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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. CONSTRUCTING A POSTCOLONIAL NATION:
THE CASE OF EAST TIMOR
by
Christina Bishop
submitted to the
The School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Arts
in
International Affairs
Chair: V /Q yl Dr. Randolph Persaud Liu*=> Q-ri) (- Dr. Louis W. Goodman I3> ~ L O o ' 1- Date <1 2002
The American University
Washington, D.C. 2002
School of International Service AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, ?56>5
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by
Christina Bishop
2002
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONSTRUCTING A POSTCOLONIAL NATION: THE CASE OF EAST TIMOR
BY
Christina Bishop
ABSTRACT
Based on the approaches of Partha Chatterjee and Benedict Anderson, this paper
reconstructs East Timor’s nation-state development. By focusing on the influences of
colonialism, it reveals the way the Timor Island became East Timor. Anderson’s
approach discusses the impact of colonial institutions and determines that after some
years of violence these imposed structures will produce a modem nation-state.
Chatterjee’s approach focuses on the instrumental role of national elites who in some
ways assume the role of the colonizers. According to Chatterjee, this role explains recent
and future conflict. While the primary purpose of this analysis is to provide a unique
study of how the nation of East Timor was constructed, it also reveals common, western-
centric assumptions regarding nation-state development. While current conflicts in East
Timor may simply be the birth pains of a new nation-state, Chatterjee’s approach offers a
compelling understanding that is less western-centric and more appropriate to the
postcolonial world.
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OFCONTENTS
Abstract ...... ii
Introduction...... 1
Theoretical Formulations on Nationalism...... 3
I. IMPACT OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM: 1515-1974 ...... 14
Historical Background...... 14
Anderson’s “Official Nationalism”...... 18
Chatterjee’s “Moment of Departure”...... 25
II. THE DECLINE OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM TO THE END OF INDONESIAN OCCUPATION: 1974-1999 ...... 33
Historical Background...... 33
Anderson’s “Popular Nationalism”...... 36
Chatteijee’s “Moment of Manoeuvre”...... 48
III. INDEPENDENCE IN EAST TIMOR: 1999-PRESENT ...... 65
Historical Background...... 66
Anderson’s “Imagined Community”...... 68
Chatteijee's “Moment of Arrival”...... 77
IV. A NEW POSTCOLONIAL NATION ...... 90
Bibliography ...... 97
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CONSTRUCTING A POSTCOLONIAL NATION: THE CASE OF EAST TIMOR
Introduction
Studies on nationalism and nation-state formation often rely on definitions deriving from
European experiences. Although some believe that nations are timeless social entities or
that they have existed for a long time in various forms, most academic debates recognize
nation-states as a modem invention. Based on this perspective, the modem (rational,
secular, market-driven) state (territorially-bounded entity) originated in Europe during the
Enlightenment. Ideas such as secularism, rationality, and the importance of progress
informed the new governing ideology while expansion of the capitalist industry
significantly changed economic interactions. As this new economic system and style of
governing merged into one structure, territorial boundaries and extensive bureaucracies
followed as defining characteristics.
In addition to this standard historical perspective, discussion of the link that
developed between a people and a governing structure followed a specific logic. People
relied on the state to perform certain functions such as protection. In turn, the state
collected taxes as a means of payment in order to perform its duties. The state remained
viable as long as its people, or citizens, perceived its legitimacy. In addition to feeling
connected with their government, the people recognized themselves as part of a single
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. community. Based on this mutual recognition, a nationalist movement or ideology
emerged within the population.
While this analysis helps explain nation-state formation and nationalism in
Europe, many parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America experienced a different process.
In fact, many of the assertions relevant to understanding nation-state development in
Europe have little relevance to these other regions of the world. The most significant
differentiating factor is the colonial experience. In postcolonial states the nation-state
structure was brought to these regions via the European colonist. When the
“enlightened” world colonized their trading partners, they purposely as well as
unconsciously subjugated and imposed their ideas of modernization onto their subjects.
Ultimately, the manner in which these populations responded to colonial impositions
presented different nation-state developments.
Because the issue of colonialism is minimized in most academic debates
concerning nation-state development, other significant developments affecting
postcolonial states are misunderstood. For example, the top-down imposition of nation
state categories and the role of the revolutionary elite are products of the colonial
experience. Thus, understanding the creation of a nation in a postcolonial context must
take these issues into consideration. Since many current nation-states did not arrive at
their status by way of the European trajectory, new studies need to be conducted in order
to broaden this academic debate. This paper analyzes the development of East Timor
into a nation-state, specifically how the nation of East Timor emerged. Using this new
nation-state as a case study, this paper attempts to answer the question: How was the East
Timor nation created? In order to answer this question, the paper will look at the
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selection of criteria for inclusion in this nation. It will also discuss the people who decide
and implement these criteria for entrance and participation.
This paper uses East Timor as a case study for two reasons. First, East Timor has
experienced a long history of colonialism and repression such that the issue of
independence has emerged and re-emerged several times in its history. Consequently,
the idea of nationalism has played a prominent role throughout its history. Second. East
Timor recently acquired nation-state status. This new status provides timely information
pertinent to this analysis. Moreover, it also officially recognizes the struggle by the
people in East Timor as a national movement. On an empirical level, this analysis
illustrates the way in which East Timor emerged as a new nation-state. From a
theoretical perspective, this paper helps shed light on and add literature to the nature of
the nation-state development in the postcolonial world.
Theoretical Formulations on Nationalism
This section briefly discusses some of the prominent theories on nationalism and nation
state formation. First, it highlights the weaknesses of the more prominent approaches to
nationalism when analyzing postcolonial states. Then, it focuses on two scholars who
have directly addressed these weaknesses.
To varying degrees, modem theorists believe that the state structure emerged from
certain ideas associated with the Enlightenment and the capitalist market. As this
structure evolved, the nation idea also emerged and responded to the state. Some authors
suggest that the state played a significant role in creating the nation while others believe
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that even though the state played a role, the idea of the nation has its roots in certain
ethnic and cultural characteristics. Although these perspectives provide some tools for
understanding the development of nationalism, they ultimately disregard the
ramifications of colonialism on several parts of the world.
For example, prominent historian Eric Hobsbawm explains in his book Nations
and Nationalism since 1780that states use nationalism to create nations. He states that
nationalism may turn preexisting cultures into nations or may simply invent them. In his
analysis he emphasizes the instrumental role of the state in creating the criteria of a
national identity; however, he also recognizes the need to reflect on the assumptions of
the people.1 While Hobsbawm captures an important element affecting postcolonial
states, namely the instrumental role of the state in using the nationalism rhetoric to create
a nation, he does not directly address the effects of colonialism on a particular population
nor does he recognize the unique history of each emerging nation-state.
Similar to Hobsbawm’s framework on many points. Emest Gellner’sNations and
Nationalism also believes that the state plays an instrumental role in engineering a
national identity. However, Gellner focuses on the importance of specific events during
the modem era such as industrialism, social mobility and, eventually, mass literacy.
According to Gellner, these processes created a new unified culture that helped to
organize economic structures, and, in the end, maximized human resources. Because
creating and maintaining a unified culture requires a standardized education system, the
state plays an instrumental role in sustaining a universal education system.2 Similar to
1 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). ‘ Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca. New York: Cornell University Press. 19S3).
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Hobsbawm, Gellner’s analysis at times discusses certain developments that are relevant
to a postcolonial context. However, Gellner’s illustration of nation-state development is
specific to European history, and his analysis does not acknowledge that industrialization
developed differently throughout the world.
Another perspective that also receives attention is Anthony D. Smith’s discussion
in The Ethnic Origins of Nations/ Smith explains that nation-states are a modem
invention but one cannot understand current nations without looking at their earlier ethnic
and cultural roots. He explains that for most nation-states today there exists an ethnic
component to their current national identity. This ethnic component can be traced
throughout history. While Gellner and Hobsbawm acknowledge the importance of the
state. Smith recognizes the importance of culture. Although this particular approach is
alluring to populations within the postcolonial world who find Gellner and Hobsbawm’s
approach disempowering. Smith also does not recognize the far-reaching effects of
colonialism.
The above selection discusses a few prominent approaches to the issues of
nationalism and nation-state formation. More importantly for this paper, however, is the
fact that these three perspectives disregard the impact of the destructive colonial era that
affected and defined several regions of the world. In this way, these approaches assume a
narrow understanding of nation-state formation that plagues many academic debates.
Even when the author mentions the applicability of his analysis to postcolonial regions,
western-centric assumptions still pervade his approach. Two prominent authors who do
address the issue of nationalism in a postcolonial context are Benedict Anderson and
5 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
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Partha Chatterjee.4 Both theorists believe that nationalism in postcolonial nation-states
does not follow the same evolutionary “logic” as in European nation-states but their
explanations differ on the way in which it evolves.
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities explains that nationalism first
emerges in the western world.5 He suggests that an “imagined community” develops
within these regions when capitalism and print language emerge. The development of the
newspaper created homogeneity in a time when individuals read about events that
occurred throughout their community. This development in conjunction with the rise of
the capitalist system created Anderson’s “print-capitalism.”6 Print-capitalism ensured
that individuals could envision an “imagined community.” wherein people within a
region felt a sense of sameness with each other, even though they had never met. This
sense of community developed into a unifying sentiment or "popular nationalism.”'
While popular nationalism describes the collective imagination that develops due
to print-capitalism, “official nationalism” occurs after and in reaction to popular
nationalism.8 Due to the power of popular nationalism, the ruling class appropriates the
nationalist language in order to solidify its power. Anderson explains, "Such official
nationalisms were conservative, not to say reactionary, policies, adapted from the model
of the largely spontaneous popular nationalism that preceded them.”9 Therefore, in
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. (London: Verso, 1983); Partha Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse.’. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1986). 5 Anderson. Imagined Communities, Chapter 3. 6 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 37-40. 7 Anderson, Imagined Communities. Chapter 3. 8 Anderson, Imagined Communities. Chapter 6. 4 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 110.
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Europe, the popular nationalism invented and supported by the surrounding communities
provided the groundwork for official rhetoric.
Anderson’s third and final phase of nationalism applies specifically to the
colonized world. In these regions, the colonized elites, educated and employed by the
imperial administrators, used the nationalist model for their independence movements.
He explains, “[In] the name of imperialism, very similar policies were pursued by the
same sorts of groups in the vast Asian and African territories subjected in the course of
the nineteenth century.’’10 According to Anderson, the influence of colonial ideology on
nationalism in postcolonial states is evident in certain institutions of power such as the
census, the map, and the museum. Colonially manipulated maps established boundaries,
and strict racial categories illustrated in a census amplified or created categorical
distinctions among groups. In addition, museums provided a visual antiquity and
ultimately a justification for the existence of the nation-state. Anderson explains, “[The]
effect of the grid was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it
belonged here, not there. It was bounded, determinate, and therefore - in principle -
countable.”11
The colonizers, therefore, constructed (or imagined) the origins, social makeup
and boundaries of these emerging nation-states. National elites, in their quest for
independence, relied on this narrative to encourage a popular nationalism. However,
Anderson explains that the elites incorporated their own culture and history into a
nationalist framework. He describes this incorporation: “Finally, refracted into non-
10 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 1 10. 11 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1 10.
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European cultures and histories, they were picked up and imitated by indigenous ruling
groups in those few zones which escaped direct subjection.”1" Anderson acknowledges
the differences between West and non-West nationalism by explaining that colonialism
produced a “blend of popular and official nationalism.’’^ Anderson describes this blend
as “[A] sort of political-biographical narrative of the realm...this narrative was adopted,
if often adapted, by the nation-state which, in the twentieth century, became the colonial
states’ legatees.”14 In other words, the idea of nationalism emerges among the elites, and
this sentiment is then transferred from the elites to the communities within these
boundaries.15
Partha Chatterjee’s Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative
Discourse? does not object to Anderson’s assertion that the principles of nationalism
were bom and manufactured in Europe. Yet, he maintains that nationalism in the
postcolonial world evolves in a considerably different manner. According to Chatterjee,
when the nation-state construct was introduced, the colonized people faced two choices.
They could rely on their distinct cultural heritage where this reliance would ultimately
reject elements of modernity. Or, they could maintain the European-imported ideas of
secularism and rationality, but ultimately create an alien identity based on elements of
domination and repression. Chatterjee explains this choice as the "[very] real dilemma:
whether to consider nationalism a rationalist, secular, modem movement, or whether to
emphasize the more distinctively national elements, many of which are frankly atavistic
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 110. 13 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 114. 14 Anderson. Imagined Communities, 13 Anderson. Imagined Communities, Chapter 7.
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and irrelevant to modem condition.”16 Chatteijee claims that this dilemma creates a
different nationalist discourse, a derivative discourse.
Chatteijee explains that most colonized countries combat colonial authority
through a nationalist alliance that fights against the colonial rule in order to create an
independent nation-state.17 Chatteijee also emphasizes the prominent role of the
educated elite, later the national leaders, in the construction of national identity. Based
on Chatteijee’s approach, when the idea of nationalism arrives on the colony, the
discourse passes through three “moments” of evolution.18 The “moment of departure"
occurs when the idea of a nation-ness first arrives, and, alongside this idea, comes the
“framework of knowledge created by post-enlightenment rationalist thought.”19 At this
time, educated elites appropriate certain aspects from the West. The moment of
departure illustrates the creation of a nationalist framework that paradoxically rejects
Western categories but also appropriates them.
Because the national leaders in the colonial world appropriate aspects of Western
thought, in some ways, this nationalism remains dominated by the colonial powers. Yet
these leaders also reject some aspects of colonial authority, and they attempt to design the
nation’s unique identity. Chatteijee explains this simultaneous appropriation and
rejection:
Thus nationalist text will question the veracity of colonist knowledge, dispute its arguments, point out contradictions, reject its moral claims. Even when it adopts, as we will see it does, the modes of thought characteristic of rational knowledge
16 Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, IS. 17 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 45. 18 Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 4 9-51. IQ Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 50.
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in the post-Enlightenment age, it cannot adopt them entirely, for then it would not constitute itself as a nationalist discourse.20
In most cases, the nationalism categories dealing with state functions are appropriated by
the colonized world while categories dealing with culture and tradition are rejected. This
selective appropriation and rejection is one of the key elements in Chatteijee’s analysis
on postcolonial nationalism.
The “moment of manoeuvre” is when the elites mobilize the masses for
independence. This moment of mobilization is important in the development of nation-
ness because at this time several contradictory elements are pushed aside for the sake of
independence. At this point, the bourgeoisie, or dominant class, mobilize the masses, the
subordinate class, against colonial rule.21 The dominant class, later the national elites,
play a decisive role throughout the independence movement in creating the sentiment that
unifies the masses. During the moment of manoeuvre, the masses strive for
independence yet use the language of nation-ness. Even though ideas of nation-ness rest
on different cultural, linguistic, and religious understandings, the underlying yearning for
independence supersedes these differences.
The “moment of arrival” occurs when independence is achieved and the new state
appropriates the nation-ness idea into its structure. At this time, the state structure
glosses “over all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences. ..[thus] incorporating
within the body of a unified discourse every aspect and stage in the history of its
formation.”22 Once the new country attains independence, the national elites focus on
'u Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 42. ■' Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 49-50. “ Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 5 1.
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economic development and state-building, and they distance this project from the
population. During the moment of arrival, the established state structure ignores
differences for the sake of economic development. This disregard by the national elites
leaves the national question “unresolved” for the people. Chatteijee states:
[N]o matter how skillfully employed, modem statecraft and the application of technology cannot effectively suppress the very real tensions which remain unresolved. They are apparent in the political life of every post-colonial nationalist regime in the world. In numerous cases they appear as separatist movements based on ethnic identities, proofs of the incomplete resolution of ‘the national question.,:3
In order to deal with this distance, the people resign themselves to an inner realm where
their specific cultural identity maintains importance. While the inner realm, or sphere,
allows the people to cherish their uniqueness, the outer realm encapsulates the Western-
derived, nationalism discourse that is now being espoused by the political, or national,
elites. Chatteijee explains:
And so the split between two domains of politics - one, a politics of the elite, and the other, a politics of the subaltern classes - was replicated in the sphere of mature nationalist thought but an explicit recognition of the split between a domain of rationalist and a domain of unreason, a domain of science and domain of faith, a domain of organization and domain of spontaneity.24
Indeed, Chatterjee’s moments create a nationalism whereby the unique identity created
and encouraged in the moment of departure is continually emphasized in some way
'3 Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 169. '4 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 153.
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throughout the evolution of nationalism. Yet, as this national identity evolves, it becomes
less and less relevant to the people.
Anderson and Chatteijee agree that nationalism arrives from Europe to colonial
societies. However, their theories differ when explaining the evolution of this nationalist
discourse in postcolonial communities. Anderson suggests that once independence is
attained, national elites lead the diverse groups into nation-state development. During
this quest for independence, the people begin to imagine themselves as part of a
community thus giving rise to a popular nationalist sentiment. Throughout this history, a
national identity evolves, thus creating Anderson’s blend of official and popular
nationalism. Although this blend does not follow the same path as Europe, it eventually
becomes an “imagined community.”
On the other hand, Chatterjee criticizes Anderson’s proposition because it ignores
the significance of the colonial impact. Although Anderson’s analysis recognizes the
influence of colonialism, it still maintains the typical nation-state development trajectory
found in other scholarly debate. According to Chatterjee, the evolution of the nationalist
discourse in postcolonial countries develops opposite to the way it developed in Europe.
While Anderson believes that conflict occurs because of the natural tendencies within the
nation-state structure, Chatteijee claims that the nation-state in postcolonial societies
creates inherent contradictions that will leave the national question forever unresolved.
As this paper attempts to understand the creation of the East Timor nation, it also
examines the explanatory power of Anderson and Chatterjee’s approaches. In order to
accomplish these two goals, this paper emphasizes certain sources to illustrate different
perspectives. Anderson’s theory relies mostly on academic research and various media
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sources while Chatteijee’s methodology calls for a closer analysis of speeches, interviews
and books by East Timor’s national leaders. Organized chronologically, each section
addresses a significant time period in the history of East Timor. Section one analyzes the
impact of Portuguese colonialism on the eastern part of Timor Island. Section two
focuses on the decline of Portuguese colonialism until the end of Indonesia’s occupation.
Section three describes East Timorese nationalism since independence. The final section
concludes with an analysis of the evolution of East Timorese nationalism in an attempt to
understand the creation of the East Timor nation.
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I. IMPACT OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM: 1515-1974
This section provides a brief summary of East Timor's pre-colonial history. Following
this description is an illustration of the arrival of the Portuguese and their impact on the
island. This section examines this development from the perspective of Anderson and
Chatteijee. Both Anderson and Chatterjee believe that the nation-state idea first emerged
among the educated elites; however, their interpretations differ regarding the way the
elites managed this new idea. While Anderson states that the elites relied on colonial
institutions to devise the characteristics of the nation, Chatteijee's moment of departure
suggests that the elite class appropriated ideas of rationality and progress from a colonial
rhetoric while rejecting colonial ideas regarding tradition and culture.
Historical Background
On the island of Timor at least thirty distinct linguistic and ethnic clans as well as
Chinese, Arab and Indian immigrants contributed to the active and popular sandalwood
trade. Evidence shows that the Antoni people were the original inhabitants, and they
speak a language known as Timorese or Vaiqueno. The Belu clan, who share the Tetum
language, arrived on the eastern side of the island and pushed the Antoni to the Center
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and West. Despite their dominance in the East, the Belu shared the island with smaller,
different clans. The Mambai are the second largest group and reside near the Ramelau
Mountains.25
In 1515, when the Portuguese arrived on the island, they encountered racially and
linguistically diverse communities. Jill Jolliffe describes this diversity:
The island of Timor is something of a racial meeting-point, a place populated by successive waves of migrants, predominantly Malay and Mesanesian. Arab, Chinese and African faces are also part of the Timorese crowd...some faces also bear features strikingly similar to those of the Australian Aborigine. Timor has been described as ‘a Babel, resulting from the convergence of more varied ethnic groups, or an inextricable melting-pot of ethnic groups.’26
Following their arrival, the Portuguese mixed with the different groups, thus futher
diversifying the island. Geoffrey Gunn explains: “It should be well understood that
colonialism bequeathed its own distinctive mestizo or mixed-race culture (more
predominately in the towns), including Sino-Timorese, Afro-Timorese, Goan-Timorese,
and mixed Portuguese-Timorese.”27 The intense mixture of linguistic, ethnic, and
religious groups created a vibrant trading center that rested on a specific economic
structure.
While most clans subsisted on shifting cultivation and animal husbandry, the
economic structure of the numerous inhabitants reflected a broad trading network. At all
25 Other prominent clans are the Galoli, Tokodede, Bunak. Kemak, Makassai, Dagada, Idale, Kairui. Nidiki. and Baikenu. For more information see Peter Carey. "Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East T im or.” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (Honolulu: University o f Hawai'I Press, 1995). 1. In addition to linguistic distinctions, these clans are also descendants of different racial groups from Melanesia and continental Asia. For more information see Jill Jolliffe. East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism. (Bisbane: University of Queensland Press. 1978). 17. ‘6 Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism. 17. "7 Geoffrev C. Gunn. ‘The 500-year Timorese Funii," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32. no. 1-2 (2000 ): 6.'
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levels, an exchange of goods, people, and sacred objects pervaded the system.28 For
example, coastal chiefs, who traded with different external merchants, relied on the
harvest from the interior kingdoms. The interior chiefs, who supervised the harvest,
received supplies from the coastal kingdoms in exchange for their services. The largest
trading product, sandalwood, influenced the predominance of coastal kingdoms in the
north and south coasts.29 This extensive exchange network suggests that the different
clans as well as the merchants and immigrants were highly interactive. Anthropologist
Elizabeth Traube explains that despite distinct kinship relations and numerous languages,
the importance of exchange and tribute linked different communities, resulting in
complex political alliances/0
Instead of altering the established exchange network, the Portuguese as well as
other immigrants inserted themselves into the tributary network by pledging loyalty and
military support in exchange for agricultural produce. When the kingdoms began to trade
with the Europeans, they encountered a relatively similar, albeit more developed,
economic system based on exchanges. Thus, the clans and kingdoms simply re-directed
some of their exchanges externally.31 Even when the Dutch arrived on the island in the
:s Clans living on the eastern part of the Timor Island combined into small. loose territorial groups that related through exchange. Clans, headed by chiefs, interacted with neighboring clans through tribute and arranged marriages. These clans paid tribute to an umbrella kingdom, also headed by a chief. Chiefs, a title based on lineage, received tribute and organized marital alliances with neighboring clans. In turn, each clan paid tribute to its ruling kingdom. Kingdoms granted land to families who in return paid rent. Exchanges between men and women for marriage ensured an appropriate balance in an economic unit in order to provide subsistence for the local population. To gain a surplus, villagers worked overtime. These products were exchanged for means of reproduction and/or marriage. For more information see John Taylor. The Price of Freedom. (London: Zed Books. 1999). 7. ~q Taylor. The Price of Freedom. 2. ,0 Elizabeth Traube, "Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization.” in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press. 1995), 44. j1 Taylor, The Price of Freedom. 15.
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early seventeenth century, initiating a long-lasting struggle with the Portuguese, the
different communities and the economic structure remained mostly unaffected. In fact, as
the Dutch and Portuguese fought over land and trade, this functioning system of
exchange continued to encourage immigration and trade.
When Portugal attempted to establish administrative control over the island in the
late seventeenth century, the economic, political, and social structures remained elusive.
However, late in the nineteenth century, international pressure for socio-economic reform
pushed Portugal to develop the small island into a more modem, educated territory/2
Historian John Taylor, who has written extensively on East Timor’s history, explains that
by the end of the nineteenth century the weak Portuguese administration, which operated
mainly from Dili, had two objectives: "[to] undermine the indigenous system of kinship
exchange and to create a basis for a systematic economic exploitation of its colony.'0 ' In
reaction to these reforms, popular anti-colonial sentiment increased. As colonial
administrators began instituting labor and education programs as well as head taxes,
various island groups rebelled more violently.
In addition to the growing anti-Portuguese sentiment, in 1941, Australian and
Dutch forces landed on East Timor to discourage Japanese occupation. Despite their
efforts, Japan invaded and occupied the island for four years. During this time, the
Japanese left over 60,000 inhabitants dead and the Island economically devastated. This
3‘ The Congress o f Berlin in 1884-85 stated that for control over a territory to be legal, its occupation must be effective. 33 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, 11.
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brutal occupation, coupled with Portugal’s immediate return following Japanese retreat,
continued to foster hostility toward the Portuguese.34
The above summary illustrates that previous to and for a considerable time
following the arrival of European powers, the Timor Island maintained political and
economic autonomy as well as ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. The Island
incorporated various social structures, and connections between peoples extended
primarily through trade and exchange but also included marriage and military alliances.
In the beginning, the Portuguese and Dutch integrated with the different groups and
contributed to the diversity already permeating the island. While anti-colonial sentiment
emerged during the end of Portuguese control, there was minimal consolidation of these
various groups on the island.
Anderson’s “Official Nationalism”
The following section uses Anderson’s approach in order to analyze the Portuguese
colonial administration's effects on East Timor. As mentioned above, Anderson suggests
that the development of a nation in postcolonial states is based on specific education
provided to the elite by the colonial powers. European elements such as the map, census,
and museum found within a colonial education contained a specific knowledge deriving
from European rationalist thought. Anderson explains, “[The] new demographic
topography put down social and institutional roots as the colonial state multiplied its size
and functions. Guided by its imagined map, it organized the new educational, juridical,
14 For more information see Gunn. ‘T he 500-year Timorese Fimu." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32. no. 1-2 (2000): 8.
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public-health, police and immigration bureaucracies it was building on the principle of
ethno-racial hierarchies.”35 Colonial schools transferred this knowledge to an elite class
of people educated in the colonial schools, and they established the foundation from
which a national identity emerges.
The basis of Anderson’s framework asserts that educating an elite group is the
initial step toward transferring the European knowledge of the nation-state to the
population. The Catholic Church and its education directive marked this significant
moment in the development of East Timor’s national discourse. Alongside the arrival of
the Portuguese colonizers came the Catholic Church, which maintained a consistent
presence on the island throughout their colonial rule. The primary objective of the
Catholic Church was to civilize the colonial subjects. This occurred through education
and missionary work. Educating mainly the wealthy city-dwellers, the Catholic Church
imported western ideas of progress, economic development and distaste for traditional
native lifestyles.36 Moreover, an ideology of nationalism was also imparted to the
students. Catholic education nourished an elite class of people who would later become
the bearers of Anderson’s nationalism model.
Colonial-imposed boundaries were also a means by which the colonial
administrations transferred the idea of the nation-state to the elites. Beginning in the
nineteenth century, economic output became the priority for the Portuguese
administration in East Timor. In order to funnel the economic gains to the colonial home
state, Portugal needed to strengthen its territory against other colonial powers. Hence, in
15 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 169. '6 Arnold S. Kohen, ‘The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor," Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars 32. no. 1-2 (2000): 20.
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1859 Portugal and Holland divided the island; East Timor and a small enclave in West
Timor known as Oecusse Ambeno became the property of Portugal, and the Dutch
controlled the area now known as West Timor.37 This division enabled the colonial
administration to control trade as well as the population.
This new colonial map of the island institutionalized difference by dividing the
island into two distinct identities. East Timor and West Timor. Despite evidence that
illustrated the inapplicability of this boundary to the different clans living on the island,
this demarcation initiated an East Timorese identity.’8 As one of Anderson's institutions
of power, the map, regardless of its inapplicability, marks a moment when the nation-ness
rhetoric emerged in East Timor. While the boundary dividing the island instituted the
primary element of a nation - a means of establishing members versus non-members.
Catholic education initiated discourse around this element.
Another emerging factor relevant to the national discourse is the creation of ethnic
categories. Anderson’s framework identifies the institution of the census as another
method by which European powers imposed the idea of the nation-state on their colonies.
The colonial administration categorized the island into a variety of groups for the
purposes of trade and taxes and as a means of controlling the population. Similar to other
colonial projects elsewhere in the world, the Portuguese also relied on a "divide and rule”
tactic in which certain groups were favored to perform specific functions. The census
helped solidify these groups into specific categories and this facilitated the colonial
"divide and rule” tactic. In addition to creating an internal friction, the census also
57 Keith Suter, “West Irian. East Timor, And Indonesia." Minority Rights Group 1979. no. 42: 22. 19. 38 Gunn, "The 500-year Timorese Funu," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32. no. 1-2 (2000): 7.
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fostered a national identity within the population in that certain groups were considered
members of the native population while others were deemed outsiders or non-indigenous.
In the case of East Timor, the Portuguese administration categorized the different
tribes and separated them from the island's other inhabitants, thereby creating the
dichotomy between native and non-native. Anthropologist H.O. Forbes’ 1884 report on
‘The Tribes of East Timor” illustrates how the Portuguese divided all the groups on the
island.39 His anthropological study provides descriptions of East Timor’s inhabitants
from a colonial perspective and illuminates the way in which these perceptions of
ethnicity and race became categories. During his visit to the Portuguese side of Timor,
he remarks on the great variety between the different “indigenes” group:
After having traveled from the northern to within a short distance of the southern shores and seen many tribes that inhabit the eastern part of the island, I am quite unable to say to what race they belong. They are an extremely mixed race, and if that dark black colour of skin seen among the Am Island is one of the typical marks of the Papuan race, I have not encountered a true Papuan in Timor. Tall, well-proportioned men with frizzled hair and of a rich, yellowish brown or chocolate color, I have seen in great abundance, and short stumpy men, with straight hair on the head and with no marked lack of hair on face.40
Forbes’ travel log flows with these types of descriptions regarding the ethnic and
linguistic distinctions among the clans. His report describes and categorizes the different
tribes, their customs and cultures. Despite the vast differences among the tribes, there
was an underlying understanding that these tribes were natives of the island while all
3<) Forbes was a guest of the Portuguese on the island and the distinctions he made can be assumed to be the same understood by the colonial authorities. 40 H. O. Forbes, Esq., On Some of the Tribes of the Island ofTimo.r (London: Harrison and Son. St. Martin Lake. 1884). 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. other inhabitants were visitors. The following passage describes the different ethnic
groups found on the Island:
In the town of Dilly itself the traveler has a fine field for ethnological investigation for he finds a singular crowd of nationalities other then European, rubbing shoulders with each other on its narrow limits. Tall erect indigenes mingle with negros from the Portuguese possessions of Mozambique and coasts of Africa, most of them there in the capacity of soldiers or condemned criminals; tall, lithe East Indians from Goa and its neighborhood; Chinese and Bugis of Macassar side by side with Arabs and Malays, men from Allor, Savu, Roti and Flores.41
Important in his accounts is the consistent differentiation between the so-called
indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants of the Island. Forbes' description of the
characteristics of the different ethnic groups and their interactions documents a
perception that whilst the different groups inhabited the same island they were
significantly different from each other:
It is interesting to study the character of each in their unconscious ways among each other. The Hindoo moves about with a superior bearing, and carries with him an unmistakable unconscious, not offensive air of superiority; the non dominating, provident, industrious, orderly-displaced Mongolian wends his way, obtaining, rather than asserting, in his quiet way, the next place, and is looked on with respect and good neighbourly consideration. The sturdy Africano rollicks about, noisy (generally drunk), careless, improvident, disliked by the natives, who fraternize with none of these interlopers on their land but keep themselves very much to themselves.4"
Before the colonial administration established control, differences between groups were
not fixed. Marriages as well as politics and economics ensured that alliances consistently
41 Forbes, On Some of the Tribes o f the Island of Timor, 3. 4‘ Forbes, On Some of the Tribes o f the Island o f Timor, 3.
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changed. However, this study suggests that with the arrival of colonialism came the
creation of new categories. Over time these divisions crystallized. Ultimately, these
divisions established the foundation from which an East Timor national identity emerged.
Portugal’s encouragement of Chinese labor from Macao followed by colonially-
imposed separation of the Chinese community from the rest of the population is an
example of the way the Portuguese cemented the boundaries between the natives and the
non-natives. Although immigrants had settled on the island throughout recorded history,
the Portuguese enticed Chinese labor from Macao in order to increase their sandalwood
trade. Although several Chinese married into Timorese families, many of the settlers
were differentiated from the clans due to their position in the economy. In addition to
their dominant position in the economy, the Chinese were also educated in different
schools. While the colonial administration and the Catholic Church organized schools
for some privileged “native” members, the Chinese communities ran their own
institutions.43 John Taylor explains:
Being to a degree institutionally separate, and often located at the end of a commercial chain, directly linked with consumers and producers, Chinese were often stereotyped by Timorese as wealthy profiteers who ultimately owed their allegiance to a foreign state. Although this stereotype undoubtedly corresponded to members of the commercial elite in the Chinese community, it often bore little relation to the reality of life for many poorer, non-trading Chinese in the villages.44
41 Taylor writes. “Although not all Chinese were involved in trading, they nevertheless dominated East Timor’s commercial sector, notably in retailing. By the end of the 1960s. 397 of the 400 retail outlets were run by Chinese families, who also played a role in the buying and selling of grain." For more information see Taylor. The Price of Freedom, 16. 44 Taylor. The Price of Freedom, 16.
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Taylor’s research supports Anderson’s explanation of colonial-imposed difference.
Colonial authorities were responsible for the large influx of Chinese immigrants, and. for
the most part, the authorities kept the Chinese institutionally separate from the rest of the
communities. Anderson explains that these practices were common and affected many
parts of Southeast Asia: “[On] the basis of this inventive census it began to insist that
those under its control whom it categorized as Chinezan dress, reside, marry, be buried,
and bequeath property according to that census.’’45 This institutional difference not only
contributed to increased stereotypes regarding the Chinese communities, but it also
solidified a unique consciousness among the communities who were not Chinese.
Anderson’s perspective on the arrival of nationalism in colonial countries reveals
the way in which colonial powers remembered and recorded East Timor’s history. The
Catholic Church symbolizes the institution in which modem rationalist thought was
cultivated among an elite. His approach highlights the way in which the colonially
imposed boundary contributes to the emergence of a national consciousness. Finally, he
demonstrates the colonially imposed differences through the creation of categories.
Ultimately, these examples suggest the way in which the Portuguese began to devise the
criteria for an East Timor nation. These criteria were accepted by the national elite and
created an official nationalism. As Portuguese power began to decline, an official
nationalism among the emerging political parties proliferated. Yet a popular nationalist
sentiment was virtually non-existent. In fact, in a 1993 speech regarding East Timor,
Benedict Anderson describes this lack of common identity:
4' Anderson. Imagined Community, 168.
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If one looks at the situation up to 1974-75, one finds a typically Iberian colonial social order. Underneath the Portuguese ruling stratum were, by rank, wealthy, apolitical Chinese, the then mestizos of mixed African, Arab, Portuguese and local ancestries, and a plethora of 'native' ethnolinguist communities. One might expect to emerge from such a social order something like what one finds in the Philippines: leaders with an ambiguous political consciousness, very much aware of their mixed ancestries and external ties. Indeed, among the older East Timorese leaders of the 1970s one did find, quite often, a kind of unsureness of identity, and a resentful attachment to things Portuguese.46
According to Anderson, the colonial administration ultimately devised the emerging
nation and the national elites accepted this construct. While these developments offer
important insight into the building of the nation, there is little recognition of the
instrumental role of the national elites. Moreover, Anderson’s approach does not take
into account the unique historical situation of East Timor. Based on Anderson’s
perspective, during this first step of nation development, the colonial administration
maintained the upper hand in nation building and the elites had minimal power.
Chatterjee, however, focuses on the elite’s role in the development of a nation in East
Timor. The following analysis uses Chatteijee’s explanation of a moment of departure to
highlight this role.
Chatteriee’s “Moment of Departure”
Chatterjee’s theory agrees that the European colonists piayed a part in transferring certain
structures to their colonies. Yet Chatteijee emphasizes the significant role of the elites in
shaping these structures. While Anderson analyzes certain institutions and their influence
46 Benedict Anderson. “Imagining East Timor." Arena Magazine no.4. April - May 1993, [magazine on line]; available from http:// www.ci.uc.pt/timor/imaizin.html: Internet; accessed August 23. 2001.
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on the colonial subjects, Chatteijee focuses on the evolution of these institutions within
the elite class. The first step in this development is the moment of departure at which
time the idea of a nation arrives. At this historical moment educated elites create a
nationalist framework by appropriating as well as rejecting Western categories. In order
to illustrate this aspect of nation building, this paper follows Chatteijee’s example by
analyzing texts written by an elite who had an instrumental role in creating the nation of
East Timor. This paper suggests that Jose Ramos-Horta occupies the role of a nationalist
thinker in C hatteijee’s moment of departure.
Ramos-Horta was one of the early leaders of East Timor’s independent movement
and was exiled for two years by the Portuguese for his anti-colonial sentiments. His
book, FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, provides a history of East Timor’s
struggle for resistance and is often referenced in academic papers and government
reports.47 In addition to providing an historical account of East Timor, Ramos-Horta’s
book also demonstrates the simultaneous appropriation and rejection of Portuguese
colonial rule. This next section identifies the way Ramos-Horta appropriates ideas and
language from the Portuguese while also deeming other characteristics as uniquely East
Timorese.
In his first chapter on Portuguese colonization, Ramos-Horta acknowledges the
ethnic and cultural diversity on East Timor, and he asserts a unique East Timorese
identity. For example, as Ramos-Horta describes the influence of “Arab and Chinese
merchants,” he also explains, “[It] seems clear that even before the European intrusion,
47 For examples see Taylor, The Price o f Freedom', Sarah Niner. "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle o f the CNRT." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32. no. 1-2 (2000); and Xanana Gusm ao, To Resist is to Win! The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmao, edited by Sarah Niner. (Victoria. Australia: David Lovell Publishing, 2000).
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the island of Timor was a political entity in itself, largely untouched by the Hindu.
Buddhist and Moslem empires that flourished in the region between the 7th and 13th
centuries.”48 This assertion suggests that Ramos-Horta is attempting to represent East
Timor as an entity in itself, or as a nation.
This point is emphasized when Ramos-Horta discusses the importance of the
struggles between the Dutch and Portuguese and their agreement to divide the Island.
Ironically, he does not discuss the inapplicability of the border itself but reiterates the fact
that the Timor Island has always had a unique history. He states, “the whole island of
Tim or was never part of any of the early Hindu or Islamic empires that covered the rest
of the archipelago.”49 Because of the circumstances revolving around the time of Ramos-
Horta’s book, namely East Timor’s struggle for autonomy, he amplifies those facts that
help distinguish it. Nevertheless, the implication of this rhetoric is the acceptance by an
elite of certain European derived characteristics.
An example of Ramos-Horta’s creation, or reiteration, of criteria within the
emerging national discourse is the establishment of a national myth or hero. In his book.
Ramos-Horta describes the oft-cited Boaventura Rebellion as the historical moment when
the East Timorese joined together to fight against the colonial powers. According to
Ramos-Horta, Boaventura was an educated chief who united several different ethno-
linguistic tribes in the region against the rule of the Portuguese.30 For approximately
seventeen years, these tribes fought against the Portuguese, and not until reinforcements
from Mozambique and Macao arrived were the Portuguese able to quell the uprising:
4S Jose Ramos-Horta. FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. ( Trenton: The Red Sea Press. Inc.. 1987). 18. 49 Ramos-Horta, FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. 19. 50 Ramos-Horta. FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. 19.
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[The] most significant contribution the Boaventura Uprising brought to the history of East Timor was the unification of the territory in the minds of its inhabitants. There are several different ethnic and linguistic groups on the territory, but with the Boaventura Uprising these groups joined together and formed the base for the unified people of East Timor that later were to struggle against the Indonesian oppressors.
Currently, Dom Boaventura is a national hero in East Timor, and this account reappears
in several academic reports and historical descriptions as the point at which a national
identity developed on East Timor.52 Ramos-Horta’s consistent reference to this event is
his attempt to maintain East Timor's national characteristics.
While Ramos-Horta elevates unique East Timorese characteristics, he also
discounts some of the claims made by the Portuguese. For example, Ramos-Horta
criticizes Portuguese textbooks because they “attempted to portray the ‘natives’ of East
Timor as ‘docile.’”53 Ramos-Horta also rejects the claim that East Timor was conquered
“with a cross, not with a sword,” and he provides evidence of several rebellions against
Portuguese authority.54 Ramos-Horta’s desire to create a unique East Timorese identity
by incorporating some aspects of Portuguese domination (the boundary) but also
simultaneously rejecting others (Portuguese textbooks) illustrates Chatterjee’s paradox of
nation development in the postcolonial world.
A clear example of this paradox is Timor's struggle for economic development.
Indeed, Chatteijee’s theory points to economic development as a distinct feature of
51 Ramos-Horta, FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 20. 52 For example, this account is found in the introductions of Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise-, Carey "Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East Timor"; and Taylor. East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 11. 5-1 Ramos-Horta, FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 20. 54 Ramos-Horta, FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 20.
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modernity, and it is this feature that the elites appropriated. Therefore, even though
Ramos-Horta attempts to locate a distinct East Timorese national identity, he criticizes
the Portuguese authorities for not helping the East Timorese develop their island:
East Timor was at the bottom of the Portuguese national budget and developmental plans. No senior cabinet minister ever set foot on the island. It was the dumping ground for political dissidents, failed professionals and incompetent bureaucrats. It was only in the 1960s that the capital city, Dili, was provided with electricity; the rest of the country continued to rely on firewood and candles. By 1974, only a few main streets in Dili had been paved. Education had improved by the late 1960s; senior high school and technical secondary institutions were turning out a number of Timorese with education beyond simple writing and reading ability.55
Ramos-Horta’s list revolves around issues of economic development. He criticizes the
colonial administration for not providing important educational support or establishing
good infrastructure. However, at the same time that Ramos-Horta calls on the Portuguese
to aid East Timor, he rejects the colonial description of an East Timor nation.
Ramos-Horta’s desire to identify a distinct East Timorese identity that is wholly
opposed to the Portuguese and his simultaneous ridicule of their disregard for East
Timorese development exemplifies a fundamental point in Chatteijee’s moment of
departure. Chatteijee explains that during the moment of departure, nationalist thinkers
emphasize their people’s superior spirituality while acknowledging colonial superiority in
the areas of economic development, education, technology, and politics. Even though
Ramos-Horta believes in a unique East Timorese identity, he criticizes the colonial
masters for not providing better education, improved roads, and access to health care.
,5 Ramos-Horta. FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 22.
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An example of this contradiction is Ramos-Horta’s description of the return of
Portuguese colonialism after Japanese occupation.
The end of the war saw East Timor a devastated country. Its miserable economy, the work of Portuguese mediocrity and mendacity, was further ruined by war. Its people were broken physically and psychologically. The Australians and the Portuguese celebrated the Allied victory. The Timorese, who bore the brunt of the Japanese occupation while the Portuguese maintained their ‘neutrality,’ were ignored during the victory' celebrations. For Europe, there was the Marshall Plan. For Indonesia, where Sukarno and his nationalist followers had collaborated actively with the Japanese, there was the reward of independence. For East Timor, there was the return of the backward colonial power ruled by a fascist dictator whose sympathies during the war were the Axis power.56
The above description again demonstrates Ramos-Horta’s frustration with Portugal’s
inability to enhance development on the island. However, after Ramos-Horta describes
East Timor's post-war colonial situation, he quotes Lord Alfred Wallace’s 1869
description of Portuguese colonial rule as proof of its miserable authority:
The Portuguese government of Timor is a most miserable one. Nobody seems to care the least about the improvement of the country...after three hundred years of occupation, there has not been a mile of road made beyond the town, and there is not a solitary European resident anywhere in the interior. All the government officials oppress and rob the natives as much as they can, and yet there is no care taken to render the town defensible should the Timorese attempt to attack it.57
In addition to the readily notable lack of sequencing, the juxtaposition of these two
accounts in Ramos-Horta’s autobiography epitomizes Chatterjee’s national thinker in his
moment of departure. Wallace’s description uncovers the inadequacies of Portuguese
56 Ramos-Horta. FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 21. >7 Ramos-Horta. FUNU: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. 21.
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colonial rule yet it also reinforces a subordinate image of the people on East Timor.
Ramos-Horta continues to criticize Portuguese colonial rule, yet the primary focus of his
criticism is their inability or lack of desire to develop East Timor.
The first chapter in Ramos-Horta’s book describes the way in which a nationalist
thinker during the moment of departure rejects some elements of Western thought,
namely those which attempt to identify the nation-ness aspect, while appropriating those
foreign concepts related to state functions. As one of East Timor’s nationalist thinkers,
Ramos-Horta illustrates a contradiction, or inverse, of national development that affects
postcolonial nationalism. On the one hand, he criticizes the Portuguese for their
description of the native East Timorese, but on the other hand, he criticizes the lack of aid
they supply the Island. This implies that the Timorese are unable to help themselves. As
Chatterjee explains, the nationalist thinker believes that certain ideas, or models, are
superior and must be appropriated while, at the same time, these models must maintain a
unique sense of spirituality:
The West has a superior culture, but only partially; spiritually, the East is superior. What is needed, now, is the creation of a cultural ideal in which the industries and the sciences of the West can be learnt and emulated while retaining the spiritual greatness of Eastern culture. This is the national-cultural project at its moment of departure.58
Both Anderson and Chatteijee illustrate how educated elites had the dominant hand in
shaping the national discourse. However, these perspectives focus on different means by
which the idea of nation emerged. According to Anderson, national knowledge was
vS Chatterjee. Nationalist Though and the Colonial World. 73.
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accepted by the educated elites with little alterations. Thus, the educated elites, or
national elites, encouraged a national identity largely based on the prevailing structure
brought to them through colonialism. In order to demonstrate this acceptance,
Anderson’s theory emphasizes the role of colonial institutions which remained prevalent
throughout the nation's development.
However, from Chatterjee’s perspective, the elite group had an important hand in
adjusting or modifying this knowledge. In the beginning nationalist thinkers appropriated
certain western ideas from the colonial rhetoric such as the modem rational state.
However, while these thinkers focused on building an economically viable state, they
recognized the need to maintain a unique sense of identity, and certain categories were
rejected. Based on this analysis, both perspectives describe certain developments and
recognize important evidence. While Anderson highlights the impact of the colonial
administration, Chatterjee assigns some influence and power to the local elites.
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II. THE DECLINE OF PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM TO THE END OF INDONESIAN OCCUPATION: 1974-1999
As the Portuguese left their colony, the national elites filled the power vacuum and began
building an independent state. This section encompasses the decline of Portuguese rule.
East Timor’s brief moment of autonomy and Indonesian’s twenty-four year occupation of
the Island. During this time, the East Timor nation emerged. From Anderson’s
perspective, it is the educated elites who transfer the language of nationalism to the
people. When the national elites transfer the framework of nationalism, the people fill
this framework with a nationalist discourse and in so doing generate a popular
nationalism. However, at this point, Chatterjee takes a significantly different approach.
According to Chatteijee’s moment of manoeuvre, the national elites call on the various
groups to organize for resistance and autonomy. Although they may use the language of
national unity, unification occurs primarily to achieve independence. This section begins
with a brief description of East Timor from 1974. the decline of Portuguese authority, to
1999 and the end of Indonesia’s occupation.
Historical Background
Following a military coup in 1974, known as the "Carnation Revolution,” Portugal
experienced drastic political changes, social unrest and economic hardships.
Consequently, Portuguese authorities were unconcerned with their small Southeast Asian
colony. Because of the colonists’ growing apathy, local political parties, mostly based in
East Timor’s capital, Dili, gained more support and recognition. As in most colonial
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legacies, the elites educated in colonial institutions formed the power base in these new
parties.59 The two principal parties were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and the
Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT).60 Another smaller party, Timorese
Popular Democratic Association (APODETI), was also created, but this party was largely
funded and founded by the Indonesian government.
Dili’s senior administrative elites and leading plantation owners joined the UDT.
The members used their positions of power in the kinship system to form the party and
rally support. Their program called for democratization and eventual self-
determination.61 ASDT, or Fretilin (Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste
Independente), members were mostly urban elites who lived in Dili and had jobs as
administrators or teachers. However, they also retained ties with their rural areas of
origin, and several of them maintained connections with their clans.62 Many Fretilin
members were students returning from Portugal and people who served in the Portuguese
military. These members appropriated a Marxist political and economic model which
w'as prevalent in Portugal at this time.
In August 1975 the UDT launched a coup that ended the shaky UDT-Fretilin
coalition. This coup resulted in a three-week civil war between the two parties, and in
that short time 2000 people died. The UDT lost much of its popular support because it
initiated the coup and, despite internal disagreements, Fretilin emerged as the ruling party
in East Timor. Fretilin control remained tenuous, and beginning in early September.
Indonesia began attacking military posts on the border between West and East Timor. In
Taylor, The Price of Freedom. 18. 60 After September 1974. the party was renamed Fretilin. 61 Taylor, The Price of Freedom. 26. 6‘ Taylor. The Price of Freedom. 27.
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November 1975, as Fretilin began to lose control and international support, it declared
East Timor an independent state.63
East Timor’s brief period of autonomy was interrupted by an Indonesian invasion.
Indonesia, which had declared independence in 1945, maintained its own imperialistic
notions so that Fretilin’s Marxist-based initiatives provided the perfect excuse in the Cold
War era for the Indonesian government to invade and eventually occupy the eastern part
of the Timor Island. By July 1976 the Indonesian military controlled most major cities of
East Timor. During this time, the diverse communities and their traditional structures
experienced severe human rights violations, resulting in the death of over ten percent of
the population.64 By the end of 1975 Indonesia had stationed over 20,000 troops in East
Timor.65
The force of Indonesia’s invasion and its subsequent national development
program had serious, blatant consequences for the people living in East Timor. Universal
education, based on a strict Indonesian curriculum, and agricultural development,
consisting of massive land redistribution, thoroughly changed the island’s societal and
agricultural structures.66 Because of the continued resistance by the Falintil, the military
arm of the Fretilin Party, the Indonesian military pushed survivors from the highland
areas to resettlement camps where many died of starvation. In addition to the lack of
63 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, Chapter 4. wWhile the exact figure is debatable. Indonesian authorities, outside observers and people living in East Timor say that between 100.000 to 200.000 people were killed out of approximately 800.000 due to murder or starvation. Keith Suter. "West Irian. East Timor, And Indonesia,” 22. 65 For a detailed account of these events see Niner. "A Long Journey o f Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of the CNRT." 11-13. 66 Alberto Arenas. “Education and Nationalism in East Timor,” Social Justice 25. no. 2 (1998): 136.
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food, military tactics (such as the scorched earth policy) disrupted local lifestyles.67 Until
the final days of Indonesia’s occupation in 1999, the people of East Timor suffered
severe violations of their human rights.
Anderson’s “Popular Nationalism”
According to Anderson, the birth of popular nationalism in a postcolonial state occurs
when the educated elite extends the nation-state idea to the people. Because the nation
state model is by definition an autonomous structure, the nation-state model provides the
elites a language for independence. Initially, these elites become the leading voices in the
fight for independence. The people embrace the nation idea as colonialism becomes
more oppressive. Examined through Anderson’s theoretical lens, during the final years of
Portuguese colonialism followed by Indonesia’s occupation, the people of East Timor
responded to the elites' call for independence with a “popular nationalism.”
The actions of the Fretilin Party and the peoples’ response to the Party exemplify
this stage in Anderson’s postcolonial nationalism. First, this political party established
state structures similar to those of the colonial administration in that the Fretilin Party
maintained the Portuguese-taught colonial categories and institutions. Second, it
successfully used the official nationalism to rally popular support among many of the
people living on East Timor. Finally, significant portions of the population supported the
Fretilin Party and, in some form, took part in the military campaigns. The following
67 Carey, "Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East Timor.” 11.
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analysis focuses on the Fretilin Party and the different ways this party brought the idea of
an East Timor nation to the people.
During the time of Portuguese decline and the island’s brief civil war the Fretilin
Party attempted to incorporate various groups into its move toward independence.
Because most of the Fretilin members were educated in Portugal and/or served in the
Portuguese army, their initiatives were Marxist in nature. For example, the party created
a broad-based support network that instituted several reforms reaching throughout the
urban and rural areas. Agricultural development was a priority and members traveled
throughout East Timor to implement agricultural initiatives such as co-operatives. These
co-operatives shared instruments and collectively worked their private plots. The villages
would then pool their surplus crops (after deducing family needs) for sale in Dili. The
villages would also collectively decide to buy a truck, build a store, or buy a small
tractor. Historian John Taylor's description of these popular co-operatives is instructive:
The results were proposals directly relevant, realizable, and popular, emerging from specific forms of co-operation with rural population. Consequently, in Fretilin’s subsequent agricultural policies, areas were targeted to be worked co operatively at the suco level, using shared implements.68
In addition to these communal agricultural initiatives, the Fretilin Party also began a
widespread health program. This Marxist replication of the colonial state structure
coincides with Anderson’s assertion that the national elites rely on the state ideology
prevalent within the colonial administration.
68 Taylor, The Price of Freedom, 34.
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In addition to replicating the economic structure, the party also focused on
creating a national East Timor culture. By establishing elements such as a common
language, the Fretilin Party incorporated its own culture into the nationalism structure.
For example, the emergence of the Tetum language as a defining characteristic of East
Timor’s national discourse can be traced back to the Fretilin Party’s initial campaign
during the decline of the Portuguese rule. While Tetum was recognized as one of the
common languages on the eastern part of the Timor Island, the proportion of people
living in East Timor that spoke the Tetum language was under fifty percent.69 Despite
the fact that several communities did not speak the language, the Party members
attempted to establish it as a lingua franca through education and the proliferation of
indigenous forms of music, poetry, and dance. They also wrote a handbook in Tetum
entitled Tai Timor Rai ITA Niang, ‘Timor Is Our Country.’ Elevating the Tetum
language through various cultural avenues cemented a particular aspect of East Timor’s
national identity. Ultimately, it encouraged the people to recognize themselves as part of
a nation and thereby gave rise to a popular sentiment.
In addition to designating Tetum as the national language, the Fretilin Party also
unified the people of Timor by propagandizing a common history which helped to
solidify a group identity. According to anthropologist Elizabeth Traube, the concerted
efforts by Fretilin members to encourage popular support against the colonial
administration created a growing solidarity among the people and the Fretilin leaders.
Traube explains, “Out of the common experience of subordination to a particular
69 Esteva Cabral, ‘T he Indonesia Propoganda War against East Timor." in The East Timor Question, ed. Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000). 72.
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European power there arose among the subjugated people a heightened awareness of their
mutual ties to one another, an awareness that was eventually to provide an enabling
condition for East Timorese nationalism.”70 Anderson’s theory discusses the institution
of museums to preserve a nation’s antiquity. Elevating a common history, which may
later be replicated in a national museum, serves the same purpose.
Due to the efforts of the Fretilin Party, unification among the people grew.
Journalist Matthew Jardine depicts this emerging sense of national identity at the time of
Portuguese decline:
By the late 1950s, public radio began broadcasting in Portuguese, Tetum (the lingua franca used by people who spoke different native languages) and Chinese (business in the colony was dominated by Chinese immigrants and by Timorese of Chinese descent). A government-controlled newspaper.A Voz de Timor, began publishing in 1960s. Certain elements in the Catholic Church played an important role in facilitating nationalist thinking.71
Jardine’s observation indicates the growth of popular nationalism through certain
elements such as newspapers and radio programs. This excerpt not only supports the
assertion that a popular nationalism was growing but it also identifies colonial categories
evident in the nationalism criteria. For example, the Chinese people were still considered
a distinct and separate sector of society. Jardine also mentions the growing influence of
the Catholic Church. Throughout this period the Church enjoyed increased popularity
and strength, making it one of the most important symbols of East Timorese nationalism.
Both of these categories were handed down from the colonial administration. Jardine’s
70 Traube. "Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization." 45. 71 Jardine. East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, 23
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observation also mentions the Tetum language as the lingua franca thus demonstrating
the growing prevalence of this language as a national characteristic.
During Portugal's colonial decline and East Timor’s brief period of autonomy, a
popular nationalism continued to grow. Yet it had not evolved into a consolidated
sentiment by the time Indonesian forces arrived. As the Indonesian forces infiltrated the
island, the Fretilin Party became the leading force for national unification. Because the
people living in the major cities lived under Indonesian authority, many fled with the
Fretilin Party to the mountains. Based in unoccupied regions and relying on mountain
communities to provide food and shelter, the resistance movement built a base. As the
Indonesian military gained ground and intensified its military attack, the nature of the
Fretilin’s military arm, Falintil’s. relied increasingly on the participation of local
communities. The soldiers lived and hid in the jungle but utilized a complex support
network linking several villages together. In this way, many communities were drawn
into the struggle.72 Throughout the resistance movement, the party maintained the
national constructs created during the colonial era, and these elements continued to foster
a strong popular sentiment. For example, the Fretilin Party continued to rely on the
Tetum language in which the soldiers communicated with each other and with local
communities. This language increased in popularity among the resistance because it was
outlawed by the Indonesian authorities who did not speak the language. Alberto Arenas’
article specifically highlights Tetum as a unifying element:
7'Vtichele Turner, Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1992. (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd.. 1992), 83-84.
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Partly out of defiance to the invading Indonesians, who for the most part could not understand the language, and also because Portuguese was outlawed, the Tetum language came to represent unity among the different groups subjugated to Indonesian repression.73
Throughout Indonesia’s occupation, the Tetum language became synonymous with the
East Timor nation. It unified the people against their Indonesian oppressors and provided
them with a means of rejecting Indonesia's occupation. Anderson describes how a
colonially imposed category can take on a life of its own, and in this case the people of
East Timor began to identify themselves as Tetum-speaking people.
In addition to the designation of a national language, the religion category
surfaced and became significant during Indonesia’s occupation. During Portuguese
colonization, most groups on Timor rebuffed the imposed religion. "1 However, due to the
Indonesian government’s requirement that all citizens belong to an officially recognized
religion, membership in the church grew considerably. Because the Catholic Church was
an Indonesian-accepted institution, the people legally maintained their distinctiveness
from their Indonesian repressors. The church not only enabled the East Timorese to
maintain a level of distinction from their occupiers but it also provided a place of refuge
for people speaking against Indonesian occupation. In addition, many priests, who joined
the Fretilin and severed ties with the Portuguese, helped link the resistance movement
with the outside world. For example. Bishop Belo, the head of the Catholic Church in
East Timor, openly spoke out against Indonesian repression, and won the Nobel Peace
73 Arenas, "Education and Nationalism in East Timor." 145. 74 In 1995 over 907r of the East Timorese population were registered communicants. Pre-1975, the total was 3 0 7c of the population. For more information see Carey. "Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East Timor."
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Prize along with Jose Ramos-Horta for his efforts.75 Consequently, the church became
inextricably tied to the resistance movement and the creation of an East Timor nation.'6
While these two categories can be traced back to the arrival of the Portuguese,
they now began to evolve in the minds of the people. Furthermore, the elevation of these
two elements as prime characteristics in East Timor’s national discourse also became
interrelated. The church's use of the Tetum language helped elevate it as the national
language. The Catholic Church used Tetum in its services and published a popular
Catholic Church newspaper,Seara , which taught Tetum to its readers and served as a
forum for progressive ideas.77 Another example of this growing interconnectedness was
the Vatican’s decision to appoint a Timorese senior administrator to the East Timor
diocese. Benedict Anderson describes the importance of the Tetum language as well as
the Catholic Church as an institution through which an East Timorese nationalism could
be nurtured:
In 1975, a majority of East Timorese were still animists...In the last seventeen years, the Catholic population of the territory has more than doubled in size. In East Timor, everyone is aware that if you are a member of the Catholic Church, you enjoy protection according to the state's own logic; at the same time a popular Catholicism has emerged as an expression of a common suffering, just as it did in nineteenth-century Ireland. Moreover, the decision of the Catholic hierarchy in East Timor to use Tetun, not Indonesian, as the language of the Church, has had profoundly nationalizing effects. It has raised Tetun from being a local language
75 Belo is most noted for his 1989 letter to the United Nations in which he openly requested that the UN help the East Timor decide its own destiny. For more information see Arnold S. Kohen. "The Catholic Church and the Independence o f East Timor." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 32, no. 1-2 (2000): 20. 76 For more information on the role of the Catholic Church in East Timor see Robert Archer. ‘The Catholic Church in East Timor." in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging o f a Nation, edited by Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (London: Cassell. 1995), 120-36. Arnold S. Kohen. From the Place of the Dead: Bishop Belo and the Struggle for East Timor (Oxford: Lion. 1999), 161-93. 77 Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, 23-24.
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or lingua franca in parts of East Timor to becoming, for the first time, the language of 'East Timorese' religion and identity.'8
Yet, while these categories enable a unifying sentiment they also establish the
exclusionary principal found in all national discourses. In this case, non-Catholics and
non-Tetum speaking groups are not considered East Timorese. Anderson explains that
when these revolutionaries take control, they also:
[inherit] the wiring of the old state: sometimes functionaries and informers, but always files, dossiers, archives, laws, financial records, censuses, maps, treaties, correspondence, memoranda, and so on. Like the complex electrical system in any large mansion when the owner has fled, the state awaits the new owner’s hand at the switch to be very much its old brilliant self again.79
The most striking example of this inheritance is the distinction the Fretilin Party
maintained between the Chinese and the "indigenous" inhabitants. Evident within the
Fretilin Party’s political platforms and its national ideology is the way that the programs
ignored, or overlooked, the differences among clans, while excluding the Chinese
community.
At the time of Portuguese departure there were over 15,000 Chinese people living
in East Timor. Because of their favored position in the economic structure, the Chinese
community members were often coupled with the Portuguese authorities. Maintaining
the rigid distinction between the "indigenous” population and the Chinese communities
78 Benedict Anderson. “Imagining East Timor." Arena Magazine no.4. April - May 1993, [magazine on line); available from http;// www.ci.uc.pt/timor/imaein.html; Internet; accessed August 23. 2001. Matthew Jardine supports Anderson: ““As the only public institution in East Timor that has survived the Indonesian occupation, the Church serves as a psychological and spiritual refuge for the East Timorese, over 909f of whom are Catholic. Under the leadership of Bishop Belo. the Church has become an outspoken defender of human rights in East Timor..." For more information see Jardine. East Timor: Genocide in Paradise. 69 79 Anderson. Imagined Communities, 160.
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in the emerging rhetoric was important and economically convenient for the Fretilin
leaders. Because economic improvement was one of the primary means of mobilizing
the people, excluding the Chinese was imperative. For example, implicit in the
agricultural initiatives of the Fretilin Party was its desire to circumvent the Chinese
community. John Taylor describes one of these cooperatives: 'The Bucoli people were
planning a cooperative for the next year’s harvest. Villages will pool their surplus crops
for sale in Dili for higher prices than they would get through Chinese middlemen.”80
During East Timor's brief moment of autonomy the Chinese community was
especially vulnerable, as they did not identify with any political party. Thus, the Chinese
community lived at the margins of society, and did not enjoy the growing solidarity
among the population. In an interview with Australian journalist Michele Turner, a
Chinese woman describes her situation during the Fretilin control: "We thought it would
be all right so we accepted the Fretilin and they didn't do anything to offend us. They
had the authority because they were the government then.”81 Even though the Chinese
community felt safe under Fretilin control, this personal testimony illuminates the
division between some groups in East Timor and the Chinese community.
Under Indonesian occupation, the Chinese communities experienced extreme
displacement and repression. " For example, during the invasion of Dili, the Indonesian
military singled out the Chinese population for selective killing so that during the first
two days of invasion approximately five hundred Chinese people were killed out of two
80 John Taylor. 'The Emergence o f a Nationalist Movement in East Timor." in East Timor at the Crossroads: The Forging of a Nation, ed. Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1995). 35 81 Turner, Telling East Timor: Personal Testimonies 1942-1999, 102. 8‘ The Chinese population in 1974 was 20,000. This had been reduced to 'a few thousand’ by July 19S5. Taylor, The Price of Freedom. 6 9 . 164.
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thousand. Taylor suggests that Indonesia’s long held resentment toward their own
Chinese diaspora accounts for a disproportionate amount of Chinese murders during the
initial invasion. Even though this selective treatment by the Indonesian military may
have created growing solidarity between the “native” East Timorese and the Chinese
community, it also served as a re-enforcement of ethnic categories put in place by the
colonial administration.
While Indonesia’s selective treatment of the Chinese was one way in which it re
enforced ethnic categories, the government also instituted a transmigration program.
These newcomers, who were either forcibly moved or enticed by the Indonesian
government, were given land that the Indonesian military had taken from the Timorese
population during anti-Fretilin campaigns. Stephen Sherlock explains:
While attempting to limit the East Timorese population, Indonesia authorities actively encouraged Indonesians from throughout the country to migrate to East Timor. Under the guise of relieving population pressures in the relatively crowded island like Java and Bali, and Filling ‘empty’ land in places like East Timor, Jakarta uses this transmigration program to try to create a pan-Indonesian identity and to serve the security needs for the military.83
The Indonesian government reportedly moved approximately 662 families (2,808) people
until 1993.84 However, these numbers do not reflect the “voluntary” or “spontaneous”
immigrants that also relocated to East Timor after Indonesian annexation. Matthew
Jardine explains that families were offered incentives to relocate such as employment and
land. He writes, “While there are no precise figures, most observers estimate that there
8,Stephen Sherlock, "Political Economy of East Timor Conflict." A sian Sun ev 36. no. 9 (September 1996), 838. 84 Sherlock, "Political Economy of East Timor Conflict,” 838.
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are at least 150,000 Indonesian settlers in East Timor, out of a total population of about
800,000-900,000.’’85
The overall aim of both the formal transmigration program and the incentives for
voluntary migration was to solidify Indonesian rule over the East Timor population as
well as foster a sense of Indonesian nationalism.86 Yet Indonesia’s transmigrant program
also re-enforced ethnic and racial categories by solidifying those categories already
imposed by the nation-state framework. In fact, the Indonesian program had the opposite
effect. The blatant imposition of different ethnic groups by the Indonesian authorities not
only increased tension between the various groups but it also solidified an East Timor
national identity. Ultimately, Indonesia’s selective treatment re-enforced and eventually
legitimized the national sentiment.
For instance, because the Indonesian authorities highly favored the newcomers for
employment as well as for any economic benefits, unemployment among the original
inhabitants of East Timor rose to sixty-five percent while the transmigrants maintained a
thirty-five percent unemployment rate. This blatant favoritism and unequal distribution
of benefits perpetuated racial stereotypes and hostility among the groups.87 Carey
explains, “Already the numbers of Indonesia transmigrants (both official and unofficial)
had begun to undermine the balance of Timorese society, bringing Muslims and Balinese
Hindus from inner-island Indonesia into a predominately Catholic and animist
community. Of the 867,000 inhabitants in East Timor, fully a quarter was thought to be
s< Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise. 65-66 s6 The number of transmigrants began to dwindle following an announcement by President Habbibe in January 1999 that a referendum on the future of East Timor would be held in August. Stephen McCIoskey. "Introduction: East Timor - From European to Third World Colonialism," in The East Timor Question. 15. S7 Sherlock. "Political Economy of the East Timor Conflict," 840.
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0(3 newcomers.” These types of categories take on a life of their own, in much the same
way the national language did, and groups take on certain identities and characteristics
such as "the industrious Chinese," "the sneaky Javanese," etc.
In addition to succumbing to ethnic and racial categories brought and
implemented by the colonial powers, the Fretilin Party also pursued modernization by
cutting traditional ties. The different clans living on East Timor maintained their
traditional indigenous system in which political and social interaction was based on a
complex set of discussions and reciprocal obligations.89 Because the Fretilin Party saw
these systems as hindering state development and national unity, conflict arose between
Fretilin’s political structure and the traditional system.90 Elizabeth Traube explains the
growing conflict between tradition and modernity in her accounts of the Mambai Tribes.
As the Fretilin leaders gained popularity, the Mambia leaders asked to be consulted
before any new power was legitimized. However, the Fretilin Party ignored their wishes
and established itself as the primary representative party. Traube explains, “In this
respect, many people nurtured a sense of grievance against Fretilin for what they
perceived as the party’s disregard for traditional authorities.”91 In order to implement a
framework for a modem nation-state, the Fretilin Party broke all ties with this traditional
systems. This disregard of the Mambai traditional system can be directly traced to the
ss Carey. “Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East Timor." 26. 89 Traube. “Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization." 54. 90 According to John Taylor, even though some clans were wary of the new political powers, there was an "indigenous" quality pervasive in the new parties. He states. “[it[ seemed possible that new social and political groups could emerge with an ability to express their increasing knowledge of the values of national development in the framework provided by the values of indigenous society." Taylor. The Price of Freedom , 19 91 Traube. “Mambai Perspectives on Colonialism and Decolonization." 54. Keith Suter supports this claim in "W est Irian, East Tim or. And Indonesia." 20.
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colonial education whereby the Catholic Church’s primary objective was to eradicate the
traditional ways of the natives.
A look at the historical developments of East Timor from Anderson’s
perspective reveals the way in which national leaders transferred colonial knowledge
regarding their territory to the people. The Fretilin Party played the critical role of
providing the national framework. The Catholic Church, the conscious use of Tetum and
a shared history of repression describe characteristics created or encouraged by
colonialism and then used by the national elites. As these cultural identifiers, or criteria
within the East Timor national discourse began to crystallize, exclusion from the
discourse occurred more frequently. The Chinese population, and later the transmigrant
peoples, mostly experienced this exclusion. By looking at the Fretilin Party and its
general initiatives, the criteria for inclusion in the nation were carried over from the
colonial administration. On one level, this analysis provides a detailed understanding of
East Timor’s nation development. However. Anderson’s theory downplays the role of
the national elites in manipulating the official rhetoric. The following analysis looks at
East Timor’s nation development from these perspectives by using Chatteijee’s
theoretical framework.
Chatteriee’s “Moment of Manoeuvre’’
An analysis of this particular epoch in light of Chatteijee’s theoretical perspective
provides a different understanding of the emerging East Timor nation. According to
Chatteijee’s theory, during the growing resistance movement against colonialism, a
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national leader calls the masses to reject the current politics. Then the elite, or
bourgeoisie class, using this call of mobilization, appropriates the people, or subaltern
classes. This appropriation solidifies the elite's power in the emerging state.92 Referring
to Indian nationalism and Gandhi’s call for mobilization, Chatteijee explains that two
movements occur at this time: “On the one hand, the transformation, in its own
distinctive way in each region and among each strata, of the demands of the people into
’the message of the mahatma,’ and on the other, the appropriation of this movement into
the structural forms of a bourgeois organizational, and later constitutional order.”*b This
moment of manoeuvre does not transfer the framework of a unified nation to the people
as Anderson suggests, but rather this moment creates a powerful base from which the
nationai elites control the state.
In order to elucidate this complex moment, the following analysis focuses on the
actions and words of East Timor’s popular national leader, Xanana Gusmao. He
embodies East Timor’s resistance movement during Indonesian's occupation, and his
ability to sustain this movement against harsh Indonesian occupation and general
international apathy rests firmly on his ability to mobilize the people of East Timor. He
exemplifies the moment of manoeuvre and Chatterjee’s national leader because of his
ability to mobilize the people. Gusmao’s autobiography, speeches, poems and letters
document the way he mobilized the people for independence and transformed this
mobilization into a unifying sentiment that spoke to all the people.
Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 100. n Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 102.
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Xanana Gusmao occupied a significant role throughout East Timor’s fight for
independence. He grew up nearby Dili where he was educated in a colonial Catholic
school. Later, he served for some time in the Portuguese military. After his military post.
Gusmao began working in a local newspaper where he expressed his anti-colonial
sentiment and his desire for a free East Timor. When Portugal withdrew in 1975 and
Indonesia invaded, Xanana Gusmao joined the resistance army, Falintil. During the early
years of the resistance movement, he commanded a platoon and gained respect and
loyalty from soldiers, politicians and the people.
In 1980 Gusmao decided to take over leadership of the Falintil. At this time he
scheduled a conference entitled, “First National Conference for the Reorganization of the
Country.” Two years later, Gusmao created an umbrella organization, the National
Council of Revolutionary Resistance (CRRN).'M His primary aim was to unite the
factions within Fretilin as well as provide the resistance movement with a new strategic
plan. Since its inception Gusmao was a strong and respected leader in the Fretilin Party;
however, the 1980 conference began Gusmao’s official career as a national leader in East
Timor.
A primary element within this moment of manoeuvre is the unification of all the
inhabitants for the purpose of liberation. Gusmao’s creation of the CRRN marks this first
step in uniting all of the different groups in East Timor for the sake of liberation. After
organizing a ceasefire with the Indonesians in 1983, Gusmao initiates a policy of
94 The restructuring of the resistance movement included a complete overhaul of the organizational and political structures. The military units became small and mobile. They worked secretly in different population centers throughout the island. Each population center consisted of a "nuclei popular resistance" that maintained links between the resistance movement in the bush and the secret networks in the population centers. Xanana Gusmao, To Resist is to Win! The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmao, edited by Sarah Niner, (Victoria. Australia: David Lovell Publishing, 2000). 68.
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“national unity.” The following year he issues a message entitled “What is National
Unity?,” and in this message he calls for an inclusive, independent East Timor in which
all nationalists, integrationists. ex-ADOPETI, and collaborators could join the nationalist
platform.95 Because the civil war between the UDT and Fretilin Parties creates a serious
rift between many communities in East Timor, Gusmao attempts to converge the two
platforms. Important in this message and his subsequent stance throughout the resistance
movement is his political impartiality and inclusiveness. Reconciling the differences
between the UDT and Fretilin is an important step in creating a broad-based national
movement.96
Gusmao consistently reiterates that his one sole purpose is to liberate East Timor,
and this desire is evident in the changes in his political stance over time. In order to
create a mass movement, he disregards his political beliefs and relies on motivating the
people for independence. Following his call for national unity. Gusmao’s speeches and
letters reiterates his call for mass mobilization of all East Timorese for the sake of a free
“homeland.” For example, in a letter to the 37th United Nations General Assembly,
Gusmao acknowledges the prominent role of the Fretilin Party. At this time, he also
emphasizes the people’s involvement in the resistance: “The glorious Falintil combated
the enemy offensive while the people of East Timor actively participated in the resistance
war, whenever possible, with traditional weapons.”97 Gusmao’s eloquent words, which
successfully inspires the people to mobilize, collectively refer to the people of East
Timor.
95 Niner. “A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of the CNRT," 14. 96 As Gusmao continued to disregard his specific politics for national liberation, he also estranged several Fretilin members. 97 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo,15.
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Chatterjee explains that this type of mobilization is typical during this moment;
the national leader must motivate the people to reject their current situation by fighting
against the presiding power. At this moment, however, the characteristics and politics of
the nation are not addressed. They are secondary to the creation of a free state. Based on
Chatteijee’s framework, however, this inspiring discourse also suggests potential
problems. This discourse emphasizes the people’s need for a leader; their "traditional
weapons” need the strong support from the Falintil military. Because the people are still
trapped in tradition, they need direction from the national leaders. Therefore, while the
people of East Timor want to break free from Indonesian repression, they must, in their
desire for liberation, also become the nation outlined and led by Gusamo.
During this moment, Gusmao utilizes several identifiers for mobilization. His
primary identifier for the nation of East Timor is represented by the term "Maubere." It
was created by Ramos-Horta yet it becomes Gusmao’s rallying cry in all of his writings.
Mauberism, which comes from Maubere, is a common term in the Mambai language.
The colonists used the word to describe poor and ignorant "natives” of East Timor.
However, during the Fretilin movement for control and later resistance, Gusmao and
other leaders re-appropriate the word and use it to symbolize unity among the people.1*8
While the exact definition of the word is unclear, it evolves into a popular identifier for
the people of East Timor, ultimately encompassing all other cultural characteristics.
Gusmao’s "Maubere consciousness” is a recurring theme, and its definition
develops over time. In the same letter to the United Nations, he identifies the inhabitants
qs Ramos-Horta. Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, 37.
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as the “Maubere People.” This becomes characteristic of his subsequent letters, speeches
and messages:
[The] Maubere People, to the surprise of the shameful and cowardly aggressors, proved to the barbarous invaders that they did not understand Maubere consciousness and the patriotism of the East Timorese population. This patriotic consciousness of the people was immediately and magnificently revealed, when they spontaneously climbed the mountains of their country, and with genuine zest, unequivocally, resolutely and totally energetically repudiated the presence of the new QQ expansionist.
Important in this letter is Gusmao’s strong emphasis on patriotism and nationalism.
Using sentiments of pride and love of one’s country and attaching it to the nation of East
Timor, Gusmao rallies support and motivates the people to reject their current state of
oppression. However, implicit in this letter is the underlying belief that the only way to
achieve legitimate liberation is to create a nation-state, and the only way for this to occur
would be to create a unified mass movement.
Gusmao’s attempt to create a unique sense of East Timorese-ness, identified as
Maubere, follows Chatteijee’s analysis of a national leader’s call for mobilization.
Chatterjee uses Gandhism as an example, but Mauberism can be seen in the same way.
Chatterjee explains this development as “an ideology conceived as an intervention in the
elite-nationalist discourse of the time and was formed and shaped by the experiences of a
specifically national movement.”100 Therefore, while the fight for independence is the
unifying element for the different groups, the actual interpretation of this mobilization is
w Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography o f Xanana Gusamo.75. 100 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 100.
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different for each group. A tendency emerges within this moment to gloss over
differences for the sake of mass mobilization, and in this case. Gusmao’s nationalism
movement set the stage for potential conflict. Because independence is the ultimate
objective wanted by all the inhabitants, dissent within the community is marginalized or
silenced. While this disallowance for difference is not recognized in most academic
discussions on nation-state development, it is also left out of Anderson’s approach to
postcolonial nationalism. However, Chatterjee suggests that recognizing this occurrence
is instrumental to understanding nation development in a postcolonial context.
For example, many of the people described as Maubere, do not speak the Tetum
language and still retain close ties with their kinship clans. As the Party mobilizes the
different groups. First for economic improvement and then for independence, the
nationalism discourse glosses over some differences while maintaining others. This gap
between the national leaders who repeat the popular rhetoric and the people who are
facing continual repression suggests that the growing popular nationalism is not
necessarily a unified national sentiment for a nation-state but rather the desire of the
people to break away from repression. Therefore, the people view the link between
themselves and the elite as a means by which they can liberate themselves from a
repressive state.
The distance between the people and the elites becomes increasingly apparent
toward the end of the resistance movement. At this time, Gusmao emphasizes the
spirituality of Maubere nationalism. Instead of relying on political frameworks, he relies
on tradition and culture as a means of supporting this national discourse. For example,
during an interview with Robert Domm in 1990, Gusmao describes the indigenous
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spirituality of the Maubere People. Answering a question about the nature of the student
resistance movement that was gaining momentum in the cities. Gusmao replies, ‘This is
based on their patriotic consciousness, which is in the blood of the Maubere People.
Because it’s in our blood, it’s not lost, and I think the whole world can understand the
phenomenon of Maubere nationalism."101 Gusmao elucidates this spirituality inherent in
the Maubere people later on in the interview:
[They] conceive their passage through Mother Earth as a temporary time, ephemeral, in which they have to realize their traditional concepts. Our people are profoundly attached to Mother Earth. All their acts, cultural manifestations, and even life, are destined to consecrate, to honor, to worship Mother Earth.102
This emphasis on spirituality is not only an important tool in the face of Indonesian
repression but it is also a significant element in Chatterjee’s moment of manoeuvre in
which the spiritual element of the national movement re-emerges from the moment of
departure and is used for the sake of mass mobilization.
Underneath this umbrella of Maubere consciousness, there are two other
prominent criteria that Gusmao uses to mobilize the East Timor nation: a shared history
of repression and the Catholic Church. These criteria were first realized and recorded
during the time of Ramos-Horta, the nationalist thinker, but they continue to evolve
during Indonesia’s occupation. These criteria are interrelated and over time they take on
a mythical and timeless aspect within the growing nation of East Timor.
101 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusaino. 142. IU' Gusmao. To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo. 143.
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In 1986 Gusmao releases a message, “A History that Beats in the Maubere Soul.”
which offers important insights into his reliance on a history of repression for unification
and mobilization.103 In this message he called on the youth of East Timor to continue the
struggle for liberation: ‘This moral and political duty comes not only from current events,
but from history and tradition of independence struggles. We have lived this history and
today, more than ever, the sovereign will of the people needs to be defended in strong and
ongoing action...”104 Throughout this message, Gusmao refers to the East Timor's
history as a prime characteristic of East Timorese-ness.
In this message, Gusmao answers a question posed by a student: "What do we
understand to be our historical identity?”105 Gusmao explains that while Portuguese
colonialism affected East Timor’s identity, the essence of an East Timor identity existed
long before the arrival of the Portuguese. He explains, “If it had not been for the
intrusion of Portuguese colonialism, the people of East Timor would have followed their
own path: they would have created a socio-political structure defined by the essence of
one people and one nation....”106 Gusmao continues to evoke a unique spirituality
regarding the inhabitants of East Timor by focusing on a history replete with traditional
and cultural values:
In their lifestyle and festivals, our people did not evoke the arrival of the Portuguese, but remembered, through tales of their elders and the past generations, the blood ties between the different kingdoms. The people of East
Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo.8t>. 104 Gusmao. To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo.86. 105 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusatno,92. 106 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo.92.
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Timor were never totally subjugated by the foreigners and always rebelled against those who stopped the free course of history.107
According to Gusmao, this ancient East Timorese history provides a strong foundation
for East Timor’s current national identity.
Another example of Gusmao’s usage of a shared history of repression is his
reference to the rebellion of Dom Boaventura. He characterizes this as a time when the
different clans joined together against the colonial powers. He finds in this rebellion
evidence that the East Timorese always had a sense of unity and never accepted
domination:
The proof of this is that only in 1912 was East Timor practically beaten by the colonial powers. The war of opposition to Portuguese domination and the particular presence of colonialism were the other two factors that assured the continuity of our own history and the unique identity of the East Timorese people.108
The resurfacing of the Boaventura story indicates its dominance in East Timor history,
and Gusmao affirms its importance by linking it to East Timor’s unique identity. Again,
Gusmao unifies the people using a shared history of repression.
Connecting Mauberism with a shared history of repression solidifies the growing
East Timorese national identity. In another speech to East Timorese students, Gusmao
explicitly connects this history of repression with the Maubere identity:
l0, Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo,92. 108 Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography o f Xanana Gusamo, 102.
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This Maubere awareness has been quelled, either by the palmatoria (Portuguese device for physical punishment), or with colonial laws, but these things forged and created foundations for our historical identity. This Maubere consciousness, the historical identity, proper and genuinely Maubere. does not bow before massacres, persecution, banishment or torture. It is for this identity that the struggle is affirmed, with blood and death.109
Gusmao clearly outlines in these powerful speeches the criteria of an East Timorese:
those people who have experienced the torturous colonial past.
In addition to characterizing the Maubere nation as one which shares a history of
repression, Gusmao also identifies the importance of the Catholic Church in the
resistance movement:
The church of East Timor knows that the Maubere People despise the barbarian occupier. The church of East Timor knows that the Maubere People reject with all their soul the presence of the murderous occupiers. The church of East Timor knows that the people would prefer to die a thousand times than to continue to be slaves of colonialism.110
Gusmao’s reference to the Church as ‘the church of East Timor,’ suggests that the
Church is part of an East Timorese identity. He reiterates this belief with his rally cry
that “[a] church that lives with the people, a church that suffers with the people, a church
that cries with the people, a church that receives the same humiliations as the people, is a
church that can never abandon the people!” 111
In 1988 Gusmao officially broke with the Marxist ideology in another
■Reorganization of the Structure of Resistance.” At this time he founded the National
Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) in an attempt to create a more inclusive
lu Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 organization for political resistance. Now, his focus turns completely to mobilizing the people for independence. Although his previous letters and speeches maintain little Marxist influence, his explicit break formally removes any political ideology from his nationalist rhetoric. In a document that formally establishes the CNRM, Gusmao admits that changing the political foundation of the resistance movement may appear weak, but he explains that the liberation and independence must be the priority.112 This political change amplifies the connection between East Timor’s national consciousness and independence. At this transitional moment, when political ideology is excluded from the resistance movement, Gusmao makes a universal call to all the people: “the ultimate objective we should pursue is liberation of our Homeland and the independence of our people.”113 Gusmao’s frustration with the political rhetoric of some of the resistance leaders rests on the fact that most of these leaders, who fled the island during Indonesia’s invasion, no longer understand the situation inside East Timor. Although Gusmao enjoys support for his changes, he also ostracizes Fretilin members who felt that he is rejecting the principals of the revolution.114 This change in ideology continues to parallel Chatterjee’s moment of manoeuvre whereby politics are subordinate to a “communal morality.”115 Gusmao’s new version of “Mauberism” incorporated all the people for the sake of national liberation. Throughout most of the resistance movement, Gusmao hides in the mountains and fought alongside his soldiers and the people. However, in December 1992 Gusmao is Gusm ao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo, 131. 11 ’ Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo, 134. 114 Miner. "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of the CNRT,’T4. 115 Chatterjee. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 92. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 arrested. In prison, he continues to be a symbol of the resistance movement. He maintains contact with the movement in East Timor but also has more correspondence with the Untied Nations, international leaders and human rights organizations. During his time in prison, the people of East Timor continue to fight for independence mostly in the form of urban protests organized by students. However, not until the fall of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998 is there significant changes in East Timor’s situation. During the year prior to East Timor’s independence, Gusmao is placed under house arrest in order to facilitate negotiations. He appears often in the media and continues to be one of the most important forces in East Timor. In 1998 Gusmao changes CNRM, the umbrella resistance organization, into the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance). Because some groups object to the use of a Fretilin-created word, Maubere, which had ties to Portuguese colonialism and the Fretilin Party. Gusmao removes it from the title and replace it with Timorense. At this point, Gusmao no longer refers to the people of East Timor as ’’Maubere” but as ’’compatriots.” 116 This change reiterates the non-partisan nationalist strategy important to Gusmao and his visions of East Timor’s resistance movement. At a convention recognizing this transformation, Gusmao spoke of the future of East Timor and continues to call on the people of East Timor to fight for independence. Gusmao still relies on “centuries of history and culture” that created an East Timorese identity and legitimizes East Timor as an independent nation:117 116 Niner. "A Long Journey of Resistance: The Origins and Struggle of the CNRT." 14. Gusm ao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo.llS. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 Sovereignty lies with our people; it is our people who deserve honour and respect. It is our people who give orders and draft mandates. It is not up to us—weak, imperfect individuals as we are—to decide. Our decisions, our commitments are legitimate only in so far as they comply with the will of our people.118 This convention amplifies the role of the people for the creation of the nation-state. In fact, the irony of this speech, coming close to independence, is only evident in the next section of this paper at which time the CNRT begins making decisions without the consent of the people. However, Gusmao recognizes the growing problems. As independence grew closer, Gusmao issues a “New Year Message for 1999,” in which he outlines the coming difficulties. He acknowledges the potential conflict among the different groups that had been unified for the independence movement. Gusmao writes. “We all understand that independence is a means not an end in itself. Independence must guarantee peace, tranquility, harmony and safety to all, with no exception, so that everyone may be committed to national development and reconstruction.”119 Gusmao’s attempt to remove the primary force of unification, the quest for independence, reveals the differences that this force had obscured. He describes the potential for this conflict: Some are already concerned with power, worried about his or her party and wishing to ensure a favorable political juncture for it. Because they see nothing but the party, they are not able to see the interests of the Homeland, the interests of our people! Sometimes the word ‘interest’ is used as a synonym of ‘yearning for independence.’ They are unable to understand any further or discover the real dimension of the meaning of ‘the nation’s interest.’120 Ils Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo,2\5. ‘I<) Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo,229. I'° Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusamo, 226. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 Gusmao explains that this sort of confusion between national interest and independence is typical of an “independence euphoria." and he asks that the people educate themselves on politics in order to avoid internal conflict: It is regrettable that 23 years after the beginning of the war for national liberation, people do not bother to spend time thinking and analyzing the process in order to understand it better. Some people do not agree that it is necessary to educate our people politically and argue that our people are politically prepared, the proof being that they resisted for 23 years. This is beside the point, these people are mistaking patriotism for political awareness.1'1 Yet Gusmao’s call for mobilization during these 23 years is purposefully devoid of any politics. In the above speech, he describes the exact problem, which ironically he helped create. While Gusmao’scall for mobilization removes politics from the resistance movement, the ultimate goal, or reason, for this call is to create a rational, independent state. Gusmao is a national leader who mobilizes the people around the idea of a Maubere identity. This identity consists mostly of the historical experience of colonialism as well as vague references to traditional and cultural characteristics. In addition, the Catholic Church plays a role in sustaining this identity. During this moment, these characteristics appear benign; however, they re-emerge when independence is achieved and the people are excluded from the state-building process. Although a popular nationalism seems to have emerged as this time, this unified sentiment exists for the sake of independence. In other words, the primary binding Gusmao, To Resist is to Win!: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusanto,225. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 element for the communities in East Timor was liberation, and not necessarily a sense of nationalism. Although Gusmao attempted to create an inclusive political climate, during the development of East Timor’s nationalist rhetoric, certain ethnic traditions are glossed over while others are completely excluded.122 Anderson’s perspective would suggest that prior to the Indonesian invasion. East Timorese nationalism existed at an elite level, and a popular sentiment was difficult to discern. After Indonesia’s arrival, however, a strong, broad-based resistance movement emerged. Because brutal human rights violations, forced resettlement and the transmigration policy affected many inhabitants on East Timor, a unified sentiment emerged against this repression. The Fretilin Party transformed this sentiment into a sense of unity by actively creating a national identity. Eventually, a popular nationalism began to blend with the official rhetoric. The Fretilin Party exemplifies a key element in Anderson’s approach, the preservation of colonial categories, as it transfers to the people a national framework defined by colonial knowledge. Chatterjee’s framework, however, would reveal another type of nationalism. His nationalism proposes that the people are mobilized for the sake of liberation. The national leader utilizes the nationalism rhetoric to achieve mobilization, and the masses follow the leader for the sake of independence. While the national elites rely on certain cultural and traditional identifiers to mobilize the people, the people’s conception of the growins nation varies. Gusmao’s creation of the vaaue Maubere identitv, characterized primarily by a history of repression and colonialism, helps to mobilize the people. Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. 28. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 However, as independence nears, tensions emerge between the constructed national identity and the future state-building project. Many scholars point to this time in East Timor history as the moment when the people of East Timor imagine themselves as part of a national community.i:j Yet, Chatteijee’s understanding of this point in nation development is compelling, and the case of East Timor provides substantial evidence to support his understanding of postcolonial nation-state development. Even the initiatives taken by the Fretilin Party, which serves as the primary example for understanding Anderson’s perspective, indicate a possible disconnect between the people and their leaders. The next section, which depicts a contemporary picture of East Timor, clearly demonstrates the differences in these two approaches. 1:1 For examples see Arenas, "Education and Nationalism in East Timor." Carey. "Introduction: The Forging of a Nation: East Timor," Jardine. East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, and Taylor, The Price of Freedom . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 [II. INDEPENDENCE IN EAST TIMOR: 1999-PRESENT This section analyzes the evolution of East Timor’s nationalism as an independent nation state. During this stage in the development of postcolonial nationalism, the nation has been legitimized in the sense that the international community had recognized East Timor as an autonomous state. At this point, Chatterjee and Anderson’s views of postcolonial nationalism diverge dramatically. Anderson suggests that a blend of official and popular nationalism occurs and the postcolonial state follows a pattern similar to that of Western states. This trajectory will eventually lead the people to recognize themselves as a nation. Even though conflict may exist, Anderson implies that these conflicts are a part of nation state building. On the other hand, Chatterjee explains that at this moment a complete disconnect between the people and the state occurs. While this disconnect has been building throughout Chatterjee's various moments, it is fully realized during his moment of arrival. The national elites take control of the state for the sake of economic development. While the elites rely on the national rhetoric because it is the accepted discourse, the people are marginalized. Chatterjee explains that because nationalism evolves inversely to the European trajectory, the nation and the state will never connect. In this way. Chatterjee directly criticizes Anderson’s analysis of postcolonial nation-state development for relying on the typical, western-centric approach. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 Historical Background In late December 1998, Suharto’s successor, B.J. Habibie, announced the possibility of independence in East Timor. Due to foreign attention, weakened Indonesian power and growing East Timorese resistance, the Indonesian government relented in 1999 to a referendum for independence. Until the referendum, the international community debated issues of self-determination with Indonesian officials and political figures representing the interests of people in East Timor. On the island, conflict mounted among the Indonesian military, pro-integrationist militias and pro-independent groups. On 30 August 1999, despite deadly threats from Indonesian-supported militias, 78.5% of the people in East Timor voted for independence. Consequently, pro- integrationists supported by the Indonesian military systematically destroyed parts of East Timor and massacred people associated with the independence movement. These militias destroyed eighty percent of the island’s infrastructure and forcibly deported approximately 200,000 people to Indonesia’s West Timor.124 A week later, a United Nations-backed International Peace Force (InterFET) landed on the island in order to combat these militias. Later, the United Nations sent an administrative team, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), to help stabilize the island and to provide a transitional governing structure. UNTAET, together with the National Consultative Committee (NCC), a policy making body comprised of East Timorese, created a Judicial Commission, Civil Service l"J Matthew Jardine. "Up From Ground Zero." In These Times 16 October 2000. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 Commission, and Central Fiscal Agency Bureau.125 On 30 August 2001, the East Timorese voted for a constituent assembly which would be the last transitional body before official independence, in May 2002. At the election for the constituent assembly, the Fretilin Party received 57% of the votes, short of the two-thirds majority needed to unilaterally ratify the new constitution.126 This assembly established the foundation and key elements of the new nation-state. For example, it drafted a constitution that decides on whether to implement a presidential or parliamentary system. Currently, the new national government is in its first months of operation. While political restructuring is an important issue for the new government. East Timor is also dealing with issues of economic development. Due to its history, it has one of the poorest economies in the world. Joao Saldanha describes it as a typical war-torn economy characterized by “falling GDP, internally displaced people and cross-border refugees, gaps in infrastructure, high inflation, weak fiscal and financial systems, fragile or collapsed institutions such as statistical and welfare services, disrupted property rights, and shattered trust.”127 While Portuguese colonialism and years of Indonesian occupation did little to develop a sustainable economy, the week of destruction following the referendum is chiefly responsible for East Timor’s current economic devastation. Thus, restructuring and developing East Timor’s economy was one of the primary goals for 1 Joao Mariano Saldanha. "The Transition of a Small War-Torn Economy into a New Nation: Economic Reconstruction of East Timor," in Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community, edited by Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.. 2001), 229. 1'6 Charles Scheiner, "East Timor Elects Constituent Assembly," The East Timor Estafeta 7. no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002): I. 1-7 Saldanha. ‘The Transition of a Small War-Torn Economy into a New Nation: Economic Reconstruction o f East Timor." 230. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 UNTAET and the consultative assembly.128 In addition to political and economic restructuring, the new nation-state is also tackling issues of national identity. Anderson’s "Imagined Community” According to Anderson's theoretical framework, at this point in East Timor’s history a blend of official and popular nationalism emerges and creates an “imagined community.” This blend continues to maintain elements of the official rhetoric such as the colonial categories and institutions. It also contains a popular sentiment in that the people identify themselves as a unified community, or a nation. Therefore, those recurring characteristics that originated in colonialism, such as the idea of a native or ethnic East Timorese, Tetum language, Catholicism and a shared history of repression, now identify the nation of East Timor. An examination of present-day media representation of the island illustrates this blend of official and popular nationalism. While interpretation of the media falls primarily on the viewer, recurring images and analyses appearing in the media not only help clarify and demonstrate the existence of a particular element but may also perpetuate the existence of certain ideas and beliefs. This understanding of the media closely parallels Anderson’s description of the development of an “imagined community.” Anderson explains that an “imagined community” emerges in Europe when the newspaper begins to tie the community together. While the media does not invent a national identity, it acts as a consistent reminder of a specific discourse. Anderson states, 1-8 For a good discussion on some of the economic and political issues facing East Timor see Joao Mariano Saldanha. 'The Transition of a Small War-Torn Economy into a New Nation: Economic Reconstruction of East Timor." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 “[Print-capitalism] gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation.”l2,) Although this idea of “print-capitalism” refers to the national consciousness that developed in Europe during the dawn of the nation-state, a similar situation exists regarding current media. Looking at diverse media coverage of the vote for independence to the present day provides many similar descriptions of an East Timor nation, and suggests that an “imagined community” has emerged on the island. For example, images, descriptions and analyses overflowed in the media following East Timor’s vote for independence. These reports unsurprisingly condensed and repeated certain characteristics of the inhabitants. Although these diverse media write from various perspectives, a common representation emerges. Media generally portray the inhabitants living on East Timor as a long-repressed ethnic group that has finally achieved independence. Most mainstream newspapers and magazines offer a brief summary of East Timor’s history. For example, an article from theFinancial Times provides a common representation: At a national level. East Timor has only ever known authoritarianism. Prior to the Indonesians, Portuguese colonialists ruled the territory for about 400 years, interrupted only by the Japanese during the Second World War. The Timorese have also retained many of their traditional, hierarchical social structures. In some areas, the descendants of East Timor's former royal families still enjoy hereditary political and ritual powers. Marriages are often still arranged between closely related clans. When Indonesia tried to introduce village elections early in its rule, people commonly voted for whoever was chosen by the elders.I ‘i O ' '■4 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 44. 1,0 Joe Leahy. “UN Faces Challenge to Prepare East Timor for democracy." Financial Times. 14 August 2001 [news on-line]: available from http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc -lDaizename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3LEJ6WDQC&live=true&tat’id=ZZZ C19QUA0C&subheading=asia Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 This common summary describes East Timor as an established entity, continually occupied by colonists. It reinforces the idea that East Timor is a timeless entity. This description introduces a traditional element to East Timor’s history, and creates a foundation based on antiquity. According to Anderson, an attachment to antiquity legitimizes the growing sentiment.131 Therefore, the consistent image in the media is that East Timor is a traditional nation victimized by colonial oppressors yet a popular sentiment among the inhabitants always existed. This timelessness solidifies the current imagined community. In a Public Broadcasting Station interview with East Timor’s temporary foreign minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, Spencer Michels offers a condensed version of the recent referendum: Eight months ago there was dancing in the streets of East Timor. Residents celebrated the end of bloody violence and began the transition to independence after nearly 25 years of Indonesian military occupation. But today the reality of widespread devastation from fighting has sunk in, in this territory of 700,000 people. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, was annexed by Indonesia in 1975, against the will of many East Timorese. Last August, in a U.N.-sponsored referendum, nearly 80% of East Timorese voted to secede from Indonesia.' This synopsis of East Timor’s history, proceeded by a common illustration of the weeks following East Timor’s vote for independence, describes a unified community of East Timorese. While space constraints may limit detailed discussion, this broad analysis of 131 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 183. In his book, Anderson makes this reference to paintings and museums found in postcolonial societies but a similar connection can be made with TV and news images. 13‘ Spencer Michel. "Rebuilding the new Nation of East Timor.” Public Broadcasting Station, 19 May 2001[news on-line]; available from http://www.Dbs.oru/newshour/bb/latinrf5Famerica/ian- iuneOO/hortarf 5F5-19.html: Internet; accessed 16 September 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 the situation "on the ground" indicates that the people of East Timor acted unanimously for independence and have a strong sense of their national identity. While these summaries offer the most common, mainstream perceptions of the East Timor nation, they also illustrate the continual use of colonial categories. For example, the above descriptions focus on the colonial category of a shared history. However, these categories also suggest potential problems and conflicts from which disagreement regarding authenticity will ultimately emerge. For example, the people who experienced the harsh years of Indonesian occupation feel that the returning diaspora abandoned them and the country. Many who have spent the last twenty-four years actively resisting Indonesian occupation, see this diaspora as intruders or may even question their East Timorese-ness. Now that the diaspora communities are returning with more money, education, employment opportunities and contacts, they also have more power and influence. InThe Canberra Times, Jenny Denton reports: There is strong evidence of deepening divisions among East Timorese. Many who were active in the struggle for independence, especially the young, have been marginalised in the influx of foreigners and returning diaspora (East Timorese formerly exiled in Australia and Portugal).133 Anderson’s theory suggests that these divisions are common among those found in all nationalist discourses. In fact, Anderson agrees that nationalism excludes groups but this exclusion does not detract from the formation of an imagined community. Another category that is often found in media sources is ethnicity. Based on different sources such asEuropa World Year Book and Northern Ireland World Guide. Jenny Denton. "East Timor suffers under weight of world plan." The Canberra Times. 14 April 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 Reuters news agency created a country profile on East Timor. The section describing the political development of East Timor begins with an illustration of the traditional Maubere society: Timor’s traditional Maubere society consisted of five categories: kings and chiefs, nobles and warriors, freemen, slaves, and nomadic shepherds. Long before the arrival of the Portuguese, the Chinese and Arabs knew Timor as sources of precious woods, which they exchanged for pottery, lead and other goods. Portugal invaded Timor in 1642 and set up a trading post for sandalwood. Dutch colonial rule expanded over the rest of the archipelago at the same time. A treaty in 1859 gave the eastern part of the island to Portugal and the west to the Dutch. There were anti-colonial rebellions in 1719, 1895. and 1959, but on the whole the Maubere managed to maintain their culture through passive resistance.134 While the summary of events follows historical developments on East Timor, the overall implication of this summary is that the people of East Timor maintain a timeless Maubere culture. In order to sustain an “imagined community," the people must believe in and adhere to a fixed, unified culture and tradition. These repeated images of East Timor’s history and Maubere culture suggest that a certain discourse has become nationally, as well as internationally, recognized. Most media report on the distinction between Indonesians and East Timorese while the issue of internal differences is occasionally reported. One distinction regarding ethnicity that remains consistent and appears in the media is that of the Chinese community. Amnesty International reported in its 2000 report that minority groups returning to East Timor have encountered some hostility from the “indigenous East Timorese:” 134 “Country Profiles: East Timor," Reuters AlertNet 2001. [news on-line]; available from httn://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/countrvprofiles/261<)09?version=l Internet; accessed 12/18/01. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 There were cases of unauthorized detentions, beatings and intimidation of individuals suspected of belonging to pro-Indonesian militias. Relatives of militia members were also harassed and intimidated and, in at least one case, tortured. Returning refugees and members of minority groups such as Muslims or ethnic Chinese were at particular risk. Human rights defenders who publicly criticized the activities of vigilante groups were threatened and harassed.Ij5 Discrimination against the Chinese reflects the continual use of colonial categories that surfaced during Portuguese colonialism. Another category that emerges is religion. The Associated Press concludes a report on East Timor with the analysis that the Catholic Church maintains East Timor’s “social cohesion.”136 The Australian's Peter Alford explains the importance of the Catholic Church since Portuguese colonialism and throughout Indonesian occupation: "[The] church has long constituted East Timor's cultural as well as religious sinews and its reward has been intense popular loyalty to a deeply conservative, socially engaged form of Catholicism that barely survives elsewhere today.”1’' The Daily Yomiuri Shimbim, a Japanese newspaper, emphasizes the Catholic culture when discussing the issues facing women. Yoshimi Nagamine reports, "East Timor, which is a Catholic community, prohibits abortion. Villagers tend to give such women the cold shoulder.”Ijii Throughout the development of East Timor’s national identity, the Catholic Church has played a significant role. Non-Catholics are a distinct minority in East Timor, and by 1.5 “Report 2001: Covering Events from January - December 2000 in East Timor,” Amnesty International. January 2001, available from http://web.amnestv.orii/ai.n.sf/Index/ASA570052000'.)QpenDcK'ument&of=COUNTRIES\EAST-i-TIMOR: Internet, accessed 12 December 2001. 1.6 Laura King, "Indonesian pullout marks end of bloody struggle, dawn of independence." A ssociated Press. 30 October 1999. 1.7 Peter Alford. “A nation built on Ashes - East Timor: Paying the Price.” The Australian. 26 June 2000. I VS Yoshimi Nagamine, “East Timor faces challenges of nation-building," Daily Yomiuri Shimbun 2 August 2000 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 1999 more than ninety percent of East Timor’s population was Catholic.139 However, historically, there have existed a great variety of religious groups, and currently there is a small minority of Muslim, animist and Protestants. State officials have made every effort to create an all-inclusive national sentiment regarding religion. For example, in July 2001 Gusmao invited Muslims to return to East Timor and claim citizenship. Some communities decided to return. Arham, the spokesperson for residents in Alor Mosque, a suburb of Dili, said, “We had 201 people in the mosque who wanted to treat Timor Lorosae as their new country.”140 In addition, the current head of the constituent assembly, Mari Alkatiri is Muslim. According to Ramos-Horta. the fact that the first elected head of government is Muslim points to universal acceptance in East Timor. Ramos-Horta explains East Timor’s uniqueness at a speech to the international aid organization, Oxfam: East Timor is a country with a 989f Catholic majority. Muslims are a few hundred and Protestants number about 50,000. The point I want to make is that as a Catholic I am proud to serve under a Muslim brother and I am even more proud that our people have accepted this as absolutely natural.141 Yet official calls for all-inclusiveness on occasion have rung hallow as the actual and symbolic importance of the Church sends a different message. 139 Arnold S. Kohen. ‘The Catholic Church and the Independence of East Timor." Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars 32, no. 1-2 (2000): 20. uo ..Qoi Mus|jms choose to be Timor Lorosae citizens." Suara Timor Lorosae, 12 July 2001, [newspaper on-line], available from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 Some reports show that certain communities have not welcomed the return of their Muslim neighbors, nor have they been respectful of the different religious practices. An AFP report soon after the vote for independence states that the Catholic community did not want the Muslim refugees to return to East Timor. However, a Muslim community member argues that, “Muslims have been in East Timor for about 500 years.”1-12 This response demonstrates the way different communities rely on historical connection as a national identifier. While reports of violence against Muslim East Timorese abounded after the referendum and militia attacks, there is still tension between these communities. The “2000 Country Report on Human Rights Practices” issued by the United States State Department describes this tension: Local, presumably Roman Catholic, residents attacked Protestant churches in East Timor, which had been associated closely with the pro-Indonesia cause, and Roman Catholics often accused Protestant clergymen of being linked to pro- Indonesia East Timorese. In June villagers burned three Protestant churches in Aileu district after a dispute between Catholic and Protestant youths.14’ Other media reports also confirm hostility between the two communities. Daniel Cooney from Australia’s The Age reported on attacks against Muslim communities in East Timor’s capital where Catholics were forcing their Muslim neighbors to relocate. UN chief administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello told Cooney. “East Timor's 265-member u_ "East Timorese protest return o f Indonesian Muslims." Agence France Presse. 31 December 1999. 143 "Country Report on Human Rights practices, 2000." US State Department, available from http://\vw\v.state.»ov/iz/drl/rls/hrrot/2000/eap/index.efm ?doeid=6S8. Internet, accessed 2 December 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 Muslim community was being forced to live in a ghetto due to weeks of stone throwing and intimidation by the Catholic majority."144 Another prominent East Timorese characteristic is the Tetum language. References to Tetum also appear often in the media as a primary characteristic of an East Timorese identity. The British Broadcasting Corporation states. “Although East Timor was a Portuguese colony until 1975, the Portuguese language is currently spoken by only 10 per cent of the population and a local dialect. Tetum. is predominant.”145 While most news articles off-handedly describe the East Timor nation as Tetum-speaking. some media reported on the heated language debate. Until recently, the national elites selected Portuguese as the national language. However, student and civil servant groups wanted the language to be Tetum. While the government recently added Tetum as another national language, this debate created significant controversy.146 In April 2001, Jenny Denton explains, “the adoption of Portuguese as the official language has locked them (East Timor youths) out of the political process and public-service employment.”147 An editorial from The Australian concisely explains that this development “smacks of a hankering for an arrangement by which a relatively well-educated few gain from the efforts of the many.”148 Yet according to Anderson this type of conflict naturally occurs in nation building, and the fact that Tetum was added as a national language points to the way in which a nation-state manages its conflicts. 144 Daniel Cooney. "Muslims Huddle in Dili Ghetto," The A ge, 27 May 2000. 145 “Foreign minister meets East Timorese leader at UN. discusses future aid." British Broadcasting Corporation, 24 September 1999. 146 For a detailed discussion of this debate see Margot Cohen. “A Tangle of Tongues." Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 April 2002. (magazine on-line], Internet, available from http://www.feer.eom/hiz76dki’75ii’/0204 11 p050eurrent.html. accessed on 6 June 2002. 147 Jenny Denton. “East Timor suffers under weight of world plan.” The Canberra Times. 14 April 2001. 148 ‘Tim or help a long-term responsibility." The Australian, 26 June 2000. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 Anderson’s postcolonial nationalism helps explain many of the developments on the island. The nation-state model arrived via colonialism to East Timor. The national elites used that nation rhetoric to unify the people on the island. When East Timor experienced a second wave of colonialism, the resistance movement continued and. over time, strengthened. Consequently, with the help of the national elites, the resistance movement transformed into a popular national sentiment. Since independence, national elites continue to solidify official nationalism with the popular nationalism by relying on institutions such as ethnicity, the Catholic Church, the Tetum language and a shared history of repression. Furthermore, disruptions within the nation are natural and expected within that new nation-state. Chatterjee’s “Moment of Arrival” Chatterjee’s description of the moment of arrival describes a shift among the national elites whereby economic development becomes the primary focus. During this moment, the national elites continue to utilize the previous mobilizing call yet state-building rests primarily in the hands of the educated, political elites. Chatteijee explains the prominent characteristic of this moment: The most distinctive feature of the mature reconstruction of nationalist ideology is the primacy of the sphere of economics in all social questions...Whether it was a question of political programmes, or economic policy, or social and cultural issues, a ‘scientific’ analysis must always proceed by relating it to the basic economic structure of •society. 149 u Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 78 During this final moment, Chatteijee examines the state leaders and their actions. This paper uses Mari Alkatiri, the president of the Fretilin Party and the chief minister of the new national government, to represent Chatteijee’s state leader. In addition to focusing on Alkatiri, this paper looks at other initiatives taken by the ruling party to illustrate this disconnect between the nation (the people) and the state (the elite). When the Fretilin party received fifty-seven percent of the votes, Alkatiri was appointed head of the constituent assembly. In his acceptance speech to the people of East Timor, he makes several explicit calls for a strong national unity. For example, he said: After waging a liberation struggle which involved all our People, and after voting in a referendum which unequivocally expressed the will of the People, we are now engaged in this irreversible process of building our democratic and sovereign State. Today, as it was throughout our struggle, the issue of National Unity is still of paramount importance for the future success of our country.150 This opening statement emphasizes the people’s instrumental role in gaining independence. Later on in his speech, Alkatiri calls on the people of East Timor to continue building national unity: National unity and, consequently, stability will not be guaranteed by a formal agreement between the leadership of parties or by appointing party leaders to government posts. National unity can only be ensured if it is entrenched in every strata and sector of our society. The government is an integral part of a democratic system that we are all building...[The] task of Government is not to ‘build’ national unity. Rather, it is the task of all East Timorese. The duty of the government is to ensure that mechanisms are put in place to enable the 150 Mari Alkatiri, "Speech by Mari Alkatiri.” On the occasion of the Ceremony o f the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor, 20 September 2001. [news on-line); available from http://www.pcug.org.au/-wildwood/0 lsepmari.htm; Internet, accessed 28 September 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 implementation of programmes that foster social cohesion, national unity and respect for democratic principles.151 Alkatiri emphasizes the sense of community among the people of East Timor. Yet while he fosters a need for unification, the government (state) ultimately plays the decisive role. Although his speech expresses the need for national unity, there is a tacit understanding that certain state-building issues would now be handed over to those in power. Thus, the nation has minimal influence over the state. Chatteijee’s theory explains that the national elite will continue to rely on the national call because it is part of the discourse. This language, which was developed during the moment of departure and relied upon during the moment of manoeuvre, is a part of the elite rhetoric. Chatterjee makes this observation in the case of Nerhu, the first prime minister of India: The nation as Mother comes to him as part of a political language he has taught himself to use; it is just another political slogan which had gained currency and established itself in the meeting-grounds of the Congress. It does not figure in his own “scientific’ vocabulary of politics. But he can use it, because it has become part of the language which the masses speak when they come to political meetings. So he interprets the word, giving to his own rationalist construction: the nation as the whole people, the victory of the nation meant the victory of the whole people, people like them and me.152 Because the elites realize the need for mass support, they continue to use the political language. Ultimately, however, issues of modem, rational state-building must be left to the educated elite class. 151 Alkatiri. "Speech by Mari Alkatiri." On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in o f Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor, 20 September 2001. I5‘ Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 147. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 After Alkatiri calls for national unity, he outlines the plans for East Timor’s economic development. Although East Timor’s economy needs aid and restructuring, an apparent schism appears between his calls for national unity and the road to economic development: I wish to underscore the importance of the establishment of a Planning Commission to assist in developing policies and in the preparation of a blueprint. This document will be prepared after adequate consultations with the stakeholders and would subsequently be submitted to the Council of Ministers for their consideration.I5j The passage demonstrates the way the elite now assumes the role of the caretakers. Even though the people of East Timor voted for the assembly, there is relatively little consultation concerning economic planning. While economic development may best be left to the experts and “stakeholders,” this Planning Commission is completely unattached to Alkatiri’s previous calls for national unity. East Timor’s economic planners are members of international organizations as well as the political officials of East Timor’s newly elected assembly: This Plan must be designed to alleviate poverty. In this regard we will be seeking the assistance of multilateral financial institutions, particularly the World Bank — I seize this opportunity to commend Jim Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, for his recent statement on the need to eradicate poverty and thus reduce the choking world imbalances which all too often become sources of anger and hatred with tragic consequences. We will most certainly include our bilateral partners in the design and funding of this Plan.154 151 Alkatiri. “Speech by Mari Alkatiri." On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor. 154 Alkatiri, “Speech by Mari Alkatiri," On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 No inhabitant of East Timor will deny the desire to alleviate poverty yet there now exists two different spheres within the new East Timor. The people of East Timor occupy the traditional and culture realm while the practical, national elites occupy the important state-building positions. Chatteijee describes the reasons for this schism: Social justice for all cannot be provided within the old framework because it is antiquated, decadent and incapable of dynamism. What is necessary is to create a new framework of institutions, which embody the spirit of progress or. modernity. Progress or modernity, according to the terms of the 20th century, means giving primacy to the systems of economic production and distribution that enough wealth can be created to ensure social justice for all. The state must assume a central coordinating role.155 According to Chatterjee, the elites appropriate the subalteran discourse. For example, as Alkatiri listed the areas in need of attention, he reiterates that this development is for the "Nation.” Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance that special attention be given to the improvement of the infrastructure that will strategically influence and promote national and foreign investment which will ultimately lead to the development of our Nation.156 Alkatiri’s continual references to the "Nation,” suggest that the national elite acknowledge the need to incorporate the nation into the rhetoric. However, there is a distinct difference between Gusmao’s call for the people to unite for independence during the resistance movement and Alkatiri’s promise to promote investment in order to develop the nation. For Alkatiri there is an assumption that the state leaders will organize ,5> Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 133. 156 Alkatiri. “Speech by Mari Alkatiri.” On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government o f East Timor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 and construct the state while the people will follow. Even though he uses the word ‘nation,’ there is a growing division between the people and the state. Alkatiri explains that it is the government’s responsibility to lead the country into economic development.157 The major debate over national language in East Timor illustrates the overriding importance of state development as opposed to nation recognition. As mentioned above, language in East Timor is one of the most controversial issues plaguing the new nation state, and this debate highlights important aspects occurring in Chatteijee’s moment of arrival. While the recent decision to include Tetum as a national language appeases some groups, it does not detract from the overall power of the national elite. The evolution of this debate and the power behind the decision offers an important example of Chatteqee’s moment of arrival. In 2000 Portuguese was declared the official language at the national congress of the CNRT. The CNRT supported this decision because it represented “East Timor’s cultural heritage.”158 Even though the national leaders state that East Timor’s national identity is tied to Portugal, the fact is that approximately fifteen percent of East Timorese understand Portuguese, and most of these people are from the elite class.139 The younger generation, especially students, want the official language to be English, Tetum or Indonesian. While most of the younger generation speak and write Indonesian, there is 157 Alkatiri. "Speech by Mari Alkatiri," On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor. 20 September 2001. I5S Mark Dodd. ‘Timor fighting a war of words," The Age. 25 August 2001. 159 This percentage has varied between 5T to 15T depending on the source. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 obvious distaste for using this as a national language. Moreover, many civil servants do not speak Portuguese because it was outlawed during Indonesian occupation.160 Tetum, on the other hand, is a symbol of East Timorese unity. In fact, throughout this analysis, the Tetum language emerged several times as an indicator of East Timor's national identity. Because it only recently acquired a written form and was never instituted in the educational system, then some people view it as economically unsuitable. English and Portuguese are mostly spoken by the educated and wealthier diaspora who fled during Indonesian invasion but are presently returning to the island. Their influence, as opposed to their numbers, has significant impact on most political, economic and social decisions. This returning diaspora as well as the older generation of resistance fighters (Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta) generally went to Portuguese speaking colonies or Portugal. They do not speak Indonesian and some no longer speak Tetum. In their position of influence they determined that Portuguese should be the national language. Ultimately, the influence of the government still dominants. Acting foreign minister, Jose Ramos-Horta, wrote a letter to UNTAET regarding the language issue. In this letter he criticizes the international aid workers for not using Portuguese: I would like to inform that no staff from this department will attend this secretariat training workshop as, once again, some of the international staff seem to wish to impose Bahasa Indonesia or English...Time and again, these international staff members have completely ignored the majority of East Timorese political leaders (who) have stated that Portuguese will be the official language of this country. In this context and in my capacity as cabinet member, I 160 Patricia Nunan, "Timor-Language Identity." Background Report on Voice of America, 7 July 2000. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 have forbidden my staff to cooperate with any branch of UNTAET that insists in ignoring Portuguese language initiatives.161 Ramos-Horta’s letter demonstrates the power residing within the national elites, and thus the overall power of the government officials in demanding the use of a particular language. Yet Simon Chesterman from the International Peace Academy acknowledges the inappropriateness of this decision in regard to the people’s desires: “Its (CNRTs) questionably representative nature is reflected in the decision last August to adopt Portuguese as the official language - a language understood by fewer than ten percent of the population and by virtually no one under thirty.”162 In addition to appeasing the wealthy sectors of the East Timorese population as well as East Timor’s current government officials, selecting Portuguese includes another type of economic component. Portugal has been a consistent actor in East Timor’s history. Throughout Indonesia’s occupation, the national elites called on Portuguese authorities to help. In addition to maintaining considerable pressure on different international organizations during Indonesia's occupation, it was also one of the main actors involved in the negotiation process for the referendum. Following East Timor’s vote for independence, there were significant shifts to state development, and Portugal has maintained a prominent role in its economic development.16'’ Despite the decision to add Tetum as a national language, which may only be of symbolic importance, this marginalization of several communities - the very communities which Fretilin, and later the CNRT, unified for independence - describes a 161 Mark Dodd, 'Timor fighting a war of words." The A ge, 25 August 2001. 16‘ Simon Chesterman. “A Nation Waits," The World Today 57 no. 5 (May 2001): 25-27. 161 Antonio de Figueiredo, "Trade-off over aid,” The Guardian (London). 4 March 2000. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 fundamental point in Chatteijee’s moment of arrival. Chatteijee’s theory explains that the decision to use Portuguese came from the elites, and has little connection with most of the population. While the national leaders explain that Portuguese has ties with East Timorese tradition and culture, this explanation does not seem to satisfy most of the population. Indeed, Chatteijee’s theory explains that this type of rhetoric suggests an official, or elite, use of the national call. The reasons for using Portuguese are not difficult to discern. For the most part, those constructing the state speak Portuguese, and thus it would be in their best interest to use Portuguese as the national language. Implicit in this decision is the economic and political accessibility now available to the elite, wealthy class. While historical connection for the elites and economic aid for state development helps the state-building project, the Portuguese language maintains little relevance to the nation-ness of East Timor. Indeed, the elites’ historical ties with Portugal are not deep. The CNRT initially decided that the Portuguese escudo should be the common currency because of its historical connection with East Timor. However, the IMF later changed this decision. Saldanha explains, ‘The IMF, however, gave priority to economic and technical restructuring over political and historical factors. Technical considerations include the stability of the dollar, its convertability, and the fact that East Timor’s exports and international aid are dominated in dollars. Moreover, the escudo is heading for extinction since Portugal adopted the euro as currency.”164 This switch indicates the obvious priority given to economic development, and suggests that cultural heritage - the cry of 164 Saldanha. ‘The Transition of a Small War-Torn Economy into a New Nation: Economic Reconstruction of East Timor," 236. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 the national elites regarding the Portuguese language - does not necessarily convert when the economic benefits do not exist. Disputes over language and currency points to another serious, irresolvable issue. Making history a primary indicator of true nation-ness creates serious rifts largely because the current state leaders are those who appear to maintain the least connection with this national identifier. Because its history of repression and colonialism has been East Timor's primary identifier since the nation-ness rhetoric gained popularity, these criteria remain prominent in the minds of the population. However, due to the vast possibilities for interpretation, hostility around this issue is increasing and difficult to reconcile. Different families, clans and villages, may rely on certain historical events that somehow define them as more East Timorese than their neighbors. For instance, the current hostility between the returning diaspora and the people who stayed on East Timor and fought the Indonesians is a product of subjective interpretation. As economic development takes center stage among the national elites, they continue to rely on certain national identifiers. For example, Alkatiri remarks about the importance of the Catholic Church. He emphasizes the Church in East Timor as a symbol of its national unity: I believe that only a national coalition of efforts can eradicate corruption, collusion and nepotism and uphold the values of social solidarity and justice. In order for this change to occur, we urge the Catholic Church in East Timor, to once again fully engage itself in the process of restoring values that once sustained this society. Without values society will perish. We will set up the institutional mechanisms to ensure consultation with all religious confessions. However, we appeal to the Catholic Church to play a leading role in the fields of education and health. The tradition, the institutional structures and experience of the Catholic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 Church in East Timor are precious assets in the restoration of the ethics needed to develop our new Nation.16 Alkatiri’s continual reliance on the Catholic Church as an institution of the people further divides the state from the people. Meaning, the Church can meet the needs of the people while the state focuses on institution-building and state development. The call for national unity, however, does not necessarily represent the current state in East Timor. Although the media representations discussed above illustrate Anderson’s rocky road to a successful nation-state, these same religious and ethnic conflicts present more serious problems if viewed from Chatteijee’s perspective. To an extent, the current and future conflicts arising due to ethnicity and religion affirm the appropriation of colonial categories by the national elites. Yet, during the struggle for liberation, the national elites ignore these appropriated differences. While these differences many appear minor, they ultimately distinguish, legitimize and justify a group's nation-ness. Once liberation is achieved and the state no longer needs the people then the various identities are left to explore and cultivate their differences. In his book The Nation and its Fragments, Chatterjee explains the way in which this distance between state officials and the people creates and then solidifies differences among the people: [The] insistence on difference, begun in the so-called spiritual domain of culture, has continued, especially in the matter of claming agency in history. Rival conceptions of collective identity have become implicated in rival claims to autonomous subjectivity. Many of these are a part of contemporary postcolonial 165 Alkatiri. "Speech by Mari Alkatiri," On the occasion of the Ceremony of the Swearing in of Members of the Transitional Government of East Timor, 20 September 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 politics and have to do with the fact that the consolidation of the power of the national state has meant the marking of a new set of differences within postcolonial society.166 Since Indonesia's departure. East Timor’s economic devastation calls for serious attention, thus Alkatiri’s emphasis on restructuring and development is understandable.167 Indeed, postcolonial countries, upon achievement of independence, often face this situation, and. therefore state leaders must focus on this aspect. Thus, as is the case in most postcolonial countries, this is the point where spiritual uniqueness splits off from the nation-state development and creates its own domain. This is Chatteijee’s moment of arrival: Nationalism has arrived; it has now constituted itself into a state ideology; it has appropriated the life of the nation into the life of the state. It is rational and progressive, a particular manifestation of the universal march of Reason; it has accepted the global realities of power, accepted the fact that World History resides Elsewhere. Only it has now found its place within that universal scheme of things.168 According to Chatteijee, when mobilization achieves its goal, the people are not needed to the same degree as the powerful elites. While the state-builders continue to use the national rhetoric, the people and their desires are mostly ignored. Thus, a distance erupts between the national elites and the people as the state-builders disregard the needs of the people and the people have no way of influencing the state. Chatterjee’s theory 166 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press. 1993). 26. While Xanana Gusmao and Mari Alkati play dominant roles in leading economic development in East Timor, they have also turned over much of the responsibility to the United Nations. World Bank and the IMF. However, this does not detract from Chatterjee's overall discussion as the national elites are explicitly linked to these organizations. 168 Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. 162. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 provides insight into the development of this difference between the national elites and the people. Alkatiri illustrates in his speeches the way in which a national leader continues to employ the national call yet focuses primarily on state-building and economic development. He utilizes the official call for national unity while focusing on economic development. Ultimately, a shared history of repression and colonization, which the national elites use to help unify and mobilize the people, is now a potential point of conflict in East Timorese nationalism. Issues like language, religion and ethnicity are also potential problems for the future of the East Timorese nation-state. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 IV. A NEW POSTCOLONIAL NATION On 20 May 2002, the international community recognized East Timor as the world's newest independent country. While its independence symbolically ended centuries of oppression, the small island continues to battle with several humanitarian issues including poverty, illiteracy and health care. According to the 2002 Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme. East Timor ranks as the poorest nation in Asia.169 President Xanana Gusmao works with elected Chief Minister Mari Alkatiri in the new government while Jose Ramos Horta continues to act as interim foreign minister. UNTAET remains on the island until national administrative structures are firmly established. While this technical restructuring occupies day-to-day news, the nation of East Timor now appears to the world as a fixed entity. Yet, it is this timeless illusion of an East Timor nation that makes this in-depth analysis important. As the East Timor nation continues to evolve within the defined structures of the modem state, acknowledging its unique history and national construction not only expands previous theoretical perceptions but also addresses the need for specific case studies. From a theoretical perspective, both Anderson and Chatteijee offer insight into understanding the creation of a nation in postcolonial East Timor. They agree that colonialism initiated the process of nation building in non-European regions of the world. Both perspectives also explain that the educated elites had an instrumental hand in shaping and implementing the criteria of the new nationalism. In addition, these approaches also discuss the evolution or appropriation of colonial categories. However, IM United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report in East Timor." U nited Nations Development Programme,(New York. 2002). Chapter I. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91 while Anderson’s theory focuses on the growth of unity among the people. Chatteijee's perspective describes the reasons for potential conflict. Although using both theories provides a more full understanding of nationalism in East Timor, they also offer opposing conclusions. Anderson’s approach explains that the development of East Timor’s nationalism is a blend of official and popular nationalism. Based on various media representations. East Timor exhibits signs of such a blend. Newspapers, interviews and radio shows not only suggest that a popular nationalism exists but they also reveal the influences of the official rhetoric. In some ways. East Timor has emerged as an imagined community. On the ground, the people of East Timor crowd political rallies; register a high voter turnout; and demonstrate other signs of patriotism such as the hanging of the national flag and wearing T-shirts with the logos of an East Timor nation. The people of East Timor proudly identify with their island, and Anderson’s theory helps illustrate this popular sentiment. These media representations also show the influence of colonial categories. Previous to colonialism, ethnic categories, religious beliefs. language and territorial boundaries were not fixed, but with the arrival of the Portuguese these categories became defining characteristics of East Timorese nationalism. Anderson’s approach also recognizes the possible ramifications of these solidified categories. He explains that differences and conflicts may emerge but that they are simply by-products of nation development. In other words, categories and institutions created by the colonists and later used by the nationalists become a part of the national discourse, and this is the way Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92 nationalism emerges in the postcolonial state. Anderson describes this universal trajectory in a lecture on May 2001: One should remember that behind the usually sunny face of contemporary western democracy lie many bloody battles and social histories of violence. The American Civil War was the second bloodiest episode of the 19th century, but the America that we know today, the super power, is unimaginable without that civil war. Britain experienced the great Civil War of the 17th century, which was very bloody, followed by a long series of armed rebellions in Scotland and Ireland. The United Kingdom of 19th century and early 20th century Imperialism, is inconceivable without the Civil War of the 17th century. France moved from absolutism to a long period of violence through their revolution of 1789, and violent upheavals right up to the 1960’s, to say nothing of many other parts of Europe. The point here is that instability is often, in hindsight, if you look back at it, necessary for what came iater.170 Using countries in the western world and their path to nation-statehood as an example, Anderson concludes that nation creation in a postcolonial context follows the same evolution as nation-states in Europe. In time, violence and instability will mediate these differences, and eventually a nation-state such as America, France or Britain will develop. Despite East Timor’s colonial past, it will, in due course, achieve the same success as those states in the west. Anderson’s conclusion asserts that nation building is a messy project and the road to a functioning, modem state is littered with rebellion and upheaval. But simply admitting that conflict is inherent in the nationalism discourse and that nation-states will most likely encounter violence is not sufficient. Ultimately, this assertion is similar to most popular theories on nation-state development mentioned at the beginning of this paper. 170 Benedict Anderson, “Democratic Fatalism in Southeast Asia Today." The Alfred Deakin Lectures. 11 May 2001, (Transcript on-line|, available from http://www.abc.net.au/rn/deakin/content/session 2.html: Internet, accessed 11 December 2001. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 Anderson’s reliance on the common western trajectory where nation-states will eventually evolve into a European-style nation-state reverts to a common oversight in most typical approaches to nation-state development. He ignores the important fact that the evolution of the nation-state in postcolonial countries follows the exact opposite trajectory to that of the nation-state in Europe. Furthermore, he does not take into account the severe and long-lasting effects of colonialism on the populations, especially on the national elites. For the most part, nationalism in Europe was cultivated simultaneously with the state-building project. In the case of East Timor, national elites, who were direct products of the colonial system, created the new nation. In fact, the current actions of the East Timor governing elite are reminiscent of colonial authorities such that these leaders make decisions in the interest of the people yet these decisions ultimately serve the elites' interests. Chatterjee’s framework examines this problem with postcolonial nation-state constructs, and takes these colonial influences as his point of departure. His three moments of nationalism describe the way in which this inverse trajectory ultimately leads to an irresolvable disconnect between the state and the people. Indeed, using Chatteijee’s framework helps explain some of the current conflicts and violence in postcolonial nation-states throughout the globe where internal violence often revolves around identity characteristics like ethnicity, religion or language. Yet, Chatterjee explains that these characteristics are not the cause of the conflict. The cause of the conflict is the state's unfulfilled promise of independence and self-determination. In other words, the elites assume the role of the colonial masters, and their promised liberation from oppression does not occurred. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94 Chatterjee’s perspective demonstrates this evolution in East Timor. Based on their education in colonial institutions, the elites created East Timor’s nationalist identity. They then called for popular mobilization against the colonial powers and elevated liberation as the prime directive. At this time, the national elites pushed internal difference to the background. When independence was attained, economic development became the priority for these national elites. Although they still use the language of nationalism, the focus is no longer national unity but state-building. While nationalism in the west was connected with the “social, intellectual and moral revolution” of that time, nationalism in the postcolonial world means liberation from oppression.171 In the case of East Timor, the different identities, disregarded during the people's quest for liberation, now resign to inner spheres while the rational state-building project occupies an outer sphere. Yet as these differences sit in this realm, waiting to be recognized, they often grow and mutate into potentially reactionary and fundamental sentiments. Chatteijee writes: For hardly anywhere in the post-colonial world has it been possible for the nation state to fully appropriate the life of the nation into its own. Everywhere the intellectual moral leadership of the ruling classes is based on a spurious ideological unity.172 While Chatteijee's approach emphasizes the effects of colonialism on postcolonial nation-state development, his approach does not allow for the possibility that a popular unity among the population may exist. Instead of a popular nationalism, Chatteijee 1/1 Chatterjee, Nationalist Though and the Colonial World. 3. l7‘ Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 162 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 suggests that several different identities coalesce into distinct groups. This gathering of identities around a certain characteristic, whether imagined or real, establishes the foundation for future ethnic, religious and linguistic clashes in postcolonial states. These different approaches to postcolonial nationalism proolematize the analysis of an East Timorese nation. While both Anderson and Chatteijee illuminate important aspects of nationalism, they reach opposing conclusions. Anderson’s analysis is useful in that he demonstrates the way a national identity pervades various levels of the population. Yet, while he identifies important aspects in East Timor’s nation development, in the end, he minimizes the significant impact of colonialism. On the other hand, Chatteijee's approach emphasizes the severe ramifications of colonialism but it does not reflect the emerging popular national sentiment. Theoretically, this paper reveals that despite Anderson’s claim to providing an alternative postcolonial approach to nation-state development, his understanding remains mostly tied to the western academic debates. Although he explains the growth of a popular sentiment, the inapplicability of his reasoning overshadows the probability that a similar popular nationalism will emerge. In other words, explaining that the popular unity existing in East Timor is the same popular sentiment seen in other nation-states in the west discredits Anderson postulations concerning nationalism in postcolonial regions. Furthermore, this conclusion contradicts the over riding purpose of this paper. The primary objective of this analysis is to thoroughly examine the construction and development of an East Timor nation based on its own terms, and theoretically. Anderson’s approach does not enable this type of examination. Because Chatteijee's approach focuses more on the instrumental role of the local elite in manipulating the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 national identity then, consequently, other local identities also receive attention. However, while this attention to various identities allows for a more local understanding of the East Timor case, Chatteijee’s approach also hinders a complete understanding. Ultimately, his approach does not explain the popular East Timorese nationalism felt within the population. Thus, the purpose of this paper is an attempt to reveal the different understandings of an East Timor national construction in order to encourage a critical examination of its current nation-state status. While this case study highlights flaws in the current theoretical debate on nation state development, it also depicts a specific East Timor nation construction. Empirically, this case study reveals the construction of a unique nation. East Timor is the newest formed nation-state therefore signs of internal identity conflict may still be smoldering underneath the jubilation of independence. 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