12 The Security Times – Strategy February 2019

Helsinki 2.0 – illusion or imperative? We need new multilateral formats, including a new permanent conference on European security with Russian participation

and mutually beneficial solutions litically and economically in East- increase of European states fol- Others argue that, prior to nego- the dividing lines between oppo- BY ALEXEY GROMYKO based on international law and the ern Europe and in other regions of lowing the breakup of the Soviet tiations, the opposite sides should nents begin to blur. The more this supremacy of the UN Charter. In the post-Soviet sphere. Union. Not all of them need to join comply with certain preliminary process is advanced, the more it n the long and complicated the absence of any positive signs Several attempts have been right away. The initiative could be conditions. This would only suc- becomes unnecessary for military history of the Cold War, ten- in this sphere, the spillover of the made in the past to move in the launched by a coalition of the will- ceed in ruining the chance that the organizations to grow territorially. Isions and détente had their new arms race into the nuclear direction of Helsinki 2.0. As a ing. The role of host nation for the conflicting players would engage Common sense and the peaks and troughs. One profound domain is a stark reality. The read- repercussion of Medvedev’s pro- conference could be filled by an in talks with one another. In the extremely precarious conditions achievement of peacemaking iness of the US to scrap the 1987 posal, the OSCE launched the internationally recognized media- past, major wars were followed of arms control and strategic was the Final Act of the Confer- INF treaty could have dramatic Corfu Process in 2009, which tor state such as Austria, Finland by the conclusion of key inter- stability dictate the necessity to ence on Security and Coopera- consequences. re-examined the post-Cold War or . national treaties that defined the launch dialogue among a coali- tion in Europe, signed in Helsinki In 2008, then-Russian President security arrangements in the What would be the fundamental victorious and defeated nations. tion of the willing in the spirit in 1975. It was the embodiment Dmitri Medvedev proposed to wake of the war in the South tenets of a new Helsinki Treaty? Today, it is impossible to expect of Helsinki. It is highly desirable of a new modus vivendi, above the EU, NATO, OSCE, CIS and Caucasus. The following year, The purposes and principles of any major center of power, espe- that all states from Vancouver to all in the relationship between Common Security Treaty Orga- and put for- the UN Charter; state sovereignty; cially a permanent member of the Vladivostok participate in this the and the United nization (SCTO) the conclusion ward the Meseberg Initiative, equality and non-interference; the UN Security Council, to admit endeavor. Unfortunately, the near States. The Helsinki Process led of the European Security Treaty. with the aim of establishing an peaceful settlement of interna- defeat or yield to ultimatums. future holds little hope that such to the creation of Europe’s most The idea was to create a common EU-Russian dialogue focused on tional conflicts; a comprehensive Insisting on preliminary condi- an idealistic scenario will prevail. inclusive organization – the Euro-Atlantic security space resolving the Transnistria conflict approach to security relations tions would in effect torpedo the However, waiting for the perfect OSCE, which comprises both based on the legally binding idea of 2010. Helsinki 2.0 could take between member states; indivisi- settlement of international dis- moment to arrive risks allowing East and West. of indivisibility of security. NATO, various shapes. It can be a per- bility of security; refrainment from putes through diplomacy. the chances of a new big war to The Helsinki treaty has not the EU and OSCE never replied. manent conference covering all the threat or use of force. NATO is vehemently opposed increase. become outdated, and the OSCE The draft of the new treaty was four Helsinki baskets, or it could Some argue that there is no to anything that might limit the The states that suffered most continues to play a crucial role part of Russia’s efforts to revive concentrate on politico-military need for Helsinki 2.0, as the exist- ability of the Alliance to enlarge. from the wars of the 20th century – especially since the Ukrainian the spirit of the 1975 Helsinki Final issues, taking into consideration ing international treaties – the However, indivisibility of security should assume the responsibil- crisis. But recent developments Act and to draw a final line under the urgency of de-escalation in UN Charter, the 1975 Final Act, does not automatically prohibit ity of initiating a new permanent have brought into sharp relief the the Cold War. “Helsinki 2.0” was this particular area. the Paris Charter, etc. – are fully enlargement of any military orga- conference on European security. necessity of a renewed commit- coined as a shorthand of this and Participants of such a perma- sufficient. However, their inter- nization. Nor does it eliminate Is there a nobler task than saving ment to its principles. The idea other attempts to find a common nent conference could include pretations vary while new histori- the open door policy of NATO, the world? is to reconfirm the principles of security denominator between states as well as international cal circumstances take hold and SCTO or other alliances; instead, 1975 and those of the 1990 Paris Russia and the West. It never got organizations. The Final Act pose new challenges. Lest mutual it undergirds expansion with prag- ALEXEY GROMYKO Charter, while taking into account off the ground. The main stum- of 1975 was signed by 35 states. claims and counterclaims mount matism, not ideology. Moreover, is director of the Institute of the historical changes of recent bling block has been the underly- The number of participants of and tensions rise, all sides should it implies that all sides become Europe of the Russian Academy years. The goal should be a bal- ing intention of the US and its Helsinki 2.0 could potentially be meet and argue in a structured and reciprocal stakeholders in the of Sciences (IE RAS). ance of interests, compromise allies to marginalize Russia geopo- much higher in view of the sharp serious dialogue. common security sphere and that IMAGO/ZUMA/KEYSTONE, IMAGO/ITAR-TASS IMAGO/ZUMA/KEYSTONE,

The architects of Helsinki 1.0 in July 1975: Henry Kissinger and Gerald Ford for the US … … and Leonid Brezhnev, Andrey Gromyko (grandfather of the author) and Konstantin Chernenko, for the USSR.

State of play: Russia and the fraying West Despite their troubles, Europe and the US are not withering away. It would behoove to avoid escalations

A few Russians are quite giddy present condition? Above all, for years, meaning that sanctions Europe will need to focus largely are still vibrant. This mutual BY DMITRI TRENIN at this view. They should sober up. one needs to accept that while will not be lifted. The Kremlin on protecting EU-Russia trade interest that has so far withstood Western economies, even if they the West is altering its structure also must stay away from Trump: links in the thickening sanc- the hybrid war is a firm enough ooking at the West today, may be facing yet another reces- at the national, international and Vladimir Putin’s meetings with tions environment and allow- basis on which to begin discuss- a Russian who witnessed sion, are fundamentally strong. supranational levels, it is not with- him only make things worse. Seek- ing human contacts to proceed ing a new lasting foundation for Lthe fall of the Berlin Wall The United States still basically ering away. The United States will ing to influence the US domestic despite growing alienation and the Europe-Russia relationship, 30 years ago sees a striking pic- controls global finance and leads continue to be in the lead, even if scene, even in a most innocuous estrangement. With EU-Russia one centered on trade, human ture. Political America is gripped the world by a huge margin in its leadership looks less benevo- way, is counter-productive. Reviv- relations largely frozen, Russian- contacts and neighborly ties. in a cold civil war, and is led by a both technology and innovation. lent and less altruistic. Europeans ing US-Russian arms control European relations will be a sum It goes without saying that no president who acts as if he were For all the talk of fake news and and other allies will have to accept will not help. The INF Treaty is of bilateral ones. While trade is such discussion can avoid the still the star of a reality TV show. Russian propaganda, mainstream the new regime, even if begrudg- dead, and New START is likely to only a bit more than half of what formal reason for the breakdown British politicians have managed Western media continue to domi- ingly, and protect some of their follow when its time is up in 2021. it was before 2014, it is still impor- of Russia-Europe relations: to maneuver their island into a nate the information landscape own interests. The EU, for all the Thus, Moscow can only work with tant, particularly in the energy Ukraine. While chances for solv- Brexit limbo. Their French col- across the globe. Migration waves initiatives of French President Washington to prevent incidents sector. Security matters will have ing the issue in the foreseeable leagues had to file for collective to Western Europe and North Emmanuel Macron, is unlikely to from spinning out of control; to to take a back seat: Europeans future are slim, every effort must bankruptcy before installing America testify to how attractive emerge as a strategic player any- avoid escalation of running con- cannot decide alone on the issues be made to ensure that inci- a kingly figure whose politi- Western living standards remain time soon. Many Europeans are flicts such as Ukraine; and to that fall within NATO’s compe- dents on land in Donbass, in the cal clothes have since become for the masses of less fortunate sufficiently terrified of China’s minimize mutual misperceptions. tence. The OSCE is essentially water off Crimea or in the Sea of threadbare. Even Germany’s people all over the world. And, geo-economic expansion, Russia’s Crucial here is a 24/7 US-Russian irrelevant, and the Russia-NATO Azov do not lead to escalation. political system, a paragon of of course, the Pentagon wields geopolitical resurgence or both. military-to-military communica- communications line is but an The hybrid war may take a long post-World War II stability, is phenomenal military power. So, There will be hand-wringing, but tion link, and high-level personal add-on to the US-Russian one. time to play out, but it is crucial beginning to visibly wobble. A unlike what happened to the also arm-twisting. In any case, the contacts between their military Yet, a few EU member states, that, like its predecessor, its stays range of smaller Western coun- Soviet Union and the communist bonds that tie Europe to America and security chiefs. These con- including France, Germany and mostly cold. tries add their own bright colors system in the late 1980s, the West will not disappear. tacts, of course, are no substitute , prefer to keep open their to the group portrait of the elites will live to see another day, even if In this situation, Russia would be for a comprehensive dialogue that channels of political dialogue across the Euro-Atlantic world it will have to transform itself in wise to focus its US policy on pre- will have to wait at least five to six with Moscow. Despite the likely DMITRI TRENIN who have lost touch with their the process. venting a direct military collision. years, and possibly more. termination of Russia’s member- is director of the Carnegie publics and confidence in them- So, how should Russia deal It must accept that the current In this larger strategic frame- ship in the Council of Europe, Moscow Center. selves. with America and Europe in their confrontation will probably go on work, Russia’s relations with contacts among ordinary people