundation,” said Jim Zemlin, executive director at the Linux Foundation. “MeeGo has been built from the ground up for rich, mobile devices and will deliver choice to consumers without lock-in. -
Creating a Custom Embedded Linux Distribution for Any Embedded
Yocto Project Summit Intro to Yocto Project Creating a Custom Embedded Linux Distribution for Any Embedded Device Using the Yocto Project Behan Webster Tom King The Linux Foundation May 25, 2021 (CC BY-SA 4.0) 1 bit.ly/YPS202105Intro The URL for this presentation http://bit.ly/YPS202105Intro bit.ly/YPS202105Intro Yocto Project Overview ➢ Collection of tools and methods enabling ◆ Rapid evaluation of embedded Linux on many popular off-the-shelf boards ◆ Easy customization of distribution characteristics ➢ Supports x86, ARM, MIPS, Power, RISC-V ➢ Based on technology from the OpenEmbedded Project ➢ Layer architecture allows for other layers easy re-use of code meta-yocto-bsp meta-poky meta (oe-core) 3 bit.ly/YPS202105Intro What is the Yocto Project? ➢ Umbrella organization under Linux Foundation ➢ Backed by many companies interested in making Embedded Linux easier for the industry ➢ Co-maintains OpenEmbedded Core and other tools (including opkg) 4 bit.ly/YPS202105Intro Yocto Project Governance ➢ Organized under the Linux Foundation ➢ Split governance model ➢ Technical Leadership Team ➢ Advisory Board made up of participating organizations 5 bit.ly/YPS202105Intro Yocto Project Member Organizations bit.ly/YPS202105Intro Yocto Project Overview ➢ YP builds packages - then uses these packages to build bootable images ➢ Supports use of popular package formats including: ◆ rpm, deb, ipk ➢ Releases on a 6-month cadence ➢ Latest (stable) kernel, toolchain and packages, documentation ➢ App Development Tools including Eclipse plugin, SDK, toaster 7 -
Sok: Make JIT-Spray Great Again
SoK: Make JIT-Spray Great Again Robert Gawlik and Thorsten Holz Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum Abstract Attacks against client-side programs such as browsers were at first tackled with a non-executable stack to pre- Since the end of the 20th century, it has become clear that vent execution of data on the stack and also with a non- web browsers will play a crucial role in accessing Internet executable heap to stop heap sprays of data being later resources such as the World Wide Web. They evolved executed as code. This defense became widely known into complex software suites that are able to process a as W ⊕ X (Writable xor eXecutable) or Data Execution multitude of data formats. Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation Prevention (DEP) to make any data region non-executable was incorporated to speed up the execution of script code, in 2003 [45, 54]. To counter DEP, attackers started to per- but is also used besides web browsers for performance form code reuse such as Return-Oriented Programming reasons. Attackers happily welcomed JIT in their own (ROP) and many variants [10, 11, 32, 68]. In general, if an way, and until today, JIT compilers are an important target adversary knows the location of static code in the address of various attacks. This includes for example JIT-Spray, space of the vulnerable target, she can prepare a fake stack JIT-based code-reuse attacks and JIT-specific flaws to cir- with addresses of these gadgets. As soon as control of cumvent mitigation techniques in order to simplify the the instruction pointer is gained, these gadgets execute exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities. -
Rockjit: Securing Just-In-Time Compilation Using Modular Control-Flow Integrity
RockJIT: Securing Just-In-Time Compilation Using Modular Control-Flow Integrity Ben Niu Gang Tan Lehigh University Lehigh University 19 Memorial Dr West 19 Memorial Dr West Bethlehem, PA, 18015 Bethlehem, PA, 18015 [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT For performance, modern managed language implementations Managed languages such as JavaScript are popular. For perfor- adopt Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation. Instead of performing pure mance, modern implementations of managed languages adopt Just- interpretation, a JIT compiler dynamically compiles programs into In-Time (JIT) compilation. The danger to a JIT compiler is that an native code and performs optimization on the fly based on informa- attacker can often control the input program and use it to trigger a tion collected through runtime profiling. JIT compilation in man- vulnerability in the JIT compiler to launch code injection or JIT aged languages is the key to high performance, which is often the spraying attacks. In this paper, we propose a general approach only metric when comparing JIT engines, as seen in the case of called RockJIT to securing JIT compilers through Control-Flow JavaScript. Hereafter, we use the term JITted code for native code Integrity (CFI). RockJIT builds a fine-grained control-flow graph that is dynamically generated by a JIT compiler, and code heap for from the source code of the JIT compiler and dynamically up- memory pages that hold JITted code. dates the control-flow policy when new code is generated on the fly. In terms of security, JIT brings its own set of challenges. First, a Through evaluation on Google’s V8 JavaScript engine, we demon- JIT compiler is large and usually written in C/C++, which lacks strate that RockJIT can enforce strong security on a JIT compiler, memory safety. -
Rust: Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things
Rust: Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things Arun Thomas [email protected] @arunthomas EuroBSDCon 2019 On Systems Programming [A] systems programmer has seen the terrors of the world and understood the intrinsic horror of existence -James Mickens, The Night Watch 2 What Makes Systems Software Hard? • Stakes are High: Systems software is critical to enforcing security and safety • Kernels, hypervisors, firmware, bootloaders, embedded software, language runtimes, browsers, … • Usually written in C or C++ for performance • BUT C and C++ are not memory-safe • Memory corruption vulnerabilities abound (and are exploited) • See recent Microsoft study (next slide) 3 Memory Unsafety is a Problem https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/07/16/a-proactive-approach-to-more-secure-code/ Microsoft found ~70% of CVEs in their products each year continue to be memory safety issues (Matt Miller, MSRC @ Blue Hat IL 2019) 4 Microsoft and Rust 5 Intel and Rust 6 Talk Overview “Systems Programmers Can Have Nice Things” -Robert O’Callahan Random Thoughts On Rust • Why Rust? • Rust for Systems Software • Getting Started with Rust on BSD 7 Why ust? 8 I like C. 9 But it turns out programming languages have evolved in the last 50 years. 10 Rust is a safe, fast, productive systems programming language. 11 Mozilla and Rust • Rust was originally created by Mozilla Research • Initial use case: Servo browser engine • Mozilla began shipping Rust components in Firefox 48 in 2016 • Oxidation is Mozilla’s term for “Rusting out” components • Rust code has improved Firefox’s -
Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities, Part II Gang Tan Penn State University Spring 2019
Memory Corruption Vulnerabilities, Part II Gang Tan Penn State University Spring 2019 CMPSC 447, Software Security Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities * slides adapted from those by Seacord 3 Integer Overflows An integer overflow occurs when an integer is increased beyond its maximum value or decreased beyond its minimum value Standard integer types (signed) signed char, short int, int, long int, long long int Signed overflow vs unsigned overflow An unsigned overflow occurs when the underlying representation can no longer represent an integer value. A signed overflow occurs when a value is carried over to the sign bit 4 Overflow Examples unsigned int ui; signed int si; ui = UINT_MAX; // 4,294,967,295; ui++; ui = 0 printf(“ui = %u\n", ui); si = INT_MAX; // 2,147,483,647 si++; si = -2,147,483,648 printf(“si = %d\n", si); 5 Overflow Examples, cont’d ui = 0; ui‐‐; ui = 4,294,967,295 printf(“ui = %u\n", ui); si = INT_MIN; // ‐2,147,483,648; si‐‐; si = 2,147,483,647 printf(“si = %d\n", si); 6 Integer Overflow Example int main(int argc, char *const *argv) { unsigned short int total; total = strlen(argv[1]) + strlen(argv[2]) + 1; char *buff = (char *) malloc(total); strcpy(buff, argv[1]); strcat(buff, argv[2]); } What if the total variable is overflowed because of the addition operation? 7 Vulnerability: JPEG Example Based on a real‐world vulnerability in the handling of the comment field in JPEG files void getComment(unsigned int len, char *src) { unsigned int size; size is interpreted as a large size = len ‐ 2; positive value of 0xffffffff -
System Collaboration and Information Sharing Through Internet of Things
System collaboration and information sharing through Internet of Things Mälardalens Högskola School of Innovation, Design and Engineering Maja Grubisic [email protected] Tina Marsic [email protected] Thesis for the Degree of Master of Computer Science – Software Engineering 30.0 credits June, 2015. Examiner: Ivica Crnkovic Supervisors: Hongyu Pei-Breivold Mälardalens Högskola Kristian Sandström ABB AB, Corporate Research Larisa Rizvanovic ABB AB, Corporate Research Abstract The focus of this thesis is realization of system collaboration and information sharing between devices through Internet of Things. Internet of Things is a network of things, where a thing can be any device capable of acquiring an IP address. Internet of Things has been discussed in many domains. Companies are exploring the full potential of it, with the purpose of automating their services and optimizing their productivity. In this thesis we have conducted a systematic research review to investigate the existing Internet of Things solutions with respect to system collaboration and information sharing through Internet of Things. We have also implemented a prototype, using Arduino microprocessors and NUCs, to illustrate system collaboration and information sharing between the two systems. II Table of Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Internet of Things ........................................................................................................................ -
Sailfish OS Hardware Adaptation Development Kit Documentation
Sailfish OS Hardware Adaptation Development Kit Documentation Release 2.2.0.2 Jolla Ltd. Aug 21, 2018 CONTENTS 1 Overview 3 1.1 Goal.................................................3 1.2 Development.............................................3 1.3 Deployment.............................................4 2 Prerequisites 5 2.1 Mobile Device............................................5 2.2 Build Machine............................................5 3 Preparing Your Device 7 3.1 Backup and Verify Your Device...................................7 3.2 Flash and Test CyanogenMod....................................7 4 Setting up the SDKs 9 4.1 Setting up required environment variables..............................9 4.2 Setup the Platform SDK.......................................9 4.3 Setting up an Android Build Environment.............................. 10 5 Building the Android HAL 11 5.1 Checking out CyanogenMod Source................................. 11 5.2 Device repos............................................. 11 5.3 Configure Mountpoint Information................................. 12 5.4 Building Relevant Bits of CyanogenMod.............................. 13 5.5 Common Pitfalls........................................... 14 6 Setting up Scratchbox2 Target 15 7 Packaging Droid HAL 17 7.1 Creating Repositories for a New Device............................... 17 7.2 Packaging droid-hal-device ................................. 19 8 Creating the Sailfish OS Root Filesystem 21 8.1 Additional Packages for Hardware Adaptation.......................... -
Practical Control-Flow Integrity
Practical Control-Flow Integrity by Ben Niu Presented to the Graduate and Research Committee of Lehigh University in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science Lehigh University January, 2016 Copyright © 2015 Ben Niu. All rights reserved. ii Approved and recommended for acceptance as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the re- quirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Ben Niu Practical Control-Flow Integrity Date Gang Tan, Dissertation Director Accepted Date Committee Members Gang Tan (Chair) Mooi-Choo Chuah Michael Spear Stephen McCamant iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am very grateful to my great advisor Prof. Gang Tan. I had no idea how to do research when I came to Lehigh, and he taught me what to think of, how to think, how to present my thoughts, and how to write them down. His door was always open for discussion, he replied emails during weekends, and he provided detailed guidance on any technical problem. I was constantly surprised at his breadth of knowledge and depth of understanding, and I enjoyed working with him. I also thank my thesis committee members, Prof. Mooi-Choo Chuah, Prof. Michael Spear, and Prof. Stephen McCamant for their courses, research works and insightful comments on my research. Michael’s parallel programming course introduced me lock-free algorithms and his operating system course consolidated my system programming skills. Stephen’s research on SFI provided me a foundation in my research, without which I would be still looking for decent solutions. I appreciate my colleagues at MSRC during my internship at Microsoft, especially Matt & Ken, Suha, Vishal, Swamy, Joe, Axel and Marcus. -
Ofono Open-Source Telephony
oFono Open-source telephony R´emiDenis-Courmont Aki Niemi Nokia Devices R&D Maemo Software Maemo summit 2009 - October 10th 2009 R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono Outline 1 A brief history of Linux telephony 2 Nokia N900 3 oFono R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono Outline 1 A brief history of Linux telephony 2 Nokia N900 3 oFono R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono voice calls Short Message Service (SMS) location supplementary services General packet radio service (GPRS) ... A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono What's (cellular) telephony? network status network selection SIM security (PIN, PUK. ) SIM phone book R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono What's (cellular) telephony? network status network selection SIM security (PIN, PUK. ) SIM phone book voice calls Short Message Service (SMS) location supplementary services General packet radio service (GPRS) ... R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono designed in the seventies. originally for 300 bauds fixed serial line ASCII awkward multiplexing PPP (binary) for backward-compatibility A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono The standard (?) Hayes commands set ITU V.250 3GPP 27.007 better known as AT commands R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono awkward multiplexing PPP (binary) for backward-compatibility A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono The standard (?) Hayes commands set ITU V.250 3GPP 27.007 better known as AT commands designed in the seventies. originally for 300 bauds fixed serial line ASCII R´emiDenis-Courmont Nokia oFono A brief history of Linux telephony Nokia N900 oFono The standard (?) Hayes commands set ITU V.250 3GPP 27.007 better known as AT commands designed in the seventies.