September–October 2018 Volume 78, Number 5 RCMI The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute

Founded 1890 SITREP The Royal Canadian Navy

Chilean Navy frigate CNS Almirante Lynch (FF 07) and Indian Navy stealth multi-role frigate INS Sahyadri (F49) perform a replenishment- at-sea with Royal Canadian Navy supply ship MV Asterix (centre) off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC

—US NAVY / MARQUEZ Inside this Issue

TheRCN of today and the Fleet of tomorrow: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight by Ron Lloyd �����������������������������������������������������������������������3

TheUnderappreciated Importance of Naval Logistics to the National Shipbuilding Strategy by Ken Hansen �����������������������������������������������������������������4

Great things underway for the RCN’s people by Michel Thomassin ���������������������������� 16

www.rcmi.org @rcmiHQ From the Editor

ni-polar, bi-polar, multi-polar, melting polar? Given how power is currently distributed in our complex international arena, coupled with the effects of Uglobalization and the rise of non-state actors, states are finding it increasingly difficult to set and maintain stable national agendas, and that includes our own. While some would argue that politics is always local, Royal Canadian Military Institute it’s hard to overlook the challenges currently posed to the economy, including Founded 1890 very difficult NAFTA negotiations and the building - or not - of a new oil export Patron pipeline and a weakening of so-called traditional international structures and The Governor General of Canada institutions, such as the UN, NATO, WTO and so on. Canada has long main- Vice Patrons tained a view that the best approach to solving international challenges is to be The Honourable Elizabeth Dowdeswell, OC, OOnt a ‘joiner’ and participate in multi-national fora as (in military parlance) a force Lieutenant Governor of Ontario General Jonathan Vance, CMM, MSC, CD multiplier. To the extent that these tenets are under stress, long-held Canadian Chief of Defence Staff approaches are being increasingly questioned. In many states, the response to His Worship John Tory Mayor of Toronto national challenges has been to fall back onto a closed mentality which, as we have seen in some cases, has led to virulent forms of populism or nationalism, even Officers & Directors LCdr/Dr. Michael J. Hoare, CD (Ret’d)—President and within Western states that profess, at least outwardly, a continued commitment Executive Director to liberal democracy with all of its attendant qualities. We must be cautious not Col Jay B. Claggett, CD (Ret’d)—Vice President Mr. James H. Lutz, MA—Vice President to catch this form of cold in Canada. Capt Rodney W. J. Seyffert, CD (Ret’d)—Secretary The Defence and Security Studies Program Committee has now launched BGen Paul A. Hayes, OMM, CD (Ret’d)—Director Mr. Robert C. Kay, JD—Director our program for 2018-19, and we have a series of highly-qualified and significant Capt Stewart C. Kellock, MOM, CStJ, CD—Director Ms. Michele Walkau, MEd—Director speakers scheduled for Security After Hours in the coming months: please watch HCol Bryan J. R. Brulotte, CD—Director for details in Dispatches. At the same time, we have already begun planning for our next Defence and Security conference which is tentatively planned for 24 April, Past President 2019. We are pleased to announce that the focus of this event will be the Arctic, a HCol Gilbert W. Taylor region which is critically important for Canada in multiple dimensions, but which Honoraries HLGen Richard Rohmer, OC, CMM, DFC, O.Ont, is increasingly contested by many states, including China, which identifies itself KStJ, OL, Legion d’Honneur, QC as a ‘near-Arctic ‘ nation. As more details regarding this event become available Honorary Vice President Dr. J. L. Granatstein, OC, FRSC we will make them public. Dr. Desmond Morton, OC, CD, FRSC Now to SITREP. As promised, the focus of this edition is naval power in Honorary Historians Mr. Arthur Manvell general, and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in particular. Given the excellent Honorary Librarian response we have had from our contributors, we are in position to also produce a LCol J. Roy Weir, CD, AdeC, QC (Ret’d) Honorary Solicitor follow-on naval-focused issue of SITREP that we will indeed publish in Novem- ber-December. We will complete the environmental triad with an army-themed Honorary Chaplains LCdr The Rev .J David Mulholland (Ret’d) edition to launch us into 2019. HLCol The Rev Mark L. Sargent, CD From the RCN, we are very pleased to have a submission from the Com- mander of the RCN, Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd, who has written specifically for General Manager Mr. Michael T. Jones the RCMI and SITREP. His focus, and that of the senior navy leadership team, is Controller the current challenges and future direction for the RCN, not least of which is the Ms. Elena Trouba largest re-capitalization of the RCN in its peacetime history. Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme, In addition, the RCN has generously provided three additional articles for Editor, Sitrep your consideration that address the vital importance of the RCN’s people to its Maj/Dr Daniel D. Eustace, CD (Ret’d) current and future success (this issue); changes to the RCN’s organizational struc- Deputy Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme ture as it prepares to accept its new ships; and an overview of recent deployments Mr. Eric S. Morse of its submarine force. An Official Publication of the In our November-December issue, we will have more on Naval affairs in- Royal Canadian Military Institute cluding contributions from geostrategic expert Dr James Boutillier, and Capt (N) 426 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9 Tel: 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919 Continued on page 16 Website: www.rcmi.org Editorial E-Mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2018 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

2 SITREP The RCN of today and the Fleet of tomorrow: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight by Ron Lloyd

s Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), it Canada and Canadians. A few key highlights include the de- is with pride that I am able to write for the RCMI on ployment of two Victoria class submarines, HMCS Chicoutimi a topic that I, and the senior leadership of the RCN in the Indo Asia Pacific, and HMCSWindsor in the Mediter- Aare seized, the current challenges and future direction of the ranean. HMCS Kingston and Summerside were deployed to RCN. Shortly after the new Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, the Gulf of Guinea contributing to Maritime Security in West Engaged was promulgated, the RCN published the RCN Stra- Africa. HMCS Whitehorse and Edmonton deployed to the east- tegic Plan 2017-2022. This plan, completely aligned with our ern Pacific and Caribbean to work with the US Coast Guard new Defence Policy, represents the RCN’s commitment to a on Counter Narcotic Operations, and HMCS Vancouver and culture of continual improvement and innovation designed to Calgary have deployed to the Indo Asia Pacific to reinforce a evolve the RCN as it embarks upon its largest recapitalization persistent Canadian presence in that important region of the in its peacetime history. world. HMCS Ville de Quebec is currently deployed in support The new vision of the RCN, as detailed in the 2017 Stra- of NATO with a new and exceptionally capable Cyclone heli- tegic plan, is Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, Ready to Fight. copter as Canada’s ongoing maritime commitment to NATO. This vision draws inspiration from our motto “Ready Aye It is no small challenge sustaining a globally deployed Navy, Ready,” and is infused with the extraordinary commitment and the leadership of the RCN is immensely appreciative of the of our sailors to make a difference in the world today, and ONE NAVY team, regular, reserve, and civilian, who enable ensures that we are in all respects prepared for the uncertain this success. More importantly, we can’t thank the families challenges that will confront Canada in the future. enough for their support and sacrifice of their loved ones who Ready to Help: The RCN envisions a naval force that is are deployed on behalf of our country. ready to enable and support other government departments, Although the team is equally busy today supporting to conduct capacity building alongside like-minded nations, operations at sea, we are also in the process of retooling every Search and Rescue on the high seas, and provides humanitar- aspect of the RCN to ensure that we are enabled to leverage ian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad. the exceptionally advanced technologies and capabilities that Ready to Lead: The RCN envisions a naval force that is will shortly be introduced into the fleet. Every aspect of our ready to lead in an increasingly complex and uncertain world. business has been examined to ensure that we adapt to the As the most flexible instrument of national power, the RCN technologies, as opposed to forcing it to adapt to our “old” is ideally positioned to allow Canada to lead in times of crisis processes. We have enabled a functional command and con- by deploying a task group or leading a coalition operation. trol construct that enables quicker and more agile decision Ready to Fight: The RCN envisions a naval force ready making. Our occupations are being modernized to provide to defend Canada, to fight alongside our allies, to fight for -Ca more depth and breadth in how we employ our exceptionally nadian values, and what Canadians hold to be right and just. talented sailors. New policies, such as our pregnancy policy, The RCN’s balanced, multi-purpose, combat-effective naval are being introduced as our commitment to being an inclusive forces need to stand ready for combat at sea and from the sea. and diverse organization. Technologies are being introduced The commitment of our sailors to successfully fulfill this at sea, such as WIFI, to ensure we remain an attractive or- vision is nothing short of inspirational. ganization for millennials and netgens. We have expedited In the short time since the plan was released, our sailors reserve enrolment so that Canadians can join their local naval have been deployed globally making a difference on behalf of reserve divisions and we are enabling distributed training to ensure that they can train in their local communities. The only constant in the RCN for the next several years will be Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd is Commander, Royal Canadian Navy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Continued on page 15 the views of the Institute or its members.

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 3 The Underappreciated Importance of Naval Logistics to the National Shipbuilding Strategy by Ken Hansen

s Canada moves forward with building plans for ships elsewhere. Meanwhile, the navy’s main stated requirement is stemming from the National Shipbuilding Strategy, for combat-capable warships. choices made will shape our maritime capabilities The Canadian professional perspective on naval logis- Afor decades to come. Assumptions by the score about what tical capabilities is based on a profound misunderstanding type of employments the ships will face are the foundations about their historical origins and the operational concepts for their planning and construction. A long history of under related to them. As an example, a commonly stated and wide- appreciating the importance of logistical factors runs up to ly held myth in Canada is that Auxiliary Oiler-Replenisher and includes the most recent of ship class operated by navy, ships (AORs) are the product of Canadian conception and the Halifax-class frigates. Understanding these problems will planning.6 This is false. The true origins of the AOR concept greatly assist decision makers when they consider the options and credit for the first operational multi-cargo replenishment before them. To be truly sovereign and independent, Canadian ships belong to the Kriegsmarine, who used them to dramatic maritime forces need adequate logistical capacity to enable effect demonstrating how even limited operational logistics maritime commitments made on behalf of the government. can act as a profound force multiplier. The true origins of the As a planner of operations and an educator for students of the Canadian concept stem from an American improvised effort art, I have observed how logistics is almost always the factor to implement fuelling at sea from escort oilers – merchant that dictates the degree of success or the reason for failure in cargo ships fitted with a simple hose and boom system. This operations. Operational logistics is the science behind modern trial system was tested in mid-1942 by the American-Canadi- naval planning. It is vital that its importance influences ship an escort group A-3, under the direction of Captain(N) Paul design, or at the very least the ships chosen from the options Heineman, USN, and was eventually implemented in less than available, before it threatens their operating capabilities. a year with over 100 merchant tankers operating throughout Operational logistics has been described as “what really the North Atlantic convoy system.7 makes a so-called blue water fleet blue,”1 and “a vital under- The paying off of the last two of three Canadian replen- pinning of a navy’s strategy.”2 It has also been recognized as ishment ships, Protecteur and Preserver, on 19 September 2014 either “a critical constraining or permissive factor” for the dropped the RCN from a trans-Atlantic navy to an offshore navy in both peacetime and war.3 The ability to deploy naval defensive one.8 Moreover, it also represented the end of a style forces and project national power at varying distances from of operations no longer relevant to contemporary defence home waters is the key discriminating feature in the typology plans.9 What the future holds for naval operational logistics used by the Canadian navy.4 Despite being such a critical is far from clear. factor for everything from strategy to tactics, logistics is an Today, the Canadian navy has an improvised sustain- underappreciated subject by academics. Jon Sumida called it ment ship, MV Asterix, the result of an emergency program to “a historiographic orphan.”5 maintain perishable seamanship skills and raise the standing The Canadian navy’s own degree of understanding about of the navy. The cost of the conversions and a five year lease naval logistics is only slightly better than that of the academics’. was “under $700M;”10 the cost of renting the Spanish navy’s A profound lack of general and advanced knowledge about replenishment ship Patino in 2016 for 40 days was “approxi- logistics was identified in a needs assessment study during mately $2.18M,”11 and renting a similar ship in 2015 from the my time at Canadian Forces College, leading to a revamp Chilean navy, Almirante Montt, for 40 sea days cost $6M.12 of the Maritime Component Program curriculum. Getting This was done to preserve perishable seamanship skills related naval forces to the area of operations in time to take effective to replenishment at sea. Meanwhile, a plan is underway to action is directly related to the ability to use sustained speed. build two German Bonn-class AORs, improved derivatives of This capability is founded principally upon the logistical the earlier Berlin-class, at the Seaspan shipyard in Vancouver, capacity of the deployed force. Regrettably, that program of British Columbia.13 Estimated completion dates for the first study is no longer in existence and has not been reinstituted ship vary; recently one suggested 2022.14 Cost estimates are increasing for the two Bonn-class ships and the latest widely quoted figure is $3.4B, an increase of $1.1B.15 Cdr Ken Hansen (ret’d) is the owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons which focuses on maritime operations and analysis, and a researcher at the Dalhousie The interval between the end of service by the two University Institute for Ocean Research Enterprise in Halifax. Protecteur-class AORs (Protecteur due to a fire in 2014 and The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Preserver in 2015 due to advanced corrosion) and the arrival the views of the Institute or its members. of Asterix in Halifax in late December 2017 left the Canadian

4 SITREP navy without a critical capability for between two and three the strategic context. Adverse weather conditions can reduce years. Obviously, the cost of interim replacements has been endurance by up to 30 percent, and the need to employ evasive significant. What is not so obvious is that a far cheaper and routing for weather avoidance, or for enemy avoidance, can effective short term option could have been implemented in add significantly to the total distance to be travelled. Logistical months, not years, but the naval leadership chose to recreate a capabilities are enablers to strategic movement, both from familiar option at the risk of lost seamanship skills and naval the perspective of volumetric capacity and speed of transit. capabilities. The choice of using a modestly converted com- In the operational context, speed relates to the ability to mercial tankship as a stop-gap measure was not considered, concentrate force sufficiently for the attainment of mission even though the Royal Australian Navy has shown that this aims, or to counter enemy plans of action. Operationally, was a reasonable expedient when they were confronted with naval forces are best employed when a high tempo of activity an almost identical dilemma.16 Purchased as a temporary pal- minimizes delay between phases of the campaign plan and liative in 2004, the ship continues in service to this day. Less between major actions. The speed required is delineated by well known is the fact that Canada has used exactly this type the operational abilities of the enemy: our force needs only to of concept to provide effective sustainment to its operating move marginally faster and sustain that speed a little longer forces during the Second World War. than the opponent for it to be of operational significance. The planned costs for the Canadian replenishment ships Naval forces have historically been affected by a dynamic pales into insignificance when compared to the amount of tension between the need to disperse to exert control over time, money and effort spent to modernize the Halifax-class operating areas versus the necessity to concentrate for effective frigates and the Victoria-class submarines, or the enormous offensive and defensive action.18 Increasing ranges in weapons funds to be spent on the next generation of surface warships and sensors reduces reaction time and increases the demand under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.17 Logistics, put for reactive speed in operations. Low endurance and the lack bluntly, is not ‘sexy’ and is underappreciated by the senior of operational logistics have been the most common causes leadership of the navy, who seem only to care for combat of naval culmination. vessels and will sacrifice anything to preserve what they view Tactically, naval speed of action relates to the swift and as core capabilities. Operational logistics has been one of effective delivery of firepower or the avoidance of circum- those sacrifices, which is a colossal blunder made by leaders stances that provide the enemy with that opportunity. The who do not understand a key component of their own navy’s advent of aircraft and missiles in naval warfare has extended capability or its history. This mistake has also been made by the range of interaction between forces and diminished the other generations of leaders in the RCN. operational and tactical significance of physical speed, placing Operational logistics should be central to any discussion emphasis instead on the ability to process information and about what type of navy Canada will have in the future, what reach the point of decision about whether or not the time is operations it will be able to undertake, where they could occur ripe for engagement.19 and how long they can persist. Understanding the theory of The physical need for tactical speed in warships has been naval operational logistics and the essential nature of mobile diminished greatly by the existence of ship-based aircraft, swift sustainment capabilities to naval forces must be integral to boats, and the advent of unmanned and remotely operated future planning and to knowing whether or not joint support vehicles of all types. Nonetheless, the operational concepts requirements will conflict with the very specific needs of the of presence and persistence in maritime operations, which navy. take place in a notoriously hostile operating environment, still place a premium on the operational characteristics of The Compromise between Size, Speed and Fuel Capacity endurance and reach. The tactical consequences of all these in Warship Design features are dictated principally by internal fuel capacity and The connotation of speed has three distinct meanings in propulsion efficiency. They can be augmented significantly naval strategy, operations and tactics. The close connection by operational sustainment.20 between fuel capacity, either internal to a ship or augmented The demands warship activities create for an operational by a dedicated sustainment function, and the ability to use logistics adjunct depend on a host of assumptions that went speed to advantage is key to appreciating the operational into their design. As early as 1911, American Rear-Admiral value of logistics. Alfred Mahan observed that all warships are the result of a In the strategic sense, speed relates to generating and de- process of compromise: ploying force expeditiously so that they can serve either as an effective deterrent, or as an efficient counter to enemy action You cannot have everything. If you attempt it, you already launched. Strategically, speed relates mainly to naval will lose everything. On a given tonnage…there readiness to deploy, but it also pertains to the durability and cannot be the highest speed and the thickest ar- capacity of ships to employ sustained speed over oceanic dis- mor, and the heaviest battery, and the longest coal tances: short ‘sprints’ of very high speed are not important in endurance.21 (Emphasis in original text.)

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 5 The implication of this compromise is that all ships structures and operational plans is central to how the whole will have special abilities best suited to certain purposes: the system functions, and yet few understand this aspect of our so-called general-purpose warship is, and has always been, a naval history or the reasons why it happens to be so today. myth. These characteristics are the results of perceived needs Several factors played major parts in determining the that stem from the strategic setting of the era or from the endurance characteristic of the Canadian navy. Three major dimly perceptible future. With the choice to focus on certain ones included: the cultural loyalty of the RCN’s leadership to capabilities comes the consequence of having lesser abilities British patterns of short-range designs, a focus on battlefleet in other areas. The Canadian navy has suffered significantly operations vice the protection of trade, and a Europe-centric from warship choices that placed a greater premium on speed focus that emphasised operations in the North Sea and eastern and manoeuvrability than on capacity and endurance.22 Rec- Atlantic vice the Pacific Ocean. Canadian warships leading ognition that this deficiency has played a major part in the up to the Second World War were typically short-range and navy’s developmental history is central to understanding the low-endurance vessels optimised for limited tactical en- importance of operational logistics. gagements associated with the battlefleet engagements. This Compromise is the natural consequence of the phys- general classification is shown inTable 1. ical limitations within which naval architects must function: Canadian naval planners selected destroyers over high ships designed or built during periods of war, or in the lead endurance cruisers and sloops in order to remain relevant up to them, will lean towards specialization in one or another to Royal Navy (RN) battlefleet surface operations, albeit at type of combat operations, but none will excel in all of them. virtually the lowest level of combat capability.26 This means that difficult Low fleet endur- choices will have to be Warship Types Battlefleet Engagement Trade Warfare (High ance was not viewed made in a wide variety (Low Endurance) Endurance) as a major disadvan- of capability areas. The Scouts Fleet Carriers (heavy & Escort Carriers tage by the RCN. The light) demand for operational great equalizing effect logistics is determined Main Battle Units Battleships Battlecruisers of operational logis- in large part by that Leaders/Patrollers Light Cruisers Heavy Cruisers tics was provided first process of compromise Screeners/Escorts Destroyers Frigates by the fleet resources and its consequences. Flotilla Craft Torpedo Boats Sloops of the RN and, later, The naval re- (Civil designs) (Corvettes) (Cutters) by the even greater ca- quirements for speed Skirmishers Fleet Submarines Trade Attack Submarines pacities of the United and manoeuvrability Table 1 – General Division of Warship Types by Fleet Function and Endurance. States Navy (USN). So also compete direct- long as a threat could be ly against the design identified that menaced principles that promote seakindliness.23 Generally, longer Canadian interests, all considerations in the design of warships and larger ships, because of their greater mass, have more favoured the enhancement of combat capabilities and the inertia that gives them higher resistance to both linear and diminution of their other characteristics. Internal spaces were angular acceleration. They are, therefore, more seakindly. A turned to more powerful machinery, longer-range weapons, less obvious consequence of size is the fact that greater length magazines, and sensors, rather than greater fuel capacity, makes a ship more fuel-efficient. Its greater mass also allows stores or accommodations. The combat logic upon which a greater capacity for fuel. naval battles in the ‘gun era’ turned demanded awareness, Many complex hydrodynamic effects affect the speed of reaction and concentration of firepower to provide movement of water around a ship.24 Generally, frictional the greatest chance of success.27 As the range and accuracy of resistance is proportional to the total wetted surface of the weapon systems increased, the imperative to sacrifice all un- hull and approximately to the square of the ship’s speed.25 necessary attributes for the sake of increased combat efficiency Speed, therefore, quickly becomes the most significant factor grew stronger. Eventually, however, the changing dynamics of in determining frictional interaction between a ship’s hull and the global security environment revealed a profound require- the surrounding water. Severe weather can also significantly ment for operational logistics. increase fuel consumption by as much as 30 percent, and Operational Logistics—Its Functional Elements the combination of high speed in heavy seas can imperil the and their Applications ship itself. The type of endurance needed to sustain distant and The three functional elements of the operational logistics long-duration operations seldom entered into Canadian naval system (supply, support and sustainment) are often confused planning. It is an underlying assumption that it will simply be and the terms are incorrectly used interchangeably.28 The first available, either from national sources or from allied navies. two, supply and support, are intrinsically connected with The integration of sustainment into Canadian naval force sustainment in major naval logistics systems. The design of

6 SITREP — MCPL LEONA CHAISSON, FORMATION IMAGING SERVICES, NOVA SCOTIA

- Family and friends cheer on the arrival of Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HMCS Charlottetown at NB Jetty, Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Halifax, on September 2, 2018. Charlottetown is returning after six months away following OP MOBILE—its deployment to the Mediterranean Sea where the ship operated with a multinational formation of surface vessels and submarines under NATO command and their response to the conflict in Libya. these systems is a complex process of estimating demand and items of supply that are periodically replenished all fall under generating capacity to meet it. For the purposes of this paper, this category. Sustainment can be carried out while underway, however, I will focus on sustainment. at anchor or alongside. Any point of distribution represents In the naval context, the ‘supply chain’ is not a continu- the end of the supply chain. That terminal point of issue will ous connection at all, but a series of packets of various sizes itself be a unit that has replenishment needs due to its own and volumes that move along a flexible route at various and consumption plus the outlays that it provides to clients. varying speeds. The constrictions on loading and unloading Operational sustainment to naval units while under- and the constraints on the size, speed and volume of loads way requires that the providing unit be designed in a way are all vitally important considerations when planning the that facilitates ease of access to its reserves of stores. This is scope, intensity and duration of naval operations. Opera- an important point of distinction from the supply element tional pauses are usually euphemisms for period of enforced of the system, which is organized for volumetric efficiency. inaction when problems in the naval supply organization The flexible arrangement enhances the transfer process but result in demand that cannot be met. This most often occurs reduces the volumetric capacity of the sustaining unit. The when vital commodities were misdirected, arrived late or in high density loading of the supply element represents a mobile insufficient quantity. The assessment of demand by operational reserve of materiel that compensates for variation in demand planners is frequently underestimated, which leads inevitably or imprecision in the estimation of need. Liquid cargoes to shortage. The most commonly underestimated supply item are the easiest to arrange for efficiency while solids require in naval warfare is fuel. space for access, handling, delivery and replenishment. The The sustainment function replaces items consumed imperative for the sustaining unit is to function in such a during the course of operations. Fuel, food and ammunition way that it only impedes the tactical efficiency of the group are the most commonly discussed commodities, but any other to the absolute minimum, which has emphasized the value

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 7 of underway replenishment over even temporary detachment added transit time. The British Ministry of War Transport of operating units to a resupply point. Creating a tactical reported that return voyage times to the U.K. increased from vulnerability due to the need for sustainment is an anathema about 90 days before France fell to about 122 days afterwards in a style of warfare that demands the utmost in awareness (+35.5%).31 The one-way reduction in carrying capacity asso- and reactiveness.29 ciated with the implementation of convoying was, therefore, The demarcation between the three functional elements between 15 and 20 percent even before problems of cargo un- in the operational logistics system has become blurred due loading and handling ashore plus losses due to enemy action to the innovation of combining the three components of the or marine accident were taken into account. The weakness of system into a variety of multi-purpose shore facilities and fleet British and Canadian escort forces compounded the problem units.30 Additionally, it has become a standard feature for mod- of reduced volumetric carrying capacity of the merchant fleet ern naval units to incorporate a degree of self-support through by raising the likelihood of serious losses. the development of technical tradesmen among sailors and By prosecuting a widely dispersed anti-mercantile war, the inclusion of workshops into ship designs. Storerooms, which was enabled by the superior endurance of their war- fuel bunkers and munitions magazines are all built according ships and their employment of operational sustainment, the to estimates of the normal and wartime operating demands Germans intended to dilute Allied escort forces by creating of service. Increased endurance through conversion of such ‘danger areas’ over vast portions of the world’s oceans.32 Ger- spaces as water ballast tanks and engineering spaces to tankage man warship endurance, on average, was more than double have been used often to enhance fuel capacity. History has that of the First World War.33 The invention of multi-cargo sus- innumerable examples of ships being ‘crammed to the deck- tainment and support ships by the Kriegsmarine began with heads’ with stores of all sorts to increase the human endurance trials during 1928 with the chartered tanker Hansa and was of the ship. The same can generally not be said of munitions, perfected in the spring and fall fleet exercises of 1934 and 1935. which require safe stowage that prohibits casual arrangements. Although a demanding seamanship evolution, the Germans The space and resources needed for such logistical features found they could be ready to transfer fuel 20 minutes after are all tradeoffs in ship design. the receiving ship began its approach to the supplying ship. Despite the almost purely tactical nature of the tasks During the Spanish Civil War, German warships frequently undertaken by Canada’s naval forces, the key issue for anal- replenished at sea, achieving fuel transfer rates of 120 tons ysis is the provision of outsides resources at the local scene per hour under operational conditions.34 By the beginning of of action to extend the endurance or to enhance the effec- the Second World War, the Kriegsmarine included a mature tiveness of deployed forces. These outside assets constitute operational logistics force that included seven distinct types an operational resource that higher authority offers to the of auxiliary naval logistics ships.35 tactical commander, or upon which the local commander The most impressive German logistics ships were the can call when the need arises. Therefore, the logistical means Dithmarschen-class multi-cargo and multi-purpose vessels. under consideration are not purely tactical resources as they Dithmarschen and her five sisters could each carry nearly 9,000 can also be subject to the calls of other nearby local tactical tons of fuel oil, 400 tons of lubricating oil, ammunition, spare commanders, or can be withdrawn due to higher strategic or parts, provisions, and water. They were equipped with repair operational demands. shops, hospital facilities, and accommodations for prisoners of war. They were also quite well armed with three 150-mm, Key Examples of Operational Logistics from two 37-mm and four 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, plus eight ma- Canadian Naval History chine guns. All of these extra features reduced the liquid cargo The Battle of the Atlantic—the time when the Canadian that could be carried but added significantly to the diversity navy reputedly ‘came of age’—contains many examples of the of support they could provide to German naval operations. importance of operational logistics from both sides of the con- Their twin-shaft arrangement produced a top speed of 22 flict. The ineffectiveness of the RCN and the RN in early escort knots, giving them the capability to accompanying warships of ocean convoy operations in the Atlantic is seldom related on high-speed transits or to outrun small patrol craft. At 582 to the endurance shortcoming of their warships. Likewise, feet, they were the longest and fastest oilers in service with German proficiency is not often attributed to their generally any navy of that era. Their length was necessary to get their superior endurance and operational logistics system. This hull lines fine enough to achieve higher speed. A coincident history has not been adequately mined for the operational benefit of streamlined shape was exceptional fuel economy. lessons learned that inform doctrine development. Here are An impressive endurance of 12,500 miles at a brisk 15 knots just a few and these only pertain to fuel, which is and will was achieved without resorting to expending cargo fuel.36 always be the primary requirement of warships in action. The penultimate example of the effectiveness of Ger- The concentration of merchant shipping into convoys man operational logistics was the sortie by the battlecruisers to provide the strongest possible escort increased round-trip Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on Operation Berlin, which took voyage times. Diversion around known danger areas also place between 25 January and 22 March 1941. The patrol

8 SITREP lasted 60 days; it travelled over 17,800 miles. The raiders were Escort Force (NEF) based at St. John’s.43 The logistical expe- replenished with 30,355 tons of fuel (245% of the combined riences there spanned all levels of activity, from the strategic capacity of both battlecruisers) and resupplied on six occa- to the tactical, and involved all three of the elements of an sions by not less than six supply ships.37 In total, 22 Allied cargo operational logistics system.44 ships, amounting to 115,622 tons, were lost and trans-Atlantic The first seven Canadian corvettes assigned arrived shipping cycles were completely disrupted. The shipping sunk at St. John’s on 27 May 1941 and the first three-ship escort in this operation exceeded that lost by the Allies in any of group sailed on 2 June to join the 57-ship Halifax to Liver- the great wolf pack convoy battles or due to any of the most pool convoy HX-129. The convoy, which left Halifax on 27 successful cruises by a single U-boat.38 May, was the first to have continuous close escort across the An equally innovative German development was the Atlantic. The RCN corvettes detached from the convoy and provision of logistical support by three submarine tankers proceeded to Iceland for fuel while a RN group took up the (two improvised types and one purpose-built boat) during continuing escort duty to the point where the eastern local Operation Drumbeat in early 1942.39 Although the fuel trans- escort group was met. ferred average only 30 tons per delivery (27% of a standard The lack of naval logistical capacity at St. John’s and the Type VII medium-range u-boat’s capacity), the net result more limitations of the support ships stationed there quickly caused than doubled the offensive power of the attack by allowing a a severe drop in operational effectiveness. Fully one-third of continuous, multi-phased plan. By the end of the fifth phase the entire British-Canadian force was normally out of service of the campaign in mid-July, German U-boats had sunk 460 due to mechanical defects requiring major repair or refit in ships, which represented 83.3 percent of the 552 ships sunk either the U.K or Halifax, where facilities were already over- in the North Atlantic that year. Fifty-seven percent of these burdened.45 By September 1941, the ten NEF groups each losses were tankers, which were already in short supply and averaged just four effective ships from the sixty available.46 A were more costly and slower to build than dry cargo ships. standard American escort group was a squadron of eight de- The net operational effect of at sea sustainment made torpedo stroyers. The USN commander of Task Force 4 (later renamed capacity, rather than fuel, the limiting factor for U-boat op- Task Force 24) operating at Argentia, Rear-Admiral Arthur L. erations.40 The tactical effect of this new methodology was to Bristol, quickly became concerned over the weakness of the extend the length of a patrol by a Type VII boat by as much NEF. Captain Morton L. Deyo, Bristol’s destroyer commander as four weeks.41 The purpose-built Type XIV U-tanker also in Iceland, observed the RCN ships arriving “tired out and just carried four torpedoes that further enhanced their sustain- barely making it.” He anticipated greater problems during ing value. Effectively, there was no longer a distinction to be winter weather, including “break downs and ships running made based on endurance between the long-range Type IX out of oil at sea.”47 In a letter dated 20 December 1941, Ad- and medium-range Type VII German submarines.42 These miral Bristol wrote to Admiral Ernest King, then Command- and other German initiatives forced Allied escort forces into er-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and described the RCN as “a a reactive posture. paper strength force” and that their difficulties in maintaining In response to widening German surface and subsur- escort groups was primarily due to “the inadequacy of their face trade warfare operations, the Admiralty extended convoy maintenance ideas and facilities.”48 Convoy escort operations escort in progressive steps until a trans-Atlantic system was were being jeopardized by the limitations of the inadequate established in June 1941. From this point onwards, the lim- support arm of the operational logistics system. ited tactical endurance of most British and Canadian escorts Fuel for convoy escorts was the most immediate and played a major role in the conduct of convoy operations. To persistent problem. Existing oil storage was only 4,500 tons at accommodate for this endurance shortcoming, and to shorten the Imperial Oil Company tank farm, which was considered the distance traveled by escorts into and out of Iceland for only enough to meet merchant ship bunkering requirements. fuel, convoy routes were shifted 600 miles northwards from Two merchant tankers were assigned to serve as station oilers the Great Circle path. A complicated series of ‘meeting points’ and to run a shuttle fuel service from Halifax or Montreal, between escort groups was also required. While these adjust- each carrying about 10,000 tons of fuel oil. However, by early ments saved fuel, it also added several days of extra steaming March 1942, the weekly outlay of naval fuels rose to 5,800 to a convoy’s total traveling time, reduced the effective car- tons.49 By late March 1942, stocks of naval fuels in St. John’s rying capacity of the cargo ships, and limited flexibility for had already declined to under 3,000 tons, which amounted evasive routing. The combination of added distance and overly to only three days of supply. By late April, all fuels at Halifax aggressive British escort tactics soon created an operational totalled only 45,000 tons, which was the equivalent of only fuel shortage crisis that made convoys more vulnerable ev- 15 days of supply for all purposes.50 The continued viability erywhere. This was the exact opposite of the intended effect of the trans-Atlantic convoy system was in serious jeopardy of extending escort coverage. due to the inability of the naval supply system to provide and The Admiralty’s reaction to the worsening situation dispense sufficient fuel. in the mid-Atlantic was the creation of the Newfoundland

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 9 The timely advent of fuelling at sea by operational sus- but as a Canadian unit,”55 could never be accomplish because tainment prevented the complete collapse of the trans-Atlantic of its complete lack of logistical capabilities. The distances escort system. From June 1942 onward, a small unit of RCN were double to triple those of the Atlantic war. Wherever the and USN forces began conducting operational experiments ‘parent’ navy went, so too would the RCN go. Without op- with refuelling at sea from commercial tankers in convoy. erational logistics, the Canadian Pacific Fleet might not even Captain Paul R. Heinemann, USN, commander of Task Unit have been able to go home. 24.1.3 (Escort Group A-3) adapted the standard USN abeam The war’s end brought a return to a defensive strategic refuelling method and trained RCN and some RN escorts posture for the navy. Fleets on both coasts were drastically in the practice. Simple canvas ‘deck wash’ hoses were passed reduced, with the force structure emphasis on light fleet carri- from the tanker to the escort via a messenger line connected ers, light cruisers and fleet destroyers. Tactically, however, the to the hose suspended from a side-facing cargo boom. He also emphasis remained on a high-intensity anti-submarine plan brought the potential of underway refuelling to the attention of of action that was to be maintained for 90 days.56 The advent the British commander, North-Western Approaches, Admiral of nuclear weapons and the Cold War actually increased the Sir Max Horton. Over the strenuous objections of his senior importance of these tactics due to the consequences for Ca- staff, Horton ordered the adoption of this practice by RN nadian cities and citizens should the navy fail. By mid-1957, escort groups.51 An Admiralty signal directed fundamental the basic operational assumption was that the fleet would take changes to escort of convoy operations: up hunting areas approximately 250 miles from a sustaining base. At that distance, warships would lose 14 percent of It has been decided that tankers fitted with oiling their operating time while in transit to replenish. This lost at sea gear for service as escort oilers are to be rec- time could be made up either by the construction of six ex- ognised as forming an integral part of the convoy tra anti-submarine ships, costing $25 million each or three escort system in the proportion 2 escort oilers to replenishment ships, costing $15 million each. Based on such each escort group.52 simple math, the naval staff agreed to recommend in principal the construction of three replenishment ships at an estimated Even the basic definition of an escort group was changed: approximate cost of 45.75 million.57 “The composition of an Escort Group is thus, in effect, the The assumptions behind the recommendation to acquire vessels forming the Group plus two Escort Oilers.”53 (Emphasis a sustainment capability made it possible to ignore, for the in original text.) Operational logistics had finally become an moment, the need for a supply capability. The replenishment integrated concept in Allied convoy doctrine. This is the true ships would provide the most important commodities, in- origin of the Canadian task group concept; one that included cluding fuel, ammunition, naval and victualling stores, and a mix of combat vessels and dedicated logistical sustainment. helicopter spares. The small distance offshore would allow for Once Allied force levels increased, aggressive anti-sub- temporary absence of the replenishment ships while they de- marine hunting plans, known as ‘Swamp Tactics’, became the parted to replenish themselves while the warships functioned norm. Hunting the submarine to the limits of its submerged on their own reserves. The nuclear threat, which by the time endurance with a saturation of air and surface units was made of the 1959 RCN Defence Plan, included Russian submarines possible primarily by the luxury of unlimited fuel supplies for capable of launching missiles and torpedoes with nuclear war- the extent of the engagement, which could last as much as 60 heads intended to attack “the retaliatory capacity of the United hours. This form of high-intensity anti-submarine operational States, centres of industry government and population, and planning and tactical execution became the pattern for post- sea lines of communication together with harbour facilities.”58 war Canadian naval operations, but the linkage to operational Part 4 of the plan, Personnel and Logistics, made provisions sustainment was not clearly understood until long after the for stocks of material to be maintained as high as possible due war’s end. to the assumed high rates of usage in combat operations. The Despite the ‘lessons’ of the Battle of the Atlantic, when support, supply and sustainment elements were devised to planning began in July 1943 for Canadian for participation work at distances that were less than half the 531 miles from in the war in Pacific the complete absence of sustainment Halifax to St. Johns during the Battle of the Atlantic, when ships in force plans was glaringly obvious. In contradiction the system so nearly collapsed due to logistical insufficiency. to doctrinal guidance that the basic composition of an escort Files detailing initial analysis for HMCS Provider,59 the group contained a minimum of two oilers, the RCN assumed first Canadian AOR, clearly identify USS Concuh (ex-German that the RN would provide all necessary logistical sustainment, Dithmarschen) as the origin of the concept.60 The archival supply and support.54 The wish of Prime Minister Mackenzie records include detailed assessments of Concuh (AOR 110) King for the RCN to be “wholly and exclusively Canadian, during her evaluation with US 6th Fleet, including the final fighting as such but under American command in the same report of Commander 6th Fleet Service Force to Commander way that the British forces will be fighting [but] not however, as U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and interview notes with Commander subsidiaries of the British Navy, as Churchill had expressed it, Bruce Kroeger, Assistant Operations Officer for Commander

10 SITREP Atlantic Service Forces, where the term “one-stop replenish- concept of ‘repair by replacement’ reduced support activity to ment” appears for the first time. The RCN’s Assistant Chief a supply problem, so long as inventories of spare parts were of Naval Staff (Plans) sent all of these files to the naval staff in maintained. This supply dimension of a support problem was Ottawa on 23 May 1956. Canadian naval liaison officers were dealt with by having the replenishment ship carry stocks of quickly attached to a number of USN logistics ships. In short critical items, just as the German Dithmarschen-class AORs order they sent a steady stream of reports back to the naval had done. The introduction of ‘field service representatives’ staff in Ottawa detailing the latest technical improvements and from industry and the creation of temporary ‘forward logistics procedural practices.61 Eventually, the deluge of information sites’ further reduced the need for a more capacious afloat resulted in instructions to the officers to suspend reporting capability. Planning operational activities and management to allow designs for Provider to be finalized. of supply items became a matter of high skill accompanied As the range of Soviet submarine weapon systems in- by more than a little luck as the fleet aged and increased the creased, the calculation of where the defence stations would demand for logistical support. Fortunately, the inherent flex- have be located resulted in ever greater numbers of escorts to ibility of the group concept and the resilience of individual maintain the required level of tactical activity. By late-1958, warships ensured the necessary minimum capacity to meet the distance from base for anti-submarine operating areas the tactical demands of the Cold War era. Whether any actual had increased to 1000 miles, the loss in time while in transit surge capacity existed is doubtful. for replenishment in port had climbed to 37 percent, and Has the Canadian Navy leaned anything from its past the number of anti-submarine ships needed to make up the experiences with naval logistics? deficiency had risen to 16.62 Typically, this did not, however, provoke a recalculation of the number of sustainment ships It has been claimed that the two “resounding lessons” required. of the Second World War internalised by the naval staff were The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, which “the necessity of being technologically proficient” and “having transpired over 37 days between 14 October and 20 November, vessels capable of trans-oceanic operations.”65 The fuel capacity put the logistical inadequacy of the RCN under an intense characteristics of Canadian warships over the past 100 years light. (Provider did not join the fleet until 28 September 1963.) show that the original trend of relying on low endurance war- The Chief of Naval Staff wrote to the Minister of National De- ships has persisted until the very latest stages of the Cold War. fence and detailed how the aircraft carrier HMCSBonaventure Table 2 (next page) shows the relationship between bunkerage and her five escorts were recalled from the .U K. at the height (fuel capacity) and the size of Canadian warships. of the crisis and were compelled to “pass through their oper- The ships built during the fuel and endurance crisis ational area to enter port, refuel and replenished before they phase of the Second World War (identified by the inset box in could be given assignments.” He used the obvious threat and the table) show a remarkable increase in fuel capacity, whether embarrassment caused by such “uneconomical expenditures compared to their displacement or length. The average fuel in both time and fuel” to press for the building of the second capacity of all types in the table is .23 tons of fuel per ton and third AORs, as the government had not yet approved the of displacement, or 1.21 tons of fuel per foot of length. The funding.63 The necessary permission was eventually granted, average fuel capacity for the high endurance escorts built but the total number of ships remained three. during the war are .45 tons of fuel per ton of displacement, The geostrategic environment caused the navy to focus or 2.07 tons of fuel per foot of length. These figures indicate first on local defence and to assume that they would be able to an extraordinary 95.6 percent increase in fuel capacity per function at longer ranges with the support of NATO navies if ton of displacement, or an equally impressive 71.1 percent the need arose. The main operating concept was still focused increase per foot of length. The under appreciated requirement on sustained high-intensity tactical activity as a counter to the for speed and endurance at the war’s start was corrected by a submarine threat. The sustainment ships were recognized as dramatic rebalancing of the characteristics resulting from a the key to achieving the level of operational activity needed peacetime predilection for combat capabilities. for tactical success. Fleet supply ships, although recognized as However, once the fuel crisis was over, the naval valuable, were considered too expensive for the gain in capa- bias in design emphasising combat capability over logistical bility they would provide.64 The operational logistics system capacity took hold again. The very low fuel capacity of the shrank at first to two elements (sustainment and support) St. Laurent-class, and their multiple derivatives which had and then to one element (sustainment) when the two escort comparable characteristics, resulted in endurance and fuel maintenance ships were taken out of active service (the first capacity that was actually significantly lower than many of the in 1964, the second in 1970). warships that proved to be so deficient in this regard during The notion of a maximum 6-month rotation for deploy- the war. This fact demonstrates that one of the two “resounding ment on operations eliminated the need for mobile supply lessons” was, in fact, not learned in Canada. Only the advent and support, while a limited sustainment capability could of more efficient combined diesel-gas turbine propulsion meet the demands of very irregular group deployments. The technologies allows today’s Halifax-class frigates to achieve

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 11 Class Type Tonnage Length Bunkerage Fuel/Ton Fuel/Foot Endurance

Thornycroft S DD 905 276 300 .33/1 1.09/1 2,300@10 A-class DD 1,320 322 380 .29/1 1.18/1 5,040@10 C-class DD 1,375 329 473 .34/1 1.44/1 5,775@10 Bangor MS 670 180 160 .24/1 .89/1 2,800@10 Algerine MS 990 225 260 .26/1 1.02/1 5,000@10 Flower CVT 940 205 230 .24/1 1.12/1 3,450@12 IE Flower CVT 976 208 440 .45/1 2.12/1 4,830@15 Castle CVT 1,010 252 480 .48/1 1.90/1 9,400@10 River FF 1,570 301 646 .41/1 2.15/1 7,500@15 Tribal DD 1,927 377 520 .27/1 1.38/1 5,700@15 Valentine DD 1,710 363 615 .36/1 1.69/1 6,680@20 St. Laurent DE 2,860 366 455 .16/1 1.24/1 4,570@14 Halifax FFH 4,750 442 460 .10/1 1.04/1 7,100@15

Table 2 – Fuel Capacity of Canadian Surface Warships under 450 feet and 5,000 tons higher endurance on a proportionally smaller fuel load. When promote human rights in the “four corners” of the globe. Yet, the strategic, operational or tactical circumstances dictate that the Canadian navy has been left with the notion that a limited, higher speed will be required, the frigates will have to resort to single-armed operational logistics system originally designed their gas turbines and their endurance will drop substantially. for operations just off the Canadian coast is appropriate for The continuing low endurance of Canadian naval its fleet of limited endurance ships. Worse, the three original vessels and the abandonment of the concept of local defensive replenishment ships have been replaced by a single interim operations as the basis for plans of action suggest two things. ship of limited utility. Worse still is the notion that the next First, the trends underscore the absolutely critical need for generation of sustainment ships will be a joint asset that sustainment ships in sufficient numbers; and second, they can simultaneously act in a number of supply, support and show that the same types of low-endurance combat ships sustainment roles for the other services. The potential for a are being built that resulted from the process of compromise conflict over priorities is bound to arise. Whose priorities are leading up to the greats conflicts of the past. They will just as liable to take precedence? likely not have sufficient endurance if and when they are put to Building logistical capacity into future plans the acid test of high-intensity operations. The diesel engines of the Halifax-class were not included in the recently completed The first step in a corrective plan should be to dispense life extension and modernization program. with the overarching bias toward combat capabilities in the Limited operational logistics, particularly sustain- design of warships. All ships should have enhanced stores and ment, represents a critical vulnerability. As the German expe- fuel capacities for achieving the highest endurance possible. rienced in the Second World War showed, a perceptive enemy Beyond this, reserve capacity should also be included in ma- will target sustainment units in order to reduce the scope and jor and minor warship designs to facilitate supporting other intensity of operations that can be mounted. While impro- government departments and non-governmental agencies.67 vised logistical arrangements will never have the capacity or Plans to reduce the size and capacity of the Arctic and Off- effectiveness of purpose-built systems, even small changes in shore Patrol Ships as an economy measure were particularly capacity can have a profound operational effect, sometimes short-sighted in this regard. The demands upon the support, with strategic consequences. sustainment and supply elements of the operational logistics The era of threat-based planning is over. The military system can be reduced substantially by making adequate role of the navy does not envision defensive high intensity provision for the first users of naval capabilities. operations close to the homeland as there is generally ac- The second step must be to recognize the current cepted to be no direct military threat. Globalization and the limitations of the sustainment element of the operational lo- need to keep the economic system stable have reduced the gistics system. The Bonn-class replenishment ships will have likelihood of state-on-state warfare.66 The concept of engaged less capacity for naval and aviation fuels than their predeces- internationalism means that Canada wishes to participate in sors. Naval tasks in the military, constabulary and diplomatic operations to alleviate suffering, uphold the rule of law and roles could require deployment to the furthest reaches of the

12 SITREP —DND CANADA - HMCS Windsor returns to its home port of Halifax after an historic deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. planet. While the sustainment ships have demonstrated their estimates of logistical need will shape the future, rather than flexibility on numerous occasions, they are limited in capacity that of foreign engineers or planners. by design. The demand for operational sustainment increases Volumetrics is an important dimension of naval sci- dramatically with the distance, size of forces involved and the ence that has yet to receive appropriate attention in Canada. tempo of the operations undertaken. As shown in the case Future missions will almost certainly demand distant opera- study of the NEF, a relatively small increase in the resources tions in any one of the three roles of the navy. The enormous available to the operational commander can make an extraor- size of the Canadian maritime seascape means that even a dinary difference in the options and the effectiveness of the domestic mission could demand operations at ranges far in force. The liberty to use speed, whether for responsiveness excess of anything planned for in the past 100 years of the navy. or elusiveness, can make the difference between success and Whether a domestic or foreign operation, be it military, diplo- failure, between life and death. matic or constabulary, the new security environment will put The third step must be to recognize that joint de- a premium on an effective operational logistics system that is mands could remove what the navy regards as essential ser- able to sustain, support and supply both the navy and its sister vice-specific logistical needs at a critical juncture. It will be services, plus the various branches of the federal government, grossly inadequate to plan for multi-role ships that can meet in addition to whatever other non-governmental agencies may only one service’s demands while those of the other services be partnered in a coalition effort to achieve mission success. go unsatisfied. Multi-purpose designs are acceptable so long The logistical component is the unifying dimension of all as their flexibility allows both rapid conversion from one role three roles of the navy. Improvements in logistical capacity to another, and the numbers provided allow for simultane- will enhance all service, government and alliance operations. ous tasking to different missions. A “transformational fleet” The current Canadian conception of naval operational of eight upgraded frigates, ten multi-role support vessels, logistics stems from its history of trans-Atlantic operations four submarines and twelve coastal patrol craft has been during the Second World War and the Cold War. Canada’s proposed.68 This idea does not seem so out-of-place once the specialized and geographically limited naval forces led to a combat bias of the past is dispensed with and a clean-slate truncated version of a complete operational logistics system. approach to future requirements is adopted. Associated with With the end of the period of threat-based planning, a more all of these considerations is the essential need to retain the complete operational logistics system is required to enable a design of future ships in Canada. This will ensure that our truly flexible and globally useful Canadian navy. 

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 13 Chapter 7, “The Great Trends,” 169-227. Notes 20 For the purposes of this paper: replenishment is the tactical activ- ity that pertains to the operational concept of sustainment; maintenance 1 James L. George, History of Warships: From Ancient Times to the or repair pertain to support; and storing, ammunition and bunkering Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 213. (more commonly, fuelling) pertains to supply. 2 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Holmes & 21 Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with Meier, 1979), 174. the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (Boston, 3 Ibid. 1911), p. 44, cited in John B. Hattendorf and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., (eds.) 4 Chief of Maritime Staff, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral (Ottawa, ON: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001), 44. Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1991), xxxi. 5 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, “British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914- 22 For an examination of the low endurance of RCN destroyers 1918. The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57 (July 1993), 447-480. during the Second World War, see: Kenneth Hansen, “The “Destroyer 6 For one such view, see: Duncan E. Miller and Sharon Hobson, The Myth” in Canadian Naval History,” Canadian Naval Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War(Toronto, ON: (Fall 206), 5 – 9. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995), 225 – 226. 23 Seakindliness is that property in a ship [or boat] which produces 7 For a fuller description, see: Kenneth P. Hansen, “Escort Oilers: a comparatively slow, small and easy motion in spite of rough seas and The untold story of the Battle of the Atlantic.” New Interpretations in Na- weather. C.A. Marchaj, Seaworthiness: The Forgotten Factor, (London, val History: Selected Papers from the sixteenth Naval History Symposium UK: Adlard Coles Ltd, 1986), 6. held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-11 September 2009 (Newport, 24 Aerodynamic effects can also be important but are not considered RI: Naval War College Press) pp. 99-114. here in the interests of brevity. 8 Scott Gilmour, “The sinking of the Canadian navy,”MacLean’s, 25 R.S. Crenshaw, Naval Shiphandling, Annapolis, MD: 1975, 4th ed. 4 August 2015, https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/the-sink- (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1955), 30. Thomas C. Gillmer, ing-of-the-canadian-navy/ Accessed 12 September 2018. Modern Ship Design, 1975 ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 9 For a history of the force structure implications of the AORs, see: 1970), 106-108. Ken Reynolds, “One Stop Shopping: Replenishment at Sea and the Royal 26 Torpedo boats had been dropped from the RN fleet plan by the Canadian Navy, 1945-1961” in Richard H. Gimblett & Richard O. Mayne end of the 1920s, when RCN fleet plans were being formulated, frigates (eds.) People, Policy and Programmes: Proceedings of the 7th Maritime did not appear until after the start of the war: George,History of War- Command (MARCOM) Historical Conference (2005) (Winnipeg, MN: 17 ships, 248. Wing Publishing Office for the Canadian Naval Heritage Press, 2008), 27 Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. See especially, Chapter 229 – 250. 6, “Evolution of Tactics in the Age of Missile Warfare,”145-168. 10 Michael MacDonald, “Navy welcomes interim supply ship while 28 Vice-Admiral George C. Dyer (ret.), USN, Naval Logistics, 2nd ed. awaiting military replacements.” Globe and Mail, 6 March 2018, https:// (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1960, 1962), 128- www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/navy-welcomes-interim-re- 141. supply-ship-while-awaiting-military-replacements/article38220436/ 29 This logic is the reason that replenishment of minor warships from Accessed 12 September 2018. major ones was, in large part, eliminated from standard practice. 11 Paul Withers, “Spanish ship arrives in Halifax to help Canada’s 30 Tim Fish, “Multipurpose Ships: logical solutions for the small naval supply ship gap.” CBC News https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ n av y.” Jane’s Navy International (December 2009), 12-19. nova-scotia/sps-patino-supply-ship-royal-canadian-navy-1.3446219 31 Catherine B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of Accessed 12 September 2018. War, (London, UK: HMSO and Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), 109, n. 12 David Pugliese, “Canada’s Navy ‘Rents’ Chilean Supply Ship.” 3. Defense News.Com, 11 July 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/na- 32 Clay Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War. Vol. I., The Hunters, 1939-1942, val/2015/07/11/canada-s-navy-rents-chilean-resupply-ship/ Accessed 12 (New York, NY: Random House, 1996), 39-40. Septembewwr 2018. 33 Kenneth Hansen, “Raeder versus Wegener: Conflict in German 13 “Canada’s Next Generation of Non-Combat Vessels” Seaspan Ship- Naval Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), yards website, undated, https://www.seaspan.com/building Accessed, 12 81 – 108. September 2018. 34 Paul Zieb, Logistische Probleme der Marine, (Neckargemünd: 14 Lee Berthiaume, “Construction of new supply ships gets the green Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1961), 83-85. light from Ottawa,” Times Colonist, 17 May 2018, https://www.timescol- 35 The seven types were: fleet supply ships (Dithmarschen-class); onist.com/business/construction-of-new-supply-ships-gets-the-green- auxiliary fleet supply ships; escort tankers; ‘V’ stores ships for the surface light-from-ottawa-1.23306730 Accessed 12 September 2018. fleet; ‘Z’ stores ships for the submarine fleet; plus port tankers and port 15 David Pugliese, “Joint Support Ship costs up by $1.1B – taxpayers supply ships that served as ‘station ships’. Jak P. Mallmann Showell, will spent $3.4B on project.” Ottawa Citizen, 5 June 2018, https://ottawac- (Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton, 1999), 116-126. itizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/joint-support-ship-cost-up-by- 36 Dithmarschen Technical Data Website, http://www.german-navy. 1-1-billion-taxpayers-will-now-spend-3-4-billion-on-project Accessed de/kriegsmarine/ships/auxships/dithmarschen/tech.html, accessed 3 July on 12 September 2018. 2010. 16 HMAS Sirius, Royal Australian Navy webpage, http://www.navy. 37 Peter Handel-Mazzetti, “The Scharnhorst-Gneisenau Team at gov.au/hmas-sirius Accessed on 14 September 2018. its Peak,” Proceedings, Vol. 82, No. 8 (August 1956): 852-860. See also: 17 For an overview, see: National Shipbuilding Strategy, Public Ser- Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea. Vol I., (London, UK: HMSO, 1956), vices and Procurement Canada Website, https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/ 373; and Graham Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable app-acq/amd-dp/mer-sea/sncn-nss/index-eng.html Accessed 12 Septem- Disaster, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 40-70. Roskill ber 2018. indicated “at least five ships” while Handel-Mazzetti said “no fewer than 18 Kenneth Hansen, “The History and Theory of Naval Effects-Based nine supply ships” were employed. Rhys-Jones tends to confirm Han- Operations,” in Allan English and Howard Coombs (eds.) Effects-Based del-Mazzetti. It seems likely that six different ships Adria( , Schlettstadt, Approaches to Operations: Canadian Perspectives (Ottawa, ON: Depart- Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme, Ermland, and Uckermark) conducted a ment of National Defence, 2008), 95 – 102. total of nine refuelling operations at six different positions. 19 For a detailed explanation, see: Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics 38 In March 1943 convoy ON-166 lost 14 ships totaling 87,901 tons and Coastal Combat, (Annapolis, MD: USNI Press, 2000). See especially, to attacks by 19 U-boat. The U-boat Net website, “Greatest Convoy 14 SITREP Battles,” http://uboat.net/ops/convoys/battles.htm, accessed 07 July 2019. ishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912-1992, “Under Two Flags” (Chapter U-107, commanded by KptLt. Günther Hessler, sank 14 ships totalling 19), (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 204 – 216. 86,699 tons on a single patrol conducted between March and July 1941. 61 “Ships and Shipping – General Information – Replenishment at The U-boat Net Website, “The Most Successful Patrols,”http://uboat.net/ Sea,” RG 24, File 8000-24-1 (Volumes 1 & 2), Box 3540, LAC. ops/top_patrols.htm, accessed 07 July 2010. 62 Memorandum, MND to Cabinet Defence Committee, “Tanker 39 For complete details, see: John F. White, U-Boat Tankers, 1941- Supply Ships,” 3 September 1958, File 79/246, Folder 60, DHH. 45: Submarine Suppliers to Atlantic Wolf Packs, (Annapolis, MD: Naval 63 Memorandum, CNS to MND, “Tanker/Supply Ships,” 19 Novem- Institute Press, 1998). ber 1962, File 79/246, “Project H-1, Tanker Supply Ships,” Folder 60, 40 Roskill, The War at Sea, I., 100. DHH. 41 U-boat.net website, “Operations – Drumbeat”, URL: http://uboat. 64 Minutes of the 142nd Meeting of the Policy and Projects Coordi- net/ops/drumbeat.htm. Accessed 31 July 2010. nating Committee, 16 June 1958, File 27/246, “Project H-2, Underway 42 Kenneth Hansen, “King, Canada, and the Convoys: A Reappraisal Stores Replenishment – Fleet Issue Ships,” Folder 60, DHH. of Adm. Ernest King’s Role in Operations Drumbeat,” Maochun M. Yu 65 Margaret Shepherd and Michael Hennessy, “Naval Shipbuilding in (ed.), New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Fif- Canada: An Introductory Review of a Century,” Ann Griffiths and Eric teenth Naval History Symposium, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, Lerhe (eds.), Naval Gazing: The Canadian Navy Contemplates its Future, 2009), 57 – 80. (Halifax, NS: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2010), 193 – 205. 43 Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History, 66 Chief of Force Development, The Future Security Environment Vol. II (Ottawa, ON: King’s Printer, 1952), 193. 2008 – 2030: Part 1, Current and Emerging Trends (Ottawa, ON: 17 Wing 44 For a more detailed analysis of the importance of fuel in convoy Publishing Office, 2009), 3-5. The section on “Military and Security operations, see: Kenneth Hansen, “Escort Oilers: The Untold Story of the Trends” has been relegated to the last third of the book. Battle of the Atlantic,” Craig C. Felker, (ed.), New Interpretations in Naval 67 These capacities can include storage for unique equipments, hotel History: Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held services, spaces for planning and work activities, and the commodities at the United States Naval Academy 10-11 September 2009, (Gainesville, needed to sustain their operations, which can include communications FL, University Press of Florida, 2010), 162-186. capabilities of a wide variety of types. 45 W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty & Michael Whitby; with Robert H. 68 Richard H. Gimblett, “A ‘Transformational’ Fleet for Canada in Caldwell, William Johnston & William G.P. Rawling, A Blue Water Navy: The 21st Century,”Maritime Affairs (Spring/Summer 2000), 42-46. The Official Operational History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1943-1945, Volume II Part2 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2007), 228. 46 Douglas, et al, A Blue Water Navy, 223. Tucker, II., 198. 47 United States Navy, Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Lloyd—continued from page 3 in World War II, Vol. II, Commander Task Force Twenty-Four, (Washing- ton, DC: Commander in Chief, United State Atlantic Fleet, 1946), 91. change and our timing could not be better, as the Future Fleet 48 United States Navy, Administrative History of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet is arriving now. in World War II, 105. 49 Tucker, II., 194. The future- HMCSHarry DeWolf, will be launched in 50 Robert C. Fisher, “We’ll Get Our Own: Canada and the Oil Ship- the middle of September and officially named in October. ping Crisis of 1942,” The Northern Mariner, Vol. III, No. 2 (April 1993), Steel is being cut for the future HMCS Protecteur, the Vic- 33-39. toria Class submarines will commence their modernization 51 Hansen, “Escort Oilers,” 162-186. program shortly and the selection of the future backbone of 52 Message, Admiralty to CINC CA NWA, 7 June 1943, RG 24, Series D-1-b, Box 3960, File 1044-1-26, Pt. 1, Library and Archive of Canada the RCN, the Canadian Surface Combatant, is anticipated by (hereafter, LAC). the spring of 2019. The RCN looks forward to the challenges 53 Memorandum, “Notes for Escort Oiler Supervising Officers, New of introducing these new platforms into service. York and Halifax – Duties and Responsibilities,” 22 May 1943, RG 24, The RCN’s success, no matter how it is defined or mea- Series D-1-b, Box 3960, File 1044-1-26, Pt. 1, LAC. 54 Tucker, II., 99-104, 464-465. sured, lies in our people. People First, Mission Always is the 55 King Diary, 14 September 1944, cited in Hennessy, The Rise and core principle that underpins how the RCN approaches all that Fall of a Canadian Maritime Policy, 1939-1965, 128. it must do moving forward. The RCN prides itself on being 56 Memorandum, DNPO to ACNS (P), “RCN Logistics Support a bold, diverse, and inclusive team that is ready to meet the Policy,” 20 January 1958, File NSTS 1650-42, DHH. challenges of the 21st century. The RCN is continually evolving 57 Minutes of the 19/57 Meeting of the Naval Staff held on 16 August 1957. Canadian Forces College Information Resource Centre collection. as an innovative and youthful organization that welcomes and 58 RCN Defence Plan CBCN 6904(59) RG 24, Accession 83-4/167, attracts Canadians, young and old, from all demographics Vol. 11, 147, File 1400-1 (Vol. 1), 7 – 8, LAC. across the land, from coast, to coast to coast. The future of the 59 “Construction of Ships - Oiler/Tanker Replenishment,” 1957, RCN as outlined in Strong Secure and Engaged is bright. We Vols 1 – 9, RG 24, Accession: 1983-84/167, Box 3752, File S-NSS-8200- AOR-508, LAC. have a detailed plan to deliver that future and we look forward 60 For a detailed history of Dithmarschen’s career as USS Concuh, See: to welcoming any and all Canadians who want to see the world Thomas Wildenberg,Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replen- a make a difference as a member of the One Navy Team. 

SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 18 15 Great things underway for the RCN’s people by Michel Thomassin

he Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is changing, and to do periods of time, families will be able to rely on the many that, it has a new vision: Ready to Help, Ready to Lead, resources available at either one of the home ports in Hali- Ready to Fight. The RCN provides assistance at home fax, Nova Scotia, or Esquimalt, British Columbia. These two Tand abroad in times of major crises, such as the flooding that beautiful regions, located on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts occurred in Canada or the devastating hurricanes in the Ca- respectively, provide all the support members and their ribbean. It demonstrates outstanding leadership in domestic families need. Personalized assistance is offered to families and international operations by playing its part in the defence to identify their needs and guide them through the range of of Canada and by participating in major operations with our services, including childcare, second language training, arts allies. It supports NATO operations by conducting anti-sub- and sports activities, and more. marine warfare patrols in Europe and deploys its submarines Life aboard has improved significantly as we embrace around the world. many innovations. For example, the RCN has installed Wi-Fi Canada’s defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged de- connections on its fleet of Halifax-class frigates and its Kings- scribes the role of the RCN in defending Canadian sovereignty ton-class maritime coastal defence vessels. As a result of this in its territorial waters, as well as Canadian strategic interests project, sailors now have access to an Internet connection and that depend on stable international maritime order based can communicate with their families and friends, reducing the on international law. To do this, the RCN is committed to hardship and isolation inherent in the life of a sailor. It is a way maintaining its excellence at sea, modernizing its business for members to stay in contact with their loved ones and be management practices, transitioning to its future fleet, and connected on social networks. For the chain of command, it motivating and supporting its Regular and Reserve Force is also a new way to communicate directives internally. sailors, its civilian employees, and their families. The motto The RCN recognizes that its sailors are the foundation “People First, Mission Always” reflects the unequivocal im- of its many successes, whether exercises or missions, at home portance of the team to the organization’s success. or abroad. That is why it continues to innovate by improving Recognizing the importance of our personnel, the RCN conditions at sea. It provides members with unparalleled has undertaken major changes starting with its recruitment benefits: stability for their families, pension after 25 years of strategies. As in Canada itself, the principles of diversity and service, competitive parental leave, Wi-Fi aboard its ships, inclusion are core Royal Canadian Navy values. Diversity and and exceptional physical training facilities. Finally, the RCN is Inclusion help contribute to the well-being of our One Navy committed to respecting the principles of equity, diversity and Team and help ensure our forces reflect Canadian society. inclusion and strives to draw on all this country’s strengths so Everyone has a place within the organization and can pursue that it is representative of the Canada of today.  a career in over 80 jobs that will take them aboard the ships and submarines of the RCN. The Navy has set ambitious goals to attract: 25.1% women, 11.8% members of visible minorities Editor’s Desk—continued from page 2 and 3.5% First Nations people. There are a number of entry programs, some of which Ian Parker of the Naval Association of Canada provide funding for the full costs of the member’s college or Ken Hansen, a leading Canadian maritime expert, university studies. The RAVEN program is for indigenous explores in some detail the importance of logistics to the Canadians interested in military and/or civilian career op- Canadian ship building program – a frequent topic of his at- portunities within the Canadian Armed Forces and Depart- tention. Ken argues that “logistics is almost always the factor ment of National Defence. The benefits for potential recruits that dictates the degree of success or the reason for failure and their families are substantial and include competitive in operations” and “despite being such a critical factor for wages, recruiting bonuses for some jobs, a pension plan after everything from strategy to tactics, logistics is an underap- 25 years of service, parental leave benefits at 93% of regular preciated subject.” salary, as well as a number of personalized financial services So to all of our former, current and future sailors (and for members. those who wish they were), we hope that you enjoy the next Knowing that a career with the RCN is very demanding two editions of SITREP. Parati vero parati!  and requires sailors to be away from their families for long

Lt Michel Thomassin is a member of the Public Affairs Branch, Royal Ca- nadian Navy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Maj Daniel D. Eustace, CD, PhD (Ret’d) the views of the Institute or its members. Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme

16 SITREP