http://dx.doi.org/10.18611/2221-3279-2015-6-3(20)-21-33 NEMESIS: KEEPING RUSSIA AN ENEMY THROUGH COLD WAR PATHOLOGIES

Matthew Crosston

Introduction a major global platform on international issues today, the fact of the matter is that Russia does There have been numerous articles on the indeed still matter: it will remain a key United authoritarian strengthening of power in Rus- Nations member; a new entrant into the World sia and Putin’s backsliding from democracy Trade Organization; a formidable military pow- throughout the 2000’s. Russian positions and er; and a signifi cant player with countries that initiatives in Syria and Ukraine have been por- overall tend to be unfriendly or openly adver- trayed within media venues across the West as sarial to the United States. America, however, evidence of quasi-Soviet revanchism. In the seems either reluctant to accept this reality and midst of this there has been very little consid- thus cuts itself off from creating new dialogues eration of the impact of American positioning with Russia. There seems to be an element of on the Russian perspective. This article ex- purposeful disdain in the way Russia is viewed, amines that infl uence, whether it is the openly analyzed, and engaged. Russia most certainly is adversarial neoconservative foundation under not blameless and at times only intensifi es its George Bush or the Republican Party in gener- bravado, apparently in a fairly petulant display al, the so-called ‘reset’ interaction under Barack meant to encourage American irritation. Per- Obama, or American foreign policy analysts haps most disappointing, it will be shown that and academics meant to be experts on Russia. two of the biggest culprits in this process will be What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and none other than the two respective presidents, non-innovative American policy that not only Barack Obama and . fails to consider Russian initiatives from Rus- This article highlights some fairly intriguing sia’s own national security interests, but aims and balanced work being done on Russian nation- to contain Russia within a continued Cold War al security positions and how American interests box that not only sours opportunities for col- endemically confl ict with those policies. Unfor- laboration but guarantees the absence of part- tunately, these works are not getting near enough nership in important global security areas. The attention. Instead there is a public American per- idea that Russia’s contemporary positions have spective that seems wholly committed to portray- not evolved beyond the residue of Cold War ing all Russian initiatives in the harshest light. mentalities seems to be more a product of schol- Whether that portrayal accurately refl ects on-the- ars and practitioners in the West rather than in ground reality sometimes seems recklessly un- the institutions of Russia itself. This piece ex- even. The raging and disjointed confl ict in Eastern amines the consequences of imagining Russia Ukraine will be highlighted as a critical case ex- only as nemesis and whether the West is more ample, where an obvious line of thought has been responsible for this Cold War pathology than it pushed and trumpeted regardless of ambiguous is willing to admit. facts and vetted counter-information. When taken Unlike many pundits which have consid- in sum, all of these angles reveal what should be ered Russia a superpower also-ran since the considered a ‘Cold War pathology’ that is actually dissolution of the Soviet Union, or even those emanating most vociferously from the American who simply bristle at the idea of giving Russia side rather than the Russian. A fi nal section will COMPARATIVE . 3 (20) / 2015 21 СРАВНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА И ГЕОПОЛИТИКА

elaborate how this pathology, based on historical strategy that can best achieve its optimal goals. legacies, may carry stark political consequences That normal process, ironically, is often far into the future, leaving what could be a major described in America as a ‘shift’ away from potential partner no choice but to be the enemy. craving attention to exorcising American de- mons. In reality there is no shift: Russia has al- Flaming Punditry and Cold War ways been about Russia, as it expects America Triumphalism: Pushing an Adversarial to be about America, France to be about France, Agenda Nigeria to be about Nigeria, so forth and so on. What Russia usually fi nds so irksome is There are numerous think tanks, both in that when it does what everyone else does in the United States and Russia, which are deeply terms of exercising global power, it is judged concerned about the state of Russian-American as psychologically unstable or defi cient. What relations. Places like the Moscow Carnegie the American media outlets and think tank per- Centre or the Brookings Institute in Washing- sonalities fail to recognize is how much of this ton, DC are regular go-to places for the me- judgment is coming not from explicitly observ- dia when seeking expert opinion and analysis. able behavior or direct quotes from Russian ac- However, these centers have had a decided tors but is placed upon Russia by the so-called slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral experts themselves as they push a decidedly relations to the Russians, with the explanations one-sided interpretation. ranging from the fairly simple to the rather Russia is not supposed to aspire to be mystically esoteric. a copy of the West nor should it be allowing “If America did not exist, Russia would particular American infl uence over its policies. have to invent it. In a sense it already has: fi rst as This is not said as anti-Americanism but rather a dream, then as a nightmare. No other country as simple logic: America would never strive looms so large in the Russian psyche. To Krem- to copy another country and it most certainly lin ideologists, the very concept of Russia’s would not allow another country to force-in- sovereignty depends on being free of America’s fl uence its foreign policy. So why should Rus- infl uence. Anti-Americanism has long been a sia? It is this very simple and straightforward staple of Vladimir Putin, but it has undergone question that seems to never be asked by what an important shift. Gone are the days when the are otherwise august media institutions and Kremlin craved recognition and lashed out at impressive political think tanks in the West. the West for not recognizing Russia as one of Sometimes this tendency can reach near farci- its own. Now it neither pretends nor aspires to cal levels. When Alexei Pushkov, the chairman be like the West. Instead, it wants to exorcise all of the Russian Parliament’s Foreign-relations traces of American infl uence.” Committee, received so much media attention It is not diffi cult to fi nd this Freudian pop- here when he spoke about ridding Russia of de- corn political psychology today when it comes pendence on America and even fi ning cinemas to ‘analyzing’ Russian positions. It portrays the that showed too many foreign fi lms, Western United States as the victim of a global oedipal experts needed to recognize the absurd for ab- complex when it comes to Russia: fi rst Putin surdity. But they did not. Failure to do so is per- desperately craves daddy’s attention only to then plexing given Western analysis always laments defi antly and recklessly reject him, petulantly the strengthening of Putin’s own presidential trying to run away from home. It is important power system and decries how little power sits to remark how most countries around the world within the legislative or judiciary branches of would actually fi nd it dangerously myopic and Russian government. Thus, it is nonsensical to unhealthy to base its own foreign policy on highlight parliamentarians as having real im- earning the ‘approval’ of another country. With pact. But this happens often in America with no ease the far more standard approach to foreign sense of diplomatic irony. policy formulation is to determine a country’s There also tends to be a failure to focus own national interests within its local security Russian analysis through the looking glass of dilemma and craft an independent and fi erce reciprocity. What this means is that current

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American thinking emphasizes how untrust- the Russians. The spread of such views in Rus- worthy Moscow decision-makers are while sia, especially among the country’s leaders, pre- completely ignoring the same Russian criticism cludes easy and quick solutions to the Ukraini- lobbed back at Washington. President Putin an crisis, but rather suggests a relatively lengthy openly and publicly discusses his lack of trust in period of tensions between Russia and the West, American power and in the specifi c policy deci- even if Russian strongman Vladimir Putin were, sions emanating from the White House. It is this for some reason, to step down.” (Italics mine) skepticism that supposedly forces his own lack The tendency is to use personal opinion of desire to engage the United States. There are as confi rmation of fact when it should be rec- simply too few voices at present in the West ognized as biased material. The only confi rma- trying to analyze this mindset as a legitimate tion is the affi rming of preconceived ideas and position. As far as can be determined, the only a particular agenda that undermines any new reason this is not analyzed more seriously is be- attitudinal environment between Russia and the cause the competing alternative – that Putin is United States. As a consequence, it is easy to untrustworthy and Moscow is the cause of all fi nd ‘research’ proclaiming Russian goals that communication breakdown – is simply accept- have never been publicly disclosed or address- ed as a de facto axiom. ing Putin objectives that have never been for- In short, if the United States does not trust mally issued. This is not to say that Russia is Russia, it is because of how Russia behaves on incapable of having ulterior motives or secret the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If agendas. Truly every country to one degree Russia does not trust the United States, that is or another has them. The criticism here is the simply Russian posturing and a case of politi- propensity in the Russian analytical sphere to cal transference, wanting to blame its own self- assume such agendas and then cherry picking made problems on someone else so that it can information to affi rm the assumption. In pure avoid any accountability. The problem is how methodological terms, selection is rife readily this is unquestioningly accepted and within the community that analyzes Russia, how few so-called Russian experts are willing leaving those analyses decidedly weak. to step forward and shine a light on such intel- This bias is only more pronounced when lectual superfi ciality. you leave academically-oriented think tanks/ Perhaps one of the worst examples of this news monitors behind and observe within the is the over-reliance on ‘insider knowledge’ with- corridors of American power. Traditionally, the out actually vetting the source’s objectivity. The focus has been on a decidedly anti-Russian fer- recent exit of Alexander Sytnik as a senior fel- vor coming from the Republican Party. How- low from the Russian Institute for Strategic Re- ever, this analysis would argue that except for a search is a prime example. Upon his exit early very brief and ultimately dashed Obama ‘reset’, in 2015, Reshetnikov unleashed a torrent of in- Russian-American relations within Washington, formation that, while interesting, really does not DC has always been dominated in both parties by amount to more than just gossip and hearsay. a remarkably typical Republican mindset. That Worse, American media and political analysts mindset sets a fairly stark characterization: Rus- adopted it almost wholly as fact rather than as a sia is an aggressive and untrustworthy dictator- possibly compromised source motivated to talk ship that is an innate contradiction to American badly about Russia: values. As such it will inevitably always be a “The Russian analyst’s scathing remarks threat to U.S. interests and global security. By all about the country’s leadership and about the indicators, Russia is a threat not just to itself and community of government experts confi rm that its immediate neighbors but to the entire world, the concept of Russian supremacy has a strong masking its own domestic failings and instabili- hold on the Russian leadership. These suprema- ties with an aggressive foreign policy that will cist views are not limited to the post-Soviet never acquiesce to a more peaceful and coopera- space, where ‘only ethnic Russians are capable tive global community. Indeed, in an American of creating statehood.’ The West is also seen as political world that likes to specialize in ambigu- decadent and somewhat spiritually inferior to ous statements and plausible deniability, it is

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rather remarkable how freely the American Con- simism and pejorative characterizations that gress seems to deride Russia: come from the U.S. Congress clearly have a – John Boehner: “It is increasingly evident negative infl uence on Putin’s strident bravado that Russia is intent on expanding its boundar- and dismissive arrogance toward America. This ies and power through hostile acts.” dilemma, however, is never an actual problem – Ted Poe: “The Russian bear is coming for American politicians: the Russian corrupt out of its cave because it got its feelings hurt and violent chicken always comes before the because of the fall of the Soviet Union, and calm and diplomatic American egg. Of course now it is trying to regain its territories.” this makes Russia feel just as convinced about – Chris Smith: accused a “repressive Rus- the American oppressive and interfering egg sian regime” of “coddling dictators” around the coming well before the Russian self-defense globe from Central Asia to Syria to Cuba and chicken. Russia refuses to accept sole blame for Venezuela. all of the bombastic rhetoric. In this particular – Trent Franks: After the conclusion of an case reality better supports the Russian side: it arms deal between Russia and Venezuela, Pres- is more accurate to describe Putin’s contempo- ident Putin was called a “thugocrat” engaged in rary hostility toward America as one far more “dangerous alliances.” deeply-rooted in frustration with American po- Keep in mind all of the above statements sitions than in sinister strategy to overtake the were uttered before the 2014 crisis in Ukraine world. But instead, America characterizes Pu- even broke out. So before the U.S. Congress tin as having an unstable mania obsessed with received what is has subsequently considered Russia remaining a great Derzhava (powerful undeniable and irrefutable proof of Russian state) and not recognizing his own culpability aggression in Ukraine, it was already quite in creating a future political cataclysm. prepared to view Russia solely as a corrupt This perfectly matches what Stephen Co- willfully abusing , hen astutely characterized several years back as powered by an irrational and paranoid hatred ‘Cold War Triumphalism.’ In basic terms, since of the United States as the sole driver of its for- Russia lost the Cold War it was and should be eign policy. treated as a de facto defeated nation. This tri- While much hope was initially placed on umphalism has arguably never left American the so-called Obama ‘reset’ in American rela- decision-making power given that the advent tions with Russia in 2008, the reality is that en- of this attitude began with President Bill Clin- thusiasm quickly faded and subsequently placed ton and has lasted through three presidencies the Democratic Party as squarely adversarial in (two Democrat, one Republican), totaling six its attitude toward Russia as the Republicans. terms and 24 years. In other words, the Ameri- Indeed, in today’s environment of divided gov- can attitudinal perspective toward Russia has ernment, having a problem with Russia seems witnessed a literal generation passing where to be one of the few happy consensus points the United States has felt justifi ed in selective in Washington. The problem, of course, is how cooperation, one-way bargaining, uneven play- that consensus is built more upon partisan pos- ing fi elds and reluctance on its own part to bury turing: each side trying to one-up the other in the ghosts of the past because said ghosts give order to earn foreign policy merit points. There it a decided political advantage. are some voices that decry a picture being The failure of America to move past the painted about Russia that combines inaccuracy triumphalism of Cold War victory has produced with heightened rhetoric while purposely ignor- a decidedly negative impact on Russian-Amer- ing mitigating contexts and less negative obser- ican relations that precludes a new era from de- vations. However, those voices are extremely veloping. It is as if Russia is being criticized rare and at the moment easily drowned out by that it simply does not know its place or will not the drumbeat of American derision. accept its role, both of which of course are de- This is why there is a decided chick- cided by America and are not open to negotia- en-and-egg quality when trying to unravel tion. This is why prominent thinkers and players Russian-American relations. The general pes- like John McCain, Charles Krauthammer, Ariel

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Cohen, Hillary Clinton, George Will, Alexander world and a country with whom America should Motyl, and Fiona Hill are quick to damn ‘Rus- build bilateral cooperation on a host of issues, sian provocations’ as moving the country to a de including forging global nonproliferation; con- facto ‘fascist’ state. In reality no such explicit fronting violent extremism; fostering new trade initiatives can be found supporting such radi- and development arrangements; promoting the cal accusations. More calm analyses fi nd Russia rule of law, accountability in government and simply not accepting being told what to do on universal values in Russia; and in cooperating as the world stage. a partner in Europe and Asia. This is especially true when one considers Now take into account Director James that Russia feels, with some validation, that it Clapper while appearing before Congress in has been incredibly non-confrontational with 2013 to discuss global threats. He described the U.S. on many contentious issues since the Russian foreign policy as a nexus of organized end of the Cold War that were not necessarily crime, state policy, and business interests (let it aligned with its own national interests. It is not be noted that all three of these descriptors were uncommon, therefore, to fi nd Russian political said pejoratively). Clapper went on to warn that players quite adamant that the U.S. ‘owes’ it for both China and Russia represented the most per- accepting moves that could have easily explod- sistent intelligence threats to the United States ed into formal confl ict after the Cold War. and that Russia could even face social discon- In a sense, the debate is one of degree: tent (read: political disorder and ) be- there is no doubt Russia has accepted that the cause of a sluggish economy, the constraint of end of the Cold War signaled a decided shift in political pluralism, and pervasive . the balance of power. It did not, however, al- At fi rst blush these two accounts seem to low that change to mean Russia was now per- offer a completely incompatible attitude toward manently relegated to the status of nation-state Russia. Reading deeper between the lines of the also-ran. And quite frankly, too many voices in NSS reveals key words, however, that always American institutions of power, both govern- trigger contempt from Russian actors in the mentally and academically, have taken that rel- Kremlin. The ideal of ‘promoting rule of law, egation as an unquestioned reality. As long as government accountability and universal val- the two nations continue to engage each other ues’ is not an olive branch offering Russia the with this attitudinal chasm, then the relationship chance to team up with America. This ideal is will continue to be dogged by vast differences not being promoted with Russia but in Russia. of opinion and massively divergent interpreta- To follow that goal up with being a ‘cooperative tions. Unfortunately, as will be seen next, the partner’ in Europe and Asia has also always sig- highest offi ce in the land for both countries has naled to Russian ears an American skepticism not been a beacon in which to effect positive about Russia’s ability to be a ‘non-meddler’. change on this note. In other words, the NSS comes across to Rus- sians not as a mechanism to promote deeper co- Posturing Presidents: Obama, Putin, equal ties between the two countries but rather and the Failure to Get Real as a snobbish slap across the face about how the United States needs to engage Russia to stop it There is no stronger example of the schizo- from getting in its own and others’ way. phrenic nature of American foreign policy to- Clapper’s comments in some ways gar- ward Russia than comparing statements written ner even more derision from Moscow. Not so in the formal National Security Strategy (NSS) of much the complaints about centralized power President Obama with actual testimony given by and corruption. Russia has been hearing these the Director of National Intelligence James Clap- criticisms since Yeltsin fi rst came down off per. In 2010 the NSS asserted that the U.S. would the tanks after the August coup in 1991. Rus- endeavor to “build a stable, substantive, multi- sia has always been rather dismissive of these dimensional relationship with Russia, based on arguments. Rather, Clapper’s comments about mutual interests.” What’s more, the NSS called the possibility of social discontent and unrest, Russia a 21st century center of infl uence in the placing that possibility at the feet of the Russian

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government because of repression and incom- – Russia is protecting, therefore, interna- petence, always comes off as a red fl ag to the tional law rather than the Assad regime. bull of Russian conspiracy theorists: they are – Many in the world are beginning to see quick to see American interference in any and the United States as relying solely on brute all things that go wrong in Russia. And even force and that such U.S. reliance has proven in- if the more rational voices in Russian political effective and pointless. power dismiss conspiracy theories, there is still – President Obama’s statement that the the obvious interpretation that while America United States should act when possible to up- might not try to personally foment unrest, Clap- hold international norms was ‘extremely dan- per’s comments make it seem like instability gerous,’ arguing that all countries are equal al- would be welcomed. ready under international law. The U.S. government at times can play too This amounts to nothing more than postur- fast and loose with semantics: as long as Amer- ing presidencies and tit-for-tat foreign policy, ica does not actively try to create discord it where each side envisions the other as the chief thinks it cannot possibly be seen as a source of global antagonist while promoting themselves such discord. Very few actors around the globe as the cowboy in the white hat standing up for agree with that interpretation, especially Rus- the less powerful in the world. But it is impor- sians. To this day Russians point to Georgia, to tant to note that Russia’s tit, as it were, came Ukraine, to the countries of the , after America’s tat. to Syria, and believe the build-up to the unrest Rightly or wrongly, Russia is convinced was either directly orchestrated by the United that America has a global agenda that pushes States or at least subtly fostered by America. not only itself as a single unilateral superpower To Russians there is no difference between ‘ac- but also pays special attention to keeping Rus- tively pursuing’ and ‘subtly managing’ while to sia on the sidelines, politically and militar- Americans they are complete polar opposites. ily marginalized. What this de facto means for This is what allows Russia to take statements U.S-Russia relations is that the highest offi ce about bilateral cooperation and substantive in both countries cannot actually be counted partnership and see nothing but animosity, mis- upon to inspire new and better interaction and trust, and manipulation. engagement. Rather, the administrations of the Indeed, it is surprising there is not more two presidents seem rather intent and eager to analysis comparing the U.S. National Security only make things worse. Given the aforemen- Strategy with the subsequent Russian foreign tioned section showing how media outlets and policy concept that came out in 2013 on the academic think tanks also tend to not improve heels of Clapper’s testimony. It affi rms the Putin the situation, this leaves very little room for an- criticism that U.S.-Russia relations will always alysts to carve some balance and fairness into remain complicated because of fundamental the debate. Despite this problem, some are in- cultural differences. What might be these cul- deed attempting to carve that space and deserve tural differences? Namely, that American iden- greater attention. tity is based on individual wants, , geno- cidal and other extreme forms of violence and Finding New Perspectives: Hope for thus will always confl ict with Russian identity, the Future or Balance Betrayed? which is based on ‘loftier ambitions, more of a spiritual kind.’ This was only compounded on Bo Petersson has done work trying to September 11th of the same year, when Putin bridge the gap between recognizing Russia’s published a letter to the New York Times: tendency to aspire to great power status while – The UN could collapse and international also simultaneously worrying about new ‘times law would suffer if nations take military action of troubles’ for the country. One of the unique without UN approval. contributions in his work is not falling to the – Such action in Syria would only result in Western tendency to over-emphasize the history a total destabilization of the area and a widen- of backwardness that is legendary in Russian lit- ing of confl ict and terrorism. erature and make sweeping grand gestures about

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contemporary political reality. Petersson rightly a balance in this analysis that does not run away points out the tension that exists in Russia be- from Russian culpability but also does not al- tween the dream of being powerful with the real- low for rendering Russia as some sort of demon ism of having problems regarding ‘true’ indepen- caricature. dence and fi nancial self-suffi ciency. Works like Vladimir Shlapentokh, world-renown for this show that there is much more time spent in numerous works across the entire spectrum of Russia addressing rational concerns of statehood Russian Studies, has shown how even during and political/economic development than many the worst examples of Russian anti-American- Western experts tend to give the country credit ism there were still some positive changes in for. Indeed, when one examines this minimal lit- Russian attitudes toward America. Shlapentokh erature what is most remarkable is just how ‘nor- cannot be considered a shill for the Russian mal’ Russian decision-making seems to be on an government. His work always points out gov- every-day political level. ernmental hypocrisy and contradiction. What’s Fyodor Lukyanov, one of the most astute important to note, however, is that this work observers on the Russian political psyche, has also fi rmly places phenomena taking place in done work dissecting the delicate aspect of Russia as fairly standard with developing and Russia being unable to consider a global en- post-democratic transitioning states and that is vironment where it is not a major player while a fairly important: too many present-day com- also experiencing self-conscious political hand- mentators seem to treat Russian reality as some wringing: sort of exemplary outlier, as it were, signaling a “Over the twenty years of reforms, we have unique degradation of democratization and mo- achieved at least one fundamental result: we dernity. Such work testifi es to the fact that Rus- have tried all possible models for the country’s sia falls squarely within the normal range when strategic development and become disappoint- it comes to problems in the post-democratiza- ed with each of them: fi rst the Soviet model, tion process. More importantly, Russia has just which proved to be unviable and bankrupt; then as much divergence in public opinion and strat- a pro-Western liberal model, which brought ifi cation in political power as other countries. about bitter disillusionment about the very idea None of this is meant to make Russia out to be of democracy. Finally, an ‘Asian’ model of au- a patron saint of statehood excellence. Rather, thoritarian modernization, on which we pinned these efforts simply allow a sense of normalcy considerable hope. Many Russians, even those when viewing Russian problems. As soon as who share liberal ideas, believed that there such normalcy can be more accepted, then the would emerge a strong and resolute leader who opportunity for greater collaboration between would restrict democracy but, at the same time, Russia and others will become more plausible. would ensure a breakthrough with an iron hand. Samuel Charap’s work on the so-called However, such aspirations, even if they do exist American ‘reset’ brought to light how often in the Russian leadership, inevitably bog down frantic assumptions seem to be made about Rus- in the quagmire of corrupt bureaucracy.” sia regardless of whether or not they correspond Most remarkable here is again the normal- to reality. Indeed, his is one of the fi rst voices cy and rationality of the decision-making pro- to explicitly throw down the gauntlet and say cess: the West always exposes a perspective that many of the problems in US-Russia relations makes Russian attempts at democracy insincere tend to be completely manufactured by exag- at best and insipid at worst. Lukyanov provides gerating the lack of ‘deliverables.’ the evidence of how Russian political develop- “Without deliverables, both sides would ment has eagerly engaged different phases since turn their attention to the yawning gap between the end of the Cold War and the problem was Washington’s expectations about Russia’s post- not with a lack of sincere effort but ultimately Soviet political development and Russian reali- with a deep disappointment with what the mod- ties that have not conformed to those expecta- els themselves were providing. That type of tions. Many key U.S. partners have far worse political introspection is hardly ever afforded human-rights records and not even the modi- today in Russian analysis in the West. There is cum of democratic procedure that exists in Rus-

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sia today – Saudi Arabia and Ghana being just vector approach, network diplomacy, openness, two examples.” and rejection of confrontation…It was Wash- Charap rightly reveals how the American ington’s initiative that created the G20 format, emphasis on bolstering sovereignty in Russia’s which is used to coordinate efforts in overcom- ‘near abroad’ devolves into strange games of ing the crisis and offers a mechanism of col- paranoia, where any Russian infl uence in its lective leadership of major world countries own immediate region is seen as a duel to the represented in geographic and civilizational death needing to be countermanded. In addi- respects.” tion, U.S. policy makers need to do a much bet- Rejecting that exceptionalism continues ter job fi ghting the Washington myth that any to rile relations between the two countries, as engagement with Russia de facto signals an many American actors seem to be perplexed at American acquiescence to democratic defi cien- Russia’s unwillingness to accept a minor role cies in the Kremlin. The reality is that Russia is on the world stage and bequeath center stage to not as fully democratic or stable as the United America alone. Dimitri Simes was one of the States, but it is also not a one-party dictator- fi rst to also connect this behavior to ‘Cold War ship and political contestation does indeed take triumphalism’ on the part of America. Simes place across the Russian Federation. Charap pointed out how the triumphalists had failed to wisely advises that Washington must stop fram- recognize, and continue to fail today, that no ing the choice as one between total capitulation one is ever eager to accept any dominant power and all-out confrontation. claiming exceptional prerogatives. It is this Finally, there has been some outstand- kind of analytical balance, recognizing Russian ing interview work done in scholarly venues recalcitrance within a context of subtle Ameri- with Russian political players, like when Johan can provocation, which is unjustly underem- Kharabi interviewed Deputy Minister of For- phasized in the West compared to more strident eign Affairs Ryabkov in 2010. Ryabkov started pieces that are not nearly as deep and offering quite simply: Russia fi rmly believes that every arguments not nearly as profound. action taken by the government of any state is The previous works have been around for largely determined by its understanding of the nearly a decade in some cases. Thus, the oppor- country’s national interests. Ironically, this ba- tunity to evolve American analysis on Russia sic point may be one of the most contentious has always been present but ultimately missed. problems in U.S.-Russia relations today: the This only makes other analyses that offer up insistence by Russia that it is largely copying platitudes about Russian mysticism seeking the example given by the United States. The great power or the Russian bear needing to bare reality is that many countries, not just Russia, its claws or the innate inability of Russia to fi nd American actions abroad very much an ever embrace democracy more troubling. Even affi rmation of exceptional behavior: that what fi ne scholars and commentators like Katz, Rat- America does others cannot do because only ti, and Gelb have all produced work in the last America supposedly knows what is truly best two years that continue this trend and thus have for the global community. That attitude has further concretized a vision of U.S.-Russia rela- riled the feathers of many, but it has been Rus- tions that seems doomed to animus. The crisis sia most eagerly calling America out. This is at in Eastern Ukraine is the critical case study to the heart of Ryabkov’s commentary embedded show how much that animus is pushed. within an affi rmation of globalization: “I believe we correctly assessed, on the To Live and Die in Donetsk: Eastern threshold of the century, future world trends – Ukraine as Nexus of U.S-Russian the formation of a new polycentric internation- Analytical Malaise al system that is replacing the previous bipolar one and is, to a major extent, the product of glo- Let us look at Ukrainian affairs over the balization…while preparing for that, we have past two years: Yanukovych was a thug; but he correctly defi ned the fundamental principles of was a thug popularly elected in his own coun- foreign policy for the new Russia as: a multi- try; but he was elected via means that were

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clearly not free or fair and rife with corruption; decide whether they would be part of Ukraine but despite ‘offi cial American ’ about or part of Russia. While Western journalists as a these corrupt elections, they still went through whole tend to be a conscientious lot, simply pur- without any major global interference. The main suing an interesting story and often putting them- consequence of this acquiescence was a reign of selves in harm’s way in order to get it, the Cold corrupt negligence full of largesse, abuse, and War pathology that remains between the United misrule. Which despite offi cial American pro- States and Russia has a tendency to put a grimy test again, this rule also went on uninterrupted fi lm over more than just political actors. It often until the Ukrainian people forced his removal. affects the way in which stories are told, the lens America doesn’t stand on the geopoliti- through which ‘impartial observers’ focus their cal high ground, either, if it wishes to critically attention. Unfortunately, this happens usually at assess Russia hosting/harboring Yanukovych. a subconscious level, resulting in news stories Cozying up at one time or another with ques- meant to be ‘fair, free, and impartial’ that instead tionable leaders because they happen to look have a decidedly biased perspective snaking its favorably upon your own global positions and way from reporter to reader. foreign policy interests? Hello (place any num- Look no further than the fi rst reporting on ber of developing corrupt nations from Latin referendum day from the highly respected and America, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia august news organization, Reuters. It reported here). American commentators need to stop how thousands of Russian troops had taken crowing about this being an example of ‘Rus- control of the Black Sea peninsula and Crimea’s sian exceptionalism.’ There is a humiliating pro-Russian leaders had sought to ensure the irony being dangerously missed when they vote was tilted in Moscow’s favor. That, along speak of such things. The only other country in with an ethnic Russian majority, was why a the world with a richer, deeper, and more pro- comfortable ‘yes’ vote to leave Ukraine was nounced sense of exceptionalism is the United expected. These were actually two very differ- States. And the Russians know it. To the Krem- ent perspectives confl ated into a single position. lin, America ‘criticizing’ Russia for exception- On the one hand, readers were given the distinct alism is like the Great White telling the Bull understanding that the referendum was basical- Shark not to be so aggressive in the water. ly rigged, commandeered by Crimean leaders, Russia’s actions within, around, and about who were nothing but sycophants to the Krem- Ukraine are no doubt self-serving, in pursuit of lin. But Reuters also accurately mentioned that its own priorities, and with only a modicum of Crimea is majority ethnic Russian, which indi- consideration, at best, as to what is in the long- cates a free and fair referendum could have pro- term interests of Ukraine. More pertinently, it duced the very result reporters were already de- will no doubt couch those actions with decla- claring as disingenuous. So which was it? Was rations of constitutionality, stability, and nor- Crimea being manipulated by local leaders and malization. And in doing so Russia in its own the Russian military or was its majority Rus- mind will be acting just as the United States has sian population voting its free will? By writing countless times in countless arenas over count- the piece so that the suspicious manipulation less years. This is the true nature of real foreign theory was confl ated with the demographically policy power to Moscow: to do as you please true statistic, readers were left confused into while getting everyone else to drag their feet thinking the referendum itself was illegitimate and ultimately do nothing. Such old-school real- no matter what. ist power has not left the global stage despite all The Reuters piece explained the the good intentions to create greater adherence began when Yanukovich turned his back on a to international law and build actual founda- trade deal with the European Union and opted tions for global governance. The problem is not for a credit and cheap oil deal worth billions of that Russia accepts this reality but that America dollars with Ukraine’s former Soviet overlord, seems affronted that Russia does. Russia. It is perplexing how the above trans- March 16, 2014 marked the day when the action is only portrayed in Western media as people of Crimea went to the voting booths to Yanukovich simply being in the back pocket of

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Moscow. Why did the West see favoring a cred- diplomatically agile and astute. And they most it, oil, and gas deal worth ‘billions of dollars’ certainly cannot be strategically deft and subtle. for Ukraine now over a possible trade engage- At least, not when they are compared to their ment with the European Union later as being counterparts in the West, who think Russians are akin to a Faustian bargain made with a ‘Soviet rash; Russians are emotional; Russians are ca- overlord?’ What impact did this tone have on pricious; Russians are sneaky; and quite frankly, uninformed readers who did not know that Russians are a bit daft. All of these things they the Russian credit deal basically meant Russia can be because all of these things suit the players forgave a massive amount of owed oil and gas at the other end of the chess board. This is the debt by Ukraine? danger of Cold War pathology: it starts to warp Finally, the piece reported that the 1992 observation so that it caters to the desired opin- constitution foresaw giving the region effective ion outcome. independence within Ukraine. That 1992 consti- Even the original Maidan revolution that tution, however, was the Ukrainian Constitution preceded events in Eastern Ukraine has been and not the Russian one. It does indeed grant the impacted by this affl iction. Consider: most Crimean region effective independence within in the 21st century have been po- Ukraine and the right to determine its own path sitioned as protests against corrupt regimes and and relations with others. Ukraine wrote those thus have largely escaped the microscope of po- words in the immediate glowing aftermath of litical analysis until much later. Georgia, Kyr- Soviet dissolution, when, quite frankly, most gyzstan, the fi rst Ukraine (the ‘Orange’ one), in the West felt the true political and economic Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, all of these prosperity path shone brightest for Ukraine and protest movements were fi rst and foremost not Russia. Many seem to have forgotten this lauded for their ability to overcome entrenched but any simple source search back to the time regimes that seemed more interested in per- period will reveal massive Western enthusiasm sonal enrichment and cronyism than functional for Ukraine’s prospects while being skeptical governance. As it turned out, none of the ‘revo- of Russia’s size, infrastructure and historical lutionary’ movements created great governing legacy. So yes, it was quite true that the consti- regimes themselves, with a few even ending up tution recklessly gave Crimea the opportunity victims of additional revolutions later on. The to pursue the very path it was now pursuing. Maidan revolution is quite different from this But this fl awed constitution was written by trend in that there was a geopolitically powerful Ukrainians, not Russians. This is a reality not neighbor right next door to the revolution that revealed to readers. The problem, once again, happened to have great interest in how things is a pervasive subconscious Cold War pathol- evolved. ogy that predetermines how readers around the In the aforementioned revolutions there world learn about the situation in Crimea and was either no nearby strong power deeply in- therefore how they see Russia’s role there. terested in how affairs on the ground played out The issue at hand seems to be that too many or the strongest power was the United States powerful decision-makers in the West felt a bit from a great distance just hoping an autocratic bamboozled and outplayed. They felt, rightly or regime would fall. In the Maidan revolution wrongly, as if they ended up with proverbial dip- this was not the case: Russia was very much lomatic egg on their faces and they did not like it. interested in the long-term geostrategic con- Even worse, it seemed they could not stand the sequences of regime change and it was the possibility that this game of chicken ended with blindness endemic to Cold War pathology that only one round (Crimea) and there would be no let Western academia miss the important con- opportunity to regain the upper hand with future sequences of that interest. There was an intel- rounds. Thus, this situation cannot be just about lectual presumptuousness that affl icted West- Crimea. Russia must not be satisfi ed with this ern scholars and diplomats alike to believe any as the end game. There simply must be another toppling of a crony-like regime could only be chess piece to be moved. Because…well…just applauded by all players. To this day there is because: because Russians aren’t supposed to be not much Western media/academic coverage

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analyzing or considering the legitimate Russian the lives of ethnic Russians. This is the great interests/investments in long-term Ukrainian missed irony of eastern Ukraine: no one in the political affairs. Those responsible for lead- West took the Russian entreaties seriously when ing the Maidan revolution were equally blind: it was said the lives of ethnic Russians needed while they are quick to lay blame on Russia to be protected in Crimea. How ironic, then, if now, it is obvious that they were completely it turned out that Russian forces would end up caught unaware and off-guard that anyone on needing to invade eastern Ukraine because eth- the global stage would have words or actions nic Russians were in fact being killed by Ukrai- for their behavior other than simple congratula- nian forces. tory phone calls. Obviously, this has proven to People have indeed died in eastern Ukraine. be a rather large and serious mistake that began They continue to die in eastern Ukraine. They in Maidan Square and bled, literally, all the way die largely because of one side’s forces. But into Eastern Ukraine. those forces are not Russian. And here in the It should be recalled that when the pros- West there is still basically silence. Apparently, pect of violence breaking out in eastern Ukraine the killing of people in eastern Ukraine is only was a major media issue in the West the protests disturbing to the West if it happens at the hands and indignation was voiced primarily under the of the Russian military rather than at the hands context of expecting that violence to come from of Ukrainian forces. What is sadly disappointing Russian military forces. It was the assumption is to see so many experts and analysts that were that the only way authorities in Kiev would take lined up to condemn confl ict erupting in eastern to arms and resort to violence was if the Rus- Ukraine when it was assumed to be Russian-ini- sians made it inevitable with their own attacks. tiated now see those same actors basically turn Just as the authorities in Kiev misplayed their the other cheek and turn their media cameras hand after the Maidan revolution, they badly away from the bloodshed and slaughter of these analyzed the situation on the ground in eastern very same people simply because the fl ag doing Ukraine. In several media interviews I gave in the killing is yellow and blue instead of white, the United States following the referendum in blue, and red. It is doubtful that the people of Crimea, I warned that the greatest possible dan- eastern Ukraine feel that it is an atrocity to die ger in Ukraine would be civil groups in major by a Russian bullet but an acceptable loss to die eastern Ukrainian cities looking to Crimea as a by a Ukrainian one. Unfortunately, it seems that model to emulate and the Crimean referendum certain governmental and media groups in the as a precedent to follow. The reason this was the West have made that very conclusion. To live greatest danger was because the relatively dull and die in Donetsk, therefore, is but a conse- and boring aftermath in Crimea could instigate quence of Cold War pathology run amok. local opposition groups in eastern Ukraine to Confl icts are never clean. War has always follow suit. After all, why shouldn’t these re- been this way and it is unlikely that war will be gions have the same advantages and privileges something different any time soon. But Ukraine that the people in Crimea just apparently earned has been a rather frustrating event, at least for with no violence or damage done to them? those who feel that Russia and the United States This potential copycat effect was not only line up better as allies and not adversaries. The obvious, the consequence was equally so: au- new leadership in Ukraine has not been able to thorities in Kiev would have to act, otherwise stop the unrest or make people excited about the they would basically be saying to the eastern country’s future. The European Union has been half of its country that it would be perfectly ac- even less impressive and quite frankly has ar- ceptable to self-disintegrate. The challenge in guably caused more chaos and instability than those media interviews was for the authorities calm and tranquility. The United States has not in Kiev, not Moscow: could they outmaneuver been able to come up with something innova- opposition forces in eastern Ukraine without tive or progressive that might create a new road resorting to violence and bloodshed? Failing to stop the violence. Faced by these extended to do so could end up an open invitation for cases of political impotence, the players seem the Russian military to actually come protect to have fallen back on the tried-and-true tactic

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of conjuring a bogeyman. Clearly, that bogey- most in the West as a place to perhaps investi- man is Russia. Alas, it is also somewhat lame gate the problems of crime and corruption or because this tactic is not about stopping war fl awed democratic transition. The not-so-subtle but rather assigning blame. It is not about creat- hint was simple yet powerful at elite graduate ing new pathways to peace and cooperation but schools: if you truly want a job in academia and treading down old paths well-worn with mis- want to be able to do ‘important’ work, Russia communication and purposeful animosity. is yesterday’s news. If you want to be on the cutting edge, look to the Middle East and hop Conclusion – The Lost Generation of on the Islamist bandwagon, where the real ac- the Post-Cold War tion (and job demand) is going to be. Of course, the seismic event on September 11, 2001, just a In some ways the United States has played short three years later, seemed to scream to the a very strange self-injurious game since 1991 now advanced Generation X PhD students that when it comes to Russia. It expected that the their mentors were near-prophets. This is what former rival accepted a new stage after the dis- has led directly to what can be called the Lost solution of the Soviet Union in which there Generation of Russian expertise and why the were no more fundamental ideological battles Cold War pathogen is so pronounced today. and that DEMOCRACY in big capital letters Barely any new thinking has emerged from was the clear and undisputed victor. As the Generation X when it comes to studying and un- greatest champion of democracy this of course derstanding the Russian Federation. One is hard- inferred that such acceptance also automatically pressed to fi nd a quote from anyone under 45 not declared the U.S. the world’s only superpower dependent on a ‘Soviet or even Tsarist assump- - the hegemon with no rivals. In some ways, tion’ for explaining Russian behavior. Is it mere- the intellectual community has been even more ly coincidence that almost every single Russian infl uenced by this perception. foreign policy maneuver today is characterized The academic celebration in the West over more often than not as some sort of revanchist the end of the Cold War and the ‘end of his- attempt to resurrect (symbolically or literally) tory’ was quietly and unassumingly accompa- the power and glory of the Soviet Union? Is it nied by an almost unconscious de-emphasis in merely odd happenstance that Putin is evaluated prestigious American graduate schools. Russia only in terms of Soviet dictatorship and not even was pushed aside because, after all, it had not from the perspective of Machiavellian realpoli- simply lost the Cold War: its destiny was surely tik? Whether it be the missile defense ‘shield’ in to become a quasi-democracy, a political also- Poland and the Czech Republic or Iran or Syria ran, and an economic swamp that would be de or the bombings near the Sochi Olympics or facto unimportant on the global stage. The fact fi nally Maidan and Eastern Ukraine, what one that Russia faced a demographic crisis in the sees are Russian ‘analyses’ that basically could fi rst half of the 1990’s that actually watched have been cut from the New York Times in 1964 its overall population shrink and the academic and just had the geography altered. No imagi- communities in the United States shook their nation, no innovation, nothing new whatsoever. collective heads and felt justifi ed in think- Too many in the West have become intellectual ing that if democracy was not in fact the end dullards about Russia. of history, it was at least the end of needing to Russia is not perfect. Russia is not blame- focus on Russia. And so by 1997, when many less. No country is. But when reputable news Generation X’ers would naturally be advancing sources and so-called experts with decades of through various PhD programs, selecting dis- experience all seem to cater to the same sto- sertation committees, and deciding on mean- ryboard and that storyboard seems a bit far- ingful theses, they were subtly but decisively fetched if not actually fantastical, and no one given a strong piece of advice: leave Russia bothers to ever question the storyboard, then it behind. is time to signal the call for a new generation of Now keep in mind this was well-inten- leaders and experts who are willing to examine tioned advice. By 1997-1998 Russia seemed to not just from old but from a more

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neutral and less emotional foreign policy real- on the emergence of these new voices, willing ity. In that crucible no one is absolved but no and committed to do battle against a Cold War one is also unfairly prejudged. Right now the pathology that has become intellectually crip- future of Russian-American relations depends pling to both sides and to the future.

Заклятый враг: взгляд на Россию как на врага сквозь дефектную призму холодной войны

Мэтью Кросстон, профессор, доктор политических наук, заведую- щий Кафедрой изучения промышленной и международной безопас- ности, руководитель программы исследований международной безопасности и разведки Университета Белвью (Небраска).

Аннотация: В настоящей статье автор рассматривает неоконсервативный внеш- неполитический курс Джорджа Буша-младшего, носящий открыто агрессивный ха- рактер, в качестве основы внешней политики Барака Обамы, которая, в соответ- ствии с распространенным мнением, больше основана на дипломатии «вовлечения». Автор делает вывод о том, что американская внешняя политика отталкивается от устаревших и не отвечающих современным реалиям принципов, в результате чего США не могут рассматривать российские инициативы с точки зрения ее соб- ственных взглядов на проблематику безопасности и проводят курс на сдерживание России ввиду сохранения мышления периода холодной войны, что, в свою очередь, не только значительно ограничивает возможности для сотрудничества, но и препят- ствует развитию партнерских отношений в вопросах глобальной безопасности. В статье анализируются последствия позиционирования России исключительно в качестве главного противника Соединенных Штатов Америки. Ключевые слова: США, новая холодная война, внешняя политика США, Путин, Обама.Ключевые слова: регион, регионализация, глобализация, мировая политика.

NEMESIS: Keeping Russia an Enemy through Cold War Pathologies

Matthew Crosston, Dr., Professor of Political Science, Chair for Industrial and International Security and Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University.

Abstract: This article examines the openly adversarial neoconservative foundation under George Bush to the supposedly more ‘engaged’ diplomatic interaction under Barack Obama. What will be exposed is a fairly uninspired and non-innovative American policy that not only fails to consider Russian initiatives from Russia’s own national security perspectives, but aims to contain it within a continued Cold War box that not only sours opportunities for collaboration but guarantees the absence of partnership in areas of global security. This piece examines the consequences of imagining Russia only as nemesis. Key Words: Russia, New Cold War, U.S. Foreign Policy, Putin, Obama.

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